Chapter VII: The Execution of Justice

State _v._ Eliza Rowand.—The “Ægis of Protection” to the Slave’s Life.

“We cannot but regard the fact of this trial as a salutary
occurrence.”—_Charleston Courier._

Having given some account of what sort of statutes are to be found on the law-books of slavery, the reader will hardly be satisfied without knowing what sort of trials are held under them. We will quote one specimen of a trial, reported in the _Charleston Courier_ of May 6th, 1847. The _Charleston Courier_ is one of the leading papers of South Carolina, and the case is reported with the utmost apparent innocence that there was anything about the trial that could reflect in the least on the character of the state for the utmost legal impartiality. In fact, the _Charleston Courier_ ushers it into public view with the following flourish of trumpets, as something which is forever to confound those who say that South Carolina does not protect the life of the slave:

THE TRIAL FOR MURDER.

Our community was deeply interested and excited, yesterday, by a
case of great importance, and also of entire novelty in our
jurisprudence. It was the trial of a lady of respectable family, and
the mother of a large family, charged with the murder of her own or
her husband’s slave. The court-house was thronged with spectators of
the exciting drama, who remained, with unabated interest and
undiminished numbers, until the verdict was rendered acquitting the
prisoner. We cannot but regard the fact of this trial as a salutary,
although in itself lamentable occurrence, as it will show to the
world that, however panoplied in station and wealth, and although
challenging those sympathies which are the right and inheritance of
the female sex, no one will be suffered, in this community, to
escape the most sifting scrutiny, at the risk of even an ignominious
death, who stands charged with the suspicion of murdering a
slave,—to whose life our law now extends the ægis of protection, in
the same manner as it does to that of the white man, _save only in
the character of the evidence necessary for conviction or defence_.
While evil-disposed persons at home are thus taught that they may
expect rigorous trial and condign punishment, when, actuated by
malignant passions, they invade the life of the humble slave, the
enemies of our domestic institution abroad will find, their
calumnies to the contrary notwithstanding, that we are resolved, in
this particular, to do the full measure of our duty to the laws of
humanity. We subjoin a report of the case.

The proceedings of the trial are thus given:

TRIAL FOR THE MURDER OF A SLAVE.

_State_ v. _Eliza Rowand_.—_Spring Term, May 5, 1847._

Tried before his Honor Judge O’Neall.

The prisoner was brought to the bar and arraigned, attended by her
husband and mother, and humanely supported, during the trying scene,
by the sheriff, J. B. Irving, Esq. On her arraignment, she pleaded
“Not Guilty,” and for her trial, placed herself upon “God and her
country.” After challenging John M. Deas, James Bancroft, H. F.
Harbers, C. J. Beckman, E. R. Cowperthwaite, Parker J. Holland,
Moses D. Hyams, Thomas Glaze, John Lawrence, B. Archer, J. S.
Addison, B. P. Colburn, B. M. Jenkins, Carl Houseman, Geo. Jackson,
and Joseph Coppenberg, the prisoner accepted the subjoined panel,
who were duly sworn, and charged with the case: 1. John L. Nowell,
foreman. 2. Elias Whilden. 3. Jesse Coward. 4. Effington Wagner. 5.
Wm. Whaley. 6. James Culbert. 7. R. L. Baker. 8. S. Wiley. 9. W. S.
Chisolm. 10. T. M. Howard. 11. John Bickley. 12. John Y. Stock.

The following is the indictment on which the prisoner was arraigned for trial:

_The State_ v. _Eliza Rowand_—_Indictment for murder of a slave_.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, } to wit:
_Charleston District_, }

At a Court of General Sessions, begun and holden in and for the
district of Charleston, in the State of South Carolina, at
Charleston, in the district and state aforesaid, on Monday, the
third day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred
and forty-seven:

The jurors of and for the district of Charleston, aforesaid, in the
State of South Carolina, aforesaid, upon their oaths present, that
Eliza Rowand, the wife of Robert Rowand, Esq., not having the fear
of God before her eyes, but being moved and seduced by the
instigation of the devil, on the 6th day of January, in the year of
our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-seven, with force and
arms, at Charleston, in the district of Charleston, and state
aforesaid, in and upon a certain female slave of the said Robert
Rowand, named Maria, in the peace of God, and of the said state,
then and there being, feloniously, maliciously, wilfully,
deliberately, and of her malice aforethought, did make an assault;
and that a certain other slave of the said Robert Rowand, named
Richard, then and there, being then and there in the presence and by
the command of the said Eliza Rowand, with a certain piece of wood,
which he the said Richard in both his hands then and there had and
held, the said Maria did beat and strike, in and upon the head of
her the said Maria, then and there giving to her the said Maria, by
such striking and beating, as aforesaid, with the piece of wood
aforesaid, divers mortal bruises on the top, back, and sides of the
head of her the said Maria, of which several mortal bruises she, the
said Maria, then and there instantly died; and that the said Eliza
Rowand was then and there present, and then and there feloniously,
maliciously, wilfully, deliberately, and of her malice aforethought,
did order, command, and require, the said slave named Richard the
murder and felony aforesaid, in manner and form aforesaid, to do and
commit. And as the jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do
say, that the said Eliza Rowand her the said slave named Maria, in
the manner and by the means, aforesaid, feloniously, maliciously,
wilfully, deliberately, and of her malice aforethought, did kill and
murder, against the form of the act of the General Assembly of the
said state in such case made and provided, and against the peace and
dignity of the same state aforesaid.

And the jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do further
present, that the said Eliza Rowand, not having the fear of God
before her eyes, but being moved and seduced by the instigation of
the devil, on the sixth day of January, in the year of our Lord one
thousand eight hundred and forty-seven, with force and arms, at
Charleston, in the district of Charleston, and state aforesaid, in
and upon a certain other female slave of Robert Rowand, named Maria,
in the peace of God, and of the said state, then and there being,
feloniously, maliciously, wilfully, deliberately, and of her malice
aforethought, did make an assault; and that the said Eliza Rowand,
with a certain piece of wood, which she, the said Eliza Rowand, in
both her hands then and there had and held, her the said
last-mentioned slave named Maria did then and there strike, and
beat, in and upon the head of her the said Maria, then and there
giving to her the said Maria, by such striking and beating
aforesaid, with the piece of wood aforesaid, divers mortal bruises,
on the top, back, and side of the head, of her the said Maria, of
which said several mortal bruises she the said Maria then and there
instantly died. And so the jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths
aforesaid, do say, that the said Eliza Rowand her the said
last-mentioned slave named Maria, in the manner and by the means
last mentioned, feloniously, maliciously, wilfully, deliberately,
and of her malice aforethought, did kill and murder, against the
form of the act of the General Assembly of the said state in such
case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the
same state aforesaid.

H. BAILEY, _Attorney-general_.

As some of our readers may not have been in the habit of endeavoring to extract anything like common sense or information from documents so very concisely and luminously worded, the author will just state her own opinion that the above document is intended to charge Mrs. Eliza Rowand with having killed her slave Maria, in one of two ways: either with beating her on the head with her own hands, or having the same deed performed by proxy, by her slave-man Richard. The whole case is now presented. In order to make the reader clearly understand the arguments, it is necessary that he bear in mind that the law of 1740, as we have before shown, punished the murder of the slave only with fine and disfranchisement, while the law of 1821 punishes it with death.

On motion of Mr. Petigru, the prisoner was allowed to remove from
the bar, and take her place by her counsel; the judge saying he
granted the motion only because the prisoner was a woman, but that
no such privilege would have been extended by him to any man.

The Attorney-general, Henry Bailey, Esq., then rose and opened the
case for the state, in substance, as follows: He said that, after
months of anxiety and expectation, the curtain had at length risen,
and he and the jury were about to bear their part in the sad drama
of real life, which had so long engrossed the public mind. He and
they were called to the discharge of an important, painful, and
solemn duty. They were to pass between the prisoner and the state—to
take an inquisition of blood; on their decision hung the life or
death, the honor or ignominy, of the prisoner; yet he trusted he and
they would have strength and ability to perform their duty
faithfully; and, whatever might be the result, their consciences
would be consoled and quieted by that reflection. He bade the jury
pause and reflect on the great sanctions and solemn responsibilities
under which they were acting. The constitution of the state invested
them with power over all that affected the life and was dear to the
family of the unfortunate lady on trial before them. They were
charged, too, with the sacred care of the law of the land; and to
their solution was submitted one of the most solemn questions ever
intrusted to the arbitrament of man. They should pursue a direct and
straight-forward course, turning neither to the right hand nor to
the left—influenced neither by prejudice against the prisoner, nor
by a morbid sensibility in her behalf. Some of them might
practically and personally be strangers to their present duty; but
they were all familiar with the laws, and must be aware of the
responsibilities of jurymen. It was scarcely necessary to tell them
that, if evidence fixed guilt on this prisoner, they should not
hesitate to record a verdict of guilty, although they should write
that verdict in tears of blood. They should let no sickly
sentimentality, or morbid feeling on the subject of capital
punishments, deter them from the discharge of their plain and
obvious duty. They were to administer, not to make, the law; they
were called on to enforce the law, by sanctioning the highest duty
to God and to their country. If any of them were disturbed with
doubts or scruples on this point, he scarcely supposed they would
have gone into the jury-box. The law had awarded capital punishment
as the meet retribution for the crime under investigation, and they
were sworn to administer that law. It had, too, the full sanction of
Holy Writ; we were there told that “the land cannot be cleansed of
the blood shed therein, except by the blood of him that shed it.” He
felt assured, then, that they would be swayed only by a firm resolve
to act on this occasion in obedience to the dictates of sound
judgments and enlightened consciences. The prisoner, however, had
claims on them, as well as the community; she was entitled to a fair
and impartial trial. By the wise and humane principles of our law,
they were bound to hold the prisoner _innocent_, and she stood
_guiltless_ before them, until proved guilty, by legal, competent,
and satisfactory evidence. Deaf alike to the voice of sickly
humanity and heated prejudice, they should proceed to their task
with minds perfectly equipoised and impartial; they should weigh the
circumstances of the case with a nice and careful hand; and if, by
legal evidence, circumstantial and satisfactory, although not
positive, guilt be established, they should unhesitatingly,
fearlessly and faithfully, record the result of their convictions.
He would next call their attention to certain legal distinctions,
but would not say a word of the facts; he would leave _them_ to the
lips of the witnesses, unaffected by any previous comments of his
own. The prisoner stood indicted for the murder of a slave. This was
supposed not to be murder at common law. At least, it was not murder
by our former statute; but the act of 1821 had placed the killing of
the white man and the black man on the same footing. He here read
the act of 1821, declaring that “any person who shall wilfully,
deliberately, and maliciously murder a slave, shall, on conviction
thereof, suffer death without benefit of clergy.” The rules
applicable to murder at common law were generally applicable,
however, to the present case. The inquiries to be made may be
reduced to two: 1. Is the party charged guilty of the fact of
killing? This must be clearly made out by proof. If she be not
guilty of killing, there is an end of the case. 2. The character of
that killing, or of the offence. Was it done with malice
aforethought? Malice is the essential ingredient of the crime. Where
killing takes place, malice is presumed, unless the contrary appear;
and this must be gathered from the attending circumstances. Malice
is a technical term, importing a different meaning from that
conveyed by the same word in common parlance. According to the
learned Michael Foster, it consists not in “malevolence to
particulars,” it does not mean hatred to any particular individual,
but is general in its import and application. But even killing, with
intention to kill, is not always murder; there may be justifiable
and excusable homicide, and killing in sudden heat and passion is so
modified to manslaughter. Yet there may be murder when there is no
ill-feeling,—nay, perfect indifference to the slain,—as in the case
of the robber who slays to conceal his crime. Malice aforethought is
that depraved feeling of the heart, which makes one regardless of
social duty, and fatally bent on mischief. It is fulfilled by that
recklessness of law and human life which is indicated by shooting
into a crowd, and thus doing murder on even an unknown object. Such
a feeling the law regards as hateful, and visits, in its practical
exhibition, with condign punishment, because opposed to the very
existence of law and society. One may do fatal mischief without this
recklessness; but when the act is done, regardless of consequences,
and death ensues, it is murder in the eye of the law. If the facts
to be proved in this case should not come up to these requisitions,
he implored the jury to acquit the accused, as at once due to law
and justice. They should note every fact with scrutinizing eye, and
ascertain whether the fatal result proceeded from passing accident
or from brooding revenge, which the law stamped with the odious name
of malice. He would make no further preliminary remarks, but proceed
at once to lay the facts before them, from the mouths of the
witnesses.

_Evidence._

_J. Porteous Deveaux_ sworn.—He is the coroner of Charleston
district; held the inquest, on the seventh of January last, on the
body of the deceased slave, _Maria_, the slave of Robert Rowand, at
the residence of Mrs. T. C. Bee (the mother of the prisoner), in
Logan-street. The body was found in an outbuilding—a kitchen; it was
the body of an old and emaciated person, between fifty and sixty
years of age; it was not examined in his presence by physicians; saw
some few scratches about the face; adjourned to the City Hall. Mrs.
Rowand was examined; her examination was in writing; it was here
produced, and read, as follows:

“Mrs. _Eliza Rowand_ sworn.—Says _Maria_ is her nurse, and had
misbehaved on yesterday morning; deponent sent Maria to Mr. Rowand’s
house, to be corrected by Simon; deponent sent Maria from the house
about seven o’clock, A. M.; she returned to her about nine o’clock;
came into her chamber; Simon did not come into the chamber at any
time previous to the death of Maria; deponent says Maria fell down
in the chamber; deponent had her seated up by Richard, who was then
in the chamber, and deponent gave Maria some asafœtida; deponent
then left the room; Richard came down and said Maria was dead;
deponent says Richard did not strike Maria, nor did any one else
strike her, in deponent’s chamber. Richard left the chamber
immediately with deponent; Maria was about fifty-two years of age;
deponent sent Maria by Richard to Simon, to Mr Rowand’s house, to be
corrected; Mr. Rowand was absent from the city; Maria died about
twelve o’clock; Richard and Maria were on good terms; deponent was
in the chamber all the while that Richard and Maria were there
together.

“ELIZA ROWAND.

“Sworn to before me this seventh January, 1847.

“J. P. DEVEAUX, _Coroner, D. C._”

Witness went to the chamber of prisoner, where the death occurred;
saw nothing particular; some pieces of wood in a box, set in the
chimney; his attention was called to one piece, in particular,
eighteen inches long, three indies wide, and about one and a half
inch thick; did not measure it; the jury of inquest did; it was not
a light-wood knot; thinks it was of oak; there was some pine wood
and some split oak. Dr. Peter Porcher was called to examine the body
professionally, who did so out of witness’ presence.

Before this witness left the stand, B. F. Hunt, Esq., one of the
counsel for the prisoner, rose and opened the defence before the
jury, in substance as follows:

He said that the scene before them was a very novel one; and whether
for good or evil, he would not pretend to prophesy. It was the first
time, in the history of this state, that a lady of good character
and respectable connections stood arraigned at the bar, and had been
put on trial for her life, on facts arising out of her domestic
relations to her own slave. It was a spectacle consoling, and
cheering, perhaps, to those who owed no good will to the
institutions of our country; but calculated only to excite pain and
regret among ourselves. He would not state a proposition so
revolting to humanity as that crime should go unpunished; but
judicial interference between the slave and the owner was a matter
at once of delicacy and danger. It was the first time he had ever
stood between a slave-owner and the public prosecutor, and his
sensations were anything but pleasant. _This is an entirely
different case from homicide between equals in society._
Subordination is indispensable where slavery exists; and in this
there is no new principle involved. The same principle prevails in
every country; on shipboard and in the army a large discretion is
always left to the superior. Charges by inferiors against their
superiors were always to be viewed with great circumspection at
least, and especially when the latter are charged with cruelty or
crime against subordinates. In the relation of owner and slave there
is an absence of the usual motives for murder, and strong
inducements against it on the part of the former. Life is usually
taken from avarice or passion. The master gains nothing, but loses
much, by the death of his slave; and when he takes the life of the
latter deliberately, there must be more than ordinary malice to
instigate the deed. The policy of altering the old law of 1740,
which punished the killing of a slave with fine and political
disfranchisement, was more than doubtful. It was the law of our
colonial ancestors; it conformed to their policy and was approved by
their wisdom, and it continued undisturbed by their posterity until
the year 1821. It was engrafted on our policy in counteraction of
the schemes and machinations, or in deference to the clamors, of
those who formed plans for our improvement, although not interested
in nor understanding our institutions, and whose interference led to
the tragedy of 1822. He here adverted to the views of Chancellor
Harper on this subject, who, in his able and philosophical memoir on
slavery, said: “It is a somewhat singular fact, that when there
existed in our state no law for punishing the murder of a slave,
other than a pecuniary fine, there were, I will venture to say, at
least ten murders of freemen for one murder of a slave. Yet it is
supposed that they are less protected than their masters.” “The
change was made in subserviency to the opinions and clamor of
others, who were utterly incompetent to form an opinion on the
subject; and a wise act is seldom the result of legislation in this
spirit. From the fact I have stated, it is plain they need less
protection. Juries are, therefore, less willing to convict, and it
may sometimes happen that the guilty will escape all punishment.
_Security_ is one of the compensations of their humble position. We
challenge the comparison, that with us there have been fewer murders
of slaves than of parents, children, apprentices, and other murders,
cruel and unnatural, in society where slavery does not exist.”

Such was the opinion of Chancellor Harper on this subject, who had
profoundly studied it, and whose views had been extensively read on
this continent and in Europe. Fortunately, the jury, he said, were
of the country, acquainted with our policy and practice; composed of
men too independent and honorable to be led astray by the noise and
clamor out of doors. All was now as it should be;—at least, a court
of justice had assembled, to which his client had fled for refuge
and safety; its threshold was sacred; no profane clamors entered
there; but legal investigation was had of facts, derived from the
testimony of sworn witnesses; and this should teach the community to
shut their bosoms against sickly humanity, and their ears to
imaginary tales of blood and horror, the food of a depraved
appetite. _He warned the jury that they were to listen to no
testimony but that of free white persons, given on oath in open
court._ They were to _imagine_ none that came not from them. It was
for this that they were selected,—their intelligence putting them
beyond the influence of unfounded accusations, unsustained by legal
proof; of legends of aggravated cruelty, founded on the evidence of
negroes, and arising from weak and wicked falsehoods. Were slaves
permitted to testify against their owner, it would cut the cord that
unites them in peace and harmony, and enable them to sacrifice their
masters to their ill will or revenge. Whole crews had been often
leagued to charge captains of vessels with foulest murder, but
judicial trial had exposed the falsehood. Truth has been distorted
in this case, and murder manufactured out of what was nothing more
than _ordinary domestic discipline_. Chastisement must be inflicted
until subordination is produced; and the extent of the punishment is
not to be judged of by one’s neighbors, but by himself. The event in
this case has been unfortunate and sad; but there was no motive for
the taking of life. There is no pecuniary interest in the owner to
destroy his slave; the murder of his slave can only happen from
ferocious passions of the master, filling his own bosom with anguish
and contrition. This case has no other basis but unfounded rumor,
commonly believed, _on evidence that will not venture here_, the
offspring of that passion and depravity which make up falsehood. The
hope of freedom, of change of owners, revenge, are all motives with
slave witnesses to malign their owners; and to credit such testimony
would be to dissolve human society. Where deliberate, wilful, and
malicious murder is done, whether by male or female, the retribution
of the law is a debt to God and man; but the jury should beware lest
it fall upon the innocent. The offence charged was not strictly
murder at common law. The act of 1740 was founded on the practical
good sense of our old planters, and its spirit still prevails. The
act of 1821 is, by its terms, an act only to increase the punishment
of persons convicted of murdering a slave,—_and this is a refinement
in humanity of doubtful policy_. But, by the act of 1821, the murder
must be wilful, deliberate and malicious; and, when punishment is
due to the slave, the master must not be held to strict account for
going _an inch beyond the mark_; whether for doing so he shall be a
felon, is a question for the jury to solve. The master must conquer
a refractory slave; and deliberation, so as to render clear the
existence of malice, is necessary to bring the master within the
provision of the act. He bade the jury remember the words of Him who
spake as never man spake,—“_Let him that has never sinned throw the
first stone_.” _They, as masters, might regret excesses to which
they have themselves carried punishment._ He was not at all
surprised at the course of the attorney-general; it was his wont to
treat every case with perfect fairness. He (Colonel H.) agreed that
the inquiry should be—

1. Into the fact of the death.

2. The character or motive of the act.

The examination of the prisoner showed conclusively that the slave
died a natural death, and not from personal violence. She was
chastised with a lawful weapon,—was in weak health, nervous, made
angry by her punishment,—excited. The story was then a plain one;
the community had been misled by the creations of imagination, or
the statements of interested slaves. The negro came into her
mistress’ chamber; fell on the floor; medicine was given her; it was
supposed she was asleep, but she slept the sleep of death. To show
the wisdom and policy of the old act of 1740 (this indictment is
under both acts,—the punishment only altered by that of 1821), he
urged that a case like this was not murder at common law; nor is the
same evidence applicable at common law. There, murder was presumed
from killing; not so in the case of a slave. The act of 1740 permits
a master, when his slave is killed in his presence, there being no
other white person present, to exculpate himself by his own oath;
and this exculpation is complete, unless clearly contravened by the
evidence of two white witnesses. This is exactly what the prisoner
has done; she has, as the law permits, by calling on God, exculpated
herself. And her oath is good, at least against the slander of her
own slaves. Which, then, should prevail, the clamors of others, or
the policy of the law established by our colonial ancestors? There
would not be a tittle of positive evidence against the prisoner,
nothing but circumstantial evidence; and ingenious combination might
be made to lead to any conclusion. Justice was all that his client
asked. She appealed to liberal and high-minded men,—and she rejoiced
in the privilege of doing so,—to accord her that justice they would
demand for themselves.

Mr. Deveaux was not cross-examined.

_Evidence resumed._

_Dr. E. W. North_ sworn.—(Cautioned by attorney-general to avoid
hearsay evidence.) Was the family physician of Mrs. Rowand. Went on
the 6th January, at Mrs. Rowand’s request, to see her at her
mother’s, in Logan-street; found her down stairs, in sitting-room.
She was in a nervous and excited state; had been so for a month
before; he had attended her; she said nothing to witness of slave
Maria; found Maria in a chamber, up stairs, about one o’clock, P.
M.; she was dead; she appeared to have been dead about an hour and a
half; his attention was attracted to a piece of pine wood on a trunk
or table in the room; it had a large knot on one end; had it been
used on Maria, it must have caused considerable contusion; other
pieces of wood were in a box, and much smaller ones; the corpse was
lying one side in the chamber; it was not laid out; presumed she
died there; the marks on the body were, to witness’ view, very
slight; some scratches about the face; he purposely avoided making
an examination; observed no injuries about the head; had no
conversation with Mrs. Rowand about Maria; left the house; it was on
the 6th January last,—the day before the inquest; knew the slave
before, but had never attended her.

_Cross-examined._—Mrs. Rowand was in feeble health, and nervous; the
slave Maria was weak and emaciated in appearance; sudden death of
such a person, in such a state, from apoplexy or action of nervous
system, not unlikely; her sudden death would not imply violence; had
prescribed asafœtida for Mrs. Rowand on a former visit; it is an
appropriate remedy for nervous disorders. Mrs. Rowand was not of
bodily strength to handle the pine knot so as to give a severe blow;
Mrs. Rowand has five or six children, the elder of them large enough
to have carried pieces of the wood about the room; there must have
been a severe contusion, and much extravasation of blood, to infer
death from violence in this case; apoplexy is frequently attended
with extravasation of blood; there were two Marias in the family.

_In reply._—Mrs. Rowand could have raised the pine knot, but could
not have struck a blow with it; such a piece of wood could have
produced death, but it would have left its mark; saw the fellow
Richard; he was quite capable of giving such a blow.

_Dr. Peter Porcher._—Was called in by the Coroner’s jury to examine
Maria’s body; found it in the wash-kitchen; it was the corpse of one
feeble and emaciated; partly prepared for burial; had the clothes
removed; the body was lacerated with stripes; abrasions about face
and knuckles; skin knocked off; passed his hand over the head; no
bone broken; on request, opened her thorax, and examined the
viscera; found them healthy; heart unusually so for one of her age;
no particular odor; some undigested food; no inflammation; removed
the scalp, and found considerable extravasation between scalp and
skull; scalp bloodshot; just under the scalp, found the effects of a
single blow, just over the right ear; after removing the scalp,
lifted the bone; no rupture of any blood-vessel; some softening of
the brain in the upper hemisphere; there was considerable
extravasation under the scalp, the result of a succession of blows
on the top of the head; this extravasation was general, but that
over the ear was a single spot; the butt-end of a cowhide would have
sufficed for this purpose; an ordinary stick, a heavy one, would
have done it; a succession of blows on the head, in a feeble woman,
would lead to death, when, in a stronger one, it would not; saw no
other appearance about her person, to account for her death, except
those blows.

_Cross-examined._—To a patient in this woman’s condition, the blows
would probably cause death; they were not such as were calculated to
kill an ordinary person; witness saw the body twenty-four hours
after her death; it was winter, and bitter cold; no disorganization,
and the examination was therefore to be relied on; the blow behind
the ear might have resulted from a fall, but not the blow on the top
of the head, unless she fell head foremost; came to the conclusion
of a succession of blows, from the extent of the extravasation; a
single blow would have shown a distinct spot, with a gradual
spreading or diffusion; one large blow could not account for it, as
the head was spherical; no blood on the brain; the softening of the
brain did not amount to much; in an ordinary dissection would have
passed it over; anger sometimes produces apoplexy, which results in
death; blood between the scalp and the bone of the skull; it was
evidently a fresh extravasation; twenty-four hours would scarcely
have made any change; knew nothing of this negro before; even after
examination, the cause of death is sometimes inscrutable,—not usual,
however.

_In reply._—Does not attribute the softening of the brain to the
blows; it was slight, and might have been the result of age; it was
some evidence of impairment of vital powers by advancing age.

_Dr. A. P. Hayne._—At request of the coroner, acted with Dr.
Porcher; was shown into an outhouse; saw on the back of the corpse
evidences of contusion; arms swollen and enlarged; laceration of
body; contusions on head and neck; between scalp and skull
extravasation of blood, on the top of head, and behind the right
ear; a burn on the hand; the brain presented healthy appearance;
opened the body, and no evidences of disease in the chest or
viscera; attributed the extravasation of blood to external injury
from blows,—blows from a large and broad and blunt instrument;
attributes the death to those blows; supposes they were adequate to
cause death, as she was old, weak and emaciated.

_Cross-examined._—Would not have caused death in a young and robust
person.

* * * * *

The evidence for the prosecution here closed, and no witnesses were
called for the defence.

The jury were then successively addressed, ably and eloquently, by
J. L. Petigru and James S. Rhett, Esqrs., on behalf of the prisoner,
and H. Bailey, Esq., on behalf of the state, and by B. F. Hunt,
Esq., in reply. Of those speeches, and also of the judge’s charge,
we have taken full notes, but have neither time nor space to insert
them here.

His Honor, Judge O’Neall, then charged the jury eloquently and ably
on the facts, vindicating the existing law, making death the penalty
for the murder of a slave; but, on the law, intimated to the jury
that he held the act of 1740 so far still in force as to admit of
the prisoner’s exculpation by her own oath, unless clearly disproved
by the oaths of two witnesses; and that they were, therefore, in his
opinion, bound to acquit,—although he left it to them, wholly, to
say whether the prisoner was guilty of murder, killing in sudden
heat and passion, or not guilty.

The jury then retired, and, in about twenty or thirty minutes,
returned with a verdict of “Not Guilty.”

There are some points which appear in this statement of the trial, especially in the plea for the defence. Particular attention is called to the following passage:

“Fortunately,” said the lawyer, “the jury were of the
country;—acquainted with our policy and practice; composed of men
too honorable to be led astray by the _noise and clamor out of
doors_. All was now as it should be; at least, a court of justice
had assembled to which his client had fled for refuge and safety;
its threshold was sacred; _no profane clamors entered there_; but
legal investigation was had of facts.”

From this it plainly appears that the case was a notorious one; so notorious and atrocious as to break through all the apathy which slave-holding institutions tend to produce, and to surround the court-house with noise and clamor.

From another intimation in the same speech, it would appear that there was abundant testimony of slaves to the direct fact,—testimony which left no kind of doubt on the popular mind. Why else does he thus earnestly warn the jury?

He warned the jury that they were to listen to no evidence but that
of free white persons, given on oath in open court; they were to
imagine none that came not from them. It was for this that they were
selected;—their intelligence putting them beyond the influence of
unfounded accusations, unsustained by legal proof; of legends of
aggravated cruelty, founded on the evidence of negroes, and arising
from weak and wicked falsehoods.

See also this remarkable admission:—“Truth had been distorted in this case, and murder manufactured out of what was nothing more than ORDINARY DOMESTIC DISCIPLINE.” If the reader refers to the testimony, he will find it testified that the woman appeared to be about sixty years old; that she was much emaciated; that there had been a succession of blows on the top of her head, and one violent one over the ear; and that, in the opinion of a surgeon, these blows were sufficient to cause death. Yet the lawyer for the defence coolly remarks that “murder had been _manufactured_ out of what was _ordinary domestic discipline_.” Are we to understand that beating feeble old women on the head, in this manner, is a specimen of _ordinary domestic discipline_ in Charleston? What would have been said if any anti-slavery newspaper at the North had made such an assertion as this? Yet the _Charleston Courier_ reports this statement without comment or denial. But let us hear the lady’s lawyer go still further in vindication of this ordinary domestic discipline: “Chastisement must be inflicted until subordination is produced; and the extent of the punishment is not to be judged by one’s neighbors, but by himself. The event, IN THIS CASE, has been unfortunate and sad.” The lawyer admits that the result of thumping a feeble old woman on the head has, _in this case_, been “unfortunate and sad.” The old thing had not strength to bear it, and had no greater regard for the convenience of the family, and the reputation of “the institution,” than to die, and so get the family and the community generally into trouble. It will appear from this that in most cases where old women are thumped on the head they have stronger constitutions—or more consideration.

Again he says, “When punishment is due to the slave, the master must not be held to strict account _for going an inch beyond the mark_.” And finally, and most astounding of all, comes this: “_He bade the jury remember the words of him who spake as never man spake_,—‘LET HIM THAT HATH NEVER SINNED THROW THE FIRST STONE.’ They, as masters, might regret excesses to which they themselves might have carried punishment.”

What sort of an insinuation is this? Did he mean to say that almost all the jurymen had probably done things of the same sort, and therefore could have nothing to say in this case? and did no member of the jury get up and resent such a charge? From all that appears, the jury acquiesced in it as quite a matter of course; and the _Charleston Courier_ quotes it without comment, in the record of a trial which it says “will show to the world HOW the law extends the ægis of her protection alike over the white man and the humblest slave.”

Lastly, notice the decision of the judge, which has become law in South Carolina. What point does it establish? That the simple oath of the master, in face of all circumstantial evidence to the contrary, may clear him, when the murder of a slave is the question. And this trial is paraded as a triumphant specimen of legal impartiality and equity! “If the _light_ that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness!”