Chapter XXIV: Appendix: No. I (1)

SECRET MEMORANDUM.

_for H. R. H. the prince of Orange, the Earl of Uxbridge, Lord Hill, and the Quarter-Master-General._

“BRUSSELS, April 29th, 1815.

“1. Having received reports that the Imperial guard had moved from Paris upon Beauvais, and a report having been for some days prevalent in the country that Bonaparte was about to visit the northern frontier, I deem it expedient to concentrate the cantonments of the troops, with a view to their early junction in case this country should be attacked, for which concentration the Quarter-Master-General now sends orders.

“2. In this case, the enemy’s line of attack will be either between the Lys and the Scheldt, or between the Sambre and the Scheldt, or by both lines.

“3. In the first case, I should wish the troops of the 4th division to take up the bridge on the Scheldt, near Avelghem, and with the regiment of cavalry at Courtray, to fall back upon Audenarde, which post they are to occupy, and to inundate the country in the neighbourhood.

“4. The garrison of Ghent are to inundate the country in the neighbourhood likewise, and that point is to be held at all events.

“5. The cavalry in observation between Menin and Furnes are to fall back upon Ostend, those between Menin and Tournay upon Tournay, and thence to join their regiments.

“6. The 1st, 2d, and 3d divisions of infantry are to be collected at the head-quarters of the divisions, and the cavalry at the head-quarters of their several brigades, and the whole to be in readiness to march at a moment’s notice.

“7. The troops of the Netherlands to be collected at Soignies and Nivelles.

“8. In case the attack should be made between the Sambre and the Scheldt, I propose to collect the British and Hanoverians at and in the neighbourhood of Enghien, and the army of the Low-Countries at and in the neighbourhood of Soignies and Braine-le-Comte.

“9. In this case, the 2d and 3d divisions will collect at their respective head-quarters, and gradually fall back towards Enghien, with the cavalry of colonel Arentschild, and the Hanoverian brigade.

“10. The garrisons of Mons and Tournay will stand fast; but that of Ath will be withdrawn, with the 2d division, if the works should not have been sufficiently advanced to render the place tenable against a _coup de main_.

“11. General sir William Ponsonby’s, sir J. O. Vandeleur’s, and sir Hussey Vivian’s brigades of cavalry, will march upon Hal.

“12. The troops of the Low-Countries will collect upon Soignies and Braine-le-Comte.

“13. The troops of the 4th division, and the 2d hussars, after taking up the bridge at Avelghem, will fall back upon Audenarde, and there wait for further orders.

“14. In case of the attack being directed by both lines supposed, the troops of the 4th. division, and 2d hussars, and the garrison of Ghent, will act as directed in Nos. 3 and 4 of this Memorandum; and the 2d and 3d divisions, and the cavalry, and the troops of the Low-Countries, as directed in Nos. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.

“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, p. 337-8.)

MEMORANDUM

_for Colonel Sir William de Lancey, Deputy Quarter-Master-General._

MOVEMENTS OF THE ARMY.

“BRUSSELS, June 15th, 1815.

“General Dornberg’s brigade of cavalry, and the Cumberland hussars, to march this night upon Vilvorde, and to bivac on the high-road near to that town.

“The earl of Uxbridge will be pleased to collect the cavalry this night at Ninove, leaving the 2d hussars looking out between the Scheldt and the Lys.

“The 1st division of infantry to collect this night at Ath and adjacent, and to be in readiness to move at a moment’s notice.

“The 3d division to collect this night at Braine-le-Comte, and to be in readiness to move at the shortest notice.

“The 4th division to be collected this night at Grammont, with the exception of the troops beyond the Scheldt, which are to be moved to Audenarde.

“The 5th division, the 81st regiment and the Hanoverian brigade of the 6th division, to be in readiness to march from Brussels at a moment’s notice.

“The duke of Brunswick’s corps to collect this night on the high-road between Brussels and Vilvorde.

“The Nassau troops to collect at day-light to-morrow morning on the Louvain road, and to be in readiness to move at a moment’s notice.

“The Hanoverian brigade of the 5th division to collect this night at Hal, and to be in readiness at day-light to-morrow morning to move towards Brussels, and to halt on the high-road between Alost and Assche for further orders.

“The prince of Orange is requested to collect at Nivelles the 2d and 3d divisions of the army of the Low-Countries; and, should that point have been attacked this day, to move the 3d division of British infantry upon Nivelles, as soon as collected.

“This movement is not to take place until it is quite certain that the enemy’s attack is upon the right of the Prussian army, and the left of the British army.

“Lord Hill will be so good as to order prince Frederick of Orange to occupy Audenarde with five hundred men, and to collect the 1st division of the army of the Low-Countries, and the Indian brigade, at Sotteghem, so as to be ready to march in the morning at day-light.

“The reserve artillery to be in readiness to move at day-light.

“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol XII, p. 472-3.)

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY ON JUNE 16TH.

_Signed by Colonel Sir William De Lancey, Deputy Quarter-Master-General._

_To General Lord Hill._

“June 16th, 1815.

“The duke of Wellington requests that you will move the 2d division of infantry upon Braine-le-Comte immediately. His Grace is going to Waterloo.”

_To the same._

“June 16th, 1815.

“Your Lordship is requested to order prince Frederick of Orange to move, immediately upon the receipt of this order, the 1st division of the army of the Low-Countries, and the Indian brigade, from Sotteghem to Enghien, leaving five hundred men, as before directed, in Audenarde.”

_To the same._

“GENAPPE, June 16th, 1815.

“The 2d division of infantry to move to-morrow morning at day-break from Nivelles to Quatre-Bras.

“The 4th division of infantry to move at day-break to-morrow morning to Nivelles.”

“June 16th, 1815.

“The reserve artillery to move at day-break to-morrow morning, the 17th, to Quatre-Bras, where it will receive further orders.”

_To Major-General Sir J. Lambert._

“June 16th, 1815.

“The brigade of infantry under the command of major-general sir J. Lambert, to march from Assche at day-break to-morrow morning, the 17th inst., to Genappe, on the Namur road, and to remain there until further orders.” (_Gurwood_, vol. XII, p. 274-5.)

No. II.

The reader will observe that the letters from which I make the following extracts, were written at three o’clock in the morning of the battle.

_To Sir Charles Stuart._

“WATERLOO, June 18th, 1815,
three o’clock A.M.

“MY DEAR STUART,

... “You will see in the letter to the duc de Berry the real state of our case, and the only risk we run. The Prussians will be ready again in the morning for anything.

“Pray keep the English (in Brussels,) quiet, if you can. Let them all prepare to move, but neither be in a hurry nor a fright, as all will yet turn out well.

“I have given the directions to the governor of Antwerp, to meet the _crotchets_ which I find in the heads of the king’s governors upon every turn....

“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, page 476.)

_To His Royal Highness the Duc de Berry._

“WATERLOO, June 18th, 1815,
three o’clock in the morning.

“SIR,

“I have not written to your Royal Highness since Thursday, as I had nothing to communicate ... and I have had a great deal to do.

“We had a very sanguinary battle on Friday last: near the farm of Quatre-Bras; the Prussians, about Sombreffe. I had very few troops with me, and no cavalry: I however drove the enemy back, and had considerable success. The Prussians suffered a good deal, and retreated during the night; and in consequence I retired also during the day. I saw very little yesterday of the enemy, who followed us very gently, and the Prussians not at all. The Prussians have been joined by their fourth corps, more than thirty thousand strong, and I have also nearly all my men together.

“It may happen that the enemy will turn us by Hal, although the weather is terrible and the roads are in a shocking state, and although I have posted prince Frederick’s corps between Hal and Enghien. If this should happen, I beg your Royal Highness to march on Antwerp ... and to inform his Majesty (Louis XVIII,) that I beg him to leave Ghent for Antwerp by the left of the Scheldt. He will find no difficulty in crossing at the _Tête de Flandre_.

... “I hope, and I have every reason to believe, that all will turn out well; but we must take every possible precaution, and avoid great losses. It is with this view, that I beg your Royal Highness to follow the directions here given, and his Majesty to make for Antwerp, not upon false reports, but upon certain information that the enemy has got into Brussels, in spite of me, in turning me by Hal....

“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, p. 476-7.)

The following letters, written just after the battle, will show how deeply the duke felt the loss of his companions in arms: the renown his success would ensure was no consolation to him for the loss of friends and heroes: patriotism, and the confident expectation that an effectual stop was at length put to the horrors which had desolated Europe for more than twenty years, were the sources of such comfort as he could feel himself, or offer to others, for the expenditure of so many valuable lives.

_To the Earl of Aberdeen, K. T._

“BRUSSELS, June 19th, 1815.

“MY DEAR LORD,

“You will readily give credit to the existence of the extreme grief with which I announce to you the death of your gallant brother, (colonel Gordon,) in consequence of a wound received in our great battle of yesterday.

“He had served me most zealously and usefully for many years, and on many trying occasions; but he had never rendered himself more useful, and had never distinguished himself more, than in our late actions.

“He received the wound which occasioned his death, when rallying one of the Brunswick battalions which was shaking a little; and he lived long enough to be informed by myself of the glorious result of our actions, to which he had so much contributed by his active and zealous assistance.

“I cannot express to you the regret and sorrow with which I look round me, and contemplate the loss which I have sustained, particularly in your brother. The glory resulting from such actions, so dearly bought, is no consolation to me, and I cannot suggest it as any to you and his friends; but I hope that it may be expected that this last one has been so decisive, as that no doubt remains that our exertions and our individual losses will be rewarded by the early attainment of our just object. It is then that the glory of the actions in which our friends and relations have fallen, will be some consolation for their loss.

“Believe me, etc.
“WELLINGTON.”

“Your brother had a black horse, given to him, I believe, by lord Ashburnham, which I will keep till I hear from you what you wish should be done with it.” (_Gurwood_, vol. XII, p. 488-9.)

_To the Duke of Beaufort, K. G._

“BRUSSELS, June 19th, 1815.

“MY DEAR LORD,

“I am very sorry to have to acquaint you that your brother Fitzroy is very severely wounded, and has lost his right arm. I have just seen him, and he is perfectly free from fever, and as well as anybody could be under such circumstances. You are aware how useful he has always been to me, and how much I shall feel the want of his assistance, and what a regard and affection I feel for him; and you will readily believe how much concerned I am for his misfortune. Indeed, the losses I have sustained, have quite broken me down; and I have no feeling for the advantages we have acquired. I hope, however, that your brother will soon be able to join me again; and that he will long live to be, as he is likely to become, an honour to his country, as he is a satisfaction to his family and friends.

“Believe me, etc.
“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, page 489.)

_To Marshal Prince Schwarzenberg._

“JONCOURT, June 26th, 1815.

... “Our battle on the 18th was one of giants; and our success was most complete, as you perceive. God grant I may never see another! for I am overwhelmed with grief at the loss of my old friends and comrades.

“My neighbour and fellow-labourer (Blücher) is in good health, though he suffers a little from the fall of a horse, wounded under him in the battle of the 16th....

“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, page 510.)

The following extracts will prove the early and complete conviction of the Duke, that all had been decided at Waterloo.

_To General Dumouriez._

“NIVELLES, June 20th, 1815.

... “You must have heard what I have done; and I hope you are satisfied. I never saw such a battle as the one the day before yesterday; and never before did I gain such a victory. I trust it is all over with Bonaparte. We are in hot pursuit of him....

“WELLINGTON.”
(Gurwood, vol. XII, page 490.)

_To General the Earl of Uxbridge._

“LE CATEAU, June 23d, 1815.

... “My opinion is that we have given Napoleon his death-blow.... He can make no head against us ... _il n’a qu’à se pendre_,” (he has only to hang himself)....

“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, p. 499-500.)

_To the Prince de Talleyrand._

“LE CATEAU, June 24th, 1815.

... “It was I who recommended to the king (Louis XVIII,) to enter France at present, because I was aware of the extent of our success in the battle of the 18th....

“I enclose you, in confirmation of my opinion of the extent of our success, the _Journal de l’Empire_ of the 22d, in which you will find Bonaparte’s account of the action, the truth of which, as far as it goes against himself, cannot be doubted....

“I conclude that you can have no scruple about joining the king forthwith, a measure which I earnestly entreat you and the other members of the king’s council to adopt without loss of time.

“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, p. 502-3.)

I may here remark, that in political foresight, the Duke was in advance of Talleyrand himself, as the letter above demonstrates.

_To Marshal Lord Beresford._

“GONESSE, July 2d, 1815.

“You will have heard of our battle of the 18th. Never did I see such a pounding match. Both were what the boxers call gluttons. Napoleon did not manœuvre at all. He just moved forward in the old style, in columns, and was driven off in the old style....

“I had the infantry for some time in squares; and we had the French cavalry walking about us as if they had been our own. I never saw the British infantry behave so well....

“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, page 529.)

The subjoined extracts show how steadily Wellington kept in view the sole object of the war; and that he was not to be cajoled by any diplomatic chicanery, and what pains he took to keep statesmen to the point.

_To Earl Bathurst._

“JONCOURT, June 25th, 1815.

“To advanced posts ... yesterday received a proposition to suspend hostilities, as it was stated that Bonaparte had abdicated in favour of his son, and has appointed a provisional government, consisting of Fouché, Carnot, Caulincourt, general Grenier, and Quinette; that these persons had sent ministers to the allied powers to treat for peace.

“It appeared both to prince Blücher and to me, that these measures were a trick....

“The object of the alliance of the powers of Europe is declared by the first article of the treaty of the 25th of March, to be to force Napoleon Bonaparte to desist from his projects, and to place him in a situation in which he will no longer have it in his power to disturb the peace of the world; and, by the third article, the powers of Europe have agreed not to lay down their arms till ... it shall have been rendered impossible for Bonaparte to excite fresh troubles....

“I could not consider his abdication of a usurped power in favour of his son, and his handing over the government provisionally to five persons named by himself, to be that description of security which the allies had in view, which should induce them to lay down their arms; and therefore I continue my operations....

“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, page 508.)

_To the French Commissioners._

“HEAD-QUARTERS, June 26th, 1815.

... “Since the 15th instant, when Napoleon Bonaparte, at the head of the French armies, invaded the dominions of the king of the Netherlands, and attacked the Prussian army the Field-Marshal has considered his sovereign, and those powers whose armies he commands, in a state of war with the government of France; and he does not consider the abdication of Napoleon Bonaparte of his usurped authority, under all the circumstances which have preceded and attended that measure, as the attainment of the object held out in the declarations and treaties of the allies, which should induce them to lay down their arms.

“The Field-Marshal cannot consent therefore to any suspension of hostilities, however desirous he is of preventing the farther effusion of blood.

“Their Excellencies ... will probably consider any interview with him a useless waste of their time....

“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, page 512.)

It will appear, by the subjoined documents, that Wellington was tender of the life of Napoleon, who had not spared that of the duc d’Enghien, and who had declared that he would treat in the same way, that is, put to death, any Bourbon prince he should catch within the boundaries of his empire. Blücher was eager to put Bonaparte to death, as the guilty author of so much rapine and bloodshed; and to punish the Parisians by fines, the destruction of the bridge of Jena, and of their city itself, if they proved refractory. From this dreadful retaliation, it required all the influence of the Duke over Blücher to preserve them. Posterity should know, if the French will not pay attention to the fact, through whose intervention Napoleon’s life was spared, and Paris saved from dishonour, if not pillage and utter destruction.

_To Sir Charles Stuart, G.C.B._

“ORVILLÉ, June 28th, 1815.

“MY DEAR STUART,

“I send you my dispatches, which will make you acquainted with the state of affairs. You may show them to Talleyrand if you choose.

“General —— has been here this day to negotiate for Napoleon’s passing to America, to which proposition I have answered that I have no authority. The Prussians think the Jacobins wish to give him over to me, believing that I will save his life. Blücher wishes to kill him; but I have told him that I shall remonstrate, and shall insist upon his being disposed of by common accord. I have likewise said that, as a private friend, I advised him to have nothing to do with so foul a transaction; that he and I had acted too distinguished parts in these transactions to become executioners; and that I was determined, that if the sovereigns wished to put him to death, they should appoint an executioner, which should not be me....

“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, page 516.)

_To Marshal Prince Blücher._

“GONESSE, July 2d, 1815.

“SIR,

“I requested general Müffling to write to your Highness yesterday, upon the subject of the propositions which had been made to me by the French commissioners for a suspension of hostilities, upon which I have not yet had a positive answer from your Highness....

“If we choose it, we can settle all our matters now, by agreeing to the proposed armistice....

“By adopting this measure, we provide for the quiet restoration of his Majesty to his throne; which is that result of the war which the sovereigns of all of us have always considered the most beneficial for us all, and the most likely to lead to permanent peace in Europe.

“It is true we shall not have the vain triumph of entering Paris at the head of our victorious troops; but ... I doubt our having the means at present of succeeding in an attack upon Paris; and, if we are to wait till the arrival of marshal prince Wrede to make the attack, I think we shall find the sovereigns disposed, as they were last year, to spare the capital of their ally, and either not to enter the town at all, or enter it under an armistice, such as it is in your power and mine to sign this day.

“I earnestly urge your Highness ... to let me have your decision whether you will agree to any armistice, or not....

“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, p. 526-7.)

_To the French Commissioners._

“GONESSE, July 2d, 1815.

“It is my duty to apprize your Excellencies, that I have just received a letter from marshal prince Blücher, who expresses the greatest aversion to granting an armistice.... I have written to him once more, having the greatest desire to save your capital from the danger which menaces it; and I expect his answer to-night....

“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol XII, page 528.)

_To Marshal Prince Blücher._

“PARIS, July 8th, 1815, midnight.

“MEIN LIEBER FÜRST,

“Several reports have been brought to me during the evening and night, and some from the government, in consequence of the work carrying on by your Highness on one of the bridges over the Seine, which it is supposed to be your intention to destroy.

“As this measure will certainly create a good deal of disturbance in the town, and as the sovereigns, when they were here before, left all these bridges, etc., standing, I take the liberty of suggesting to you to delay the destruction of the bridge, at least till they shall arrive; or, at all events, till I can have the pleasure of seeing you to-morrow morning.

“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, page 549.)

The duke of Wellington was obliged to continue his mediation with Blücher, to prevent the exasperated veteran from punishing the pockets and humbling the pride of the Parisians; and for this his generous and enlightened intervention the Duke did not receive the gratitude that was due to him, as must appear from the following letters:

_To Marshal Prince Blücher._

“PARIS, July 9th, 1815.

“The subjects on which lord Castlereagh and I conversed with your Highness and general comte Gneisenau this morning, viz. the destruction of the bridge of Jena and the levy of the contribution of one hundred millions of francs upon the city of Paris, appear to me to be so important to the allies in general, that I cannot allow myself to omit to draw your Highness’s attention to them again in this shape.

“The destruction of the bridge of Jena is highly disagreeable to the king and to the people, and may occasion disturbance in the city. It is not merely a military measure, but is one likely to attach to the character of our operations, and is of political importance. It is adopted solely because the bridge is considered a monument of the battle of Jena, notwithstanding that the government are willing to change the name of the bridge.

“Considering the bridge as a monument, I beg leave to observe that its immediate destruction is inconsistent with the promise made to the commissioners on the part of the French army, during the negotiation of the convention; viz. that the monuments, museums, etc., should be reserved for the decision of the allied sovereigns.

“All that I ask is, that the execution of the orders given for the destruction of the bridge may be suspended till the sovereigns shall arrive here, when, if it should be agreed by common accord that the bridge ought to be destroyed, I shall have no objection....

“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, p. 552-3.)

_To Monsieur_ ——.

“PARIS, July 13th, 1815.

“I have received your letter of the 10th. Perhaps if you had taken the trouble to inform yourself respecting the works of the Prussian army at the bridge of Jena, and the part I have acted in this affair, you would think that I do not merit the reproaches which you with your signature, and others anonymously, have made me on this subject.

“But I ascribe them to the levity with which impressions are received and are allowed to influence the actions of men, and the most important measures, in this country; and if the injustice you have done me in your letter lead you to inquire and reflect before you ever again bring a charge against a public man, I pardon you.

“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, p. 555-6.)

The pains which the Duke took to preserve the strictest discipline amongst the troops under his command, and which far surpassed the care taken by other commanders in similar circumstances, entitled him to the gratitude of the Parisians, but did not always exempt him from ill-timed and unreasonable demands. The following severe but just reply was provoked by general comte de Vaubois, who seems to have importuned the Duke for compensation for damages said to be done by the British troops to the French people:

_To General Comte de Vaubois._

“PARIS, November 10th, 1815.

“MONSIEUR,

“You, who have served, must be well aware that it is not possible to give compensation to the full amount for all the damages arising from the presence of an army in a country, or the irregularities of individual soldiers, or the inevitable consequences of military occupation. It is quite true that I usually require reparation to be made for damages caused to the inhabitants by any irregularities of the troops, especially of English troops. But it is more as a means of discipline than as a full compensation to the inhabitants; and I cannot adopt in every case the same means with foreign troops, who are not so well, nor so regularly paid.

“The fact is, _M. le général_, that France, in carrying her arms into other countries, caused misery, devastation and ruin: I myself have been eyewitness of the destruction of property throughout whole provinces, that refused to submit to the yoke of the tyrant, and that were in consequence entirely depopulated.

“Although private revenge ought never to be the motive of a man, and most assuredly it is not that of the allied sovereigns, we can hardly expect that soldiers, men taken from the poorest and most hardy ranks of society, after having seen their properties, or those of their relatives, burned, sacked, destroyed by the French, should have any very great respect for French property, when, by the fortune of war, they find themselves in France.

“It is our duty, it is the interest of all of us, more even, I think, than that it is the duty of the French government, to prevent those acts of devastation; and I believe that there is no one who has endeavoured to do this duty so much as I have. But, _M. le général_, you know what armies are; and I appeal to your judgment: is it possible entirely to prevent such occurences in such an army as is under my command; particularly when the soldier is excited by the remembrance of the evils which he and his relatives have had to endure at the hands of French troops?...

“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, p. 685-6.)

_To H.R.H. Prince Frederick of Orange._

“PARIS, November 10th, 1815.

“I send you a letter I have just received from general comte de Vaubois, concerning the damages done by the soldiers of the Netherlands.

“You will see that their officers were not present at their bivac ... and that the damage done by them amounts to 30,000 francs, a sum ten times greater perhaps than the general will have to pay, as his part of the contribution to the allies, in five years. It is clearly of great importance that the allies prevent these irregularities.

“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, page 686.)

Many have been pleased to say that the duke of Wellington both could and ought to have interposed to save marshal Ney from being ignominiously executed. Without entering into the question, whether Ney was a perjured traitor to Louis XVIII, and if so, what was the meetest punishment for his treason, it may be confidently averred that Napoleon would have spared no man under similar circumstances. The following documents are worthy of attention:

MEMORANDUM

RESPECTING MARSHAL NEY.

“PARIS, November 19th, 1815.

“It is extraordinary that Madame la maréchale Ney should have thought proper to publish in print parts of a conversation which she is supposed to have had with the duke of Wellington; and that she has omitted to publish that which is a much better record of the Duke’s opinion on the subject to which the conversation related; viz. the Duke’s letter to the maréchal prince de la Moskowa, in answer to the maréchal’s note to his Grace. That letter was as follows:

“November, 14th, 1815.

“I have had the honour of receiving the note which you addressed
to me on the 13th November, relating to the operation of the
capitulation of Paris on your case. The capitulation of Paris of
the 3d July was made between the commanders in chief of the allied
British and Prussian armies on the one part, and the prince
d’Eckmühl, commander in chief of the French army, on the other; and
related exclusively to the military occupation of Paris.

“The object of the 12th article was to prevent the adoption of any
measures of severity, under the military authority of those who
made it, towards any persons in Paris on account of the offices
which they had filled, or their conduct, or their political
opinions. But it was never intended, and could not be intended,
to prevent either the existing French government, under whose
authority the French commander in chief must have acted, or any
French government which should succeed to it, from acting in this
respect as it might deem fit.”

“It is obvious from this letter that the duke of Wellington, one of the parties to the capitulation of Paris, considers that that instrument contains nothing which can prevent the king from bringing marshal Ney to trial in such manner as his Majesty may think proper[103].

“The contents of the capitulation fully confirm the justice of the Duke’s opinion. It is made between the commanders in chief of the contending armies respectively; and the first nine articles relate solely to the mode and time of the evacuation of Paris by the French army, and of the occupation by the British and Prussian armies.

“The 10th article provides that the existing authorities shall be respected by the two commanders in chief of the allies; the 11th, that public property shall be respected, and that the allies shall not interfere _en aucune manière dans leur administration et dans leur gestion_; (in any manner, either in their administration or in their management;) and the 12th article states, _Seront pareillement respectées les personnes et les propriétés particulières: les habitants, et, en général, tous les individus qui se trouvent dans la capitale, continueront à jouir de leurs droits et libertés, sans pouvoir être inquiétés, ni recherchés en rien relativement aux fonctions qu’il occupent, ou auraient occupées, à leur conduite, et à leurs opinions politiques_. (The persons as well as the property of individuals, shall be equally respected; the inhabitants, and in general every individual residing in the capital, shall continue in full possession of their rights and liberties, without being molested in any manner, on account of the functions which they may have filled, their conduct, or their political opinions.)

“By whom were these private properties and persons to be respected? By the allied generals and their troops mentioned in the 10th and 11th articles; and not by other parties to whom the convention did not relate in any manner.

“The 13th article provides that _les troupes étrangères_, (the foreign troops) shall not obstruct the carriage of provisions by land or water to the capital.

“Thus it appears that every article in the convention relates exclusively to the operations of the different armies, or to the conduct of the allies and that of their generals, when they should enter Paris; and, as the duke of Wellington states in his dispatch of the 4th of July, with which he transmitted the convention to England, it ‘decided all the military points then existing at Paris, and touched nothing political[104].’

“But it appears clearly that, not only was this the Duke’s opinion of the convention at the time it was signed, but likewise the opinion of Carnot, of marshal Ney, and of every other person who had an interest in considering the subject.

“Carnot says, in the _Exposé de la conduite politique de M. Carnot_, (page 43,) _Il fut résolu d’envoyer aux généraux anglais et prussiens une commission spéciale chargée de leur proposer une convention purement militaire, pour la remise de la ville de Paris entre leurs mains, en écartant toute question politique, puisqu’on ne pouvait préjuger quelles seraient les intentions des alliés, lorsqu’ils seraient réunis_. (It was decided to forward to the English and Prussian generals a special commission, to the purport of proposing to them a convention, purely military, for the surrender of the city of Paris into their hands, setting aside all political questions, since it was impossible to foresee what might be the ultimate intentions of the allies, when they should be assembled.)

“It appears that marshal Ney fled from Paris in disguise, with a passport given to him by the duc d’Otrante, under a feigned name, on the 6th of July. He could not be supposed to be ignorant of the tenor of the 12th article of the convention; and he must then have known whether it was the intention of the parties who made it, that it should protect him from the measures which the king, then at St.-Denis, should think proper to adopt against him.

“But if marshal Ney could be supposed ignorant of the intention of the 12th article, the duc d’Otrante, could not, as he was at the head of the provisional government, under whose authority the prince d’Eckmühl must have acted when he signed the convention[105].

“Would the duc d’Otrante have given a passport under a feigned name to marshal Ney, if he had understood the 12th article as giving the marshal any protection, excepting against measures of severity by the two commanders in chief?

“Another proof of what was the opinion of the duc d’Otrante, of the king’s ministers, and of all the persons most interested is establishing the meaning now attempted to be given to the 12th article of the convention of the 3d July, is the king’s proclamation of the 24th July, by which nineteen persons are ordered for trial, and thirty-eight persons are ordered to quit Paris, and to reside in particular parts of France, under the observation and superintendence of the police, till the Chambers should decide upon their fate[106].

“Did the duc d’Otrante, did any of the persons who are the objects of this proclamation, did any person on their behalf, ever then, or now, claim for them the protection of the 12th article of the convention? Certainly the convention was then understood, as it ought to be understood now, viz. that it was exclusively military and was never intended to bind the then existing government of France, or any government which should succeed it.

“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, p. 694-6.)

EXTRACT FROM THE PROCLAMATION OF LOUIS XVIII.

“CAMBRAY, June 28th, 1815.

... “In the plot which they contrived, I perceive many of my subjects to have been misled, and some guilty. I promise—I who never promised in vain, as all Europe can witness,—to pardon to misled Frenchmen all that has transpired since the day I quitted Lille amidst so many tears, up to the day I re-entered Cambray, amidst so many acclamations. But the blood of my people has flowed in consequence of a treason unprecedented in the annals of the world. That treason has summoned foreigners into the heart of France; every day reveals to me a new disaster. I owe it, therefore, to the dignity of my crown, to the interest of my people, and to the repose of Europe, to except from pardon the instigators and authors of this horrible plot. They shall be delivered over to the vindication of the laws by the two Chambers, which I propose forthwith to assemble....

“LOUIS.”

_To ——[107], Esq._

“PARIS, August 8th, 1815.

“MY DEAR SIR,

“I have received your letter of the 2d, regarding the battle of Waterloo. The object which you propose to yourself is very difficult of attainment, and, if really attained, is not a little invidious. The history of a battle is not unlike the history of a ball. Some individuals may recollect all the little events, of which the great result is the battle won or lost; but no individual can recollect the order in which, or the exact moment at which they occurred, which makes all the difference as to their value or importance.

“Then the faults or the misbehaviour of some gave occasion for the distinction of others, and perhaps were the cause of material losses; and you cannot write a true history of a battle without including the faults and misbehaviour of part at least of those engaged.

“Believe me that every man you see in a military uniform is not a hero; and that, although in the account given of a general action, such as that of Waterloo, many instances of individual heroism must be passed over unrelated, it is better for the general interests to leave those parts of the story untold, than to tell the whole truth.

“If, however, you should still think it right to turn your attention to this subject, I am most ready to give you every assistance and information in my power.

“Believe me, etc.
“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, page 590.)

_To the same._

“PARIS, August 17th, 1815.

“MY DEAR SIR,

“I have received your letter of the 11th, and I regret much that I have not been able to prevail upon you to relinquish your plan.

“You may depend upon it, you will never make it a satisfactory work.

“I will get you the list of the French army, generals, etc.

“Just to show you how little reliance can be placed, even on what are supposed the best accounts of a battle, I mention that there are some circumstances mentioned in general Müffling’s account which did not occur as he relates them.

“He was not on the field during the whole battle, particularly not during the latter part of it.

“The battle began, I believe, at eleven.

“It is impossible so say when each important occurrence took place, nor in what order. We were attacked first with infantry only; then, with cavalry only; lastly, and principally, with cavalry and infantry mixed.

“No houses were possessed by the enemy in Mont-St.-Jean, excepting the farm in front of the left of our centre[108], on the road to Genappe, can be called one. This they got, I think, at about two o’clock, and got it from a circumstance which is to be attributed to the neglect of the officer commanding on the spot.

“The French cavalry were on the plateau in the centre between the two high-roads for nearly three quarters of an hour, riding about among our squares of infantry, all firing having ceased on both sides. I moved our squares forward to the guns; and our cavalry, which had been detached by lord Uxbridge to the flanks, was brought back to the centre. The French cavalry were then driven off. After that circumstance, repeated attacks were made along the whole front of the centre of the position, by cavalry and infantry, till seven at night. How many I cannot tell.

“When the enemy attacked sir Thomas Picton I was there, and they got as far as the hedge on the cross-road, behind which the —— had been formed. The latter had run away, and our troops were on our side of the hedge. The French were driven off with immense loss. This was the first principal attack. At about two in the afternoon, as I have above said, they got possession of the farm-house on the high-road, which defended this part of the position; and they then took possession of a small mound on the left of the high-road going from Brussels, immediately opposite the gate of the farm; and they were never removed from thence till I commenced the attack in the evening: but they never advanced farther on that side.

“These are answers to all your queries; but remember, I recommend to you to leave the battle of Waterloo as it is.

“Believe me, etc.
“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, p. 609-610.)

The fair inference is, that the Duke, on seeing the orchard and garden of La Haye-Sainte in possession of the enemy about two o’clock P.M., thought the farm was also in their hands, which certainly was not the case till about five o’clock.

The farm-house in question, La Haye-Sainte, was lost from a deficiency of _proper_ ammunition; its gallant defenders were riflemen. Who was to be blamed for that deficiency, it is difficult now to ascertain: the Duke, it appears, thought the officer commanding on the spot was censurable on this account. Let me be allowed to record my regret, that on this and many other occasions, valuable lives and important posts were often lost, owing to our having three different sizes for ball cartridges. If there were but one size, as I think there might be, for cavalry, infantry and rifles, the mutual supply of ammunition would be at all times practicable, and, in critical moments, of the utmost value.

_To His Royal Highness the Duke of York._

“ORVILLÉ, June 28th, 1815.

... “I would beg leave to suggest to your Royal Highness the expediency of giving to the non-commissioned officers and soldiers engaged in the battle of Waterloo, a medal[109]. I am convinced it would have the best effect in the army; and, if the battle should settle our concerns, they will well deserve it....

“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, page 520.)

_To Earl Bathurst._

“PARIS, September 17th, 1815.

“MY DEAR LORD,

“I have long intended to write to you about the medal for Waterloo. I recommend that the men should all have the same medal, hung on the same ribbon as that now used with the medals....

“WELLINGTON.”

No. III.

SUMMARY

OF THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF FIELD-MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,
WITH THE PUBLIC HONOURS AND EMOLUMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN CONFERRED
UPON HIM.

Born 1st May, 1769.
Ensign 7th March, 1787.
Lieutenant 25th December, 1787.
Captain 30th June, 1791.
Major 30th April, 1793.
Lieutenant-Colonel 30th September, 1793.
Colonel 3d May, 1796.
Major-General 29th April, 1802.
Lieutenant-General 25th April, 1808.
General, in Spain and Portugal 31st July, 1811.
Field-Marshal 21st June, 1813.

Governor of Seringapatam 6th May, 1799.
The inhabitants of Calcutta vote a
sword of the value of 1,000_l._ to
Major-General Wellesley 21st February, 1804.
The officers of his division vote to
Major-General Wellesley a gold
vase, which is afterwards changed
to a service of plate embossed with
“Assye.” 26th February, 1804.
Appointed a Knight Companion of
the Bath 1st September, 1804.
Thanked by parliament 8th March, 1805.
Returned to serve in parliament 12th April, 1806.
Sworn a Privy Counsellor 8th April, 1807.
Secretary to Ireland 19th April, 1807.
Negotiates capitulation at Copenhagen 5th September, 1807.
Thanked in parliament for the same. 1st February, 1808.
A piece of plate, commemorating the
battle of Vimeiro, voted to Lieutenant-General
Sir Arthur Wellesley
by the general and field-officers
who served at it 22d August, 1808.
Thanked in parliament for Vimeiro 27th January, 1809.
Appointed to command the army in
Portugal 2d April, 1809.
Appointed Marshal-General of the
Portuguese army 6th July, 1809.
Created Baron Douro of Wellesley
and Viscount Wellington of Talavera 26th August, 1809.
Thanks of parliament voted for Talavera 1st February, 1810.
Pension of 2,000_l._ per annum, voted
to him and his two succeeding
heirs male 16th February, 1810.
Thanks of parliament for the liberation
of Portugal 26th April, 1811.
License granted in the name of the
King by the Prince Regent, to
accept the title of Conde do Vimeiro,
and the insignia of Knight
Grand-Cross of the Tower and
Sword from the prince regent of
Portugal 26th October, 1811.
Created by the regency of Spain a
Grandé, with the title of Duque
de Ciudad-Rodrigo January, 1812.
Thanks of parliament for Ciudad-Rodrigo 10th February, 1812.
Advanced in the British peerage by
the title of Earl Wellington 18th February, 1812.
Voted 2,000_l._ per annum in addition 21st February, 1812.
Thanks of parliament for Badajoz 27th April, 1812.
The order of the Golden Fleece conferred
by the regency of Spain July, 1812.
Appointed Generalissimo of the
Spanish armies 12th August, 1812.
Advanced in the British peerage by
the title of Marquis of Wellington. 18th August, 1812.
Advanced by the regent of Portugal
to the title of Marquez de
Torres-Vedras 12th September, 1812.
Thanks of parliament for Salamanca. 3d December, 1812.
A grant of 100,000_l._ from parliament,
to be laid out in the purchase of
lands as a reward for his services. 7th December, 1812.
Advanced by the regent of Portugal
to the title of Duque da Victoria. 18th December, 1812.
Elected a Knight of the Garter 4th March, 1813.
Thanks of parliament for the battle
of Vittoria 8th July, 1813.
The regency of Spain, on the proposition
of the Cortes, offers to
bestow on the Duque de Ciudad-Rodrigo
the estate of Soto-de-Roma,
in Granada 22d July, 1813.
Thanks of parliament for San-Sebastian
and the operations subsequent
to Vittoria 8th October, 1813.
The prince Regent grants permission
to the Marquis of Wellington to
accept and wear the insignia of
Grand-Cross of the following orders:
Imperial and Royal Austrian
Military order of Maria-Theresa;
Imperial Russian Military order of
St.-George;
Royal Prussian Military order
of the Black Eagle;
Royal Swedish Military order
of the Sword 4th March, 1814.

Thanks of the Prince Regent and the
parliament for Orthez 24th March, 1814.
Advanced in the British peerage by
the titles of Marquis of Douro and
Duke of Wellington 3d May, 1814.
A grant of 400,000_l._ voted by parliament,
in addition to the former
grants 24th June, 1814.
Ambassador to France 5th July, 1814.
Assists at Congress at Vienna January, 1815.
Takes command of the British forces
on the continent 11th April, 1815.
Battle of Waterloo 18th June, 1815.
Thanks of the Prince Regent and
parliament for Waterloo 22d June, 1815.
A grant of 200,000_l._ voted by parliament,
in addition to the former
grants 6th July, 1815.
Created Prince of Waterloo by the
king of the Netherlands 18th July, 1815.
Commander in chief of the allied
armies of occupation 22d October, 1815.
Appointed Field-Marshal in the Austrian,
Russian and Prussian armies 15th November, 1818.
Visits Waterloo with George IV 1st October, 1821.
Commander in Chief 22d January, 1827.
First Lord of the Treasury 13th February, 1828.
Appointed Lord Warden of the
Cinque Ports 20th January, 1829.
Elected Chancellor of the University
of Oxford 29th January, 1834.

No. IV.

The reader should be aware, that in military returns, the figures which represent the strength of regiments often greatly exceed the actual number of effective men _present_. There are always numerous casualties, not accounted for in returns, particularly before a battle. The _missing_ are not all eventually _loss_; for, if not taken prisoners most of them join after the strife. The strength of the British was of course greater on the 16th, before the action at Quatre-Bras, where the loss was particularly severe, as may be seen in the subjoined tables, in the 1st foot-guards, 1st Royal Scots, 32d, 33d, 42d, 44th, 69th, 79th, and 92d regiments.

The officers who afterwards died of their wounds, are here returned _killed_.

RETURNS

_of the strength (officers, non-commissionned officers, drummers,
trumpeters, rank and file) of the British army, on the morning of
the 18th of June 1815; and of the total loss, in killed, wounded
and missing, on the three days: 16th, 17th, and 18th._

STAFF.

KILLED.—The duke of Brunswick, sir Thomas Picton, sir William Ponsonby. _Colonel_ sir William De Lancey. _Lieutenant-colonel_ Currie. _Captains_: W. Crofton (54th Reg.), T. Smith (93d Reg.).

WOUNDED.—H.R.H. the prince of Orange. _Lieutenant-general_ sir G. Cooke. _Major-generals_: Sir E. Barnes, sir James Kempt, sir Colin Halkett, sir Denis Pack, sir Colquhoun Grant, sir W. Dornberg, sir F. Adam. _Lieutenant-colonels_: Waters, sir G. Berkeley (35th Reg.). _Majors_: A. Hamilton, Hunter Blair, Hon. G. Dawson. _Captains_: Hon. E. S. Erskine, E. Fitzgerald (25th Reg.), W. Murray, H. Seymour, T. Wright, H. M^cLeod, J. Mitchell (25th Reg.), J. Tyler, A. Langton, H. Dumaresque. _Lieutenants_: W. Havelock (43d Reg.), J. Hamilton (46th Reg.), J. Rooke, D. Hall.

Officers who were killed or wounded, serving on the staff but belonging to regiments which were on the field, are here included in the returns of their respective regiments.

By adding together the figures in the first two columns opposite to any regiment, the reader may obtain its total effective strength, at the opening of the campaign.

(page 238)
+------------+--------+-----------+-------------------------------------+
| | |LOSS ON THE| |
| |STRENGTH|-----+-----| |
| REGIMENTS. | on the |16th | | OFFICERS KILLED. |
| | 18th. | and |18th.| |
| | |17th.| | |
+------------+--------+-----+-----+-------------------------------------+
| 1st Life- | 245 | 18 | 65 |_Lieutenant-colonel_ Ferrior. |
| Guards. | | | |_Captain_ Lind. |
+------------+--------+-----+-----+-------------------------------------+
| 2d Life- | 235 | ” | 155 |_Lieutenant-colonel_ Fitzgerald. |
| Guards. | | | | |
+------------+--------+-----+-----+-------------------------------------+
|Royal Horse-| | | | |
| Guards. | 246 | 8 | 98 |_Major_ R. Packe. |
| (Blues.) | | | | |
+------------+--------+-----+-----+-------------------------------------+
| | | | |_Lieutenant-colonel_ Fuller. |
| 1st Dragoon| 571 | ” | 246 |_Majors_: Graham, Bringhurst. |
| Guards. | | | |_Captain_ Battersby. _Lieutenant_: |
| | | | |Brooke. Schelver, _adjutant_. |
| | | | |_Cornet_ Hon. B. Bernard. |
+------------+--------+-----+-----+-------------------------------------+
| | | | |_Captains_: E. Windsor, C. Foster. |
| 1st Royal | 428 | ” | 196 |_Lieutenant_ R. Magniac. _Cornet_ |
| Dragoons. | | | | J. Sykes. Shepley, _adjutant_. |
+------------+--------+-----+-----+-------------------------------------+
| | | | |_Lieutenant-colonel_ J. Hamilton. |
| 2d Royal | | | |_Captain_ T. Reignolds. _Cornets_: |
| Dragoons. | 442 | ” | 199 |E. Westby, H. C. Kinchant, |
| (Scots | | | |L. Barnard, T. Trotter, L. Shuldham. |
| Greys.) | | | | |
+------------+--------+-----+-----+-------------------------------------+
| 6th (Innis-| | | | |
| killing) | 445 | ” | 217 |_Lieutenant_ P. Ruffe. |
| Dragoons. | | | |M^cCluskey, _adjutant_. |

(page 239)
+------------+--------+-----------+---------------------------------------+
| | |LOSS ON THE| |
| |STRENGTH|-----+-----| |
| REGIMENTS. | on the |16th | | OFFICERS WOUNDED. |
| | 18th. | and |18th.| |
| | |17th.| | |
+------------+--------+-----+-----+---------------------------------------+
| 1st Life- | 245 | 18 | 65 |_Captains_: J. Whale, E. Kelly, |
| Guards. | | | |S. Richardson, S. Cox. |
+------------+--------+-----+-----+---------------------------------------+
| 2d Life- | 235 | ” | 155 |_Lieutenant_ Waymouth. |
| Guards. | | | | |
+------------+--------+-----+-----+---------------------------------------+
|Royal Horse-| | | |_Lieutenant-colonels_: Sir J. Elley, |
| Guards. | 246 | 8 | 98 |sir R. C. Hill, C. Hill. _Lieutenants_:|
| (Blues.) | | | |C. Shawe, E. W. Bouverie. |
+------------+--------+-----+-----+---------------------------------------+
| | | | | |
| 1st Dragoon| 571 | ” | 246 |_Captains_: M. Turner, P. Sweny, |
| Guards. | | | |J. Naylor, _Lieutenant_ D. Irvine. |
+------------+--------+-----+-----+---------------------------------------+
| | | | |_Major_ C. Radclyffe. _Captain_ |
| 1st Royal | 428 | ” | 196 |A. Clark. _Lieutenants_: G. Gunning, |
| Dragoons. | | | |T. Keily, S. Trafford, C. Ommaney, |
| | | | |C. Blois, S. Goodenough, S. Wyndowe. |
+------------+--------+-----+-----+---------------------------------------+
| | | | |_Lieutenant-colonels_: J. B. Clarke, |
| 2d Royal | | | |T. P. Hankin. _Major_ R. Vernon. |
| Dragoons. | 442 | ” | 199 |_Captain_ J. Poole. _Lieutenants_: |
| (Scots | | | |J. Mills, F. Stupart, J. Carruthers, |
| Greys.) | | | |C. Wyndham. |
+------------+--------+-----+-----+---------------------------------------+
| 6th (Innis-| | | |_Lieutenant-colonels_: J. Muter, |
| killing) | 445 | ” | 217 |F. S. Miller, W. F. Browne. |
| Dragoons. | | | |_Captain_ Hon. S. Douglas. |
| | | | |_Lieutenant_ A. Hassard. |