Chapter D: Rules for Individual Skirmishers

1. In advancing, in retreat, or at a halt, use _every cover_ that presents itself.

2. Preserve _the alignment and the intervals_, so far as possible. On open ground, this may be done perfectly. In woods, skirmishers should never, for a moment, lose sight of each other.

3. The security of the _flanks_ should be looked out for by the men near them.

4. Run over _exposed ground_ as quickly as possible.

5. Approach the _crest of a hill_ with great caution.

6. If threatened by _artillery alone_, advance and kill off the men and horses before they get into battery. When the pieces have got into battery, lie down, if on exposed ground, till they limber up again, and then recommence the fire.

7. A skirmisher, with the new rifled arms, ought, at five hundred yards, to be _more than a match for a gun_; for, in men and horses, he has a much larger target than the gun has in him.

Again, with the new rifle shells, he may be able to blow up a caisson.

8. Neither should a skirmisher have much to fear from a _single horseman_. With his bayonet fixed, he would usually be able to defend himself successfully against the trooper, whose sabre is the shorter weapon of the two; more especially, if he will take care to keep on the trooper's left, which is his exposed side.

9. Never lose your calmness. Your power consists, not in rapid firing, but in the _accuracy of your aim_. Avoid all hurried and violent movements; and never raise your gun till sure of a shot.

10. The aim, according to the Tactics, is made by bringing the gun down, instead of raising it up. However little the soldier may be excited, he will be apt to pull the trigger more or less too soon; that is, while the muzzle is yet too elevated. This is the reason why infantry missiles usually _fly too high_. The difficulty would not be obviated by causing the aim to be made by raising the piece; for then the same disturbing cause already mentioned, the soldier's excitement, would make the shots fly as much too low, as they now fly too high.

Rapid firing is another cause of this incompleteness of aim. Infantry firing is already too rapid to be effective; so that what is claimed for the new breech-loading weapons as an advantage, that they increase the rapidity of fire, furnishes, on the contrary, a strong objection to them. The effectiveness of the fire of a sharp-shooter, especially, will be usually in inverse, instead of direct proportion to the number of shots he delivers in a given time.

In view of this, and of the tendency to pull the trigger before the muzzle is sufficiently depressed, it has become an established maxim, to

"Aim low,
Fire slow"

TACTICAL USE OF ARTILLERY.

The subject will be treated under the following heads:--

I.--HOW POSTED WITH RESPECT TO THE GROUND.
II.--HOW POSTED WITH RESPECT TO OUR OWN TROOPS.
III.--HOW POSTED WITH RESPECT TO THE ENEMY.
IV.--POSTING OF BATTERIES AND PIECES AS BETWEEN THEMSELVES.
V.--HOW USED.
VI.--ITS FIRE.
VII.--ITS SUPPORTS.

I.--How posted with respect to the Ground.

1. Artillery has a much longer range than musketry. In order to avail ourselves of this advantage, we must so post it as to overlook all the ground to which its utmost range extends. It therefore requires _an elevated position_.

2. It has been considered an additional advantage of a commanding position for artillery, that it enables our guns to cover our infantry, attacking or attacked, by _firing over their heads_.

This was done by the French at Waterloo, apparently with great effect. But the advantage is a doubtful one; for firing over our own troops, especially with cast-shot or shell, is very dangerous to them, and is apt to intimidate them. It moreover furnishes to the enemy a double target. The shot which miss our troops will be apt to fall among the guns behind them; and some of those which do not reach the guns, will probably take effect among the troops in front of them.

3. But _very high_ points are unfavorable positions for batteries. Batteries so placed would not command the ground immediately below them; as guns cannot be depressed to fire below a certain angle without soon destroying their carriages. And this would facilitate their capture; for, once arrived on the ground near them, the assailants could not be injured by their fire. It has been estimated that the slope in front of a battery should not exceed one perpendicular to fifteen base.

4. When guns have to be used as a support to other parts of the line, which is often the case, their capture might lead to serious consequences. They should therefore have the ground clear of all obstacles which may _mask their fire_, not only in front, but to their right and left.

5. Although the most favorable position for guns is an eminence sloping gradually towards the enemy, an _open and level plain_ is by no means an unfavorable one; for, on such ground, the enemy will be visible at a great distance, and our shot may act by ricochet, which causes more destruction than ordinary point-blank firing.

For ricochet, firm and even ground is requisite; on soft or rough ground it is not attainable.

6. In enfilading the enemy's position, or in raking his advancing columns from head to rear, a _grazing fire_ is the most destructive that can be used. This consists of a long succession of ricochets at low heights. Where the ground is level and firm, we can obtain this fire at a short distance from the enemy; as, on such ground, ricochet shots do not rise much. But where the ground is uneven, to obtain such a fire, a more distant position will be requisite.

7. _Muddy_ ground is unfavorable for artillery. Over such ground, its carriages move slowly, and its fire is less effective. Balls cannot ricochet; and shells often sink into the mud, and thus are either extinguished or explode with but little effect.

Napoleon depended so much on his artillery at Waterloo that, although every moment was precious, he delayed commencing the battle till his chief of artillery had reported the ground, which had been covered by a soaking rain, to be sufficiently dry for the movements and effectiveness of that arm. The three hours' delay thus caused, would have sufficed him to crush Wellington's army before the arrival of the Prussians.

8. _Stony_ ground is a bad location for a battery; for the enemy's shot will scatter the stones around it with more or less fatal effect.

9. _Rough_ or _uneven_ ground immediately in front of a battery is not objectionable, as it will stop the enemy's shot.

10. A battery, when it is possible to avoid it, should not be posted within musket range of _woods_, _bushes_, _ravines_, _hedges_, _ditches_, or other cover from which the enemy's sharpshooters might kill off the gunners, or, by a sudden dash, capture the guns.

11. To prevent the enemy from approaching a battery under cover, it should be so placed as to be able to sweep all _villages_, _hollows_, and _woods_, in front and in flank.

12. In taking up a position, a battery should avail itself of all _inequalities of the ground_, for the shelter of its pieces and gunners, or of its limbers and caissons, at least.

For the same purpose, a battery posted on an eminence should have its pieces some ten paces behind its crest.

13. Where the ground affords no shelter, and where the position of the guns is not likely to be changed, it may be worth while to cover them by an _epaulement_ or breastwork, some three feet, or more, high.

II.--How posted with respect to our own Troops.

1. In order to be ready to support the flanks of our attacking columns, and to aid in the defence in every part of the field, batteries should be placed at _several different points_ in the line of battle.

2. In a defensive battle especially, as it is uncertain on what point the enemy will mass his principal attack, the artillery should usually be distributed _through the whole line_.

3. A line of battle has been compared to the _front of a fortification_, of which the infantry is the curtain, and the artillery batteries the bastions.

4. The _lighter_ guns should be placed on the _salient_ points of our line, from which they can be more easily withdrawn; the heavier guns, constituting the stationary batteries, on the more retired points.

5. Pieces should not be placed _in prolongation with troops_; for this would be giving the enemy a double mark. Artillery posted in front of other troops will draw a fire on them. When a battery must be placed in front of the line, let the infantry in rear of it clear the ground by ploying into double columns.

6. Never place artillery so as to _impede the movements of the other two arms_. A battery posted in front of the centre would often hamper the movements of the infantry; besides being peculiarly exposed to a converging fire from the enemy's batteries.

7. The safest position for a battery is on that wing which is most secure from a flank attack.

But guns should re-enforce the weaker points, thus making the enemy attack the strongest ones.

Therefore, _where a wing is weak_, place the largest number of guns there, to support it. If we have one wing entirely uncovered, of four batteries, for instance, we should give three to the uncovered wing.

8. Of the heavy batteries, one, at least, should be placed in the first line, so that we may be able to open an effective fire on the enemy at the _earliest possible moment_.

9. The prompt use, at the proper moment, of the reserve, may decide the battle. The movements of heavy artillery, therefore, are too slow for the reserve, which should have most of the light pieces. _Horse artillery_ is especially suitable for it.

10. Guns near an infantry square should be posted at its _angles_. If the square is charged by cavalry, the gunners run into the square, after filling their ammunition pouches, which they take in with them, as well as their sponges and other equipments. The limbers and caissons are sent to the rear; or, if there is no time to do this, they may be brought into the square. If this is impossible, they may be formed into a barricade.

At Waterloo, on the French cavalry's retiring from their charges on the enemy's squares, the British gunners rushed out from the squares in which they had taken refuge, and plied their guns on the retiring squadrons.

III.--How posted with respect to the Enemy.

1. If the enemy's batteries are concentrated in one position, by placing our own batteries properly we may obtain a powerful _cross-fire_ on them.

2. It is always advantageous to so dispose our batteries as to take those of the enemy _in enfilade_, or obliquely (_en echarpe_, as it is called).

At the battle of Murfreesboro', in December, 1862, a rebel battery, being taken in enfilade by one of our own, was silenced in about five minutes.

3. So, also, if we can obtain an oblique or enfilading fire _on his troops_, it will be very destructive. A flanking battery, raking the enemy's position, is often enough, of itself, to decide a battle.

Thus, the battle of Chippewa was finally decided by our getting a gun or two in a flanking position, enabling us to enfilade the British line.

So, at the battle of Shiloh, the rebels' triumphant advance on the evening of the first day was effectually checked by the fire of our gun-boats Tyler and Lexington, which had taken an enfilading position opposite their right flank.

4. For this reason, we must never post one of our own batteries so that the enemy's guns will take it _obliquely_, or _in flank_; unless, indeed, by doing so, we may probably obtain some important and decisive effect before it can be destroyed, or made unserviceable.

5. Batteries should be so placed as to _command the whole ground in our front_, even almost up to our bayonets, and so as to be able to direct their fire towards every point; at all events, so that a fire can be kept up on the enemy till he is within short musket-range.

It is manifest that the best position for a battery, to enable it to effectually cover the entire ground in our front, would not be in our line of battle, but in advance of one of its flanks, from which it could take the enemy's troops advancing over it, in enfilade.

6. Artillery fire from _an unexpected quarter_ always has a powerful moral effect. Two guns, even, hoisted up to a place where the enemy does not dream of there being any, may have a decisive effect.

IV.--Posting of Batteries and of Pieces as between themselves.

1. The best mode of posting batteries is in the form of a crescent, its horns pointing towards the enemy, or forming the sides of a re-entering angle; for this gives a _convergent fire_ to the enemy's divergent one.

Its inconvenience is, the exposure of its flanks to attack, or to enfilade. Therefore, when such a position is adopted, its flanks must be protected by natural obstacles or by artificial defences.

2. Batteries, or parts of batteries, should be at _supporting distances_ from each other; that is, not over six hundred yards apart, so as to effectually cover the whole ground between them, in case of need, with grape and canister. When rifled guns are used, this distance may be increased.

3. _A long line of guns_ in our line of battle is objectionable; for, if it should become necessary to withdraw them, they would leave a dangerous interval.

4. It is dangerous to collect _a great many pieces in one battery_, especially in the beginning of an action, when the enemy is fresh, for it strongly tempts him to capture it. When used, such a battery should have powerful supports to protect it, or should be sheltered by a village, a defile, or other cover, occupied beforehand.

5. Although, to be used offensively, guns should be in strong masses, in order to strike a decisive blow on some single point; this is by no means the case when _used defensively_; for,

(1.) It is only when guns are more or less scattered over different parts of the field, that they can be made to give a cross-fire on the enemy's advancing columns, or on any part of his line.

(2.) If the position where they are massed does not happen to be attacked, they become useless, while stripping the rest of the line.

(3.) If they are captured, all the artillery is lost at once, as happened to the Austrians at the battle of Leuthen, causing their defeat.

6. A certain number of pieces of horse-artillery must always be _kept in reserve_, so that, if an artillery fire at any point should be suddenly wanted, it may be furnished with the least possible delay.

7. Guns of _various calibres_ should never be in the same battery, to prevent confusion as to the respective ranges, and in the supply of their ammunition.

8. An independent section or battery should never consist of _howitzers alone_, for the proper fire of these pieces is too slow to be effective in repulsing an attack on them.

9. There should always be _wide intervals_ between the pieces; otherwise the battery would offer too good a mark to the enemy.

V.--How used.

First, GENERALLY. Secondly, IN OFFENSIVE COMBAT. Thirdly, IN DEFENSIVE COMBAT. Fourthly, AGAINST INFANTRY. Fifthly, AGAINST CAVALRY. Lastly, AGAINST ARTILLERY.

A. GENERALLY.

1. So far as is possible, guns should be kept _hidden from the enemy_ till the moment of opening on him. They may be masked by the ground, or other cover, natural or artificial, or by troops placed in front of them. The surprise will add much to their effect. Moreover, concealed, they will be less exposed to be taken. Nothing discourages troops more than the loss of a battery at the beginning of an action.

2. A desultory and indiscriminate artillery fire will accomplish nothing. To effect any thing important, it must be _concentrated on some object_; and the fire must be persevered in till the desired effect has been produced.

3. It is a general principle that artillery should not reply to the enemy's batteries, unless compelled to by their effect on our own troops. To obtain the most decisive effects from artillery fire, it should be directed _on the enemy's troops_, instead of his guns.

4. If it should become advisable to silence one of his batteries, it will be done more promptly and effectually by the employment, for this purpose, of _two_ of our own batteries, than of a single one.

5. There is usually great advantage in keeping our batteries constantly _shifting their position_; for then--

(1.) They have the effect of a surprise, by opening on the enemy at some unexpected point.

(2.) They make the enemy believe our guns to be more numerous than they really are.

(3.) They are in less danger of being captured.

But these changes of position are attended with this inconvenience, that they expose the horses to be taken in flank by the enemy's batteries and sharpshooters.

6. The movements of a battery in the field should be _as rapid as possible_; for, while moving, it is helpless and exposed.

Moreover, celerity of movement and accuracy of fire will often more than compensate for inferiority in the number of guns; as was the case at the battle of Palo Alto, in the Mexican War, where the enemy's guns outnumbered ours two to one.

B. IN OFFENSIVE COMBAT.

1. When used to _prepare for an attack_ of infantry or cavalry, artillery concentrates as much fire as possible on the point where the attack is to be made, in order to overcome the resistance there, and thus make success easy.

2. When there are several points on which our fire should be directed, we must not batter them all at once, but concentrate our whole fire on them _in succession_.

3. In attack, artillery should _not be split up_ among different brigades or divisions; else no decisive result can be expected from it. Whole batteries, used together, will have a more telling effect than if scattered over the field in separate sections.

In no case should less than two pieces be used together; for, while one piece is being loaded, the piece and its gunners need the protection of another one ready to be discharged.

4. Pieces in support of an infantry column of attack should never be in its rear, but _on its flanks_, near its head, in which position it will best encourage the infantry. But if a battery have already a position from which it can afford to the attack effective assistance, it should remain in it; sending a few pieces to accompany the infantry, which always greatly values artillery support.

5. Powerful effects may be produced by the _sudden assemblage of a great number of guns_ on some particular point. This was a favorite manoeuvre of Napoleon; who, by his rapid concentration of immense batteries of light artillery on the important point, usually obtained the most decisive results. At Wagram, for instance, when Macdonald's column was ready to make its great charge on the Austrian centre, Napoleon suddenly massed one hundred guns in front of his own centre, and made it advance in double column at a trot, then deploy into line on the leading section, and concentrate its fire on the villages forming the keys to the enemy's position, in front of his right and left wings respectively; each battery opening its fire on arriving at half-range distance. The effect was overwhelming.

6. The _nearer_ artillery delivers its fire, the more powerful, of course, are its effects. Horse artillery, in sufficient strength, attacking the enemy at short grape-shot distance, say within three hundred or four hundred yards, may lose half its pieces, but with the other half it will probably decide the battle at that point.

At Palo Alto, Duncan's rapid closing with his guns to less than half range, drove back the Mexican right wing, which could not stand the destructive fire.

7. _Horse artillery_ does not usually attempt to follow up cavalry in its attack; but takes a position to cover its retreat, if repulsed, or to push forward in support, in case of success.

8. When cavalry has to _debouch from a defile_, horse artillery may render it most effectual assistance, by taking a position that will enable the cavalry to form without fear of being charged and destroyed while forming.