Chapter VI: Section 3: of the act entitled "An act to provide for the protection of (5)

A brief statement of the occurrences that led to the subversion of the constitutional Government of Hawaii in the interests of annexation to the United States will exhibit the true complexion of that transaction.

On Saturday, January 14, 1893, the Queen of Hawaii, who had been contemplating the proclamation of a new constitution, had, in deference to the wishes and remonstrances of her cabinet, renounced the project for the present at least. Taking this relinquished purpose as a basis of action, citizens of Honolulu numbering from fifty to one hundred, mostly resident aliens, met in a private office and selected a so-called committee of safety, composed of thirteen persons, seven of whom were foreign subjects, and consisted of five Americans, one Englishman, and one German. This committee, though its designs were not revealed, had in view nothing less than annexation to the United States, and between Saturday, the 14th, and the following Monday, the 16th of January--though exactly what action was taken may not be clearly disclosed--they were certainly in communication with the United States minister. On Monday morning the Queen and her cabinet made public proclamation, with a notice which was specially served upon the representatives of all foreign governments, that any changes in the constitution would be sought only in the methods provided by that instrument. Nevertheless, at the call and under the auspices of the committee of safety, a mass meeting of citizens was held on that day to protest against the Queen's alleged illegal and unlawful proceedings and purposes. Even at this meeting the committee of safety continued to disguise their real purpose and contented themselves with procuring the passage of a resolution denouncing the Queen and empowering the committee to devise ways and means "to secure the permanent maintenance of law and order and the protection of life, liberty, and property in Hawaii." This meeting adjourned between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon. On the same day, and immediately after such adjournment, the committee, unwilling to take further steps without the cooperation of the United States minister, addressed him a note representing that the public safety was menaced and that lives and property were in danger, and concluded as follows:

We are unable to protect ourselves without aid, and therefore pray for
the protection of the United States forces.

Whatever may be thought of the other contents of this note, the absolute truth of this latter statement is incontestable. When the note was written and delivered the committee, so far as it appears, had neither a man nor a gun at their command, and after its delivery they became so panic-stricken at their position that they sent some of their number to interview the minister and request him not to land the United States forces till the next morning. But he replied that the troops had been ordered and whether the committee were ready or not the landing should take place. And so it happened that on the 16th day of January, 1893, between 4 and 5 o'clock in the afternoon, a detachment of marines from the United States steamer _Boston_, with two pieces of artillery, landed at Honolulu. The men, upward of 160 in all, were supplied with double cartridge belts filled with ammunition and with haversacks and canteens, and were accompanied by a hospital corps with stretchers and medical supplies.

This military demonstration upon the soil of Honolulu was of itself an act of war, unless made either with the consent of the Government of Hawaii or for the _bona fide_ purpose of protecting the imperiled lives and property of citizens of the United States. But there is no pretense of any such consent on the part of the Government of the Queen, which at that time was undisputed and was both the _de facto_ and the _de jure_ Government. In point of fact the existing Government, instead of requesting the presence of an armed force, protested against it. There is as little basis for the pretense that such forces were landed for the security of American life and property. If so, they would have been stationed in the vicinity of such property and so as to protect it, instead of at a distance and so as to command the Hawaiian Government building and palace. Admiral Skerrett, the officer in command of our naval force on the Pacific station, has frankly stated that in his opinion the location of the troops was inadvisable if they were landed for the protection of American citizens, whose residences and places of business, as well as the legation and consulate, were in a distant part of the city; but the location selected was a wise one if the forces were landed for the purpose of supporting the Provisional Government. If any peril to life and property calling for any such martial array had existed, Great Britain and other foreign powers interested would not have been behind the United States in activity to protect their citizens. But they made no sign in that direction. When these armed men were landed the city of Honolulu was in its customary orderly and peaceful condition. There was no symptom of riot or disturbance in any quarter. Men, women, and children were about the streets as usual, and nothing varied the ordinary routine or disturbed the ordinary tranquillity except the landing of the _Boston's_ marines and their march through the town to the quarters assigned them. Indeed, the fact that after having called for the landing of the United States forces on the plea of danger to life and property the committee of safety themselves requested the minister to postpone action exposed the untruthfulness of their representations of present peril to life and property. The peril they saw was an anticipation growing out of guilty intentions on their part and something which, though not then existing, they knew would certainly follow their attempt to overthrow the Government of the Queen without the aid of the United States forces.

Thus it appears that Hawaii was taken possession of by the United States forces without the consent or wish of the Government of the islands, or of anybody else so far as shown except the United States minister. Therefore the military occupation of Honolulu by the United States on the day mentioned was wholly without justification, either as an occupation by consent or as an occupation necessitated by dangers threatening American life and property. It must be accounted for in some other way and on some other ground, and its real motive and purpose are neither obscure nor far to seek.

The United States forces being now on the scene and favorably stationed, the committee proceeded to carry out their original scheme. They met the next morning, Tuesday, the 17th, perfected the plan of temporary government, and fixed upon its principal officers, ten of whom were drawn from the thirteen members of the committee of safety. Between 1 and 2 o'clock, by squads and by different routes to avoid notice, and having first taken the precaution of ascertaining whether there was anyone there to oppose them, they proceeded to the Government building to proclaim the new Government. No sign of opposition was manifest, and thereupon an American citizen began to read the proclamation from the steps of the Government building, almost entirely without auditors. It is said that before the reading was finished quite a concourse of persons, variously estimated at from 50 to 100, some armed and some unarmed, gathered about the committee to give them aid and confidence. This statement is not important, since the one controlling factor in the whole affair was unquestionably the United States marines, who, drawn up under arms and with artillery in readiness only 76 yards distant, dominated the situation.

The Provisional Government thus proclaimed was by the terms of the proclamation "to exist until terms of union with the United States had been negotiated and agreed upon." The United States minister, pursuant to prior agreement, recognized this Government within an hour after the reading of the proclamation, and before 5 o'clock, in answer to an inquiry on behalf of the Queen and her cabinet, announced that he had done so.

When our minister recognized the Provisional Government, the only basis upon which it rested was the fact that the committee of safety had in the manner above stated declared it to exist. It was neither a government _de facto_ nor _de jure_. That it was not in such possession of the Government property and agencies as entitled it to recognition is conclusively proved by a note found in the files of the legation at Honolulu, addressed by the declared head of the Provisional Government to Minister Stevens, dated January 17, 1893, in which he acknowledges with expressions of appreciation the minister's recognition of the Provisional Government, and states that it is not yet in the possession of the station house (the place where a large number of the Queen's troops were quartered), though the same had been demanded of the Queen's officers in charge. Nevertheless, this wrongful recognition by our minister placed the Government of the Queen in a position of most perilous perplexity. On the one hand she had possession of the palace, of the barracks, and of the police station, and had at her command at least 500 fully armed men and several pieces of artillery. Indeed, the whole military force of her Kingdom was on her side and at her disposal, while the committee of safety, by actual search, had discovered that there were but very few arms in Honolulu that were not in the service of the Government.

In this state of things, if the Queen could have dealt with the insurgents alone, her course would have been plain and the result unmistakable. But the United States had allied itself with her enemies, had recognized them as the true Government of Hawaii, and had put her and her adherents in the position of opposition against lawful authority. She knew that she could not withstand the power of the United States, but she believed that she might safely trust to its justice. Accordingly, some hours after the recognition of the Provisional Government by the United States minister, the palace, the barracks, and the police station, with all the military resources of the country, were delivered up by the Queen upon the representation made to her that her cause would thereafter be reviewed at Washington, and while protesting that she surrendered to the superior force of the United States, whose minister had caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support the Provisional Government, and that she yielded her authority to prevent collision of armed forces and loss of life, and only until such time as the United States, upon the facts being presented to it, should undo the action of its representative and reinstate her in the authority she claimed as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.

This protest was delivered to the chief of the Provisional Government, who indorsed thereon his acknowledgment of its receipt. The terms of the protest were read without dissent by those assuming to constitute the Provisional Government, who were certainly charged with the knowledge that the Queen, instead of finally abandoning her power, had appealed to the justice of the United States for reinstatement in her authority; and yet the Provisional Government, with this unanswered protest in its hand, hastened to negotiate with the United States for the permanent banishment of the Queen from power and for a sale of her Kingdom.

Our country was in danger of occupying the position of having actually set up a temporary government on foreign soil for the purpose of acquiring through that agency territory which we had wrongfully put in its possession. The control of both sides of a bargain acquired in such a manner is called by a familiar and unpleasant name when found in private transactions. We are not without a precedent showing how scrupulously we avoided such accusations in former days. After the people of Texas had declared their independence of Mexico they resolved that on the acknowledgment of their independence by the United States they would seek admission into the Union. Several months after the battle of San Jacinto, by which Texan independence was practically assured and established, President Jackson declined to recognize it, alleging as one of his reasons that in the circumstances it became us "to beware of a too early movement, as it might subject us, however unjustly, to the imputation of seeking to establish the claim of our neighbors to a territory with a view to its subsequent acquisition by ourselves." This is in marked contrast with the hasty recognition of a government openly and concededly set up for the purpose of tendering to us territorial annexation.

I believe that a candid and thorough examination of the facts will force the conviction that the Provisional Government owes its existence to an armed invasion by the United States. Fair-minded people, with the evidence before them, will hardly claim that the Hawaiian Government was overthrown by the people of the islands or that the Provisional Government had ever existed with their consent. I do not understand that any member of this Government claims that the people would uphold it by their suffrages if they were allowed to vote on the question.

While naturally sympathizing with every effort to establish a republican form of government, it has been the settled policy of the United States to concede to people of foreign countries the same freedom and independence in the management of their domestic affairs that we have always claimed for ourselves, and it has been our practice to recognize revolutionary governments as soon as it became apparent that they were supported by the people. For illustration of this rule I need only to refer to the revolution in Brazil in 1889, when our minister was instructed to recognize the Republic "so soon as a majority of the people of Brazil should have signified their assent to its establishment and maintenance;" to the revolution in Chile in 1891, when our minister was directed to recognize the new Government "if it was accepted by the people," and to the revolution in Venezuela in 1892, when our recognition was accorded on condition that the new Government was "fully established, in possession of the power of the nation, and accepted by the people."

As I apprehend the situation, we are brought face to face with the following conditions:

The lawful Government of Hawaii was overthrown without the drawing of a sword or the firing of a shot by a process every step of which, it may safely be asserted, is directly traceable to and dependent for its success upon the agency of the United States acting through its diplomatic and naval representatives.

But for the notorious predilections of the United States minister for annexation the committee of safety, which should be called the committee of annexation, would never have existed.

But for the landing of the United States forces upon false pretexts respecting the danger to life and property the committee would never have exposed themselves to the pains and penalties of treason by undertaking the subversion of the Queen's Government.

But for the presence of the United States forces in the immediate vicinity and in position to afford all needed protection and support the committee would not have proclaimed the Provisional Government from the steps of the Government building.

And finally, but for the lawless occupation of Honolulu under false pretexts by the United States forces, and but for Minister Stevens's recognition of the Provisional Government when the United States forces were its sole support and constituted its only military strength, the Queen and her Government would never have yielded to the Provisional Government, even for a time and for the sole purpose of submitting her case to the enlightened justice of the United States.

Believing, therefore, that the United States could not, under the circumstances disclosed, annex the islands without justly incurring the imputation of acquiring them by unjustifiable methods, I shall not again submit the treaty of annexation to the Senate for its consideration, and in the instructions to Minister Willis, a copy of which accompanies this message, I have directed him to so inform the Provisional Government.

But in the present instance our duty does not, in my opinion, end with refusing to consummate this questionable transaction. It has been the boast of our Government that it seeks to do justice in all things without regard to the strength or weakness of those with whom it deals. I mistake the American people if they favor the odious doctrine that there is no such thing as international morality; that there is one law for a strong nation and another for a weak one, and that even by indirection a strong power may with impunity despoil a weak one of its territory.

By an act of war, committed with the participation of a diplomatic representative of the United States and without authority of Congress, the Government of a feeble but friendly and confiding people has been overthrown. A substantial wrong has thus been done which a due regard for our national character as well as the rights of the injured people requires we should endeavor to repair. The Provisional Government has not assumed a republican or other constitutional form, but has remained a mere executive council or oligarchy, set up without the assent of the people. It has not sought to find a permanent basis of popular support and has given no evidence of an intention to do so. Indeed, the representatives of that Government assert that the people of Hawaii are unfit for popular government and frankly avow that they can be best ruled by arbitrary or despotic power.

The law of nations is founded upon reason and justice, and the rules of conduct governing individual relations between citizens or subjects of a civilized state are equally applicable as between enlightened nations.

The considerations that international law is without a court for its enforcement and that obedience to its commands practically depends upon good faith instead of upon the mandate of a superior tribunal only give additional sanction to the law itself and brand any deliberate infraction of it not merely as a wrong, but as a disgrace. A man of true honor protects the unwritten word which binds his conscience more scrupulously, if possible, than he does the bond a breach of which subjects him to legal liabilities, and the United States, in aiming to maintain itself as one of the most enlightened nations, would do its citizens gross injustice if it applied to its international relations any other than a high standard of honor and morality. On that ground the United States can not properly be put in the position of countenancing a wrong after its commission any more than in that of consenting to it in advance. On that ground it can not allow itself to refuse to redress an injury inflicted through an abuse of power by officers clothed with its authority and wearing its uniform; and on the same ground, if a feeble but friendly state is in danger of being robbed of its independence and its sovereignty by a misuse of the name and power of the United States, the United States can not fail to vindicate its honor and its sense of justice by an earnest effort to make all possible reparation.

These principles apply to the present case with irresistible force when the special conditions of the Queen's surrender of her sovereignty are recalled. She surrendered, not to the Provisional Government, but to the United States. She surrendered, not absolutely and permanently, but temporarily and conditionally until such time as the facts could be considered by the United States. Furthermore, the Provisional Government acquiesced in her surrender in that manner and on those terms, not only by tacit consent, but through the positive acts of some members of that Government, who urged her peaceable submission, not merely to avoid bloodshed, but because she could place implicit reliance upon the justice of the United States and that the whole subject would be finally considered at Washington.

I have not, however, overlooked an incident of this unfortunate affair which remains to be mentioned. The members of the Provisional Government and their supporters, though not entitled to extreme sympathy, have been led to their present predicament of revolt against the Government of the Queen by the indefensible encouragement and assistance of our diplomatic representative. This fact may entitle them to claim that in our effort to rectify the wrong committed some regard should be had for their safety. This sentiment is strongly seconded by my anxiety to do nothing which would invite either harsh retaliation on the part of the Queen or violence and bloodshed in any quarter. In the belief that the Queen, as well as her enemies, would be willing to adopt such a course as would meet these conditions, and in view of the fact that both the Queen and the Provisional Government had at one time apparently acquiesced in a reference of the entire case to the United States Government, and considering the further fact that in any event the Provisional Government by its own declared limitation was only "to exist until terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed upon," I hoped that after the assurance to the members of that Government that such union could not be consummated I might compass a peaceful adjustment of the difficulty.

Actuated by these desires and purposes, and not unmindful of the inherent perplexities of the situation nor of the limitations upon my power, I instructed Minister Willis to advise the Queen and her supporters of my desire to aid in the restoration of the status existing before the lawless landing of the United States forces at Honolulu on the 16th of January last if such restoration could be effected upon terms providing for clemency as well as justice to all parties concerned. The conditions suggested, as the instructions show, contemplate a general amnesty to those concerned in setting up the Provisional Government and a recognition of all its _bona fide_ acts and obligations. In short, they require that the past should be buried and that the restored Government should reassume its authority as if its continuity had not been interrupted. These conditions have not proved acceptable to the Queen, and though she has been informed that they will be insisted upon and that unless acceded to the efforts of the President to aid in the restoration of her Government will cease, I have not thus far learned that she is willing to yield them her acquiescence. The check which my plans have thus encountered has prevented their presentation to the members of the Provisional Government, while unfortunate public misrepresentations of the situation and exaggerated statements of the sentiments of our people have obviously injured the prospects of successful Executive mediation.

I therefore submit this communication, with its accompanying exhibits, embracing Mr. Blount's report, the evidence and statements taken by him at Honolulu, the instructions given to both Mr. Blount and Minister Willis, and correspondence connected with the affair in hand.

In commending this subject to the extended powers and wide discretion of the Congress I desire to add the assurance that I shall be much gratified to cooperate in any legislative plan which may be devised for the solution of the problem before us which is consistent with American honor, integrity, and morality.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

[Footnote 4: See pp. 348-349.]

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _Washington, December 18, 1893_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

In compliance with a resolution passed by the Senate on the 6th instant, I hereby transmit reports of the Secretaries of State and of the Navy, with copies of all instructions given to the respective diplomatic and naval representatives of the United States in the Hawaiian Islands since the 4th day of March, 1881, touching the matters specified in the resolution.

It has seemed convenient to include in the present communication to the Senate copies of the diplomatic correspondence concerning the political condition of Hawaii, prepared for transmission to the House of Representatives in response to a later resolution passed by that body on the 13th instant.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _Washington, December 18, 1893_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

In compliance with a resolution passed by your honorable body on the 13th instant, I hereby transmit a report of the Secretary of State, with copies of the instructions given to Mr. Albert S. Willis, the representative of the United States now in the Hawaiian Islands, and also the correspondence since the 4th day of March, 1889, concerning the relations of this Government to those islands.

In making this communication I have withheld only a dispatch from the former minister to Hawaii, numbered 70, under date of October 8, 1892, and a dispatch from the present minister, numbered 3, under date of November 16, 1893, because in my opinion the publication of these two papers would be incompatible with the public interest.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _January 4, 1894_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I transmit herewith a report of the Secretary of State, submitted in compliance with the resolution of October 17 last, in the matter of the claim of certain persons against the Government of Spain for illegal arrest off the coast of Yucatan in the year 1850, and subsequent imprisonment.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _January 13, 1894_.

_To the Congress_:

I transmit herewith copies of all dispatches from our minister at Hawaii relating in any way to political affairs in that country, except such as have been heretofore laid before the Congress.

I also transmit a copy of the last instructions sent to our minister, dated January 12, 1894, being the only instructions to him not already sent to the Congress.

In transmitting certain correspondence with my message dated December 18, 1893, I withheld a dispatch from our present minister, numbered 3 and dated November 16, 1893, and also a dispatch from our former minister, numbered 70 and dated October 8, 1892. Inasmuch as the contents of the dispatch of November 16, 1893, are referred to in the dispatches of a more recent date, now sent to Congress, and inasmuch as there seems no longer to be sufficient reason for withholding said dispatch, a copy of the same is herewith submitted. The dispatch numbered 70 and dated October 8, 1892, above referred to, is still withheld for the reason that such a course still appears to be justifiable and proper.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _January 20, 1894_.

_To the Congress_:

I transmit herewith dispatches received yesterday from our minister at Hawaii, with certain correspondence which accompanied the same, including a most extraordinary letter, dated December 27, 1893, signed by Sanford B. Dole, minister of foreign affairs of the Provisional Government, addressed to our minister, Mr. Willis, and delivered to him a number of hours after the arrival at Honolulu of a copy of my message to Congress on the Hawaiian question, with copies of instructions given to our minister.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _January 22, 1894_.

_To the Congress_:

I transmit herewith copies of dispatches received from our minister to Hawaii after the arrival of those copies which accompanied my message of the 20th instant. I also inclose, for the information of Congress, copies of reports and a copy of an order just received by the Secretary of the Navy from Rear-Admiral Irwin, commanding our naval forces at Honolulu.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _February 2, 1894_.

_To the Congress_:

I transmit a communication from the Secretary of State, accompanying a dispatch received a few days ago from our minister at Hawaii.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _Washington, February 12, 1894_.

_To the Congress_:

I transmit herewith two dispatches received a few days ago from our minister at Hawaii, and a reply to one of them from the Secretary of State, in which a correct version is given of an interview which occurred November 14, 1893, between the Secretary of State and Mr. Thurston, representing the Provisional Government at Washington.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _February 16, 1894_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives_:

I transmit herewith, for the information of Congress, a communication from the Secretary of State, covering the report of the Director of the Bureau of the American Republics for the year 1893.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _February 19, 1894_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

I herewith transmit copies of certain dispatches recently received from our minister at Honolulu.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _February 19, 1894_.

_To the Senate_:

On the evening of the 16th instant I received a copy of a resolution passed by the Senate, requesting the transmission to that body of all reports and dispatches from our minister at Hawaii, and especially a certain letter written to him by Mr. Dole, President of the Provisional Government.

On the same day I received from the State Department a copy of a dispatch from Minister Willis, accompanied by various exhibits. I was not able to send them to the Senate on that day. The Senate adjourned that afternoon until to-day, and thus prevented the submission until now of these papers.

The next day after the receipt of the Senate resolution, and on the 17th instant, other dispatches were received from Mr. Willis at the State Department. They were copied with all possible haste, and are now submitted at the first meeting of the Senate since their receipt. They include the letter mentioned in the Senate resolution and the answer of Minister Willis to the same.

Since the 18th day of December last, when I submitted to the "broader authority and discretion of the Congress" all matters connected with our relations with Hawaii, I have with the utmost promptness transmitted to the Congress all dispatches and reports relative to the subject, and I am not aware of any dispatches or documents in the remotest way connected with these relations which have come to the possession of the State Department or the Executive and been withheld from the Senate.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _Washington, March 7, 1894_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I transmit herewith a report submitted by the Secretary of State in response to the resolution of the Senate dated January 23, 1894, requesting communication of correspondence exchanged between the Government of the United States and the Governments of Colombia, Venezuela, and Hayti.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _March 7, 1894_.

_To the Congress_:

I transmit herewith copies of certain dispatches lately received from our minister at Hawaii, together with copies of the inclosures which accompanied such dispatches.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _March 8, 1894_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I transmit herewith a report furnished by the Secretary of State in response to a resolution of the Senate of the 1st instant, making inquiry respecting the present condition of the _Virginius_ indemnity fund.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _Washington, D.C., March 14, 1894_.

_To the Senate_:

I herewith transmit a report[5] of the Secretary of State of the 14th instant, concerning the several inquiries in the resolution of the Senate addressed to him under date of the 9th instant.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

[Footnote 5: Relating to the coined silver money and the products of India, Russia, and the Argentine Republic.]

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _Washington, March 19, 1894_.

_To the Senate_:

I transmit herewith, with a view to its ratification, a convention concluded at this capital on the 17th instant between the United States and China concerning the subject of emigration between those two countries.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _Washington, March 19, 1894_.

_To the Senate_:

I transmit herewith a report from the Secretary of State, concerning the landing of British troops at Bluefields, Nicaragua, in answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 7th instant on that subject.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _March 19, 1894_.

_To the Congress_:

I transmit herewith a copy of a dispatch received from our minister at Hawaii, together with copies of the inclosures which accompanied said dispatch.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _Washington, April 3, 1894_.

_To the Senate_:

I transmit herewith report from the Secretary of State, inclosing the final report of the agent of the United States before the Paris Tribunal, also the protocols thus far received and certain other papers relating to that arbitration.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _Washington, April 13, 1894_.

_To the Congress_:

I transmit herewith copies of certain dispatches from the United States minister at Honolulu, received by the Secretary of State since my message of March 19, 1894.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _Washington, April 21, 1894_.

_To the Congress_:

I transmit herewith a communication from the Secretary of State, covering a dispatch from the United States minister at Honolulu and reply thereto.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _Washington, D.C., May 1, 1894_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives_:

I transmit herewith the ninth annual report of the Commissioner of Labor. This report relates entirely to building and loan associations in the United States.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _Washington, May 9, 1894_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I transmit herewith, in response to the resolution of the Senate of April 6, 1894, a report of the Secretary of State, containing the requested information as to the present condition of affairs in the Samoan Islands, with copies of the correspondence in relation thereto, including that with the Governments of Great Britain and Germany.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _Washington, May 9, 1894_.

_To the Congress_:

I transmit herewith a communication from the Secretary of State, in regard to recent dispatches from the United States minister at Honolulu, received since my message of April 21, 1894, and also a dispatch from the minister dated April 14, 1894.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _Washington, May 29, 1894_.

_To the Congress_:

I herewith transmit, having regard to my message of May 9, 1894, a communication from the Secretary of State, covering a dispatch from the United States minister at Honolulu.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _Washington, June 20, 1894_.

_To the Senate_:

I transmit herewith, in response to the resolution of the Senate of December 20, 1893, a report from the Acting Secretary of State, covering the desired copies of correspondence in the matter of the claim of Antonio Maximo Mora against Spain.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _Washington, June 23, 1894_.

_To the Congress_:

I herewith transmit a communication covering dispatches from the United States minister at Honolulu.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _June 25, 1894_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives_:

The shocking intelligence has been received that the President of the French Republic met his death yesterday at the hands of an assassin. This terrible event which has overtaken a sister Republic can not fail to deeply arouse the sympathies of the American nation, while the violent termination of a career promising so much in aid of liberty and advancing civilization should be mourned as an affliction to mankind.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _June 29, 1894_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

Answering a resolution of your honorable body dated the 13th instant, I transmit herewith a report[6] of the Secretary of State, with an accompanying document, which contain all the information in my possession touching the matters embraced in said resolution.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

[Footnote 6: Relating to the probable retaliatory action of foreign governments for the proposed imposition by the United States of a duty on sugar.]

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _Washington, July 9, 1894_.

_To the Senate_:

I transmit herewith, in further response to the Senate resolution of April 6, 1894, a report from the Secretary of State, accompanied by copies of certain correspondence relating to Samoan affairs.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _July 19, 1894_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

In compliance with a resolution of the Senate of the 18th instant, the House of Representatives concurring, I return herewith the bill (S. 1105) entitled "An act for the relief of Albert Redstone."

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _Washington, July 24, 1894_.

_To the Congress_:

I herewith transmit a communication from the Secretary of State, covering a dispatch from the United States minister at Honolulu.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _Washington, D.C., July 27, 1894_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives_:

I transmit herewith the seventh special report of the Commissioner of Labor. This report relates to what is generally known as the slums of cities, and has been prepared in accordance with a joint resolution approved July 20, 1892.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _Washington, July 30, 1894_.

_To the Congress_:

I herewith transmit a communication from the Secretary of State, covering two dispatches from the United States minister at Honolulu.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

VETO MESSAGES.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _January 17, 1894_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

I return without my approval House bill No. 71, entitled "An act for the relief of purchasers of timber and stone lands under the act of June 3, 1878."

This bill permits the proofs and affidavits which under present statutes parties desiring to acquire certain public lands are required to make before the registers and receivers of the land offices within which such lands are located to be made before any commissioner of the United States circuit court or before the judge or clerk of any court of records of the county or parish in which the lands are situated.

A similar bill was passed by the Fifty-second Congress and was disapproved by the Commissioner of the General Land Office and the Secretary of the Interior. The successors of these officers oppose the present bill on the ground that in its operation it would open the door to fraud and to a perversion of the intentions of the Government in relation to the public lands.

It is difficult, with the most scrupulous care, to guard the alienation of our public lands from fraud and illegal practices. It is perfectly plain, however, that the prospect of accomplishing this result is better under present laws, which require the necessary proofs to be made before land officers who are appointed for that purpose and who are under the control of the General Land Office and amenable to its regulations, than it would be by substituting other officers over whom the Land Office has no control.

Certain rules and orders of the Land Office are now in force which regulate the taking of the necessary proofs and permit oral examinations by registers and receivers. These regulations are of the utmost importance if our land laws are to be justly and honestly administered.

I fully concur in the objections made to this bill by the officers having charge of the public lands in the last Administration and by their successors who are now charged with that responsibility. I am convinced that such a relaxation of our existing land laws as is contemplated by the bill under consideration would not be in the interest of good administration.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _January 20, 1894_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

I hereby return without my approval House bill No. 3289, entitled "An act to authorize the New York and New Jersey Bridge Companies to construct and maintain a bridge across the Hudson River between New York City and the State of New Jersey."

This bill authorizes the construction of a bridge over the North River between the States of New York and New Jersey, the terminus of which in the city of New York shall not be below Sixty-sixth street. It contemplates the construction of a bridge upon piers placed in the river. No mention is made of a single span crossing the entire river, nor is there anything in the bill indicating that it was within the intention of the Congress that there should be a bridge built without piers. I am by no means certain that the Secretary of War, who is invested by the terms of the bill with considerable discretion so far as the plans for the structure are concerned, would have the right to exact of the promoters of this enterprise the erection of a bridge spanning the entire river.

Much objection has been made to the location of any piers in the river for the reason that they would seriously interfere with the commerce which seeks the port of New York through that channel. It is certainly very questionable whether piers should be permitted at all in the North River at the point designated for the location of this bridge. It seems absolutely certain that within a few years a great volume of shipping will extend to that location, which would be seriously embarrassed by such obstruction.

I appreciate fully the importance of securing some means by which railroad traffic can cross this river, and no one can fail to realize the serious inconvenience to travel caused by lack of facilities of that character. At the same time, it is a plain dictate of wisdom and expediency that the commerce of the river be not unnecessarily interfered with by bridges or in any other manner.

Engineers whose judgment upon the matter can not be questioned, including the engineer of the company proposing to build this bridge, have expressed the opinion that the entire river can be spanned safely and effectively by a suspension bridge, or a construction not needing the use of piers.

The company to which the permission to bridge the river is granted in the bill under consideration was created by virtue of an act of the legislature of the State of New York which became a law, by reason of the failure of the governor to either approve or veto the same, on the 30th day of April, 1890. It may be safely assumed that the members of the legislature which passed this law knew what was necessary for the protection of the commerce of the city of New York and had informed themselves concerning the plan of a bridge that should be built in view of all the interests concerned.

By paragraph 24 of the law creating this company it is provided that "the said bridge shall be constructed with a single span over the entire river between towers or piers located between the span and the existing pier-head lines in either State," and that "no pier or tower or other obstruction of a permanent character shall be placed or built in the river between said towers or piers under this act."

In view of such professional judgment, and considering the interests which would be interfered with by the location of piers in the river, and having due regard to the judgment of the legislature of the State of New York, it seems to me that a plan necessitating the use of piers in the bed of the river should be avoided. The question of increased expense of construction or the compromise of conflicting interests should not outweigh the other important considerations involved.

I notice the bill provides that the companies availing themselves of its privileges shall receive no greater pay for transporting the mails across the bridge than is allowed per mile to railroads using the same. If this is intended, as the language seems to import, to authorize this bridge company to charge the United States Government a toll for the carriage of its mails across the bridge equal to the amount which may be paid per mile by the Government for carrying the mails by railroads crossing the bridge, it seems to me it should not be allowed. The expense to the Government for carrying the mails over the structure should beyond any doubt be limited to the compensation paid the railroads for transportation.

An exceedingly important objection to the bill remains to be considered. In 1890 the North River Bridge Company was incorporated by an act of Congress for the purpose of constructing a bridge across the North River, the New York terminus of which was located at or near Twenty-third street in the city of New York. The proposition to construct the bridge at that point was a subject very carefully and thoroughly examined at that time and during the agitation of the project for a number of years prior to the passage of the act. As a result of such examination and much discussion, Congress granted permission to this company to construct a bridge having a single span and suspended from towers on each side of the river, and in the act especially prohibited the placing of any piers in the river, either of a temporary or of a permanent character, in connection with said bridge. This plan to bridge the river without piers was at that time considered feasible by the engineers of the company, and it accepted the terms of the act. Before this permission was finally granted a number of bills were introduced in the Congress covering the same subject, which were referred to Government engineers. Reports were made by these officers in every case insisting upon a construction with a single span and without piers in the bed of the river.

The eighth subdivision of the bill herewith returned provides that any company heretofore created for the purpose of bridging the river may avail itself of the provisions of the act, and makes such company subject to all its provisions. This, of course, has reference to the North River Bridge Company and releases that company from the prohibition of the act under which it was permitted to span the river and permits it to construct piers in the river. It seems to me that the language of the bill under consideration, so far as it relates to this particular feature, is equivalent to a new grant to that company, differing very materially from the grant which was thought expedient at the time it was before the Congress, and removes the guaranty that in the construction of its bridge there shall be no obstructions in the river such as were especially guarded against by the bill originally passed for its benefit. In effect a new charter is granted to a company not named in the bill, and with no apparent reason for the important enlargement of its privileges thus accomplished. It is entirely apparent that the reasons against obstructions in the North River which might interfere with commerce and navigation and the beneficial use of the harbor of New York are immensely strengthened when they are applied to a location in the river far below the location of the bridge which is permitted in the bill now before me.

Whatever question there may be about the injurious character of the obstruction at Sixty-sixth street in New York City, I believe there can be no doubt whatever that piers placed in the river more than 2 miles below, at Twenty-third street, would be very serious impediments. If this thoroughfare, so important to the commerce of the country and the State of New York, is to be crossed by bridges, each scheme for that purpose should be considered by itself and its merits and advisability determined by the circumstances which naturally belong to it. The objection to piers in the river for the purpose of supporting bridges is in any event so serious that the considerations which would determine the question of a bridge located at Sixty-sixth street ought not in such an indirect manner as is done by this bill be applied to a like structure at Twenty-third street.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _March 29, 1894_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

I return without my approval House bill No. 4956, entitled "An act directing the coinage of the silver bullion held in the Treasury, and for other purposes."

My strong desire to avoid disagreement with those in both Houses of Congress who have supported this bill would lead me to approve it if I could believe that the public good would not be thereby endangered and that such action on my part would be a proper discharge of official duty. Inasmuch, however, as I am unable to satisfy myself that the proposed legislation is either wise or opportune, my conception of the obligations and responsibilities attached to the great office I hold forbids the indulgence of my personal desire and inexorably confines me to that course which is dictated by my reason and judgment and pointed out by a sincere purpose to protect and promote the general interests of our people.

The financial disturbance which swept over the country during the last year was unparalleled in its severity and disastrous consequences. There seemed to be almost an entire displacement of faith in our financial ability and a loss of confidence in our fiscal policy. Among those who attempted to assign causes for our distress it was very generally conceded that the operation of a provision of law then in force which required the Government to purchase monthly a large amount of silver bullion and issue its notes in payment therefor was either entirely or to a large extent responsible for our condition. This led to the repeal on the 1st day of November, 1893, of this statutory provision.

We had, however, fallen so low in the depths of depression and timidity and apprehension had so completely gained control in financial circles that our rapid recuperation could not be reasonably expected. Our recovery has, nevertheless, steadily progressed, and though less than five months have elapsed since the repeal of the mischievous silver-purchase requirement a wholesome improvement is unmistakably apparent. Confidence in our absolute solvency is to such an extent reinstated and faith in our disposition to adhere to sound financial methods is so far restored as to produce the most encouraging results both at home and abroad. The wheels of domestic industry have been slowly set in motion and the tide of foreign investment has again started in our direction.

Our recovery being so well under way, nothing should be done to check our convalescence; nor should we forget that a relapse at this time would almost surely reduce us to a lower stage of financial distress than that from which we are just emerging.

I believe that if the bill under consideration should become a law it would be regarded as a retrogression from the financial intentions indicated by our recent repeal of the provision forcing silver-bullion purchases; that it would weaken, if it did not destroy, returning faith and confidence in our sound financial tendencies, and that as a consequence our progress to renewed business health would be unfortunately checked and a return to our recent distressing plight seriously threatened.

This proposed legislation is so related to the currency conditions growing out of the law compelling the purchase of silver by the Government that a glance at such conditions and a partial review of the law referred to may not be unprofitable.

Between the 14th day of August, 1890, when the law became operative, and the 1st day of November, 1893, when the clause it contained directing the purchase of silver was repealed, there were purchased by the Secretary of the Treasury more than 168,000,000 ounces of silver bullion. In payment for this bullion the Government issued its Treasury notes, of various denominations, amounting to nearly $156,000,000, which notes were immediately added to the currency in circulation among our people. Such notes were by the law made legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, except when otherwise expressly stipulated, and were made receivable for customs, taxes, and all public dues, and when so received might be reissued. They were also permitted to be held by banking associations as a part of their lawful reserves.

On the demand of the holders these Treasury notes were to be redeemed in gold or silver coin, in the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury; but it was declared as a part of this redemption provision that it was "the established policy of the United States to maintain the two metals on a parity with each other upon the present legal ratio or such ratio as may be provided by law." The money coined from such bullion was to be standard silver dollars, and after directing the immediate coinage of a little less than 28,000,000 ounces the law provided that as much of the remaining bullion should be thereafter coined as might be necessary to provide for the redemption of the Treasury notes issued on its purchase, and that "any gain or seigniorage arising from such coinage shall be accounted for and paid into the Treasury."

This gain or seigniorage evidently indicates so much of the bullion owned by the Government as should remain after using a sufficient amount to coin as many standard silver dollars as should equal in number the dollars represented by the Treasury notes issued in payment of the entire quantity of bullion. These Treasury notes now outstanding and in circulation amount to $152,951,280, and although there has been thus far but a comparatively small amount of this bullion coined, yet the so-called gain or seigniorage, as above defined, which would arise from the coinage of the entire mass has been easily ascertained to be a quantity of bullion sufficient to make when coined 55,156,681 standard silver dollars.