Chapter VII: Part 7

(3.) Pride and ambition, to be like the angels, or like God, in those things, in which it was unlawful to desire it: it may be, they might desire to be like him in independency, absolute sovereignty, _&c._ which carries in it downright Atheism, for a creature to desire thus to be like to him.

(4.) There was an instance of profaneness, in supposing that this tree was God’s ordinance, for the attaining of knowledge, and accounting that, which was in itself sinful, a means to procure a greater degree of happiness.

(5.) It contained in it unbelief, and a disregard, either to the promise annexed to the covenant given to excite obedience, or the threatening denounced to deter from sin; and, on the other hand, they gave credit to the devil, rather than God.

(6.) There was in it an instance of bold and daring presumption, concluding that all would be well with them, or that they should, notwithstanding, remain happy, though in open rebellion against God, by the violation of his law; concluding, as the serpent suggested, that they should not surely die.

(7.) It was the highest instance of ingratitude, inasmuch as it was committed soon after they had received their being from God, and that honour of having all things in this world put under their feet, and the greatest plenty of provisions, both for their satisfaction and delight, and no tree of the garden prohibited, but only that which they ate of, Gen. ii. 16, 17.

(8.) It was committed against an express warning to the contrary; therefore whatever dispute might arise concerning other things being lawful, or unlawful, there was no question but that this was a sin, because expressly forbidden by God, and a caution given them to abstain from it.

(9.) If we consider them as endowed with a rectitude of nature, and in particular that great degree of knowledge which God gave them: This must be reckoned a sin against the greatest light; so that what inadvertency soever there might have been, as to what respects that which first led the way to a sinful compliance: they had a sufficient degree of knowledge to have fenced against the snare, how much soever they pretended themselves to be beguiled and deceived, as an excuse for their sin; and, had they made a right use of their knowledge, they would certainly have avoided it.

(10.) Inasmuch as one of our first parents proved a tempter to the other, and the occasion of his ruin, this contained a notorious instance of that want of conjugal affection and concern for the welfare of each other, which the law of nature, and the relation they stood in to one another, required.

(11.) As our first parents were made after the image of God, this sin contained their casting contempt upon it; for they could not but know that it would despoil them of it. And as eternal blessedness was to be expected if they yielded obedience, this they also contemned, and, as every sinner does, they despised their own souls in so doing.

(12.) As Adam was a public person, the federal head of all his posterity, intrusted with the important affair of their happiness, though he knew that his fall would ruin them, together with himself, there was not only in it a breach of trust, but a rendering himself, by this means, the common destroyer of all mankind; which was a greater reproach to him, than his being their common father was an honour.

We shall conclude with a few inferences from what has been said, concerning the fall of our first parents.

_1st_, If barely the mutability of man’s will, without any propensity or inclination to sin in his nature, may endanger, though not necessitate, his fall, especially when left to himself, as the result of God’s sovereign will; then how deplorable is the state of fallen man, when left to himself by God in a judicial way, being, at the same time, indisposed for any thing that is good.

_2dly_, From the action of the devil, in attempting to ruin man, without the least provocation, merely out of malice against God, we may infer the vile and heinous nature of sin, its irreconcilable opposition to God; and also how much they resemble the devil, who endeavour to persuade others to join with them as confederates in iniquity, and thereby to bring them under the same condemnation with themselves: this is contrary to the dictates of human nature, unless considered as vile, degenerate, and depraved by sin.

_3dly_, How dangerous a thing is it to go in the way of temptation, or to parley with it, and not to resist the first motion that is made to turn us aside from our duty? And what need have we daily to pray, as instructed by our Saviour, that God would not, by any occurrence of providence, lead us into temptation!

_4thly_, We learn, from hence, the progress and great increase of sin: it is like a spreading leprosy, and arises to a great height from small beginnings; so that persons proceed from one degree of wickedness to another, without considering what will be the sad effect and consequence thereof.

Footnote 52:

_This is beautifully described by Milton, (in his paradise lost, Book
IX.) and many others have asserted the same thing for substance, as
thinking it below the wisdom of the man to be imposed on; thereby
insinuating, though without sufficient ground, that he had a greater
degree of wisdom allotted to him than his wife._

Footnote 53:

_Josephus indeed, (See Antiq. Lib. I. cap. 2.) intimates, that the
serpent was, at first, endowed with speech, and that his loss of it
was inflicted for his tempting man; but it is a groundless conjecture
arising from a supposition, that those things spoken of in Gen._ iii.
_which are attributed to the devil, were done without him, which is
not only his opinion, but of many other Jewish writers, and several
modern ones._

Footnote 54:

_The words of the prohibition, in Gen._ ii. _17. are_, Ye shall surely
die: _whereas in the account she gives thereof to the serpent, her
words are_, פן תמתון _which Onkelos, in his Targum, renders_, Ne forte
moriamini.

Footnote 55:

The command had been given to Adam: he was the representative of Eve
and his posterity; accordingly, upon her eating, no change was
discovered: but as soon as he ate, “_the eyes of them both were
opened_.” They instantly felt a conscious loss of innocence, and they
were ashamed of their condition.

This affection may have either good or evil as its exciting cause. The
one species is praise-worthy, the other culpable. When there exists
shame of evil, the honour of the party has been wounded.

Honour, the boast of the irreligious, is the vanguard of virtue, and
is always set for her defence, while she is contented with her own
station. But when honour assumes the authority, which belongs to
conscience and reason, the man becomes an idolater. For conscience
aims at God’s glory, honour at man’s; conscience leads to perfect
integrity, whilst honour is contented with the reputation of it: the
one makes us good, the other desires to become respectable. Conscience
and religion will produce that, which honour aims at the name of.
Honour without virtue, is mere hypocrisy.

But honour as ancillary to virtue, will detect and vanquish
temptation, before virtue may apprehend danger: she is therefore to be
regarded and fostered, but to be restrained within her own precincts.

Shame of good is rather an evidence of a want of honour, and springs
from dastardly cowardice: it argues weak faith, superficial knowledge,
and languid desires of good. Such knowledge and desires are barely
enough to aggravate the guilt, and show it was deliberate.

The religious man must count upon opposition from a world hostile to
holiness. His conduct and character will necessarily, by contrast,
condemn those of the wicked. But he is neither to abandon his duty,
but cause his light to shine; nor purposely afflict the sensibility of
his enemies, but treat them with mildness and kindness. The demure and
dejected countenance is to be avoided, not only because the Christian
has a right to be cheerful, but because when voluntary, it is
hypocritical; and because also it injures the cause by exciting
disgust and contempt, and provoking persecution, where a mild and
evenly deportment would command the respect and admiration even of the
evil themselves.

Contempt and ridicule will come. But the Christian should know that
this indicates defect in the authors of them. If religion were, as the
infidel hopes it will prove, without foundation, to ridicule the
conscientious man for his weakness, is rudeness, weakness, and want of
generosity. If religion be doubtful, to ridicule it is to run the
hazard of Divine resentment, and highly imprudent. If it be certain,
it is to rush upon the bosses of God’s buckler, and the most horrid
insolence.

Ridicule is no test of truth, for the greatest and most important
truths may be subjected to wit; it is no index of strength of
understanding; and wit and great knowledge almost never are found
together. It indicates nothing noble or generous, but a little
piddling genius, and contemptible pride.

He who yields to the shame of that which is good, weakens his powers
of resistance, provokes the Spirit of grace, hardens his conscience,
strengthens the hands of the enemy, excites the contempt of the wicked
themselves, grieves his follow Christians, affronts God to his face,
and incurs the judgment of Christ “Whosoever is ashamed of me and my
words, of him will I be ashamed.”

Quest. XXII.

QUEST. XXII. _Did all mankind fall in that first transgression?_

ANSW. The covenant being made with Adam, as a public person, not for
himself only, but for his posterity, all mankind descending from him
by ordinary generation, sinned in him, and fell with him in that
first transgression.

Having shewn, in the foregoing answer how our first parents sinned and fell, we are now led to consider, how their fall affected all their posterity, whom they represented; and accordingly it is said, that the covenant was made with Adam, as a federal head, not for himself only, but all his posterity; so that they sinned in, and fell with him. But, before we enter more particularly on this subject, it may not be improper to enquire, whether this character, of being the head of the covenant, respects only Adam, or both our first parents? I am sensible there are many who think this covenant was made with Adam, as the head of his posterity, exclusive of Eve; so that, as he did not represent her therein, but his seed, she was not, together with him, the representative of mankind; therefore, though the covenant was made with her, and she was equally obliged to perform the conditions thereof, yet she was only to stand or fall for herself, her concern herein being only personal; and therefore it follows, from hence, that when she fell, being _first in the transgression_, all mankind could not be said to sin and fall in her, as they did in Adam; therefore, if she alone had sinned, she would have perished alone.

And if it be objected hereunto, that she could not then be the mother of innocent children, for _who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean?_ The reply, which is usually given to this, which is only matter of conjecture, is, that God would have created some other woman, who should have been the mother of a sinless posterity.[56]

The reason why these conclude that the covenant was made only with Adam, is because we never read expressly, in scripture, of its being made with Eve in behalf of her posterity; and particularly it is said, in Gen. ii. 16, 17. that _the Lord God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree in the garden thou mayest freely eat; but of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die_. And it is observed, that this law was given to him before the woman was created; for it said, in the following words, _It is not good that man should be alone; I will make him an help meet for him_. And, in other scriptures, which treat of this matter, we read of the man’s being the head of the covenant, but not his wife: thus the apostle, in 1 Cor. xv. 45, 47. compares him, whom he styles, _the first man, Adam_, as the head of this covenant, with Christ, whom he calls, _The second man_, as the head of the covenant of grace; and elsewhere he says, _As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive_, ver. 22. and again _By one man sin entered into the world_, &c. Rom. v. 12. and _By one man’s disobedience, many were made sinners_, ver. 19. It is not said by the disobedience of our first parents, but of one of them, to wit, Adam; therefore, from hence, they conclude, that he only was the head of this covenant, and herein the representative of mankind.

But, though I would not be too peremptory in determining this matter, yet, I think, it may be replied to what has been said in defence thereof; that though it is true, it is said, in the scripture, but now mentioned, that God forbade the man to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, before the woman was created, yet she expressly says, that the prohibition respected them both[57], when she tells the serpent, _We may eat of the fruit of the trees of the garden; but of the fruit of the tree in the midst of the garden, God hath said, Ye shall not eat thereof, lest ye die_, Gen. iii. 2, 3. Besides, we read, that Eve had dominion over the creatures, as well as Adam, Gen. i. 26-28. it is true, it is said, that _God created man_, &c. but by the word _man_, both our first parents are intended; for it immediately follows, _and he blessed them_, therefore the woman was not excluded; so that we may apply the apostle’s words, (though used with another view) _The man is not without the woman, nor the woman without the man, in the Lord_, 1 Cor. xi. 11. to this particular dispensation of providence. And there seems to be the same reason for one’s being constituted the federal head of their posterity, as the other, since they were both designed to be the common parents thereof; the tenor of the covenant seems to be the same with respect to them both, and the tree of life was a seal and pledge of blessings, to be conveyed by both.

But to proceed to consider the subject-matter of this answer,

I. We shall prove, that Adam was a public person, the head of the covenant with whom it was made for himself, and all his posterity. When we speak of him as the head of our posterity, we do not only mean their common parent, for, had there been no other idea contained therein, I cannot see how they could be said to fall in him; for it doth not seem agreeable to the justice of God to punish children for their parents’ sins, unless they make them their own, at least, not with such a punishment that carries in it a separation from his presence, and a liableness to the condemning sentence of the law.

Therefore Adam must be considered as constituted their head, in a federal way, by an act of God’s sovereign will, and so must be regarded as their representative, as well as their common parent; which, if it can be proved, then they may be said to fall with him. For the understanding hereof, we must conclude him to have been the head of the world, even as Christ is the Head of his elect; so that, in the same sense as Christ’s righteousness becomes their’s to wit, by imputation, Adam’s obedience, had he stood, would have been imputed to all his posterity, as his sin is, now he is fallen. This is a doctrine founded on pure revelation: and therefore we must have recourse to scripture, to evince the truth thereof. Accordingly,

1. There are several scriptures in which this doctrine is contained; as that in Rom. v. 14. where the apostle speaks concerning our fall in Adam, whom he calls, the _figure_[58] _of him that was to come_. Now, in what was Adam a type of Christ? Not as he was a man, consisting of soul and body; for, in that respect, all that lived before Christ, might as justly be called types of him. Whenever we read of any person, or things, being a type in scripture, there are some peculiar circumstances by which they may be distinguished from all other persons, or things that are not types. Now Adam was distinguished from all other persons, more especially as he was the federal head of all his posterity; and that he was so, appears from what the apostle not only occasionally mentions, but largely insists on, and shews in what respect this was true; and he particularly observes, that as one conveyed death the other was the head, or Prince of Life. These respective things indeed, were directly opposite, therefore the analogy, or resemblance, consisted only in the manner of conveying them; so that as death did not become due to us, in the first instance of our liableness to it, for our own actual sin, but the sin of Adam; that right we have to eternal life, by justification, is not the result of our own obedience, but Christ’s: This is plainly the apostle’s method of reasoning. Now, if Christ was, in this respect a federal Head and Representative of his people, then Adam, who is in this, or in nothing, his type, or figure, must be the Head of a covenant, in which his posterity were included.

There is another scripture, by which this may be proved in 1 Cor. xv. 45-59. where the apostle speaks of the _first and second Adam_; by the latter he means Christ. Now, why should he be called the second man, who lived so many ages after Adam, if he did not design to speak of him, as typified by him, or bearing some resemblance of him? And, in other expressions, he seems to imply as much, and shews how we derive death from Adam, of whom he had been speaking, in the foregoing verses. Accordingly, he says, _The first man was of the earth, earthy: and, as is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy, and we have borne the image of the earthy_; so that if Adam was the root and occasion of all the miseries we endure in this world, arising from his violation of the covenant he was under, it plainly proves, that he was therein the head and representative of all his posterity.

For the farther proof of this, we may take occasion to consider the apostle’s method of reasoning, in the scripture but now referred to, _By one man sin entered into the world_, that is, by the first man, _in whom all have sinned_, Rom. v. 12. so I would choose to render it rather than as it is in our translation, since this seems to be the most natural sense of the word[59]; and it proves Adam, in whom all sinned, to be their head and representative, and also agrees best with the apostle’s general design, or argument, insisted on, and farther illustrated in the following verses.

Again, the apostle speaks of those penal evils consequent on Adam’s sins, which could not have befallen us, had he not been our federal head and representative; Thus, in ver. 18. _By the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation_[60]. It may be observed, that the apostle, in this text, uses a word, which we translate _condemnation_[61]; which cannot, with any manner of consistency, be taken in any other than a forensick sense; and therefore he argues, from thence, that we are liable to condemnation, by the offence of Adam; which certainly proves the imputation of his offence to us, and consequently he is considered therein as our federal head.

2. This farther appears, in that all mankind are exposed to many miseries, and to death, which are of a penal nature; therefore they must be considered, as the consequence of sin. Now they cannot be the consequence of actual sin, in those, who are miserable and die, as soon as they are born, who have not _sinned after the similitude of Adam’s transgression_; therefore this must be the result of his sin, which it could not be, had he not been the federal head of all his posterity.[62]

_Object._ It is objected to this, that God might, out of his mere sovereignty, ordain that his creatures should be exposed to some degree of misery; and, if this misery be not considered, as the punishment of sin, in infants, then it does not prove the imputation of Adam’s sin to them; and even their death, considered only as a separation of soul and body, may not contain in it a proper idea of punishment, (which consists in the stroke of justice, demanding satisfaction for sin) if it be only reckoned an expedient, or a necessary means for their attaining eternal life. Therefore it doth not follow, that, because we are liable to death, before we have done good or evil, it must necessarily be a punishment due to that sin, which was committed by Adam.

_Answ. 1._ I will not deny but that God might dispense some lesser degrees of natural evil, to a sinless creature, out of his mere sovereignty; neither will I contend with any, who shall say, that he might, without any dishonour to his perfections, send on him an evil, sensibly great, provided it were not only consistent with his love, but attended with those manifestations and displays thereof, which would more than compensate for it, and, at the same time, not have any tendency to prevent the answering the end of his being; yet I may be bold to say, that, from the nature of the thing, God cannot inflict the least degree of punishment on a creature, who is, in all respects guiltless. If therefore these lesser evils are penal, they are the consequence of Adam’s sin.

2. As for death, that must be considered as a penal evil; for, as such, it was first denounced, as a part of the curse, consequent on Adam’s sin; and the apostle says, _The wages of sin is death_, Rom. vi. 23. and elsewhere he speaks of all men, as _dying in Adam_, 1 Cor. xv. 22. and therefore his sin is imputed to all mankind; and consequently he was their federal head and representative in the covenant that he was under.

II. They, whose federal head and representative Adam was, are such as descended from him by ordinary generation. The design of this limitation is to signify, that our Saviour is excepted, and consequently that he did not sin or fall in him, inasmuch as he was born of a virgin; therefore, though he had the same human nature with all Adam’s posterity, yet he did not derive it from him, in the same way as they do; and a similitude of nature, or his being a true and proper Man, does not render him a descendant from Adam, in the same way as we are. The formation of his human nature was the effect of miraculous, supernatural, creating power; therefore he was no more liable to Adam’s sin, as being a Man, than a world of men would be, should God create them out of nothing, or out of the dust of the ground, by a mediate creation, which would be no more miraculous, or supernatural, than it was to form the human nature of Christ in the womb of a virgin. Now, as persons, so formed, would not be concerned in Adam’s sin, or fall, whatever similitude there might be of nature; even so our Saviour was not concerned therein.[63]

Moreover, that we might understand that he was not included in this federal transaction with Adam, the apostle opposes him, as the _second Man_, the federal Head of his elect, or spiritual seed, to Adam, the _first man_, and head of his natural seed, in that scripture before referred to, ver. 45. And, as an argument, that his extraordinary and miraculous conception exempted him from any concern in Adam’s sin and fall; the angel, that gave the first intimation hereof, when he tells the blessed virgin, his mother, that _the Holy Ghost should come upon her, that the power of the highest should over-shadow her_, he says, _Therefore that Holy Thing, that shall be born of thee, shall be called, the Son of God_; thereby implies, that, in his first formation, he was holy, and consequently had no concern in the guilt of Adam’s sin, because of the manner of his formation, or conception; and this is certainly a better way to account for his being sinless, than to pretend, as the Papists do, that his mother was sinless; which will do no service to their cause, unless they could ascend in a line to our first parents, and so prove, that all our Saviour’s progenitors were immaculate, as well as the virgin; which is more than they pretend to do.

III. It is farther observed, in this answer, that mankind sinned in and fell with Adam in his _first transgression_, and therefore they had no concern in those sins, which he committed afterwards. This appears from hence, that Adam, as soon as he sinned, lost the honour and prerogative, that was conferred upon him, of being the federal head of his posterity, though he was their natural head, or common father; for the covenant being broken, all the evils, that we were liable to, arising from thence, were devolved upon us, and none of the blessings, contained therein, could be conveyed to us that way, since it was impossible for him, after his fall, to perform sinless obedience, which was the condition of the life promised therein. This doth not arise so much from the nature of the covenant, as from the change that there was in man, with whom it was made. The law, or covenant, would have given life, if man could have yielded perfect obedience; but since his fall rendered that impossible, though the obligation thereof, as a law, distinct from a covenant, and the curse, arising from the sanction thereof, remains still in force against fallen man; yet, as a covenant, in which life was promised, it was, from that time, abrogated; and therefore the apostle speaks of it, as being _weak through the flesh_, Rom. viii. 3. that is, by reason of Adam’s transgression, and consequently he ceased, from that time, to be the federal head, or means of conveying life to his posterity; therefore those sins that he committed afterwards, were no more imputed to them, to inhance their condemnation, than his repentance, or good works, were imputed for their justification.

IV. Having considered the first transgression of Adam, as imputed to all those who descended from him by ordinary generation, we shall proceed to consider, how this doctrine is opposed, by those who are in the contrary way of thinking.

_Object. 1._ It is objected, that what is done by one man cannot be imputed to another; for this is contrary to the divine perfections, to the law of nature, and the express words of scripture. It is true, that which is done by us, in our own persons, may be imputed to us, whether it be good or evil. Thus it is said, that Phinehas’s _zeal in executing judgment, by which means the plague was stayed, was counted to him for righteousness_, Psal. cvi. 30, 31. so was Abraham’s _faith_, Rom. iv. 9, 23. Accordingly God approved of these their respective good actions, as what denominated them righteous persons, and placed them to their account, as bestowing on them some rewards accordingly; so, on the other hand, a man’s own sin may be imputed to him, and he may be dealt with as an offender: But to impute the sin committed by one person to another, is to suppose that he has committed that sin which was really committed by another; in which case, the Judge of all the earth would not do right.

_Answ._ When we speak of persons being punished for a crime committed by another, as being imputed to them, we understand the word _imputation_ in a forensick sense, and therefore we do not suppose that here is a wrong judgment passed on persons or things, as though the crime were reckoned to have been committed by them; accordingly we do not say, that we committed that sin, which was more immediately committed by Adam. In him it was an actual sin; it is ours, as imputed to us, or as we are punished for it, according to the demerit of the offence, and the tenor of the covenant, in which we were included.

Moreover, it is not contrary to the law of nature, or nations, for the iniquity of some public persons to be punished in many others, so that whole cities and nations have suffered on their account; and as for scripture-instances hereof, we often read of whole families and nations, suffering for the crimes of those, who had been public persons, and exemplary in sinning. Thus Achan coveted the wedge of gold, and, for this, he suffered not alone; but his _sons and daughters were stoned, and burned with fire_, together with himself, Joshua vii. 24, 25. though we do not expressly read, that they were confederates with him in the crime. And as for the Amalekites, who, without provocation, came out against Israel in the wilderness, God threatens them, that he would have _war with them for this, from generation to generation_, Exod. xvii. 16. and in pursuance of this threatening, God, imputing the crime of their forefathers to their posterity, some hundreds of years after, ordered _Saul to go and utterly destroy them, by slaying both man and woman, infant and suckling_, 1 Sam. xv. 2, 3. And the sin of Jeroboam was punished in his posterity, according to the threatening denounced, 1 Kings xiv. 10, 11. as was also the sin of Ahab, 1 Kings xxi. 21, 22. And the church acknowledges, that it was a righteous dispensation of providence for God to bring upon Judah those miseries, which immediately preceded, and followed their being carried captive, when they say, _Our fathers have sinned, and are not; and we have borne their iniquity_, Lam. v. 7. and our Saviour speaks to the same purpose, when he tells the Jews, _That upon you may come all the righteous blood shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel, unto the blood of Zacharias, son of Barachias, whom ye slew between the temple and the altar_, Matth. xxiii. 35. These instances, and others of the like nature, prove that it is no unheard of thing, for one man to suffer for a crime committed by another[64].

But I am sensible the principal thing intended in the objection, when this is supposed to be contrary to scripture, is, that it contradicts the sense of what the prophet says, when he tells the people, that _they should not have occasion any more to use this proverb in Israel, The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children’s teeth are set on edge_; for _the soul that sinneth shall die_, Ezek. xviii. 2-4. the meaning of which scripture is, that if they were humble and penitent, and did not commit those crimes that their fathers had done, they should not be punished for them, which was a special act of favour, that God would grant them on this supposition; and it is as much as to say, that he would not impute their father’s sins to them, or suffer them to be carried captive, merely because their fathers had deserved this desolating judgment. But this does not, in all respects, agree with the instance before us; for we are considering Adam as the federal head of his posterity, and so their fathers were not to be considered in this, and such like scriptures. Moreover, the objectors will hardly deny, that natural death, and the many evils of this life, are a punishment, in some respects, for the sin of our first parents. Therefore the question is not, whether some degree of punishment may ensue hereupon? but, whether the greatest degree of the punishment of sin in hell, can be said to be the consequence hereof? But this we shall be led more particularly to consider, under a following answer[65].

_Object. 2._ It is farther objected, that it is not agreeable to the divine perfections, for God to appoint Adam to be the head and representative of all his posterity; so that they must stand, or fall, with respect to their spiritual and eternal concerns in him, inasmuch as this was not done by their own choice and consent, which they were not capable of giving, since they were not existent. The case say they, is the same, as though a king should appoint a representative body of men, and give them a power to enact laws, whereby his subjects should be dispossessed of their estates and properties, which no one can suppose to be just; whereas if they had chosen them themselves, they would have no reason to complain of any injustice that was done them, inasmuch as the laws, made by their representatives, are, in effect, their own laws. Therefore, to apply this to the case before us, had all mankind chose Adam to be their representative, or consented to stand or fall in him, there would have been no reason to complain of the dispensation of God’s providence, relating hereunto: but, inasmuch as it was otherwise, it does not seem agreeable to the justice of God, to constitute him the head and representative of all his posterity: so that, by his fall, they should be involved in ruin, and eternal perdition.

_Answ._ There are various methods taken to answer this objection.

1. Some say little more to it than this: That if Adam had retained his integrity, we should have accepted of, and rejoiced in that life, which he would have procured by his standing; there would then have been no complaint, or finding fault, with the divine dispensation, as though it had been unjust; therefore, since he fell, and brought death into the world, it is reasonable that we should submit, and acknowledge, that all the ways of God are equal. But, though we must all allow that submission to the will of God, in whatever he does, is the creatures duty, yet I cannot think this a sufficient answer to the objection, and therefore would not lay much stress upon it, but proceed to consider what may be farther said in answer to it.

2. Others say, that, since Adam was the common father, and consequently the most honourable of mankind, (our Saviour only excepted, whom he did not represent) therefore it was fit that he should have this honour conferred upon him; so that, had all his posterity been existent, and the choice of a representative been wholly referred to them, the law of nature would have directed to, and pointed out the man, who ought, in this respect, to have the preference to all others. This answer bids fairer, I confess to remove the difficulty than the other, especially if it be added, that God might have given Adam some advantages of nature, above the rest of mankind, besides that relative one, arising from his being their common father; and therefore, that it would have been their interest, as well as their duty, to have chosen him, as being best qualified to perform the work that was devolved upon him.

3. But, since this will not wholly remove the difficulty, it is farther alleged, that God chose him, and therefore we ought to acquiesce in his choice; and, indeed, had all mankind been then existent, supposing them to be in a state of perfect holiness (and we must not suppose the contrary) then they would have acknowledged the equity of this divine dispensation, otherwise they would have actually sinned, and fallen, in rejecting and complaining of the will of God. But this will not satisfy those who advance the contrary scheme of doctrine, and deny the imputation of Adam’s sin to his posterity, who still complain of it, as a very severe dispensation, and conclude, that the sovereignty of God is pleaded for against his other perfections; therefore something farther must be added, in answer to the objection.

We freely allow, that it is not equitable (to use the similitude taken from human forms of government) for a king to appoint a representative, who shall have a power committed to him, to take away the properties, or estates of his subjects: but this does not, in many respects, agree with the matter under our present consideration: nevertheless, if we were to suppose, that these subjects had nothing which they could call their own, separate from the will of the prince, and their properties and estates were not only defended, but given by him, and that upon this tenure, that he reserved to himself a right to dispossess them of them at his pleasure; in this case, he might, without any injustice done them, appoint a representative, by whose conduct they might be forfeited, or retained; and this agrees with our present argument. Accordingly let it be considered, that there were some things which Adam was possessed of in his state of innocency, and others which he was given to expect, had he stood, which he had no natural right to, separate from the divine will; therefore it follows, from hence, that God might, without doing his posterity any injustice, repose this in the hands of a mutable creature, so that it should be retained or lost for them, according as he stood or fell. And this will appear less exceptionable, when we consider the nature of that guilt, which all mankind were brought under, by Adam’s sin, and the loss of original righteousness, as the consequence of his fall; which they, who maintain the other side of the question, generally represent, in such a way, as though we supposed that there were no difference between it, and the guilt contracted, together with the punishment ensuing on actual sins, how great soever they are. But this will be more particularly considered under a following answer,[66] in which we shall endeavour to take a just estimate of the difference between the guilt of Adam’s sin, imputed to us, and that of actual sins committed by us.

Footnote 56:

If Adam represented Eve (his rib) in the covenant, she did not fall
till he fell.

Footnote 57:

_The compilers of the LXX. seem to have understood the words in this
sense, when then render the text in_ Gen. ii. 17. η δ αν ημερα φαγητε
απ αυτου θαγατω απο θανεισθε.

Footnote 58:

Τυπος, _the Type_.

Footnote 59:

Εφ᾽ ω.

Footnote 60:

_The words are_, ως δι ενος παραπτωματος, εις παντας ανθρωπους εις
κατακριμα. _The word Judgment, though not in the original, is very
justly supplied in our translation, from verse 16. or else, as the
learned Grotius observes, the word εγενετο might have been supplied;
and so the meaning is_, Res processit in condemnationem. _And J.
Capellus gives a very good sense of the text, when he compares Adam as
the head, who brought death into the world, with Christ by whom life
is obtained. His words are these_: Quemadmodum omnes homines, qui
condemnantur, reatum suum contraxerant, ab una unius hominis offensa;
sic & quotquot vivificantur, absolutionem suam obtinuerunt ab una
unius hominis obedientia.

Footnote 61:

_The word_ κατακριμα _is used in scripture, in a forensic sense, in
those places of the New Testament, where it is found: Thus ver. 16. of
this chapter, and chap. viii. 1. And accordingly it signifies a
judgment unto condemnation; as also do those words, the sense whereof
has an affinity to it, in Rom. viii. 34._ τις ο κατακρινων; _and also_
ακατακριτος, _as in Acts xvi. 37. and_ chap. xxii. 25. _So that,
according to the construction of the word, though_ κριμα _signifies_
judicium _in general_, κατακριμα signifies judicium adversus aliquem,
_or_ condemnatio.

Footnote 62:

That mankind are born and live in sin, maybe collected from various
sources of argument; by matter of fact, none are found free from, who
are capable of actual guilt, by the evils and death which a just God
would not otherwise inflict; by the ideas of the ancients who speak of
a degeneration from a golden, to an iron age, by the general practice
of offering sacrifice, which is an acknowment of guilt, by the
testimony of the heathens, that evil example has a preponderating
influence over good, by the historical account of the fall of man in
the scriptures, by their numerous testimonies that none are righteous
before God or can be justified by their obedience to his laws, by the
confessions of the saints, by the necessity of repentance in all, by
the propriety of prayer for the pardon of sin, by Christ’s example of
daily prayer which contains such a petition, by the necessity of faith
that we may please God, by man’s unwillingness to be reconciled to
God, and rejection of all the spiritual good things offered, and
contempt of divine threatnings; and above all other proofs, by the
coming and suffering of Christ.

Footnote 63:

The covenant of grace was from eternity, and implied his innocence.

Footnote 64:

_This is not only agreeable to many instances contained in scripture,
but it has been acknowledged to be just by the very heathen, as
agreeable to the law of nature and nations. Thus one says: Sometimes a
whole city is punished for the wickedness of one man: Thus Hesiod,_
πολλακι και ξυμπασα πολις κακου ανδρος επαυρει; _and Horace says,_
Quicquid delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi: _And one observes, that it
was the custom of several cities of Greece, to inflict the same
punishment on the children of tyrants, as their fathers had done on
others:_ In Græcis civitatibus liberi tyrannorum suppressis illis,
eodem supplicio afficiuntur. _Vid. Cicer. Epist. ad Brut. XV. & Q.
Curt. Lib. VI. speaks of a law observed among the Macedonians; in
which, traiterous conspiracies against the life of the prince were
punished, not only in the traitors themselves, but in their near
relations,_ Qui regi infidiati essent, illi cum cognatis & propinquis
suis morte afficerentur.

Footnote 65:

_See Quest._ xxvii.

Footnote 66:

_See Quest._ xxvii.

Quest. XXIII., XXIV., XXV., XXVI.

QUEST. XXIII. _Into what estate did the fall bring mankind?_

ANSW. The fall brought mankind into an estate of sin and misery.

QUEST. XXIV. _What is sin?_

ANSW. Sin is any want of conformity unto, or transgression of any
law of God, given as a rule to the reasonable creature.

QUEST. XXV. _Wherein consisteth the sinfulness of that estate
whereinto man fell?_

ANSW. The sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell, consisteth
in the guilt of Adam’s first sin, the want of that righteousness
wherein he was created; and the corruption of his nature, whereby he
is utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite unto all that is
spiritually good, and wholly inclined to all evil, and that
continually, which is commonly called, Original sin, and from which
do proceed all actual transgressions.

QUEST. XXVI. _How is original sin conveyed from our first parents
unto their posterity?_

ANSW. Original sin is conveyed from our first parents unto their
posterity by natural generation, so as all that proceed from them,
in that way, are conceived and born in sin.

Having considered the fall of our first parents, and all mankind being so far concerned therein, as that their sin is imputed to them; we are now led to speak concerning that sin and misery which ensues hereupon. And,

I. This is not barely called a single act of sin, or one particular instance of misery, but a state of sin and misery. Man’s being brought into a state of sin, is sometimes called sin’s reigning, or having dominion over him; and his being brought into a state of misery, is called the reign, or dominion of death; so that as, by various steps, we proceed from one degree of sin unto another, our condemnation is gradually enhanced thereby. This is the subject matter of the first of these answers.

II. We have a brief definition of sin, in which there is something supposed, namely, that there was a law given, and promulgated, as a rule of obedience, to the reasonable creature, without which there could be no sin committed, or guilt contracted; as the apostle saith, _Where no law is, there is no transgression_, Rom. iv. 15. or, _Sin is not imputed, where there is no law_, chap. v. 13.

And inasmuch as it is observed, that the subjects, bound by this law, are reasonable creatures; this gives us to understand, that though other creatures be the effect of God’s power, and the objects of his providence, yet they are not the subjects of moral government. They cannot therefore be under a law, inasmuch as they are not capable of understanding their relation to God, as Sovereign, or their obligation to obey him, or the meaning of a law, which is the rule thereof. Moreover, we have in this answer, an account of the formal nature of sin.

1. It is considered, either in its negative, or rather privative idea, as containing in it a defect, or want of conformity to the law, a privation of that rectitude of nature, or righteousness that man had at first, or our not performing that which we are bound, by the law of God, to do; and those particular instances of sin, included herein, are called sins of omission.

2. It is described by its positive idea, and so it is called, a transgression of the law, or doing that which is forbidden by it. Thus it is called, by the apostle, _The transgression of the law_, 1 John iii. 4. This we shall not insist on at present, inasmuch as we shall have occasion to enlarge on this head, when we consider the sins forbidden, under each of the ten commandments, and the various aggravations thereof.[67]

III. We are, in the next answer, led to consider the sinfulness of all mankind, as fallen in Adam, or original sin, as derived to, and discovered in us; and this consists more especially in our being guilty of Adam’s first sin, our wanting that righteousness which he was possessed of; and also in the corruption of nature, from whence all actual transgressions proceed.

1. We shall enquire what we are to understand by the guilt of Adam’s first sin. Having before shewn that his disobedience is imputed to his posterity, that which is the result thereof, is, that all the world becomes guilty before God: guilt is an obligation, or liableness to suffer punishment for an offence committed, in proportion to the aggravations thereof. Now, since this guilt was not contracted by us, but imputed to us, we must consider it as the same, in all; or not admitting of any degrees; nevertheless, there is a very great difference between that guilt which is the result of sin imputed to, and that which arises from sin’s being committed by us. They, who do not put a just difference between these two, give occasion to many prejudices against this doctrine, and do not sufficiently vindicate the perfections of God, in his judiciary proceedings in punishing one or the other of them. That we may avoid this inconvenience, let it be considered, that original and actual sins differ more especially in two respects.

(1.) The sin of our first parents, how heinous soever it was in them, as being an actual transgression, attended with the highest aggravations, yet it cannot be said to be our actual sin, or committed by an act of our will; therefore, though the imputation thereof to us, as has been before proved, is righteous, yet it has not those circumstances attending it, as though it had been committed by us. Therefore,

(2.) The guilt thereof, or the punishment due to it, cannot be so great as the guilt we contract, or the punishment we are liable to, for actual sins, which are committed with the approbation and consent of the will, and as they are against some degree of light and convictions of conscience, and manifold engagements to the contrary: but this does not properly belong to Adam’s sin, as imputed to us; nor is the punishment due to it the same, as though it had been committed by us in our own persons.

But, that we may not be misunderstood, let it be considered, that we are not speaking of the corruption of nature inherent in us. We do not deny, but that the fountain that sends forth all actual sins, or that sin reigning in the heart, is, in various respects, more aggravated, than many others that are committed, which we call actual transgressions, as the corrupt fountain is worse than the streams, or the root than the branch, or the cause than the effect. But when we consider, as at present we do Adam’s sin only, as imputed, and as being antecedent to that corruption of nature, which is the immediate cause of sinful actions; or when we distinguish between original sin, as imputed and inherent, we only understand, by the former, that it cannot expose those who never committed any actual sins, to so great a degree of guilt and punishment, as the sins committed by them are said to expose them to.

And let it be farther observed, that we do not say that there is no punishment due to original sin, as imputed to us; for that would be to suppose that there is no guilt attending it, which is contrary to what we have already proved; but all our design, at present, is, to put a just difference between Adam’s sin, imputed to us, and those that are committed by us. And, indeed, if what we have said under this head, be not true, the state of infants, dying in infancy, under the guilt of Adam’s sin, must be equally deplorable with that of the rest of mankind; therefore, when I find some expressing themselves to this purpose, I cannot wonder that others, who deny this doctrine are offended at it. It is one thing to say, that they are exposed to no punishment at all, which none, that observe the miseries that we are liable to, from our first appearance in the world, to our leaving it, whether sooner or later, can well deny; and another thing to say, that they are exposed to the same punishment for it, as though they had actually committed it; the former we allow; the latter we must take leave to deny lest we should give occasion to any to think that the Judge of all does any thing, which carries in it the least appearance of severity, and injustice. Thus concerning the guilt of Adam’s first sin, imputed to us; which leads us to consider the effects thereof. Accordingly,

2. Man is said to want that righteousness which he had at first, which is generally called, original righteousness. This is styled, the privative part of original sin, as the corruption of the human nature, and its propensity to all sin, is the positive part thereof. In considering the former of these, or man’s want of original righteousness, we may observe,

(1.) That man has not wholly lost God’s natural image, which he was possessed of, as an intelligent creature, consisting in his being endowed as such with an understanding, capable of some degree of the knowledge of himself and divine things; and a will, in many respects, free, _viz._ as to what concerns natural things, or some external branches of religion, or things materially good, and in his having executive powers, to act agreeably thereunto; though these are miserably defaced, and come far short of that perfection, which he had in the state in which he was first created. Some have compared this to an old decayed building, which has, by the ruins of time, lost its strength and beauty, though it retains something of the shape and resemblance of what it was before. Thus the powers and faculties of the soul are weakened, but not wholly lost, by the fall. They are like the fruits of the earth, which are shrivelled and withered in winter, and look as though they are dead; or like a man, who has out-lived himself, and has lost the vivacity and sprightliness of his parts, as well as the beauty of his body, which he formerly had.