Chapter II: Part 2

Look at it whatever way we may the finite mind cannot grasp the conception of the infinite. Nay, cannot know of the existence of the infinite. Hence all efforts to explain the First Cause, the absolute, and the infinite, are more artificial and unreal than painted ships upon a painted sea.

We may view the subject in still another light. If God reasons, his knowledge is limited and he is finite. Man reasons because his knowledge is circumscribed. If he knew everything he would have no doubts, and hence would not need to investigate, experiment, recollect, and compare. He would not be compelled to lay down certain definite data, and follow their implications through rules of logic, and through scientific experiment in order to reach conclusions. The end would be as clearly before his mind as the beginning; in fact there would be to such a mind no beginning and no end. But we cannot imagine an infinite being who needs to recollect past events. But if we deny that in the mind of God there is the faculty of memory, we thereby deny that he reasons. The same may be said of doubt, for if the mind of God is never troubled with doubts, it is simply because he does not reason. Much of the mind's activity is employed in doubts. Doubt and inquiry are necessary elements of thought. Does God doubt? Does he investigate, compare, and test matters by experiment? If he does then he is not infinite, and if he does not, then he does not reason. Has he imagination? If he exercises this important function of the mind then he deals in unrealities, idealizes, has dreams, cherishes visions, builds air castles. If he does not thus exercise imagination he cannot be said to reason.

It is an old argument that design implies a designer. The essential weakness of this argument lies in what is called "proofs of design." And in support of this idea it is commonly urged that there are everywhere apparent in nature evidences of order, harmony, and adaptation. But to put this argument into a sentence, the maggot in the cheese could offer the same arguments to show there was a design in his position in the cheese. He could argue that everything about him showed order, harmony, and adaptation. It was just the cheese for him.

But even if we should admit this statement, it would not prove the existence of God, for if an intelligent mind had created the universe, it is certain that that mind itself must have been governed by law which yields to order, harmony, and adaptation, and if these imply a designer in one case they must also in the other, and therefore every designer must have had a designer.

The Difference Between the Two Cosmogonies as Given in the First Two Chapters of Genesis.

In the first, the earth emerges from the waters and is therefore saturated with moisture. (Gen. 1 : 9, 10.) In the second, the whole face of the ground requires to be moistened. (Gen. 2 : 6.)

In the first, the birds and beasts are created before man. (Gen. 1 : 20, 24, 26.) In the second, man is created before the birds and beasts. (Gen. 2 : 7, 9.)

In the first, all the "fowls that fly" are made out of the waters. (Gen. 1 : 20.) In the second, the "fowls of the air" are made out of the ground. (Gen. 2 : 19.)

In the first, man is made lord of the whole earth. (Gen. 1 : 28.) In the second, he is merely placed in the garden of Eden to dress it and to keep it. (Gen. 2 : 8, 15.)

In the first, man and woman are created together. (Gen. 1 : 28.) In the second, the beasts and birds are created between the man and woman. (Gen. 2 : 7, 8, 15, 22.)--Bishop Colenso.

Evidence of the Vast Age of the Universe.

"I have looked further into space than ever human being did before me. I have observed stars, of which the light, it can be proved, must take two millions of years to reach this earth. Nay more, if those distant bodies had ceased to exist two million of years ago, we should still see them, as the light would travel after the body was gone. * * *

"The light from the nearest star requires some three years to reach the earth. From a star one thousand three hundred and forty-four times farther it would require about four thousand years, and for such a cluster as we have imagined, no less than six thousand years are needed." (Sir Wm. Herschell, "Life and Works of Sir Wm. Herschell" by Edward S. Holden.)

Sir Wm. Thomson, in Encyclopedia Britannica, article, Geology, showed from data available at the time, "that the superficial consolidation of the globe (this earth) could not have occurred less than twenty millions of years ago."

"And as any table of the earth's crust will show you there are
rocks above and below the chalk, for the production of which
millions heaped upon millions of years were required." (Clodd's
"Childhood of Religions.")

Such eminent scientists as Sir Wm. Thomson, Helmholtz, Newcomb, Croll, Bishop, Reade, Lyell, Darwin, and others think it would have taken many millions of years for the original nebulæ to condense to the present dimensions of the sun.

PROPHECY.

"A prophecy, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, signifies a prediction of future events, which could not have been foreseen by human sagacity, and the knowledge of which was supernaturally communicated to the prophet. It is clear, therefore, that in order to establish the claim of anticipatory statement, promise, or denunciation, to the rank of a prophecy, four points must be ascertained with precision; namely, (1.) what the event was to which the alleged prediction was intended to refer; (2.) that the prediction was uttered in specific, not vague, language before the event; (3.) that the event took place specifically, not loosely, as predicted; (4.) and that it could not have been foreseen by human sagacity. * * *

"It is probably not too much to affirm that we have no instance in the prophetical books of the Old Testament of a prediction, in the case of which we possess, at once and combined, clear and unsuspicious proof of the date, the precise event predicted, the exact circumstances of the event, and the inability of human sagacity to foresee it.

"The state of the case appears to be this: That all the Old Testament prophesies have been assumed to be genuine inspired predictions; and, when falsified in their obvious meaning and received interpretation, by the event, have received immediately a new interpretation, and been supposed to refer to some other event. When the result has disappointed expectation, the conclusion has been, not that the prophecy was false, but the interpretation was erroneous. It is obvious that a mode of reasoning like this is peculiar to theological inquirers. * * *

"In justification of this idea of a double sense, he (Dr. Arnold) continues: 'The notion of a double sense in prophecy has been treated by some persons with contempt. Yet it may be said that it is almost necessarily involved in the idea of prophecy. Every prophecy has according to the very definition of the word, a double source; it has, if I may venture so to speak, two authors, the one human, the other divine.... If uttered by the tongue of man, it must also, unless we suppose him to be a mere instrument (in the same sense as a flute or a harp), be colored by his own mind. The prophet expresses in words certain truths conveyed to his mind; but his mind does not fully embrace them, nor can it; for how can man fully comprehend the mind of God? Every man lives in time, and belongs to time; the present must be to him clearer than the future.... But with God there is no past, nor future; every truth is present to him in all its extent, so that his expression, if I may so speak, differs essentially from that which can be comprehended by the mind, or uttered by the tongue of man. Thus every prophecy as uttered by man (that is, by an intelligent and not a mere mechanical instrument), and at the same time as inspired by God, must, so far as appears, have a double sense; one, the sense entertained by the human mind of the writer; the other, the sense infused into it by God.' We must confess our amazement at the obvious and extreme unsoundness of this whole passage. Not only does it painfully remind us of the double meaning so often and so justly charged upon the Pagan oracles--but it assumes the strange and contradictory improbabilities: first, that God was unable to convey his meaning to the mind of the prophet; secondly, that he infused this meaning into the words which were uttered, although he could not infuse it into the mind of the man who uttered them; and thirdly, that we can see further into the mind and meaning of God than those to whom he spoke; that they in expressing the ideas which he had put into their minds, mistook or imperfectly conceived those ideas,--but that to us is given to discover a thought which those words contained, but did not express, or which, if they did express it, they were not understood by the writer to express. Now, either the ideas which God wished to communicate were conveyed to the mind of the prophet, or they were not; if they were so conveyed, then the prophet must have comprehended them, and intended to express them correctly--for it is monstrous to suppose that God would infuse ideas into a man's mind for the purpose of being communicated to the public; which ideas he yet did not enable him to communicate; and then all the above confused subtleties fall to the ground. If, on the other hand, these ideas were not so conveyed to the prophet's mind, then it must have been the words and not the ideas which were inspired, and God used the prophet simply as a flute (a supposition scouted by Dr. Arnold) and we are thus driven to the equally monstrous supposition that God used words which did not convey his meaning, even to the very favored individual to whom and through whom he spoke." (Greg's "Creed of Christendom," pp. 76, 92.)

"We have already had ample proof that the Jewish writers not only did not scruple to narrate past events as if predicting future ones--to present history in the form of prophecy, but that they habitually did so. The original documents from which the books of Moses were compiled, must have been written, as we have seen in the time of the earliest kings, while the book of Deuteronomy was not composed, and the whole Pentateuch did not assume its present form till, probably, the reign of Josiah; yet they abound in such anticipatory narrative--in predictions of events long past. The instances are far too numerous to quote." (Greg's "Creed of Christendom," p. 86.)

"There is not throughout the whole Bible any word that describes to us what we call a poet, nor any word that describes what we call poetry. The case is, that the word prophet, to which latter times have affixed new ideas, was the Bible word for poet, and the word prophesying meant the art of making poetry. It also meant the art of playing poetry to a tune upon any instrument of music.

"We read of prophesying with pipes, tabrets, and horns--of prophesying with harps, with psalteries, with cymbols, and with every other instrument of music then in fashion. Were we now to speak of prophesying with a fiddle, or with a pipe and tabor, the expression would have no meaning, or would appear ridiculous, and to some people contemptuous, because we have changed the meaning of the word.

"We are told of Saul being among the prophets, and also that he prophesied, but we are not told what they prophesied, nor what he prophesied. The case is, there was nothing to tell; for these prophets were a company of musicians and poets, and Saul joined in the concert, and this was called prophesying."--Thomas Paine on the Prophecies.

"There is no reason to think that a prophet ever received a revelation which was not spoken directly and pointedly to his own time. (Ency. Brit. "Bible.")

"It is plain, however, that the whole work (the Pentateuch) is not the uniform production of one pen, but that in some way a variety of records of different ages, and styles have been combined to form a single narrative. Accordingly, Jewish tradition bears evidence that Moses wrote the Pentateuch, Joshua the book named after him, Samuel the book of Judges, and so forth. As all Hebrew history is anonymous, a sure sign that people had not yet learned to lay weight on questions of authorship, it is not probable that this tradition rests on any surer ground than conjecture." (Ency. Brit., "Bible.")

"I have now fully and fairly analyzed and exposed many of the most important prophecies or pretended prophecies of the whole Bible, I have shown that very few of them are real prophecies at all; that those which are real prophecies, very few ever have been, or ever can be fulfilled; that the very few which seem to have been fulfilled were written after the occurrence of the events claimed to be their fulfilments, and that, whether fulfilled or unfulfilled, none of these prophecies ever have been, or ever can be, of any service to the world. And thus fall all the prophetic props of priestcraft. Not one of them can bear the test of fair examination." (Kelso's "Bible Analayzed.")

MIRACLES.

"At the very outset of inquiry into the origin and true character of Christianity we are brought face to face with the supernatural. Christianity professes to be a Divine Revelation of truths which the human intellect could not otherwise have discovered. It is not a form of religion developed by the wisdom of man and appealing to his reason, but a system miraculously communicated to the human race, the central doctrines of which are either supernatural or untenable. If the truths said to be revealed were either of an ordinary character, or naturally attainable they would at once discredit the claim to divine origin. No one could maintain that a system discoverable by reason would be supernaturally communicated. The whole argument for Christianity turns upon the necessity of such a revelation, and the consequent probability that it would be made. * * *

"The spontaneous offer of miraculous evidence, indeed, has always been advanced as a special characteristic of Christianity logically entitling it to acceptance in contradistinction to all other religions. 'It is an acknowledged historical fact,' says Bishop Butler, 'that Christianity offered itself to the world, and demanded to be received, upon the allegation, that is, as unbelievers would speak, upon the pretence of miracles, publicly wrought to attest the truth of it in such an age; ... and Christianity, including the dispensation of the Old Testament, seems distinguished by this from all other religions.'

"Having then ascertained that miracles are absolutely necessary to attest the reliability of a Divine Revelation we may proceed to examine them more closely, and for the present we shall confine ourselves to the representation of these phenomena which are in the Bible. Throughout the Old Testament the doctrine is inculcated that supernatural communications must have supernatural attestation. God is described as arming his servants with power to perform wonders, in order that they may thus be accredited as his special messengers. The Patriarchs and the people of Israel generally are represented as demanding 'a sign' of the reality of the communications said to come from God, without which, we are led to suppose, they not only would not have believed, but would have been justified in disbelieving, that the messengers actually came from him. Thus Gideon asks for a sign that the Lord talked with him.

'And the Lord said unto him, Surely I will be with thee, and thou shalt smite the Midianites as one man.'

'And he (Gideon) said unto him, If now I have found grace in thy sight, then show me a sign that thou talkest with me.' (Judges 6 : 16, 17.)

"And Hezekiah demands proof of the truth of Isaiah's prophecy that he should be restored to health.

'And Hezekiah said unto Isaiah, What shall be the sign that the Lord will heal me, and that I shall go up unto the house of the Lord the third day?' (2 Kings 20 : 8.)

"It is, however, unnecessary to refer to instances, for it may be affirmed that upon all occasions, miraculous evidence of an alleged divine mission is stated to have been required and accorded.

"The startling information is at the same time given, however, that miracles may be wrought to attest what is false as well as to accredit what is true. In one place, it is declared that if a prophet actually gives a sign or wonder and it comes to pass, but teaches the people on the strength of it, to follow other gods, they are not to hearken to him, and the prophet is to be put to death.

'If there arise among you a prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a sign or wonder, and the sign or wonder come to pass, whereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us go after other gods which thou hast not known, and let us serve them; thou shalt not hearken unto the words of that prophet or that dreamer of dreams.' (Deut. 13 : 1, 2, 3.)

"The false miracle is here attributed to God himself.

'For the Lord your God proveth you, to know whether you love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul.' (Deut. 13 : 3.)

"In the book of the prophet Ezekiel the case is stated in a still stronger way, and God is represented as directly deceiving the prophet.

'And if the prophet be deceived when he hath spoken a thing, I the Lord have deceived that prophet, and I will stretch out my hand upon him, and will destroy him from the midst of my people Israel.' (Ezek. 14 : 9.)

"The narrative of God's hardening Pharaoh's heart in order to bring more plagues upon the land of Egypt is in this vein. God, in fact, is represented as exerting his almighty power to deceive a man and then destroying him for being deceived. In the same spirit is the passage in which Micaiah describes the Lord as putting a lying spirit into the mouths of the prophets who incited Ahab to go to Ramoth-gilead. (1 Kings 22 : 14-23.)

"The miracles wrought by the Egyptian sorcerers in competing with Moses were done by another power than God. We have notable instances of the belief in signs and wonders wrought by this other power. Jesus is represented as warning his disciples against false prophets, who work signs and wonders.

'Many will say to me in that day, Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name? and in thy name cast out devils? and in thy name done many wonderful works? of whom he should say, I never knew you, depart from me, ye that work iniquity.' (Mat. 7 : 22, 23.)

And again in another place:

'For false prophets shall arise, and shall work signs and wonders, to seduce, if it were possible, the elect.' (Mark 13: 22.)

Also, when the Pharisees accuse him of casting out devils by Beelzebub, the prince of the devils, Jesus asks: 'By whom do your children cast them out?' a reply which would lose all its point if they were not admitted to be able to cast out devils. In another passage John is described as saying: 'Master, we saw one casting out devils in thy name, who followeth not us, and we forbade him.' Without multiplying instances, however, there can be no doubt of the fact that the reality of false miracles and lying wonders is admitted in the Bible. The obvious deduction from this representation of miracles is that the source and purpose of such supernatural phenomena must always be exceedingly uncertain. Their evidential value is, therefore, profoundly affected, 'it being,' as Dr. Newman has said of ambiguous miracles, 'antecedently improbable that the Almighty should rest the credit of his Revelation upon events which but obscurely implied his immediate presence.' As it is affirmed that other supernatural beings exist, as well as an assumed personal God, by whose agency miracles are performed, it is impossible to argue with reason that such phenomena are at any time especially due to the intervention of the Deity. Dr. Newman recognizes this, but passes over the difficulty with masterly lightness of touch. After advancing the singular argument that our knowledge of spirits is only derived from scripture, and that their existence cannot be deduced from nature, whilst he asserts that the being of a God--a personal God be it remembered--can be so discovered, and that, therefore, miracles can only properly be attributed to him, he proceeds: 'Still it may be necessary to show that on our own principles we are not open to inconsistency. That is, it has been questioned whether, in admitting the existence and power of the spirits on the authority of Revelation, we are not in danger of invalidating the evidence upon which that authority rests. For the cogency of the argument for miracles depends on the assumption, that interruptions in the course of nature must ultimately proceed from God; which is not true, if they may be effected by other beings without his sanction. And it must be conceded, that, explicit as scripture is in considering miracles as signs of divine agency, it still does seem to give created spirits some power of working them; and even, in its most literal sense, intimates the possibility of their working them in opposition to the true doctrine (Deut. 13 : 1-3; Mat. 24 : 24; 2 Thes. 2 : 9-11).' (Dr. Newman's Two Essays on Miracles, p. 31.)

"Dr. Newman repudiates the attempts of various writers to overcome this difficulty by making a distinction between great miracles and small, many miracles and few, or by referring to the nature of the doctrine attested in order to determine the author of the miracles, or by denying the power of spirits altogether, and explaining away scripture statements of demoniacal possession and the narrative of the Lord's temptation. 'Without having recourse to any of these dangerous modes of answering the objection,' he says, 'it may be sufficient to reply, that, since, agreeably to the antecedent sentiment of reason, God has adopted miracles as the seal of a divine message, we believe he will never suffer them to be so counterfeited as to deceive the humble inquirer.' (Ibid. p. 51.)

"This is the only reply which even so powerful a reasoner as Dr. Newman can give to an objection based on distinct statements of scripture itself. He cannot deny the validity of the objection, he can only hope or believe in spite of it. Personal belief independent of evidence is the most common and the weakest of arguments; at best it is prejudice masked in the garb of reason. It is perfectly clear that miracles being thus acknowledged to be common both to God and to other spirits they cannot be considered a distinctive attestation of divine intervention; and as Spinoza finely argued, not even the mere existence of God, can be inferred from them; for as a miracle is a limited act and never expressed more than certain and limited power, it is certain that we cannot from such an effect, conclude even the existence of a cause whose power is infinite.

"This dual character obviously leads to many difficulties in defining the evidential function and force of miracles, and we may best appreciate the dilemma which is involved by continuing to follow the statements and arguments of divines themselves. To the question whether miracles are absolutely to command the obedience of those in whose sight they are performed, and whether upon their attestation, the doer and his doctrine are to be accepted as of God, Archbishop French unhesitatingly replies: 'It cannot be so, for side by side with the miracles which serve for the furthering of the kingdom of God runs another line of wonders, the counter-workings of him who is ever the ape of the Most High.' (Dr. French's 'Notes on the Miracles of Our Lord.') Eighth ed., p. 22.

"'This fact,' he says, 'that the kingdom of lies has its wonders no less than the kingdom of truth, is in itself sufficient evidence that miracles cannot be appealed to absolutely and finally, in proof of the doctrine which the worker of them proclaims.'

"This being the case, it is important to discover how miracles perform their function as the indispensible evidence for a Divine Revelation, for with this disability they do not seem to possess much potentiality. Archbishop French then offers the following definition of the function of miracles: 'A miracle does not prove the truth of a doctrine or the divine mission of him that brings it to pass. That which alone it claims for him at the first is a right to be listened to; it puts him in the alternative of being from heaven or from hell. The doctrine must first commend itself to the conscience as being good, and only then can the miracle seal it as divine.' But the first appeal is from the doctrine to the conscience, to the moral nature of man. Under certain circumstances, he maintains their evidence is utterly to be rejected. 'But the purpose of the miracle' he says, 'being as we have seen, to confirm that which is good, so, upon the other hand, where conscience and mind witness against the doctrine, not all the miracles in the world have a right to demand submission to the word which they seal. On the contrary, the great act of faith is to believe, against, and in despite of them all, in what God has revealed to, and implanted in the soul of the holy and the true; not to believe another gospel, though an angel from heaven, or one transformed into such should bring it (Deut. 13 : 3; Gal. 1 : 8); and instead of compelling assent, miracles are then rather warnings to us that we keep aloof, for they tell us that not merely lies are here, for to that the conscience bore witness already, but that he who utters them is more than a common deceiver, is eminently a liar and anti-Christ, a false prophet; standing in more immediate connection than other deceived and evil men to the kingdom of darkness, so that Satan has given him his power (Rev. 13 : 2); is using him to be an especial organ of his, and to do a special work for him.' And he lays down the distinct principle that: 'The miracle must witness for itself, and then, and then only, the first is capable of witnessing for the second.'

"These opinions are not peculiar to the Archbishop of Dublin, but are generally held by divines, although Dr. French expresses them with unusual absence of reserve. Dr. Mozley emphatically affirms the same doctrine when he says: 'A miracle cannot oblige us to accept any doctrine which is contrary to our moral nature or a fundamental principle of religion.' Dr. Mansel speaks to the same effect: 'If a teacher claiming to work miracles proclaims doctrines contrary to previously established truths, whether to the conclusions of natural religion or to the teaching of a former revelation, such a contradiction is allowed even by the most zealous defenders of the evidential value of miracles, to invalidate the authority of the teacher. But the right conclusion from this admission is not that true miracles are invalid an evidences, but that the supposed miracles in this case are not true miracles at all; that is, are not the effects of divine power, but of human deception or of some other agency.' A passage from a letter written by Dr. Arnold, which is quoted by Dr. French in support of his views, both illustrates the doctrine and the necessity which has led to its adoption. 'You complain,' says Dr. Arnold, writing to Dr. Hawkins, 'of those persons who judge of a revelation not by its evidence, but by its substance. It has always seemed to me that its substance is a most essential part of its evidence; and that miracles wrought in favor of what was foolish or wicked would only prove Manicheism. We are so perfectly ignorant of the unseen world, that the character of any supernatural power can only be judged by the moral character of the statements which it sanctions. Thus only can we tell whether it be a revelation from God or from the Devil.' In another place Dr. Arnold declares: 'Miracles must not be allowed to overrule the gospel; for it is only through our belief in the gospel that we accord our belief in them.'

"It is obvious that the mutual dependence which is thus established between miracles and the doctrines in connection with which they are wrought destroys the evidential force of miracles, and that the first and final appeal is made to reason. The doctrine in fact proves the miracles instead of the miracle attesting the doctrine. Divines, of course, attempt to deny this, but no other deduction from their own statements is logically possible. Miracles according to scripture itself, are producible by various supernatural beings and may be satanic as well as divine: man on the other hand, is so ignorant of the unseen world that avowedly, he cannot, from the miracle itself, determine the agent by whom it was performed; the miracle, therefore, has no intrinsic evidential value. How, then, according to divines, does it attain any potentiality? Only through a favorable decision on the part of reason on the 'moral nature of man' regarding the character of the doctrine. The result of the appeal to reason respecting the morality and credibility of the doctrine determines the evidential status of the miracle. The doctrine therefore, is the real criterion of the miracle which, without it, is necessarily an object of doubt and suspicion.

"We have already casually referred to Dr. Newman's view of such a relation between miracle and doctrine, but may here more fully quote his suggestive remarks. 'Others by referring to the nature of the doctrine attested,' he says, 'in order to determine the author of the miracle, have exposed themselves to the plausible charge of adducing, first the miracle to attest the divinity of the doctrine, and then the doctrine to prove the divinity of the miracle.' This argument he characterizes as one of the 'dangerous modes' of removing a difficulty, although he does not himself point out a safer, and in a note, he adds: 'There is an appearance of doing honor to the Christian doctrines in representing them as intrinsically credible, which leads many into supporting opinions which, carried to their full extent, supercede the need of miracles altogether. It must be recollected, too, that they who are allowed to praise have the privilege of finding fault, and may reject, according to their a priori notions, as well as receive. Doubtless the divinity of a clearly immoral doctrine could not be evidenced by miracles; for our belief in the moral attributes of God, is much stronger than our conviction of the negative proposition, that none but he can interfere with the system of nature. But there is always the danger of extending this admission beyond its proper limits, of supposing ourselves judges of the tendency of doctrines; and because, unassisted reason informs us what is moral and immoral in our own case, of attempting to decide on the abstract morality of actions.... These remarks are in nowise inconsistent with using (as was done in a former section) our actual knowledge of God's attributes, obtained from a survey of nature and human affairs, in determining the probability of certain professed miracles having proceeded from him. It is one thing to infer from the experience of life another to imagine the character of God from the gratuitous conceptions of our own minds.' Although Dr. Newman apparently fails to perceive that he himself thus makes reason the criterion of miracles and therefore incurs the condemnation with which our quotation opens, the very indecision of his argument illustrates the dilemma in which divines are placed. Dr. Mozley, however, still more directly condemns the principle we are discussing, that the doctrine must be the criterion of the miracle, although he also, as we have seen elsewhere, substantially affirms it. He says: 'The position that the revelation proves the miracle, and not the miracles the revelation, admits of a good qualified meaning; but taken literally, it is a double offense against the rule, that things are properly proved by the proper proof of them; for a supernatural fact is the proper proof of supernatural doctrine, while a supernatural doctrine on the other hand is certainly not a proper proof of a supernatural fact.'

"This statement is obviously true, but it is equally undeniable that, their origin being uncertain, miracles have no evidential force. How far then, we may inquire in order thoroughly to understand the position, can doctrines prove the reality of miracles or determine the agency by which they are performed? In the case of moral truths within the limits of reason, it is evident that doctrines, which are in accordance with our idea of what is good and right do not require miraculous evidence at all. They can secure acceptance by their own merits alone. At the same time it is universally admitted that the truth or goodness of a doctrine could not attest the divine origin of a miracle. Such truths, however, have no proper connection with revelation at all. 'These truths,' to quote the words of Bishop Atterbury, 'were of themselves sufficiently obvious and plain, and needed not a divine testimony to make them plainer. But the truths which are necessary in this manner to be attested, are those which are of positive institution; those which if God had not pleased to reveal them, human reason could not have discovered; and those, which, even now, they are revealed, human reason cannot fully account for, and perfectly comprehend.' How is it possible then that reason, or the 'moral nature of man' can approve as good, or appreciate the fitness of, doctrines which in their very nature are beyond the criterion of reason. What reply, for instance, can reason give to any appeal to it regarding the doctrine of the trinity or of the incarnation? If doctrines, the truth and goodness of which are apparent, do not afford any evidence of divine revelation, how can doctrines which reason can neither discover nor comprehend attest the divine origin of miracles? Dr. Mozley clearly recognizes that they cannot do so. 'The proof of a revelation,' he says, and we may add, the proof of a miracle--itself a species of revelation--'which is contained in the substance of a revelation has this inherent check or limit in it; namely: that it cannot reach to what is undiscoverable by reason.' 'Internal evidence is itself an appeal to reason, because at every step the test is our own appreciation of such and such an idea or doctrine, our own perception of its fitness; but human reason cannot in the nature of the case prove that which, by the very hypotheses, lies beyond reason.' It naturally follows that no doctrine which lies beyond reason, and therefore requires the attestation of miracles, can possibly afford that indication of the source and reality of miracles which is necessary to endow them with evidential value, and the supernatural doctrine must, therefore, be rejected in the absence of miraculous evidence of a decisive character.

"Canon Mozley labors earnestly, but unsuccessfully, to restore to miracles as evidence some part of that potentiality of which these unfortunate limitations have deprived them. 'Whilst on the one hand,' he says, 'we must admit indeed an inherent modification in the function of a miracle as an instrument of proof,' he argues that this is only a limitation, and no disproof of it, and he contends that: 'The evidence of miracles is not negatived because it has conditions.' His reasoning, however, is purely apologetic, and attempts by the unreal analogy of supposed limitations of natural principles and evidence to excuse the disqualifying limitations of the supernatural. He is quite conscious of the serious difficulty of the position: 'The question' he says, 'may at first sight create a dilemma.--If a miracle is nugatory on the side of one doctrine, what cogency has it on the side of another? Is it legitimate to accept its evidence when we please and reject it when we please?' The only reply he seems able to give to these very pertinent questions is the remark which immediately follows them: 'But in truth a miracle is never without an argumentative force, although that force may be counterbalanced.' In other words, a miracle is always an argument, although it is often a bad one. It is scarcely necessary to go to the supernatural for bad arguments.

"It might naturally be expected that the miraculous evidence selected to accredit a divine revelation should possess certain unique and marked characteristics. It must at least, be clearly distinctive of divine power and exclusively associated with divine truth. It is inconceivable that the Deity, deigning thus to attest the reality of a communication from himself of truths beyond the criterion of reason, should not make the evidence simple and complete, because the doctrines proper to such a revelation, not being appreciable from internal evidence, it is obvious that the external testimony for them,--if it is to be of any use--must be unmistakable and decisive. The evidence which is actually produced, however, so far from satisfying these legitimate anticipations, lacks every one of the qualifications which reason antecedently declares necessary. Miracles are not distinctive of divine power but are common to Satan, and they are admitted to be performed in support of falsehood as well as in the service of truth. They bear, indeed, so little upon them the impress of their origin and true character, that they are dependent for their recognition upon our judgment of the very doctrines to attest which they are said to have been designed.

"Even taking the representation of miracles, therefore, which divines themselves give, they are utterly incompetent to perform their contemplated functions. If they are superhuman they are not supersatanic, and there is no sense in which they can be considered miraculously evidential of anything. To argue as theologians do, that the ambiguity of their testimony is intended as a trial of our faith is absurd, for reason being unable to judge of the nature either of supernatural fact or of supernatural doctrine it would be mere folly and injustice to subject to such a test beings avowedly incapable of sustaining it. Whilst it is absolutely necessary, then, that a divine revelation should be attested by miraculous evidence to justify our believing it the testimony so called seems in all respects unworthy of the name, and presents anomalies much more suggestive of human invention than divine originality. We are, in fact, prepared by the scriptural account of miracles to expect that further examination will supply an explanation of such phenomena which will wholly remove them from the region of the supernatural.

"We have seen that a divine revelation is such only by virtue of communicating to us something which we could not know without it, and which is in fact undiscoverable by human reason; and that miraculous evidence is absolutely requisite to establish its reality. It is admitted that no other testimony could justify our believing the specific revelation which we are considering, the very substance of which is supernatural and beyond the criterion of reason, and that its astounding announcements, if not demonstrated to be miraculous truths, must inevitably be pronounced 'the wildest delusions.' On examining the supposed miraculous evidence, however, we find that not only is it upon general grounds antecedently incredible, but that the testimony by which its realty is supported, so far from establishing the inferences drawn from the supposed supernatural phenomena, is totally insufficient even to certify the actual occurrence of the events narrated.

"Even if the reality of miracles could be substantiated, their value as evidence for the divine revelation is destroyed by the necessary admission that miracles are not limited to one source, but that there are miracles satanic which are to be disbelieved, as well as divine and evidential ones to be believed.

"Similar miracles to those which are supposed to attest it are reported long antecedent to the promulgation of Christianity, and continued to be performed for centuries after it.

"A stream of miraculous pretension, in fact, has flowed through all human history, deep and broad as it has passed through the darker ages, but dwindling down to a thread as it has entered days of enlightenment.

"The true character of miracles is at once betrayed by the fact that their supposed occurrence has been confined to ages of ignorance and superstition, and that they are absolutely unknown in any time or place where science has provided witnesses fitted to appreciate and ascertain the nature of such exhibitions of supernatural power.

"There is no uncertainty as to the origin of belief in supernatural interference with nature. The assertion that spurious miracles have sprung up round a few instances of genuine miraculous power has not a single valid argument to support it.

"When we turn from more general arguments to examine the documentary evidence for the reality of the supposed miraculous occurrences, and of the divine revelation which they accredit, we meet with the characteristics which might have been expected. We do not find any trace even of the existence of our gospels for a century and a half after the events they record. They are anonymous narratives, and there is no evidence of any value connecting these works with the writers to whom they are popularly attributed. The miraculous evidence upon which alone, it is admitted, we could be justified in believing its astounding doctrines being thus nugatory, the claims of Christianity to be considered a divine revelation must necessarily be disallowed, and its supernatural elements, which are, in fact, the very substance of the system, inevitably sharing the same fate as the supposed miraculous evidence, must, therefore, be rejected as incredible and opposed to reason and complete induction." ("Supernatural Religion," p. 698.)

"A miracle as evidence can establish no fact, for the reason that the miracle does not exist. The miracle itself must be attested. As we have no evidence of miracles, we are not called on to believe them, but to believe the story which relates them. 'But the miracle is above and beyond reason.' To this we reply: It is absurd to assume what is beyond reason, to account for what is opposed to reason." (Ibid.)

David Hume's Argument on Miracles.

"A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable that all men must die; that lead cannot of itself remain suspended in the air; that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless it be that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of these laws, or, in other words, a miracle, to prevent them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle if it ever happen in the common course of nature. It is no miracle that a man seemingly in good health should die suddenly; because such a kind of death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently observed to happen. But it is a miracle that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been observed in any age or country. There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed or the miracle rendered credible but by an opposite proof which is superior. (2.)

"The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention), 'that no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavors to establish; and even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force which remains after deducting the inferior.' When any one tells me that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself whether it be more probable that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact which he relates should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other, and according to the superiority which I discover I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous than the event which he relates, then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.

"In the foregoing reasoning we have supposed that the testimony upon which a miracle is founded may possibly amount to an entire proof, and that the falsehood of that testimony would be a real prodigy; but it is easy to show that we have been a great deal too liberal in our concession, and that there never was a miraculous event established on so full an evidence.

"For, first, there is not to be found, in all history, any miracle attested by a sufficient number of men of such unquestioned good sense, education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in themselves; of such undoubted integrity as to place them beyond all suspicion of any design to deceive others; of such credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind as to have a great deal to lose in case of their being detected in any falsehood; and, at the same time, attesting facts performed in such a public manner, and in so celebrated a part of the world, as to render the detection unavoidable; all which circumstances are requisite to give us a full assurance in the testimony of men.

"Secondly. We may observe in human nature a principle which, if strictly examined, will be found to diminish extremely the assurance which we might, from human testimony, have in any kind of prodigy. The maxim by which we commonly conduct ourselves in our reasonings is, that the objects of which we have no experience resemble those of which we have; that what we have found to be most usual is always most profitable, and that where there is an opposition of argument we ought to give the preference to such as are founded on the greatest number of past observations; but though, in proceeding by this rule, we readily reject any fact which is unusual and incredible in an ordinary degree, yet in advancing further the mind observes not always the same rule, but when anything is affirmed utterly absurd and miraculous it rather the more readily admits of such a fact, upon account of that very circumstance which ought to destroy all its authority. The passion of surprise and wonder arising from miracles, being an agreeable emotion, gives a sensible tendency toward the belief of those events from which it is derived. And this goes so far, that even those who can not enjoy this pleasure immediately, nor can believe those miraculous events of which they are informed, yet love to partake of the satisfaction at second-hand or by rebound, and take pride and delight in exciting the admiration of others.

"With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of travelers received, their descriptions of sea and land monsters, their relations of wonderful adventures, strange men and uncouth manners! But if the spirit of religion joins itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common sense, and human testimony, in these circumstances, loses all pretensions to authority. A religionist may be an enthusiast, and imagine he sees what has no reality; he may know his narrative to be false, and yet persevere in it with the best intentions in the world, for the sake of promoting so holy a cause; or even where this delusion has not place, vanity, excited by so strong a temptation, operates on him more powerfully than on the rest of mankind in any other circumstances, and self-interest with equal force. His auditors may not have, and commonly have not, sufficient judgment to canvass his evidence; what judgment they have, they renounce by principle, in these sublime and mysterious subjects; or if they were ever so willing to employ it, passion and a heated imagination disturb the regularity of its operations. Their credulity increases his impudence, and his impudence overpowers their credulity.

"Eloquence, when at its highest pitch, leaves little room for reason or reflection, but, addressing itself entirely to the fancy or the affections, captivates the willing hearers and subdues their understanding. Happily, this pitch it seldom attains. But what a Tully or a Demosthenes could scarcely effect over a Roman or Athenian audience, every Capuchin, every itinerant or stationary teacher, can perform over the generality of mankind, and in a higher degree, by touching such gross and vulgar passions.

"The many instances of forged miracles and prophecies, and supernatural events, which in all ages have either been detected by contrary evidence or which detect themselves by their absurdity, prove sufficiently the strong propensity of mankind to the extraordinary and the marvelous, and ought reasonably to beget a suspicion against all relations of this kind. This is our natural way of thinking, even with regard to the most common and most credible events. For instance, there is no kind of report which rises so easily and spreads so quickly, especially in country places and provincial towns, as those concerning marriages: insomuch that two young persons of equal condition never see each other twice but the whole neighborhood immediately join them together. The pleasure of telling a piece of news so interesting, of propagating it, and of being the first reporters of it, spreads the intelligence. And this is so well known that no man of sense gives attention to these reports till he finds them confirmed by some greater evidence. Do not the same passions, and others still stronger, incline the generality of mankind to believe and report, with the greatest vehemence and assurance, all religious miracles?

"Thirdly. It forms a strong presumption against all supernatural and miraculous relations that they are observed chiefly to abound among ignorant and barbarous nations; or if a civilized people has ever given admission to any of them, that people will be found to have received them from ignorant and barbarous ancestors, who transmitted them with that inviolable sanction and authority which always attend received opinions. When we peruse the first histories of all nations, we are apt to imagine ourselves transported into some new world, where the whole frame of nature is disjointed, and every element performs its operations in a different manner from what it does at present. Battles, revolutions, pestilence, famine, and death, are never the effect of those natural causes which we experience. Prodigies, omens, oracles, judgments, quite obscure the few natural events that are intermingled with them. But as the former grow thinner every page, in proportion as we advance nearer the enlightened ages, we soon learn that there is nothing mysterious or supernatural in the case, but that all proceeds from the usual propensity of mankind toward the marvelous; and that though this inclination may at intervals receive a check from sense and learning, it can never be thoroughly extirpated from human nature.

"It is strange, a judicious reader is apt to say upon the perusal of those wonderful historians, that such prodigious events never happen in our days. But it is nothing strange, I hope, that men should lie in all ages. You must surely have seen instances enough of that frailty. You have yourself heard many such marvelous relations started, which, being treated with scorn by all the wise and judicious, have at least been abandoned even by the vulgar. Be assured that those renowned lies, which have spread and flourished to such a monstrous height, arose from like beginnings; but being sown in a more proper soil, shot up at last into prodigies almost equal to those which they relate.