Chapter VII: Regarding a New Treaty with Russia

When the treaty of eighty years’ standing between two then traditionally friendly powers, the United States and Russia, expired on the last day of the year 1912, it devolved upon that one of the powers which gave notice of abrogation (the United States) to take the initial steps in negotiating a new one.

Since notice of abrogation has been given, attention has been focused upon Russia’s attitude toward the main point at issue--namely, the exclusion of Jews, American or otherwise, from Russian territory. Those most in touch with Russian affairs are impressed with her determination to maintain her present position on this point, inasmuch as she considers it merely a question of her right to regulate her internal affairs unhindered, a right which the United States exercise freely. It is doubtful if the international aspects of the case have appealed to Russians at all, for they often express surprise that Americans, who have a race question at home, should not understand that it is a race question with them, too. Eventually, the United States must submit a proposition which will successfully meet this situation, or otherwise no treaty relations will be possible with Russia.

At first glance this would seem an impossible thing to do without an undignified backdown by the United States, a thing which their national self-respect could not permit them to contemplate. Fortunately, however, the situation is by no means so desperate as that, and it is the purpose here, with all due respect, to submit a way around the difficulty. The suggestion is offered in the belief that both nations are ready and anxious to reassume the traditionally friendly relations which have always existed between them, and will do anything reasonable and consistent with their dignity to remove all misunderstandings. Moreover, now that a controversy has been opened between them, each should seize the opportunity to make more definite and precise its new treaty relations, in order to avoid misapprehensions in the future. All diplomatic treaty negotiations in time of peace are essentially give-and-take transactions, and the things which are yielded may benefit the party yielding no less than the supposed beneficiary. So it is quite conceivable that when the present situation is cleared up, each side may find itself the gainer because of the things it has conceded.

There are a few other matters of minor importance that should receive consideration, now that the subject is open for the readjustment of treaty relations. Instead of the general terms of the earlier treaty, there should be a specific restatement of the rights and duties of consuls in the two countries. This is all the more necessary because of the fact that the bases of Russian and American jurisprudence are quite dissimilar. The personal concern to the consuls signifies but little; what is wanted is a fuller definition of what they may or may not officially do. A comparison in this respect with the treaties of other countries will reveal much to be desired.

The whole case, then, can be summarized thus:

First. Let it be granted by the United States that each nation has a right to regulate its internal affairs unhindered, even to the exclusion of any of its citizens that the foreign country may think fit to exclude;

Second. Let it be granted by Russia that every government has the exclusive right to vise its own passports. Then a slight readjustment of her administrative machinery will leave nothing to which the United States can rightly object.