Chapter IX

POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY IN REGARD TO SLAVERY.

We believe the Abolitionists are accustomed to find one apology for the movement in which they are engaged, in the assumption, that all the Members of the American Union are responsible for the existence of slavery therein, if not equally, yet in part; and being conscientiously opposed to slavery, their conscience obliges them to act in obedience to its dictates. They cannot, therefore, choose to abstain from this enterprise, if they would. We propose here to consider this question, as it cannot be denied, if the assumption be founded in truth and justice, that there is some weight in the statement. It is obviously proper to begin at the _beginning_, and enquire where the responsibility rests for introducing slavery into this country.

We say, therefore, that it was imposed upon this country against the avowed wishes, and resolute remonstrances of the ancestors of those, who now have charge of the evil that was thus entailed; and that resistance to the imposition came to the brink of a rebellion--nay, was a cause of rebellion.

“So early as 1502, the Spaniards begun to employ a few negroes in the mines of Hispaniola; and in the year 1517, the Emperor, Charles V., granted a patent to certain persons for the exclusive supply of 4000 negroes annually, to the islands of Hispaniola, Jamaica, Cuba, and Puerto Rico.”[3] John Hawkins, an Englishman, received the honors of knighthood, and was made Treasurer of the Navy, by Queen Elizabeth, for his achievements in the slave trade. Elizabeth, James I., Charles I., and II., were all in the habit of chartering companies to carry it on. Charles II., his brother, the Duke of York, noblemen, gentry, and _ladies_ of high rank and quality, were subscribers to these companies; and England, Europe, revolted not at the deed! The public conscience of the world seemed to tolerate it! When the slave trade first commenced, from Great Britain, under Elizabeth, the American Colonies did not exist. The succeeding princes patronized the traffic, and introduced slavery into their American provinces. “In 1760, South Carolina, a British Colony, passed an act to prohibit further importation; but Great Britain rejected this act with indignation, and declared that the slave trade was beneficial and necessary to the mother country. The Governors of the Colonies had _positive orders_ to sanction no law enacted against the slave trade. In Jamaica, in the year 1765, an attempt was made to abolish the trade to that island. The Governor declared, that his instructions would never allow him to sign the Bill. It was tried again in 1774, but Great Britain, by the Earl of Dartmouth, President of the Board, answered: _We cannot allow the Colonies to check or discourage, in any degree, a traffic so beneficial to the nations._”[4]

[Footnote 3: Bryant Edward’s West Indies.]

[Footnote 4: Professor Dew’s Review of the Debate in the Virginia legislature, of 1831-’32.]

The history of legislation, in the Colony of Virginia, records _twenty-three_ Acts, imposing duties on the importation of slaves, with the avowed design of suppressing the trade. “In 1772, most of the duties, previously imposed, were re-enacted, and the Assembly transmitted, at the same time, a petition to the Throne, of which the following are extracts:--

“‘We are encouraged to look up to the Throne, and _implore_ your Majesty’s paternal assistance, in averting a calamity of a most alarming nature.... The importation of slaves into the Colonies from the coast of Africa, hath long been considered a trade of _great inhumanity_, and under its present encouragement, we have too much reason to fear, will endanger the very existence of your Majesty’s American dominions. Deeply impressed with these sentiments, we most _humbly beseech_ your Majesty _to remove all those restraints_ on your Majesty’s Governors of this Colony, which prohibit such laws as might check so very pernicious a commerce.’

“The _first_ Assembly which met in Virginia, after the adoption of her Constitution, prohibited the traffic; and ‘_the inhuman use of the royal prerogative_’ against the action of the Colony upon this subject, is enumerated in the _first_ clause of the first Virginia Constitution, _as a reason of the separation from the mother country_.”[5]

[Footnote 5: Professor Dew.]

Such was the _common_ feeling of the Southern Colonies, though more decidedly manifested in Virginia. They never invited, they never tempted the slave trade, except by a silent acquiescence for a season, in what was imposed upon them by the cupidity of foreigners, and the mandates of authority, before the public conscience of mankind had begun to remonstrate; and the moment they opened their eyes to its domestic results among themselves, they set their faces, and employed all their lawful powers, against it.

“Federal America interdicted the slave trade from her ports _thirteen_ years before Great Britain; she made it punishable as a crime _seven_ years before, she fixed _four_ years sooner the period of non-importation--which period was earlier than that determined upon by Great Britain for her Colonies.”[6]

[Footnote 6: Walsh’s Appeal.]

For the introduction of Slavery into America, therefore, the Americans themselves are acquit of all political responsibility. All that can be said is, that individuals purchased slaves that were brought and offered, when the public conscience of the world tolerated the traffic; but it was under the authority, and by the imposition, of a parent Government, in another Continent, that slavery was reared into a domestic and political institution, the process all the while having been solemnly protested against by those whose voice had a claim to be heard, and who were most intimately concerned, until it grew into a magnitude and importance, too formidable to be dealt with by a violent hand of excision and extirpation--sufficiently formidable, indeed, to demand the utmost wisdom and prudence of man for its treatment and ultimate disposal.

Thus, having fairly wiped from the American escutcheon the political responsibility of introducing slavery in this Continent, and among ourselves, it remains to be considered, how far the present generation of slaveholding Americans are responsible for this state of things. The sum of the matter lies in one short sentence: _They were born into the world the heirs of this condition._ In no manner or degree are they responsible for it, any farther than they maintain it, and _as_ they maintain it. We suppose the Abolitionists themselves would not differ widely from us here, except as, peradventure, some of them may take their stand on the theological proposition--“In Adam’s fall we sinned all.” If, however, it may be assumed, that all agree on this point, it is the simple and the great question at issue. The slave States say, that is _their_ business; and the Abolitionists say, it is _ours_. This is the _contest_--the question _to be tried_.

And one of the apologies of the Abolitionists, for interference in this concern, is, that the whole nation is involved in the responsibility. Let us see, whether this be true. It must be admitted, that it requires some study to comprehend the nature of our political fabric, as a nation, with the relations of its parts to each other, and to the Unity; but still, like a mathematical problem, though obscure and misty to the intellect, before it is laid down and demonstrated step by step, it is afterwards no less clear and satisfactory. It happens, that this task has already been done in a former chapter, and requires only to be restated here. The great principle, and its whole scope, are laid down before the eye, in the tenth Article of the Federal Constitution.[7] By this rule, the respective States are declared possessed, by original right, of all independent and sovereign powers, not “delegated or prohibited” by the Federal Constitution. In these limited attributes of sovereignty, therefore, they are placed precisely on the footing of all other independent States and Nations; and as the institution of slavery, and all legislation over it, is one of these “reserved” powers, it follows, that all its responsibility devolves on those States, in which it exists, and is maintained. It is impossible it should extend any farther, from the nature of the compact. It is a simple proposition, and may be understood by any body, by a child, that I cannot be responsible for that which the laws of society forbid me to meddle with; and this is precisely the proposition which sets forth and limits the responsibility of slavery in the United States. The Union was formed on these conditions, and in an exigency under which the parties were forced to combine for common good, with mutual concessions thus specified, in the same manner as a society of any individual persons is formed by mutual compact and mutual concession, and the responsibility of every member is limited by the line thus marked out. As he is not permitted to trespass on the rights secured to others, he cannot be held responsible for any thing that would demand such a trespass. If the rights thus secured are invaded, or violated, the administration of justice does not devolve on individual members of the community, or on any combination not provided for by law, but on the constituted and public authorities. Even though there be manifest injustice for which the law does not provide a remedy, or injustice sanctioned by law, the same principle applies, and the evil can be redressed only by a constitutional legislation.

[Footnote 7: Page 52.]

But, it is said, the principle of slavery is incorporated and sanctioned in the Federal Constitution; and we are all at least so far responsible. This, surely, will not be urged by Abolitionists, who have formally and publicly declared, by their own mode of legislation, as shown in the previous chapter, that this principle has ceased to exist, and is no longer binding. But suppose it does exist. It neither declares, nor sanctions, the _right_ of slavery _as such_: but simply interposes the authority of a principle, which applies equally to all the States, to enable them to maintain and secure their domestic institutions, as established by their sovereign will--a principle, which may accidentally operate more in favour of one State, than of another, but which is equally important to all, and is habitually employed by all. The Government of the United States, therefore, is not responsible in this matter, politically considered; and therefore not responsible at all, as it exists only as a political institution. All these public relations are political, and can involve no other responsibility than that which is prescribed by the laws of the social state, as it exists. The relation of the master to the slave involves a responsibility which applies to private conscience, and the master must answer for it. So also the relation of the master to that political commonwealth which maintains slavery; and he must answer for that, to the extent of his political influence and relations. And so with every member of such a commonwealth; but farther than this, he cannot be held to account. This, we think, is the legitimate domain of conscience, and the limit of responsibility, in regard to this subject.

But, it will yet be said, that the Government of the United States is the public guardian of slavery, by the force and habitual application of the fourth article of the Federal Constitution; and therefore, all the citizens of the Republic are involved in this responsibility, and consequently have a right to concern themselves about it. Notwithstanding, it cannot be denied, that the Federal compact bars this claim; and the Christian’s conscience might find its salvo in the Scripture which saith--“He shall abide in the Tabernacle and holy hill of the Lord, who sweareth to his own hurt, and changeth not.” In the day of trial, our fathers swore to this compact, and bound their children in the covenant, if we accept the inheritance; if not, then we have no voice in the matter. But, we think, the political pledge of the general Government to maintain the domestic institutions of the several States, in case of need, so far as they do not interfere with the prerogatives “delegated,” or those “prohibited,” does not involve a responsibility for the _character_ of those institutions--not at all.

The _Union_ is admitted to have been indispensible to our National Independence, and the slave States came into it on the condition, that the institution of slavery should not be disturbed, and that it should be maintained in the way the Federal Constitution prescribes. Whether slavery was right or wrong in itself, or how long it should be maintained, were questions never submitted; but were left among the “reserved” rights. The Union never had any responsibility in the existence of slavery; it never assumed any; it has never had any whatever; it has only covenanted to protect the sovereign rights of the slave States, as it has the sovereign rights of all other States, leaving to them the sovereign control over their own domestic institutions, without assuming any one item of responsibility in regard to their character. The principle which forbids the interference of the Union, absolves it from responsibility.

But still the Abolitionist holds his ground, as a religionist, and declares, that he is bound to have a care for all his fellow creatures, and to help them, wherever he sees them laboring under any evils, physical or moral, or any wrongs social or political. So far as his benevolence extends to those who suffer under social and political wrongs, if they happen to be beyond the limits of his own Commonwealth, we can only give him a piece of advice, which he may use or not, at his own discretion, viz. that, till the world gets to be in a more favorable state for the range of his sympathies, as a religionist claiming to carry his religion into politics by force, he had better be content with the wisdom of Moses, who, as it would seem, saw fit, not only to tolerate, but to _legalize_, slavery--for whatever may be said of _different forms_, it cannot be denied that the _principle_ was there. Or, with the wisdom of the Apostle Paul, who, instead of interfering with the political fabrics of his time, in regard to this as well as other matters, sent back Onesimus, a runaway slave, thereby recognizing the legal claim of his master, Philemon, with such messages as these: “If he hath wronged thee, or oweth thee ought, put that to my account.... Whom I would have _retained_ ... but _without thy mind_ would I do nothing.... Though I might be much bold in Christ to _enjoin_ thee that which is convenient, yet for love’s sake I rather _beseech_ thee.” Or, with the wisdom of the Apostle Peter, who said: “Servants, be subject to your Masters with all fear--not only to the _good_ and _gentle_, but to the _froward_. And what glory is it, if, when ye shall be buffetted for your faults, ye take it patiently; but if, when ye do well, and suffer for it, ye take it patiently, this is acceptable to God.” It is also written by “such an one as Paul, the aged: Let as many servants as are _under the yoke_, count their own Masters worthy of all honor, that the name of God and his doctrines be not blasphemed, &c. _These things_,” saith he to Timothy, “_teach_ and _exhort_.” For, we think, the Abolitionist would be much better employed in imitating these illustrious examples, than by inculcating sedition, and stirring up insurrection. Or, if this should not suit his taste, then we would advise him by all means, to let the politics of foreign States alone, as it is a delicate and dangerous business, not as yet tolerated by the actual state of society. If he thinks so, he may rely upon it, he has made a mistake.

If, however, he insists on being thus occupied, and since his labors are not well received in the slave holding States of America, and seem likely to do more hurt than good, we would advise him to “shake off the dust off his feet against them,” and turn to another field, and still _more_ remote, as he likes distant objects. If he would do the greatest amount of good, and since he is resolved to have a _foreign_ field, let him try where the evil exists in more aggravated forms. For there is actually less slavery in the United States, in proportion to the population, and the whole of it in a milder form, than in any other part of the world, civilized or uncivilized. For what is the _name_ of a thing, apart from its essential attributes? Slavery, fairly defined, is the unequal and unjust depression of man in relation to his fellow man, as the result of an artificial state of society, which has been erected, and is maintained for the advantage of the few, and to the disadvantage of the many. The degree of depression, and the amount of _oppression_, are accidental. Both are greater in any other part of the world that can be named, beyond the bounds of the United States, than in the slave States of the South--if, perhaps, we except the North American British Provinces--now being invaded on Abolition principles.

If the Abolitionists are resolved to interfere with the domestic condition of other States for the relief of the oppressed, and cannot otherwise satisfy their consciences, let them go to England, to Ireland, and to the British manufactories. We assure them, they will find work enough there, and enough of slavery too, as that particular form of evil is especially to their taste. Let them go to the Continent of Europe, and they will find enough of it any where in that field--more especially in Italy, in Spain and Portugal, in Hungary, in Poland, and above all, in Russia. Let them go to the tribes and nations that border on the shores of the Mediterranean; let them penetrate into Northern, Southern, and Eastern Asia; it is all a ripe field for their sickle, or if they like it better, for their sword--for it will no doubt soon come to that. Let them go to Africa--which their sympathies would naturally lead them to first--and there, independent of the temptations and effects of the slave traffic, as all travellers inform us, they will find slavery in such amount, and in forms of such horrid and murderous cruelty, as to show the fields of its abode in the Southern States a paradise in comparison. There they will see, that it is better to be a slave in America, than a free man in Africa, without justifying slavery; and that the best conditions of African barbarism could never be envied by the worst of American slavery, if both were equally well known to the parties, having their option between the two. There they might learn, that God, in his high and inscrutable providence, can bring good out of evil, and that, by the lights of American civilization, and the blessings of American Christianity, thrown out upon Africa from these shores, that long suffering, abused, and “pealed” race, may yet hope to receive some indemnification for their bleeding wrongs.

But do the Abolitionists reply, “that if we enter on the fields of Europe, or of any other countries, for political action, by any efficient force, to rescue the oppressed, we shall lose our heads.” That, indeed, may be a wise thought. Or, “if we attempt it by secret operations, and by emissions of the press, clandestinely introduced, we shall embroil our country in a foreign war.” There is little doubt of that. Or, “if we organize a political machinery at home, industriously occupying years of preparation for descent, waiting for an opportunity, and it is known that our force is likely to tell with effect, when the time of aggressive action shall arrive, it will produce the same result, unless our own Government shall interpose, and suppress our movement.” This, too, is doubtless a fair conclusion. But, let it be remembered, that a foreign war is infinitely less to be dreaded, than a domestic and civil one; and that it is no less certain, if the Abolition movement is not suppressed, we must have the last. The cases are parallel: as a foreign Nation could not endure such interference, neither can the slave States of the South. There is as valid and justifiable a right of interference in one case, as in the other, and an equal provocation for resort to arms, if the General Government should not interpose its authority, and arrest the movement.