Chapter I: Front Matter

agency on the basis of necessity—The views of the younger Edwards,
Day, Chalmers, Dick, D’Aubigne, Hill, Shaw, and M’Cosh, concerning
the agreement of liberty and necessity.
Section VII. The sentiments of Hume, Brown, Comte, and Mill, in
relation to the antagonism between liberty and necessity.
Section VIII. The views of Kant and Sir William Hamilton in relation
to the antagonism between liberty and necessity.
Section IX. The notion of Lord Kames and Sir James Mackintosh on the
same subject.
Section X. The conclusion of Mœhler, Tholuck, and others, that all
speculation on such a subject must be vain and fruitless.
Section XI. The true conclusion from the foregoing review of
opinions and arguments.
Chapter II. The Scheme Of Necessity Makes God The Author Of Sin.
Section I. The attempts of Calvin and other reformers to show that
the system of necessity does not make God the author of sin.
Section II. The attempt of Leibnitz to show that the scheme of
necessity does not make God the author of sin.
Section III. The maxims adopted and employed by Edwards to show that
the scheme of necessity does not make God the author of sin.
Section IV. The attempts of Dr. Emmons and Dr. Chalmers to reconcile
the scheme of necessity with the purity of God.
Chapter III. Scheme Of Necessity Denies The Reality Of Moral
Distinctions.
Section I. The views of Spinoza in relation to the reality of moral
distinctions.
Section II. The attempt of Edwards to reconcile the scheme of
necessity with the reality of moral distinctions.
Section III. Of the proposition that "The essence of the virtue and
vice of dispositions of the heart and acts of the will, lies not in
their cause, but in their nature."
Section IV. The scheme of necessity seems to be inconsistent with
the reality of moral distinctions, not because we confound natural
and moral necessity, but because it is really inconsistent
therewith.
Chapter IV. The Moral World Not Constituted According To The Scheme Of
Necessity.
Section I. The scheme of necessity is based on a false psychology.
Section II. The scheme of necessity is directed against a false
issue.
Section III. The scheme of necessity is supported by false logic.
Section IV. The scheme of necessity is fortified by false
conceptions.
Section V. The scheme of necessity is recommended by false
analogies.
Section VI. The scheme of necessity is rendered plausible by a false
phraseology.
Section VII. The scheme of necessity originates in a false method,
and terminates in a false religion.
Chapter V. The Relation Between The Human Will And The Divine Agency.
Section I. General view of the relation between the divine and the
human power.
Section II. The Pelagian platform, or view of the relation between
the divine and the human power.
Section III. The Augustinian Platform, or view of the relation
between the divine agency and the human.
Section IV. The views of those who, in later times, have symbolized
with Augustine.
Section V. The danger of mistaking distorted for exalted views of
the divine sovereignty.
Chapter VI. The Existence Of Moral Evil, Or Sin, Reconciled With The
Holiness Of God.
Section I. The hypothesis of the soul’s preexistence.
Section II. The hypothesis of the Manicheans.
Section III. The hypothesis of optimism.
Section IV. The argument of the atheist—The reply of Leibnitz and
other theists—The insufficiency of this reply.
Section V. The sophism of the atheist exploded, and a perfect
agreement shown to subsist between the existence of sin and the
holiness of God.
Section VI. The true and only foundation of optimism.
Section VII. The glory of God seen in the creation of a world, which
he foresaw would fall under the dominion of sin.
Section VIII. The little, captious spirit of Voltaire, and other
atheizing minute philosophers.
Chapter VII. Objections Considered.
Section I. It may be objected that the foregoing scheme is "new
theology."
Section II. It may be imagined that the views herein set forth limit
the omnipotence of God.
Section III. The foregoing scheme, it may be said, presents a gloomy
view of the universe.
Section IV. It may be alleged, that in refusing to subject the
volitions of men to the power and control of God, we undermine the
sentiments of humility and submission.
Section V. The foregoing treatise may be deemed inconsistent with
gratitude to God.
Section VI. It may be contended, that it is unfair to urge the
preceding difficulties against the scheme of necessity; inasmuch as
the same, or as great, difficulties attach to the system of those by
whom they are urged.
Part II. The Existence Of Natural Evil, Or Suffering, Consistent With The
Goodness Of God.
Chapter I. God Desires And Seeks The Salvation of All Men.
Section I. The reason why theologians have concluded that God
designs the salvation of only a part of mankind.
Section II. The attempt of Howe to reconcile the eternal ruin of a
portion of mankind with the sincerity of God in his endeavours to
save them.
Section III. The views of Luther and Calvin respecting the sincerity
of God in his endeavours to save those who will finally perish.
Chapter II. Natural Evil, Or Suffering, And Especially The Suffering Of
Infants Reconciled With The Goodness Of God.
Section I. All suffering not a punishment for sin.
Section II. The imputation of sin not consistent with the goodness
of God.
Section III. The imputation of sin not consistent with human, much
less with the divine goodness.
Section IV. The true ends, or final causes, of natural evil.
Section V. The importance of harmonizing reason and revelation.
Chapter III. The Sufferings Of Christ Reconciled With The Goodness Of
God.
Section I. The sufferings of Christ not unnecessary.
Section II. The sufferings of Christ a bright manifestation of the
goodness of God.
Section III. The objections of Dr. Channing, and other Unitarians,
against the doctrine of the atonement.
Chapter IV. The Eternal Punishment Of The Wicked Reconciled With The
Goodness Of God.
Section I. The false grounds upon which the doctrine of the eternity
of future punishment has been placed.
Section II. The unsound principles from which, if true, the fallacy
of the eternity of future punishments may be clearly inferred.
Section III. The eternity of future punishments an expression of the
divine goodness.
Chapter V. The Dispensation Of The Divine Favours Reconciled With The
Goodness Of God.
Section I. The unequal distribution of favours, which obtains in the
economy of natural providence, consistent with the goodness of God.
Section II. The Scripture doctrine of election consistent with the
impartiality of the divine goodness.
Section III. The Calvinistic scheme of election inconsistent with
the impartiality and glory of the divine goodness.
Section IV. The true ground and reason of election to eternal life
shows it to be consistent with the infinite goodness of God.
Conclusion. A Summary View Of The Principles And Advantages Of The
Foregoing System.
Chapter I. Summary Of The First Part Of The Foregoing System.
Section I. The scheme of necessity denies that man is the
responsible author of sin.
Section II. The scheme of necessity makes God the author of sin.
Section III. The scheme of necessity denies the reality of moral
distinctions.
Section IV. The moral world not constituted according to the scheme
of necessity.
Section V. The relation between the human agency and the divine.
Section VI. The existence of moral evil consistent with the infinite
purity of God.
Chapter II. Summary Of The Second Part Of The Foregoing System.
Section I. God desires the salvation of all men.
Section II. The sufferings of the innocent, and especially of
infants, consistent with the goodness of God.
Section III. The sufferings of Christ consistent with the divine
goodness.
Section IV. The eternity of future punishment consistent with the
goodness of God.
Section V. The true doctrine of election and predestination
consistent with the goodness of God.
Section VI. The question submitted.
Footnotes

Introduction.

OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A THEODICY.

How, under the government of an infinitely perfect Being, evil could have proceeded from a creature of his own, has ever been regarded as the great difficulty pertaining to the intellectual system of the universe. It has never ceased to puzzle and perplex the human mind. Indeed, so great and so obstinate has it seemed, that it is usually supposed to lie beyond the reach of the human faculties. We shall, however, examine the grounds of this opinion, before we exchange the bright illusions of hope, if such indeed they be, for the gloomy forebodings of despair.