Chapter XVI: Section 3: of the act entitled "An act to provide for the protection of (5)

Before attempting to give an outline of the facts upon which this conclusion rests I think it right to say a word or two upon the legal aspect of the case. The _Baltimore_ was in the harbor of Valparaiso by virtue of that general invitation which nations are held to extend to the war vessels of other powers with which they have friendly relations. This invitation, I think, must be held ordinarily to embrace the privilege of such communication with the shore as is reasonable, necessary, and proper for the comfort and convenience of the officers and men of such vessels. Captain Schley testifies that when his vessel returned to Valparaiso on September 14 the city officers, as is customary, extended the hospitalities of the city to his officers and crew. It is not claimed that every personal collision or injury in which a sailor or officer of such naval vessel visiting the shore may be involved raises an international question, but I am clearly of the opinion that where such sailors or officers are assaulted by a resident populace, animated by hostility to the government whose uniform these sailors and officers wear and in resentment of acts done by their government, not by them, their nation must take notice of the event as one involving an infraction of its rights and dignity, not in a secondary way, as where a citizen is injured and presents his claim through his own government, but in a primary way, precisely as if its minister or consul or the flag itself had been the object of the same character of assault.

The officers and sailors of the _Baltimore_ were in the harbor of Valparaiso under the orders of their Government, not by their own choice. They were upon the shore by the implied invitation of the Government of Chile and with the approval of their commanding officer; and it does not distinguish their case from that of a consul that his stay is more permanent or that he holds the express invitation of the local government to justify his longer residence. Nor does it affect the question that the injury was the act of a mob. If there had been no participation by the police or military in this cruel work and no neglect on their part to extend protection, the case would still be one, in my opinion, when its extent and character are considered, involving international rights. The incidents of the affair are briefly as follows:

On the 16th of October last Captain Schley, commanding the United States steamship _Baltimore_, gave shore leave to 117 petty officers and sailors of his ship. These men left the ship about 1.30 p.m. No incident of violence occurred, none of our men were arrested, no complaint was lodged against them, nor did any collision or outbreak occur until about 6 o'clock p.m. Captain Schley states that he was himself on shore and about the streets of the city until 5.30 p.m.; that he met very many of his men who were upon leave; that they were sober and were conducting themselves with propriety, saluting Chilean and other officers as they met them. Other officers of the ship and Captain Jenkins, of the merchant ship _Keweenaw_, corroborate Captain Schley as to the general sobriety and good behavior of our men. The Sisters of Charity at the hospital to which our wounded men were taken when inquired of stated that they were sober when received. If the situation had been otherwise, we must believe that the Chilean police authorities would have made arrests. About 6 p.m. the assault began, and it is remarkable that the investigation by the judge of crimes, though so protracted, does not enable him to give any more satisfactory account of its origin than is found in the statement that it began between drunken sailors. Repeatedly in the correspondence it is asserted that it was impossible to learn the precise cause of the riot. The minister of foreign affairs, Matta, in his telegram to Mr. Montt under date December 31, states that the quarrel began between two sailors in a tavern and was continued in the street, persons who were passing joining in it.

The testimony of Talbot, an apprentice, who was with Riggin, is that the outbreak in which they were involved began by a Chilean sailor's spitting in the face of Talbot, which was resented by a knockdown. It appears that Riggin and Talbot were at the time unaccompanied by others of their shipmates. These two men were immediately beset by a crowd of Chilean citizens and sailors, through which they broke their way to a street car, and entered it for safety. They were pursued, driven from the car, and Riggin was so seriously beaten that he fell in the street apparently dead. There is nothing in the report of the Chilean investigation made to us that seriously impeaches this testimony. It appears from Chilean sources that almost instantly, with a suddenness that strongly implies meditation and preparation, a mob, stated by the police authorities at one time to number 2,000 and at another 1,000, was engaged in the assault upon our sailors, who are represented as resisting "with stones, clubs, and bright arms." The report of the _intendente_ of October 30 states that the fight began at 6 p.m. in three streets, which are named; that information was received at the _intendencia_ at 6.15, and that the police arrived on the scene at 6.30, a full half hour after the assault began. At that time he says that a mob of 2,000 men had collected, and that for several squares there was the appearance of a "real battlefield."

The scene at this point is very graphically set before us by the Chilean testimony. The American sailors, who after so long an examination have not been found guilty of any breach of the peace so far as the Chilean authorities are able to discover, unarmed and defenseless, are fleeing for their lives, pursued by overwhelming numbers, and fighting only to aid their own escape from death or to succor some mate whose life is in greater peril. Eighteen of them are brutally stabbed and beaten, while one Chilean seems from the report to have suffered some injury, but how serious or with what character of weapon, or whether by a missile thrown by our men or by some of his fellow-rioters, is unascertained.

The pretense that our men were fighting "with stones, clubs, and bright arms" is in view of these facts incredible. It is further refuted by the fact that our prisoners when searched were absolutely without arms, only seven penknives being found in the possession of the men arrested, while there were received by our men more than thirty stab wounds, every one of which was inflicted in the back, and almost every contused wound was in the back or back of the head; The evidence of the ship's officer of the day is that even the jackknives of the men were taken from them before leaving the ship.

As to the brutal nature of the treatment received by our men, the following extract from the account given of the affair by the La Patria newspaper, of Valparaiso, of October 17, can not be regarded as too friendly:

The Yankees, as soon as their pursuers gave chase, went by way of the
Calle del Arsenal toward the city car station. In the presence of an
ordinary number of citizens, among whom were some sailors, the North
Americans took seats in the street car to escape from the stones which
the Chileans threw at them. It was believed for an instant that the
North Americans had saved themselves from popular fury, but such was
not the case. Scarcely had the car begun to move when a crowd gathered
around and stopped its progress. Under these circumstances and without
any cessation of the howling and throwing of stones at the North
Americans, the conductor entered the car, and, seeing the risk of the
situation to the vehicle, ordered them to get out. At the instant the
sailors left the car, in the midst of a hail of stones, the said
conductor received a stone blow on the head. One of the Yankee sailors
managed to escape in the direction of the Plaza Wheelright, but the
other was felled to the ground by a stone. Managing to raise himself
from the ground where he lay, he staggered in an opposite direction
from the station. In front of the house of Señor Mazzini he was again
wounded, falling then senseless and breathless.

No amount of evasion or subterfuge is able to cloud our clear vision of this brutal work. It should be noticed in this connection that the American sailors arrested, after an examination, were during the four days following the arrest every one discharged, no charge of any breach of the peace or other criminal conduct having been sustained against a single one of them. The judge of crimes, Foster, in a note to the _intendente_ under date of October 22, before the dispatch from this Government of the following day, which aroused the authorities of Chile to a better sense of the gravity of the affair, says:

Having presided temporarily over this court in regard to the seamen of
the United States cruiser _Baltimore_, who have been tried on account
of the deplorable conduct which took place, etc.

The noticeable point here is that our sailors had been tried before the 22d of October, and that the trial resulted in their acquittal and return to their vessel. It is quite remarkable and quite characteristic of the management of this affair by the Chilean police authorities that we should now be advised that Seaman Davidson, of the _Baltimore_, has been included in the indictment, his offense being, so far as I have been able to ascertain, that he attempted to defend a shipmate against an assailant who was striking at him with a knife. The perfect vindication of our men is furnished by this report. One only is found to have been guilty of criminal fault, and that for an act clearly justifiable.

As to the part taken by the police in the affair, the case made by Chile is also far from satisfactory. The point where Riggin was killed is only three minutes' walk from the police station, and not more than twice that distance from the _intendencia_; and yet according to their official report a full half hour elapsed after the assault began before the police were upon the ground. It has been stated that all but two of our men have said that the police did their duty. The evidence taken at Mare Island shows that if such a statement was procured from our men it was accomplished by requiring them to sign a writing in a language they did not understand and by the representation that it was a mere declaration that they had taken no part in the disturbance. Lieutenant McCrea, who acted as interpreter, says in his evidence that when our sailors were examined before the court the subject of the conduct of the police was so carefully avoided that he reported the fact to Captain Schley on his return, to the vessel.

The evidences of the existence of animosity toward our sailors in the minds of the sailors of the Chilean navy and of the populace of Valparaiso are so abundant and various as to leave no doubt in the mind of anyone who will examine the papers submitted. It manifested itself in threatening and insulting gestures toward our men as they passed the Chilean men-of-war in their boats and in the derisive and abusive epithets with which they greeted every appearance of an American sailor on the evening of the riot. Captain Schley reports that boats from the Chilean war ships several times went out of their course to cross the bows of his boats, compelling them to back water. He complained of the discourtesy, and it was corrected. That this feeling was shared by men of higher rank is shown by an incident related by Surgeon Stitt, of the _Baltimore_. After the battle of Placilla he, with other medical officers of the war vessels in the harbor, was giving voluntary assistance to the wounded in the hospitals. The son of a Chilean army officer of high rank was under his care, and when the father discovered it he flew into a passion and said he would rather have his son die than have Americans touch him, and at once had him removed from the ward. This feeling is not well concealed in the dispatches of the foreign office, and had quite open expression in the disrespectful treatment of the American legation. The Chilean boatmen in the bay refused, even for large offers of money, to return our sailors, who crowded the Mole, to their ship when they were endeavoring to escape from the city on the night of the assault. The market boats of the _Baltimore_ were threatened, and even quite recently the gig of Commander Evans, of the _Yorktown_, was stoned while waiting for him at the Mole.

The evidence of our sailors clearly shows that the attack was expected by the Chilean people, that threats had been made against our men, and that in one case, somewhat early in the afternoon, the keeper of one house into which some of our men had gone closed his establishment in anticipation of the attack, which he advised them would be made upon them as darkness came on.

In a report of Captain Schley to the Navy Department he says:

In the only interview that I had with Judge Foster, who is
investigating the case relative to the disturbance, before he was aware
of the entire gravity of the matter, he informed me that the assault
upon my men was the outcome of hatred for our people among the lower
classes because they thought we had sympathized with the Balmaceda
Government on account of the _Itata_ matter, whether with reason or
without he could of course not admit; but such he thought was the
explanation of the assault at that time.

Several of our men sought security from the mob by such complete or partial changes in their dress as would conceal the fact of their being seamen of the _Baltimore_, and found it then possible to walk the streets without molestation. These incidents conclusively establish that the attack was upon the uniform--the nationality--and not upon the men.

The origin of this feeling is probably found in the refusal of this Government to give recognition to the Congressional party before it had established itself, in the seizure of the _Itata_ for an alleged violation of the neutrality law, in the cable incident, and in the charge that Admiral Brown conveyed information to Valparaiso of the landing at Quinteros. It is not my purpose to enter here any defense of the action of this Government in these matters. It is enough for the present purpose to say that if there was any breach of international comity or duty on our part it should have been made the subject of official complaint through diplomatic channels or for reprisals for which a full responsibility was assumed. We can not consent that these incidents and these perversions of the truth shall be used to excite a murderous attack upon our unoffending sailors and the Government of Chile go aquit of responsibility. In fact, the conduct of this Government during the war in Chile pursued those lines of international duty which we had so strongly insisted upon on the part of other nations when this country was in the throes of a civil conflict. We continued the established diplomatic relations with the government in power until it was overthrown, and promptly and cordially recognized the new government when it was established. The good offices of this Government were offered to bring about a peaceful adjustment, and the interposition of Mr. Egan to mitigate severities and to shelter adherents of the Congressional party was effective and frequent. The charge against Admiral Brown is too base to gain credence with anyone who knows his high personal and professional character.

Recurring to the evidence of our sailors, I think it is shown that there were several distinct assaults, and so nearly simultaneous as to show that they did not spread from one point. A press summary of the report of the fiscal shows that the evidence of the Chilean officials and others was in conflict as to the place of origin, several places being named by different witnesses as the locality where the first outbreak occurred. This if correctly reported shows that there were several distinct outbreaks, and so nearly at the same time as to cause this confusion. The La Patria, in the same issue from which I have already quoted, after describing the killing of Riggin and the fight which from that point extended to the Mole, says:

At the same time in other streets of the port the Yankee sailors fought
fiercely with the people of the town, who believed to see in them
incarnate enemies of the Chilean navy.

The testimony of Captain Jenkins, of the American merchant ship _Keweenaw_, which had gone to Valparaiso for repairs, and who was a witness of some part of the assault upon the crew of the _Baltimore_, is strongly corroborative of the testimony of our own sailors when he says that he saw Chilean sentries drive back a seaman seeking shelter upon a mob that was pursuing him. The officers and men of Captain Jenkins's ship furnish the most conclusive testimony as to the indignities which were practiced toward Americans in Valparaiso. When American sailors, even of merchant ships, can only secure their safety by denying their nationality, it must be time to readjust our relations with a government that permits such demonstrations.

As to the participation of the police, the evidence of our sailors shows that our men were struck and beaten by police officers before and after arrest, and that one at least was dragged with a lasso about his neck by a mounted policeman. That the death of Riggin was the result of a rifle shot fired by a policeman or soldier on duty is shown directly by the testimony of Johnson, in whose arms he was at the time, and by the evidence of Charles Langen, an American sailor, not then a member of the _Baltimore's_ crew, who stood close by and saw the transaction. The Chilean authorities do not pretend to fix the responsibility of this shot upon any particular person, but avow their inability to ascertain who fired it further than that it was fired from a crowd. The character of the wound as described by one of the surgeons of the _Baltimore_ clearly supports his opinion that it was made by a rifle ball, the orifice of exit being as much as an inch or an inch and a quarter in width. When shot the poor fellow was unconscious and in the arms of a comrade, who was endeavoring to carry him to a neighboring drug store for treatment. The story of the police that in coming up the street they passed these men and left them behind them is inconsistent with their own statement as to the direction of their approach and with their duty to protect them, and is clearly disproved. In fact Riggin was not behind but in front of the advancing force, and was not standing in the crowd, but was unconscious and supported in the arms of Johnson when he was shot.

The communications of the Chilean Government in relation to this cruel and disastrous attack upon our men, as will appear from the correspondence, have not in any degree taken the form of a manly and satisfactory expression of regret, much less of apology. The event was of so serious a character that if the injuries suffered by our men had been wholly the result of an accident in a Chilean port the incident was grave enough to have called for some public expression of sympathy and regret from the local authorities. It is not enough to say that the affair was lamentable, for humanity would require that expression even if the beating and killing of our men had been justifiable. It is not enough to say that the incident is regretted, coupled with the statement that the affair was not of an unusual character in ports where foreign sailors are accustomed to meet. It is not for a generous and sincere government to seek for words of small or equivocal meaning in which to convey to a friendly power an apology for an offense so atrocious as this. In the case of the assault by a mob in New Orleans upon the Spanish consulate in 1851, Mr. Webster wrote to the Spanish minister, Mr. Calderon, that the acts complained of were "a disgraceful and flagrant breach of duty and propriety," and that his Government "regrets them as deeply as Minister Calderon or his Government could possibly do;" that "these acts have caused the President great pain, and he thinks a proper acknowledgment is due to Her Majesty's Government." He invited the Spanish consul to return to his post, guaranteeing protection, and offered to salute the Spanish flag if the consul should come in a Spanish vessel. Such a treatment by the Government of Chile of this assault would have been more creditable to the Chilean authorities, and much less can hardly be satisfactory to a government that values its dignity and honor.

In our note of October 23 last, which appears in the correspondence, after receiving the report of the board of officers appointed by Captain Schley to investigate the affair, the Chilean Government was advised of the aspect which it then assumed and called upon for any facts in its possession that might tend to modify the unfavorable impressions which our report had created. It is very clear from the correspondence that before the receipt of this note the examination was regarded by the police authorities as practically closed. It was, however, reopened and protracted through a period of nearly three months. We might justly have complained of this unreasonable delay; but in view of the fact that the Government of Chile was still provisional, and with a disposition to be forbearing and hopeful of a friendly termination, I have awaited the report, which has but recently been made.

On the 21st instant I caused to be communicated to the Government of Chile by the American minister at Santiago the conclusions of this Government after a full consideration of all the evidence and of every suggestion affecting this matter, and to these conclusions I adhere. They were stated as follows:

First. That the assault is not relieved of the aspect which the early
information of the event gave to it, viz, that of an attack upon the
uniform of the United States Navy having its origin and motive in a
feeling of hostility to this Government, and not in any act of the
sailors or of any of them.

Second. That the public authorities of Valparaiso flagrantly failed in
their duty to protect our men, and that some of the police and of the
Chilean soldiers and sailors were themselves guilty of unprovoked
assaults upon our sailors before and after arrest. He [the President]
thinks the preponderance of the evidence and the inherent probabilities
lead to the conclusion that Riggin was killed by the police or soldiers.

Third. That he [the President] is therefore compelled to bring the case
back to the position taken by this Government in the note of Mr. Wharton
of October 23 last * * * and to ask for a suitable apology and for some
adequate reparation for the injury done to this Government.

In the same note the attention of the Chilean Government was called to the offensive character of a note addressed by Mr. Matta, its minister of foreign affairs, to Mr. Montt, its minister at this capital, on the 11th ultimo. This dispatch was not officially communicated to this Government, but as Mr. Montt was directed to translate it and to give it to the press of the country it seemed to me that it could not pass without official notice. It was not only undiplomatic, but grossly insulting to our naval officers and to the executive department, as it directly imputed untruth and insincerity to the reports of the naval officers and to the official communications made by the executive department to Congress. It will be observed that I have notified the Chilean Government that unless this note is at once withdrawn and an apology as public as the offense made I will terminate diplomatic relations.

The request for the recall of Mr. Egan upon the ground that he was not _persona grata_ was unaccompanied by any suggestion that could properly be used in support of it, and I infer that the request is based upon official acts of Mr. Egan which have received the approval of this Government. But however that may be, I could not consent to consider such a question until it had first been settled whether our correspondence with Chile could be conducted upon a basis of mutual respect.

In submitting these papers to Congress for that grave and patriotic consideration which the questions involved demand I desire to say that I am of the opinion that the demands made of Chile by this Government should be adhered to and enforced. If the dignity as well as the prestige and influence of the United States are not to be wholly sacrificed, we must protect those who in foreign ports display the flag or wear the colors of this Government against insult, brutality, and death inflicted in resentment of the acts of their Government and not for any fault of their own. It has been my desire in every way to cultivate friendly and intimate relations with all the Governments of this hemisphere. We do not covet their territory. We desire their peace and prosperity. We look for no advantage in our relations with them except the increased exchanges of commerce upon a basis of mutual benefit. We regret every civil contest that disturbs their peace and paralyzes their development, and are always ready to give our good offices for the restoration of peace. It must, however, be understood that this Government, while exercising the utmost forbearance toward weaker powers, will extend its strong and adequate projection to its citizens, to its officers, and to its humblest sailor when made the victims of wantonness and cruelty in resentment not of their personal misconduct, but of the official acts of their Government.

Upon information received that Patrick Shields, an Irishman and probably a British subject, but at the time a fireman of the American steamer _Keweenaw_, in the harbor of Valparaiso for repairs, had been subjected to personal injuries in that city, largely by the police, I directed the Attorney-General to cause the evidence of the officers and crew of that vessel to be taken upon its arrival in San Francisco, and that testimony is also herewith transmitted. The brutality and even savagery of the treatment of this poor man by the Chilean police would be incredible if the evidence of Shields was not supported by other direct testimony and by the distressing condition of the man himself when he was finally able to reach his vessel. The captain of the vessel says:

He came back a wreck, black from his neck to his hips from beating,
weak and stupid, and is still in a kind of paralyzed condition, and has
never been able to do duty since.

A claim for reparation has been made in behalf of this man, for while he was not a citizen of the United States, the doctrine long held by us, as expressed in the consular regulations, is:

The principles which are maintained by this Government in regard to
the protection, as distinguished from the relief, of seamen are well
settled. It is held that the circumstance that the vessel is American
is evidence that the seamen on board are such, and in every regularly
documented merchant vessel the crew will find their protection in the
flag that covers them.

I have as yet received no reply to our note of the 21st instant, but in my opinion I ought not to delay longer to bring these matters to the attention of Congress for such action as may be deemed appropriate.

BENJ. HARRISON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _January 25, 1892_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives_:

I transmit herewith, for the consideration of Congress, a communication of the 23d instant from the Secretary of the Interior, submitting an extract from the report of the commission appointed under the act of January 12, 1891, entitled "An act for the relief of the Mission Indians in the State of California," and other papers relating to the exchange of lands with private individuals and the purchase of certain lands and improvements for the use and benefit of the Mission Indians, with draft of a bill to carry into effect the recommendations of said Mission Commission.

I have approved the report of the Mission Commission, except as much as relates to the purchase of lands from and exchange of lands with private individuals, which is also approved subject to the condition that Congress shall authorize the same.

The matter is presented with the recommendation for the early and favorable action of Congress.

BENJ. HARRISON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _Washington, January 25, 1892_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

Referring to a communication of June 11, 1890, concerning the adoption by the Committee on Foreign Relations of a resolution respecting the claim of William Webster against the Government of Great Britain, I herewith transmit a report of the Secretary of State, with accompanying documents, showing the action taken under that resolution.

BENJ. HARRISON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _Washington, January 25, 1892_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives_:

I transmit herewith a report of the Secretary of State, with accompaniments, in relation to the claim of the representatives of the late Hon. James Crooks, a British subject, against the Government of the United States for the seizure of the steamer _Lord Nelson_ in 1812.

The favorable action of the Fiftieth and Fifty-first Congresses upon the bills heretofore introduced for the relief of the claimants makes it proper that I should recommend it anew for the consideration and final disposition of the present Congress.

BENJ. HARRISON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _January 28, 1892_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives_:

I transmit herewith additional correspondence between this Government and the Government of Chile, consisting of a note of M. Montt, the Chilean minister at this capital, to Mr. Blaine, dated January 23; a reply of Mr. Blaine thereto of date January 27, and a dispatch from Mr. Egan, our minister at Santiago, transmitting the response of Mr. Pereira, the Chilean minister of foreign affairs, to the note of Mr. Blaine of January 21, which was received by me on the 26th instant. The note of Mr. Montt to Mr. Blaine, though dated January 23, was not delivered at the State Department until after 12 o'clock m. of the 25th, and was not translated and its receipt notified to me until late in the afternoon of that day.

The response of Mr. Pereira to our note of the 21st withdraws, with acceptable expressions of regret, the offensive note of Mr. Matta of the 11th ultimo, and also the request for the recall of Mr. Egan. The treatment of the incident of the assault upon the sailors of the _Baltimore_ is so conciliatory and friendly that I am of the opinion that there is a good prospect that the differences growing out of that serious affair can now be adjusted upon terms satisfactory to this Government by the usual methods and without special powers from Congress. This turn in the affair is very gratifying to me, as I am sure it will be to the Congress and to our people. The general support of the efforts of the Executive to enforce the just rights of the nation in this matter has given an instructive and useful illustration of the unity and patriotism of our people.

Should it be necessary I will again communicate with Congress upon the subject.

BENJ. HARRISON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _February 2, 1892_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

In reply to a resolution of the Senate of the 27th ultimo, requesting the President "to advise the Senate as to what action, if any, has been taken ... to cause careful soundings to be made between San Francisco, Cal., and Honolulu ... for the purpose of determining the practicability of laying a telegraphic cable between those two points, or between any point on the Pacific coast and the Kingdom of the Hawaiian Islands," I inclose herewith a communication from the Secretary of the Navy, dated January 30, 1892.

BENJ. HARRISON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _February 9, 1892_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

I transmit herewith, in answer to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 13th of January last, a report from the Secretary of State and accompanying papers.[24]

BENJ. HARRISON.

[Footnote 24: Correspondence with Spain, Brazil, Salvador, and the Dominican Republic relative to reciprocal trade relations; copies of commercial arrangements entered into with those countries; list of import and export duties imposed by Brazil, Salvador, and the Dominican Republic, and by Spain with respect to Cuba and Puerto Rico.]

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _February 10, 1892_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives_:

I transmit herewith, as required by law, a communication of the 6th instant from the Secretary of the Interior, with the report of the Puyallup Indian Commission and accompanying papers.

BENJ. HARRISON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _February 16, 1892_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives_:

There was passed by the last Congress "An act for the protection of the lives of the miners in the Territories," which was approved by me on the 3d day of March, 1891. That no appropriation was made to enable me to carry the act into effect resulted, I suppose, from the fact that it was passed so late in the session. This law recognizes the necessity of a responsible public inspection and supervision of the business of mining in the interest of the miners, and is in line with the legislation of most of the States.

The work of the miner has its unavoidable incidents of discomfort and danger, and these should not be increased by the neglect of the owners to provide every practicable safety appliance. Economies which involve a sacrifice of human life are intolerable.

I transmit herewith memorials from several hundred miners working in the coal mines in the Indian Territory, asking for the appointment of an inspector under the act referred to. The recent frightful disaster at Krebs, in that Territory, in which sixty-seven miners met a horrible death, gives urgency to their appeal, and I recommend that a special appropriation be at once made for the salaries and the necessary expenses of the inspectors provided for in the law.

BENJ. HARRISON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _February 17, 1892_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives_:

The Indian appropriation bill which was approved March 3, 1891, contains the following provision:

And the sum of $2,991,450 be, and the same is hereby, appropriated,
out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to pay
the Choctaw and Chickasaw nations of Indians for all the right, title,
interest, and claim which said nations of Indians may have in and to
certain lands now occupied by the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians under
Executive order, said lands lying south of the Canadian River, and now
occupied by the said Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians; said lands have
been ceded in trust by article 3 of the treaty between the United
States and said Choctaw and Chickasaw nations of Indians which was
concluded April 28, 1866, and proclaimed on the 10th day of August of
the same year, and whereof there remains, after deducting allotments as
provided by said agreement, a residue ascertained by survey to contain
2,393,160 acres; three-fourths of this appropriation to be paid to such
person or persons as are or shall be duly authorized by the laws of
said Choctaw Nation to receive the same, at such time and in such sums
as directed and required by the legislative authority of said Choctaw
Nation, and one-fourth of this appropriation to be paid to such person
or persons as are or shall be duly authorized by the laws of said
Chickasaw Nation to receive the same, at such times and in such sums as
directed and required by the legislative authority of said Chickasaw
Nation; this appropriation to be immediately available and to become
operative upon the execution by the duly appointed delegates of said
respective nations specially authorized thereto by law of releases and
conveyances to the United States of all the right, title, interest, and
claim of said respective nations of Indians in and to said land (not
including Greer County, which is now in dispute), in manner and form
satisfactory to the President of the United States; and said releases
and conveyances, when fully executed and delivered, shall operate to
extinguish all claim of every kind and character of said Choctaw and
Chickasaw nations of Indians in and to the tract of country to which
said releases and conveyances shall apply.

If this section had been submitted to me as a separate measure, especially during the closing hours of the session, I should have disapproved it; but as the Congress was then in its last hours a disapproval of the general Indian appropriation bill, of which it was a part, would have resulted in consequences so far-reaching and disastrous that I felt it my duty to approve the bill. But as a duty was devolved upon me by the section quoted, viz, the acceptance and approval of the conveyances provided for, I have felt bound to look into the whole matter, and in view of the facts which I shall presently mention to postpone any Executive action until these facts could be submitted to Congress. Very soon after the passage of the law it came to my knowledge that the Choctaw Legislature had entered into an agreement with three citizens of that tribe to pay to them as compensation for procuring this legislation 25 per cent of any appropriation that might be made by Congress. The amount to be secured by these three agents under this agreement out of the three-fourths interest in the appropriation of the Choctaw Nation is $560,896. I have information that a contract was made by the Chickasaws to pay about 10 per cent of their one-fourth interest to the agents and attorneys who represented them.

Within a month after the passage of the law R.J. Ward, one of the agents, who was to divide with his associates the enormous sum to be paid by the Choctaws, presented to me an affidavit dated April 4, 1891, which is herewith submitted. It appears from his statement that the action of the Choctaw Council in this matter was corruptly influenced by the execution of certain notes signed by Ward for himself and his associates in sums varying from $2,500 to $15,000. His associates deny any knowledge of this, but the giving and existence of these notes is not refuted. The statement of the two associates of Ward denying any knowledge or participation in this fraud is also submitted, together with other papers relating to the matter. Whatever may be the fact as to the use or nonuse of corrupt methods to secure this legislation from the Choctaw Council, I do not think the Congress of the United States should so legislate upon this matter as to give effect to such a contract, which I am sure must have been unnoticed when the measure was pending. If the relations of these Indians to the United States are those of a ward, Congress should protect them from such extortionate exactions. We can not assume that the expenses and services of a committee of three persons to represent this claim before Congress should justly assume such proportions. The making of such a contract seems to convey implications which I am sure are wholly unjust.

After the passage of the appropriation bill legislation was had by the Choctaw Nation looking to the completion of the contract made with their delegates as to the payment of this money; but subsequently, when it was supposed that this extraordinary arrangement might require me to bring the matter to the attention of Congress, an act was passed by the Choctaw General Council, approved October 19, 1891, declaring all contracts made by the Choctaw delegates with any attorneys in connection with this appropriation void and of no effect. A copy of this law will be found with the papers submitted. There has also been submitted to me an unofficial copy of the opinion of the attorney-general of the Choctaw Nation holding that this last legislation is unconstitutional and void. I am of the opinion that if this appropriation is to stand provision should be made for protecting these tribes against extortionate claims for compensation in procuring action by Congress. Copies of the several laws passed by the Choctaw Nation with reference to this matter will be found in the accompanying papers. It will be noticed that the distribution proposed is limited to Choctaws by blood, excluding the freedmen and the white men who have been given full citizenship from any participation. A protest against this method of distribution has been filed by a white citizen of the tribe, and also a representation by Hon. Thomas C. Fletcher, their attorney, on behalf of the freedmen. In view of the fact that the stipulations of the treaty of 1866 in behalf of the freedmen of these tribes have not, especially in the case of the Chickasaws, been complied with, it would seem that the United States should in a distribution of this money have made suitable provision in their behalf. The Chickasaws have steadfastly refused to admit the freedmen to citizenship, as they stipulated to do in the treaty referred to, and their condition in that tribe and in a lesser degree in the other strongly calls for the protective intervention of Congress.

After a somewhat careful examination of the question I do not believe that the lands for which this money is to be paid were, to quote the language of section 15 of the Indian appropriation bill, already set out, "ceded in trust by article 3 of the treaty between the United States and said Choctaw and Chickasaw nations of Indians which was concluded April 28, 1866," etc. It is agreed that that treaty contained no express limitation upon the uses to which the United States might put the territory known as the leased district. The lands were ceded by terms sufficiently comprehensive to have passed the full title of the Indians. The limitation upon the use to which the Government might put them is sought to be found in a provision of the treaty by which the United States undertook to exclude white settlers and in the expressions found in the treaties made at the same time with the Creeks and other tribes of the purpose of the United States to use the lands ceded by those tribes for the settlement of friendly Indians.

The stipulation as to the exclusion of white settlers might well have reference solely to the national lands retained by the Choctaw and Chickasaw tribes, and the reason for the nonincorporation in the treaty with them of a statement of the purpose of the Government in connection with the use of the lands is well accounted for by the fact that as to these lands the Government had already, under the treaty of 1855, secured the right to use them perpetually for the settlement of friendly Indians. This was not true as to the lands of the other tribes referred to. The United States paid to the Choctaws and Chickasaws $300,000, and the failure to insert the words that are called words of limitation in this treaty points, I think, clearly to the conclusion that the commissioners on the part of the Government and the Indians themselves must have understood that this Government was acquiring something more than a mere right to settle friendly Indians, which it already possessed, and something more than the mere release of the right which the Choctaws and Chickasaws had under the treaty of 1855 to select locations on these lands if they chose.

Undoubtedly it was the policy of this Government for the time to hold these and the adjacent lands as Indian country, and many of the expressions in the proclamations of my predecessors and in the reports of the Indian Bureau and of the Secretary of the Interior mean this and nothing more. This is quite different from a conditional title, which limits the grant to a particular use and works a reinvestment of full title in the Indian grantors when that use ceases. But those who hold most strictly that a use for Indian purposes, where it is expressed, is a limitation of title seem to agree that the United States might pass a fee absolute to other Indian tribes in the lands ceded for their occupancy. Certainly it was not intended that in settling friendly Indians upon these lands the Government was to be restrained in its policy of allotment and individual ownership. If for an adequate consideration, by treaty, the United States placed upon these lands other Indian tribes, it was competent to give them patents in fee for a certain and agreed reservation. This being so, when the policy of allotment is put into force the compensation for the unused lands should certainly go to the occupying tribe, which in the case supposed had paid a full consideration for the whole reservation.

It will hardly be contended that in such case this Government should pay twice for the lands. In the appropriation under discussion this principle is in part recognized, for no claim is made by the Choctaws and Chickasaws for the lands allotted to the Cheyennes and Arapahoes. The claim is for unallotted or surplus lands. The case of the Cheyennes and Arapahoes is this: In consideration of other lands the Government gave them a treaty reservation in the Cherokee Outlet, but never perfected it by paying the Cherokees the stipulated price and placing these Indians upon it. The Cheyennes and Arapahoes declined to go upon the strip and located themselves farther south, where they now are. The Government subsequently recognized their right to remain there, and set apart the lands now being allotted to members of that tribe and the lands for which payment is now claimed by the Choctaws and Chickasaws as the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Reservation. I think the United States must be held to have assented to the substitution of these lands for the treaty lands in the Cherokee Strip, and that being true, when the reservation is broken up, as now, by allotments, it would seem that the Cheyennes and Arapahoes were entitled to be compensated for these surplus lands. In fact, a commission which has been dealing with the tribes in the Indian Territory has concluded an arrangement with them by which the Government pays $1,500,000 for these surplus lands and for the release of any claim to the Cherokee Strip, so that in fact in this agreement with the Cheyennes and Arapahoes the Government has paid for the lands for which payment is now claimed by the Choctaws and Chickasaws.

It should not be forgotten also that the allotment to the Cheyennes and Arapahoes is still incomplete. The method of calculation which resulted in stating the claim of the Choctaws and Chickasaws at $2,991,450 is explained by a letter of Mr. J.S. Standley, one of the Choctaw delegates, dated April 6, 1891. The agent for the Cheyennes and Arapahoes wrote Mr. Standley that there were 600 Indians residing upon the lands south of the Canadian River, and who it was supposed would take allotments there, and upon this statement the legislation was based. Now it must be borne in mind that the Cheyennes and Arapahoes have the right to locate anywhere within their reservation, and that instead of 600 double that number might have taken their allotments south of the Canadian River upon these lands. This is not probable, but a later report indicates that the number will certainly be in excess of 600. If the sum to be paid to the Choctaws and Chickasaws depended upon a knowledge of the number of acres of unallotted land south of the Canadian River, it would seem to have been reasonable that the appropriation should have been delayed until the exact number of acres taken for allotment had been officially ascertained. This has not yet been done.

It is right also, I think, that Congress in dealing with this matter should have the whole question before it, for the declaration of Indian title contained in this item of appropriation extends to a very large body of land and will involve very large future appropriations. The Choctaw and Chickasaw leased district, embracing the lands in the Indian Territory between the ninety-eighth and one hundredth degrees of west longitude and extending north and south from the main Canadian River to the Red River, including Greer County, contains, according to the public surveys, 7,713,239 acres, or, excluding Greer County, 6,201,663 acres. This leased district is occupied as follows:

Greer County, by white citizens of Texas, 1,511,576 acres. The United States is now prosecuting a case in the courts to obtain a judicial declaration that this county is part of the Indian country. If a decision should be rendered in its favor, the claim of the Choctaws and Chickasaws to be paid for these lands at the rate named in this appropriation would at once be presented.

The Wichita Reservation is also upon the leased lands and is occupied by the Wichitas, Caddoes, Delawares, and remnants of other tribes by Department orders, made to depend upon the treaty with the Delawares in 1866 and some other unratified agreements with tribes or fragments of tribes in 1872. This reservation contains 743,610 acres.

The Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Reservation is occupied by those Indians under a treaty proclaimed August 25, 1868, which provides that said district of country "shall be, and the same is hereby, set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation of the tribes herein named, and for such friendly tribes or individual Indians as from time to time they may be willing (with the consent of the United States) to admit among them." This reservation contains 2,968,893 acres.

The Cheyennes and Arapahoes, whose surplus lands are to be paid for by this appropriation, have occupied the country between the Washita and Canadian rivers, extending west to the one hundredth degree of longitude. This reservation contains 2,489,160 acres.

I have stated these facts in order that it may be seen what further appropriations are involved in a settlement for all these lands upon the basis which Congress has adopted. It does not seem to me to be a wise policy to deal with this question piecemeal. It would have been better, if a remnant of title remains in the Choctaws and Chickasaws to the lands in the leased district, to have settled the whole matter at once. Under the treaty of 1855 the Choctaws and Chickasaws quitclaimed any supposed interest of theirs in the lands west of the one hundredth degree. The boundary between the Louisiana purchase and the Spanish possessions by our treaty of 1819 with Spain was as to these lands fixed upon the one hundredth degree of west longitude.

Our treaty with the Choctaws and Chickasaws made in 1820 extended their grant to the limit of our possessions. It followed, of course, that these lands were included within the boundaries of the State of Texas when that State was admitted to the Union, and the release of the Choctaws and Chickasaws, whatever it was worth, operated for the benefit of the State of Texas and not of the United States. The lands became public lands of that State. For the release of this claim and for the lease of the lands west of the ninety-eighth degree the Government of the United States paid the sum of $800,000. In the calculations which have been made to arrive at the basis of the appropriation under discussion no part of this sum is treated as having been paid for the lease. I do not think that is just to the United States. It seems probable that a very considerable part of this consideration must have related to the leased lands, because these were the lands in which the Indian title was recognized, and the treaty gave to the United States a permanent right of occupation by friendly Indians. The sum of $300,000, paid under the treaty of 1866, is deducted, as I understand, in arriving at the sum appropriated. It seems to me that a considerable proportion of the sum of $800,000 previously paid should have been deducted in the same manner.

I have felt it to be my duty to bring these matters to the attention of Congress for such action as may be thought advisable.

BENJ. HARRISON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _February 24, 1892_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives_: