Chapter XXX: Section XXXIII: Chapter XII (1)

WELLINGTON RETURNS TO THE DOURO. FINIS

The garrison of the Retiro had surrendered on August 14th: Wellington remained for seventeen days longer in Madrid, and did not leave it, to take the field again, until August 31st. His stay in the Spanish capital was not due, in the first instance, to the causes which might seem most plausible--a desire to give his war-worn infantry a rest during the hottest weeks of the year, or a determination to reorganize the military resources of Madrid and New Castile for the profit of the allied cause[752]. Both these ideas existed, and the latter in especial absorbed much of his attention--he spent long hours in trying to concert, with Carlos de España, measures for the utilization of the captured munitions of the Retiro, and for the recruiting of the regiments of the Spanish ‘Fifth Army.’ In this he accomplished less than he had hoped, partly because of the dreadful exhaustion of the central provinces of Spain after the famine of the preceding year, partly because of the inefficiency of most of the Spanish officials with whom he had to deal. He was much discontented with the list of persons appointed by the new Regency to take up authority in the reconquered provinces; and Castaños, whom he most trusted, and desired to have with him, was lingering in Galicia[753].

[752] Wellington to Henry Wellesley, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 364.

[753] Same to same, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 373. He was particularly
indignant at the supersession of Mexia, Intendant of Castile, by
Lozano de Torres, with whom he had quarrelled in Estremadura in
1809, ‘the most useless and inefficient of all God’s creatures,
and an impediment to all business.’

But the main reason for the halt at Madrid was the uncertainty as to the movements of Soult. Was the Duke of Dalmatia about, as would seem reasonable, to evacuate Andalusia? And if so, would he pick up King Joseph and the Army of the Centre in La Mancha, and march on Madrid with the 65,000 men whom they could collect? Or would he retire on Valencia and join Suchet? Or again, would he persist in his intention, expressed in dispatches to Joseph, which had fallen into Wellington’s hands, of holding on to Andalusia and making it a separate base of French power, despite of the fact that he had been cut off from communication with the imperial armies of the East and North?

‘Any other but a modern French army would now leave the province [of Andalusia],’ wrote Wellington to Lord Bathurst on July 18[754], ‘as they have now absolutely no communication of any kind with France or with any other French army; and they are pressed on all sides by troops not to be despised, and can evidently do nothing. Yet I suspect that Soult will not stir till I force him out by a direct movement upon him: and I think of making that movement as soon as I can take the troops to the South without injuring their health.’ All military reasons were against the probability of Soult’s holding on in Andalusia, yet he had certainly expressed his intention of doing so as late as the middle of July, and, what was more important still in judging of his plans, he had not made a sudden movement of retreat when the news of Salamanca reached him. Hill writing on August 4th, six days after the receipt of the tidings of Marmont’s disaster, had to report[755] that ‘the recent glorious event’ seemed to have had very little effect on the enemy, who ‘continued in a strong position in his front.’ And this was true, for Soult, after hearing the news of Salamanca, had made his last frantic appeal to King Joseph to fall back on Andalusia, and make his base at Seville if Madrid were lost. Wellington was right in suspecting that, if the Marshal had got his desire, the South would have been maintained against him, and he would have had to march thither in person, to pick up Hill, and to bring matters to an issue by another pitched battle. It was only on August 12th that Soult reluctantly resolved to evacuate Andalusia: his first precautionary movements for retreat were made on August 15th, but it was not till the 24th that the Cadiz Lines were destroyed, or till the 26th that all the French troops in front of Hill suddenly vanished. Wellington was therefore kept for more than a fortnight in a state of complete uncertainty as to whether he might not have to march southward in the end, to evict Soult from his viceroyalty. It was only on the 24th that he got information from Hill (written on the 17th) which gave the first premonitory warning that the French seemed to be on the move[756]. Next day confirming evidence began to come to hand: ‘it is generally reported, and I have reason to believe, that the Army of the South is about to make a general movement ... it is supposed in the direction of Granada and Valencia[757].’ On August 30, ‘though Sir Rowland Hill on the 17th instant had no intelligence that the march was commenced, there was every appearance of it.’ The fact that seemed to make it incredible that Soult could be proposing to hold Andalusia any longer, was precise information that King Joseph and the Army of the Centre had marched upon Valencia to join Suchet, and had passed Chinchilla on August 24th, going eastward[758]. If the King had gone by the passes of the Sierra Morena southward, to join Soult, doubt might still have been possible: but since he had made Valencia his goal, and was crawling slowly along in that direction with his immense convoy of refugees and baggage, Soult--left entirely to his own resources--could not retain his present position. He must march on Valencia also, and it would be many weeks before he could place himself in touch with Suchet, and produce a threatening combination on the Mediterranean coast.

[754] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 370.

[755] See above, p. 537.

[756] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 377.

[757] Ibid., ix. pp. 380-1.

[758] News from Joseph O’Donnell commanding the Spanish army of
Murcia. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 388.

On August 31st, therefore, with no absolutely certain news yet to hand as to Soult’s retreat, but with every military probability in favour of its having been begun, Wellington resolved to leave Madrid and to return to the valley of the Douro, where the movements of Clausel and the French Army of Portugal demanded his attention. He never thought for a moment of endeavouring to march through La Mancha to intercept or molest Soult’s retreat. The distance was too great, the roads unknown, the problem of feeding the army in the desolate and thinly-peopled country about the Murcian and Andalusian borders too difficult. Wellington made up his mind that he had some time to spare: he would march against Clausel and then ‘return to this part of the country [Madrid] as soon as I shall have settled matters to my satisfaction on the right of the Douro. And I hope I shall be here [Madrid] and shall be joined by the troops under Sir Rowland Hill, before Soult can have made much progress to form his junction with the King[759].’ It is important, therefore, to realize that, in Wellington’s original conception, the operations in Old Castile, which we may call the Burgos campaign, were to be but a side-issue, an intermediate and secondary matter. The real danger in Spain, as he considered, was the approaching, but not immediate, junction of Soult, Suchet, and King Joseph at Valencia. And the Commander-in-Chief evidently proposed to be at Madrid, to face this combination, by October 1st. How and why he failed to carry out this intention must be explained at length in the next volume.

[759] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, August 30, from Madrid.
_Dispatches_, ix. p. 390.

Meanwhile, when he marched off to the Douro with part of his army, he had to make provisions for the conduct of affairs in the South during his absence. Hill, as has been shown in another chapter, had been told to march on Madrid, as soon as Soult’s forces had made their definitive departure for the East. As Drouet only disappeared from Hill’s front on August 26th, the northward march of the army from Estremadura began late: it had not commenced to cross the Guadiana on September 1: its progress to and along the Tagus valley was slow, owing to the difficulty of procuring food, and its main body had not reached Almaraz and Talavera before the 20th September, and was only concentrated about and behind Toledo at the end of the month. But though Hill’s movement was not rapid, it was made in sufficiently good time to face the danger that was brewing on the side of Valencia. And there can be no doubt that if he had received orders to hurry, he could have been in line some days before he actually appeared[760]. He brought up all his force[761] except Buchan’s Portuguese brigade[762], which was left at Truxillo and Merida, to keep up his communication with Elvas. Estremadura, so long the contending ground of armies, had now no solid body of troops left in it save the Spanish garrison of Badajoz. For Penne Villemur and Morillo, with the division which had so long operated in Hill’s vicinity, moved with him into New Castile. They went by the rugged roads through the mountains of the province of Toledo[763], and took post at Herencia, on the high-road from Madrid to the Despeñaperros pass, in front of the British 2nd Division.

[760] The cavalry at the head of the column were at Truxillo
on the 15th September, Almaraz on the 19th, Talavera on the
21st. The infantry in the rear of the division only crossed the
Guadiana at Medellin on September 14th, was at Truxillo on the
17th, Almaraz on the 20th, Talavera on the 26th, Toledo on the
30th (Swabey’s diary).

[761] Hill brought up the 2nd Division--British, 7,000;
Portuguese, 2,900; Hamilton’s Portuguese, 5,300; Long’s and
Slade’s cavalry, about 1,900; artillery, about 400 = 17,500 of
all ranks.

[762] Late Power’s brigade: The 5th and 17th, the old garrison of
Elvas, and the 22nd.

[763] They marched from Cabeza del Buey, on the borders of
Andalusia and Estremadura, via Talarubia and Mazarambros to
Herencia. ‘Journal of Regiment of Leon,’ in Clonard, vol. iv.

In the rear of Hill’s column, and separated from it by many days’ march, was another small British force toiling up to Madrid from a very distant point. This was the force under Colonel Skerrett, which had taken part in the fighting round Seville. It consisted of the battalion of the Guards from Cadiz, the 2/47th and 2/87th, two companies of the 2/95th, a squadron of the 2nd Hussars K.G.L., the 20th Portuguese Line, and a battery. By Wellington’s orders no British troops were now left in Cadiz save the 2/59th, part of de Watteville’s regiment, the ‘battalion of foreign recruits,’ soon to become the 8/60th, and a few artillery. Skerrett’s column, some 4,000 strong, marched by Merida and Truxillo, and reached Toledo in time to join Hill for the autumn campaign in front of Madrid. Hill’s corps, when joined by Skerrett, provided a force of over 20,000 men, about equally divided between British and Portuguese.

It would have been profitable to Wellington, as matters went in the end, if he had handed over the entire task of observing Soult’s operations to Hill. But being under the impression that he would return ere long to Madrid, he left there and in the neighbourhood nearly half the force that he had brought from Salamanca. He only took with him to oppose Clausel the 1st, 5th, and 7th Divisions, with Pack’s and Bradford’s Portuguese, and Bock’s and Ponsonby’s (late Le Marchant’s) brigades of heavy dragoons, a force of some 21,000 men[764]. He left the 3rd and Light Divisions at Madrid, the 4th Division at the Escurial, and Carlos de España’s Spaniards at Segovia. The cavalry of Victor Alten and D’Urban were assigned to this force, and remained, the former at Madrid, the latter at the Palacio de Rio Frio, near Segovia. The British infantry divisions had all suffered heavily at Badajoz, and the 4th at Salamanca also--they were weak in numbers, but were expecting ere long to be joined by numerous convalescents. The total force left behind amounted to about 17,000 men, including the Spaniards[765]. Thus when Hill and Skerrett came up from the South, there was a mass of nearly 40,000 men accumulated round Madrid, while Wellington himself, after picking up Clinton and the 6th Division, and the other troops left on the Douro, had a little under 30,000. This proved in the autumn campaign an ideally bad partition of the army, for on each wing the Anglo-Portuguese force was decidedly less numerous than that which the French could bring against it. If Wellington had taken his full strength to the North, he could have defied Clausel and Caffarelli, and they could never have made head against him, or pressed him away from Burgos. Hill, on the other hand, in front of Madrid, would have been no more helpless with 22,000 men than he actually was with 38,000 men, when Soult and King Joseph brought 60,000 against him in October. In either case he could only retreat without offering battle. But Wellington, if the three additional divisions left in New Castile had been brought to the North, would have had such a superiority over the French in Old Castile that he could have dealt with them as he pleased. The only explanation of the unfortunate proportional division of his army, is that Wellington undervalued the task he had to execute beyond the Douro, thought that he could finish it more quickly than was to be the case, and calculated on being back at Madrid in October before Soult could give trouble.

[764] There marched with Wellington--1st Division, 5,980 of
all ranks; 5th Division, 4,726; 7th Division, 4,841; Pack and
Bradford, 3,954; Bock and Ponsonby, 1,673; artillery, &c., about
500 = 21,674.

[765] There remained at Madrid, the Escurial, &c.--Arentschildt’s
cavalry, 515; D’Urban’s Portuguese cavalry, 552; 3rd Division,
4,234; 4th Division, 4,548; Light Division, 3,462; artillery,
about 350; Carlos de España’s Spaniards, about 3,000 = 16,661.

Yet when he started he was not comfortable in his mind about the general situation. If the French drew together, their total strength in Spain was far too great for him. In a moody moment he wrote to his brother Henry: ‘though I still hope to be able to maintain our position in Castile, and even to improve our advantages, I shudder when I reflect upon the enormity of the task which I have undertaken, with inadequate powers myself to do anything, and without assistance of any kind from the Spaniards.... I am apprehensive that all this may turn out ill for the Spanish cause. If by any cause I should be overwhelmed, or should be obliged to retire, what will the world say? What will the people of England say? What will those in Spain say?[766]’

[766] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 375.

Wellington’s forebodings were, only too soon, to be justified. But the tale of the campaign against Clausel and Caffarelli, of the advance to and retreat from Burgos, must be told in another volume.

APPENDICES

I

SUCHET’S ARMY IN VALENCIA. MORNING STATE OF OCT. 1, 1811

1st Division (Musnier): _Officers._ _Men._ _Total._
Robert’s { 114th Line (3 batts.) 58 1,579 1,637
Brigade { 1st of the Vistula (2 batts.) 27 836 863
Ficatier’s { 121st Line (3 batts.) 44 1,156 1,200
Brigade { 2nd of the Vistula (2 batts.) 26 1,103 1,129 = 4,829

2nd Division (Harispe):
Paris’s { 7th Line (4 batts.) 55 1,584 1,639
Brigade { 116th Line (3 batts.) 42 1,105 1,147
Chlopiski’s { 44th Line (2 batts.) 35 1,191 1,226
Brigade { 3rd of the Vistula (2 batts.) 26 724 750 = 4,762

3rd Division (Habert):
Montmarie’s { 5th Line (2 batts.) 31 771 802
Brigade { 16th Line (3 batts.) 56 1,261 1,317
Bronikowski’s Brigade, 117th Line (3 batts.) 49 1,291 1,340 = 3,459

Palombini’s Italian Division:
Saint Paul’s{ 2nd Léger (3 batts.) 59 2,141 2,200
Brigade { 4th Line (3 batts.) 57 1,603 1,660
Balathier’s { 5th Line (2 batts.) 37 893 930
Brigade { 6th Line (3 batts.) 51 1,378 1,429 = 6,219

Compère’s Neapolitan Division:
1st Léger (1 batt.) 27 419 446
1st Line (1 batt.) 24 536 560
2nd Line (1 batt.) 27 358 385 = 1,391

Cavalry (General Boussard):
4th Hussars (4 squadrons) 30 720 750
24th Dragoons (2 squadrons) 17 419 436
13th Cuirassiers (4 squadrons) 27 557 584
Italian ‘Dragoons of Napoleon’ 24 442 466
Neapolitan Chasseurs 13 156 169 = 2,405

Artillery (General Vallée) 48 1,757 1,805
Engineers (General Rogniat) 16 584 600
Équipages Militaires and Gendarmerie 10 653 663 = 3,068
--- ------ ------ ------
916 25,217 26,133 26,133

N.B.--Ficatier’s Brigade, 3 battalions of Palombini’s division, and two squadrons of 4th Hussars were not present at the battle of Saguntum, being on the line of communications, and blockading Peniscola and Oropesa.

This return, lent me by Mr. Fortescue who found it in the Paris Archives, differs by over 2,000 men from Suchet’s figures given in his _Mémoires_, p. 436 of vol. ii. The Marshal has left out the 3 battalions and 2 squadrons on the line of communications, mentioned above.

II

STRENGTH OF BLAKE’S ARMY AT THE BATTLE OF SAGUNTUM

I. ‘THE EXPEDITIONARY CORPS.’
_Officers._ _Men._ _Total._

Lardizabal’s Division: Africa (2 batts.), Murcia
(2 batts.), 2nd of Badajoz (2 batts.), Campo
Mayor (1 batt.), Tiradores de Cuenca (1 batt.) 149 2,823 2,972

Zayas’s Division: 2nd Spanish Guards, 4th ditto,
1st Walloon Guards, Voluntarios de la Patria,
Toledo, Ciudad Rodrigo, Legion Estrangera (1
batt. each), Companies of Cazadores 177 2,373 2,550

Loy’s Cavalry: Granaderos (2 squadrons), Rey
(1 ditto), Husares de Castilla (1 ditto) 50 244 294

Horse Artillery: two batteries 11 214 225
--- ----- -----
Total of the ‘Expeditionary Corps’ 387 5,654 6,041

II. VALENCIAN TROOPS (‘SECOND ARMY’).

Miranda’s Division: Valencia (3 batts.), Voluntarios
de Castilla (2 batts.), 1st of Avila (1 batt.),
2nd Cazadores de Valencia (1 batt.) 120 3,844 3,964

Obispo’s Division: Cariñena (2 batts.) 2nd of Avila
(1 batt.), 1st Voluntarios de Aragon (1 batt.),
Daroca (1 batt.), Tiradores de Doyle (1 batt.) 110 3,290 3,400

Villacampa’s Division: Princesa (2 batts.), Soria
(2 batts.), 2nd Voluntarios de Aragon (1 batt.),
1st Cazadores de Valencia (1 batt.), Molina
(1 batt.) 162 3,190 3,352

Reserve (General Velasco): 3rd Battalions of
Voluntarios de Castilla, Don Carlos, Avila, Cazadores
de Valencia, and Voluntarios de Orihuela 75 3,595 3,670

San Juan’s Cavalry: Cuenca, Dragones del Rey,
Reina, Numancia, Husares de Aragon, Cazadores
de Valencia, Alcantara, Husares Españoles,
Husares de Granada (none over two squadrons
strong) 111 1,610 1,721

Artillery: 1 horse, 2 field batteries 21 340 361
--- ------ ------
Total ‘2nd Army’ 599 15,869 16,468

III. MURCIAN TROOPS (‘3RD ARMY’).

_Officers._ _Men._ _Total._
Creagh’s Brigade: Corona, Alcazar,
Tiradores de Cadiz (1 batt. each) 97 2,121 2,218

Montijo’s Brigade: 1st of Badajoz, 1st of
Cuenca, Voluntarios de Burgos, Sappers
(1 batt. each) 108 2,302 2,410

Cavalry: Reina (2 squadrons), Pavia (2
squadrons), Granada (2 squadrons),
Madrid (1 squadron), Husares de Fernando
7me (1 squadron) 83 743 826

Horse Artillery: 1 battery 3 78 81
--- ----- -----
Total ‘3rd Army’ 291 5,244 5,535

General Total of the Army: 1,277 officers, 26,767 men = Total, 28,044.

III

SUCHET’S ARMY AT THE SIEGE OF VALENCIA. MORNING STATE OF DEC. 31

N.B.--The regiments of the Army of Aragon are the same as in Appendix I.

I. ARMY OF ARAGON (officers and men).

Musnier’s Division (10 battalions) 3,727
Harispe’s Division (10 battalions) 4,828
Habert’s Division (8 battalions) 3,150
Palombini’s Division (10 battalions) 3,591
Compère’s Division (3 battalions) 1,092
Boussard’s Cavalry (13 squadrons) 1,839
Artillery 1,511
Engineers, &c. 857
------
Total Army of Aragon 20,595

II. REILLE’S CORPS (officers and men).

Pannetier’s { 10th and 81st Line (7 battalions) 2,834
Brigade {

Bourke’s { 20th and 60th Line (7 battalions) 3,961
Brigade {

Severoli’s Italian { 1st Line (3 batts.) }
{ 7th Line (2 batts.) } 4,370
Division { 1st Léger (3 batts.) }

Cavalry { 9th Hussars 543
{ 1st Italian Chasseurs 262

Artillery 1,153
------
Total Reille’s Corps 13,123

General Total of combined forces, 33,718.

IV

SURRENDER-ROLL OF BLAKE’S ARMY OF VALENCIA, JAN. 9, 1812

_Officers._ _Rank
and file._
Zayas’s Division 96 1,319
Lardizabal’s Division 165 3,385
Miranda’s Division 237 5,513
Division of Reserve, &c. 130 3,171
Cavalry 77 818
Artillery 73 1,581
Engineers and Sappers 38 383
--- ------
Total 816 16,170

General total, 16,986 of all ranks, not including 62 officers in staff or administrative employments, 23 chaplains, and 19 surgeons.

Of the remainder of Blake’s army there had rallied at Alicante by January 14 of infantry 361 officers and 5,125 men, of cavalry 164 officers and 671 men, of artillery 30 officers and 720 men--total of all arms, 7,071.

V

FRENCH TROOPS EMPLOYED AT THE SIEGE OF TARIFA (DEC. 1811-JAN. 1812)

[From the table in Belmas, iv. pp. 40-2.] _Of all
ranks._
From Leval’s Division, 43rd Line, 7th and 9th Poles (2 batts.
each) 3,000

From Barrois’s Division, 16th Léger (3 batts.), 51st Ligne (2
batts.), 54th Ligne (2 batts.) 4,200

From Villatte’s Division, 27th Léger (1 batt.), 94th and 95th
Ligne (1 batt. each) 1,800

Cavalry, 16th Dragoons, and one squadron 21st Dragoons 585

Artillery 469

Engineers, Sappers, Marines, &c. 385
------
Total 10,439

In addition three battalions of the 8th and 63rd line and two squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons were occupied on the lines of communications, between Vejer and Fascinas.

ANGLO-SPANISH GARRISON OF TARIFA

_Of all
British (Colonel Skerrett): ranks._
2/47th 570
2/87th 560
Battalion of Flank Companies 400
1 company 95th regiment 75
1 troop 2nd Hussars K.G.L. 70
Artillery (Hughes’s Company R.A.) 83
-----
Total 1,758

Spanish (General Copons):
Cantabria (1 batt.) 450
Irlanda (1 batt.) 357
Cazadores 333
Artillery 106
Sappers 83
Cavalry 17
-----
Total 1,346

N.B.--Another return makes the total of the British part of the garrison 67 officers and 1,707 men, a total of 1,774.

VI

CIUDAD RODRIGO

A. THE FRENCH GARRISON

The garrison, according to Belmas, iv. pp. 282-3, stood on the day of the investment as follows:

34th Léger, one battalion 975 officers and men effective.
113th Ligne, one battalion 577 ” ”
Artillery, 2 companies 168 ” ”
Engineers 15 ” ”
Non-combatants (Civil officers, &c.) 36 ” ”
Sick in Hospital 163
Staff 3
-----
Total 1,937

B. BRITISH LOSSES DURING THE SIEGE

The British losses between the investment and the storm were, according to the official returns at the Record Office, 1 officer and 69 men killed, 19 officers and 462 men wounded, 2 men (both Portuguese) missing, or a total of 553. These figures added to the 568 lost in the storm (for details see below), make altogether 1,121, which does not agree with the statement in Wellington _Dispatches_, viii. p. 557; this gives as the total for the siege 9 officers and 169 men killed, 70 officers and 748 men wounded, 7 men missing, or only 1,003, over a hundred less than the total from the return quoted above. Napier gives 1,290 as the casualties for the whole siege, which much exceeds the return in the Record Office; he also makes the total for the storm 60 officers and 650 killed and wounded, while the official return here printed makes it only 59 officers and 509 men. Lord Londonderry and Sir John Jones also give figures agreeing with no others. I prefer to take the total of the official report, which is here appended.

C. BRITISH LOSSES AT THE STORM OF CIUDAD RODRIGO. JANUARY 19, 1812

_Killed._ _Wounded._
_Officers._ _Men._ _Officers._ _Men._ _Total._
Staff 1[767] -- 2[768] -- 3
Engineers -- -- 2 2 4

3rd Division:
{1/45th 3 14 4 27 48
Mackinnon’s {5/60th -- 1 1 3 5
Brigade {74th -- 4 4 13 21
{1/88th -- 7 4 23 34

{2/5th 1 33 8 52 94
Campbell’s {77th -- 14 5 31 50
Brigade {2/83rd -- 1 -- 4 5
{94th 2 13 6 48 69
---
Divisional Total 326

Light Division:
Vandeleur’s {1/52nd 1 2 2 23 28
Brigade {2/52nd -- 1 1 7 9
{3/95th -- -- -- 9 9

Barnard’s {1/43rd -- 7 3 31 41
Brigade {1/95th -- 1 3 16 20
{2/95th -- -- 2 4 6
---
Divisional Total 113

Portuguese -- 19 4 91 114
-- --- -- --- ---
Grand Total 8 117 51 384 560

Adding 5 British and 3 Portuguese missing, the total loss is 568 in the storm.

[767] General Mackinnon.

[768] Generals Craufurd and Vandeleur.

VII

NOTE ON SOME POINTS OF CONTROVERSY REGARDING THE STORM OF CIUDAD RODRIGO

Beside the controversy alluded to on page 183 about the exact amount of co-operation by the Light Division in helping the 3rd to clear the French from behind the Greater Breach, there are several other vexed points concerning the storm of Ciudad Rodrigo. The one on which most dispute arose was that concerning the capture of General Barrié. Gurwood of the 52nd claimed to have been the first officer to enter the Castle, and to receive the surrender of the governor and his staff. He is mentioned as doing so in Wellington’s Rodrigo dispatch, and generally had the credit at the time. But Lieutenant Mackie of the 88th, who had led the forlorn hope of the 3rd Division, also put in a claim, and had many supporters. Many years after the war was over, Maxwell (the author of one of the several _Lives of the Duke of Wellington_, which came out in early Victorian times) championed Mackie’s claim with such vehemence that Gurwood issued a pamphlet defending his own credit. Considerable controversy arose in the _United Service Journal_ for 1843, and elsewhere. Mackie’s story was that he, with some of the 88th, arrived first at the Castle, summoned the governor to surrender, and was received by several French officers, who handed him over a sword and announced that the general yielded. Some moments after, according to Mackie, Gurwood came up, spoke to the governor himself, and obtained his sword, which, when the prisoners were brought before Wellington, he presented to his commander, who gave it him back, telling him to retain it as a trophy, and entered Gurwood’s name in his dispatch as the officer who had received the surrender. Gurwood’s story, told with as much detail and circumstance as Mackie’s, is that he, with two soldiers of the 52nd, arrived at the citadel, got the gate opened by threatening the officer in charge that no quarter would be given if resistance were made, and was received by Barrié, who in a great state of nervousness, threw his arms round his neck, kissed him, and said, ‘_je suis le Gouverneur de la place--je suis votre prisonnier_,’ handing over his sword at the same time. He accompanied the captive staff-officers to Wellington’s presence, and presented them to him. It is difficult to come to any certain conclusion in face of two such contradictory tales, but there is a bare possibility of reconciling them, by supposing that Mackie entered first, that the door was closed behind him and his party, and that Gurwood was let in a moment later, and spoke to the governor, while Mackie had been dealing only with his aide-de-camp, whose sword he had received. But if so, it is odd that Gurwood never saw Mackie: Mackie is quite positive that he saw Gurwood, and that he came in some minutes later than himself. The dispute tended to become a controversy between Light Division and 3rd Division veterans, each backing their own man. A synopsis of the papers may be found in the last two chapters of vol. i of Grattan’s second series of _Adventures with the Connaught Rangers_ (London, 1853). Napier, who was much interested in the discussion, put in his final definitive edition the non-committal statement that ‘the garrison fled to the Castle, where Lieutenant Gurwood, who though severely wounded had entered among the foremost at the Lesser Breach, received the governor’s sword’ (iv. p. 90). Harry Smith says (i. p. 58): ‘Gurwood got great credit here unfairly. Johnstone and poor Uniacke were the first on the ramparts, Gurwood having been knocked down in the breach, and momentarily stunned. However, Gurwood’s a sharp fellow, and he cut off in search of the governor and brought his sword to the Duke. He made the _most_ of it.’

Another controversy is as to which troops of the 3rd Division got first into the body of the town. The 88th claimed the priority, but also the 94th. The late Mr. Andrew Lang lent me a very interesting letter of his kinsman, William Lang of the 94th, very clearly stating that a solid body of 200 men of his regiment were the first troops that penetrated in force to the Plaza Mayor, and received the surrender of the garrison there.

Still another controversy, about which there is much in the Rice Jones papers, in the possession of Commander Hon. Henry Shore, R.N., is as to what engineer officers conducted the storming-columns. Apparently some credit has been misplaced among individuals here, but to decide upon the point would take more space than a book like this can afford.

VIII

ARMY OF THE SOUTH

REORGANIZED AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF THE POLES AND OTHER REGIMENTS

RETURN OF MARCH 1, 1812

[From the returns in the _Archives Nationales_. Lent me by Mr. Fortescue.]

_Officers._ _Men._
1st Division: Conroux. Head-quarters: Villamartin
(near Bornos).
1st Brigade, Meunier; 9th Léger (2 batts.)*, 24th
Ligne (3 batts.).
2nd Brigade, Mocquery; 96th Ligne (3 batts.).

Total, including artillery 182 5,263

2nd Division: Barrois. Head-quarters: Puerto Real
(near Cadiz).
1st Brigade, Cassagne: 16th Léger, 8th Ligne (3
batts. each).
2nd Brigade, Avril: 51st Ligne, 54th Ligne (3
batts. each).

Total, including artillery 225 7,551

3rd Division: Villatte. Head-quarters: Santa Maria
(near Cadiz).
1st Brigade, Pécheux: 27th Léger, 63rd Ligne (3
batts. each).
2nd Brigade, Lefol: 94th Ligne, 95th Ligne (3
batts. each).

Total, including artillery 244 7,115

4th Division: Leval. Head-quarters: Granada.
1st Brigade, Rey: 32nd Ligne, 43rd Ligne (4 batts.
each).
2nd Brigade, Vichery: 55th Ligne (4 batts.), 58th
Ligne* (3 batts.).

Total, including artillery 273 9,131

5th Division: Drouet D’Erlon. Head-quarters: Zafra
(Estremadura).
1st Brigade, Dombrowski: 12th Léger, 45th Ligne
(3 batts. each).
2nd Brigade, Reymond: 64th Ligne* (2-2/3 batts.),
88th Ligne* (2 batts.)

Total, including artillery 192 5,927

6th Division: Daricau. Head-quarters: Zalamea
(Estremadura).
1st Brigade, Quiot: 21st Léger, 100th Ligne (3
batts. each).
2nd Brigade, St. Pol: 28th Léger*, 103rd Ligne*
(2 batts. each).

Total, including artillery 174 4,854
----- ------
Total of six divisions 1,290 39,841

The regiments marked * had each one battalion in garrison at Badajoz, except the 64th, which had two companies there only [9th Léger, 28th Léger, 58th, 88th, 103rd Ligne]. The total of these 5-1/3 battalions was 2,951 officers and men. Adding these to the six divisions the total was 44,082 French infantry present under arms.

CAVALRY.

1st Division. Head-quarters: Ribera (Estremadura).
1st Brigade, Perreymond: 2nd Hussars, 21st
Chasseurs, 26th Dragoons.
2nd Brigade, Bonnemain: 5th Chasseurs, 27th
Chasseurs.

Total 116 1,840

2nd Division. Head-quarters: Cordova.
1st Brigade, Digeon: 2nd, 4th, 5th Dragoons.
2nd Brigade, Lallemand: 14th, 17th, 27th Dragoons.

Total 170 3,307

3rd Division, Pierre Soult. Head-quarters: Granada.
1st Brigade, Boille: 10th Chasseurs, 12th
Dragoons.
2nd Brigade, Ormancey: 16th Dragoons, 21st
Dragoons.

Total 135 2,203
--- -----
Total Cavalry 421 7,350

N.B.--7th Lancers, a Polish regiment, is omitted here, but actually stayed with the Army of the South till the end of 1812.

Spanish Troops [by return of April 1]: _Officers._ _Men._
Infantry 218 2,732
Cavalry 163 2,358
--- -----
Total _Juramentados_ 381 5,090

Artillery (deducting divisional batteries) 100 2,800
Engineers and Sappers 20 900
Three naval battalions (43rd and 44th _équipages de
flotte_, and a battalion of _ouvriers de
marine_) 60 1800
Gendarmerie, &c. 10 600
----- ------
General Total of army 2,282 58,381

Or adding the garrison of Badajoz (2,951 infantry, 268 artillery, 265 sappers, 42 cavalry, of the Army of the South, _not_ including 910 Hessians of the Army of the Centre), a total of 64,189, without sick, &c.

When Soult on April 1st, 1812 marched to attempt the relief of Badajoz, he drew up the following statistics as to the strength of his army, _omitting the naval troops, and the gunners of the Cadiz Lines_:

(1) Marched for Badajoz: _Officers._ _Men._
Infantry 600 17,964
Cavalry 237 3,944
Artillery 26 613
Engineers 2 116
--- ------
Total 865 22,637 = 23,502

(2) Left before Cadiz and in Granada, &c.:
Infantry 611 18,312
Cavalry 152 2,555
--- ------
Total 763 20,867 = 21,630

(3) Garrisons of the Provinces of Cordova,
Jaen, Granada, and Seville:
Infantry 90 2,547
Cavalry 57 1,654
--- -----
Total 147 4,201 = 4,348

(4) Spanish troops:
Infantry 218 2,732
Cavalry 163 2,358
--- -----
Total 381 5,090 = 5,471

Adding up these four totals we get officers 2,156, rank and file 52,795 = 54,951. This total omits the artillery in the Cadiz Lines and other fortified places, and the three marine regiments, and such sappers, gendarmes, military train, &c., as did not form part of the expedition that marched with Soult to relieve Badajoz. Adding these, at their strength of March 1, we get a total of about 59,000 of all ranks, not including the garrison of Badajoz. This agrees well enough with the March total of 60,663, allowing for a month’s wear and tear.

IX

THE SIEGE OF BADAJOZ, MARCH 15-APRIL 6, 1812

(A) STRENGTH OF THE FRENCH GARRISON ON MARCH 15

[See the Tables in Belmas, iv. pp. 364-5 and in Jones, i. p. 229.]

Staff 25
Infantry:
3/9th Léger officers and men 580
1/28th Léger ” ” 597
1/58th Ligne ” ” 450
3/88th Ligne ” ” 600
3/103rd Ligne ” ” 540
64th Ligne (2 companies) ” ” 130
Hesse-Darmstadt (2 batts.) ” ” 910
_Juramentados_ 54 = 3,861 infantry.
Cavalry 42
Artillery 261
Engineers and Sappers 260
Sick in Hospital 300
Civil Departments, non-combatants, &c. 254
-----
5,003

A report of the governor at noon on April 5, found among his papers after the storm, gave the following as surviving under arms (sick excluded)--infantry 3,403, artillery 282, engineers 217, cavalry 50, _Juramentados_ 86. This report, printed in Jones, i. p. 230, implies a higher original total than Belmas allows--the artillery and _Juramentados_ are actually more numerous on April 5 than on March 15! And the infantry are only 458 less, despite of losses of a considerably higher figure, for another paper of the commandant shows (Jones, i. p. 230)--Sortie of March 19: killed 30, wounded 287=317[769]. Storm of Picurina Fort: killed or prisoners, 8 officers, 278 men = 286. We have thus 603 casualties in these two affairs only, beside the ordinary wear and tear of the siege.

[769] Phillipon’s report to Clarke, drawn up on June 12, gives
273 instead of 317 for the loss in this sally (see Belmas, iv. p.
414).

Noting the considerable number of ‘round figures’ in Belmas’s table, I am inclined to think that the total of the garrison must have been a few hundreds over what he allows.

(B) LOSSES AT STORM OF BADAJOZ, APRIL 6, 1811

[From the Returns at the Record Office.]

_Killed._ _Wounded._ _Missing._
_Officers._ _Men._ _Officers._ _Men._ _Officers._ _Men._ _Total._
General Staff 1 -- 16 -- -- -- 17
Royal Artillery 1 6 1 9 -- -- 17
Royal Engineers 2 -- 3 5 -- -- 10
Assistant Engineers -- -- 3 -- -- -- 3

THIRD DIVISION.
Kempt’s Brigade:
1/45th Foot 6 19 8 64 -- -- 97
3/60th Foot 1 4 4 26 -- -- 35
74th Foot -- 12 7 33 -- 2 54
1/88th Foot 3 28 7 106 -- -- 144
J. Campbell’s Brigade:
2/5th Foot 1 11 3 28 -- -- 43
77th Foot -- -- 3 11 -- -- 14
2/83rd Foot 1 22 7 39 -- -- 69
94th Foot 1 12 1 51 -- -- 65
-- --- -- --- -- -- ---
Total 3rd Division 13 108 40 358 -- 2 521

FOURTH DIVISION.
Kemmis’s Brigade:
3/27th Foot 4 37 12 132 -- -- 185
1/40th Foot 2 51 13 170 -- -- 236
Bowes’s Brigade:
1/7th Foot 5 44 12 119 -- -- 180
1/23rd Foot 3 22 14 92 -- 20 151
1/48th Foot 3 32 16 122 -- -- 173
-- --- -- --- -- -- --
Total 4th Division 17 186 67 635 -- 20 925

FIFTH DIVISION.
Hay’s Brigade:
3/1st Foot -- -- -- -- -- -- --
1/9th Foot -- -- -- -- -- -- --
2/38th Foot 1 12 3 26 -- -- 42
Walker’s Brigade:
1/4th Foot 2 40 15 173 -- -- 230
2/30th Foot -- 38 6 86 -- -- 130
2/44th Foot 2 37 7 88 -- -- 134
-- --- -- --- -- -- --
Total 5th Division 5 127 31 373 -- -- 536

LIGHT DIVISION:
1/43rd Foot 3 74 15 249 -- -- 341
1/52nd Foot 5 53 14 248 -- -- 320
1/95th Foot 3 27 10 154 -- -- 194
3/95th Foot 4 9 4 47 -- -- 64
-- --- -- --- -- -- ---
Total Light Division 15 163 43 698 -- -- 919

Brunswick Oels, dispersed
in companies in 4th and
5th Divisions -- 7 2 26 -- -- 35
-- --- --- ----- -- -- -----
Total British loss 54 597 206 2,104 -- 22 2,983

PORTUGUESE 8 147 45 500 -- 30 730
-- --- --- ----- -- -- -----
General Total 62 744 251 2,604 -- 52 3,713
-- --- --- ----- -- -- -----
Losses during previous
operations 10 219 54 661 -- 13 957

The total loss during the siege and storm would therefore appear to have been 4,670.

X

WELLINGTON’S ARMY AT SALAMANCA. STRENGTH AND LOSSES

N.B.--Strength by the morning state of July 15, 1812. Losses of the British by the return annexed to Wellington’s dispatch: those of the Portuguese from the official returns at Lisbon. The fighting strength on July 22, owing to losses at Castrejon and Castrillo, and to weary men falling out during the retreat, may have been perhaps 1,000 less.

I. BRITISH TROOPS

_Losses._
_Strength._ _Killed._ _Wounded._ _Missing._
_Officers._ _Men._ _Total._ _Officers._ _Men._ _Officers._ _Men._ _Men._ _Total Loss._
CAVALRY
(Stapleton Cotton):
Le Marchant’s Brigade
3rd Dragoons 17 322 339 1 6 -- 11 2 20
4th Dragoons 22 336 358 -- 7 1 21 -- 29
5th Dragoon Guards 22 313 325 -- 9 2 42 3 56

G. Anson’s Brigade
11th Light Dragoons 30 361 391 -- -- -- -- -- --
12th Light Dragoons 19 321 340 1 2 -- 2 -- 5
16th Light Dragoons 14 259 273 -- -- -- -- -- --

V. Alten’s Brigade
14th Light Dragoons 23 324 347 -- 1 -- 2 -- 3
1st Hussars K.G.L. 23 376 399 -- 2 5 16 -- 23

Bock’s Brigade
1st Dragoons K.G.L. 25 339 364 -- -- -- -- -- --
2nd Dragoons K.G.L. 23 384 407 -- -- -- -- -- --
--- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- ---
Total British Cavalry 218 3,335 3,543 2 27 8 94 5 136
--- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- ---

INFANTRY.
1st Division (H. Campbell):
Fermor’s Brigade
1st Coldstream Guards 26 928 954 -- 7 1 22 8 38
1st Third Guards 23 938 961 -- 1 1 20 2 24
1 comp. 5/60th Foot 1 56 57 -- -- -- -- -- --

Wheatley’s Brigade
2/24th Foot 23 398 421 -- -- -- 5 -- 5
1/42nd Foot 40 1,039 1,079 -- -- -- 3 -- 3
2/58th Foot[770] 31 369 400 -- -- -- 3 1 4
1/79th Foot 40 634 674 -- -- -- 1 3 4
1 comp. 5/60th 1 53 54 -- -- -- -- -- --

Löwe’s Brigade
1st Line Battalion
K.G.L. 26 615 641 -- 1 -- 8 -- 9
2nd Line Battalion
K.G.L. 26 601 627 -- 1 2 40 4 47
5th Line Battalion
K.G.L. 30 525 555 -- 1 1 17 -- 19
--- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- ---
Total 1st Division 267 6,156 6,423 -- 11 5 119 18 153
--- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- ---
3rd Division (Pakenham):

Wallace’s Brigade
1/45th Foot 26 416 442 -- 5 5 45 -- 55
74th Foot 23 420 443 -- 3 2 40 4 49
1/88th Foot 21 642 663 2 11 4 110 8 135
3 comps. 5/60th Foot 11 243 254 -- 6 3 24 3 36

J. Campbell’s Brigade
1/5th Foot 32 870 902 -- 10 6 110 -- 126
2/5th Foot 19 289 308 -- 1 2 21 -- 24
2/83rd Foot 24 295 319 -- 2 2 30 -- 34
94th Foot 24 323 347 1 3 3 21 -- 28
--- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- ---
Total 3rd Division 180 3,498 3,678 3 41 27 401 15 487
--- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- ---
4th Division (Lowry Cole):

W. Anson’s Brigade
3/27th Foot 19 614 633 -- -- 1 7 -- 8
1/40th Foot 24 558 582 -- 12 5 115 -- 132
1 comp. 5/60th 2 44 46 -- -- -- -- -- --

Ellis’s Brigade
1/7th Foot 24 471 495 1 19 10 165 -- 195
1/23rd Foot 19 427 446 1 9 6 90 -- 106
1/48th Foot 22 404 426 -- 9 10 60 -- 79
1 comp. Brunswick
Oels[771] 1 53 54 -- -- -- -- -- --
--- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- ---
Total 4th Division 111 2,571 2,682 2 49 32 437 -- 520
--- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- ---
5th Division (Leith):

Greville’s Brigade
{ 3/1st Foot 32 729 761 -- 23 8 129 -- 160
{ 1/9th Foot 31 635 666 -- 3 1 42 -- 46
{ 1/38th Foot[772] 36 764 800 2 14 12 115 -- 143
{ 2/38th Foot 20 281 301 -- 9 2 40 1 52
{ 1 comp. Brunswick
{ Oels[2] 2 76 78 -- -- -- -- -- --

Pringle’s Brigade
{ 1/4th Foot 36 421 457 -- -- 1 17 -- 18
{ 2/4th Foot 27 627 654 -- 2 -- 23 6 31
{ 2/30th Foot 20 329 349 -- 3 1 22 1 27
{ 2/44th Foot 20 231 251 2 4 -- 23 -- 29
{ 1 comp. Brunswick
{ Oels[2] 3 66 69 -- -- -- -- -- --
--- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- ---
Total 5th Division 227 4,159 4,386 4 58 25 411 8 506
--- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- ---
6th Division (Clinton):

Hulse’s Brigade
{ 1/11th Foot 31 485 516 1 44 14 281 -- 340
{ 2/53rd Foot 25 316 341 -- 26 11 105 -- 142
{ 1/61st Foot 29 517 546 5 39 19 303 -- 366
{ 1 comp. 5/60th 2 59 61 -- -- -- -- -- --

Hinde’s Brigade
{ 2nd Foot 27 381 408 1 13 6 77 12 109
{ 1/32nd Foot 33 576 609 2 15 9 111 -- 137
{ 1/36 Foot 29 400 429 4 16 5 74 -- 99
--- ----- ----- -- --- -- --- -- -----
Total 6th Division 176 2,734 2,910 13 153 64 951 12 1,193
--- ----- ----- -- --- -- --- -- -----
7th Division (Hope):

Halkett’s Brigade
{ 1st Light Batt. K.G.L. 25 544 569 -- -- 2 7 -- 9
{ 2nd Light Batt. K.G.L. 21 473 494 1 5 1 9 -- 16
{ Brunswick Oels[773] (9
{ companies) 23 573 596 -- 4 2 42 1 49

De Bernewitz’s Brigade
{ 51st Foot 27 280 307 -- -- -- 2 -- 2
{ 68th Foot 21 317 338 1 3 2 14 -- 20
{ _Chasseurs_
{ _Britanniques_ 27 686 713 -- 5 -- 10 14 29
--- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- ---
Total 7th Division 144 2,873 3,017 2 17 7 84 15 125
--- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- ---
Light Division (Chas. Alten):

Barnard’s Brigade
{ 1/43rd Foot 30 718 748 -- -- 1 15 -- 16
{ Detachments 2/95th and
{ 3/95th Rifles 19 373 392 -- -- -- 5 -- 5

Vandeleur’s Brigade
{ 1/52nd Foot. 28 771 799 -- -- -- 2 -- 2
{ 8 comps. 1/95th 27 515 542 -- -- -- 2 2 4
--- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- --
Total Light Division 104 2,377 2,481 -- -- 1 24 2 27
--- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- --

Royal Horse Artillery
(troops of Ross,
Macdonald, and Bull,
and drivers) 18 403 421 -- 1 -- 2 -- 3
Field Artillery
(companies of Lawson,
Gardiner, Greene,
Douglas, May, and
drivers) 35 650 685 -- 1 -- 4 -- 5
King’s German Legion
Artillery (battery of
Sympher) 5 75 80 -- 2 -- 4 -- 6
-- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- --
Artillery Total 58 1,128 1,186 -- 4 -- 10 -- 14
-- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- --
ENGINEERS 12 9 21 -- -- -- -- -- --

STAFF CORPS 5 81 86 -- -- -- -- -- --

WAGON TRAIN 24 115 139 -- -- -- -- -- --

[770] The 2/58th though properly belonging to the 5th Division,
appears to have acted on this day with the 1st Division.

[771] The losses of the attached companies of Brunswick Oels are
only to be found under its regimental total in 7th Division.

[772] This battalion only joined the division on the
battle-morning.

[773] The losses of the attached companies of Brunswick Oels are
only to be found under its regimental total in 7th Division.

BRITISH TOTAL

Infantry 1,209 24,368 25,577 24 329 159 2,387 69 2,968
Cavalry 218 3,335 3,553 2 27 8 94 5 136
Artillery 58 1,128 1,186 -- 4 -- 10 -- 14
Engineers 12 9 21 -- -- -- -- -- --
Staff Corps 5 81 86 -- -- -- -- -- --
Train 24 115 139 -- -- -- -- -- --
General Staff ? ? ? 2 -- 9 -- -- 11
----- ------ ------ -- --- --- ----- -- -----
Total 1,526 29,036 30,562 28 360 176 2,491 74 3,129

II. PORTUGUESE TROOPS

CAVALRY:
D’Urban’s Brigade: 1st
and 11th Dragoons (12th
Dragoons absent)[774] 32 450 482 2 5 2 18 10 37
INFANTRY:
Power’s Brigade, 3rd
Division: 9th and 21st
Line, 12th Caçadores 90 2,107 2,197 1 29 9 23 14 76
Stubbs’s Brigade, 4th
Division: 11th and 23rd
Line, 7th Caçadores 137 2,417 2,554 3 177 18 267 11 476
Spry’s Brigade, 5th
Division: 3rd and 15th
Line, 8th Caçadores 156 2,149 2,305 3 45 4 64 7 123
Rezende’s Brigade, 6th
Division: 8th and 12th
Line, 9th Caçadores 134 2,497 2,631 8 113 10 336 20 487
Collins’s Brigade, 7th
Division: 7th and 19th
Line, 2nd Caçadores 132 2,036 2,168 -- 5 1 10 1 17
Pack’s Independent
Brigade: 1st and 16th
Line, 4th Caçadores 85 2,520 2,605 5 97 15 242 17 376
Bradford’s Independent
Brigade: 13th and 14th
Line, 5th Caçadores 112 1,782 1,894 -- 8 -- 3 6 17
Attached to Light
Division: 1st and 3rd
Caçadores 30 1,037 1,067 -- 5 -- 12 -- 17
ARTILLERY:
Arriaga’s battery 4 110 114 -- -- -- 1 -- 1
--- ------ ------ -- --- -- --- -- -----
Total 912 17,105 18,017 22 484 59 976 86 1,627

[774] The 12th Dragoons were marching to the rear in charge of
the baggage-train.

III. SPANISH TROOPS

Carlos de España’s
Division: 2nd of
Princesa, Tiradores de
Castilla, 2nd of Jaen,
3rd of 1st Seville,
Caçadores de Castilla,
Lanceros de Castilla 160 3,200 3,360 -- 2 -- 4 -- 6

GENERAL TOTAL

BRITISH 1,526 29,036 30,562 28 360 176 2,491 74 3,129
PORTUGUESE 912 17,105 18,017 22 484 59 976 86 1,627
SPANISH 160 3,200 3,360 -- 2 -- 4 -- 6
----- ------ ------ -- --- --- ----- --- -----
Total 2,598 49,341 51,939 50 846 235 3,471 160 4,762

XI

STRENGTH AND LOSSES OF MARMONT’S ARMY AT SALAMANCA

To fix the fighting strength of Marmont’s army at Salamanca is comparatively easy. It consisted of the 49,636 officers and men accounted for by the return of July 15th printed on the next page, minus some 700 men lost at the combats of Castrillo and Castrejon [also called ‘combat of the Guarena’] on July 18, and such few hundreds more as may have fallen behind from fatigue during the long marches of July 20-1. Roughly speaking, it must have counted some 48,500 men, as opposed to Wellington’s 50,000. The French translators of Napier’s _Peninsular War_ (Mathieu Dumas and Foltz) only give a table of June 15, which is of course a month out of date for Salamanca, and append a note that ‘deducting artillery, engineers, _équipages militaires_, officers, sergeants, and garrisons, as also losses between June 15 and July 15 they find the result of about 42,000 sabres and bayonets for the battle.’ Why any sane person _should_ deduct officers, sergeants, and artillerymen from a fighting total I am unable to conceive, though contemporary British writers, including Wellington himself, often did so. But the results of adding to their ‘42,000 sabres and bayonets’ the list of 1,925 officers, 3,244 artillerymen and artillery train (both in the divisions and in the reserve), 332 engineers, and 742 _équipages militaires_, is to give the figure 48,343, which practically agrees with the total that I state above; if sergeants are added it would much exceed that total. We may take this, therefore, as fairly correct--bearing in mind that the 26 officers and 742 men of the _équipages militaires_ cannot be counted as combatants.

These totals do not include the 23rd Léger (2 batts.) and the 2/1st Line, both from Thomières’s division, which were garrisoning Astorga, about 1,500 strong. Nor do they include the minor garrisons left at Toro, Zamora, Olmedo, Valdestillas, Tordesillas, Simancas, Cabezon, Medina del Campo, Puente de Duero, Tudela de Douro, Amagro, &c., which appear to have been altogether about 4,184 strong, nor the dépôts at Valladolid, 3,307 strong on June 15, but probably much less on July 15, when Marmont had remounted nearly 1,000 dismounted dragoons and picked up all detachments and convalescents that he could gather. Nor do they include the sick, who had been 8,633 on June 15th, and 8,332 on May 15th--probably the total in hospital was a trifle more on July 15, owing to the fatigues of the campaigns round San Cristobal in the latter days of June.

Parallel with the return of July 15th, I have printed that of August 1. The difference between the two--211 officers and 10,124 men--might be supposed to represent the losses in the campaign between those dates. It does not, however, because the total of August 1 represents not only the survivors from the battle of Salamanca, but all the men from garrisons evacuated after it, and from the Valladolid dépôt, who joined the colours after the disaster of July 22, in consequence of the district in which they were lying having been evacuated by the army. The garrisons of Toro and Zamora held out till they were relieved, that of Tordesillas surrendered to the Galicians: but the men from the other smaller garrisons and from the dépôts fell in to their respective corps before August 1. I imagine that we may take these additions to be some 5,000 men at least, but cannot give the exact figures, through being unable to say what the Valladolid dépôts (3,307 strong on June 15) amounted to on July 15.

After comparing the totals of the brigades and regiments shown under July 15 and August 1, we must proceed to show the reasons why, in individual cases, the regimental differences between the two sets of figures cannot be taken to represent the sum of the losses in the Salamanca campaign. The proof is clear.

THE ARMY OF PORTUGAL BEFORE AND AFTER THE BATTLE OF SALAMANCA

From two returns of effectives in the Archives of the Ministry of War, Paris, dated July 15 and August 1, respectively.

_July 15._ _August 1._
_Officers._ _Men._ _Officers._ _Men._
1st DIVISION (Foy):

Brigade { 6th Léger (2 batts.) 46 1,055 41 684
Chemineau { 69th Ligne (2 batts.) 50 1,408 47 1,322

Brigade {
Desgraviers- { 39th Ligne (2 batts.) 49 918 49 872
Berthelot { 76th Ligne (2 batts.) 56 1,351 45 887

Artillery Train, &c. 7 207 7 207
--- ----- --- -----
Divisional Total 208 4,939 189 3,972
--- ----- --- -----
2nd DIVISION (Clausel):

Brigade { 25th Léger (3 batts.) 54 1,485 43 1,222
Berlier { 27th Ligne (2 batts.) 40 1,637 31 1,248

Brigade { 50th Ligne (3 batts.) 52 1,490 46 1,177
Barbot { 59th Ligne (2 batts.) 47 1,531 38 1,278

Artillery Train, &c. 7 219 7 216
--- ----- --- -----
Divisional Total 200 6,362 165 5,141
--- ----- --- -----

Brigade { 31st Léger (2 batts.) 46 1,359 45 1,325
Menne { 26th Ligne (2 batts.) 44 1,145 43 1,116

{ 47th Ligne (3 batts.) 67 1,558 62 1,650
? { 70th Ligne (2 batts.) 49 1,114 36 1,061

Artillery Train, &c. 5 302 3 193
--- ----- --- -----
Divisional Total 211 5,478 189 5,345
--- ----- --- -----
4th DIVISION (Sarrut):