Chapter I: NEED hardly express my sorrow that the publication of this letter has (5)

And now, my dear Friend, if you have followed me through these pages, as I know with all kindness and attention you will have done, you will see, in some measure at any rate, why I must bitterly lament and utterly condemn the steps which you have taken. I cannot see that the Church of England has forfeited her trust. I cannot, therefore, believe God has forsaken her. I cannot think that He bids us leave her. I have not indeed concealed my opinion of the dangers which beset her. Humanly speaking, her _safety_ lies in their being known and felt by her children; but I firmly believe there is yet a battle to be fought _in_ her, and _for_ her, which is worth all our energies and should engage all our hearts. No man knows better than you what is to be done: no man better how great is the stake: no man better how glorious the result, if God grant the battle to be won. Alas! that it should be bitter now to say it, no man has fought more nobly in the ranks of the English Church: no man more distinctly or with less hesitating lips has enunciated her dogmatic teaching: no man has contended more boldly on the side of God, and the creeds, and the Catholic faith than you have done in this our battle for life and death! Oh! that you might even now once more “cast in your lot among us;” confess you believe you have been blinded by care and grief, and so been at least over-hasty in your resolves; and throw yourself once more into the ranks of the chosen warriors among us, and into the battle with us. Believe me,—nay, rather judge it for yourself—great things are coming on apace: things which will make men’s course plain before their face, without their being over-forward to decide them in isolation for themselves by the mere act of their private judgment; and perchance if we may but be wisely guided, and have patience to endure, we may both come out ourselves “as silver purified seven times in the fire,” and be the means, though all unworthy, to unite Christendom again in one. Oh! what heart can exaggerate the beauty with which our Church shall again shine forth, if she can retain the good that is in her and discard the evil! How nobly will then appear the characteristic virtues of the English mind;—its love of honesty and truth;—its conscientiousness and repudiation of pious frauds;—its loathing disbelief in the avail of expiation of sin by mere formal observances, the sinner remaining unrepentant all the while! If these qualities may be fostered, and its characteristic vices;—its arrogancy and pride;—its unbounded reliance upon itself, and the miserably ignorant as well as utterly destructive habit and abuse of private judgment: therefore its refusal of Catholic teaching, and practical denial of sacramental grace; if these can be eradicated, how fairly indeed shall the Church of England shine forth once more, as “clothed in white raiment,” as able “to save alive the souls” committed to her, as “the ransomed” and “well-beloved” of the Lord! “as a fountain of gardens, a well of living waters, and streams from Lebanon.” But for this (though we know God needeth no man’s help, and can spare _whom_ he pleaseth, and his work not the less be done, and his counsel stand,) yet _we_ seem to be able to spare no man from our ranks who has ever fought upon our side. Oh! (with a breaking heart, one is almost tempted to exclaim:) Oh! that we could but have with us now, all those who in these last five or ten years have “lost patience” in our camp. What with them, could they be restored to us, might we not seem ready to attain, even against all the “principalities and powers” that latitudinarian indifference or infidel philosophy may array against us? But, I may not indulge in such longings. I may not ask, nor think of, nor hope, even _your_ return. I do not ask it, for I know it is a thing you may not grant for asking. I will not think of it, for “vain are the thoughts of man!” I will not even hope it; for why should “the heart be made sick,” when so much work is to be done. But I may and will _pray_ for it, if it be His gracious will, who is able to give more than we know how either to ask or to think, “whose way is in the sea, and whose paths in the great waters, and whose footsteps are not known.”

Believe me, my dear Maskell, yours, though in sorrow, still in affection,

MAYOW WYNELL MAYOW.

APPENDICES.

A. p. 15.

IT should be observed, that as to the point of encouragement to “patient waiting,” I have in the text much understated the force of the argument to be drawn from the ecclesiastical history of the fourth century, inasmuch as even after the Council of Nicea, there were fresh troubles and disturbances upon the same doctrine, which were not settled for more than fifty years. To use Mr. Keble’s words (on July 23rd), “The Church waited till the Council of Constantinople, A.D. 381, under all sorts of interruptions and anomalies, charges of heresy, and breaking of communion.” My purpose, however, in referring to that period of history being chiefly to point to the Nicene Creed as an instance of a declaratory act, explanatory of the Apostles’, I did not think it necessary to pursue the matter further than A.D. 325.

B. p. 22.

“IT is plain that the meaning of a mute document, if it be tied to
follow the utterance of a _living_ voice, which shall claim the
supreme right of interpretation, must vary with its living
expositor.”—MANNING’S _Rule of Faith_, (1838). App. p. 85.

“But neither can it be admitted that if the justification of the
reformers is to rest on such grounds as the foregoing, their
reputation can owe thanks to those who would now persuade the Church
to acquiesce in a disgraceful servitude, and to surrender to the
organs of the secular power the solemn charge which she has received
from Christ, to feed his sheep and his lambs: for the real feeder of
those sheep, and those lambs, is _the power that determines the
doctrine with which they shall be fed_. Whether that determination
shall profess to be drawn straight from the depths of the mine of
revealed truth, or whether it shall assume _the more dangerous and
seductive title of construction only_; _of a license of construction
which disclaims the creation_, _the declaration_, _or the decision of
doctrine_, _but which simultaneously with that disclaimer has marked
out for itself a range of discretion which has already enabled it to
cancel all binding power in one of the articles of the faith_, and
will hereafter as certainly enable it to cancel the binding power of
all those which the first fell swoop has failed to touch.”—_Letter to
the Lord Bishop of London_, _by the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone_,
_M.P._ p. 60.

See also Archdeacon Manning’s recent letter to the Bishop of Chichester, where the same subject is again treated in the most convincing manner, pp. 35, 37.

C. p. 34.

IT will immediately occur to the reader that this particular point as to the burial service, as well as many others here touched upon, have been already handled in the most masterly way by the Bishop of Exeter, in his letter to the Primate. I suppose I hardly need say I have entertained no so absurd notion as that I could surreptitiously plagiarize from such a source; but I may perhaps be allowed to explain, that I should not have ventured upon the same ground at all, had it not been for a further object in my remarks than that which appears to have been most prominently before his Lordship’s mind in writing. I have been concerned in my particular argument, not so much to clear our services from being supposed to require the “charitable construction” asserted by the Privy Council, as to draw out in somewhat greater detail the points which show the marvellous inapprehensiveness (as it appears to me) displayed by the Court on the whole subject-matter with which they had to deal.

D. p. 35.

“THE question must be decided,” says the Court, (Judgment, p. 9,) “by the articles and liturgy, and we must apply to the construction of those books the same rules which have long been established, and are by law applicable to the construction of all written instruments. We must by no means intentionally swerve from the old established rules of construction, or depart from the principles which have received the sanction and approbation of the most learned persons in time past, as being on the whole, the best calculated to determine the true meaning of the documents to be examined.” It may be worth while, in reference to their treatment, especially of the office for private baptism, to append here a few words of the rule of construction as laid down by Blackstone. “The construction shall be upon the _entire deed_, and not merely upon disjointed parts of it, so that _every part_, if possible, shall _take effect_, and _no word but what may operate in one shape or another_.” (Comm. ii. 379.) It is manifest there was _no impossibility_, nay, _no difficulty_, in such a construction of the office for private baptism as should allow “_every part_” to “_take effect_;” such also that there might be “_no word but what should operate_,” so far as merely making that service agree with the other; the only difficulty was to give every word its effect, _if both were to lead to a particular conclusion_.

E. p. 46.

ON a matter of so grave a character as that referred to in this place it seems necessary to give at rather more length that part of Lord Denman’s judgment (in the case of Dr. Hampden in the Queen’s Bench) delivered on the 1st of February, 1848, which states his reasons for refusing to let the writ issue, when two of the judges of his court were in favour of doing so.

“Now comes the question which presses most on my mind. Having stated
my reasons for the opinion which I deliberately form, and
conscientiously entertain that this has never been at any time the
law in the Church of England, I must be of opinion that the court
ought to refuse the writ of mandamus; but upon that opinion I have
had the greatest difficulty, and have felt the greatest possible
hesitation in acting, because I feel the authority of my two learned
brothers, and the ungracious appearance of refusing the opportunity
of inquiry. In any ordinary set of circumstances, in the case of an
inclosure, of a railway, or matter of property, we should have no
question what ever that the doubt of any one on the bench would have
made further inquiry desirable. I should have instantly agreed. A
writ of error would lie in that case to correct any opinion that
might be shown on more discussion to be erroneous. But every judge
must act on his own conviction. I own that my opinion is so entirely
settled, and, I must say, so entirely unchanged by what I have heard
of the argument to-day, that feeling the utmost disposition to do all
that can be done to show my respect for my learned brothers, I do not
think that I can consent to say for my part that this writ ought to
go. I think it ought not. * * * * * I am satisfied that the only
effect would be to keep alive the dreadful agitation and frightful
state of religious, or rather, let me say, theological animosity,
which it is impossible not to observe in this country. There would
be a delay of at least two years; probably four more days would be
consumed in argument, and we cannot tell how much more when it would
come into the court of error. The bishopric all that time would be
vacant, perhaps other vacancies might occur, and no doubt the example
here set would be followed; and in every case I should expect, in the
excited state of men’s minds, that the archbishop would be called
upon to summon all mankind, to hear whether they had anything to say
against the bishop elect, and to open a court, that would probably
never be closed.”

* * * * *

“Now, under all these considerations, feeling the utmost respect for
my learned brethren, and the greatest regret that we do not take the
same view, I must own that I feel some deference is due also to the
high person who is named as the defendant in this rule. Some
deference is due to those who certify the fitness of Bishop Hampden
for the office to which he is elected. Still more deference is due
_to the peace of the Church_, and _to the tranquillity of the State_.
It seems to me that we should be _putting every thing to hazard_ and
_leading to consequences which it is impossible to foresee_, if we,
who are firmly convinced that there is no such law as that upon which
these parties seek to act, encouraged the smallest doubt as to its
existence. Reserving my opinion on that point till I had heard all
the observations of my learned brothers, and keeping my mind open to
the last, and free to say that this is a question which ought to be
discussed, I must fairly say, with all respect for my brother
Coleridge’s admirable argument, that it has confirmed me in the
opinion of the danger of exposing the Act of Parliament, and the most
simple construction of the plainest language, and the most inveterate
and universal opinion on its effect, to the speculations of those who
will bring their forgotten books down, and wipe off the cobwebs from
decretals and canons, before they can find one argument for
disturbing the settled practice of three hundred years.

“In my opinion this rule ought to be discharged.”—_Rule discharged_.
_Lord Denman’s Judgment in the Hampden case_. _Report_, _by R.
Jebb_, _Esq._ pp. 495, 496.

I have no doubt at all, that the honest conviction of the Lord Chief Justice was, that his view of the law was the sound one; nor any, that he thought he was doing rightly in using his power to refuse the writ; but there can be no doubt on the other hand (for he explicitly avows it) that the reasons upon which he arrived at such conclusion, and reversed the universal practice not only of his own court but of every court in Westminster Hall, were a _calculation of consequences_, and a regard to _future contingencies_, _as they seemed dangerous or advantageous_ to his eye: and this is precisely the point of view in which I have desired to lay the matter before my readers in the body of my letter. It will be observed that in nothing which I have here said am I impugning Lord Denman’s Law, or giving any opinion as to the soundness of his view of the matter then in question before the Court of Queen’s Bench. I appeal not to any matter of opinion, but to matter of fact; to the incontestible fact, that all the precedents of that and every other court of law in this country for a very long period, were set aside by his Lordship on that occasion. I give no opinion at all, save that to do such a thing upon a ground of expediency, applying, as it appeared to him, to the individual case, was a course calculated to shake persons’ confidence in the administration of the law in cases where the Church is affected. Let no man therefore say, “What are you, to set up your opinion against the Chief Justice of the Queen’s Bench?” I say, again, I set up no opinion, I appeal to no matter of opinion at all, but to the undisputed matter of fact, that the usage of the court _was_ at any rate so set aside and set at naught.

F. p. 48.

I CANNOT refrain from quoting here a few lines from the very able speech of the Chairman of the Meeting of July 23, so singularly apposite and illustrative do they seem to me of this passage in my letter written some time previously.

“An instinctive reverence for the law, and a well-founded confidence
in the judges of our land exclude from the minds of some men even the
thought of questioning the propriety of this judgment”—(i.e. of the
Committee of Privy Council). “It is painful to shock this natural
sentiment—but when such grave interests are at stake, we must not
allow them to escape the responsibility to which they are
summoned.”—_Speech of J. G. Hubbard_, _Esq. at St. Martin’s Hall_,
_July_ 23, 1850.

G. p. 71.