Chapter I: Part 1

A LETTER
TO THE
REV. CHARLES N. WODEHOUSE,
CANON OF NORWICH,
OCCASIONED BY HIS RECENT PUBLICATION,
ENTITLED,
“WHAT IS THE MEANING OF SUBSCRIPTION?”
WITH A FEW
OBSERVATIONS ON THE SPEECH
&c.
OF THE
LORD BISHOP OF NORWICH,
ON
SUBSCRIPTION.

BY THE REV. CHARLES CAMPBELL,
VICAR OF WEASENHAM.

* * * * *

LONDON:
J. G. AND F. RIVINGTON.
MATCHETT, STEVENSON, AND MATCHETT, NORWICH;
AND
J. S. GOWING, SWAFFHAM.
1841.
_Price Two Shillings_.

* * * * *

“The Liturgy of the Church of England hath advantages, so many and so
considerable, as not only to raise itself above the devotions of
other Churches, but to endear the affections of all good people to be
in love with Liturgies in general . . . The Rubrics of it were wrote
in the blood of some of the compilers, men famous in their
generation, whose reputation and glory of martyrdom, hath made it
immodest for the best of men now to compare themselves with them.
And its composure is so admirable, that the most industrious arts of
its enemies can scarce find out an objection of value enough to make
a doubt, or scarce a scruple in a serious spirit . . . There are also
in the Offices forms of solemn Absolution and Benediction, and if
they be not highly considerable, there is nothing sacred in the
Evangelical Ministry, but the Altars themselves are made of
unhallowed turf.”

_Bishop Jeremy Taylor_.

A LETTER, ETC.

DEAR SIR,

It was hoped that the little excitement occasioned by the debate of last Session on a petition to the House of Lords for some alteration of our Articles and Liturgy, had been suffered to subside; and it was with regret we received the announcement of your recent publication, entitled “What is the meaning of Subscription?”

I am not aware that any of the clergy of this Diocese, during the last nine years, that is from the date of your first publication on this subject, namely, “_A Petition to the House of Lords for Ecclesiastical Improvements with Explanations_,” have shewn any disposition to intermeddle with your proceedings, or to “condemn you for doing the best you could in your own cause,” singular as they may have thought, and _singular_ as you admit to have been “the mode adopted by you to obtain your object.” {1}

Whatever they may have thought, they have hitherto been silent, influenced I am persuaded more by feelings of respect for your personal character, than from conviction of the strength of your position and the consequent weakness of their own. I can answer for myself, and I am satisfied that I am speaking the general sense of the clergy of the Diocese, in saying that they not only could, but had it been from any circumstances necessary, would have borne their ready and willing testimony to the truth and faithfulness of the eulogy pronounced by your Diocesan on your “character and conduct as a clergyman and a gentleman.”

They must naturally therefore be the more inclined to wish that it had consisted with your views to stop short of a public avowal that you could not with any regard for “_truth and honesty_,” make the declaration to which they hesitate not _ex animo_ to subscribe.

_Richard Baxter_ has said, “that many are apt to think that _this is right_, because the best and strictest people are of this mind.” {2a} With “many” therefore, your opinions will have their weight; and if the Subscription of the clergy is to be judged by your views of it, their situation would seem to be any thing but an enviable one.

And as these your views must seem to be strongly corroborated by the congenial sentiments of our Diocesan; should I in the course of the following observations, which I take the liberty of addressing to you, hazard also a few remarks upon his Lordship’s reasons for deeming an Expansion of Subscription desirable; I trust I shall find that I have not been misled by your example, but that to me also, “it may be allowed to differ from my superiors without disrespect or offence.” {2b}

Allow me then, to express my regret, that “res dura et regni _novitas_,” as you may apply the royal excuse to your own _novel_ position, should have compelled you to resort in your own case to a course you so decidedly object to in others; more especially as you appear to have had your misgivings, to have foreseen the possibility of “harm accruing from it,” and very justly to have anticipated that the perusal of a publication written with the object you appear to have had in view, would “call forth a painful feeling in the minds of Christians and Churchmen.” {3a}

“No one,” you say, “can object more decidedly than yourself to the common practice of publishing correspondence between individuals on matters relating merely to themselves.” {3b}

But the practice is usually resorted to by others, as it seems to have been by yourself, under an impression that the publication is in some way or other “important to their own defence.” {3c}

You would however, and naturally enough, persuade yourself that yours is “a very different case,” a case “relating strictly to a _public question_, one affecting the whole Church, and indeed all Christians in the nation.” {3d}

I will not stay to enquire whether viewing it in this light, the voice of the Church ought not to have been heard above your own. But I must think that something more than you have advanced is requisite to constitute a public question, and enable us to see the difference between your own case and that of others, “who publish correspondence on matters _relating merely to themselves_.”

It is true that your case has been publicly discussed in parliament, and so has the case of many another individual; but I must think a distinction is to be drawn between a person dragging his own affairs before the public and a public affair; and any weight that you would attach to the discussion you allude to, as giving to your case the character and importance of a public question, may perhaps be lessened by a consideration of the manner in which that discussion was brought about. The Bishop of Lincoln rose, not to the question, but “at the particular desire of the Rev. Mr. Wodehouse,” wishing to have his case brought into notice; the Bishop of Norwich said that he “should not have risen, had not the name of the Rev. Mr. Wodehouse been introduced;” and the Bishop of London “would not have entered into the discussion, had it not been for some observations which had escaped from the Bishop of Norwich.” _No temporal Peer rose_. Strictly relating then as you would consider your case to be a public question, there appeared but little indication of its being so considered by the House of Lords, and as to the opinion of the clergy, the Bishop of Lincoln observed, “I am not aware that any general desire for such alterations exists, on the contrary, I believe, that never did the great body of the clergy deprecate more strongly any change in the Articles and Liturgy than at the present moment.”

The discussion however seems not a little to have disquieted you—but having raised the whirlwind, though you have failed to guide it—ought you not to have been less impatient of the storm?

Leniter ex merito quicquid patiare ferendum est.

It is difficult to believe that on calmer reflection, a mind like yours will experience no uneasiness at the recollection of having endeavoured to turn an _intended_ kindness to the prejudice of those who had conferred it, and in that light all must view the evident wish on the parts of the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the Bishop of London, to resolve your doubts, and as far as their private opinions could avail—restore peace to your mind. I allude to the use you have made of private conversations, I say _private_, for up to a certain time you appear to have so considered the opinions that were then given you. “I have been favoured,” you say in a letter to one of the Bishops, “with the _private_ opinions of many persons I am _bound_ to respect.” {5a} I admit that for your further satisfaction you received permission to _mention_, or as you say “make known what passed at these interviews.”—Still, although it would have made no difference as to the permission granted, had they even contemplated such a circumstance; I suspect that the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of London, must have felt a little surprised to find that their every word had straitly been observed—

Set in a note book, conn’d and got by rote,
To cast into their teeth—_eleven years_ afterwards!

Yet, by the aid alone of these communications, you have endeavoured to fix upon the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of London the following charge, namely, “that in the debate of the 26th of May, 1840, his Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of London more decidedly endeavoured to crush the very idea of the _same latitude_, which they had on other occasions most unequivocally allowed and approved.” {5b}

I hesitate not for a moment to say that it is a charge unsupported even by the shadow of a proof. And let us first examine your evidence as it bears upon the Archbishop of Canterbury.

The points to which you direct our attention in substantiation of your charge are these:—His Grace’s conversation in May, 1829—his letters of May 12, 1830—and March 18, 1840—and his speech in the debate on the Petition.

In his letter of March 18, 1840, his Grace says, “I shall be much surprised if expressions are found in any letter of mine, which can be _considered as an intended justification of your opinions_,” an observation at variance, as you have persuaded yourself with his letter of 1830, and his conversation with you in 1829.

In the first place I would submit that a distinction obtains between not _condemning_ an opinion and _intending to justify_ it. It is possible that his Grace may take higher views of the power committed to the stewards of the mysteries of God than you do. But agreeing perhaps with you that “the power of the keys” cannot as you have elsewhere observed, be “_beyond a doubt_ defined.” {6a} His Grace might be unwilling to condemn your lower views, but you could scarcely have construed this into an _intended justification_ of them. He had besides told you “that the absence of censure did not imply a tacit _acquiescence_ in your opinions.” {6b}

But what was the latitude which his Grace thought fairly allowable, and how far will it justify you in saying that in his speech he endeavoured to crush the very idea of that _same_ latitude being allowed?

Your conversation with his Grace seems to have turned on the _three points_ mentioned in your petition,—the Athanasian Creed, the Absolution, and the words used in a part of the Ordination Service. Upon your mentioning the different opinions given by various eminent writers of our church as to the Athanasian Creed and its condemnatory clauses, his Grace observed, “_Well_—_none of these opinions has been condemned_, _take whichever suits your own views_, _and be satisfied_.” {7a} But you cannot be satisfied, and although repeatedly told by his Grace, and also by the Bishop of Lincoln, that you could not, so long as Convocation remained in abeyance, obtain the _authoritative sense of the Church_ on these points, you persist in pressing for it. To a request to this effect conveyed in a letter to his Grace, you again refer to the subject of your conversation. To this his Grace replies, “With respect to the subject of your letter, I have only to refer you to our former conversation, in which I expressed _an opinion_ that, on points where writers of eminence have differed without slur on their orthodoxy, a certain latitude of interpretation is fairly allowable. But with respect to the _authoritative sense of the Church_ on the points mentioned in your petition, no individual has a right to declare it, if it is a matter of doubt: and if, during a long succession of years, some difference of opinion is found among writers eminent for learning and piety, the silence of the Church, under such circumstances, may be taken as an indication of her unwillingness to abridge the liberty of her members on _these points_.” {7b}

I can see nothing here like an _intended justification_ of your opinions. His Grace would give you it appears _no decision_ in private, he nowhere led you to infer that he even _approved_ of your opinions, and could hardly have intended you to conclude that he meant to _justify_ them. He tells you “he could not see how your position would be mended by an open declaration of his opinion, _even if favourable_ to that exposition which would suit your views,” {8} which seems at least to imply a doubt, and where there is a doubt, the judge usually directs the jury to give the prisoner the benefit of it, but this does not involve the judge’s _approval_ or _intended justification_ of the prisoner’s case.

Yet this is all that his Grace admitted,—and to what had this admission a reference? To a certain latitude of _interpretation_ allowable under certain circumstances. And I think I can safely defy you to point out a _solitary expression_ in his Grace’s speech on the 26th of May, 1840, in which he attempts to evade this admission, or, in the language of your accusation, “endeavours to crush the very idea of the _same_ latitude which on other occasions he had unequivocally allowed and _approved_.” His Grace’s _approval_ however is nowhere apparent.

His Grace addresses himself in his speech to the prayer of the petition, “which he apprehends their Lordships will not countenance in the least degree.” And what is the prayer? “It prays, amongst other things, your Lordships to consider what measures ought to be adopted to make the Prayer Book and the Subscription of the Liturgy consonant with the _practice_ of the clergy, and the acknowledged meaning of the Articles of the church.” And what is the imputed _practice_ of the clergy? According to the statement of the petitioners it is their “general practice to _deviate_ from the authorised _forms_ and _positive obligations_ of the Church,”—when with reference to your own case, the three points on which you consulted his Grace, you can prove that to _deviate_ from or _omit_ the Athanasian Creed—the Absolution—and the words used at the Imposition of Hands—is the _same_ latitude, which with reference to their _interpretation_, he had thought fairly allowable.—You may then boast that you have convicted the Spiritual Head of the Church of inconsistency and duplicity, and no one will attempt to controvert your insinuation that his Grace “has one opinion at Lambeth, and another in the House of Lords.” {9a}

Your charge as it affects the Bishop of London, rests on similar evidence. His Lordship’s conversation in 1829—a letter of 1830—and his speech in 1840. You consulted his Lordship in 1829 on the same subjects, and received in substance the same reply as had been given to you by the Archbishop. And I can as confidently defy you to point out in his Lordship’s speech in 1840, a passage that can give any colouring of justice to your charge; unless you can shew that to deprecate an _alteration_ of our Articles and Liturgy is the same thing as to admit that certain parts of them may bear a difference of _interpretation_, or show that there is no difference between an _existing_ “elasticity” and a _further_ “expansion.”

Your evidence then, if anywhere, must be found in his Lordship’s letter of 1830. The letter of which you complain to the Archbishop as “_unkind and inconsistent with former advice_.” {9b}

But as you seem to me to have conversed with his Lordship on one subject, and to have written to him, the following year, upon another, I do not see how you make it appear that his Lordship’s letter was inconsistent with his former advice.

It does not appear that you had asked his Lordship “in what sense you would be expected to subscribe” _in future_, but whether _having subscribed_, certain opinions which you had taken up, were consistent with your Subscription. His Lordship thought that they were.

But nine months afterwards, on being called upon to _renew_ your Subscription, you inform his Lordship that you had determined not to make it again but with a sort of _protest_.—By Subscription, you are called upon to declare that “the Book of Common Prayer and of ordering Bishops, Priests, and Deacons, containeth in it nothing _contrary_ to the word of God, and that the Articles are _agreeable_ to it:” but to this you will not assent, unless you may at the same time be permitted to declare that you do not believe it. You must explain, you tell his Lordship, the sense in which you shall have no objection to subscribe, and that through the medium of a petition to parliament. Now there appears nothing in your report of the conversation to lead to the inference, nor can I easily bring myself to think that his Lordship could have led you to infer that a _qualified_ Subscription was admissible either from candidates for orders, or other clergymen. A different exposition of the general doctrine laid down in several of our Articles, may be fairly allowable; the _letter_ of our Liturgy may in several parts admit of a different interpretation, and if taking our own views of these points, believing them not inconsistent with an allowable interpretation of the words, we can _unreservedly_ subscribe, well and good—but for my own part, I should scarcely expect it of a Bishop to receive a qualified Subscription from me, the precedent I must think would be a bad one, and the practice subversive of the very object of Subscription, independent of the awkward acknowledgement it involves, that our Church exacts from her members a form of Subscription, which cannot be made without a _salvo_.

You scarcely could have inferred from his Lordship’s _advice_, that he “unequivocally allowed and approved of _this_ latitude.” But as he had told you that he thought your interpretation of certain points admissible, and that you might openly hold your opinions, you _might_ have inferred that he also considered them consistent with an “_unreserved_ Subscription, and that according to the literal sense of the words”—for the question is, will not the literal sense of the words bear a different _application_? You subscribe _unreservedly_, at least you have given us no reason to suppose otherwise, to the Apostles’ Creed, in which we are told that Christ sitteth at the _right hand_ of God, but the _literal_ meaning of the words is at variance with the truth, that “God is without body, parts, or passions.” {11} I must think that you have conjured up a greater difficulty on the score of Subscription than in reality obtains. At all events you must detail some further particulars of his Lordship’s conversation, before you will enable us to detect its discrepancy with the subject of his subsequent letter.

But if his Lordship’s private opinion on the allowable interpretation of the points on which you consulted him, failed to remove your doubts and scruples, and you were after all fully persuaded in your own mind that the words in question could by no possibility bear the only interpretation with which you could _conscientiously_ subscribe to them; I cannot see how the _open sanction_ of the Church could affect you to the “easing of your conscience.” For surely if the words will _not_ bear a certain sense, the Church cannot make them—the sanction of all the Bishops in Christendom could never make _black_ mean _white_. If you are of opinion that it could, for a Protestant you must entertain rather high views of the power of the Church—and yet such would seem to be your opinion, for in the “Circular” which you sent a day or two before the presentation of the petition last year, to “all the Peers whose London residences could be ascertained;” after alluding to _these opinions_ which you had received from the Archbishop and the Bishop of London, you say, “my answer was, if such be the case, let these statements be _openly sanctioned_, and I am content. But I cannot with _truth and honesty_ subscribe, not according to the _literal_ meaning of the words, _unless_ such latitude _be authorised by the Church_.”

Now if the Subscription is still to be made to the same form of words, it is very difficult to see how the _authority of the Church_ can impart to them a meaning, to which without that authority _truth and honesty_ would forbid you to subscribe. If you do not take care, the Editors of the Oxford Tracts will mark you for their own, in spite of yourself.

But in what position do you now stand? You have _done_ what you informed the Bishop of London, you could “not be comfortable without doing.” You have made known to the world, and that by the means you proposed to yourself, namely, a petition to parliament, what your opinions are, and the world interferes not with them, nor does the Church condemn them; you have only therefore to arrange the matter with your own conscience—if that condemns you, your course is a clear one. But why should it condemn you more for the next fourteen years, than it would seem to have done for the last fourteen? During that time you have held your preferment with your opinions, and why should you not continue to hold your opinions with your preferment?

You tell us that your object was eleven years ago to “ascertain _with certainty_ whether you held any opinion which the Church condemned.” {13} You were informed that the _authoritative sense_ of the Church on the points you wished for information _could not_ in the abeyance of Convocation be obtained; but you were at the same time told, and that, by many whose opinions probably would have had great weight in Convocation had it been immediately convened for your satisfaction, that they considered your opinions allowable, that the Church did not condemn them; and I think it would have been a reasonable inference with which to have quieted your conscience, that had the Convocation been assembled, the authoritative sense of the Church would not have been against you.

And certain passages in your ministerial career had led us to hope and to infer that you had come to that conclusion, that having unburthened your mind, you were at rest. For in 1836, you presented a second petition to the House of Lords, but from that time, as far at least as we could judge from your proceedings, you seemed to have given up your pursuit, at all events, it appears that you rested upon your oars till 1840. And in the interim, in the year 1837, after having abstained for some years, and in consequence as it was supposed of your scruples, we saw you again _voluntarily_ coming forward, and in your character of a Presbyter, officiating at the ceremony of the _Imposition of Hands_, co-operating with the Bishop during the recital of the very words at which your conscience had taken such alarm, and with respect to which in your former petition, “you had humbly and earnestly prayed that such steps might be taken as should seem good to their Lordships, in order to effect those alterations in the Liturgy which would relieve the conscience of their petitioner.” {14a} And we had also subsequently read the resolution you had come to, and _deliberately_ published in 1838. In a note to a sermon which you published in that year, you say, “In the absence of all authoritative censure, I conclude as many others do, that a silent change has taken place, ‘from the diversity of times and men’s manners.’ In that conclusion I abide, repeating what I have often said, that _whenever_ I am pronounced wrong on _authority_, I am ready to meet the consequences.” {14b}

I can myself say, and I am sure that all who have had any opportunity of knowing you, will say it with the same sincerity, in that conclusion we most heartily wish that you _would_ abide—that you would continue to discharge your pastoral duties, your deliberate and solemnly accepted engagements to the “Chief Shepherd” in the same exemplary manner that has marked your hitherto career, _until_ you are pronounced wrong _on authority_—or called from your stewardship to render up your account with joy. In what estimation you may hold the opinions of your brother petitioners, the _Messrs. Hull_, I know not, but they say, “Our clergy _cannot_ leave the Church—their _ordination vows are upon them_.” And besides, my dear sir, to rush upon martyrdom in the absence of all persecution, or, as far as the public can see, any apparent necessity, will at best obtain for you but an Empedoclean sort of fame. And as nothing has occurred since you published your resolution in 1838, to affect your situation differently from what it had been for nine or ten years before, save the failure of another petition; should you resign in consequence of that circumstance, it would look almost as if you resigned merely to spite the Archbishop.

But under the little difficulty that exists of ascertaining with any certainty what your intentions have been, or even now are, we earnestly trust they may not result in the alternative of a resignation, to which in the course of your correspondence you have made such frequent allusions. “An alternative,” which as Bishop Heber says, “it is easy to suggest in the case of a brother, but which every man in his own case receives with difficulty.” {15a}

A few days before the presentation of the last petition you wrote to his Grace thus, “If I fail on this occasion . . . I consider myself pledged to resign my preferment.” {15b} The result of that petition was unfavourable. But ten months afterwards, that is, in your last publication, you call upon his Grace to pronounce that judgment which he had told you he “was _unwilling_ to pronounce on scruples which he hoped time might remove,” {15c}—“and _should_ that judgment require such a step, you will with God’s permission resign next December, _unless_ a clear expression of public opinion should intervene appealing against the judgment pronounced.” {15d}

Let us hope then that you will abide in this your _latest_ resolution, for I think from the evidence with which you have furnished us, we may venture to conclude that no such judgment will be pronounced as shall call for any expression of public opinion.

I shall now proceed to hazard a few observations on the reasons assigned by the Bishop of Norwich in favour of an _Expansion_ of Subscription, seeing that they are considered by many so strongly to confirm the correctness of your own views, and as you have told us that you cannot consistently with _truth and honesty_ make the required Subscription, we cannot but apprehend that in the proportion that those views are believed to be substantial and correct, the character of the clergy must be prejudiced, at all events in the eyes of those, who unwilling or unable to investigate the matter for themselves, take up the opinions of others, and arriving through them at a corollary of their own, hesitate not to go as far as to declare that “_all_ the clergy are _perjured_.”

As I can devise no better, I shall pursue the plan you have adopted with respect to the speech of the Bishop of London, that is, giving such extracts from his Lordship’s speech as bear upon the subject of Subscription, with a running comment of my own. I will not however, introduce my remarks with the preface you have affixed to your “plain story,”—giving us to understand that it is intended to be “a refutation of almost every statement in the Bishop of London’s speech.” {16} Lest having led my readers to exclaim

Quid dignum tanto feret hic promissor hiatu.

I should leave them to conclude that I had been labouring under what the faculty, I believe, term “a false conception.”

His Lordship’s first reason for wishing for a more expanded Subscription, is that—

“IF _it be true that there is anything approaching to the appearance
of insincerity on the part of those making the Subscription_, _if we
seem to confess with our lips that we do not confess and believe in
our hearts we give our opponents a vantage ground of which they will
not be slow to avail themselves_.”

There is said to be much virtue in an IF, and _eâ virtute nos involvissemus_, had not his Lordship torn the covering away, and “left us naked to our enemies,”—self-convicted of “confessing with our lips that we do not confess and believe in our hearts.” For says his Lordship—

“IN FACT, _with respect to Subscription_, _I have never yet met with
a single clergyman_ (_and I have spoken with almost numberless
individuals on the subject_), _who ever allowed that he agreed in
every point_, _in every iota to the Subscription which he took at
ordination_.”

It would not be treating his Lordship with candour to give to his observation an offensive meaning, which it was not intended to convey. It is more with reference to the mal-construction and malicious use of it by our opponents, that we are led to wish that it had not been made. Since his Lordship’s subsequent pamphlet, from which we collect the sense in which he was viewing Subscription, when he made the observation, a sense in which, for instance with reference to those clauses of the Athanasian Creed, which are commonly, and unjustly, called _damnatory_, few I suspect do subscribe, being, in my opinion, in no wise bound to an application of the clauses, so manifestly at variance with the spirit in which the formulary was imposed on us by our Reformers;—since I say, this pamphlet can obtain but a very small part of the circulation of the speech itself, where the observation stands _unqualified_; the general impression of his Lordship’s meaning must be that the clergy subscribe _ex animo_, to that which _ex animo_ they do not believe.

At the same time I have never seen the necessity of responding to those appeals through which the clergy of this Diocese have been called upon to take some public step, to repel the observation as an implied libel upon them. I would rather it should be remembered that his Lordship, comparatively speaking, has been but a short time amongst us, and that for anything we can tell, the enquiries of which he speaks may have been chiefly made amongst the clergy of another Diocese, (indeed, considering that it is not a likely question for a Bishop to put to candidates for Orders, or his clergy generally, the inference must be that they were), and if their “withers should be galled,” let them respond to these appeals, “ours are unwrung.”

It must, however, be admitted that any _insincerity_ in the matter of Subscription, would deservedly expose us to the contempt of our opponents.—But a generous mind would shrink instinctively from inferring insincerity from any thing _approaching only to its appearance_. _Decipimur specie_ ought to hold with respect to _evil_ not less than _good_. Still, alas! to the jaundiced eye every object presents itself in colours not its own. And I fear that the opinion which his Lordship would seem to entertain of the actuating spirit of our opponents, is but too well founded, and amply justifies his apprehension that _they_ would not be slow to avail themselves of the _appearance_, caring little to dissipate the “mentis gratissimus error,” by ascertaining themselves of the non-existence of the _reality_. That accomplished, but embittered infidel, the historian Gibbon, did not scruple to declare that the clergy, one and all of them, made their Subscription either “with a sigh or a smile;” but I trust that the clergy, as a body, can afford to leave such opponents in the unmolested possession of their imaginary vantage ground. Until _Mordecai_ was removed from his seat at the gate, the soul of _Haman_ could not be quieted within him—nor will the souls of our opponents, until the Church is brought down to a level with their own sects.

“_If it_ (_Subscription_) _is to be understood in the literal_, _most
strict_, _and most stringent sense_, _it would create difficulties_,
_which must weigh heavily upon scrupulous and tender consciences_.”

But even supposing this—where there is no compulsion, there no violence can be done to the conscience, and no one is compelled to “enter the church,” and in using the expression, I confess I cannot perceive with the _Messrs. Hull_, that it is redolent “of a very popish error,” it certainly means, as they observe, “taking orders;” and I should think that the last persons likely to present themselves to a Bishop for that purpose, would be those whose consciences were already overborne by the pressure of their scruples.

“Tenderness of conscience,” says _Bishop Jeremy Taylor_, “is an equivocal term, and does not always signify in a good sense.” {19} I am far from meaning to impeach the sincerity of the petitioners, but if his Lordship applied the term in any other than a _good sense_, he might seem to have paid them but an equivocal compliment, and if he used it in a good sense with respect to _them_, the great body of the clergy who have subscribed, and felt no pang, might suspect his Lordship of meaning to imply that they were gifted with consciences of a somewhat tougher texture than is altogether to be envied. Some have chosen to draw this inference; I will not however believe that they have done his Lordship’s deliberate sentiments justice in so doing.

“_And by continuing these difficulties_ (_of Subscription_) _we
should leave the way open only to those whose consciences have no
scruples_, _and who would enter the Church only with a view to the
profits and secular advantages_.”

I would submit that a man may enter the Church with _a_ view to its _secular_ advantages, without being justly involved in the suspicion of _insincerity_, or of necessity, laying himself open to the imputation of entering it _only_ with a view to its profits. For instance, should a gentleman have in his gift what is commonly called a _family living_, he may design it as a provision for a younger son, who enters upon a course of study and trains himself for the ministry, and that without necessarily discarding all view to the _secular_ advantages of his profession, knowing that “they which preach the gospel should live of the gospel:” but so far from its following that he enters the Church with _no other_ or higher motive; how frequently do we find it the case with those whose lot has thus been cast, as it were, for them, that they prove not merely exemplary parish priests, but eventually rise to adorn the _Episcopal Bench_. His Lordship will not object to my adducing his own successful career as a case in point.

But if such characters as his Lordship speaks of, can even _now_ in the teeth of all the imputed difficulties, enter the church, if they be so disposed, I do not clearly see how removing these difficulties will mitigate the evil—how widening the portal will tend to obstruct the entrance. Nor, although it stands so recorded in his Lordship’s speech, will I believe it to be, his deliberate opinion, that by leaving the matter of Subscription as it _now_ stands, we leave the way open _only_ to those whose consciences can feel _no scruples_. If these expressions of his Lordship are to be taken only in a good sense, I trust for the credit of the Church that his Lordship is not the only exception to the general rule. The _Messrs. Hull_, in their animadversions on the Bishop of London’s speech, draw a nice distinction between “opening the door,” and “leaving it open.” In cases of burglary I believe the distinction involves a difference; we may venture therefore to hazard a guess to which of the brothers, the lawyer or the divine, we may attribute that contribution to the joint stock pamphlet. {21}

“_But there is an answer commonly given_, _and a weighty one_, _to
this objection_. _The Church has a sort of elasticity which allows
and graduates the differences that exist_.”

Yet on the use of the word “elasticity” by the Bishop of London, you say, “I confess myself entirely unable to distinguish between the ‘expansion’ of the one prelate or the ‘elasticity’ of the other.” {22a} If there is no difference between the existing elasticity and the expansion pleaded for, for what boon did the petitioners pray? I anticipate your answer, and will reply to it presently.

“_It does not become the Church of England_, _a Church founded on
liberty of conscience and the right of private judgment_, _to say
that there shall not be a certain latitude of opinion_.”

This observation has been the theme for much discussion. It has been pretty roundly insinuated that his Lordship’s meaning had been wilfully misapprehended by the Bishop of London. I see myself but little ground for the insinuation. It will at all events be admitted that his Lordship did not qualify or define the sense in which he used the observation. He has however explained his meaning and the extent to which he applied it in his pamphlet, or as you term it “brief defence” of his speech.

After quoting the “passing remarks of a country newspaper,” as elucidatory of his Lordship’s meaning, you say, “I cannot believe the Bishop of London could be blind to a distinction so obvious.” {22b} For the present, be it so. In the same page in which this expression of your incredulity as to his Lordship’s blindness occurs, you quote another passage from his speech, that in which he observes of Subscription,—“it is not required from all members of the Church, but only from the ministers of the Church, as a security against a greater evil, &c.” Upon which you exclaim, “can we forget that _all_ graduates at the universities are required to subscribe, that these are all _laymen_?” Not very easily, I admit. And which would you wish us to suppose? That his Lordship had forgotten it, or that he was ignorant of it, or that he intended to palm upon the audience before which he spake such an assertion as a _literal_ fact? As I am inclined to think that _you_ suppose neither one nor the other, I must say, “I cannot believe that you could be blind to his Lordship’s meaning,” and could not help exclaiming on reading your ready imputation against the Bishop of London—“Physician! heal thyself.”

But whilst so many explanations have since been given of the meaning in which this observation was made by the Bishop of Norwich, and so many insinuations levelled at the Bishop of London for not choosing to see it, I am disposed to think that his Lordship did not feel himself called upon to dive into the thoughts of the Bishop of Norwich, but intending to give a direct negative to an unqualified affirmative, meant to re-repudiate the notion that “the church of England, _was_ founded on liberty of conscience, and the right of private judgment,” and to assert with reference to the well-known _fruits_ of such a principle, that the Church was founded on “truth.” But the Bishop of Norwich contends that the expression is an “incorrect” one, and that had he been speaking of “the only true foundation of the true Catholic Church itself,” he should have said that it was “founded on the Apostles and Prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner stone.” {24a} The Bishop of London could scarcely have thought the _periphrasis_ necessary, considering before whom he was speaking, he would probably reply to the imputed incorrectness of the expression, that he always considered the foundation of which the Bishop of Norwich here speaks, to be “truth,” and that the Church was the interpreter of the _Apostles_, and _Prophets_, and _Jesus Christ_, or in other words of the _Gospel of Christ_. He meant also I should suppose, to repudiate the notion, that _the Reformation of the Church_ proceeded on such a principle, and in effect to affirm that from the days of Archbishop Cranmer to these of Archbishop Howley, no such principle had ever been recognized by the _Church_, as that of admitting “liberty of conscience and the right of private judgment,” to have any _directive_ influence in Church affairs; a fact, which if not sufficiently proved by the mandate of Edward the Sixth, enforcing under the penalties of “sequestration, suspension, excommunication, and such _other coercion_, as to ordinaries or others having ecclesiastical jurisdiction, shall seem convenient, straitly charging and commanding his loving subjects to observe the injunctions of 1547,” {24b}—would be amply established by your own observations respecting _Bishop Hooper_, for the sending of the good old man to prison in the matter of the vestments, and that by the _Reformers_ themselves, would seem but little to favour the notion that our reformed Church was founded on “liberty of conscience and the right of private judgment.”

But that I may not also be accused of misapprehending his Lordship’s meaning, I will here quote his explanation of the sense in which the observation was made—

“_It is of course plain that I was neither speaking of the Catholic
Church at all_, _nor even of the Church of England_, _except in its
character of a Reformed Church_, _founded as such on the principles
of the Reformation_, _which I again deliberately assert to be liberty
of conscience and the right of private judgment_, _in opposition to
that Church from whence it separated_, _in which the authority of
Popes_, _Councils_, _and Priests_, _superseded all appeal to the
scriptures themselves_, _and by which of course freedom of judgment
was strictly prohibited_.” {25a}

Not that it bears upon his Lordship’s argument, still I would respectfully submit whether our alleged _separation_ here from the Church of Rome be strictly correct; we threw off our allegiance to the _usurped_ authority, temporal and spiritual, of the Pope; we reformed the abuses of _our own Church_, but we _separated_ from no mother Church. The episcopal Church in England existed long before the Pope cast his eye upon it.—“In the acts of the Council of Arles, which was held A.D. 314, we find the Subscriptions of three British Bishops.” {25b}

But I would further question whether in his Lordship’s _qualified_ sense of the observation it can with any strictness be said, that our _reformed_ Church was founded on the principle he contends for.

It will, I think, be admitted that whatever was done with reference to the Church by that “Postilion of the Reformation,” as Burnet calls him, the _Papist_ Henry, was done by him more with a view “to cudgel the Pope into a compliance with what he desired,” {26a} than from any desire to reform our religion. At all events, we must give up any attempt to reconcile his “six acts” with “liberty of conscience.”

The reformation of our _religion_ had its commencement in the reign of his successor. Here, if any where, we must look for the principle in question. But can it be said that our religion was reformed “in _opposition_ to the authority of Popes and Councils,” when it is so well known, that “the Bishop of Rome’s usurped power and jurisdiction was of most just causes taken away and _abolished_,” {26b} in the preceding reign? Neither can it, I think, in strictness be said, _of that time_, that the _Priests_ superseded all appeal to the scriptures, seeing that it was by the Bishops themselves that the scriptures were chiefly caused to be circulated. I am speaking not of the German Protestant Church, but that of which his Lordship speaks, “the Church of England, in its character of a reformed Church.” And I have before shewn on your own authority in the matter of _Hooper_, that she recognised nothing so little as the principle of “liberty of conscience.” That sectarism or separation _from_ the Church is founded on this principle, will be admitted.

It has always appeared to me, that the hacknied phrase, “liberty of conscience and the right of private judgment,” applied to an associated body, is a pure fallacy, I had almost said, a cobweb to catch the fly popularity, quite as valuable as an appeal, “_ad captandum vulgus_,” as the cry—“_Nolumus leges Angliæ mutari_,” to which “catch-word,” his Lordship attributes the defeat of the attempt to revise the Liturgy in 1689. You also attribute this defeat to “the violence of party;” but there are those, and the late pious and excellent _Bishop Jebb_ amongst the number, who ascribe it to the “_special interference of Providence_.” “But the special interference of Providence did not terminate with the first establishment of our Liturgy . . . Even within the Church itself, some were found whose integrity cannot be impeached, who were on the point of introducing alterations which could not have failed to prove equally injurious to the cause of truth and piety.” {27a} Even Bishop Burnet, one of the Commissioners, with reference to the probable result of those contemplated alterations of 1689, imputes the failure of the attempt to a “very happy direction of the providence of God observed in the matter.” {27b}

The Church, however, coerces the conscience of no man, every one is at liberty to take his own religious course, and I confess I cannot see why that which is conceded to all other societies should be denied to the Church—the right of being governed by her own constitutions, and the right also of judging what constitutions are most conducive to the welfare and good order of her community.

If I could not conscientiously conform to the doctrines and discipline of the _Baptist_ or the _Independent_, I question if they would allow me to give my conscience the liberty to act amongst them according to its dictates. They would no more deny than we do ourselves, the abstract principle, neither would they “fine,” nor put me in “the pillory,” but I suspect they would “exclude” me, and with very good reason, from their ministry. To talk of conceding the abstract right of private judgment, has always appeared to me a good deal like talking of conceding to a person with sound lungs the privilege of breathing. But to contend for the _principle_ and talk of certain latitudes and limits, seems to me to involve a contradiction—once assign any _limits_ to the “right,” and you destroy the principle. But although his Lordship pleads for the principle being, as he contends, that on which our Church is founded, and ought to be acted upon, he would circumscribe it within “a certain latitude of opinion.” He would not have it trench upon “the distinguishing features and essential doctrines of the Christian Church.” But who is to be the judge of these doctrines? Two of the petitioners, the _Messrs. Hull_, repudiate the very idea of the Church being the authorized interpreter of the truth. “If,” say these brothers, in allusion to a remark by the Bishop of London, “the word ‘authorised’ bear its usual signification, such a remark would indeed be inconsistent with liberty of conscience and the right of private judgment.” {28a}

Again, arguing from _the abuse_ of Subscription by “unconscientious and unscrupulous men,” they say, “it is on that account that the simplest Creed, and the truth to which the term ‘necessary’ is directly applied in our bible, are enough to justify a call into the ministry.” {28b}

But let any one compare the following passage, from _Mr. Belsham’s_ first letter to a former Bishop of London, with his exposition of the Unitarians’ Creed, as it is given at the end of that _lucus a non lucendo_—his “Calm Inquiry.” “That the Unitarians believe _everything that __is essential_ to salvation is _evident_ from the unequivocal testimony of the Apostle Paul himself, who in the Epistle to the Romans, x. 9, expressly teaches that if we confess with our mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in our heart that God hath raised him from the dead, we shall be saved.” Here then we have a professed believer in the _simplest creed_—but will it “justify his call into the ministry?” Take again the case of the _Baptist_, agreeing with us I believe on all the essential doctrines of Christianity, admitting the _necessity_ of _Baptism_, but differing from us only on a question of _time_. With our views on Infant Baptism should we be justified in admitting him into the ministry? and if not, what becomes of liberty of conscience and the right of private judgment? Might not the professed believer in this simple creed and the Baptist, under the contemplated restrictions of the principle complain with you “that the same invasion of Christian liberty remains? Fines, and imprisonment, and the pillory, have vanished; _exclusion_ remains (to them) in the same unabated force.” {29} Let us then remove the corrective remedy of Subscription to Articles of Faith, and where shall we stay the progress of the gangrene? How shall we exclude “the naughty seducers?”

“_I consider that by in any way expanding the sense and meaning of
Subscription_, _a boon would be granted_, _and a great benefit
conferred upon the scrupulous and tender consciences of those who are
among_”—it might be asked how they came there—“_or may become the
brightest ornaments of the establishment_.”

But if these ornaments can only be secured at the risk, I do not say with the “_intention_” of letting into the ministry together with them, men who hold things _contrary to sound doctrine_, however exemplary may be their lives, however brilliant their acquirements, still should they be in error concerning the Faith, shall we not have purchased them at too high a price?

Brighter ornaments we may never hope to see than that army of martyrs, those profoundly learned and eminently pious men, the sanctity of whose lives, the fervour of whose holy zeal in the cause of Christ have shed an undying lustre on the religion they professed when living, and who being dead yet speak—and in the accents of encouragement to the _tenderest_ conscience, seem to breathe a _crede nobis_,—the Church in the holy communion of which WE lived and died, proffers nothing to be received as an article of faith, that is “not _agreeable_ to the word of _God_,” nothing as a point of discipline “that is _contrary_ to it.”

“_I would remove every obstacle in the way of Subscription_, _by
which tender consciences of unquestionable orthodoxy_, _agreeing on
every point essential to Christianity_, _might be relieved from
difficulties_, _which I know weigh much with men of honourable and
high feeling_.”

But when Subscription is objected to as it is by the petitioners, because they think it pledges them to an assent to things unscriptural, as for instance “the _unscriptural character_ of the Athanasian Creed,” as it is viewed by the _Messrs. Hull_, and the non-agreement of it, and other matters in the scripture as they are viewed by yourself—when the alternative is to give assent to matters that are _contrary to scripture_, or to sacrifice “_truth and honesty_,”—surely the expression of a _tender_ conscience is incorrectly applied to men like these. For what must be the _toughness_ of theirs who could submit to the alternative?

But although the Bishop of Norwich would not allow “liberty of conscience” to extend so far as to trench upon the “essential doctrines of the Christian Church.” Nevertheless, having alluded in his speech to the difficult circumstances in which the reformers were placed, and in consequence of which “_the Articles of the Church were framed on a reference to the opinions of a very wide body who differed among themselves on many important points_.” His Lordship contends in the “brief defence” of his speech, “that it only _requires the full carrying out of this principle into practice_, to meet the difficulties of the present case.” {31}

The radical reformer of the State contends that it only requires the _full carrying out_ of the principle of the Reform Bill, to give universal suffrage and universal satisfaction to the people, and I am inclined to think that the result in either case would be pretty much the same—equally disastrous to the Church as to the State.

But it has been contended during the present movement, that if alterations be made in our Liturgy to meet one tender conscience, a similar boon should be extended to all. Upon this objection his Lordship argues, “if this be true, it is much more true that if _no latitude_ is to be allowed in any subordinate point, we cannot make exceptions in one case more than another.” But this appears to me to be a _petitio principii_, it is assuming that there is no existing “elasticity,” no departure from an _iota_ admissible, _no latitude_ in any point, subordinate or otherwise already recognized, and if so, seeing that on most of the points on which your objections hinge, his Lordship would seem, from his pamphlet, to coincide with you in your views, it might not unreasonably be asked,—how Dr. Stanley came to be at this moment, Bishop of Norwich.