Chapter VII: Part 7

When the manuscript was finished it was intrusted to Mr. William H. Bailhache, editor of the _Illinois State Journal_, who put it in type himself, assisted by a veteran compositor, also an old friend of Lincoln. After taking a dozen proof-slips, the type was distributed. Judge David Davis and one or two other friends read it in Springfield. Orville H. Browning read it on the journey to Washington, and upon the morning of his arrival at the capital, a copy was handed to Mr. Seward, who spent an entire Sunday revising it. His amendments and suggestions were almost as voluminous as the original document. Lincoln adopted either in whole or in part nearly all of them, except where they affected the style or changed the policy indicated. The most important changes made were to modify the declaration of his intentions to recover and hold the fortifications and property which had been seized by the secessionists and to speak of the exercise of power in that direction with some ambiguity and a hint at forbearance.

During all his life at the White House Lincoln took an active part in political affairs. He never forgot that he was the President of the whole country; but at the same time he considered it necessary to its salvation to establish the Republican party upon a firm and permanent basis, and for that purpose a more complete and thorough organization was necessary. He knew the value of an organization of trained politicians and of political discipline as well as any man in public life. He was thoroughly a practical politician and as skilful in execution as he was in planning. He knew how to manipulate men and direct movements as well as Thurlow Weed, and no man in the Cabinet or in either House of Congress was more adroit in accomplishing his purposes. He never failed to carry through Congress any measure that he considered important; he never failed to obtain the confirmation of a nominee. He used the patronage of his office to strengthen the Republican party because he believed it essential to the salvation of his country. He possessed a political tact so subtle and masterful that it enabled him to reconcile rivalries and enemies, to unite conflicting purposes, and to bring to his support men of implacable hostility, who never realized his purpose until his object was accomplished, and then it was such as they almost invariably approved. He was candid when candor was necessary, he was mysterious when he believed it wise to excite curiosity, and he was determined and often arbitrary with men whom he thought would be most impressed that way. His greatest quality, the most valuable talent he possessed, was his ability to fathom the human heart, to understand its weakness and its strength, so that he could measure the influence that must be exerted and the methods by which it could be induced to assist him in his direction of affairs.

His lowly birth and early experience were of great advantage to him in understanding human nature, and he looked to the great masses of "the plain people" as well as to the Almighty for guidance, and had full faith in their honesty and capacity. Before he acted upon any important question he felt the public pulse, and when he thought the people were ready he acted, and not before. While he was a great leader, a shrewd and deep manipulator of public opinion, he often said, in his quaint way, that it was possible to fool a part of the people all the time, and all of the people part of the time; but no man could fool all the people all the time. With his great common sense, he endeavored to discover what was in the public mind and how the public conscience would regard certain measures proposed, and waited for it to point out his path of duty. The atmosphere of Washington never affected him; he was self-contained and indifferent to social and other influences that usually exercise much force upon public men.

His sympathies were tender, and his desire to contribute to the happiness of every one made it difficult for him to say "No;" but this, his greatest weakness, was never shown in the direction of the military or political policy of the government. On the contrary, the man who would violate the laws of war and imperil the discipline of an army by pardoning a deserter or commuting the sentence of some poor wretch who was sentenced to be shot would not permit delegations of United States Senators to move him one atom from what he deemed best to be done. He carried this principle into his appointments to office also. During the Presidential canvass of 1864, when a quarrel between the Weed and Fenton factions of the Republican party endangered the ticket in New York, Lincoln sent for the Senator. What occurred we do not know; but Mr. Fenton started immediately for New York with Mr. Nicolay, and the latter returned to Washington with the resignation of Rufus F. Andrews, a friend of Mr. Fenton, who had been surveyor of the port, and Abram Wakeman, Mr. Weed's choice for the office, was appointed at once. From that time forward Mr. Weed was earnest in his support of the Republican ticket. Senator Fenton, in his reminiscences, says, "The small majority in New York in November, less than 7000 for the Republican ticket, served to illustrate Mr. Lincoln's political sagacity and tact. He was always a politician as well as a statesman, and but for his intervention at that time the electoral vote of New York might have been cast for the Democratic candidate, and no one dare measure the effect of such an event upon the war."

President Lincoln never hesitated to use the patronage of the government for political purposes. He held that the government of the United States is a political organization, and that the political opinions of those intrusted with its administration in those critical days were of as much consequence as their integrity or intelligence. As a consequence, he made his appointments first from among those whom he believed would give him the most efficient support in his efforts to save the Union, and second to those who believed in the principles and the measures of the party with which he was identified. He would have rejected with scorn the demands of the civil service reformers of the present day. Public opinion was not then educated up to the existing standard of political morality. At the same time, his keen sense of justice required him to recognize and reward merit and efficiency even among his political opponents.

He had a sly way of stating his intentions, and he often expressed great truths in an odd way. Soon after his arrival in Washington the Massachusetts delegation in the Peace Congress called upon him to recommend Salmon P. Chase for Secretary of the Treasury. Lincoln heard them respectfully, and then, with a twinkle in his eye, remarked,--

"Gentlemen, of course, you would not expect me to tell you who is going to be in the Cabinet; but, from what I hear, I think Mr. Chase's chances are about one hundred and fifty for any other man's hundred for that place."

One day, at Cabinet meeting, Mr. Chase was reproaching himself for failing to write a letter that he had intended to send that day, when Lincoln observed,--

"Never be sorry for what you don't write; it is the things you do write that you are usually sorry for."

The President enforced political discipline among the subordinates of the government. Representative George W. Julian, of Indiana, relates this incident:

"After my nomination for re-election in the year 1864, Mr. Holloway, who was holding the position of Commissioner of Patents, and was one of the editors of a Republican newspaper in my district, refused to recognize me as the party candidate, and kept the name of my defeated competitor standing in his paper. It threatened discord and mischief, and I went to the President with these facts, and on the strength of them asked for Mr. Holloway's removal from office.

"'Your nomination,' said Mr. Lincoln, 'is as binding on Republicans as mine, and you can rest assured that Mr. Holloway shall support you, openly and unconditionally, or lose his head.'

"This was entirely satisfactory; but after waiting a week or two for the announcement of my name, I returned to the President with the information that Mr. Holloway was still keeping up his fight, and that I had come to ask of him decisive measures. I saw in an instant that his ire was roused. He rang the bell for his messenger, and said to him in a very excited and emphatic way,--

"'Tell Mr. Holloway to come to me!'

"The messenger hesitated, looking somewhat surprised and bewildered, when Mr. Lincoln said in a tone still more emphatic,--

"'_Tell Mr. Holloway to come to me!_'

"It was perfectly evident that the business would now be attended to, and in a few days my name was duly announced and the work of party insubordination ceased."

The late Chief-Justice Cartter, of the District of Columbia, once called upon Lincoln with a party of politicians to secure the appointment of a gentleman who was opposed by the Senators from his State. Lincoln suggested that they ought to get the Senators on their side. They replied that, owing to local complications, such a thing was impossible. Lincoln retorted that nothing was impossible in politics; that the peculiarities of the Senator referred to were well known, and that by the use of a little tact and diplomacy he might be brought around, in which case there would be no doubt about the appointment. To clinch his argument Lincoln told a story of James Quarles, a distinguished lawyer of Tennessee. Quarles, he said, was trying a case, and after producing his evidence rested; whereupon the defence produced a witness who swore Quarles completely out of court, and a verdict was rendered accordingly. After the trial one of his friends came to him and said,--

"Why didn't you get that feller to swar on your side?"

"I didn't know anything about him," replied Quarles. "I might have told you about him," said the friend, "for he would swar for you jest as hard as he'd swar for the other side. That's his business. Judge, that feller takes in swarrin' for a living."

Representative John B. Alley, of Massachusetts, who was himself famous as a politician, said, "Mr. Lincoln was a thorough and most adroit politician as well as statesman, and in politics always adopted the means to the end, fully believing that in vital issues 'success was a duty.' In illustration of this feeling and sentiment, I need only refer to his action and conduct in procuring the passage of the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery. It required a two-thirds vote of Congress to enable the amendments to the Constitution to be sent to the Legislatures for ratification, and there were two votes lacking to make two-thirds, which Lincoln said 'must be procured.' Two members of the House were sent for and Lincoln said that those two votes must be procured. When asked 'How?' he remarked,--

"'I am President of the United States, clothed with great power. The abolition of slavery by constitutional provision settles the fate, for all coming time, not only of the millions now in bondage, but of unborn millions to come--a measure of such importance that _those two votes must be procured_. I leave it to you to determine how it shall be done; but remember that I am President of the United States, clothed with immense power, and I expect you to procure those votes.'"

These gentlemen understood the significance of the remark. The votes were procured, the constitutional amendment was passed, and slavery was abolished forever.

"Senator Sumner and myself," continued Mr. Alley, "called upon him one morning to urge the appointment of a Massachusetts man to be a secretary of legation, chiefly upon the ground of his superior qualifications. But Mr. Lincoln said, emphatically, 'No;' that he should give the place to an applicant from another State who was backed by strong influence, although he acknowledged that he did not think him fit for the position.

"We were naturally indignant, and wished to know if one of acknowledged fitness was to be rejected because he was a Massachusetts man, and one whom he was willing to say was not fit was to be appointed. 'Yes,' said the President, 'that is just the reason,' and facetiously added, 'I suppose you two Massachusetts gentlemen think that your State could furnish suitable men for every diplomatic and consulate station the government has to fill.' We replied that we thought it could. He appeased our displeasure by saying he thought so too, and that he considered Massachusetts the banner State of the Union, and admired its institutions and people so much that he sent his 'Bob,' meaning his son Robert, to Harvard for an education."

The Presidential campaign of 1864 was fought on one issue only, and that was the success of the war, although Lincoln, in his annual message to Congress in the December following, declared that "No candidate for any office whatever, high or low, has ventured to seek votes on the avowal that he was for giving up the Union." Nevertheless, the Democrats nominated McClellan and attempted to discredit the patriotism and the ability of Lincoln. Similar attempts were made in his own party by the radical antislavery element and the friends of Secretary Chase and numerous disappointed contractors and politicians, but they made hardly a ripple upon the great current of public opinion which swept on irresistible to the Convention. Lincoln did nothing to promote his candidacy, but made no secret of his desire for a re-election, and himself suggested the most effective argument in his own support when he recalled the homely proverb of his youth that "It is bad policy to swap horses while crossing a stream." He placed no obstacles in the way of Mr. Chase, and when warned that General Grant might aspire to the Presidency, replied, "If he takes Richmond, let him have it." He admonished the officials of the administration against too much activity and rebuked them for opposing his enemies. He made no speeches of importance during the campaign, but on several occasions addressed delegations which visited Washington, appeared at sanitary fairs for the benefit of sick soldiers, responded to serenades, and whenever custom or courtesy required him to appear in public he did so without reference to political results.

In August, 1864, the political horizon was very dark, and the President himself, who was always the most hopeful and confident of men, almost entirely lost heart. Having convinced himself that the campaign was going against him, he deliberately laid down a line of duty for himself, and at the Cabinet meeting on August 23 he requested each one of his ministers to write their names upon a folded sheet of paper in such a way that the seal could not be broken without mutilating their autographs. He made no explanation of its contents or of his reason for desiring them to attest it, but after the election it was disclosed that the mysterious paper contained a pledge from himself and his administration loyally to accept any verdict which the people of the country might pronounce upon their efforts to save the Union, and to continue their labors with zealous loyalty until relieved by their successors. The pledge closed as follows:

"This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this administration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to so co-operate with the President-elect as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration, as he will have secured the election on such ground that he cannot possibly save it afterwards."

V

A PRESIDENT AND HIS CABINET

Lincoln tells us that before he left the telegraph office at Springfield on the night of the election in November, 1860, he had practically selected his Cabinet. The superintendent of the telegraph company gave him a room from which all other visitors were excluded, and, with no company but two operators, he read the reports as they came in. Between times he had plenty of opportunity for meditation, and, always confident, the returns soon convinced him of his election and his mind naturally turned upon the next important act for him to perform. "When I finally left that room," he said afterwards, "I had substantially completed the framework of my Cabinet as it now exists."

To begin with, he decided to offer posts of honor to those who had been his rivals for the Presidential nomination,--Seward, Chase, Cameron, and Bates,--and to fill the remaining places with representatives of the various elements that had combined to form the Republican party. It was to be a composite Cabinet, purely political, including no intimate friends, no personal adherents, and in the entire list there was not one with whom he ever had confidential relations. His plan seems to have been to combine, as one of his secretaries said, the experience of Seward, the integrity of Chase, the popularity of Cameron, and to hold the West with Bates, attract New England with Welles, please the Whigs through Smith, and convince the Democrats through Blair. Lincoln always had a great respect for names. No one had studied more closely the careers of American politicians, although his personal acquaintances outside of his own State were limited, and he was more familiar with the personal qualifications and political records of the gentlemen he had chosen than were they with his. Perhaps he overestimated their ability and the value of their advice, as he was likely to do because of his own modesty and inexperience. He saw distinctly the impending crisis, and felt the need of support from leaders of experience, ability, and influence, as well as popular sympathy. But at the same time the combination he selected had in it all the seeds of disaster because of personal jealousy, previous political rivalry, and the intrigues of their henchmen. Yet by his great tact, patience, and strength of purpose he made them instruments of his will. As finally chosen, his Cabinet represented every faction of the new Republican party and the ablest representative of each division as evenly as an odd number could. When reminded that he had selected four Democrats and only three Whigs, he promptly replied that he was himself a Whig, and hoped that he should often be at Cabinet meetings to make the parties even. This was a famous jest during the early part of the administration.

Although he had decided in his own mind upon five of seven of his future advisers before the votes that elected him were counted, he treated with patience and courtesy the crowds of politicians that came from different parts of the country to advise and persuade him in the interest of their friends. He listened attentively to all that his visitors had to say and gave their suggestions careful reflection. He said to Thurlow Weed that he supposed the latter had some experience in cabinet-making, and, as he had never learned that trade himself, he was disposed to avail himself of the suggestions of friends. The making of a Cabinet, he added, was by no means as easy as he had supposed, partly, he believed, because, while the population had increased, great men were scarcer than they used to be.

He was extremely anxious to get two Southerners for the Cabinet, as he believed that such an act might go far to reconcile the loyal people of that section to his election and establish him in their confidence, but from the beginning he saw that his hopes were not to be realized. In order to draw out public sentiment, he wrote a brief anonymous editorial for the _Illinois State Journal_ on the subject, in which he asked whether it was known that any Southern gentlemen of character would accept such an appointment, and, if so, on what terms would they surrender their political differences to Mr. Lincoln or Mr. Lincoln to them.

"There are men in Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee," said Thurlow Weed, "for whose loyalty under any circumstances and in any event I would vouch."

"Let's have the names of your white blackbirds," replied Lincoln, and Weed gave him four, Mr. Seward suggested several, and Mr. Greeley suggested five. Of all the gentlemen named, Lincoln preferred John A. Gilmer, of North Carolina, with whom he had served in Congress, and who had been a prominent leader of the Whig party in that State. He invited Gilmer to Springfield, but the latter would not come, and after canvassing the various suggestions which were made him, he found that he must limit his choice to the border States, and selected Edward Bates, of Missouri, and Montgomery Blair, of Maryland.

Mr. Bates was an able lawyer and a highly respected and popular antislavery Whig from a slave State. He had been a candidate for the Presidential nomination at Chicago, and had received 48 votes out of 465 cast by delegates from Delaware, Maryland, Missouri, Texas, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. Early in December he sent word to Mr. Bates that he would be in St. Louis the next day to consult him about matters of importance; but Mr. Bates would not permit him to make the journey, and started at once for Springfield. They had been acquainted for several years and were very good friends, and after cordial greetings, Lincoln explained that he would like to have Mr. Bates accept the post of Attorney-General in his Cabinet, for which the latter was in every way qualified, and which he would find congenial. Mr. Bates accepted, and the next day the announcement was given to the newspapers for the purpose of quieting the demands of the conservative Republicans and antislavery Whigs in the border States for recognition.

A few days later he offered a Cabinet position to Caleb B. Smith, of Indiana, without assigning him to any particular portfolio. This was done to relieve him from the pressure that was being brought by Schuyler Colfax, whose friends were exceedingly persistent. Mr. Colfax was very much disappointed, and attributed his failure to obtain the appointment to Lincoln's resentment towards him because he had favored the re-election of Douglas to the United States Senate in 1858. Lincoln was not aware of this supposition until after he had entered upon his duties as President, when he showed his candor and good-nature by writing a friendly letter to Mr. Colfax explaining that "a tender of the appointment was not withheld in any part because of anything that happened in 1858. Indeed, I should have decided as I did, easier than I did, had that matter never existed. I had partly made up my mind in favor of Mr. Smith--not conclusively, of course--before your name was mentioned in that connection. When you were brought forward I said, 'Colfax is a young man already in a position, is running a brilliant career, and is sure of a bright future in any event. With Smith it is now or never.' I now have to beg that you will not do me the injustice to suppose for a moment that I remember anything against you in malice."

Mr. Smith did not remain in the Cabinet a great while, however. The duties of Secretary of the Interior were arduous and uncongenial, and he retired in December, 1862, at his own request, to accept an appointment to the United States District bench. He was succeeded by John P. Usher, also of Indiana, who continued in office until after the inauguration of Johnson, although he tendered his resignation early in 1865 to relieve President Lincoln from the criticism of having two members of his Cabinet from Indiana, Hugh McCulloch having been appointed Secretary of the Treasury. The President was reluctant to let Mr. Usher go, but accepted his resignation, and, for some reason never explained, fixed May 15, 1865, as the day when it should take effect. When that day arrived Lincoln had no further need of his services.

Mr. Bates proved a strong supporter of the war. He was a man of determination and belligerent disposition, notwithstanding his conservative education; and although he came from a slave State, he was one of the most radical of the President's advisers whenever the slavery question came up. When the Emancipation Proclamation was first proposed, Mr. Bates and Mr. Stanton were the only members of the Cabinet who gave it their unreserved approval, while Mr. Chase, who came nearer to being the representative of the abolition faction than any other member, and Mr. Seward, who was supposed to be the most radical of Republicans, were opposed to it.

Among Mr. Stanton's papers is a curious memorandum which throws a search-light upon his position and that of some of his colleagues.

"Tuesday, July 22.

"The President proposes to issue an order declaring free all
slaves in States in rebellion on the ---- day of ----.

"The Attorney-General and Stanton are for its immediate
promulgation.

"Seward against it; argues strongly in favor of cotton and
foreign governments.

"Chase silent.

"Welles--

"Seward argues--That foreign nations will intervene to
prevent the abolition of slavery for sake of cotton. Argues in
a long speech against its immediate promulgation. Wants to wait
for troops. Wants Halleck here. Wants drum and fife and public
spirit. We break up our relations with foreign nations and the
production of cotton for sixty years.

"Chase thinks it a measure of great danger, and would lead
to universal emancipation.--The measure goes beyond anything I
have recommended."

However, before 1864 Mr. Bates grew weary of his official labors and expressed to the President his desire to retire. He was offered a vacant judgeship in Missouri, but declined it on the ground that he could not work in harmony with the radicals who were in control of politics there. When he retired the Cabinet was left without a Southern member.

A few days before the meeting of the Supreme Court, in December, 1864, Lincoln sent for Titian J. Coffey, the Assistant Attorney-General, and said,--

"My Cabinet has shrunk up North, and I must find a Southern man. I suppose if the twelve apostles were to be chosen nowadays the shrieks of locality would have to be heeded. I have invited Judge Holt to become Attorney-General, but he seems unwilling to undertake the Supreme Court work. I want you to see him, remove his objection if you can, and bring me his answer."

"I then had charge of the government cases in the Supreme Court, and they were all ready for argument," said Mr. Coffey. "I saw Judge Holt, explained the situation, and assured him that he need not appear in court unless he chose to do so. He had, however, decided to decline the invitation, and I returned to the President and so informed him.

"'Then,' said the President, 'I will offer it to James Speed, of Louisville, a man I know well, though not so well as I know his brother Joshua. I slept with Joshua for four years, and I suppose I ought to know him well. But James is an honest man and a gentleman, and if he comes here you will find he is one of those well-poised men, not too common here, who are not spoiled by a big office.'"

Mr. Speed accepted the appointment and served until after the assassination.

The relations between several of the members of Lincoln's Cabinet were from the beginning to the end unfriendly, and no President without the tact, patience, and forbearance of Lincoln could have controlled them. He treated them all with unvarying kindness, and although he never disclosed any desire or intention to dominate, and, in fact, invariably yielded on matters of little importance, he was always their master, and on matters of great importance they were compelled to submit to his will. It is the highest testimony to their confidence in him that even those who had retired at his wish never afterwards failed to show him respect and even affection, and none of them ever retired from his post from feelings of dissatisfaction with the orders or the treatment he received from him.

During the early days of his administration he had a higher opinion of his advisers than they had of him, which was because they did not yet know one another. He recognized them as men who had made honorable records in the United States Senate and in other eminent positions, while they regarded him as an ordinary frontier lawyer, without experience, and the struggle for ascendancy and control puzzled a good many people from time to time. Mr. Seward was looked upon as the chief pillar of the temple for many months, Mr. Stanton's iron will was constantly felt by the public, Mr. Chase was regarded as an eminent statesman; but in all the critical issues of the war the uncouth Western lawyer, without experience in statecraft or executive administration, unused to power, asserted and maintained his official supremacy, and every member of his Cabinet yielded implicit obedience. They recognized his unselfish purpose, his purity of character, his keen perception, his foresight, and his common sense, and were usually willing to accept his judgment. While others fretted and became confused in the emergencies that overwhelmed them, Lincoln was never liable to excitement or impulsive action.

From a photograph by Brady]

At the beginning of his administration the entire organization of the government was in a chaotic state. The Buchanan administration had filled the offices with Democrats and Southern sympathizers, who resigned immediately after Lincoln's inauguration and left their affairs in utter confusion. Their places had to be filled with untrained men who did not understand their duties and had not been accustomed to official labor or discipline. It would have been remarkable if they had conducted the routine work without friction, but the urgency and the magnitude of the responsibility and labor that were thrown upon them was more than a trained corps of officials could have executed without confusion and delay. The President was probably the only man connected with the government that did not lose his self-control. During all that most trying period, as was the case throughout his life, he was composed, serene, and confident. Oftentimes, when subordinate officials and outsiders came to him raging with indignation, he heard them with patience, replied with a jest on his lips, and quieted their nerves by talking of commonplace matters. His Cabinet officers were often fretful, and there was continual friction between the several departments. Several times it almost reached the breaking-point. But Lincoln soothed and satisfied all parties without taking the side of either.

Montgomery Blair, of Maryland, was not only a representative of the border State aristocracy, but belonged to one of the most prominent Democratic families in the country, was one of the founders of the Republican party, and was first known to Lincoln as the attorney who argued Dred Scott's case in the Supreme Court. He was a graduate of West Point Military Academy, had several years of military training in Indian campaigns, had studied law, and was appointed a judge of the Court of Common Pleas when he was a very young man. President Buchanan made him solicitor of the Court of Claims, but removed him because of his opposition to the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. This made a Republican of Blair, and, with the exception of his brother Francis P. Blair, of Missouri, and Cassius M. Clay, of Kentucky, he was the most conspicuous antislavery man in all the Southern States.

Blair could not be appointed to the Cabinet without a bitter controversy. He was opposed by Henry Winter Davis, one of the most able and brilliant young Whigs in the House of Representatives, and by other partisans in Maryland, who fought so hard and so persistently as to involve several of the leading Whigs of the country on his side, while the former Democrats in the Republican party rallied to the support of Blair. Davis had the powerful sympathy of Seward and Chase, Benjamin F. Wade, and other prominent abolitionists, and it became no longer a matter of personal rivalry between Blair and Davis, but a struggle for supremacy between the Whigs and the Democrats for the control of the administration. During the few days before the inauguration it seemed as if the Republican party would be split in twain, or at least that the entire Cabinet slate would be destroyed if either Blair or Davis received an appointment. Lincoln seemed to be the only man in Washington who was not involved in the controversy. He watched the situation with keen eyes, however, and was alert for every event or incident that might have a serious effect upon his administration; but his mind was made up, and when Norman B. Judd came bursting into his bedroom at Willard's Hotel on the night of March 3, to inquire in great excitement if he had decided to nominate Davis instead of Blair, Lincoln replied calmly but with emphasis,--

"When that slate breaks again it will break at the top."

Mr. Blair was a loyal and useful member of the Cabinet, and from the beginning was in favor of prompt and energetic measures against the secessionists. He had been a Democrat of the Jackson type, and urged Lincoln to adopt Jackson's vigorous policy against nullification. It might have been wiser and better for the country, it might have saved lives and money, sorrow and tears, if his advice had been adopted. He understood the South better than Seward or Chase or any other member of the Cabinet; but conditions would not permit the adoption of his energetic policy, and he became very restless. His temper and his character were revealed in a memorandum which he submitted with his colleagues at the request of Lincoln, concerning setting forth his views of the course that should be pursued.

Mr. Blair wrote,--

"_First._ As regards General Scott, I have no confidence
in his judgment on the questions of the day. His political
views control his judgment, and his course, as remarked on
by the President, shows that whilst no one will question his
patriotism, the results are the same as if he were in fact
traitorous.

"_Second._ It is acknowledged to be possible to relieve Fort
Sumter. It ought to be relieved without reference to Pickens or
any other possession. South Carolina is the head and front of
this rebellion, and when that State is safely delivered from the
authority of the United States it will strike a blow against our
authority, from which it will take us years of bloody strife to
recover."

He opposed the Emancipation Proclamation on the ground of policy, and made an earnest effort to convince Lincoln that it was a mistake to take such radical action at that particular junction. He had been an emancipationist for years, the principle of the measure he approved, but he thought the time was inopportune, because he feared that it would drive the border States over to the Confederacy.

Mr. Blair was constantly coming into collision with Mr. Stanton. Like two flints, they struck fire whenever they met, and often engaged in acrimonious discussions at Cabinet meetings over actual or fancied grievances on the part of Mr. Blair, who felt that Mr. Stanton was continually interfering with his prerogatives. Mr. Blair's enmity to Mr. Seward was equally strong and often developed in an embarrassing manner, while the hostility between Mr. Chase and himself was concealed under the thinnest veneer of politeness.

In the summer of 1864 Mr. Blair desired to have certain orders issued relating to the postal service within the lines of the army. A draft of the proposed orders was made, but Mr. Stanton declined to issue them. General Markland, who was in charge of the army mails, says, "When I returned to Mr. Blair with the information that the orders would not be issued by the Secretary of War, he said, 'We will see,' and wrote a letter to Mr. Lincoln, which he gave to me to deliver with the accompanying papers. When I delivered the letter, Mr. Lincoln read it carefully and handed it back to me, saying,--

"'What is the matter between Blair and Stanton?' "I told him all I knew in reference to the proposed orders. He then said, 'If I understand the case, General Grant wants the orders issued, and Blair wants them issued, and you want them issued, and Stanton won't issue them. Now, don't you see what kind of a fix I will be in if I interfere? I'll tell you what to do. If you and General Grant understand one another, suppose you try to get along without the orders, and if Blair or Stanton makes a fuss, I may be called in as a reference, and I may decide in your favor.' The orders were never issued, and pleasant relations were maintained on that score all around."

Mr. Blair was not popular with the Union people of the North. The public distrust is strikingly illustrated by the following anecdote from the reminiscences of Henry Ward Beecher: "There was some talk, early in 1864, of a sort of compromise with the South. Blair had told the President he was satisfied that if he could be put in communication with some of the leading men of the South in some way or other, that some benefit would accrue. Lincoln had sent a delegation to meet Alexander Stephens, and that was all the North knew. We were all very much excited over that. The war lasted so long, and I was afraid Lincoln would be so anxious for peace, and I was afraid he would accept something that would be of advantage to the South, so I went to Washington and called upon him. I said to him, 'Mr. Lincoln, I come to you to know whether the public interest will permit you to explain to me what this Southern commission means? I am in an embarrassing position as editor and do not want to step in the dark.' Well, he listened very patiently, and looked up to the ceiling for a few moments, and said, 'Well, I am almost of a mind to show you all the documents.'

"'Well, Mr. Lincoln, I should like to see them if it is proper.' He went to his little secretary and came out and handed me a little card as long as my finger and an inch wide, and on that was written,--

"'You will pass the bearer through the lines' [or something
to that effect].

"'A. LINCOLN.'

"'There,' he said, 'is all there is of it. Now, Blair thinks something can be done, but I don't; but I have no objection to have him try his hand. He has no authority whatever but to go and see what he can do.'"

The President was continually receiving letters, resolutions, and even delegations demanding the removal of his Postmaster-General, and Mr. Blair did not improve the situation by his own conduct. He continued to write letters and make speeches, and indulged in caustic and sometimes cruel criticism of his colleagues and the Republican leaders in Washington until the situation became so strained that the President was compelled to ask his resignation. Before this was done, however, a little incident occurred which forcibly illustrates the President's patience, dignity, and at the same time his determination. The incident is probably without parallel in the history of the government.

General Halleck, in command of the army, called the attention of the Secretary of War to a speech made by Mr. Blair just after General Early's raid upon Washington and the destruction of Mr. Blair's property over the District border in Maryland, in which the army and its commander were denounced for cowardice and inefficiency. General Halleck declared that if the charge was true the names of the officers should be stricken from the rolls of the army. If it were not true, he said, the slanderer should be dismissed from the Cabinet.

Secretary Stanton handed the letter to the President without comment, whereupon Lincoln replied to General Halleck:

"Whether the remarks were really made I do not know, nor do I suppose such knowledge is necessary to a correct response. If they were made, I do not approve them; and yet, under the circumstances, I would not dismiss a member of the Cabinet therefor. I do not consider what may have been hastily said in a moment of vexation at so severe a loss is sufficient ground for so grave a step. Besides this, truth is generally the best vindication against slander. I propose continuing to be myself the judge as to when a member of the Cabinet shall be dismissed."

Not satisfied with this, the President, when the Cabinet came together, read them this impressive little lecture:

"I must myself be the judge how long to retain and when to remove any of you from his position. It would greatly pain me to discover any of you endeavoring to procure another's removal, or in any way to prejudice him before the public. Such endeavor would be a wrong to me, and, much worse, a wrong to the country. My wish is that on this subject no remark be made or question asked by any of you, here or elsewhere, now or hereafter."

This occurred in July, but Mr. Blair continued to exasperate every person with whom he came in contact. He accused Seward, Stanton, and Chase of a conspiracy to break down the administration, and wearied the President with his suspicions of the motives and actions of all the leading Republicans of the country, until Lincoln finally wrote him a kindly letter, saying, "You have generously said to me more than once that whenever your resignation could be a relief to me it was at my disposal. The time has come. You know very well that this proceeds from no dissatisfaction of mine with you personally or officially. Your uniform kindness has been unsurpassed by that of any other friend."

Mr. Blair's loyalty to Lincoln and the Union was in no way affected by his dismissal. He immediately took the stump in behalf of Lincoln's re-election and his personal fidelity and friendship were never shaken. Lincoln offered him the choice between the Austrian and Spanish missions, but he declined the honor with thanks.

Mr. Blair's successor was William Dennison, of Ohio, a man of the highest character, who had been Governor of that State at the outbreak of the war, and had sustained the administration at Washington with great ability and loyalty. He was a man of fine presence, winning manners, and amiable disposition, wise in counsel, and energetic in action.

Simon Cameron, of Pennsylvania, was a candidate for the Presidential nomination at Chicago and received fifty votes. His friends reached some sort of an understanding with David Davis, who was looked upon as Lincoln's personal representative at the Convention, under which they transferred their votes to the latter, although it was distinctly understood that Davis had no authority to make pledges or promises and could only recommend to Lincoln that Mr. Cameron be recognized in as honorable and notable a manner as possible. It was, however, perfectly natural for the President to select a member of his official family from a State of such importance as Pennsylvania, and Mr. Cameron was recognized as the representative of the protective tariff element in the Republican party. Hence, after a "balancing of matters," as he called it, he invited Mr. Cameron to Springfield during the holidays in 1860, had a frank talk with him, and tendered him a seat in the Cabinet either as Secretary of the Treasury or Secretary of War, "which of the two I have not yet definitely decided."

There was a volcanic eruption in Pennsylvania after the announcement, and bitter hostility was immediately developed among the members of Mr. Cameron's own party, headed by the newly elected Governor and chairman of the Republican State Committee, who protested against his appointment, and claimed the right to be consulted if a member of the Cabinet was to be selected from their State. Being a strict party man, the President recognized their claim, and therefore wrote a polite and friendly note to Mr. Cameron, explaining that it was impossible to take him into the Cabinet under the circumstances, and suggesting that he decline the appointment. "Better do this at once," he wrote, "before things change so that you cannot honorably decline and I be compelled to openly recall the tender. No person living knows or has an intimation that I write this letter." This, of itself, is sufficient answer to the frequent charge that there was a corrupt bargain at Chicago between Lincoln and Cameron.

As might be expected, Mr. Cameron was deeply disappointed, and sent a friend to Springfield to demand a further explanation of the President-elect. Whereupon Lincoln wrote a conciliatory reply, expressing regret that Mr. Cameron's feelings were wounded by the tone of his letter, and saying that it had been written "under great anxiety, and perhaps I was not so guarded in its terms as I should have been. My great object was to have you act quickly, if possible, before the matter should be complicated with the Pennsylvania Senatorial election. Destroy the offensive letter or return it to me. I say to you now that I have not doubted that you would perform the duties of a department ably and faithfully. Nor have I for a moment intended to ostracize your friends. If I should make a Cabinet appointment for Penn. before I reach Washington, I will not do so without consulting you and giving all the weight to your views and wishes which I consistently can. This I have always intended."

This was purely personal, and attached to it was a letter in more formal language which Mr. Cameron was authorized to show to his friends. In it Lincoln stated that Mr. Cameron came to Springfield by his invitation and not upon any suggestion of his own; that he had been offered an appointment in the Cabinet, but that complications had arisen which made it necessary to recall the offer.

In this way Mr. Cameron was "let down easy," and while he did not conceal his disappointment and chagrin, he kept his temper and conducted himself in so dignified a manner that Lincoln was greatly impressed. Cameron's enemies, still fearing that he might be taken into the Cabinet, resorted to despicable measures to prejudice Lincoln against him, while, on the other hand, he was earnestly defended by some of the best people of Pennsylvania; hence the President decided to revive his original plan, and placed Mr. Cameron's name on the slate as Secretary of War.

It proved to be an unfortunate decision, for before active hostilities began it had been clearly demonstrated that he was not qualified to fill that important post. Scandals and dissensions of the most serious character were immediately developed in the War Department, so that Congress appointed a special committee to make an investigation. Its report was sensational and was too grave for Lincoln to overlook. About the time the report was made Mr. Cameron took the liberty to announce in his annual report the policy of the administration in regard to arming the negroes and enlisting them in the military service. So radical an announcement, without even consulting him, was not only a shock to Lincoln, but passed the limits of his forbearance. Fortunately, Mr. Cameron's report had not reached the public. Printed copies had been sent to the press to be published as soon as the telegraph had announced that the President's message had been read in Congress. Every copy was recalled to Washington, the objectionable paragraphs were modified, a new edition was published, and Mr. Cameron expressed a wish to exchange the onerous responsibilities of the War Department for a foreign mission. Lincoln wrote him a brief note, keeping up the pretence by saying, "As you have more than once expressed a desire for a change of position, I can now gratify you consistently with my view of the public interest. I therefore propose to nominate you to the Senate next Monday as Minister to Russia."

As was the case with Mr. Blair, the dissolution of relations caused no break in the friendship between the President and his former minister. Cameron remained one of the most devoted of Lincoln's supporters and one of the most earnest and effective advocates of his renomination to the Presidency.

Gideon Welles was altogether the most agreeable and satisfactory of the fifteen members of Lincoln's official advisers. He invariably sustained him in any position that he took or in any measure that he desired. He gave him consistent and cordial support and the least trouble and anxiety of any of his official family. Mr. Welles was selected as the representative of New England. Amos Tuck, of New Hampshire, George Ashmun, of Boston, and several other eminent gentlemen were also under consideration.

From a photograph by Brady]

The morning after his speech in Hartford, in the spring of 1860, Lincoln took a long stroll through the principal streets of that beautiful city. As he approached the hotel he stepped into a book-store, where a gentleman who had been in his audience the evening before approached and introduced himself. There seemed to be a mutual attraction, and for two hours they discussed various subjects of interest, politics, law, and literature. The next time they met was after the Chicago Convention, to which Mr. Welles was a delegate, and during the campaign they exchanged frequent letters, until Lincoln was thoroughly convinced of the fitness, availability, and character of the Connecticut lawyer for a position in his Cabinet. The special knowledge of maritime law shown by the latter seems to have suggested his assignment to the Navy Department.

Mr. Welles showed a vigorous determination, a high sense of patriotism, and great executive ability from the start, but almost immediately after the organization of the Cabinet came into collision with Mr. Seward because of the interference of the latter with naval affairs, and they never became friends. Notwithstanding the intensity of their hostility, however, both remained through the entire administration, and were the only members of the original Cabinet who continued in that relation until Lincoln's death. Although there were many complaints of his arrogant manner and irritable temper, Mr. Welles always showed a loyal affection for the President, and in August, 1862, refused to sign the "round robin" which Seward and Chase had prepared, demanding the dismissal of General McClellan. He agreed heartily with them, but refused to sign because of his deep respect for the President and a fear of wounding his feelings.

The first member of the Cabinet selected was William H. Seward. There was no delay, doubt, or hesitation in Lincoln's intention to offer him the highest honor in his gift from the hour that he received the news of his nomination, and it was entirely fitting that it should be so. At that time Mr. Seward was pre-eminent among the members of the Republican party. He was its leader in the Senate and was recognized as its logical candidate for the Presidency. He had the largest number of supporters at the Convention, and was defeated only by a combination of the minority. He had been longer in public life, was higher in official rank, and had been more conspicuous and successful in statesmanship than any other of Lincoln's supporters; he had been Governor of the greatest State in the Union, and was just completing his second term in the United States Senate. He had the best organization behind him that had ever been known in American politics up to that time, with Thurlow Weed, recognized as the most consummate politician in the country, as his manager. It certainly would have been strange if the President-elect had not selected such a man as Secretary of State. Nevertheless, there was considerable opposition to Seward's appointment in his own State as well as elsewhere. It came from personal jealousy and enmity, and also from patriotic and honorable people who feared that he might dominate the administration, they not liking his methods; but Lincoln did not hesitate. He wrote Mr. Seward at once after the election, asking permission to nominate him as Secretary of State, and saying that such had been his intention from the day of the nomination at Chicago. "With the belief that your position in the public eye, your integrity, ability and learning and great experience, all combine to render it an appointment pre-eminently fit to be made."

Mr. Seward took three weeks for reflection, and with "much self-distrust" finally relieved Lincoln's anxiety by admitting, in a lofty manner, that he considered it his duty to accept. The tone of this letter did not please Lincoln; and from that moment, with the instinct of self-protection which he often displayed,--and his instincts were exceedingly accurate,--he was on his guard in dealing with the great man from New York. Nevertheless, he treated him with frankness and delicate courtesy and continued to correspond with him concerning confidential matters.