Chapter VI: Part 6

Righteousness is taken ordinarily to signify a conformity to laws, or
rules of right conduct. Actions, and persons may respectively be
denominated righteous. The moral law, which is both distinguishable by
the moral sense, and expressly revealed, requires perfect and
perpetual rectitude in disposition, purpose, and action. Because none
are absolutely conformed to this law, none can fairly claim to be in
themselves, simply, and absolutely righteous. Men are said therefore
to be righteous comparatively, or because the defects of many of their
actions are few, or not discernible by their fellow men. _To be made_,
(or constituted) _righteous_, or, to _be justified_, in the sight of
God, in scriptural language cannot mean, _to be made inherently
righteous_. It is God who justifies, he cannot call evil good, and
cannot be ignorant of every man’s real demerit. This righteousness of
the saint has not consisted, under any dispensation, in his own
conformity to the Divine law; “_In the Lord have I righteousness_;”
“_That I may win Christ and be found in him, not having my own
righteousness_.” If it did, there would be no necessity for the aid of
God’s Spirit to sanctify the nature of the justified person. To be
justified or constituted righteous, is therefore to be _treated and
accepted as righteous_. If God _justifies the ungodly_, his truth and
justice must be clear. He cannot be induced to depart from perfect
rectitude, and strict propriety. When the ungodly are justified, or
treated as if righteous, it is not on their own account, for their
righteousness is defective; but _by the obedience of one_, (that is
Christ,) _many are made righteous_. The term _obedience_ excludes the
essential righteousness of Christ as God. And his righteousness which
he rendered in our nature can neither be transfused into, nor
transferred unto his people, so as to be theirs inherently. Nor can an
infinitely wise God consider the righteousness of one man to be the
personal righteousness of another. But one person may receive
advantages from the righteousness of another. Sodom would have been
spared if there could have been found ten holy men in it. Millions may
be treated kindly, because of favour or respect had for one of their
number espousing the cause of the whole. One man may become the surety
of, and perform conditions for many, or pay a ransom for them, and
purchase them from slavery. If it be said that one may not lay down
his life, especially if it be important, for the preservation of
another’s; yet Christ was the _Lord of life_ and possessed what no
mere creature can, the right to lay down his life, and power to take
it up again. The importance of the satisfaction should be adequate to
the honour of the law. But that every objection to such substitution
might be removed, it is shewn that, this was the very condition upon
which the restoration of the saints was suspended in the purposes of
God before man was created; and was _promised us in Christ Jesus
before the world began_. Justice therefore can neither object to the
substitution, nor withhold the rewards.

Footnote 31:

_Splendida peccata._

Footnote 32:

_See Vol. II. Page 275._

Footnote 33:

_The distinction often used in the civil law between_ fide-jussor
_and_ expromissor, _or a person’s being bound together with the
original debtor, and the creditor’s being left to his liberty to exact
the debt of which of the two he pleases, which is called_ fide-jussor;
_and the surety’s taking the debt upon himself, so as that he who
contracted it is hereby discharged, which is what we understand by_
expromissor, _has been considered elsewhere. See Vol. II. Page 174,
186._

Footnote 34:

_Volenti non fit injuria._

Footnote 35:

_See Vol. II. Page 281._

Footnote 36:

_See Vol. II. page 288._

Footnote 37:

_See Vol. II. page 280-293._

Footnote 38:

חשב λογιζω.

Footnote 39:

I am not without painful apprehension, said Peter to John, that the
views of our friend James on some of the doctrines of the gospel, are
unhappily diverted from the truth. I suspect he does not believe in
the proper _imputation_ of sin to Christ, or of Christ’s righteousness
to us; nor in his being our _substitute_, or representative.

_John._ Those are serious things; but what are the grounds, brother
Peter, on which your suspicions rest?

_Peter._ Partly what he has published, which I cannot reconcile with
those doctrines; and partly what he has said in my hearing, which I
consider as an avowal of what I have stated.

_John._ What say you to this, brother James?

_James._ I cannot tell whether what I have written or spoken accords
with brother Peter’s ideas on these subjects: indeed I suspect it does
not: but I never thought of calling either of the doctrines in
question. Were I to relinquish the one or the other, I should be at a
loss for ground on which to rest my salvation. What he says of my
avowing my disbelief of them in his hearing must be a
misunderstanding. I did say, I suspected that _his views_ of
imputation and substitution were unscriptural; but had no intention of
disowning the doctrines themselves.

_Peter._ Brother James, I have no desire to assume any dominion over
your faith; but should be glad to know what are your ideas on these
important subjects. Do you hold that sin was properly imputed to
Christ, or that Christ’s righteousness is properly imputed to us, or
not?

_James._ You are quite at liberty, brother Peter, to ask me any
questions on these subjects; and if you will hear me patiently, I will
answer you as explicitly as I am able.

_John._ Do so, brother James; and we shall hear you not only
patiently, but, I trust, with pleasure.

_James._ To impute,[40] signifies in general, to _charge_, _reckon_,
or _place to account_, according to the different objects to which it
is applied. This word, like many others, has a _proper_, and an
_improper_ or figurative meaning.

First: It is applied to the _charging_, _reckoning_, or _placing to
the account_ of persons and things, THAT WHICH PROPERLY BELONGS TO
THEM. This I consider as its _proper_ meaning. In this sense the word
is used in the following passages. “Eli _thought_ she, (Hannah,) had
been drunken—Hanan and Mattaniah, the treasurers were _counted_
faithful—Let a man so _account_ of us as the ministers of Christ, and
stewards of the mysteries of God—Let such an one _think_ this, that
such as we are in word by letters when we are absent, such will we be
also indeed when we are present—I _reckon_ that the sufferings of this
present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory that shall
be revealed in us.”[41] Reckoning or accounting, in the above
instances, is no other than judging of persons and things _according
to what they are, or appear to be_. To impute sin in this sense is to
charge guilt upon the guilty in a judicial way, or with a view to
punishment. Thus Shimei besought David that his iniquity might _not be
imputed to him_; thus the man is pronounced blessed to whom the Lord
_imputeth not iniquity_: and thus Paul prayed that the sin of those
who deserted him might _not be laid to their charge_.[42]

In this sense the term is ordinarily used in common life. To impute
treason or any other crime to a man, is the same thing as charging him
with having committed it, and with a view to his being punished.

Secondly: It is applied to the _charging_, _reckoning_, or _placing to
the account_ of persons and things, THAT WHICH DOES NOT PROPERLY
BELONG TO THEM, AS THOUGH IT DID. This I consider as its _improper_ or
figurative meaning. In this sense the word is used in the following
passages—“And this your heave-offering shall be _reckoned_ unto you
_as though it were_ the corn of the threshing-floor and as the fulness
of the wine-press—Wherefore hidest thou thy face, and _holdest_ me for
thine enemy—If the uncircumcision keep the righteousness of the law,
shall not his uncircumcision be _counted_ for circumcision—If he hath
wronged thee, or oweth thee aught, _put that on mine account_.”[43]

It is in this _latter_ sense that I understand the term when applied
to justification. “Abraham believed God, and it was _counted_ unto him
for righteousness—To him that worketh not, but believeth on him that
justifieth the ungodly, his faith is _counted_ for righteousness.” The
counting, or reckoning, in these instances, is not a judging of things
_as they are_; but _as they are not, as though they were_. I do not
think that faith here means the righteousness of the Messiah: for it
is expressly called “believing.” It means believing, however, not as a
virtuous exercise of the mind which God consented to accept instead of
perfect obedience, but _as having respect to the promised Messiah_,
and so to his righteousness as the ground of acceptance.[44]
Justification is ascribed to faith, as healing frequently is in the
New Testament; not as that from which the _virtue_ proceeds, but as
that which _receives_ from the Saviour’s fulness.

But if it were allowed that faith in these passages really means the
object believed in, still this was not Abraham’s _own_ righteousness,
and could not be properly _counted_ by him who judges of things as
they are, as being so. It was _reckoned_ unto him _as if it were_ his;
and the effects, or benefits of it were actually imparted to him: but
this was all. Abraham did not become meritorious, or cease to be
unworthy.

“What is it to place our righteousness in the obedience of Christ,
(says Calvin,) but to affirm that hereby only we are _accounted_
righteous; because the obedience of Christ is imputed to us AS IF IT
WERE OUR OWN.”[45]

It is thus also that I understand the imputation of sin to Christ. He
was accounted in the divine administration _as if he were, or had
been_ the sinner, that those who believe in him might be accounted _as
if they were, or had been_ righteous.

Brethren, I have done. Whether my statement be just or not, I hope it
will be allowed to be explicit.

_John._ That it certainly is; and we thank you. Have you any other
questions, brother Peter, to ask upon the subject?

_Peter._ How do you understand the apostle in 2 Cor. v. 21. _He hath
made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin, that we might be made the
righteousness of God in him?_

_James._ Till lately I cannot say that I have thought closely upon it.
I have understood that several of our best writers consider the word
αμαρτια (_sin_) as frequently meaning a _sin-offering_. Dr. Owen so
interprets it in his answer to Biddle,[46] though it seems he
afterwards changed his mind. Considering the opposition between the
sin which Christ was made, and the righteousness which we are made,
together with the same word being used for that which he was _made_,
and that which he _knew not_, I am inclined to be of the doctor’s last
opinion; namely, that the sin which Christ was made, means _sin
itself_; and the righteousness which we are made, means _righteousness
itself_. I doubt not but that the allusion is to the sin-offering
under the law; but not to its being _made a sacrifice_. Let me be a
little more particular. There were two things belonging to the
sin-offering. _First_: The imputation of the sins of the people,
signified by the priest’s laying his hands upon the head of the
animal, and confessing over it their transgressions; and which is
called “putting them upon it.”[47] That is, it was _counted_ in the
divine administration _as if the animal had been_ the sinner, and the
only sinner of the nation. _Secondly_: Offering it in sacrifice, or
“killing it before the Lord for an atonement.”[48] Now the phrase,
_made sin_, in 2 Cor. v. 21. appears to refer to the _first_ step in
this process in order to the last. It is expressive of what was
preparatory to Christ’s suffering death rather than of the thing
itself, just as our being _made righteousness_ expresses what was
preparatory to God’s bestowing upon us eternal life. But the term
_made_ is not to be taken literally; for that would convey the idea of
Christ’s being really the subject of moral evil. It is expressive of a
divine _constitution_, by which our Redeemer with his own consent,
stood in the sinner’s place, as though he had been himself the
transgressor; just as the sin-offering under the law was, in mercy to
Israel, reckoned or accounted to have the sins of the people “put upon
its head,” with this difference; that was only a shadow, but this went
really to take away sin.

_Peter._ Do you consider Christ as having been _punished, really and
properly_ PUNISHED?

_James._ I should think I do not. But what do you mean by punishment?

_Peter._ An innocent person may _suffer_, but, properly speaking, he
cannot be _punished_. Punishment necessarily supposes _criminality_.

_James._ Just so; and therefore as I do not believe that Jesus was in
any sense criminal, I cannot say he was really and properly punished.

_Peter._ Punishment is the infliction of natural evil for the
commission of moral evil. It is not necessary, however, that the
latter should have been committed by the party—Criminality is
supposed: but it may be either personal or imputed.

_James._ This I cannot admit. Real and proper punishment, if I
understand the terms, is not only the infliction of natural evil for
the commission of moral evil; but the infliction of the one _upon the
person who committed the other, and in displeasure against him_. It
not only supposes criminality, but that the party punished was
literally the criminal. Criminality committed by one party, and
imputed to another, is not a ground for real and proper punishment. If
Paul had sustained the punishment due to Onesimus for having wronged
his master, yet it would not have been real and proper punishment _to
him_, but _suffering_ only, as not being inflicted in displeasure
against him. I am aware of what has been said on this subject, that
there was a more intimate _union_ between Christ and those for whom he
died, than could ever exist between creatures. But be it so, it is
enough for me that the union was not such as THAT THE ACTIONS OF THE
ONE BECAME THOSE OF THE OTHER. Christ, even in the act of offering
himself a sacrifice, when, to speak in the language of the Jewish law,
the sins of the people were put or laid upon him, gave himself
nevertheless THE JUST FOR THE UNJUST.

_Peter._ And thus it is that you understand the words of Isaiah, _The
Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all_?

_James._ Yes, he bore the punishment due to our sins, or that which,
considering the dignity of his person, was equivalent to it. The
phrase “He shall bear his iniquity,” which so frequently occurs in the
Old Testament, means, he shall bear the punishment due to his
iniquity.

_Peter._ And yet you deny that Christ’s sufferings were properly
_penal_.

_James._ You would not deny eternal life which is promised to
believers to be properly _a reward_; but you would deny its being _a
real and proper reward_ TO THEM.

_Peter._ And what then?

_James._ If eternal life, though it be a reward, and we partake of it,
yet is really and properly the reward of Christ’s obedience, and not
our’s; then the sufferings of Christ, though they were a punishment,
and he sustained it, yet were really and properly the punishment of
our sins, and not his. What he bore _was_ punishment: that is, it was
the expression of divine displeasure against transgressors. So what we
enjoy is reward: that is, it is the expression of God’s
well-pleasedness in the obedience and death of his Son. But neither is
the one a punishment _to him_, nor the other, properly speaking, a
reward _to us_.

There appears to me great accuracy in the scriptural language on this
subject. What our Saviour underwent is almost always expressed by the
term _suffering_. Once it is called a _chastisement_: yet there he is
not said to have been chastised; but “the chastisement of our peace
was _upon him_.” This is the same as saying he bore _our_ punishment.
He was made a curse for us: that is, having been reckoned, or
accounted the sinner, as though he had actually been so, he was
treated accordingly, as one that had deserved to be an outcast from
heaven and earth. I believe the wrath of God that was due to us was
poured upon him, but I do not believe that God for one moment was
angry or displeased _with him_, or that he smote him from any such
displeasure.

There is a passage in Calvin’s _Institutes_, which so fully expresses
my mind, that I hope you will excuse me if I read it. You will find it
in Bk. ii. chap. xvi. § 10, 11. “It behoved him that he should, as it
were, hand to hand, wrestle with the armies of hell, and the horror of
eternal death. The chastisement of our peace was _laid upon him_. He
was smitten of his Father for our crimes, and bruised for our
iniquities: whereby is meant that he was put in the stead of the
wicked, as surety and pledge, yea, and as the very guilty person
himself, to sustain and bear away all the punishments that should have
been laid upon them, save only that he could not be holden of death.
Yet do we not mean that God was at any time either his enemy, or angry
with him. For how could he be angry with his beloved Son, upon whom
his mind rested? Or how could Christ by his intercession appease his
Father’s wrath towards others, if, full of hatred, he had been
incensed against himself? But this is our meaning—that he sustained
the weight of the divine displeasure; inasmuch as he, being stricken
and tormented by the hand of God, DID FEEL ALL THE TOKENS OF GOD WHEN
HE IS ANGRY AND PUNISHETH.”

_Peter._ The words of scripture are very express—He hath _made him to
be sin for us_—He was _made a curse for us_.—You may, by diluting and
qualifying interpretations, soften what you consider as intolerable
_harshness_. In other words, you may choose to correct the language
and sentiments of inspiration, and teach the apostle to speak of his
Lord with more decorum, lest his personal purity should be impeached,
and lest the odium of the cross, annexed by divine law, remain
attached to his death: but if you abide by the obvious meaning of the
passages, you must hold with _a commutation of persons_, the
_imputation_ of sin and of righteousness, and a _vicarious
punishment_, equally pregnant with _execration_ as with _death_.

_John._ I wish brother Peter would forbear the use of language which
tends not to convince, but to irritate.

_James._ If there be any thing convincing in it, I confess I do not
perceive it. I admit with Mr. _Charnock_, “That Christ was ‘made sin’
_as if he had_ sinned all the sins of men; and we are ‘made
righteousness,’ _as if we had_ not sinned at all.” What more is
necessary to abide by the obvious meaning of the words? To go further
must be to maintain that Christ’s being _made sin_ means that he was
literally rendered wicked, and that his being _made a curse_ is the
same thing as his being punished for it according to his deserts.
Brother Peter, I am sure, does not believe this shocking position: but
he seems to think there is a medium between his being treated _as if
he were_ a sinner, and his _being one_. If such a medium there be, I
should be glad to discover it: at present it appears to me to have no
existence.

Brother Peter will not suspect me, I hope, of wishing to depreciate
his judgment, when I say, that he appears to me to be attached to
certain terms without having sufficiently weighed their import. In
most cases I should think it a privilege to learn of him: but in some
things I cannot agree with him. In order to maintain the _real_ and
_proper punishment_ of Christ, he talks of his being “guilty by
imputation.” The term _guilty_, I am aware, is often used by
theological writers for _an obligation to punishment_, and so applies
to that voluntary obligation which Christ came under to sustain the
punishment of our sins: but strictly speaking, guilt is the _desert_
of punishment; and this can never apply but to the offender. It is the
opposite of innocence. A voluntary obligation to endure the punishment
of another is not guilt, any more than a consequent exemption from
obligation in the offender, is innocence. Both guilt and innocence are
transferable in their effects, but in themselves they are
untransferable. To say that Christ was _reckoned_ or _counted_ in the
divine administration _as if he were_ the sinner, and came under an
obligation to endure the curse or punishment due to our sins, is one
thing: but to say he _deserved_ that curse, is another. Guilt,
strictly speaking, is the inseparable attendant of transgression, and
could never therefore for one moment occupy the conscience of Christ.
If Christ by imputation became _deserving_ of punishment, we by
non-imputation cease to deserve it; and if our demerits be literally
transferred to him, his merits must of course be the same to us: and
then, instead of approaching God as _guilty_ and _unworthy_, we might
take consequence to ourselves before him, as not only guiltless, but
meritorious beings.

_Peter._ Some who profess to hold that believers are justified by the
righteousness of Christ, deny, nevertheless, that his _obedience
itself_ is imputed to them: for they maintain that the scripture
represents believers as receiving only the _benefits_, or effects of
Christ’s righteousness in justification, or their being pardoned and
accepted for Christ’s _righteousness sake_.—But it is not merely _for
the sake_ of Christ, or of what he has done, that believers are
accepted of God, and treated as completely righteous; but it is IN him
as their Head, Representative, and Substitute; and by the imputation
of that _very obedience_ which as such he performed to the divine law,
that they are justified.

_James._ I have no doubt but that the imputation of Christ’s
righteousness presupposes a _union_ with him; since there is no
perceivable fitness in bestowing benefits on one _for another’s sake_
where there is no union or relation subsisting between them. It is not
such a union, however, as that THE ACTIONS OF EITHER BECOME THOSE OF
THE OTHER. That “the scriptures represent believers as _receiving_
only the benefits or the effects of Christ’s righteousness in
justification,” is a remark of which I am not able to perceive the
fallacy: nor does it follow that his obedience itself is not imputed
to them. Obedience itself may be and is imputed, while its effects
only are _imparted_, and consequently _received_. I never met with a
person who held the absurd notion of imputed benefits, or imputed
punishments; and am inclined to think there never was such a person.
Be that however as it may, sin on the one hand and righteousness on
the other, are the proper objects of imputation; but that imputation
_consists_ in charging or reckoning them to the account of the party
in such a way as to _impart_ to him their evil or beneficial effects.

_Peter._ The doctrine for which I contend as taught by the apostle
Paul, is neither novel, nor more strongly expressed than it has
formerly been by authors of eminence.

_James._ It may be so. We have been told of an old protestant writer
who says, that “In Christ, and by him, every true Christian may be
called _a fulfiller of the law_:” but I see not why he might not as
well have added, Every true Christian may be said to have been slain,
and, if not to have redeemed himself by his own blood, yet to be
worthy of all that blessing, and honour, and glory, that shall be
conferred upon him in the world to come.—What do you think of Dr.
CRISP’S Sermons? Has he not carried your principles to an extreme?

_Peter._ I cordially agree with WITSIUS, as to the impropriety of
calling Christ _a sinner, truly a sinner, the greatest of sinners_,
&c. yet I am far from disapproving of what Dr. CRISP, and some others,
_meant_ by those exceptionable expressions.

_James._ If a Christian may be called _a fulfiller of the law_, on
account of Christ’s obedience being imputed to him, I see not why
Christ may not be called _a transgressor of the law_, on account of
our disobedience being imputed to him. Persons and things _should be
called what they are_. As to the _meaning_ of Dr. CRISP, I am very
willing to think he had no ill design: but my concern is with the
meaning which his words convey to his readers. He considers God in
charging our sins on Christ, and accounting his righteousness to us,
as reckoning of things _as they are_. (p. 280.) He contends that
Christ was _really_ the sinner, or guilt could not have been laid upon
him. (p. 272.) Imputation of sin and righteousness, with him, is
literally and actually A TRANSFER OF CHARACTER; and it is the object
of his reasoning to persuade his believing hearers that from
henceforward Christ is the sinner, and not they. “Hast thou been an
idolater, says he; a blasphemer, a despiser of God’s word, a profaner
of his name and ordinances, a thief, a liar, a drunkard—If thou hast
part in Christ, _all these transgressions of thine become actually the
transgressions of Christ, and so cease to be thine; and thou ceasest
to be a transgressor from the time they were laid upon Christ, to the
last hour of thy life_: so that now thou art _not_ an idolater, a
persecutor, a thief, a liar, &c.—thou art not a sinful person. Reckon
whatever sin you commit, when as you have part in Christ, you are all
that Christ was, and Christ is all that you were.”

If the _meaning_ of this passage be true and good, I see nothing
exceptionable in the expressions. All that can be said is, that the
writer explicitly states his principle and avows its legitimate
consequences. I believe the principle to be false.—(1.) Because
neither sin nor righteousness are _in themselves_ transferable. The
act and deed of one person may _affect_ another in many ways, but
cannot possibly become his act and deed.—(2.) Because the scriptures
uniformly declare Christ to be sinless, and believers to be sinful
creatures.—(3.) Because believers themselves have in all ages
_confessed_ their sins, and applied to the mercy-seat for
_forgiveness_. They never plead such an union as shall render their
sins not theirs, but Christ’s; but merely such a one as affords ground
to apply for pardon _in his name_, or _for his sake_; not as worthy
claimants, but as unworthy supplicants.

Whatever reasonings we may give into, there are certain times in which
_conscience_ will bear witness, that notwithstanding the imputation of
our sins to Christ, _we are actually the sinners_; and I should have
thought no good man could have gravely gone about to overturn its
testimony. Yet this is what Dr. Crisp has done. “Believers _think_,
says he, that they find their transgressions in their own consciences,
and they _imagine_ that there is a sting of this poison still behind,
wounding them: but, beloved, if this principle be received for a
truth, that God hath laid thy iniquities on Christ, how can thy
transgressions, belonging to Christ, be found in thy heart and
conscience?—Is thy conscience Christ?” p. 269.

Perhaps no man has gone further than Dr. CRISP in his attempts at
consistency; and admitting his principle, that imputation consists in
a transfer of character, I do not see who can dispute his conclusions.
To have been perfectly consistent, however, he should have proved that
all the confessions and lamentations of believers, recorded in
scripture, arose from their being under the _mistake_ which he labours
to rectify; that is, _thinking_ sin did not cease to be theirs, even
when under the fullest persuasion that the Lord would not impute it to
them, but would graciously cover it by the righteousness of his Son.——
——

_John._ I think, brother Peter, you expressed at the beginning of our
conversation, a strong suspicion that brother James denied the
_substitution of Christ_, as well as the proper imputation of sin and
righteousness. What has passed on the latter subject would probably
tend either to confirm or remove your suspicions respecting the
former.

_Peter._ I confess I was mistaken in some of my suspicions. I consider
our friend as a good man; but am far from being satisfied with what I
still understand to be his views on this important subject.

_John._ It gives me great pleasure to hear the honest concessions of
brethren, when they feel themselves in any measure to have gone too
far.

_Peter._ I shall be glad to hear brother James’s statement on
_substitution_, and to know whether he considers our Lord in his
undertaking as having sustained the character of a _Head_, or
_Representative_; and if so, whether the persons for whom he was a
substitute were the elect only, or mankind in general.

_James._ I must acknowledge that on this subject I feel considerably
at a loss, I have no consciousness of having ever called the doctrine
of substitution in question. On the contrary, my hope of salvation
rests upon it; and the sum of my delight, as a minister of the gospel,
consists in it. If I know any thing of my own heart, I can say of my
Saviour as laying down his life _for, or instead of_ sinners, as was
said of Jerusalem by the captives—_If I forget_ THEE, _let my right
hand forget: If I do not remember_ THEE, _let my tongue cleave to the
roof of my mouth_!

I have always considered the denial of this doctrine as being of the
essence of Socinianism. I could not have imagined that any person
whose hope of acceptance with God rests not on any goodness in himself
but entirely on the righteousness of Christ, imputed to him _as if it
were his own_, would have been accounted to disown his substitution.
But perhaps, my dear brother, (for such I feel him to be,
notwithstanding our differences,) may include in his ideas of this
subject, that Christ was so our _head_ and _representative_, as that
what he did and suffered, we did and suffered in him.—If no more were
meant by this, resumed James, than that what he did and suffered is
graciously accepted on our behalf _as if it were ours_, I freely, as I
have said before, acquiesce in it. But I do not believe, and can
hardly persuade myself that brother Peter believes, the obedience and
sufferings of Christ to be so ours, as that we can properly be said to
have obeyed and suffered.

Christ was and is our _head_, and we are his members: the union
between him and us, however, is not in all respects the same as that
which is between the head and the members of the natural body: for
that would go to explain away all distinct consciousness and
accountableness on our part.

As to the term _representative_, if no more be meant by it than that
Christ so personated us as to die in our stead, that we, believing in
him, should not die, I have nothing to object to it. But I do not
believe that Christ was so our representative, as that what he did and
suffered, we did and suffered; and so became meritorious, or deserving
of the divine favour.—But I feel myself in a wide field, and must
entreat your indulgence while I take up so much of the conversation.

_Peter and John._ Go on, and state your sentiments without apology.

_James._ I apprehend then that many important mistakes have arisen
from considering the interposition of Christ under the notion of
_paying a debt_. The blood of Christ is indeed the _price_ of our
redemption, or that for the sake of which we are delivered from the
curse of the law: but this metaphorical language, as well as that of
_head and members_, may be carried too far, and may lead us into many
errors. In cases of debt and credit among men, where a surety
undertakes to _represent_ the debtor, from the moment his undertaking
is accepted, the debtor is free, and may claim his liberty, not as a
matter of favour, at least on the part of the creditor, but of strict
justice. Or should the undertaking be unknown to him for a time, yet
as soon as he knows it, he may demand his discharge, and, it may be,
think himself hardly treated by being kept in bondage so long after
his debt had been actually paid. But who in their sober senses will
imagine this to be analagous to the redemption of sinners by Jesus
Christ? Sin is a debt only in a metaphorical sense: properly speaking,
it is a _crime_, and satisfaction for it requires to be made, not on
pecuniary, but on moral principles. If Philemon had accepted of that
part of Paul’s offer which respected property, and had placed so much
to his account as he considered Onesimus to have “owed” him, he could
not have been said to have _remitted_ his debt; nor would Onesimus
have had to thank him for remitting it. But it is supposed of Onesimus
that he might not only be in debt to his master, but have “wronged”
him. Perhaps he had embezzled his goods, corrupted his children, or
injured his character. Now for Philemon to accept of that part of the
offer, were very different from the other. In the one case he would
have accepted of a pecuniary representative; in the other of a moral
one; that is, of a mediator. The satisfaction in the one case would
annihilate the idea of remission; but not in the other. Whatever
satisfaction Paul might give to Philemon respecting the wound
inflicted upon his character and honour as the head of a family, it
would not supersede the necessity of pardon being sought by the
offender, and freely bestowed by the offended.

The reason of this difference is easily perceived. Debts are
transferable; but crimes are not. A third person may cancel the one;
but he can only obliterate the _effects_ of the other; the _desert_ of
the criminal remains. The _debtor_ is accountable to his creditor as a
_private_ individual, who has power to accept of a surety, or if he
please, to remit the whole, without any satisfaction. In the one case
he would be just; in the other merciful: but no place is afforded by
either of them for the _combination_ of justice and mercy in the same
proceeding. The _criminal_, on the other hand, is amenable to the
magistrate, or to the head of a family, as a _public_ person, and who,
especially if the offence be capital, cannot remit the punishment
without invading law and justice, nor in the ordinary discharge of his
office, admit of a third person to stand in his place. In
extraordinary cases, however, extraordinary expedients are resorted
to. A satisfaction may be made to law and justice, as to the _spirit_
of them, while the _letter_ is dispensed with. The well-known story of
Zaleucus, the Grecian law-giver, who consented to lose one of his eyes
to spare one of his son’s eyes, who by transgressing the law had
subjected himself to the loss of both, is an example. Here, as far as
it went, _justice and mercy were combined_ in the same act: and had
the satisfaction been much fuller than it was, so full that the
authority of the law, instead of being weakened, should have been
abundantly magnified and honoured, still it had been _perfectly
consistent with free forgiveness_.

Finally: In the case of the debtor, satisfaction being once accepted,
justice _requires_ his complete discharge: but in that of the
criminal, where satisfaction is made to the wounded honour of the law,
and the authority of the lawgiver, justice, though it _admits_ of his
discharge, yet no otherwise _requires_ it than as it may have been
matter of promise to the substitute.

I do not mean to say that cases of this sort afford a competent
representation of redemption by Christ. That is a work which not only
ranks with extraordinary interpositions, but which has no parallel: it
is a work of God, which leaves all the petty concerns of mortals
infinitely behind it. All that comparisons can do, is to give us some
idea of the _principle_ on which it proceeds.

If the following passage in our admired _Milton_ were considered as
the language of the law of innocence, it would be inaccurate—

“——Man disobeying,

He with his whole posterity must die:
Die he, or justice must; unless for him
Some other able, and as willing, pay
The rigid satisfaction, death for death.”

Abstractedly considered, this is true; but it is not expressive of
what was the revealed law of innocence. The law made no such
condition, or provision; nor was it indifferent to the law-giver who
should suffer, the sinner, or another on his behalf. The language of
the law to the transgressor was not _thou shalt die, or some one on
thy behalf_; but simply _thou shalt die_: and had it literally taken
its course, every child of man must have perished. The sufferings of
Christ in our stead, therefore, are not a punishment inflicted in the
ordinary course of distributive justice; but an extraordinary
interposition of infinite wisdom and love: not contrary to, but rather
above the law, deviating from the letter, but more than preserving the
spirit of it. Such, brethren, as well as I am able to explain them,
are my views of the substitution of Christ.

_Peter._ The objection of our so stating the substitution of Christ,
as to leave no room for the free pardon of sin, has been often made by
those who avowedly reject his satisfaction; but for any who really
consider his death as an atonement for sin, and as essential to the
ground of a sinner’s hope, to employ the objection against us, is very
extraordinary, and must, I presume, proceed from inadvertency.

_James._ If it be so, I do not perceive it. The grounds of the
objection have been stated as clearly and as fully as I am able to
state them.

FULLER

Footnote 40:

חשב; λογιζομαι.

Footnote 41:

1 Sam. i. 13. Neh. xiii. 13. 1 Cor. iv. 1. 2 Cor. x. 11. Rom. viii.
18.

Footnote 42:

2 Sam. xix. 19. Ps. xxxii. 2. 2 Tim. iv. 16.

Footnote 43:

Num. xviii. 27-30. Job xiii. 24. Rom. ii. 26. Philem. 18.

Footnote 44:

Expository Discourses on Gen. xv. 1-6. Also Calvin’s Inst. bk. iii.
ch. xi. § 7.

Footnote 45:

Inst. bk. iii. ch. xi. § 2.

Footnote 46:

p. 510.

Footnote 47:

Lev. xvi. 21.

Footnote 48:

Lev. i. 4, 5.

Quest. LXXII., LXXIII.

QUEST. LXXII. _What is justifying Faith?_

ANSW. Justifying faith is a saving grace, wrought in the heart of a
sinner, by the Spirit and word of God; whereby he, being convinced
of his sin and misery, and of the disability in himself, and all
other creatures, to recover him out of his lost condition, not only
assenteth to the truth of the promise of the gospel, but receiveth
and resteth upon Christ and his righteousness therein held forth,
for pardon of sin, and for the accepting and accounting of his
person, righteous in the sight of God for salvation.

QUEST. LXXIII. _How doth faith justify a sinner in the sight of
God?_

ANSW. Faith justifies a sinner in the sight of God; not because of
those graces which do always accompany it, or of those good works
that are the fruits of it; nor as if the grace of faith, or any act
thereof, were imputed to him for justification; but only as it is an
instrument, by which he receiveth and applieth Christ and his
righteousness.

We choose first to speak to the latter of these two answers, in which faith is considered as that whereby a sinner is justified, before the former of them, inasmuch as it seems better connected with what has been before insisted on, in explaining the doctrine of justification. And in considering the account we have of justifying faith, there are two things, which may be taken notice of, in this answer.

I. It is observed, that though there are other graces which always accompany faith and good works, that flow from it; yet none of these are said to justify a sinner in the sight of God.

II. How faith justifies, or what it is to be justified by faith.[49]

I. That though there are other graces which always accompany faith, and good works that flow from it; yet none of these are said to justify a sinner in the sight of God. There is an inseparable connexion between faith, and all other graces; which, though it be distinguished, is never separate from them. They are all considered as _fruits of the Spirit_, Gal. v. 22, 23. thus the apostle reckons up several other graces that are connected with faith, and proceed from the same Spirit, such as _love_, _peace_, _joy_, _long-suffering_, _gentleness_, _goodness_, _meekness_, _temperance_: and the same apostle commends the church at Thessalonica for their _work of faith; and_ considers this as connected with a _labour of love, and patience of hope in our Lord Jesus Christ_, 1 Thess. i. 3. And the apostle Peter exhorts the church, to which he writes, to _add to their faith virtue, and to virtue knowledge, to knowledge temperance, to temperance patience, to patience godliness, to godliness brotherly kindness, and to brotherly kindness charity_, 2 Pet. i. 5, 6, 7. which supposes that all these graces ought to be connected together. And the apostle James calls it a _dead faith_, James ii. 17. which has not other works or graces joined with it; and, indeed, these graces are not only connected with it, but flow from it, or are the fruits thereof: thus we read of the _heart’s being purified by faith_, Acts xv. 9. that is, this grace, when acted in a right manner, will have a tendency, in some degree, to purge the soul from that moral impurity, which proceeds out of the heart of man, and is inconsistent with saving faith: and elsewhere we read of _faith as working by love_, Gal. v. 6. that is, exciting those acts of love, both to God and man, which contain a summary of practical religion. It is also said to _overcome the world_, 1 John v. 4. and it enables Christians to do or suffer great things for Christ’s sake, of which the apostle gives various instances in the Old Testament saints, Heb. xi. But, notwithstanding the connexion of other graces with faith, and those works which flow from it, we are never said, in scripture, to be justified thereby; not by love to God; nor by any act of obedience to him, which can be called no other than works: whereas, when the apostle speaks of our justification by faith, he puts it in opposition to works, when he says, that _a man is justified by faith, without the deeds of the law_, Rom. ii. 28.

_Object._ To this it is objected, that the apostle here speaks concerning the ceremonial law, which he excludes from being the matter of our justification, and not the moral law, or any evangelical duty, such as love and sincere obedience, which, together with faith is the matter of our justification.

_Answ._ To this it may be replied, That when the apostle speaks of our justification by faith, without the deeds of the law, he does not hereby intend the ceremonial law; for those whom he describes as justified persons, are said to be, in a following verse, not only Jews, but Gentiles, that were converted to the Christian faith; the former, indeed, were under a temptation to seek to be justified by the ceremonial law, and so to conclude that they had a right to eternal life; because of their being distinguished from the world, by the external privileges of the covenant which they were under, many of which were contained in, or signified by that law: but the Gentiles had nothing to do with it, and therefore never expected to be justified by the ceremonial law; accordingly, when the apostle speaks of justification by faith without the deeds of the law, he cannot hereby be supposed to intend the ceremonial law. And if we look a little farther into the context, we shall find, by his method of reasoning, that he excludes all works in general, and opposes faith to them; for he argues, that we are justified in such a way, as tends to exclude boasting; but he that insists on any works performed by himself, as the matter of his justification, cannot do this any otherwise than in a boasting way, valuing himself, and founding his right to eternal life, upon them. We are not therefore justified by them, but by faith; that is, we are justified in such a way as that, while we lay claim to the greatest privileges from Christ, we are disposed to give him all the glory, or to renounce our own righteousness at the same time that we have recourse to his righteousness for justification, by faith.

But that it may farther appear, that our justification by faith, is opposed to justification by works, either those that accompany or flow from it, we may apply what has been before suggested, in considering the matter of our justification to this argument. If we consider the demands of justice, or what it may in honour reckon a sufficient compensation for the dishonour that has been brought to the divine name by sin, or what may be deemed a satisfactory payment of the outstanding debt of perfect obedience, which was due from us, or punishment, which we were liable to, according to the sanction of the divine law; we may easily infer, that no obedience, performed by us, though including in it the utmost perfection, that a fallen creature is capable of attaining, is a sufficient satisfaction; and if there can be no justification without satisfaction, then we cannot be justified thereby. Therefore it is a vain thing for persons to distinguish in this case, between works done before and after faith, as though the former only were excluded from being the matter of our justification; or to say, as some do, that we are not indeed justified by obedience to the moral law, but by our obeying the precepts which our Saviour has laid down in the gospel, such as faith, and repentance, _&c._ which they call obedience to the gospel as a new law: but let it be considered, that these evangelical duties are supposed to be performed as the result of a divine command, which has the formal nature of a law, whether they be contained in the moral law or no; therefore, when we are justified by faith in opposition to the works of the law, this must be opposed to obedience of any kind performed by us.

And this also appears from the nature of faith, to which justification, by the works of the law, is opposed; for faith is a soul-humbling grace, and includes in it a renouncing of all merit, or inducement taken from ourselves, as a reason why God should bestow on us the blessings we stand in need of; it trusts in Christ for righteousness, and in him alone, and therefore turns itself from any thing that may have the least tendency to eclipse his glory, as the only foundation of our justification: therefore, when we are said to be justified by faith, and not by the works of the law, the meaning is, we are justified in such a way as tends to set the crown upon Christ’s head, acknowledging him to be the only fountain from whence this privilege is derived.

It follows from hence that our justification cannot be founded on our repentance; though this is often maintained by those who are on the other side of the question, who suppose, that justification contains in it nothing else but forgiveness of sin; and if offences are to be forgiven by men, upon their repentance, or confessing their fault, then forgiveness may be expected from God, on our repentance: and some use a very unsavoury way of speaking, when they say, that our tears have a virtue to wash away our sins; and that they may give farther countenance to this opinion, they refer to that scripture, in which it is said, _Repent, that your sins may be blotted out_, Acts iii. 19. and others of the like nature; by which we are not to suppose, that the apostle means, that forgiveness of sin is founded on our repentance, as the matter of our justification in the sight of God; but that there is an inseparable connexion between our claim to forgiveness of sin, (together with all the fruits and effects of the death of Christ, whereby this blessing was procured) and repentance; so that one is not to be expected without the other; and though men are to forgive injuries in case the offender acknowledges his fault, and makes sufficient restitution; this they may do, inasmuch as the offence is only committed against a creature; and especially if the offence be of a private nature. But supposing this should be applied to juridical and forensick cases, will any one say, that the prince is obliged to forgive the criminal who is under a sentence of condemnation, because he is sorry for what he has done, or confesses his fault? Would this secure his honour as a law-giver? And if hereupon the offender were to be discharged from his guilt, would not this be a defect in the administration of the legislature? How then can this be applied to forgiveness, expected at the hand of God; in which justice, as well as mercy, is to have the glory that is due to it; and we are not only to be acquitted, but justified, or pronounced guiltless, since our acknowledgment of our offence cannot be reckoned a sufficient satisfaction to the justice of God?

_Object._ It is objected, by those on the other side of the question, that though repentance be not in itself a sufficient compensation to the justice of God for the crimes which we have committed; yet God may, by an act of grace, accept of it, as though it had been sufficient[50]. This they illustrate by a similitude taken from a person’s selling an estate of a considerable value, to one who has no money to buy it, provided he will pay a pepper-corn of acknowledgment. Thus, how insignificant soever, repentance, or any other grace, which is deemed the matter of our justification, be in itself, it is by an act of favour, deemed a sufficient price.

_Answ._ In answer to this I would observe, that the objection, which was before brought against the doctrine we have been maintaining, concerning the imputation of Christ’s righteousness, namely, that it was a putative righteousness, a not judging of things according to truth, and the like, seems to be of no weight when it affects their own cause; otherwise we might turn their argument against themselves, and ask them; whether this be for God to judge according to truth, when that is accepted as a sufficient payment, by his justice, which is in itself of no value? But passing this by, we may farther observe, that this is wholly to set aside the necessity of satisfaction, as the Socinians do; and therefore it is no wonder that they make use of this method of reasoning. As for others who do not altogether deny this doctrine, yet think that a small price may be deemed satisfactory for sin committed. That which may be replied to it, is, that if justification, as tending to advance the glory of divine justice, in taking away the guilt of sin, depends upon a price paid that is equivalent to the debt contracted; and nothing short of a price of infinite value can be reckoned an equivalent thereunto, then certainly that which is performed by men, cannot be deemed a sufficient payment, or accepted of as such.

It is a vain thing for persons to pretend that there is a difference between satisfying God, and satisfying his justice; or, that to satisfy God is to pay a price, be it never so small, that he demands; whereas, satisfying justice is paying a price equal to the thing purchased; since we must conclude, that God cannot deem any thing satisfactory to himself, that is not so to his justice. Therefore, this distinction will not avail, to free their argument from the absurdity that attends it.