Chapter X: The Infamous Offer

While the Kaiser and his advisers were thus adroitly pulling diplomatic and journalistic wires to secure coherence of time with place and auspicious conditions for dealing the premeditated blow, the British Government were treated with the fine blinding dust of ethical phrases and stories of persevering but baffled efforts put forth in the cause of European peace.

The German Ambassador (Sir Edward Grey writes to Sir Edward
Goschen) has been instructed by the German Chancellor to inform
me that he is endeavouring to mediate between Vienna and St.
Petersburg, and he hopes with good success. Austria and Russia
seem to be in constant touch, and he is endeavouring to make
Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at St. Petersburg the scope
and extension of Austrian proceedings in Servia. I told the
German Ambassador that an agreement arrived at direct between
Austria and Russia would be the best possible solution. I would
press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that, but my
information this morning was that the Austrian Government have
declined the suggestion of the Russian Government that the Austrian
Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be authorized to discuss
directly with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the means
of settling the Austro-Servian conflict. The press correspondents
at St. Petersburg had been told that the Russian Government would
mobilize. The German Government had said that they were favourable
in principle to mediation between Russia and Austria if necessary.
They seemed to think the particular method of conference,
consultation, or discussion, or even _conversations a quatre_ in
London too formal a method. I urged that the German Government
should suggest any method by which the influence of the four
Powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and
Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation
or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any
method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would “press
the button” in the interests of peace.

Now at this same moment orders had been issued by the Government of which the Chancellor was the head to move the advance-posts of the German army on the French frontiers. And these orders were carried out on the following day, as we now know from the French Minister’s despatch to M. Cambon, dated July 31st. “The German army,” he writes, “had its advance-posts on our frontiers yesterday.” And we further learn from M. Sazonoff that even before this date “absolute proof was in possession of the Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia--more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland.”[30]

The disingenuousness, not to use a harsher term, of these diplomatic methods needs no comment. It is one of the inseparable marks of German diplomacy and German journalism, which are as odious in peace as are German methods of warfare during a campaign. Of plain dealing and truthful speech there is no trace. Underlying the assurances, hopes, and sincere regrets with which all German conversations with our diplomatists are larded, it is easy to distinguish the steady tendency to impress our Foreign Office with Germany’s fervid desire to maintain peace, her bitter disappointment at being forced step by step into war, and her humanitarian resolve to keep that war within the narrowest possible limits. And with all the documents and the subsequent facts before us, it is just as easy to perceive the real drift of the Kaiser’s scheming. Great Britain was to be made to feel that anything which Germany might be forced to do in the way of disregarding treaties would be done with the utmost reluctance and only under duress. The building up of this conviction was one of the main objects of the curious expedients resorted to by her clumsy statesmen, and was at the same time the overture to the last act in which the Treaty of 1839 was to be flung aside as a scrap of paper, but “without prejudice” to British interests.

The bid for British neutrality was the culminating phase of this unique diplomatic campaign. It was proffered with an intensity of emotion, a high-pitched feeling for the weal of the British nation, and a biblical solemnity which must, it was felt, tell with especial force with a people whose character so often merges in temperament and whose policy is always suffused with morality. Every consideration to which the Foreign Secretary, his colleagues, their parliamentary supporters, and the nation were thought to be impressible was singled out and emphasized. The smooth-tongued tempter at first, sure of his prey, approached the Liberal and pacific Cabinet through our political interests, elementary feelings, and national prejudices, winnowed by religious sentiment and passionate sincerity. With a penetrative intuition which would have proved unerring had it been guided by any of the lofty sentiments which it presupposed in its intended victim, they appealed to our loathing for crime, our hatred of oriental despotism, our indifference to Slav strivings, our aversion to the horrors of war, our love of peace, our anxiety to come to a permanent understanding with Germany, and by our attachment to all these boons of a highly cultured people they adjured us to hold aloof from the war and connive at their disregard of a treaty which they would have been delighted to respect had not brutal necessity compelled them to ignore it. But even this hard stroke of Fate--hard for them as for the Belgians--they would deaden to the best of their power by recognizing Belgium’s integrity anew at the end of the war.

It was at this end of the cleverly fashioned disguise that the cloven hoof protruded.

It is worth recalling that on the very day[31] on which the German Ambassador, acting on the instructions of his Chief, told Sir Edward Grey that the Chancellor was endeavouring to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg, “and he hopes (the Chancellor) with good success,” that same Chancellor, with that foreknowledge which is the sole privilege of the author of a movement, was cautiously preparing the scene for the next act on which he himself was soon to raise the curtain.

He said (our Ambassador in Berlin[32] wrote) that should Austria
be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared,
become inevitable owing to Germany’s obligations as Austria’s
ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then
proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality.
He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main
principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would
never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict
there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany
aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain,
every assurance would be given to the British Government that the
Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the
expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that
might ensue.

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said
that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in this respect.
As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as
Germany’s adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the
Netherlands, Germany was ready to give his Majesty’s Government an
assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action
of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon
in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be
respected if she had not sided against Germany.

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been
Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to
bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these
assurances might form the basis of the understanding which he so
much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between
England and Germany, though it was, of course, at the present
moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British
neutrality in the conflict which the present crisis might possibly
produce would enable him to look forward to the realization of his
desire.

In reply to his Excellency’s enquiry how I thought his request
would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that
at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any
course of action, and that I was of opinion that you would desire
to retain full liberty.

Now, a few remarks will suffice to set this seemingly speculative survey of the Chancellor in its true light. The impression which the opening words conveyed, “Should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable owing to Germany’s obligations as Austria’s ally,” was that while Germany deprecated any course that might lead to a conflict, she would be obliged by her religious respect for her own scrap of paper to spring to her ally’s support if Austria were attacked by Russia. But Austria was not attacked by Russia. On the contrary, these two Powers had come to an arrangement before Germany presented her ultimatums to Russia and France. The Kaiser declared war against Russia on August 1st, whereas Russia abstained from every overt act of hostility against Austria, and instructed her Ambassador to remain in Vienna until Austria should declare war on Russia. And this did not happen until August 6th. Germany and Russia, therefore, were several days at war, while Russia and Austria were still holding diplomatic intercourse with each other. In view of these decisive facts, one cannot seriously contend that Germany’s rôle was that of an ally hastening to succour an assailed comrade.

Further, when the Chancellor was affirming that in return for British neutrality he would give every assurance that the Imperial German Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France, he must have known, as all the parties to the secret arrangement knew, that the wording was chosen to leave a loophole through which Italy, if she could be cajoled into active co-operation, might pass into Savoy and Nice, and possibly even Tunis. It was exactly the same phraseology that had been employed in Austria’s assurance respecting her self-denying promise not to annex any part of Servian territory to her own dominions. Both engagements were cast in the same grammatical mould; both emanated from one and the same source.

The second remark is to the effect that the German Chancellor can hardly be taken to have adequately expressed what was in his mind when he stated that it depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium. He must have known that that was a foregone conclusion of the German Kaiser and the General Staff, with which France’s action had nothing to do. That he knew this full well may be inferred from the justification for the invasion of Belgium which was officially offered to Sir E. Goschen by the German Secretary of State, von Jagow:

They had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way,
so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations, and
endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible.

We have to hark back to the days of Frederick to discover a parallel for the amazing duplicity and hypocrisy of the present Kaiser’s Government.

Plainly and definitively this “infamous offer” was rejected.

His Majesty’s Government (ran the answer) cannot for a moment
entertain the Chancellor’s proposal that they should bind
themselves to neutrality on such terms.

What he asks us to effect is to engage to stand by while French
colonies are taken and France is beaten, so long as Germany does
not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable,
for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from
her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power
and become subordinate to German policy.

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make
this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from
which the good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever
obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of
Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.

Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether the
prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England
and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us
for tying our hands now. We must reserve our full freedom to act as
circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavourable
and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor
contemplates.

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add
most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations
between England and Germany is that they should continue to
work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in
this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I
believe, be _ipso facto_ improved and strengthened. For that object
His Majesty’s Government will work in that way with all sincerity
and goodwill.

And now the British Government in turn made a bid, an honourable bid, for peace.

And I will say this (Sir Edward Grey wrote): If the peace of Europe
can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own
endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany
could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive
or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by
France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have
desired this, and worked for it, so far as I could, through the
last Balkan crisis, and Germany having a corresponding object, our
relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian
to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present
crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through
for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and
reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite
_rapprochement_ between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.

Both Austria-Hungary and Germany were thus offered every inducement which the Governments of Great Britain, France, and Russia could give, including stable guarantees that nothing would be undertaken against them diplomatically or otherwise, and that they could live and thrive not only in peace, but in an atmosphere from which all fear of war was eliminated. More than this they could not have hoped for, unless they were bent upon aggression. But then they were bent upon aggression from the outset, and their sole concern was to execute it with as much advantage and as little risk to themselves as the unusually favourable conjuncture seemed to promise. That was the mainspring of their diplomacy during the crisis.

As soon as Kriegsgefahr[33] was proclaimed in Germany,[34] and general mobilization ordered in Russia,[35] Sir Edward Grey at once drew up a question in identical terms which he had put to the French and the German Governments as to whether, in case of war, they were minded to abide by the restrictions on their future military operations which respect for the neutrality of Belgium entailed. To the Brussels Cabinet the query was whether Belgium was prepared to maintain her neutrality to the utmost of her power. These three simultaneous inquiries opened the fateful issue on which so much depended. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs unhesitatingly replied that the Government of the Republic were resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium unless it were violated by some other Power. From Germany the British Ambassador could obtain no answer. He telegraphed:

I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult
the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I
gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might
give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of
campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was, therefore,
very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His
Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request.

This reference to the disclosure of their plan of campaign was sufficiently suggestive. Characteristic of the system of making mendacious charges against all whom they are preparing to wrong is the groundless allegation contained in Sir Edward Goschen’s next sentence:

It appears from what he (the Secretary of State) said that German
Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been
committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a
consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo
already.

I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matter
further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to
me remote.

Sir Edward Grey, unwilling to let this important issue be suddenly settled by an accomplished fact, informed the German Ambassador next day[36] that the reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country.

If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that
which had been given by France it would materially contribute to
relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were
a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the
other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain
public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing
this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorized to tell
him this I gave him a memorandum of it.

This broad hint caused Prince Lichnowsky, who had instructions to move every lever to hold Great Britain back, to realize how near was the fatal parting of the ways. Accordingly, he bestirred himself once more.

He asked me (the Foreign Secretary continues) whether if Germany
gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality we would engage to
remain neutral.

I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free,
and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could
say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public
opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very
strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give
a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

Naturally. For that condition took no account of France.

Dismayed at the tumbling of the house of cards put together by his Government, the Ambassador made a final appeal to Sir Edward Grey:

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate
conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that
the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to
remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must
keep our hands free.

On Monday, August 3rd, these data were communicated to the House of Commons by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in a masterly speech marked by moderation and reserve. He laid before the House all the data available for a judgment and decision, understating, as is his wont, the case for such a solution as he himself might be apt to favour.

It now appears (he said) from the news I have received to-day,
which has come quite recently--and I am not yet quite sure how
far it has reached me in an accurate form--that an ultimatum has
been given to Belgium by Germany, the object of which was to offer
Belgium friendly relations with Germany on condition that she
would facilitate the passage of German troops through Belgium.
Well, until one has these things absolutely definitely up to the
last moment, I do not wish to say all that one would say if one
was in a position to give the House full, complete, and absolute
information upon the point. We were sounded once in the course of
last week as to whether if a guarantee was given that after the
war Belgian integrity would be preserved that would content us.
We replied that we could not bargain away whatever interests or
obligations we had in Belgian neutrality. Shortly before I reached
the House I was informed that the following telegram had been
received from the King of the Belgians by King George:

“Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty’s friendship
and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of
England in 1870, and the proof of friendship you have just
given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic
intervention of your Majesty’s Government to safeguard the
integrity of Belgium.”

Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can
diplomatic intervention do now? We have great and vital interests
in the independence of Belgium, and integrity is the least part.
If Belgium is compelled to allow her neutrality to be violated, of
course the situation is clear. Even if by agreement she admitted
the violation of her neutrality, it is clear she could only do so
under duress. The smaller States in that region of Europe ask but
one thing: their one desire is that they should be left alone and
independent. The one thing they fear is, I think, not so much that
their integrity should be interfered with, but their independence.
If in this war which is before Europe one of the combatants should
violate its neutrality and no action should be taken to resent
it, at the end of the war, whatever the integrity may be, the
independence will be gone. I have one further quotation from Mr.
Gladstone as to what he thought about the independence of Belgium.
He said:

“We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which
is wider than that we have in the literal operation of the
guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether
under the circumstances of the case this country, endowed as it
is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness
the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the
pages of history, and thus become participators in the sin.”

Now if it be the case that there has been anything in the nature of
an ultimatum to Belgium, asking her to compromise or violate her
neutrality, whatever may have been offered to her in return, her
independence is gone if that holds, and if her independence goes,
the independence of Holland will follow.

As yet, however, there was nothing solid in the way either of a declaration of Germany’s policy or of an ascertained breach of Belgium’s neutrality to go upon. And the Foreign Secretary was careful to make this clear:

Now (he said) I have put the question of Belgium somewhat
hypothetically, because I am not yet sure of all the facts, but if
the facts turn out to be as they have reached us at present, it is
quite clear that there is an obligation on this country to do its
utmost to prevent the consequences to which those facts will lead
if they are undisputed.

Meanwhile, the British Ambassador in Berlin had kept on pressing for an answer to what was indeed a Sphinx question--the scrap of paper--for the Kaiser, whose diagnosis of the British character, fitfully tested and modified by the official despatches daily pouring in upon him, played a material part in swaying his appreciation of the situation, and together with it his decision. The bearings of this decision were twofold--political and military. Germany might dispense with the strategic advantages which the route through Belgium offered her army under one of two conditions: either if the odds against France were sufficient to enable her to count upon an easy victory, or if the political disadvantages that would accrue to her from a violation of the Treaty of 1839 outweighed the military facilities it would secure her. And it was for the purpose of settling this preliminary point and allowing her to choose whichever course offered her the greatest inducements that Prince Lichnowsky put the question whether the British Government would engage to remain neutral if Germany promised to observe the terms of the Treaty. And when, this attempt having failed to elicit a definite assurance, he pressed Sir Edward Grey to formulate conditions which would buy our neutrality, the British Secretary of State virtually told him that it was not for sale.

This straightforward way of meeting the stratagem by which our hands were to be fettered, while Germany was to be free to choose whichever alternative best suited her, clinched the matter in the Kaiser’s mind, if we may judge by the closing conversations between his Ministers in Berlin and our Ambassador.

Sir Edward Goschen describes these final scenes of the historic game of “hedging” in words which will be remembered as long as the British Empire stands:

In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of
the 4th inst. (he writes) I called upon the Secretary of State that
afternoon and inquired, in the name of his Majesty’s Government,
whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating
Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was
sorry to say that his answer must be “No,” as, in consequence of
the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian
neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went
into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to
take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by
the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead
with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as
early as possible.

It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by
the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the
paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got
through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time.
This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians
for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of
action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an
inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow
that this _fait accompli_ of the violation of the Belgian frontier
rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly
grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw
back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would
deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was
now impossible for them to draw back.

Thus the die was cast. An accomplished fact was created which could not, it was urged, be undone. It was now unhappily too late, just as it had been too late to stay Austria’s invasion of Servia. But at least reasons could still be offered in explanation of the stroke, and it was hoped that Great Britain might own that they were forcible. The Germans “had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, and they could not have got through by the other route without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time.” And the German army was in a hurry.

During the afternoon (continues the British Ambassador) I received
your further telegram of the same date, and, in compliance with the
instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial
Foreign Office, and informed the Secretary of State that unless the
Imperial Government could give the assurance by twelve o’clock that
night that they would proceed no further with their violation of
the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed
to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that his
Majesty’s Government would have to take all steps in their power to
uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to
which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give
no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the
day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely
necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium.
I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram, and,
pointing out that you had mentioned twelve o’clock as the time when
his Majesty’s Government would expect an answer, asked him whether,
in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue,
it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer
should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even
twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same.

I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports.
This interview took place at about seven o’clock. In a short
conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant
regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the
Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain,
and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said
that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter
of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand
that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, his
Majesty’s Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than
they had done.

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as
it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity
of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very
agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for
about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by his Majesty’s
Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word--“neutrality,”
a word which in war-time had so often been disregarded--just for
a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred
nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All
his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this
last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had
devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down
like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was
like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life
against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all
the terrible events that might happen.

I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the
same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for
strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to
advance through Belgium and violate the latter’s neutrality, so I
would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of
“life and death” for the honour of Great Britain that she should
keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium’s
neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept,
or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great
Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, “But at what price will
that compact have been kept? Has the British Government thought of
that?” I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear
of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking
solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently
overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear
reason, that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further
argument.

As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining
Germany’s enemies was all the greater that almost up to the
last moment he and his Government had been working with us and
supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and
Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two
nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between
them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for
years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace
between Russia and Austria, the war had spread, and had brought us
face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements,
we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed
our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily
understand that no one regretted this more than I.

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the Embassy,
and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram
was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before
nine p.m. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never
despatched.

At about 9.30 p.m. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of
State, came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the
very friendly official and personal relations between us were about
to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was
equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority
on international law as he was known to be must know as well or
better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were
many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off, and,
nevertheless, war had not ensued; but that in this case he would
have seen from my instructions, of which I had given Herr von Jagow
a written summary, that his Majesty’s Government expected an answer
to a definite question by twelve o’clock that night, and that in
default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such
steps as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann said that that
was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government
could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or
any other night.