Chapter VII: Plato (427–347 B. C.) (2)

=The Two Tendencies in Plato.= From the doctrine of the two worlds there are two distinct tendencies running through the entire teaching of Plato. These are (1) the tendency to glorify nature, and (2) the tendency to turn away from nature to ascetic contemplation. On the one hand, Plato felt within himself the light heart-beat of the artist, and the Hellenic love of life was strong within him. He felt that the Idea of the Good was realized even in the world of sense, that there was pleasure in the sensuous imitation of the Idea, in practical artistic skill, and in an intelligent understanding of mathematical orderings. These were at least preparations for the highest Good, which consisted in knowledge of the Ideas. On the other hand, one finds beside this the ascetic tendency to be repelled by nature, a negative ethics that would leave the world of sense and would spiritualize the life. The _Theætetus_ sets up an ideal of retirement for the philosopher, and points out that he should find refuge as soon as possible from the evils of the world in the divine presence. The _Phædo_ pictures the whole life of the philosopher as a dying, a purification of the soul, an existence in prison, from which escape is only by virtue and knowledge. This ascetic tendency seems very anti-Greek; and yet is it foreign to Greek life? In Greek history do we not find, by the side of the Epic and the glorification of nature, the Mysteries and the withdrawal of the individual from the world? Both these historic tendencies appear in Plato, and on the whole the ascetic tendency is stronger. The Ideas are contrasted with the nature world more often than they transfigure it. The dualism of Heaven and earth is emphasized, and the contrast is strongly drawn between the reality of the Ideas and the temporality of sense.

=Platonic Love.= Described in technical terms, in both Socrates and Plato, Love (Eros) is the philosophic and not a purely intellectual impulse. Its rather more didactic character in Socrates of an attempt to engender knowledge and virtue in others appears in Plato in a larger way as the personal and practical realization of the truth. Reduced to its simplest terms, Platonic Love is the longing of the human being in his imperfectness for perfectness and completeness. It is the innate desire for immortality.

True love, according to Plato, takes its beginning in the astonishment or pain at the presentment of the Ideas through remembrance, and the starting-point of Love in an individual is the principle fundamental in pre-existence. The philosophic impulse for the Ideas takes the form of Love, because visible beauty has a special brightness and makes a strong impression on the mind. Love belongs only to mortal natures; for they, since they do not possess the divine unchangeableness, have to propagate themselves continually. Love may be described therefore as the propagative impulse. On the one side it may be viewed as an inspiration from above, springing from the higher, divinely-related nature in man; on the other hand it may be viewed as an aspiration from below of the sensuous and human in man. On this side it is a yearning and not a possession; and it presupposes a want. Analyzed in this way, Love is the middle term between having and not having. It is the union of the higher and lower natures in man, and throughout the universe there stirs this longing for the eternal and imperishable.

What is the object of this Love,――of this desire of the finite to fill itself with the eternal and to generate something enduring? That object is the possession of the Good, which is happiness. The possession of the Good is immortality. What is the external condition of Love’s existence? The presence of Beauty; for this alone, by its harmonious form, corresponds to our desire and awakens it. Does this Love appear first in its complete realization? No; there are many kinds of beauty, and Love is as various in degree and kind as beautiful objects. Love rises step by step, and is realized in a graduated series of forms. There is Love for beautiful shapes, sexual love; Love for beautiful souls, and this appears in works of art, education, and legislation; Love for beautiful sciences, the seeking of beauty wherever found; and finally Love for the pure, shapeless, eternal, and unchangeable――the Idea, which is immortality. All else is preliminary to the dialectical knowledge of the Ideas. In all this, man is reaching out from his sense of want for satisfaction, from his poverty to the completed riches of life. Love bears him on from height to height until, in religion and Love of the Good, man gains his immortality. In Platonic Love all kinds of Love have place in pointing the soul onward to the divinely perfect. Yet this Love for the divinely perfect is the soul’s aspiration from the beginning, and all the preliminary stages are only the uncertain attempts to seize the Idea in the copies. Love, therefore, is this universal struggle of the finite to inform itself with the Idea; and delight in any one object of beauty is a stage in the development of this impulse.[32]

=Plato’s Theory of Ethics.= Plato’s Theory of Ideas is, after all, fundamentally only an outspoken ethical metaphysics, and his Ethics is his most fruitful accomplishment. Plato’s ethical teaching is therefore involved in all that we have said about him up to this point. An understanding of his ethics includes an understanding of the formation and growth of his dialectic, an insight into his physical theory, knowledge of the two tendencies which run through his teaching, and especially an understanding of his doctrine of Love. If some of the previous exposition is repeated, it will be only to bring out more fully his ethical teaching as a special science. We shall speak of three topics under this general subject of his ethics: (1) his development of his theory of the Good; (2) the four cardinal virtues; (3) his theory of political society.

=1. Development of Plato’s Theory of the Good.= Plato betrays his ascetic tendency in his first drafting of the Ideas and, as we have said, the double-world theory is the cause of this. Only one of the two worlds is real and will appeal to the Wise Man. The soul belongs to the supersensible world, and the knowledge, of which virtue consists, takes man away from the sensible world. Since earthly life is full of evil, the soul should die to it and turn away as soon as possible to the divine presence. This ascetic aspect of morality is set forth in the _Phædo_ and the _Theætetus_.

In the general development of his metaphysics in the second drafting of his Ideas, Plato’s ethical theory developed also. He not only went beyond the abstract statement of Socrates, but beyond his own original asceticism. When he brought his two worlds into teleological relationship, he was logically compelled to abandon his conception of ascetic morals. The physical world has now a relative reality, and by the same sign sense-life has a relative moral value. It was Plato’s firm conviction that moral conduct makes man truly blessed, in this and another world. He still held, too, that this blessedness, this complete perfection of the soul, this sharing in the divine world of the Ideas, is the Highest Good. Yet he now came to recognize other kinds of happiness as steps toward the ideal Good. There are varieties of Goods, as appeared in his doctrine of Love. Besides the intuition of knowledge and its pleasures, there are physical Goods and their pleasures. Intellectual pleasure may be unmixed with pain, but there are also sensuous pleasures unmixed with pain. Here is indeed Plato, the Greek, speaking; Plato, the Greek artist, impelled by the charm of the Greek world around him. Strongly as he combated the Cyrenaic hedonism, and closely as he was allied to Socrates, his Greek nature gave way before the manifestations of the Idea of the Good in the physical world. The pleasure in nature objects, in educational development, in the practical and plastic arts, in mathematical sciences, and in the orderliness of life――all these became for him preliminary stages in the full participation in the ethical Good. They came to have for him a relative value, as expressed in the _Philebus_, _Republic_, and _Symposium_.

=2. The Four Cardinal Virtues.= But Plato went farther, and was not content merely to point out the place of human conduct in the twofold world. He developed his theory of ethics systematically. He classified the virtues on the basis of his threefold division of the soul. Naturally enough, in his first draft of his theory, Plato followed Socrates in reducing the single virtues to one, viz., the virtue of knowledge. In his second drafting, however, in the later dialogues, he assumed their distinct independence, and he reflected upon their respective spheres. A virtue corresponds to each part of the soul. Each part has its own perfection, which is its virtue. Moreover, in so far as one or another part of the soul preponderates in different men, so far are they suited to developing the corresponding virtue.

{ Rational nature――in brain (Wisdom)
Soul (Justice) { Irrational { Noble part――in heart (Courage)
{ nature { Ignoble part――in liver (Temperance)

From the above scheme it will be observed that the rational nature has the brain as its organ and reaches its perfection or virtue in Wisdom; that the ignoble irrational nature has the liver as its organ, and reaches its virtue in self-control or Temperance. Finally, since the perfection of the whole soul consists in the orderly relation of its single parts, so subordinated and regulated that the soul can reach its highest perfection, the fourth and highest virtue is Justice. _The four cardinal virtues are Temperance, Courage, Wisdom, and Justice._

=3. Plato’s Theory of Political Society.= The virtue, Justice, has little meaning in individual ethics, and as an ethical perfection can only be attained in society. There is no English word that is quite the equivalent for the Greek term, but Justice is the usual translation. Justice, however, does not contain the moral spirit of the Greek word. Consistent with his conception of the Ideas in his metaphysics, Plato’s ideal of moral perfection is to be found, not in the individual, but in the species. Plato pictures less the perfect man than the perfect society. Perfect happiness is rather that of the social whole than of the individual, and this ideal of happiness can be reached only in the ideal State. That is why the dialogue, the _Republic_, occupies so important a place in Plato’s writings. It is an attempt to show how the fourth and last virtue, Justice, can be attained. The first book was written in Plato’s early period, and was perhaps called a “dialogue concerning Justice.” Justice is distinctly the social virtue found only in a perfect society, and it will make possible the fulfillment of Wisdom, Courage, and Temperance. The individual man is a vital being whose heart is the central organ, whose characteristic virtue is courage. His courage is indeed a combination of wisdom and temperance. The picture is of the individual man, not amenable to society, but in “a state of warfare.” In such isolation Justice would not exist as a virtue.

The political state is necessary if the Idea of the Good is to be manifested in human life. The state is the true educator in Justice, and at the same time the ideal state will be the realization of Justice. The task of the state everywhere is the same, to wit, to direct the common life of man so that every one may be happy through virtue. The result may be attained only by so ordering the relations of society that Justice may prevail. Plato’s _Republic_ is a carefully worked-out plan of such an ideal society. The author made several attempts at Syracuse with the aid of Dion to get first the elder and then the younger Dionysius to transform the tyranny into an ideal state. These attempts resulted disastrously. In the disappointment of his old age that his ideal scheme had never succeeded, he wrote the _Laws_, which is a revised version of the _Republic_ with the Pythagorean number theory as a basis.

The Spartan state is his model. The Platonic Republic is aristocratic. There is paternal government in everything, censorship of everything. Each individual’s course is marked out for him. When Greek political life was undergoing dissolution, Plato raised the ideal of political unity as necessary to individual happiness as against the anarchism of segregation. Yet even in this he was reflecting the current distrust of political institutions. The comparison of existing political conditions with his own political ideal reinforced his aristocratic leanings, and made him the more distrustful of the political possibilities of a democracy. He believed that an intelligently worked out scheme of government was practicable, and should be forced upon people, if necessary. In no other way was political salvation possible.

Since the State is the man “writ large,” it has three parts, corresponding to the three parts of the human soul. There is (1) the working or peasant class, which corresponds to the appetitive part of man; the only object of such a class is to furnish food for the State, and the highest virtue of this class is temperance. The peasant can only work, eat, and drink, and the highest praise of him is that he controls his appetites. (2) The warrior class guards the State within and without; and its characteristic virtue is courage. The will must show its highest efficiency in guidance of the emotions. (3) Highest of all is the cultured class of philosophers or rulers, who determine by their insight the laws that should rule the State. The virtue of this class is wisdom, for is this class not the brain of the State? The perfection of the entire State exists when the three classes have their proper distribution of power. Then does justice exist. The duty of the rulers is therefore to have the highest wisdom possible, of the warriors to be unflinching in their devotion to duty, of the peasants to exercise self-control. Thus Plato’s Republic is an aristocracy in the hands of the carefully cultured, which consists of the two upper classes. By means of community of wives, the exposure of deformed infants, and the State’s education of the children of the two upper classes, a continuous selection can be made, the two upper classes can be renewed, and all private ends can be renounced in favor of the State. Thus the sole end of a community is moral education, and Plato arranges his ideal community with reference to that. The two upper classes are a great family, to whom this is intrusted. They have dedicated their lives to the furthering of science and to its administration.

A SELECTION OF PASSAGES FROM PLATO FOR ENGLISH READERS.

By Professor Benjamin Jowett, late Principal of Balliol College, Oxford.

The figures refer to the pages in the margin of Professor
Jowett’s translation of Plato’s Dialogues; the letters
(A, B, C, D, E) to the subdivisions of these pages.

FIRST VOLUME.

CHARMIDES.

Socrates prescribes for Charmides’ headache.
156 D (... ‘Such, Charmides, is the nature of the charm’....)
–157 C (... ‘my dear Charmides.’)

LYSIS.

We only trust those who appear to know more than ourselves.
206 D (‘Upon entering’ ...)
–210 B (‘He assented.’)

LACHES.

(1) The art of fighting in armour is useless to the soldier.
182 E (‘I should not like to maintain’ ...)
–184 C (... ‘his opinion of the matter.’)

(2) The harmony of words and deeds.
188 C (‘I have but one feeling’ ...)
–189 B (... ‘the difference of our ages.’)

PROTAGORAS.

(1) The Sophists at the house of Callias.
314 B (... ‘And now let us go’ ...)
–316 A (... ‘rendered his words inaudible.’)

(2) Protagoras tells the story of Prometheus and Epimetheus.
320 D (‘Once upon a time’ ...)
–322 D (... ‘a plague of the state.’)

(3) The education of a Greek child.
325 D (‘Education and admonition’ ...)
–326 E (... ‘would be far more surprising.’)

EUTHYDEMUS.

The doctrinaire politician and the true philosopher.
304 B (‘Such was the discussion, Crito’ ...)
–to end (... ‘and be of good cheer.’)

CRATYLUS.

The significations of the various letters.
426 B (‘My first notions’ ...)
–427 C (... ‘and out of them by imitation compounding
other signs.’ ...)

PHAEDRUS.

(1) The philosopher must study the nature of man.
229 A (‘Let us turn aside,’ ...)
–230 A (... ‘a diviner and lowlier destiny?’ ...)

(2) The banks of the Ilissus.
230 B (... ‘But let me ask you, friend,’ ...)
–E (... ‘in which you can read best.’)

(3) The soul in a figure and her transmigrations.
245 C (‘The soul through all her being’ ...)
–257 A (... ‘leave you a fool in the world below.’)

(4) The true orator.
269 E (‘I conceive Pericles’ ...)
–272 C (... ‘and yet the creation of such an art is not
easy.’)

(5) The tale of Thamus and Theuth.
274 C (‘I have heard a tradition of the ancients’ ...)
–275 C (... ‘that the Theban is right in his view about
letters.’)

(6) Speech better than writing.
275 C (‘I cannot help feeling’ ...)
–277 A (... ‘to the utmost extent of human happiness.’)

(7) The true art of composition.
277 B (‘Until a man knows the truth’ ...)
–278 D (... ‘poet or speech-maker or law-maker.’)

ION.

The inspiration of the poet.
533 C (‘I perceive, Ion,’ ...)
–536 C (... ‘not by art, but by divine inspiration.’)

SYMPOSIUM.
_The Character of Socrates._

(1) His fit of abstraction in the porch.
174 A (‘He said that he met Socrates’ ...)
–175 C (... ‘Socrates entered.’ ...)

(2) His strange appearance and marvellous power of influencing
others.
215 A (‘And now, my boys,’ ...)
–216 G (... ‘so that I am at my wit’s end.’)

(3) His endurance, eccentricity, and bravery.
219 E (... ‘All this happened’ ...)
–222 A (... ‘a good and honourable man.’)

SECOND VOLUME.

MENO.

Learning is only Recollection (ἀνάμνησις): The Immortality of
the Soul proved out of Pindar.
81 A (‘I will tell you why’ ...)
–E (... ‘active and inquisitive.’ ...)

APOLOGY, OR THE DEFENCE OF SOCRATES.

The whole.

CRITO, OR SOCRATES IN PRISON.

The whole.

PHAEDO, OR THE LAST DAY OF SOCRATES’ LIFE.

(1) Socrates in prison.
57–60 C (... ‘pleasure appears to succeed.’)

(2) Why the philosopher is willing to die, although he will not
take his own life.
60 C (‘Upon this Cebes said’ ...)
–69 E (... ‘it will be well.’)

(3) The Description of the Other Life.
107 C (‘But then, O my friends,’ ...)
–115 A (... ‘after I am dead.’)

(4) The Death of Socrates.
115 A (‘When he had done speaking’ ...)
–to end.

GORGIAS.

(1) The good man desires, not a long, but a virtuous, life.
511 A (‘You always contrive’ ...)
–513 A (... ‘their own perdition.’ ...)

(2) The Judgment of the Dead.
523 A (‘Listen, then,’ ...)
–527 A (... ‘any sort of insult.’)

(3) The Moral of the Tale.
527 A (‘Perhaps this may appear’ ...)
–to end.

[Appendix.]

I _Alcibiades._

Socrates humiliates Alcibiades by shewing him his inferiority
to the Kings of Lacedaemon and of Persia.
120 A (‘Why, you surely know’ ...)
–124 B (... ‘ever desired anything.’)

II _Alcibiades._

The Gods approve of simple worship.
148 C (‘The Lacedaemonians, too,’ ...)
–150 B (... ‘for me to oppose.’)

_Eryxias._

The nature of money.
399 E (‘Then now we have to consider’ ...)
–400 E (... ‘of no use to us ... True.’)

THIRD VOLUME.

REPUBLIC.

_Book i._
The commencement of the Dialogue: Cephalus on Old Age.
327–331 B (... ‘is, in my opinion, the greatest.’)

_Book ii._
(1) The argument of Adeimantus.
362 E (... ‘But let me add something more’ ...)
–367 E (... ‘seen or unseen by Gods and men.’)

(2) The true nature of God.
376 D (‘Come, then, and let us pass’ ...)
–383 A (‘Your thoughts ... my own.’)

_Book iii._
(1) Grace and beauty in art and education.
400 D (‘But there is no difficulty’ ...)
–402 A (... ‘made him long familiar.’)

(2) The good physician and the good judge.
408 C (‘All that, Socrates, is excellent,’ ...)
–409 E (‘And in mine also.’)

(3) The true use of music and gymnastic.
409 E (‘This is the sort of medicine’ ...)
–412 A (‘You are quite right, Socrates.’)

_Book iv._
Virtue the health, Vice the disease, of the Soul.
443 C (‘Then our dream has been realized’ ...)
–444 E (‘Assuredly.’)

_Book v._
(1) The right treatment of enemies.
469 A (‘Next, how shall our soldiers’ ...)
–471 C (... ‘like all our previous enactments, are very
good.’)

(2) The last wave:――The Government of Philosophers.
471 C (‘But still I must say, Socrates.’ ...)
–473 E (... ‘is indeed a hard thing.’)

_Book vi._
(1) The Parable of the Pilot.
487 A (‘Here Adeimantus interposed’ ...)
–489 D (‘Precisely so, he said.’)
(2) The low estimation in which Philosophy is held by the World.
493 E (‘You recognize the truth of what I have been saying?’
...)
–497 A (... ‘as well as of himself.’)

_Book vii._
The Allegory of the Cave.
514 A–520 E (... ‘present rulers of the State.’)

_Book viii._
Democracy and the Democratic Man.
555 B (‘Next comes democracy’ ...)
–562 A ( ... ‘the democratic man.’)

_Book ix._
{ The Many-headed Monster. }
{ The City of which the Pattern is laid up in Heaven. }
588 A (‘Well, I said, and now’ ...)
–to the end of the book.

_Book x._
The Vision of Er.
614 B (‘Well, I said, I will tell you a tale;’ ...)
–to the end of the book.

TIMAEUS.

(1) The Tale of Solon.
20 E (‘Then listen, Socrates’ ...)
–26 D ( ... ‘these ancient Athenians.’ ...)

(2) The Balance of Mind and Body.
87 C (‘There is a corresponding enquiry’ ...)
–90 D ( ... ‘the present and the future.’)

CRITIAS, OR THE ISLAND OF ATLANTIS.

The entire Dialogue.

FOURTH VOLUME.

PARMENIDES.

The meeting of Socrates and Parmenides at Athens. Criticism of
the Ideas.
126 A (‘We had come from our home’ ...)
–136 C ( ... ‘and see the real truth.’)

THEAETETUS.

(1) Socrates, a midwife, and the son of a midwife.
148 E (‘These are the pangs of labour’ ...)
–151 E ( ... ‘by the help of God you will be able to tell.’)

(2) The Lawyer and the Philosopher.
172 B ( ... ‘Here arises a new question’ ...)
–177 C ( ... ‘Let us go back to the argument.’)

SOPHIST.

The Pre-Socratic Philosophers and their puzzles.
241 D (‘Will you then forgive me’ ...)
–246 D ( ... ‘but seekers after truth.’)

STATESMAN.

The Reign of Cronos.
269 A (‘Again, we have been often told’ ...)
–274 E (... ‘and at another time in another.’ ...)

PHILEBUS.

{ The first Taste of Logic. }
{ The Art of Dialectic. }
15 C (‘Good; and where shall we begin’ ...)
–17 A (... ‘and true dialectic.’)

FIFTH VOLUME.

LAWS.

_Book i._
(1) The true nature of Education.
643 A (‘You seem to be quite ready to listen’ ...)
–644 B (... ‘of every man while he lives.’)

(2) Man a puppet of the Gods.
644 E (‘Let us look at the matter thus’ ...)
–645 B (... ‘more clearly distinguished by us.’ ...)

_Book iii._
The Origin of Government.
676 A (‘Enough of this’ ...)
–679 E (‘Very true.’)

_Book iv._
(1) The virtuous Tyrant.
709 C (‘And does not a like principle’ ...)
–712 A (... ‘granting our supposition.’)

(2) The life of Virtue.
715 E (‘And now what is to be the next step?’ ...)
–718 A (... ‘for the most part in good hope.’ ...)

_Book v._
(1) { The honour of the Soul. }
{ Precepts for a virtuous life. }
726 A–732 D (... ‘both in jest and earnest.’)

(2) The best and second-best state.
739 A (‘The next move’ ...)
–741 A (... ‘to fight against necessity.’)

(3) Riches and Godliness.
742 D (... ‘The intention, as we affirm’ ...)
–744 A (... ‘the work of legislation.’)

_Book vii._
(1) The good citizen must not lead an inactive life.
806 D (‘What will be the manner of life’ ...)
–808 C (... ‘to the whole state.’)

(2) The education of the young.
808 D (... ‘When the day breaks’ ...)
{ –809 A (... ‘according to the law.’) }
{ 810 A (... ‘A fair time’...) }
{ –812 A (... ‘come to an end.’) }

_Book viii._
The evils of licentiousness.
835 C (... ‘There is, however, another matter’ ...)
–841 E (... ‘wrongly indulged.’)

_Book x._
(1) { The three classes of unbelievers. }
{ Advice to the young. }
885 B (... ‘For we have already said’ ...)
–888 D (... ‘the truth of these matters.’)

(2) God is not an idle ruler of the Universe; but orders all,
even the smallest things, for our good.
899 D (... ‘And now we are to address him’ ...)
–905 D (... ‘any understanding whatsoever’ ...)

(3) God cannot be propitiated by the gifts of the wicked.
905 D (... ‘For I think that we have sufficiently proved’ ...)
–907 D (... ‘will not discredit the lawgiver.’)

_Book xi._
(1) The evils of retail trade, and the cure of them.
918 A (‘After the practices of adulteration’ ...)
–919 C (... ‘shamelessness and meanness.’)

(2) The honour of parents.
930 E (‘Neither God, nor a man’ ...)
–932 A (... ‘to what has now been said.’...)

_Book xii._
(1) The good state in its intercourse with the world.
949 E (‘Now a state’ ...)
–951 C (... ‘is ill-conducted.’)

(2) The Burial of the Dead.
958 C (‘Thus a man is born’ ...)
–960 A (... ‘a fitting penalty.’...)