Chapter II: Part 2

That spirit or mind has a relation to space, is evident from the fact of its location in the body. The body itself exists in space, therefore every particle of substance which it contains must exist in space. No point can be assumed in the body but what has a relation to the surrounding space or extension. Therefore spirit must have a relation to extension or it cannot exist in the body. All unextended points have a relation to space, though they are no part of space, and do not occupy space; but an unextended substance to have no relation to space cannot be as much as a point. A point is a _located_ nothing, but an unextended substance is nothing, having no _location._

What can be more unphilosophical, contradictory, and absurd, than to assume that something can exist that is "unextended,"--that "occupies no room, fills no space,"--has "no parts?" We ask our readers to pause for a moment, and endeavour to conceive of a substance that has no parts. Grasp it if you can in your imaginations. Think of its existing where there is no space. Conceive, if you can in your imaginations. Think of its existing where there is no space. Conceive, if you can, of a locality outside of the bounds of a boundless space. Do not your judgments, and every power of your minds revolt at the absolute absurdities and palpable contradictions? By this time, perhaps, you are ready to inquire, can it be possible that any man in all the world could believe in such impossibilities? Yes, it is possible. These very absurdities now stand in bold relief, not only in the most approved philosophical works of modern times, but incorporated in the very "Articles of Religion" which millions have received as their rule of faith.

That spirit or mind has a relation to duration is manifest in the act of remembering. Through the memory the mind perceives itself to be the same conscious being _now_, that it was, an hour, a day, a year ago; it perceives that itself has existed through a certain period of duration. There is as much certainty of its own relations to duration as there is of any such relation in any other substance whatever. If there is no certainty that mind has a relation to duration, there is no certainty that any other substance has such a relation; hence all would be uncertainty, even our own existence. Bishop Berkeley denied the existence of the material world, and the first Article of his religion swept away the immaterial world from _space;_ and the modern immaterialist sweeps it away from all relation to _time_. So between them all, space and time are pretty well cleaned out; not so much as a nest egg left to replenish the great infinite void.

Mind, like all other matter, is susceptible of being moved from place to place. We see this exemplified in the movements of the mind through the medium of the body which conveys it from place to place on the surface of the earth. But though man was stationary upon the earth's surface, the earth itself with all its inhabitants, is moving with the rapid velocity of nineteen miles every second, which proves to a demonstration that mind is capable of being moved from place to place with a velocity far exceeding that of a cannon ball. But _motion_ involves the ideas of both space and time. Mind cannot be moved without being moved in space; it cannot pass from point to point instantaneously. However rapid the velocity, time is an essential ingredient to all motion. That eminent and profound philosopher, the late Professor Robison of Edinburgh, says, "In motion we observe the _successive_ appearance of the thing moved in _different_ parts of space. Therefore, in our idea of motion are involved the ideas or conceptions of space and time."

"All things are placed in space, in the order of situation. All events happen in time, in the order of succession."

"No motion can be conceived as instantaneous. For, since a moveable, in passing from the beginning to the end of its path, passes through the intermediate points; to suppose the motion along the most minute portion of the path instantaneous, is to suppose the moveable in every intervening point at the same instant. This is inconceivable and absurd." (Robison's Mechanical Philosophy. Vol I. Introduction.) The motion of mind, therefore is another positive proof that it has a relation to both space and duration.

"Extension and resistance," says Dr. Thomas Brown, "are the complex elements of what we term matter; and nothing is matter to our conception, or a body, to use the simpler synonymous term which does not involve these elements." Figure, magnitude, divisibility, are only different modifications of extension. Solidity, liquidity, viscidity, hardness, softness, roughness, smoothness, are different modifications of resistance. All these terms are only extension and resistance, modified in a certain degree, and under other names. Our notion of extension is supposed by Dr. Brown to be acquired from our notion of time as successive, involving length and divisibility. Our notion of resistance he supposes to be obtained through our muscular organs. These organs are first exerted, and then excited by something without, and in their turn excite the mind with a feeling of resistance. The feeling of resistance combined with the feeling of extension gives us the notion of matter. If Dr. Brown's views be correct, no one can acquire a notion of matter, by seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, or simple touch. Either or all of these will only produce certain feelings in the mind without giving us any notion of an external extended resistance. A muscular effort opposed by some substance or foreign body is the only possible way, according to his theory, for the infant mind to obtain a notion of extended solidity or resistance. (Brown's Philosophy of the Human Mind. From the XX to the XXIX Lecture inclusive.)

If solidity and extension then are the essential characteristics of matter; and if the resistance of a muscular effort be the only possible way of learning these characteristics; it may be asked, how did Dr. Brown learn that the rays of light are material? He has frequently in his philosophy called light material. Has light in any way resisted his muscular efforts? Have the muscular organs ever been able to grasp a ray of light? Have the particles of light either singly or collectively ever acted upon our muscular organs in such manner as to give us a notion of extension and resistance? Have they ever affected the mind in any way only to impart to it the feeling of color? Does not Dr. Brown himself repeatedly affirm, that light can only impart the sensation of color; and that extension, magnitude, figure, solidity, can never be known by the sense of seeing? Does he not assert, that "nothing is matter to our conception which does not involve these elements?" Why then does he assume light to be material?

If, then, light can be ranked as a material substance without exhibiting the least resistance to the muscular organs, why not mind or spirit be considered material also? Why believe that light consists of inconceivably small vibratory or emanating particles of matter from the mere affection of mind called color, and yet be unwilling to believe that the mind affected is material? If that which produces a sensation or feeling be regarded a solid extended substance, independently of muscular resistance, where is the impropriety, in regarding that which receives the sensation or feeling, as a solid extended substance also?

Dr. Brown, and all other immaterialists, universally believe that the sensation of smell is produced by small material particles, acting upon our olfactory nerves. But we ask, how is Dr. Brown or any other person to determine those odorous particles to be material? It may be said, that we determine them to be solid and extended by tracing them to the substances from which they emanate. But can it be proved that they constitute any part of the solid extended substance from which they emanate, any more than light is a part of the substance from which it emanates? We know a rose to be solid and extended, not from the sensation of vision or smell, but from the sensation of resistance which it offers to our muscular organs when we attempt to grasp it. But because a rose is solid and extended, that does not prove that light and fragrance, by which we discern its color and smell, are any part of the rose.

If Dr. Brown's theory be true, it is absolutely impossible to prove that the odoriferous particles which affect us with the sensation of fragrance, are a solid extended substance. These particles of odour appear, indeed, to have been connected in some way with bodies from which they emanate; but there is no possible means for the muscular powers to determine them to be parts of those bodies, any more than the colored light or the heat which are also transmitted from them. No one in speaking of a rose would think of classifying heat and light as a portion of its solid substance; yet both heat and light, like the particles of odour, are intimately connected with it, and are constantly being thrown off from it.

"What is there," inquires Dr. Brown, "which we can discover in the mere sensation of fragrance, that is itself significant of solidity, extension, or whatever we may regard as essential to the existence of things without? As a mere change in the form of our being, it may suggest to us the necessity of some cause or antecedent of the change. But it is far from implying the necessity of a corporeal cause;--any more than such a direct corporeal cause is implied in any other modification of our being, intellectual or moral--in our belief, for example, of the most abstract truth, at which we may have arrived by a slow development of proposition after proposition in a process of internal reflective analysis, or in the most refined and sublime of our emotions, when, without thinking of any one of the objects around, we have been meditating on the divinity who formed them--himself the purest of spiritual existences. Our belief of a system of external things, then, does not, as far as we can judge from the nature of the feelings, arise from our sensations of smell, more than from any of our internal pleasures or pains." (Brown's Philosophy of the Human Mind. Lecture XX.)

Odorous particles, then, have never been submitted to Dr. Brown's only test of materiality, and yet he, and all other immaterialists, without any hesitation, pronounce them to be matter. The spirit, like these particles of odour, can exist in connexion with the body or separate from it; and yet it forms no part of the fleshy tabernacle. If like the particles of odour, it really eludes the grasp of the muscular organs, and if neither these odoriferous particles, nor the spirit, can be proved by any muscular effort to have solidity and extension; why, then, should one be called _material,_ and the other _immaterial?_

If the mind be unextended, how can it receive any sensations from things without? It could not act upon bodily organs, for they are extended. Neither could bodily organs act upon it.

Philosophers have endeavoured to invent numberless hypothesis to account for the action of matter on the mind, which they have assumed to be immaterial. The old Peripatetic doctrine of perception, by species or phantasms, which for so many centuries held so unlimited a sway in the philosophic world, was probably originated to connect material with immaterial substances. When this absurdity slowly died away, other hypothesis, no less erroneous, immediately supplied its place. Des Cartes, seeing no possibility of any reciprocal action between matter and something that was inextended, invented his system of occasional causes, and represented the external world entirely incapable of affecting the mind in any way whatever. He ascribed all the sensations and affections of the mind to the immediate agency of the Deity, virtually rendering external objects entirely useless to the mind. This conjecture has been modified by succeeding philosophers without, however, removing its absurdities. It is useless to revert to all the absurd theories which have from time to time distracted the metaphysical world, and which have been originated for no other purpose than to uphold the still greater absurdity of immaterialism. Philosophers of ancient times imagined the existence of an immaterial substance, unextended in its nature, like nothing. To support this wild and vague imagination, learned metaphysicians have given birth to innumerable conjectures, in order to connect this imaginary substance with the material world.

Dr. Brown, however, being a little more wise than the immaterialists who preceded him, does not attempt to connect the mutual affections, existing between matter and mind, by substituting some conjectural intervening _causes._ Instead of this, he advocates the direct affection of the mind by the presence of material objects--that the change of state in the one is produced by the change of state in the other, independently of intervening causes. Now this, in our view, is really what happens.

We believe that matter can only act upon mind because mind is an extended material substance. But Dr. Brown supposes there is no absurdity in matter acting upon that which is unextended. He endeavours to substantiate the possibility of the direct mutual affections of mind and matter, by referring to some examples of matter acting upon matter as in gravitation. (Brown's Philosophy of the Human Mind. Lecture XXX.) But we do not conceive these cases to be in the least analogous; for there is no absurdity in supposing one extended substance to act upon another which is also extended. But for extended substances with parts to act upon unextended substances is without a parallel, and inconceivably absurd. Indeed there could be no action at all; an immaterial mind could not act upon an immaterial mind any more than nothing could act upon nothing. To talk about matter affecting that which is inextended and without parts, is to talk about matter affecting nothing.

The very fact of the external organs affecting the mind without any intervening cause, the same as other matter affects other matter, is an argument of the strongest kind in favour of the materiality of mind. A piece of iron is affected in a certain manner by introducing into its presence a loadstone, so the mind is affected in a certain manner by the presence of light upon the retina, or by the presence or odour upon the olfactory nerve. If, then, mind can be directly affected by other substances, the same as matter directly affects matter, why should it be called an immaterial substance?

If resistance to our muscular efforts, as Dr. Brown supposes, be our only test of solidity and extension, and consequently of matter, then mind itself has the greatest claims to materiality. A muscular effort is nothing more than an effort of the mind. Without the mind the muscles are incapable of any effort whatsoever. Two men stretch out their arms, press their hands together, and resist each other with great force. In this example as it is commonly said, the muscular efforts of the one are resisted by the muscular efforts of the other; but as the muscles have no power of themselves, the facts of the case are, that the mind of the one truly resists the mind of the other through the medium of their respective muscles. If that which causes resistance then be material, mind must be material.

If two bodies of iron of equal size were moving with equal velocities towards each other, upon meeting they would destroy each others motion, and the next moment, though in contact, there would be no signs of resistance; not so with the resistance which mind offers to mind through the medium of the muscular organs; the resistance can be continued at the option of the two resisting minds; hence mind exhibits resistance in a greater degree than other substances, and should, therefore, according to Dr. Brown's test, be considered material in preference to all other substances.

No two atoms of spirit or any other matter can occupy two or more places at the same time. We have never known of a circumstance of the spirit of man residing in the body and out of it at the same time. No particles of light, odour, heat, electricity, can occupy two places at once. These substances can only be extensively diffused by being extensive in quantity. The particles of light which enter the right eye are not the same which enter the left eye. Though their qualities may be exactly alike, yet they are separate individual substance, as much so as if they were millions of miles asunder. The same is true of the atoms of spirit and all other substances.

OF THE ESSENCE OF SUBSTANCES.

Philosophers of modern times have asserted that we know nothing of the _essence_ of bodies. It is affirmed that all that can be known of mind or matter, are merely its properties. Dr. Abercrombie, says, "We talk, indeed, about matter, and we talk about mind; we speculate concerning materiality and immateriality, until we argue ourselves into a kind of belief that we really understand something of the subject. The truth is, we understand nothing. Matter and mind are known to us by certain properties: but in regard to both it is entirely out of the reach of our faculties to advance a single step beyond the facts which are before us. Whether in their substratum or ultimate essence, they are the same, or whether they are different we know not, and never can know in our present state of being." (Abercrombie on the Intellectual Powers. Part I. Sec. I.)

There are many truths which we ascertain by reflection, independently in a great measure of our senses. We are assured and know in our own minds that duration must be endless, and that space must be boundless, not because we have learned these truths directly through the medium of our senses, or have been able to demonstrate them by any process of reasoning. In the same way we know concerning the essence of bodies. Instead of being entirely ignorant on the subject, as modern philosophers assert, it is directly the opposite; we know the essence of all substances. Solidity is the only essence in existence. Although the ultimate atoms of matter cannot come under the cognizance of our senses, and we cannot demonstrate their solidity by any process of reasoning, yet we are none the less assured of their solidity. We believe that they are solid because it is impossible for us to believe otherwise. We are as certain that the ultimate atoms of all substances are solid, as we are that they exist. What we mean by solidity is, that all substances completely fill a certain amount of space, and that it is impossible for them ever to fill a greater or less amount of space.

The amount of absolute space occupied by any substance is constant, that is the elementary atoms cannot be increased or decreased in magnitude in the least degree. Particles may be divided, but their respective parts occupy the same amount of space when separated as when united. Condensation or expansion is not a property of the ultimate atoms of bodies, but merely the relation which these atoms sustain to each other. When a collection of atoms called body are forced into a closer connexion with each other, the body is said to be condensed. When their relative distances are increased the body is expanded. The maximum of density excludes all pores. In such a condition the space is wholly occupied--any further condensation is absolutely impossible. A bar of iron varies its dimensions with its temperature, while the atoms of which the bar consists remain unchangeable in size. The pores of the iron increase in the same proportion as the bar increases, and diminish as the bar diminishes. Solidity is universally supposed to be a property of atoms, but this is an error. Solidity is not a property, but only another name for the essence. A property must be a property of something; but solidity is not a property of _anything_--it is the essence itself--the thing that exists, aside from all properties and powers. If we suppose _solidity_ to be a _property,_ then it is evident that there must be a distinction between atoms as possessors, and solidity as the thing or property possessed; but we find it impossible to conceive of atoms separate and apart from solidity. Deprive atoms of solidity, and they are deprived not of a property, but of existence itself, and nothing remains. Solidity is associated with existence, and we cannot conceive of the one independently of the other. Solidity, then, is the essence to which all qualities belong--taste, smell, colour, weight, &c., are the affections of solids. Every feeling or thought is the feeling or thought of solids. All the powers of the universe, from the almighty powers of Jehovah down to the most feeble powers that operate, are the powers of solid atoms. We can conceive of solid atoms existing without powers, but we cannot conceive of atoms existing without solidity; therefore the very essence of all substance is solidity. Love, joy, and all other affections are only the different states of this essence.

When the essence or solidity of substance is considered by itself, independently of its powers, there cannot possibly be any difference in atoms only in their _magnitude_ and _form_. The essence of all substance is precisely alike when the essence alone is considered. Substances can only differ in their magnitude, form, and susceptibilities, but not in their essences, for they are and must be alike.

THE IMMATERIALISTS ONLY POSSIBLE ARGUMENT REFUTED.

The only possible argument which the immaterialist pretends to bring forward in support of the _inextension_ and _indivisibility_ of a thinking substance, and consequently of its immateriality--is founded on the self-consciousness of such substance.

A thinking substance is conscious of its own individual unity: it is conscious that itself is not _many_ beings, but one. Mankind universally feel their own individual unity when each contemplates himself. Each one is certain that it is the same being that rejoiced yesterday who remembers to-day--that all past and present affections are the affections of _one_ being, and not of many. The absolute _oneness_ of a thinking being is supposed to be inconsistent with a _plurality_ of parts. To avoid this supposed inconsistency the immaterialist assumes that such a substance is without parts.

Dr. Brown says "that the very notion _of plurality_ and division is as inconsistent with the notion of self as the notions of existence and nonexistence." (Brown's Philosophy of the Human Mind. Lecture XCVI.) That by the term "_plurality_," he means the plurality of parts, as well as a plurality of atoms,--is very evident from the whole tenor of his reasoning. If the materialist, as Dr. Brown again says, "assert thought to be the affection of a single particle, a monade; he must remember that if what he chooses to term a single particle, be a particle or matter, it too must still admit of division; it must have a top and bottom, a right side and a left; it must, as it is demonstrable in geometry, admit of being cut in different points, by an infinite number of straight lines; and all the difficulty of the composition of thought, therefore, remains precisely as before." "If it be supposed," continues he, "so completely divested of all the qualities of matter, as not to be _extended,_ nor consequently divisible, it is then mind which is asserted under another name, and every thing which is at all important in the controversy is conceded." (Brown's Philosophy of the Human Mind. Lecture XCVI.)

A unity of substance, consisting of parts, is supposed by Dr. Brown and other immaterialists to be, not only relatively, but absolutely absurd. But this supposed absurdity is only imaginary, and is founded wholly on supposition and false reasoning, and not on our self-consciousness. Self-consciousness teaches us the _unity_ of self, but it does not teach us that a unity of self is inconsistent with a plurality of parts, and consequently inextended.

The absolute _oneness_ or _unity_ of a thinking being can, by no means, be denied. Every man in all the world,--the savage as well as the philosopher,--is conscious that what he calls himself is not _many_ but _one_; but no man is conscious that the thinking substance called self does not consist of a plurality of parts--no one is conscious that self is inextended. Indeed, in the very notion of unity is involved the notion of a plurality of parts. In abstract numbers themselves a unit consists of an unlimited number of fractional parts. A unit of time is composed of innumerable parts called moments. A unit of space embraces a countless number of fractional spaces. A unit of substance is composed of an immense number of fractional parts. Without a plurality of parts we can form no notion whatsoever of unity. If consciousness, therefore, teaches us of the unity of self, it must teach us of a unity consisting of parts; otherwise it teaches us nothing. The unity of the thinking being, then, proves to a demonstration that it consists of parts, and consequently must be extended.

The term _unity_ when applied to time, space, or substance, is entirely indefinite as to quantity. Any quantity, either great or small, may be assumed as a unit. In a multitude of human beings a man; in a bodily organ a molecule of any compounded substance which enters into its composition; and, in a molecule, an atom may be assumed as the unit. In an atom there is an indefinite number of parts, either of which may be chosen as a unit. But when we descend the scale still farther, and speak of that which has no parts, we can form no possible conception of a unit of inextension. The term nothing, instead of unity, is the only applicable term for that which is inextended. To think of unity in reference to external things, we think of something that has parts; so likewise to feel the unity of the mind is to feel that it has parts.

If the unity or oneness of the mind is any evidence in favor of its being inextended and without parts, the unity or oneness of all other substances is equal evidence of their inextension. All the atoms of every substance in the immensity of space, when considered separately and apart, are units, that is each atom is not _many_ substances, but one. Therefore, if the unity of substance necessarily implies the inextension of substance, every atom in the universe must be inextended and without parts, and consequently immaterial.

If it be said that the universe contains no substances that can be called _units,_ but that each atom is a _plurality_ of substances, this would not obviate the difficulty in the least; it would only be adding absurdity to absurdity; for a _plurality_ to exist without the possibility of a _unity's_ existing, is inconceivable nonsense. A plural number, without a singular, or many substances to co-exist without the possibility of the existence of any single one, is as grossly absurd as immaterialism itself. Hence _unity_ implies parts as much as _plurality._ Therefore, wherever a unity or plurality of substance exists, there matter exists, with all its essential characteristics.

No doubt but that the immaterialist absurdity was invented principally to combat the gross errors which have been embraced by some materialists, both of ancient and modern times. The great majority of materialists have contended that thought and feeling are the _results_ of organization, beginning and ceasing with it. Hobbes, Spinosa, Priestley, Darwin, and numerous other individuals, have strenuously advocated this inconsistency. They have asserted that particles of matter have no susceptibilities of thought and feeling when unorganized, but as soon as they were brought together into a certain system, the result of such union is thought and feeling. Dr. Brown, in combating this vague conjecture, has clearly shown that a system of particles can have no properties as a whole which it does not possess in its individual parts; and, consequently, that a thought, or a joy, or a fear, or any other affections of the mind, cannot possibly be the affections resulting from a plurality, but in all cases must be the affections or feelings of every part of a substance. We most cordially believe with Dr. Brown, that a system of particles cannot possibly possess a property which the individuals composing the system do not possess. Had this great philosopher and metaphysician stopped here, his reasoning would have been amply sufficient to have overthrown the errors of Priestly, Darwin, and others who have supposed thought to begin and end with organization. But by supposing an individual unity to be inconsistent with extension and parts, he has advocated an absurdity still more glaring than the one which a part of his reasoning has so successfully overthrown.

There is another gross error of a very different nature from the one advocated by Priestley and his followers, which Dr. Brown also very clearly exposes. This error consists in assuming thought, hope, fear, joy, sorrow, desire, and all other affections to be little particles of matter. We are not aware, however, that there was ever a human being so void of common sense as to advocate this palpable inconsistency. It is very evident that this error is not necessarily incorporated with that absurd notion which supposes thought and other affections to be a _property_ of an organized system of particles, but not a property of each individual particle. The two errors are widely different: the one supposes a thought or feeling to be a _property,_ not of a single particle, but of a collection of particles; the other supposes a thought or feeling to be a little particle of matter itself, and not a _property_ of either a particle or collection of particles. The former error has had numerous advocates in such men as Priestley, Darwin, &c.; but the latter, so far as we are aware, has had no advocates. Dr. Brown, however, has attacked not only the former, but the latter error, as though it really had an existence in some popular theory.

If thought be little particles of matter, Dr. Brown justly argues, "that it will be not more absurd to talk of the twentieth part of an affirmation, or the quarter of a hope, of the top of a remembrance, and the north and east corners of a comparison, than of the twentieth part of a pound, or of the different points of the compass in reference to any part of the globe of which we may be speaking." We agree with him most perfectly in saying, "that with every effort of attention which we can give to our mental analysis, we are as incapable of forming any conception of what is meant by the quarter of a doubt, or the half of a belief, as of forming to ourselves an image of a circle without a central point, or of a square without a single angle."

Dr. Brown also endeavours to bring this mode of reasoning to bear against the absurdity which supposes thought to be a _quality_ of a collection of particles arranged in the form of an organ, but not a quality of single particles. But it is evident that the arguments which entirely demolish one error, leave the other entirely untouched. The weakness of Dr. Brown's argument, when wrongfully applied against the last-named error, will more fully appear by reference to his own words which read as follows:--

"Even though it were admitted, however, in opposition to one of the clearest truths in science, that an organ is something more than a mere name for the separate and independent bodies which it denotes, and that our various feelings are states of the sensorial organ, it must still be allowed that, if two hundred particles existing in a certain state form a doubt, the division of these into two equal aggregates of the particles, as they exist in this state at the moment of that particular feeling, would form halves of a doubt; that all the truths of arithmetic would be predicable of each separate thought, if it were a state of a number of particles."

By a little reflection it will be seen that Dr. Brown's inference is entirely unfounded. "If two hundred particles existing in a certain state form a doubt," it does not necessarily follow that "the division of these into two equal aggregates of the particles," would form halves of a doubt. If two hundred pounds weight attached to a certain machine will produce a result called _motion,_ it does not necessarily follow that one hundred pounds will produce a result called _half of a motion._ If exactly two hundred particles organized in a certain form, were requisite to produce a certain thought, then it is evident that to alter in the least either the number or organization would be a complete destruction of that particular thought, instead of forming fractions of it. This is what Priestley and his followers assert. They say that thought begins and ends with the organization, and that the single individuals entering into the system, form no thought nor fractions of a thought. This absurdity, therefore, remains untouched by this argument of Dr. Brown. It is effectually demolished, however, by another species of argument, used by him to which we have already referred. He has proved Priestley's theory to be false, not by supposing that the fractions of a doubt could be made to result from it, but by clearly showing that an organ is only a name for a collection of many substances, which cannot possibly possess any property as a whole, which the individuals do not possess when existing singly. He has also proved the theory which asserts that a thought or a feeling is a little particle of matter, to be false, because it involves the absurdity of fractional thoughts, hopes, fears, &c.

But there is one more theory which we venture to propose, that we believe to be impregnable, which no philosopher or metaphysician ever has or ever can refute. This theory may be stated as follows:--

A thought, hope, fear, joy, or any other feeling is not a little particle of matter, nor the result or quality of a collection of particles, called an organ or a system or organs, but it is the state or affection of a single individual substance, having extension and parts, and all the essential characteristics belonging to all other matter.

There is no absurdity in speaking of the half, or of a quarter, or of any other fractional part of this substance, but there would be a great absurdity in speaking of the fractional parts of its mere _states_ or _affections._ The half or a thousandth part of a thinking substance is as reasonable as the half or a thousandth part of an attracting substance; but the top or bottom of a thought would be as absurd as the top or bottom of attraction. The north or east side of a substance which remembers, is just as correct as the north or east corners of a substance which possesses a chemical affinity; but the north side of a remembrance would be as inconsistent as the north side of a chemical affinity. Hence, none of the arguments which are so successfully brought to bear against the other two theories, will in the least affect this. It is invulnerable in every point at which it may be assailed.

Every conceivable part of this substance, however minute, possesses the same property as the whole. A thought, or any other state of feeling is, therefore, perceived by every possible part of which a whole consists. A unity of substance, as we have already had occasion to remark, consists of an immense number of fractional parts. These, in order to constitute _unity,_ must be so closely connected with, and related to each other, that whatever state or affection one may happen to be in, all the rest must immediately be notified of the same. If one part be affected with pain, every other part most be conscious of it. If one part rejoices, hopes, or fears, the whole must, by sympathy, rejoice, hope, or fear in the same manner. But if one part could suffer, while another part was unconscious of such suffering; or if the affection of one part had no tendency to affect another, then the individual unity would be destroyed, and the substance would be as many distinct, thinking, feeling beings as there were parts unconscious of the affections of the others.

It is not necessary that a thinking substance should be limited to magnitudes or quantities that are exceedingly minute in order to constitute a unity. Large amounts of substance are as consistent with unity as small ones. But in all cases, whether the quantity be large or small, it is necessary that the parts should bear that relation to each other, that when one is affected every other should be affected also; otherwise, it could not be a unity. The feeling or thinking substance of an elephant or whale is as much an individual unity as the feeling substance or spirit of a gnat or animalculæ, though the magnitude of the former far exceeds that of the latter. It is the peculiar organization or relation of parts in such a manner as to be all conscious of each other's affection which constitutes the unity, without any regard to the size or amount of substance organized. When the several parts are so organized as to think, remember, hate, love, and feel alike, under the different circumstances to which the organization may be exposed, the whole is one individual unity or being.

If the mind or spirit be of the same magnitude as the body, then the impressions received through the various organs of a human body would only have to be transferred to the distance of about five feet, in order that every part of the mind might be alike conscious of such impressions. Let the velocity be ever so rapid, time would be an essential ingredient to the transfer of these communications from part to part. If they were communicated with the velocity of sound, those parts of the mind the most distant from the one first affected, would receive the impression in the two hundredth part of a second. If the transfer were as rapid as light, the impression would be conveyed to the most distant extremities of the mind in the two hundred millionth part of a second. These inconceivably minute portions of time would be altogether imperceptible to the mind. Hence, whenever any part of the mind is affected through its sensorial organs, every other part seems to be affected in the same instant, whereas, in reality, the affection is conveyed successively from part to part, the same as sound or light is conveyed from a sounding or a luminous body.

The conveyance of internal thoughts or emotions of any kind form one part of the mind to the other, is probably equal in velocity to the transfer of the various notions gained by sensation. Therefore, in consequence of the inconceivable velocity with which all thoughts and sensations are conveyed from one extremity of the mind to another, it is impossible for one part of the mind to have a thought, sensation, or feeling of any kind which the other parts of the mind can, during any term of time that is appreciable, be ignorant of. It is for this reason that the _whole_ of the mind thinks,--the whole of the mind loves,--the _whole_ of the mind hates,--the _whole_ of the mind wills, &c.

If the term of time were of any appreciable length in which thoughts and feelings are conveyed from one part of the perceptive mind to the other, then, while one part of the mind was hating an object, another part of the same mind might be loving it because of newly discovered qualities; and while a part of the mind in one foot was suffering intense pain, caused by treading upon hot iron, another part of the mind in the other foot, not having had time to receive the information, would venture also into the same danger.

Were it possible for the different parts of the mind to feel and think without being able to communicate their respective feelings to each other, then every part that thus thought and felt, would be a distinct individual, as much so as if it were separated for miles from all the rest, or, as if it were a separate organization. In this case, the whole being or mind which we before termed I, would cease its individual unity; and each part which thought and felt independently, could appropriate to itself the term I, and with the greatest propriety could apply the term YOU to every other part which thought and felt distinctly and differently from itself.

It is, therefore, because all parts of the mind seem to be affected in the same way, and apparently at the same time, that it is felt to be a single individual mind. It is this, and this only, that constitutes the unity of a thinking being, and not, as the immaterialist asserts, a something "without parts," which from its very nature could constitute neither a unity, nor a plurality, nor any thing else, but nothing.

If the human spirit be nearly the same form and magnitude as the fleshly tabernacle in which it dwells, it must be composed of an immense number of particles, each of which is susceptible of almost an infinite variety of thoughts, emotions, and feelings. Whence originated these susceptibilities? Are they the results of organization? Did each particle obtain its susceptibilities by being united with others? This would be impossible; for if a particle were entirely destitute of the capacity of thinking and feeling, no possible organization could impart to it that power. The power to think and feel, is not, nor can not be derived from any arrangement of particles. If they have not this power before organization, they can never have it afterwards. It follows then, that if ever there were a time when the particles of the human spirit existed in a disorganized state, each particle so existing, must have had all the susceptibilities of feeling and thought that it now has; and, consequently, each particle must have been a separate independent being of itself. Therefore, under such circumstances, one particle would have been no more affected with the state or condition of others, than one man is affected with the pleasures or pains of others with whom he is not associated.

How, then, it may be asked, can these separate independent beings, be so united as to form but one being, possessing the same susceptibilities as each of the individuals of which it is composed? The answer to this question may be more clearly understood by the following illustration. Let a certain number of iron filings exist in a scattered condition, widely separated from each other. It is evident that each possesses the susceptibility of magnetism. Such as are brought within the influence of a loadstone or magnet, under favourable circumstances, will exhibit all the magnetic phenomena, while others unconnected and at a distance, will remain entirely unaffected. But let all these filings be firmly united together into one bar of iron, and be exposed to the influence of a magnet or loadstone, and they will then be affected alike. Those which were before the union distinct individual particles, exhibiting at the same time different susceptibilities and qualities, according to the different circumstances in which they were placed,--are, by their union, consolidated into one mass. In this condition, if one part be magnetized, the whole will be magnetized; if one part be moved, the whole will be moved. Therefore the particles in this bar, though distinct parts of the same substance, can no longer be considered distinct individuals, because they are no longer affected differently, but alike. So it is with the human spirit: its particles previous to the organization, are, as above stated, separate and distinct beings, and the affections of each are entirely independent of the state of the others. But when organized into a person, all particles must from henceforth be subject to the same influences; and though they are distinct parts of the same substance, yet they are one in all their thoughts and feelings; and it is this which constitutes individuality in all intelligent organizations.

If a bar of iron, weighing one pound, had the power of expressing its different qualities, it could with the greatest propriety say, I am heavy--I am magnetized--I move. The term I would represent the whole bar, consisting of an infinite number of parts,--all affected precisely in the same moment and in the same manner. Now no one would for a moment suppose the pound of iron to be immaterial and without parts, because the term I was representative of a single individual bar. So likewise in the expressions, I think,--I feel,--I remember; the term I is a representative of the whole being, every part of which thinks, feels, and remembers in the same moment and in the same manner.

The arguments which Dr. Brown has used (Brown's Philosophy of the Human Mind. Lecture XCVI.) against the materiality of the mind, would apply with the same force against the materiality of iron or any other substance; for if thought or feeling prove the unity and inextension of mind,--weight, magnetism, or motion will, with as much reason, prove the unity and inextension of iron.

Mr. Taylder has asserted that "The Materialism of the Mormons is not only unscriptural, but anti-scriptural." (Taylder against Materialism, page 21.)

1.--He undertakes to show that it is unscriptural, by asserting that it is "in opposition to the _spirituality_ of the Divinity." (Taylder against Materialism, page 22.)

We readily admit that any system which is "in opposition to the _spirituality_ of the Divinity," is not only unscriptural but dangerously false. That the Spirits of the Father and the Son, as well as the Holy Spirit, consist of a substance purely spiritual, can by no means be denied by any believer in the sacred scriptures. It is a doctrine firmly believed by us and all the Latter-day Saints. It is a doctrine most definitely expressed and advocated in our pamphlet on the Kingdom of God, and that, too, on the very page from which Mr. Taylder makes copious extracts. It is there that we have definitely spoken of "_the_ SPIRITS _of the Father and Son_:" it is there that we speak of the Holy SPIRIT: it there that we have expressly said that "_God is a SPIRIT_." And yet in the face of all these declarations Mr. Taylder has had the hardihood to say that our theory is "in opposition to the spirituality of the Divinity." Instead of this, it is the material theory alone that establishes the very existence, of Spirit. Take away the _materiality_ of Spirit, and you at once destroy its very existence, as we have abundantly shown in the foregoing pages.

The immaterialists have aimed a deadly blow at the foundation of all spiritual existence, by denying it extension and parts. We, in opposition to this unphilosophic, unscriptural, and atheistical doctrine, have most clearly expressed our belief in a real tangible substance called Spirit, which has extension and parts, like all other matter.

"In the case of the angels' visit to Abraham, and of their partaking of food, who," inquiries Mr. Taylder, "would conclude they must have fleshy bodies?" (Taylder against Materialism, page 24.) We answer that a "_fleshly body_" and a _spiritual body_ are entirely different things. One is a body of material flesh; the other is a body of material spirit--they are entirely different kinds of matter, as much so as iron and oxygen. Jesus says, "God is a Spirit;" and again he says, "a Spirit hath not flesh and bones." From these sayings of Jesus, we can see that spiritual matter and fleshy or bony matter are distinct substances. These passages are sometimes quoted as a supposed proof of immateriality. But everyone knows that there are millions of substances that are not flesh and bones. A house, a stone, or a tree, "hath not flesh and bones," any more than a spirit; shall we therefore say that all these substances are _immaterial_? If a spirit must be _immaterial_ because it hath not flesh and bones, then every substance in the universe, except flesh and bones, must be immaterial.

Mr. Taylder supposes that the persons who appeared to Abraham, and ate, and walked, and conversed with him, were only "_bodily forms_," "_assumed_ in _mercy_ to man." But, we ask, how does our author know but what these bodily forms were the real, true, substantial forms of these beings, instead of assumed ones? He seems to think that "it might be assumed, with equal propriety, that the Divine Being is 'a rock,' 'a fortress,' 'a tower,' 'a shield,' 'a buckler,' because he is so styled in the bible." But did he ever appear in the form of a "rock," or "a fortress," to any person anciently? Did he ever appear to Abraham, to Jacob, to Moses, to the Seventy Elders of Israel, to Micaiah, to Isaiah, or to the Jewish nation, when he walked among them, in the flesh, as a tower, a shield, or a buckler? No: he appeared to them all as a person. If the three persons whom Abraham saw had appeared like a shield, or any other inanimate thing, they would not have been called men. It was because they resembled the human species that they were thus called.

Mr. Taylder says, "this scheme contradicts itself; for if Christ were possessed of a body of flesh and blood, how could he become incarnate? The Mormons believe," continues he, "in the incarnation, but this contradicts it. Their doctrine implies that he had a _body before_ he was incarnate, or he had a body before he had a body, or he had a body and had not a body at the same time." (Taylder's Tract, page 26.)

This author must be very ignorant of our doctrine if he supposes that we think that Christ had "a body of flesh and blood" before his incarnation. Christ, before his incarnation, was a spiritual body, and not a body of flesh and bones. It was the body of his spirit and not a fleshly body that was with the Father in the beginning, when God said, "let us make man in our likeness and in our image." Whenever he appeared before he dwelt in flesh, it was the pure spiritual matter only that was seen. The spiritual body of Christ has hands, face, feet, and all other members, the same as his body of flesh and bones. The spiritual bodies of all men were in the likeness of the spiritual body of Christ when they were first created.

That spiritual bodies are capable of condensation, is evident from the fact of their occupying the small bodies of infants. The spirits of just men, who have departed from the fleshly tabernacle, have been seen by the inspired writers; and from their description of them, we should not only judge them to be of the same _form_, but likewise of about the same size as man in this life. These departed spirits, then, which are about the same magnitude as men in the flesh, once occupied infant bodies. There are only two methods by which to account for their increase in magnitude; one is by an additional quantity of spiritual matter, being gradually and continually incorporated in the spiritual body, by which its magnitude is increased in the same way and in the same proportion as the fleshly body is increased. And the other is by its elasticity or expansive properties by which it increases in size, as the tabernacle of flesh and bones increases, until it attains to its natural magnitude, or until its expansive and cohesive properties balance each other, or are in a state of equilibrium.

The latter method seems to be in accordance with scripture. The spiritual body of Christ, when seen previous to his incarnation, is not represented as an infant in stature, but as a man, and consequently his spirit must have been of the size of a man. Therefore, when he came and dwelt in the infant tabernacle of flesh, born of a virgin, his spirit must have been greatly condensed; and did not completely regain its former magnitude until the fleshly tabernacle had attained its full growth.

As a further evidence of the condensation of spiritual matter, we read of seven devils beings cast out of Mary Magdalene, and of a legion of others inhabiting one man, and which, after being cast out, entered a large herd of swine. Now these devils were once angels who kept not their first estate. Those angels who kept their first estate, that have been seen, appear about the size and of the form of men, insomuch that they are frequently called men in the scriptures: and it is reasonable to suppose that those angels who fell did not, to any great extent, alter their size and form. Therefore, they must have been very much condensed and crowded when a legion of them entered one body.