Chapter XII: Appendix: Of Documents (2)
(_A_) _Advances by the United States Government to other Governments
(as in July 1921)_
───────────────┬─────────────────┬───────────────┬──────────────┐
│ Credits granted │ │ │
│ under Liberty │ Surplus War │ Food Relief. │
│ Loan Acts.[117] │Materials Sale.│ │
│ │ │ │
───────────────┼─────────────────┼───────────────┼──────────────┤
Armenia │ │ │ $8,028,412.15│
Austria │ │ │ │
Belgium │ $347,691,566.23│ $27,588,581.14│ │
Cuba │ 9,025,500.00│ │ │
Czecho–Slovakia│ 61,256,206.74│ 20,621,994.54│ 6,428,089.19│
Esthonia │ │ 12,213,377.88│ 1,785,767.72│
Finland │ │ │ 8,281,926.17│
France │ 2,950,762,938.19│ 400,000,000.00│ │
Great Britain │ 4,166,318,358.44│ │ │
Greece │ 15,000,000.00│ │ │
Hungary │ │ │ │
Italy │ 1,648,034,050.90│ │ │
Latvia │ │ 2,521,869.32│ 2,610,417.82│
Liberia │ 26,000.00│ │ │
Lithuania │ │ 4,159,491.96│ 822,136.07│
Poland │ │ 59,636,320.25│ 51,671,749.36│
Rumania │ 23,205,819.52│ 12,922,675.42│ │
Russia │ 187,729,750.00│ 406,082.30│ 4,465,465.07│
Serbia │ 26,175,139.22│ 24,978,020.99│ │
├─────────────────┼───────────────┼──────────────┤
Totals │$9,435,225,329.24│$565,048,413.80│$84,093,963.55│
───────────────┴─────────────────┴───────────────┴──────────────┘
───────────────┬──────────────┬─────────────┬──────────────────
│ │ Interest │
│ Grain │ accrued and │ Total[118]
│ Corporation │unpaid up to │ Obligations.
│ │ July 1921. │
───────────────┼──────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Armenia │ $3,931,505.34│ │ $11,959,917.49
Austria │ 24,055,708.92│ │ 24,055,708.92
Belgium │ │ $34,000,000 │ 409,280,147.37
Cuba │ │ │ 9,025,500.00
Czecho–Slovakia│ 2,873,238.25│ 6,000,000 │ 97,179,528.72
Esthonia │ │ │ 13,999,145.60
Finland │ │ │ 8,281,926.17
France │ │ 284,000,000 │ 3,634,762,938.19
Great Britain │ │ 407,000,000 │ 4,573,318,358.44
Greece │ │ │ 15,000,000.00
Hungary │ 1,685,835.61│ │ 1,685,835.61
Italy │ │ 161,000,000 │ 1,809,034,050.90
Latvia │ │ │ 5,132,287.14
Liberia │ │ │ 26,000.00
Lithuania │ │ │ 4,981,628.03
Poland │ 24,353,590.97│ │ 135,661,660.58
Rumania │ │ 2,500,000 │ 38,628,494.94
Russia │ │ 19,000,000 │ 211,601,297.37
Serbia │ │ 3,500,000 │ 54,653,160.21
├──────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Totals │$56,899,879.09│$943,500,000 │$11,084,767,585.68
───────────────┴──────────────┴─────────────┴──────────────────
(_B_) _Advances by the British Government to Other Governments (as on
March 31, 1921)_
_Allied Governments[119]_—
France £557,039,507 6 8
Russia 561,402,234 18 5
Italy 476,850,000 0 0
Belgium 103,421,192 8 9
Serbia 22,247,376 12 5
Montenegro 204,755 19 9
Rumania 21,393,662 2 8
Portugal 18,575,000 0 0
Greece 22,577,978 9 7
Belgian Congo 3,550,300 0 0
───────────────────────£1,787,262,007 18 3
Loans for Relief—
Austria £8,605,134 9 9
Rumania 1,294,726 0 8
Serb–Croat–Slovene
Kingdom 1,839,167 3 7
Poland 4,137,040 10 1
Czecho–Slovakia 417,392 3 3
Esthonia 241,681 14 2
Lithuania 16,811 12 4
Latvia 20,169 1 10
Hungary 79,997 15 10
Armenia 77,613 17 2
Inter–Allied Commission
on the Danube 6,868 17 6
─────────────────── 16,736,603 6 2
Other Loans (Stores, etc.)—
Czecho–Slovakia £2,000,000 0 0
Armenia 829,634 9 3
──────────────────── 2,829,634 9 3
────────────────────
Total £1,806,828,245 13 8
────────────────────
FOOTNOTES:
[112] The following is the official summary issued at the time. The complete text of the Agreement has not been published.
[113] Of which the most tangible were 400,000,000 Danish kroner payable in respect of Sleswig, certain sums were from Luxemburg for coal, any balance available in respect of German ships seized as prizes in Brazilian ports, and any balance available towards reparation out of German assets in the United States.
[114] So far as I am aware, no complete official text of these decisions has been published in English. The above is translated from the French text.
[115] The Commission published at the same time a warning that it had not adopted these claims, but was about to examine them.
[116] The arrangement under which a German private company is to be created to deal directly with the orders without the intervention of the French and German Governments is intended to obviate the delays which experience has shown to be inseparable from the employment of the present machinery. It does not appear to have any important bearing on the general financial situation, since the deliveries will clearly have to be financed by the German Government and will ultimately be paid for by means of a reparation credit in account with the German Government.
[117] This is a net figure and allows for repayments made up to July 1921, of which the chief items are $78,000,000 by France, and $111,000,000 by Great Britain.
[118] The totals at the foot of these two columns include miscellaneous items for interest not entered in the particulars given in the columns themselves. A further sum of about $250,000,000 will have accrued for interest by February 1922.
[119] These accounts include interest, except in the case of Belgium and Serbia, from whom interest has not been charged, and in the case of Russia, where no interest has been entered up since January 1918.
INDEX
Allied debts, 170 f., 183, 193 f., 238
Armistice negotiations, 145, 148 f.
Army of Occupation, expenses of, 84_n._, 133 f., 140, 191
Austria, 130, 190, 191
Balfour, A. J., 148_n._
Baruch, 72_n._, 106_n._, 153, 155, 156, 159, 160_n._
Belgian priority, 135–6, 139–40, 190, 204
Reparation claims, 123–4, 197
Boulogne Conference, 19
Boyden, 112, 130
Bradbury, Sir John, 93, 95, 128_n._, 129, 216
Brenier, 109, 110, 118_n._
Briand, 24, 25, 27, 41, 69, 114
British Reparation Claims, 124, 211
Brockdorff–Rantzau, 29
Brussels Conference (Experts), 22–3
Brussels Conference (League of Nations), 86
Brussels Conference (Premiers), 19
Bulgaria, 130, 190
Clemenceau, 84_n._, 108, 149, 150
Coal, 44 f., 75, 98
Cunliffe, Lord, 72, 156
Curzon, Lord, 57_n._
D’Ahernon, Lord, 31
Decisions of London, 95
Disarmament of Germany, 16–19
Dominion Prime Ministers’ Conference, 139
Doumer, 111, 141
Dubois, 110, 115_n._, 128_n._
Dulles, John Foster, 156–7
East Prussia (plebiscite), 11
_Economic Consequences of the Peace_, 5, 39, 45, 51, 55_n._, 71, 72,
74_n._, 107, 108, 114, 119, 124, 126_n._, 127_n._, 144, 146_n._,
166, 173
Elsas, Dr. Moritz, 88–9, 92_n._
Exports, German, 79 f., 99, 165 f.
Financial Agreement of Paris (Aug. 1921), 135, 141 f.
Foch, Marshal, 31, 33, 57, 148_n._
Forgeot, 70_n._
Fournier–Sarlovèze, 116_n._
Frankfurt, Occupation of, 15, 57
French Reparation Claim, 107 f., 117 f., 210
George, Lloyd, 1, 17, 18, 21, 27, 30, 33, 41, 84_n._, 121, 138_n._, 139,
150, 155, 179, 198
German Budget, 81 f.
German Counter–proposal (March 1921), 28–30
German Counter–proposal (April 1921), 36 f., 215 f.
German individual income, 86 f.
German property in United States, 77, 143
Gladstone, 6
Guarantees, Committee of, 68 f., 225 f.
Haig, Sir Douglas, 148_n_.
Harding, President, 171
Heichen, Dr. Arthur, 87
Helfferich, 88, 90
_History of the Peace Conference of Paris_, 147_n._, 152_n._, 160_n._
House, Col., 148_n._
Hughes, W. M., 156
Hungary, 192
Hymans, 150
Hythe Conference, 18
Invasion of Germany, 31, 32, 36
Italian Reparation Claims, 127, 211
Italy, 190
Kaiser, trial of, 14
Kapp, “Putsch,” 15
Klotz, 24, 72, 109, 111, 147, 151 f.
Lamont, J. W., 106_n._, 161, 162_n._
Lansburgh, Dr. Albert, 87
Law, Bonar, 150
League of Nations, 12, 61, 188
Leipzig trials, 15
Lévy, Raphaël–Georges, 118_n._
Leygues, 21, 24
Lignite, 55
London Conference I., 28, 34
London Conference II., 40
London Settlement, 64 f., 72, 73, 81, 84_n._, 130, 188 f., 221
London Ultimatum I., 30, 35, 213
London Ultimatum II., 16, 19, 31_n._, 42, 44, 57, 219 f.
Loucheur, 31, 92, 95, 109, 110, 112_n._, 117, 120
Loucheur–Rathenau Agreement; _vide_ Wiesbaden Agreement
Mark Exchange, 81, 100 f.
Mercantile Marine of Germany, 16, 137
“Mermeix,” 148_n._, 149_n._
Millerand, 18, 20
Newspaper opinion, 7
Nitti, 18
Occupation, Army of, 84_n._, 133, 140
Occupation of Germany, 188, 214, 219
Occupation of Germany, legality of, 32, 41, 57 f.
Orlando, 150
Paris decisions, 18, 26, 32, 34, 39, 40, 57, 207
Payment in kind, 97 f., 168
Pensions, 125, 146 f., 185
Poincaré, 24, 108, 128, 129
Poland, 192 f.
Poland’s coal, 52
Private opinion, 7, 8
Rathenau, 92, 95
Reparation Claims, 126 f., 210 f.
Reparation and International Trade, 163 f.
Reparation Bill, 39, 106 f., 185
Reparation Bonds, 58 f., 101, 207, 221
Reparation Commission, 21, 32, 35, 45, 47, 59, 61, 66_n._, 67, 68, 73,
93, 106, 110, 118, 126, 156, 221 f., 235
Reparation Commission, Assessment of, 27, 127 f., 219
Reparation, Estimates of, 39, 72
Reparation Receipts, division of, 138 f., 203
Restitution, 16, 149, 150
Revision of Treaty, 185 f.
Ruhr, Occupation of, 36, 41, 58, 204
Ruhr riots, 15
San Remo Conference, 15, 18
Sanctions, 32, 36, 57_n._
Schlesvig (plebiscite), 11
Simons, 28, 29, 32, 38_n._, 213
Smuts, General, 160
Sonino, 150
Spa Coal Agreement, 45 f., 102, 133, 136, 205
Spa Conference, 18, 19, 45, 138, 203
Sumner, Lord, 156
Tardieu, 24, 27, 60, 72, 106_n._, 107_n._, 108_n._, 114_n._, 117,
120_n._, 121_n._, 138, 147, 148_n._, 149_n._, 150_n._, 151, 153
_The Times_, 18, 20, 22, 27, 32, 55_n._, 100, 110, 117_n._
United States, 36, 38, 78_n._, 143
United States and Inter–Allied Debts, 170, 183, 194 f., 238
United States, Treaty rights of, towards Germany, 77, 78, 130, 140, 142
Upper Silesia, 11, 30, 32, 39, 52, 54
Westphalian riots, 15
Wierzlicki, 53
Wiesbaden Agreement, 76, 92 f., 187, 211 f.
Wilson, President, 146 f., 151 f., 157, 160, 161–162
Young, Allyn, 5_n._
BY THE SAME AUTHOR
THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE
_First published in London, December, 1919, and in New York, January, 1920. Afterwards reprinted in French, German, Italian, Spanish, Dutch, Flemish, Danish, Swedish, Rumanian, Russian, and Chinese, these editions, of which the chief are mentioned below, amounting in all to 140,000 copies._
1. THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE.
London: Macmillan and Co., 1919.
2. THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE.
London: Labour Research Department, 1920.
[Out of print.]
3. THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE.
New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. 1920. $2.50.
4. LES CONSÉQUENCES ÉCONOMIQUES DE LA PAIX. Traduit de l’Anglais par PAUL FRANCK.
Paris: Editions de la Nouvelle Revue Française. 1920.
5. DIE WIRTHSCHAFTLICHEN FOLGEN DES FRIEDENSVERTRAGENS. Übersetzt von M. J. BONN und C. BRINKMANN.
München: Duncker und Humblot. 1920.
6. DE ECONOMISCHE GEVOLGEN VAN DEN VREDE. Met een Inleiding van Mr. G. VISSERIG.
Amsterdam: Uitgevers–Maatschappij Elsevier. 1920.
7. LE CONSEGUENZE ECONOMICHE DELLA PACE. Traduzione di VINCENZO TASCO. Prefazione di VINCENZO GIUFFRIDA.
Milano: Fratelli Treves. 1920.
8. FREDENS EKONOMISKA FOLJDER. Översättning av EVERT BERGGRÉN.
Stockholm: Albert Bonnier. 1920.
9. LAS CONSECUENCIAS ECONÓMICAS DE LA PAZ. Traducción por JUAN UÑA.
Madrid: Calpe. 1920.
10. DE ECONOMISCHE GEVOLGEN VAN DEN VREDE. Vlaamsche Uitgave vertaing van G. W.
Brussel: Uitgeverij _Ons Vaderland_. 1920.
11. URTMARILE ECONOMICE A LE PĂCH.
Bucaresti: Editura _Viata Romineasca_. 1920.
12. EKONOMITJESKIJA POSLEDSTVIJA MIRA.
Stockholm: W. Tullbergs Boktryckeri. 1921.
PRESS NOTICES
_British_
_THE NATION_, Dec. 13, 1919.—“This is the first heavy shot that has been fired in the war which the intellectuals opened on the statesmen the moment they realized what a piece of work the Treaty was.”
_WESTMINSTER GAZETTE_, Dec. 20, 1919.—“Mr. Keynes has produced a smashing and unanswerable indictment of the economic settlement.... It is too much to hope that the arbiters of our destinies will read it and perhaps learn wisdom, but it should do much good in informing a wide section of that public which will in its turn become the arbiters of theirs.”
_SUNDAY CHRONICLE_, Dec. 21, 1919.—“No criticism of the Peace which omits, as Mr. Keynes seems to me by implication to omit, the aspect of it not as a treaty, but as a sentence, has any right to be heard by the European Allied peoples.”
_THE SPECTATOR_, Dec. 20, 1919.—“The world is not governed by economical forces alone, and we do not blame the statesmen at Paris for declining to be guided by Mr. Keynes if he gave them such political advice as he sets forth in his book.”
_THE TIMES_, Jan. 5, 1920.—“Mr. Keynes has written an extremely ‘clever’ book on the Peace Conference and its economic consequences.... As a whole, his cry against the Peace seems to us the cry of an academic mind, accustomed to deal with the abstractions of that largely metaphysical exercise known as ‘political economy,’ in revolt against the facts and forces of actual political existence.... Indeed, one of the most striking features of Mr. Keynes’s book is the political inexperience, not to say ingenuousness, which it reveals.... He believes it would have been wise and just to demand from Germany payment of £2,000,000,000 ‘in final settlement of all claims without further examination of particulars.’”
_THE ATHENÆUM_, Jan. 23, 1920.—“This book is a perfectly well–equipped arsenal of facts and arguments, to which every one will resort for years to come who wishes to strike a blow against the forces of prejudice, delusion, and stupidity. It is not easy to make large numbers of men reasonable by a book, yet there are no limits to which, without undue extravagance, we may not hope that the influence of this book may not extend. Never was the case for reasonableness more powerfully put. It is enforced with extraordinary art. What might easily have been a difficult treatise, semi–official or academic, proves to be as fascinating as a good novel.”
_FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW_, March 1, 1920.—“Mr. Keynes’s book has now been published three months, and no sort of official reply to it has been issued. Nothing but the angry cries of bureaucrats have been heard. No such crushing indictment of a great act of international policy, no such revelation of the futility of diplomats has even been made.”
_TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT_, April 29, 1920.—“Mr. Keynes ... has violently attacked the whole work of those who made the Treaty in a book which exhibits every kind of ability except the political kind.... Mr. Keynes knows everything except the elements of politics, which is the science of discovering, and the art of accomplishing, the practicable in public affairs.”
_TIMES_ (“Annual Financial and Commercial Review”), Jan. 28, 1921.—“The almost unhealthy greed with which Mr. Keynes’s book on _The Economic Consequences of the Peace_ was devoured in a dozen countries was but a symptom of the new desire to appreciate, and, if possible, to cope with, the economic consequences not only of the peace but of the war.”
_LIVERPOOL COURIER_, Feb. 2, 1921.—“In the eyes of the world—at least, of the world that is not pro–German—the reparation costs are wholly inadequate. It is true that in the eyes of Mr. J. M. Keynes it is wicked to charge Germany with the cost of war pensions, but we imagine that the average man with a simple sense of simple justice does not agree with Mr. Keynes.”
“REALIST” in the _ENGLISH REVIEW_, March 1921.—“The operation of indemnity–payment must be followed through to its remorseless end.... The cry ‘Germany must pay’ has still a good healthy sound about it.”
_ENGLISH REVIEW_, June 1921.—“What Mr. Maynard Keynes predicted in his remarkable book is coming only too true. All over Europe the nations are standing to arms, thinking boundaries, while trade languishes, production stagnates, and credit lapses into the relativities.”
_American_
JOSEPH P. COTTON in the _EVENING POST_, New York, Jan. 30, 1920.—“Mr. Keynes’s book is the first good book on peace and the reconstruction of Europe. The writing is simple and sincere and true ... a great book with a real message.”
PAUL D. CRAVATH in the _SUN AND NEW YORK HERALD_, Feb. 2, 1920.—“No English novel during or since the war has had such a success as this book. It should be read by every thoughtful American. It is the first serious discussion of the Peace Treaty by a man who knows the facts and is capable of discussing them with intelligence and authority.”
HAROLD J. LASKI in the _NATION_, New York, Feb. 7, 1920.—“This is a very great book. If any answer can be made to the overwhelming indictment of the Treaty that it contains, that answer has yet to be published. Mr. Keynes writes with a fullness of knowledge, an incisiveness of judgment, and a penetration into the ultimate causes of economic events that perhaps only half–a–dozen living economists might hope to rival. Nor is the manner of his book less remarkable than its substance. The style is like finely–hammered steel. It is full of unforgettable phrases and of vivid portraits etched in the biting acid of a passionate moral indignation.”
F. W. TAUSSIG, Harvard University, in the _QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS_, Feb. 1920.—“Mr. Keynes needs no introduction to economists. The high quality of his work is known. This book shows the sure touch, the wide interests, the independent judgment, which we expect. It shows, also, fine spirit and literary skill.... Coming to the economic provisions of the Treaty, I find myself in general accord with what Mr. Keynes says. He makes out an estimate of what Germany can do in the way of reparation.... The maximum cannot, in his judgment, exceed ten billions of dollars. Some such figure, it is not improper to say, was reached independently by Professor A. A. Young in his estimates for the American financial advisers.”
_FINANCIAL WORLD_, New York City, Feb. 16, 1920.—“There is a thousand dollars of information in it for the average business man.”
FRANK A. VANDERLIP in _CHICAGO NEWS_, March 3, 1920.—“I regard it as the most important volume published since the Armistice. It is certain to have a profound effect on world thought. It is a deep analysis of the economic structure of Europe at the outbreak of the war, a brilliant characterisation of the Peace Conference, a revealing analysis of the shortcomings of the Treaty, a dissection of the reparation claims, done with the scientific spirit and steadiness of hand of a great surgeon, a vision of Europe after the Treaty, which is the most illuminating picture that has yet been made of the immediate situation on the Continent, and, finally, constructive remedial proposals. Every chapter bears the imprint of a master hand, of a mind trained to translate economic data, and of absolutely unfaltering courage to tell the truth.”
ALVIN JOHNSON in the _NEW REPUBLIC_, April 14, 1920.—“There has been no failure anywhere to recognise that Keynes’s _Economic Consequences of the Peace_ requires an ‘answer.’ Too many complacencies have been assailed by it.... What progress are his critics making in their attack on it?... There is surprisingly little effort made by American reviewers to refute the charge that the Treaty is in many respects in direct violation of the preliminary engagements, nor is anywhere a serious attempt made to show that those engagements were not morally binding.... The critics have not seriously shaken Keynes’s characterization of the Treaty. They have not been able to get far away from agreement with him as to what the Treaty should have been. They admit the desirability of revision.”
_DETROIT FREE PRESS_, Nov. 21, 1921.—“Only once have I seen Viviani go into action gradually. It was after his last trip to the United States. He was talking in a subdued conversational tone when suddenly he thought of John Maynard Keynes’s book, _The Economic Consequences of the Peace_. His face, hitherto motionless, twitched a little. His words accelerated slowly. The current of his emotion spread curiously through the muscles of his whole body, until the figure which had been relaxed from head to foot became tense in every fibre. In a moment he was denouncing, with the sonorous blast of his anger, the book which he said he had encountered in every country in the New World, as ‘a monument of iniquity,’ a monster which confronted him everywhere in South or North America, and which for some (to him) incredible reason everyone seemed to believe as the gospel truth about the pact of Versailles.”
TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE
-Plain print and punctuation errors fixed.
-Table at page 238 has been splitted into two tables, because of its large dimension.
End of Project Gutenberg's A Revision of the Treaty, by John Maynard Keynes
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A Revision of the TreatyChapter XII: Appendix: Of Documents (2)
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