Chapter XVII: ANGLO-AFGHAN RELATIONS--continued

Upon the conclusion of the Tirah campaign the forward policy ceased to be measured by the virulence of Anglo-Afghan amenities. Relations between Kabul and Calcutta were dominated by the pleasant impressions of his guest which Abdur Rahman had gathered when, as the Honourable George Nathaniel Curzon, M.P., the incoming Viceroy had visited Kabul in 1894. With much care this distinguished student had made an elaborate examination of border politics, presenting the results of his diligence in a series of scholarly and exhaustive studies of _Russia in Central Asia, Persia and the Persian Question_, _The Pamirs and the Source of the Oxus_, and _A Recent Journey in Afghanistan_. By reason of these journeys across Asiatic Russia, the Pamirs, Afghanistan and Persia, and through his remarkable opportunities for observation, unrivalled powers of assimilation, grasp of subject, luminosity of judgment and lucidity of expression, Mr. George Curzon was without a peer as an authority on frontier problems. When this brilliant and indefatigable mind was called to India as Lord Curzon of Kedleston, the methods by which the forward policy had been regulated in the closing decade of the nineteenth century had broken down, the labour of reconstruction reverting to a man who at least was the foremost expert of his time. Modifications were now essential; and Lord Curzon at once put into execution a number of important reforms in the economic and military control of the north-west frontier. The regular garrison in Chitral was lessened by one third. The soldiers in Lower Swat and the Malakand were reduced from 3550 men to one battalion and a half of native infantry and a small detachment of cavalry, while regular troops were withdrawn from the Gilgit Agency. Similarly, communication with Malakand was strengthened by constructing a railway, 2 feet 6 inches in breadth from Nowshera to Dargai, to which four companies were posted, while a very large cantonment was created at Nowshera. In the Khyber the regular establishment, 3700 strong, was replaced by two battalions (1250 in all) of the reorganised and enlarged Khyber Rifles, with an increased number of British officers and an improved scale of pay. The costly and extensive fortifications which at one time it was proposed to build in the pass, and at its further extremity, were abandoned in favour of a cheaper and improved scheme of defences, constructed to meet the requirements of the Afridi garrison. The plan of laying either the bed of a railway or a railway itself up the Khyber pass was displaced by the extension of the existing north-west railway from Peshawar to Jamrud, a distance of 10 miles.

Between Peshawar and Kohat, the amiable co-operation of the pass tribes was secured in the peaceable construction of the long desired cart-road through the Kohat pass, and a military road through the Mullagori country in the Khyber region, serving as a safe alternative road to that by way of Ali Masjid, was undertaken. At the same time a narrow gauge line, linking Thall _viâ_ Kohat with Kushalgarh upon the Indus and now converted to broad gauge, was projected; while, at a later date Nushki was joined up with Quetta. The finishing touch to an almost perfect system of frontier communications may be found in the preparations recently made for carrying the line along the left bank of the Kabul river to Dakka.

South of Kohat the Samana Rifles, a force of tribal militia 450 strong under British officers and recruited from the Orakzai tribesmen, was furnished as an extra battalion to the border military police, and the strength of the regular garrisons, maintained on the Samana range, reduced from 1700 to 600 men. In the Kurram valley, the Kurram militia were reorganised in two battalions (1250 strong) under British officers. In Waziristan, two battalions of Waziristan militia, 800 strong, were raised, the one for the Tochi valley or Northern Waziristan, the other for the Gomul valley or Southern Waziristan, thus releasing the services of 4000 regulars. These changes were rendered possible by the organisation and training of border police, militia and levies, the total strength of which is 10,000 men. The risk of entrusting to these irregulars the garrisoning of advanced posts was provided against by maintaining flying columns at Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, and minimised by the marked improvement of road and railway communication with all strategic centres in the North-West Province. While the financial saving was great, efficiency was increased because regiments were no longer split up into detachments. The number of regulars serving beyond the administrative frontier was reduced from 10,200 in 1899 to 5000, while supporting garrisons were increased from 22,000 in 1899 to 24,000.

When the Viceroy of India was satisfied that these measures were destined to reap their complement of success he supplemented his experiments in frontier management by their concluding phase. On August 27, 1900, after eighteen months’ patient inquiry and constant observation, he drew up a Minute advocating the separation of the administration of the north-west frontier from the control of the Punjab Government. These proposals were supported by the signatures of his colleagues in a covering despatch on September 13. Following the lines of Lord Lytton’s celebrated Minute upon the creation of a distinct Trans-Indus District, April 22, 1877, Lord Curzon embodied in one of the most brilliant pieces of analysis ever placed before the Imperial Government a temperate and lucid exposition of the existing order of frontier administration. The acceptance of the views enunciated in this Minute was notified by the Secretary of State for India, Lord George Hamilton, on December 20, 1900, but it was not until November 9, 1901, that the establishment of the new territory under the name of the North-West Frontier Province was proclaimed.

While Lord Curzon during the first three years of his _régime_--January 1899 to November 1901--was occupied with repairing the fabric of Indian frontier administration, Afghanistan, in the early spring of 1900, became the cause of an exchange of diplomatic notes between the late Lord Salisbury as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the late Russian Ambassador to Great Britain, M. de Staal, acting under the orders of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Mouravieff. In a communication dated February 6, 1900, M. de Staal informed the Foreign Office that the Russian Government were proposing that direct relations should be established between Russia and Afghanistan with regard to frontier matters; but that such relations should have no political character as the Russian Government intended to maintain their former engagements and would continue to consider Afghanistan outside the sphere of Russian influence. An immediate reply to this request was vouchsafed in which it was stated that, having regard to the understanding by which Afghanistan is outside the sphere of Russian influence,

... it would be impossible for the British Government to
take into consideration any change in existing arrangements
or to frame proposals to be brought before the Amir without
more precise explanation in regard to the method which
the Russian Government would desire to see adopted for
the exchange of such communications between the frontier
officials, the limitations to be placed on them and the
means of ensuring that those limitations would be observed.

To this intimation no reply at the moment was preferred by the Russian authorities, and the study of Anglo-Afghan relations shifts once more to the dominions of the Amir. Throughout the period in which Lord Curzon was so engrossed with the machinery of frontier and administrative reforms Abdur Rahman had not been in any way an idle ruler. In spite of his failing powers, with great energy and determination, he had concentrated his efforts upon the completion of his life’s work. With that accomplished, assured of the good-will of the Government of India shortly after Lord Curzon’s arrival in 1899 by the release of the munitions of war which had been detained through the outbreak of the Tirah troubles, he turned his hand to matters of more domestic concern. Satisfied with the improvements in his military establishment, content with the reforms which he had introduced in the administrative economy of his state, and having established its independence by elaborate artifices, he again sought the preservation of his line. In an effort to prepare his people for the acceptance and accession of Habib Ullah Khan at his demise he had, in 1891, delegated to this son authority to hold the public Durbars in Kabul. At the same time he had reserved to himself the control of foreign affairs, manifesting in this direction a keen appreciation of the value to the position of India which underlay the situation of Afghanistan. Menaced by growing physical infirmity and with strange premonition of his approaching end, at a special Durbar in the autumn of 1900 he informed the assembled nobles and high officials of his inability to cope with the increasing volume of affairs. Thereupon, amid a scene of singular pathos, the old Amir indicated that his son, Habib Ullah, would be given a still larger measure of authority.

A few months later, in May of 1901, a more emphatic warning of the grave state of the Amir’s health was received. Intelligence came through from Kabul to Peshawar that Abdur Rahman was no longer able to walk, and that he was not expected to live through the approaching winter. Incapacitated by a combination of Bright’s disease and gout as he was, the mental faculties of the ruler of Afghanistan were nevertheless unimpaired, and throughout the closing year of his life he applied them constantly to the improvement of his country. Interested in the South African War and grasping the salient lessons of our unreadiness, the Amir laid out much money in 1900-1901 upon a scheme of mobilisation; while in May 1901 he secured permission to import from Germany some thirty howitzers and field guns. At the same time, and without informing the Government of India, he ordered a large number of castings for big guns, an order which was subsequently repudiated by Habib Ullah. In August 1901 he personally directed the preparations for the suppression of the threatened disaffection in Khost, besides attending to the rising of the Tagis of Hariob on the Peiwar in September. These events were the last affairs of a prominent description to which Abdur Rahman was able to apply himself. Even while engaged in the business attending the Tagis operations his Highness began to show signs of decline and, on September 20, he was seized with a stroke of paralysis which disabled his right side.

His native physicians had prepared a compound of rare medicines costing several thousand rupees; but, as the paralytic seizure was kept strictly secret in the palace, this concoction was not in readiness and, when offered to the Amir, he could not take it. On September 28 his Highness, feeling his end approaching, summoned his sons, the nobles, the principal civil and military officers and the chief _raises_ of Kabul, Hindu and Mahommedan. One son only, Mahommed Afzul Khan, a boy of thirteen, was absent. He was with his mother at Balkh, that lady belonging to the Saids of Balkh. When all had assembled the Amir by look acknowledged their homage and then addressed them in a feeble, but distinct voice, saying:

You know when a king becomes old and infirm and near his
end he always desires to nominate a successor. I wish to
have my successor settled now. Consider among yourselves
whom you believe fit to succeed me.

The listeners were affected to tears by this speech. They declared that the Shahzada Habib Ullah, who had managed the state affairs so well for eight years, was the ruler whom they desired. On this the dying Amir indicated that a sword with a belt set with precious stones should be handed to Habib Ullah, together with a big volume containing his will and instructions for the future management of the state. He then ordered Nasr Ullah Khan to gird his brother with the sword, and dismissed the audience. Abdur Rahman had always the presentiment that he would die in the same year as our lamented sovereign Queen Victoria; and, after this assemblage, his condition became rapidly worse and he died on October 1. The news was kept secret until the morning of the 3rd, when, his precautions against disturbance having been completed, Habib Ullah himself made it public. Later in the day, on October 3, at a special Durbar Habib Ullah was formally accepted as Amir, whereupon he issued the following proclamation to the high officers of state:

His Excellency is informed of the demise of my august
father, the light of religion and the kingdom (may his
abode be in Paradise) who (as the verse runs “Death is the
end of all and not a moment’s delay is possible when it
draws nigh”) welcomed the invitation of God, and took his
way to Paradise.

His Excellency is now given a detailed account of what
happened. His late Highness had been frequently unwell;
but notwithstanding his chequered health he was not for a
moment found lacking in the conduct of his kingly duties,
until the light of his life was put down. He breathed
his last on Thursday night dated 19th Jamadi-ul-Sani at
Kala Bagh, his summer residence. He gave his soul to the
Creator of the Universe (truly all things tend towards
God). On Friday 19th rumours got abroad and the news
was communicated to the capital for the information of
officials. The people of the country, subjects as well as
military, came together to convey condolence, one and all.
Beyond the possibility of doubt they considered the monarch
was their kind father and their gracious ruler. The people
of the territories of Herat, Kandahar and Turkestan, etc.,
who were present in the metropolis, attended the exalted
Court and My Presence (who am the slave of God) and praised
the Almighty. Great was the concourse and so large the
number of those who witnessed the _Fateha_[44] that it is
known to God and to God alone. All of them followed the
service with sincerity of heart and purity of mind. Then
they took the oath of allegiance with praises to Omnipotent
God. They said as follows: “We desire to make your Highness
our king so that we may not live in an uncivilised state.
We wish you to acknowledge our oath of allegiance; and
we beg your Highness to take the management of all the
affairs of state and that of our nation; and we ask you to
discharge your duties night and day like his Highness the
deceased ruler of ours and to give us rest and repose.”

After the close of the speech and prayer I too with the
Throne’s usual kindness and munificence accepted their
oath of allegiance and request; and I have given them such
entire satisfaction as lies in my power. On that very day
all of our brothers took their oath of allegiance and after
them all the members of the House Royal and persons of the
noble families of Mahommed Zai and other tribes, _saids_,
priests, gentry and all officials of state, civil and
military, took the oath; and I too for my reign and time
acknowledged the oath. Then all offered up their prayers
for the late monarch (may his abode be in Paradise) and
gave thanks to God for my reign. After the dismissal and
breaking up of all the aforesaid proceedings the officials
of state, civil as well as military, and all those who
could afford and spare time from matters temporal took
their road to Kala Bagh and, together with those who were
already present, joined the funeral procession of the late
ruler (Light of the Country and Religion). The blessed
corpse of that august and potent king, according to his
will, was carried to the royal cemetery with great pomp
and honour; and he was interred in the ground and placed
in the place which is the real and ultimate abode for man.
That august and potent monarch, that king of pleasing and
praiseworthy manners, expired and sank in the depth of the
kindness of God (may his abode be in Heaven).

His Excellency is now informed of all that has happened.
He is given an account for his full information; and a
separate report is despatched to His Excellency the Viceroy
of India on account of the alliance that exists between us.

A second Durbar was held on the 6th, when the commander-in-chief, the principal military officers, the tribal chiefs then in Kabul, the leading nobles and the chief mullahs renewed publicly their agreement, made with the late Amir in the autumn of 1900, regarding the succession of Habib Ullah. With the Koran before them they affixed their seals to an oath which ran as follows:

We, all military officers, together with the army, all
Afghan tribal chiefs, sirdars, mullahs and other followers
of Islam in Afghanistan, do swear by the Koran to accept
Amir Habib Ullah as our King of Islam.

Habib Ullah replied:

You have appointed me as your king and I accept the office.
Please God I will be always a follower of the religion of
Mahomet the Prophet of God (may peace be on him) and I will
be guardian of the Mussalmans of Afghanistan who will obey
me as King of Islam.

The thousands of people assembled on the occasion of this Durbar solemnly removed their turbans, loudly acclaiming Habib Ullah as their new ruler. The leading Hindus of Kabul, headed by Dewan Harinjan, afterwards presented their agreement to the Amir, who graciously accepted it with the assurance that they should continue to live in peace and quietude, and promising a reduction of the taxes hitherto levied on their community. In Kabul on October 8, yet another Durbar was held, whereat Sirdar Nasr Ullah Khan brought the Koran, the sword and the flag belonging to the late Amir. Habib Ullah rose on the approach of his brother. Placing the Koran upon his head and fastening the sword round his waist, he raised the flag and took the oath to rule Afghanistan as a true Mahommedan. He said his brothers, the whole army and the people had appointed him king. He accepted the office and publicly asked God to pardon all his sins. The Amir then declared that he confirmed his brother, Nasr Ullah Khan, in the offices which he had held under the late Amir, at the same time appointing Omar Khan to take charge of the Revenue Department and Amin Ullah Khan to preside over the Judicial Department.

Simultaneously with these announcements several acts of clemency and generosity were proclaimed. In each of the important centres prisoners, confined for minor offences, were released; while various sums of money for charitable distribution, in all aggregating one lakh of rupees, were remitted to the local authorities. Kabul naturally came in for especial marks of grace. The trading community was advised of the remission of the more oppressive taxes, and certain guilds were notified that Treasury grants would be made to them. Five hundred prisoners in the capital province were also set at liberty. In a general way, since Abdur Rahman’s scheme of taking one able-bodied man in eight for military service had given rise to discontent, Habib Ullah advanced the pay of all ranks in the Regular and Irregular establishments. The pay of the cavalry was increased from twenty rupees to twenty-five rupees per month, the infantry from eight rupees to ten rupees per month, and the levies from six rupees to eight rupees per month. The officers enjoyed a proportionate increment. These evidences of consideration secured the tranquillity of the people at a change of ruler, although the perspicacity of the late Amir, in arranging matrimonial alliances for Habib Ullah with the leading families in the army and priesthood, had already secured the allegiance to his successor of these two important factors in the state. The accession, therefore, was undisturbed; and, while couriers bore the news far and wide to officials, the issue of a fresh coinage, bearing the impression in Turkish characters “Amir Habib Ullah Khan, Amir of Kabul, the Seeker of God’s Help,” carried conviction in the market-place. At the same time in India, October 14, was observed as an official Day of Mourning, and Habib Ullah was informed that a Mahommedan deputation, charged with the condolences of the Government of India and the personal greetings of the Viceroy, would immediately set out for Kabul. A few days later Habib Ullah’s preoccupation with the affairs of state passed from the civil to the spiritual side, when the new ruler of Afghanistan gave an ominous sign of that bigotry which has since distinguished him. For the first time in the country’s history the head of the state publicly performed the priestly functions in celebrating the Id at the Idgah Mosque. The chief priest of Kabul immediately proclaimed Habib Ullah to be the successor of Mahommed, whereupon the Amir of Afghanistan delivered an address inspired throughout by a spirit of intolerant ecclesiasticism. Among other things, he laid down that a fine not exceeding ten Kabuli rupees would be inflicted on all who did not offer prayers night and morning in the mosques. A register of the daily attendance of all individuals in the various quarters was to be kept; and a “box of justice” set up in each into which secret reports, upon any who neglected their religious duties, could be dropped.

The visitation of Providence upon Abdur Rahman could hardly have come at a more inopportune moment. Although the peace of the Indian frontier in 1901 was disturbed only by the Mahsud-Waziri operations, resulting from the legacy of hate which our activities on the Waziristan border during Lord Elgin’s administration had bequeathed to Lord Curzon, the action of Russia in the previous year in respect of Russo-Afghan relations had made it quite clear that the harmony of Mid-Asia was involved in the disastrous failure of British arms in the Transvaal. Nothing had ever been more probable than that an irruption of disorder throughout Afghanistan would attend the death of the late Amir. It was upon this contingency that, in the past, much thought and no little speculation had turned. Even if historical parallels were ignored, there were so many claimants to the accession in the field that the wiseacres of the chancelleries throughout the world had freely prophesied the decease of Abdur Rahman to be the signal for a general _mêlée_ in Asia, in which Russia and Great Britain would support the rival factions. The Russians, no less than ourselves, shared these premonitions; and, when the precarious condition of Abdur Rahman’s health became actually alarming in the spring of 1901, there was a wealth of suggestion in the silent preparation which took place along the Russo-Afghan and Indo-Afghan borders. Under the watchful ægis of Lord Curzon no sign of the apprehensions to which the death of Abdur Rahman gave rise in the mind of the Government of India was permitted to become public. While the first indication of a recrudescence of Russian activity along the Afghan border had been given nearly two years before, a fresh fillip to the situation was imparted by the sudden departure for the Afghan frontier of the Russian Minister of War, General Kuropatkin, who quitted St. Petersburg immediately after the receipt of the tidings of the Amir’s demise. Almost the earliest act of the former Governor-General of Asiatic Russia upon his arrival in Trans-Caspia was to release from imprisonment at Merv, on October 19, 1901, six Afghans who had been charged with espionage. Summoning them to his presence, he gave them the following message of good-will to the new Amir:

A misfortune has befallen Afghanistan. The Amir Abdur
Rahman is dead and Habib Ullah, one of his sons, has
ascended the throne. We Russians have always considered
ourselves friends of Afghanistan and we wish to remain so
in the present change of Government. Therefore, in setting
you at liberty, I command you to report yourselves to your
nearest chieftain and to repeat to him the words you have
heard from the Russian Minister of War.

While General Kuropatkin moved from Merv to Tashkent, where he was engaged in an inspection of the garrison, besides taking part in the ceremonies attendant upon the turning of the first sod of the Tashkent division of the Orenburg-Tashkent Railway, the Government of India replied to his act of overt insolence by entrusting to the chief of the Mahommedan Mission, which left Peshawar for Kabul on November 20, 1901, an invitation for his Highness the Amir of Afghanistan to visit India. In spite of certain pre-occupation, General Kuropatkin, during his visit to Central Asia, found time to devote considerable attention to Abdur Rahman’s successor. Before December 11, when the deputation of Indian Mahommedans quitted Kabul for their own homes, Habib Ullah received from the Governor of Mazar-i-Sharif an intimation that the Governor of Tashkent would send towards the close of the winter 1901-02 a deputation of Mahommedan officials from Russian Turkestan to participate in the Nauroz festival on March 21 at Kabul. Accompanying the escort were to be several batteries of field guns with supplies of ammunition, intended as a gift to his Highness in commemoration of his accession.

The significance of these circumstances was not lost upon Habib Ullah, whose perception would indeed have been dim if the antagonism of Anglo-Russian interests at the Court of Kabul had escaped his notice. An inkling of his attitude towards foreign affairs had been given when, in the very early days of his reign, he had ordered his people to observe Abdur Rahman’s prohibition against any use of the Quetta-Chaman extension between the first station on the southern side of the Khwaja Amran tunnel and the terminus at its northern extremity. In view of this, more than ordinary interest attached to the pronouncement which, it was anticipated, Habib Ullah would make to the members of the Indian Mission of Condolence.

At their first reception Habib Ullah’s attitude hardly commended itself to the pleasure of his guests. Inquiring what were the intentions of the Government of India in respect of his father’s subsidy, the invitation from the Viceroy was handed to him. After expressing satisfaction at the compliment which had been paid to him and alluding to the difficulty of accepting the invitation for some time, he hinted that the obligations contracted by Abdur Rahman were not binding upon himself. Finally, he threw the delegates a crumb of comfort in the assurance that he would follow in the footsteps of his lamented father. At a later date, in full Durbar and attended by the Mission, he expounded his policy, reiterating his intention to respect Abdur Rahman’s prejudices in regard to the introduction of telegraphs, the construction of railways, the reorganisation of the army, the appointment of a European British agent to Kabul and the adoption of Western customs--even the use of foreign medicines was banned. Schools for instruction in the Persian and Arabic languages, and the Mahommedan faith, would be opened, but the country would be jealously guarded against every form of external aggression.

For reasons which did not transpire, but which would not be difficult to determine, the visit of a Mahommedan deputation from Russian Turkestan did not take place. Meanwhile, astonishment at the promulgation of the recent ordinances had barely subsided when Habib Ullah began to press attentions upon his former tutor and pestilential frontier fanatic, Najib-ud-Din, the Mullah of Hadda, this action at once introducing into the arena of Anglo-Afghan relations a disquieting figure. Ostensibly with a view to honouring his former teacher, Habib Ullah detached certain disciples from the mullah’s entourage for a Mahommedan crusade in Kafiristan, increased his sacerdotal powers by placing a large section of the frontier within his religious jurisdiction, ordered a new mosque to be built for him and invited him to participate in the Installation ceremonies at the Nauroz, presenting him with the gift of an elephant and howdah for the journey. Invitations to the Nauroz celebrations were issued to other leading spirits in the frontier disturbances of 1897, including the notorious Mullah Powindah from Waziristan, the troublesome fire-eater Mullah Said Akbar from Tirah and the Safi Mullah. Following so closely upon the semi-contemptuous rejection of the representations which the Government of India had made through the deputation of Indian Mahommedans, Habib Ullah’s predilection for the society of men who had already incurred the displeasure of the Government of India made manifest the fact that the impulse of bigotry was stronger in him than the dictates of policy. The late Amir was accustomed to use the mullahs to consolidate his own authority and to interpose a fretful hedge of fanaticism between his kingdom and the outside world. But he knew also how to curb their insolence when occasion required, and he made them all--_kazis_, _imams_ and _muftis_--servants of the state. This adroitness in professing a militant orthodoxy and in securing at the same time the supremacy of the state over the church in Afghanistan, has been described as one of the most remarkable proofs of Abdur Rahman’s political genius.

Habib Ullah’s action in immersing himself in religious affairs so soon as he had ascended the throne, belonged to a different category. It gave rise to misgivings with regard to his capacity to hold the helm of state with the same firmness and clearness of vision as had enabled his father to descry the various shoals ahead. In any case since it boded no good to the peace of the frontier, it drew down upon the Amir a polite but unmistakable remonstrance. The effect of this was not lost upon the throne; and when the aged mullah pleaded, in excuse of his inability to attend the Nauroz, the difficulties of a journey across the hills in March, the point was conceded by his late pupil. Moreover, the Amir’s attitude at the Nauroz was circumspect and remarkable only for a very colourless exposition of the divine character of the _shariat_, the strict fulfilment of which he enjoined upon all good Mahommedans. Five days after the celebration of the Nauroz, however, the summons to the Hadda Mullah was repeated, but the Amir’s reception of this distinguished prelate was sufficiently cool to disarm criticism.

Administrative and domestic difficulties beset Habib Ullah at an early date in his career as Amir of Afghanistan. Before the summer of 1902 had waned the discovery of a palace intrigue with extensive ramifications induced him, at a Durbar on June 8, to order the re-establishment of the Secret Intelligence Branch in Kabul, the reports from which were to be presented to him each morning. At the same time, in an interesting attempt to temper despotism with justice, he ordained that an influential _rais_ from each tribe should be associated with each local governor to assist in the disposal of tribal cases. More important matters were to come before a Council of State in Tribal Affairs, which he now proceeded to create. It was composed of leading members of various tribes; and weekly meetings were to take place in Kabul under his own presidency. Almost the first matter to engage the consideration of this body was, in August 1903, a joint protest from the Ghilzais, Duranis and Suliman Khels against the application of Abdur Rahman’s scheme of calling up one man in eight for military service. In preference to this measure the objectors propounded the suggestion that musketry instructors should be appointed to all large villages. Acceptance of any modification of Abdur Rahman’s plan was deferred until the return of Nasr Ullah Khan from a tour of inspection of the military conditions of the state, which the Amir had projected.

As these events were occurring at Kabul, it became evident in Europe, that although Russia had not returned to the charge in respect of her communication to the Foreign Office on February 6, 1900, she had not abandoned the purpose which she had in view. In the middle of August 1902 the Russian authorities, in defiance of their treaty limitations, twice secretly addressed the Afghan Government, concealing this grave breach of their obligations towards us by an impudent agitation in the press for liberty of direct communication with Afghanistan. On August 31, the mouthpiece of the Russian Foreign Office, the _Novoe Vremya_, contained the following startling observation:

... The necessity for closer intercourse has so increased
that it is impossible longer to observe the conditions of
the 1873 Agreement. The Russian Government have notified
England that the effort of two years ago to enter into
direct relations with Afghanistan continues. We cannot,
therefore, consider ourselves bound by any obligations
whatsoever on the question of having direct relations
with Afghanistan on any subject that might interest us.
By virtue of the proximity of the two countries, the
development of intercourse between the local populations
which goes on every year will undoubtedly call for the
adoption of measures for the establishment of normal
relations with Afghanistan as being the only ones possible
with a neighbouring state. Upon the progress of events
generally and the civilising effects over the local
populations of Russian influence will depend alone the time
when such measures will be adopted....

Four days later, on September 4, the _St. Petersburg Bourse Gazette_, a paper in close relation with the Finance Ministry, said:

... The question which is ripe for settlement and will
not brook delay is the question of Russian diplomatic
representation at Kabul. Now that the Russian outposts have
been pushed to the Afghan frontier, it is unreasonable that
Kabul should remain inaccessible....

A message from the governor of Russian Turkestan to the governor of Afghan Turkestan, requesting that direct commercial intercourse might be established across the Oxus, had already been delivered when the initiatory efforts of the _Novoe Vremya_ and the _St. Petersburg Bourse Gazette_ were seconded by the _Viedomosti_ and the _Moscow Bourse Gazette_. While the Russian press debated the character of their obligations to us in respect of Afghanistan, the emissary of the Russian Government, Sikandur Khan, a Turcoman from Ali Yurt, proceeded to Kabul. Nearly two months elapsed before tidings of the arrival of Sikandur Khan at Kabul on September 4, reached India. Proof of Russia’s proceedings was then incontestable since, on September 5, at a State Durbar which had been specially summoned, Habib Ullah read a letter from the Russian Government to the following effect:

... In the opinion of the Russian Government the time
has now come for closer commercial relationship between
Afghanistan and Russia. The Afghans have nothing to
fear from Russian aggression, since the friendliness
existing between England and Russia would be endangered
if further annexations were made by the Government of
the Tsar in the direction of Badakshan and Wakhan. This
fact in itself becomes a permanent guarantee of peace.
In these circumstances it is an act of folly to continue
the attitude of suspicion and concealed hostility that
now exists between the Afghan and Russian commanders of
frontier posts. The Russian Government, therefore, invites
the Amir to throw open to Russian caravans the trade
routes between Khushk and Herat and Khushk and Kabul. The
Russian Government in return will allow Afghan traders to
enter freely and traverse without restrictions Russian
territory. The matter has already been laid before the
British Government, but this letter is addressed personally
to the Amir of Afghanistan because a favourable answer from
the Afghan Government would greatly strengthen the Russian
case....

When the reading of this document was finished the Amir asked for the opinion of the Durbar, the temper of its members being illustrated by Ali Yar Khan, who said:

“Let this Turki dog who carries messages for infidels be beaten on the head with shoes till his hair falls off. That ought to be our answer to the Russians.”

The Amir, greatly displeased at this remark, observed that, if there were any shoebeating, it would be for him who suggested the maltreatment of the messenger. Subsequently fifty rupees were given to the Russian courier. After some public discussion the Durbar dispersed, the Amir ordering the State Secretary to acknowledge receipt of the Russian communication, and to say that, while he was willing to discuss the matter, the interchange of views must in future be made through the Government of India in accordance with the precedent established by his father, the Amir Abdur Rahman. The Russian proceedings not unnaturally attracted the attention of Parliament; and on October 21, Lord George Hamilton acquainted the British public for the first time with the receipt of the proposal which had been transmitted by the Russian Embassy to the Foreign Office nearly three years before. The correctness of the Amir’s reply was in striking contrast with the impropriety of the Russian communication, the despatch of which had transgressed the limits of diplomatic etiquette. As far back as 1868-69, Prince Gortchakoff had assured Lord Clarendon that the Russian Government regarded Afghanistan as completely outside her sphere of influence. That engagement had been re-affirmed in 1875; extended, according to the statement made by M. de Giers to Mr. Kennedy on October 2, 1883, to include abstention from the transmission of letters of ceremony, and constantly renewed in personal conversation upon a variety of occasions since the original was enacted.

This action of Russia on the waters of the Oxus had drawn attention to the vague, uncertain state of the relations subsisting between Kabul and Calcutta. As matters stood all former agreements between India and Afghanistan had automatically terminated with the death of Abdur Rahman; and it remained for the succeeding Amir to adjust the situation by calling upon the Government of India to renew the arrangements by which Afghanistan had become a subsidised and protected state of India. Although twelve months had passed since the decease of the late Amir and many opportunities had been accorded him, Habib Ullah had given no indication of any desire to enter into any undertaking with the Government of India. Nevertheless he credited himself quite wrongfully each month with the accretions of his subsidy and the balance of his father’s monies which were lying, by the particular arrangement of the late Amir, at the Treasury in India. There is, to the onlooker, the greater piquancy in this regular remittance to India of debit cheques against the Treasury, since Habib Ullah, from the outset of his reign, had exhibited a most imperfect loyalty. The patronage which he extended to the Hadda Mullah had already brought one rebuke upon him; its continuation, in the face of such remonstrance, disclosed no sense of responsibility to the Government of India. Again his procrastination in dealing with the Viceroy’s invitation to a conference obviously qualified those amiable expressions of regard for Lord Curzon which Habib Ullah was at such pains to profess.

Since his accession, in marked contrast with the policy of his father, he had received numerous deputations from the Afridi zone, including one from the most predatory of all the clans south of the Khyber, the Zakka Khels, whose hostility to the British Government has always been a prominent feature of the frontier. The good impression, created in September, when he had invited the Hadda Mullah to return finally to his own country, placing a _takht-i-rawan_ at his disposal for the journey, was ruined by this foolish dalliance with Afridi tribes from within the Durand border. At the moment, taking time by the forelock, Habib Ullah was anxious to raise an Afridi bodyguard, composed of men upon whose personal loyalty absolute reliance could be placed in case of an _émeute_ in the palace. Knowledge of this fact acted as a spur to the more disorderly border-elements, who wished to separate the Afridis, as a tribe, from the control of the Indian Government. Embodying their several schemes in one, they put forward a plan which was presented to Habib Ullah by Khawas Khan, an Afridi _malik_, who, in 1897, had fled before the avenging arm of the Indian Government to Kabul. This worthy, now entirely dependent upon the benevolence of the Amir’s Government, urged his protector to raise an Afridi contingent, to which project Habib Ullah was foolish enough to assent. Robes of honour were issued to the tribal chiefs and a rate of pay, double the amount allowed to the Afghan soldiery, with a month’s advance, was promised to all recruits. Two thousand Afridis came forward in the first week, 500 of whom after receiving their rewards at once deserted. The success of this new departure appeared to be assured, when the corps was disbanded on account of the hostility which was displayed by the Afghans themselves to the scheme, the men being permitted to retain the clothing, modern breech-loading rifles and ammunition with which they had been supplied. The moving influence in this salutary change of mind on the part of Habib Ullah had been that of Nasr Ullah Khan; and it was with the greater regret that, in a little time, the Amir of Afghanistan was found to have broken away from the more masterful will of his brother to toy once again with the questionable ministrations of the Hadda Mullah. Early in November this holy, but tiresome, prelate wrote and persuaded Habib Ullah to hold a special Durbar in order to accept from the hands of the mullahs the title of Siraj-ul-Millat wa ud-Din--“The Lamp of The Congregation and The Faith.” In view of this it was generally felt that the happiest augury for the peace of the Indo-Afghan border, at the end of 1902, was the death of the Hadda Mullah on December 23, when the Afghan Government devoted a sum of 30,000 rupees towards the funeral obsequies of their sainted _protégé_.

The removal of the obstacles in the way of any cordial understanding between Russia and Great Britain in respect of Afghanistan was not assisted when, on January 14, 1903, the Foreign Office in St. Petersburg issued, in reference to the declaration made by Lord George Hamilton, the following _communique_:

As regards Russia’s relations with Afghanistan, it is
necessary to declare that Russia addressed no request of
any sort to the British Cabinet, but simply notified it of
her desire and purpose to enter into direct relations with
Afghanistan in the future.

No further declarations were made on this subject.

If language is to have any meaning at all in diplomacy, as in ordinary life, this utterance can only be characterised as one of the most flagrant perversions of truth that have ever disgraced the history of even Russian politics. Quite rightly the request of February 6, 1900, had been interpreted as a veiled demand for the right to establish a Russian representative at Kabul. The proposal admits of being supported by the plausible contention that such an agency would be a convenient means of settling disputes and avoiding collisions on the Russo-Afghan border. It must not be forgotten that it was over almost an identical question--the reception of the Stolietoff Mission by Shir Ali--that Great Britain fought the Second Afghan War; and it can hardly be denied that, if the concession demanded by the Note of 1900 were granted, the result would be to set up an influence in Kabul hostile in spirit to our own and from the first day of its existence there devoted to the sapping of our position.

Great inconvenience of course attaches to a system by which the smallest detail in the adjustment of any difficulty along the Russo-Afghan frontier must be referred for settlement from the Oxus to Tashkent, from Tashkent to St. Petersburg, from St. Petersburg to London, from London to the Government of India, and from the Viceroy’s Council to Kabul where, after much delay, the same process is repeated over the return journey. Unfortunately, the maintenance of such a cumbersome procedure is essential to the harmony of Anglo-Afghan relations since, although Russia professes to require facilities for frontier intercourse in commercial matters alone, similar protestations reduced Manchuria to the level of a Russian protected State until Japan intervened. Great Britain does not wish to embark upon a campaign in Central Asia and there need be no war so long as Russia, observing the pledges which she has given, tempers her desires with discretion. But continuation of the mischievous interference in Persia and Afghanistan, which has distinguished her actions hitherto, is a menace to the world’s peace, as the indulgent nature of the British Government has now been pushed to the limit of its endurance.

So far as Anglo-Afghan relations were concerned the New Year of 1903 held out little prospect of improvement. Possibly the mass of business, associated with Habib Ullah’s installation as Siraj-ul-Millat wa ud-Din, early in April, did prevent the Amir of Afghanistan from visiting India in the spring of this year. But, aside from the irregularity of the Amir’s behaviour, the incident of April 6, when Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Yate, commanding the 24th Baluchistan Infantry Regiment and stationed at Chaman, was arrested by Afghan officials for an innocent trespass beyond the Indo-Afghan border and removed to the fort at Baldak Spin, may be regarded as throwing light upon the precise quality of the bonds of amity which were uniting the two countries. Again, serious exception could be taken at the manner in which the Amirs of Afghanistan were employing the permission to import munitions of war which had been granted by the Government of India. The arrival of the thirty Krupp guns, acquired by Abdur Rahman on the eve of his death, had revealed the presence of a large number of castings for heavy ordnance which had been secretly obtained from Essen by the late Amir. A small army of carts and camels, lent by the Government of India, carried the thirty guns from Peshawar to Jelalabad, whence forty elephants, sent by Habib Ullah for the purpose, bore them to Kabul. Very properly transport was denied to that part of the purchase which disclosed Abdur Rahman’s strange dereliction of his treaty rights. Moreover, it was not difficult for Habib Ullah to recognise the irregularity of his father’s procedure, the immediate consequence of which was the repudiation of the order by the son. Unhappily, before this particular incident could be considered to have closed an immense consignment of rifle cartridges, numbering several millions of rounds, many of which were found to be of the explosive character condemned by the Hague Conference, arrived from the Amir’s agents in England. Since it never had been intended that the right to import munitions of war accorded to the late Amir of Afghanistan implied the power to amass an unlimited amount of war _matériel_ in Kabul, no other course was open to the Viceroy of India than to see that these other stores were likewise detained by the frontier authorities.

Something more important than considerations of prestige, therefore, was embroiled in the indifference which the Amir of Afghanistan displayed towards India as the paramount state, making it incumbent upon the Government to repeat their earlier representations. There was no need, indeed the occasion had hardly arisen, for any violent coercion. The situation required merely such tightening of the reins as would bring to the ruler of Kabul a proper comprehension of the actual ties between his country and India. In the correspondence which ensued, the Amir claimed the right to import munitions of war under the treaty which had given similar powers to Abdur Rahman. Unfortunately Habib Ullah had no such right; nor was any moral obligation to honour the debit notes which Habib Ullah had drawn every month against the Indian Treasury attaching to the Government of India. These points were made clear to the Amir who had neither the funds to pay for nor the authority to order the armaments which were then waiting at the frontier. The lesson had been driven home, and the loftiness of tone, which the Amir of Afghanistan had adopted in the initiatory letter, was hardly discernible in his concluding statement. Since there was no malice in the attitude of the Government of India, the Amir of Afghanistan was again invited to visit India for purposes of a conference with the Viceroy. A visitation of cholera, which swept through Kabul and North-eastern Afghanistan in 1903, the worst since the epidemic of 1879, permitted an excuse to be offered at which no exception could be taken. Before the scourge had subsided Russia had repeated her designs against Afghanistan. This, in view of the explicit denouncement of her treaty requirements, implied by the _communique_ of January 1903, was not perhaps surprising. Their renewal was denied by Lord Cranbourne in the House of Commons both in the spring and autumn sessions of 1903. Nevertheless, in the middle of February, Sirdar Ali Khan, the governor of Afghan Turkestan, had sent to Kabul four Russian spies whom he had arrested near Mazar-i-Sharif; but the most flagrant of these insidious encroachments upon a British preserve occurred in the following August, when the governor of Russian Turkestan sent back some deserters from the Afghan army who had escaped into Russian territory. Obviously the note of defiance in the message which accompanied them was addressed to the suzerain power.

It ran:

As the Tsar and the Amir are amicably disposed the one to
the other, His Imperial Majesty has given orders that every
effort shall be made to continue the friendly relations
existing between Russia and Afghanistan.

As representative of the Tsar I am directed to send back
all refugees and evil-doers who come to my territory from
Afghanistan. This is the reason why I send back to you
these eleven soldiers with their arms.

Please be kind enough to communicate this to the Amir.

In spite of these persistent endeavours to establish friendly relations with Kabul there is little reason to believe that Habib Ullah offered any encouragement to the Russian frontier officers. Inveterate suspicion of foreign influence characterises every aspect of his external policy and Russia and Great Britain are made to feel impartially the effect of this attitude. Abdur Rahman accepted the good faith of the Indian Government unquestioningly and understood his northern neighbour sufficiently to realise that it was less a wish for the friendship of Afghanistan than a desire to pin-prick India which prompted her overtures. Habib Ullah has yet to learn how to stand where his father strode with perfect confidence, a foolish mistrust sapping the strength of the son. Under a less skilful statesman than Lord Curzon it is conceivable that the patience of the Government of India would long since have been exhausted. That exceptional familiarity with the affairs of Asia, which preeminently distinguishes the late Viceroy, enabling him to tread Oriental labyrinths with wise discrimination, permitted him upon this occasion to bridge once more a crisis between Afghanistan and India. Almost in defiance of Kabul obstruction, he proceeded to the solution of difficulties which did not require any personal discussion with a refractory potentate. Early in the winter of 1903-04, the Government of India took up for consideration those sections of the Afghan boundary which, ever since the withdrawal of the Udny Mission eight years previously, had required demarcation. Surprised into ruffled acquiescence, the Amir in January 1904 began to make extensive preparations for a meeting between Major Roos-Keppel, the chief of the British Commission, and his own representative. Through the brief absence of Lord Curzon from the helm of state, the vacillation of the Amir precipitated a collapse of these plans at the last moment. Wilfully stupid, too, only a little later--in July 1904--was Habib Ullah’s order to Nasr Ullah Khan to select twenty-four officers who were to be detailed as envoys to England, France, Germany, Russia, Persia, China, Japan, Turkey and Egypt in the Old World, and America in the New World.

If the break-down in the negotiations anent the Mohmand boundary had increased the tension between Kabul and Calcutta, it was certainly impossible to tolerate this more direct perversion of the principles out of which the fabric of our relations with Afghanistan had been woven. Concerned at the rupture which was threatening between India and Afghanistan at a moment when Lord Curzon was absent from India and too timid to insist upon the Amir’s acceptance of the Viceroy’s invitation to a conference, the Imperial Government, as the only means of renewing the Agreements upon which they were set which remained to them, decided to despatch a Mission to Kabul. At the instance of the Secretary of State for India, Mr. St. John Brodrick, the acting Viceroy of India, Lord Ampthill, acquainted Habib Ullah with the wishes of His Majesty’s Government. In reply His Highness, with the hope of improving his position when the time came for diplomatic discussion and as an act of conciliation towards the Viceroy, intimated his willingness to send his son Inayat Ullah Khan--a charming, intelligent boy of sixteen and a remarkable instance of that youthful precocity which attains so abnormal a development in the Oriental--to meet Lord Curzon upon his return to India. However pressing may have been the questions outstanding between the Government of India and the Amir of Afghanistan, the visit of a British Mission to Kabul--no doubt desirable and in that sense opportune--was derogatory in a Government whose invitations to the head of the country, which it was proposed to honour in such an emphatic fashion, had been treated with contumacy. Lord Curzon’s opposition to the project is well-known; but with the exception of this distinguished statesman few were prepared for the unfortunate set back which the mission received. A grievous miscalculation undoubtedly was made. But the blunder, which determined its existence and brought about a complete miscarriage of Anglo-Indian policy, lay not so much in sending the mission as in His Majesty’s Government not having decided, if the Amir proved recalcitrant, how far and upon what ground the Cabinet should stand firm.

As constituted, the Mission comprised Mr., now Sir, Louis Dane, Foreign Secretary at Simla, Mr. H. R. Dobbs--who, together with Major Wanliss, had recently returned from replacing the boundary pillars on the Perso-Afghan border--Major W. Malleson, R.A., Captain Victor Brooke, 9th Lancers, and a British doctor. Leaving Peshawar on November 27, the mission reached Dakka on November 29, and was met at Lundi Khana by 200 Afghan cavalry under the Sipah Salar Ghulam Hussein, the Sarhang of Dakka, and Mahommed Hasan Khan. Major Roos-Keppel, political agent for the Khyber, accompanied the party for a few miles beyond Lundi Khana to Torkhana, where a guard of honour of the Khyber Rifles was drawn up, the mission ultimately arriving at Kabul on December 10. Elaborate gifts were conveyed by Mr. Dane for presentation to the Amir, among many others a £700 motor-car and several cases of sporting equipment. As a compliment to the ladies of the harem the Government of India thoughtfully included a cinematograph, providing at the same time the necessary operator. Among the presents to the Mission from his Highness were a gold watch and a set of gold cuff links which Habib Ullah had offered to Mr. Dane. The note struck by the negotiations was scarcely in the same pitch as the festivities by which the withdrawal of the Mission was celebrated, when seven gramophones simultaneously discharged bursts of discordant revelry. Nevertheless, the din of these instruments fell on the ears of those who had every cause to be relieved at the peaceful termination of their labours, since the clouds had hung low over Kabul throughout the Anglo-Afghan conferences of 1904-05.

Many things in our buffer state of course required to be improved as much for the enhancement of its own interests as for the advantage of India. There was the Amir’s perpetuation of Abdur Rahman’s objection to Afghan subjects using the northern extremity of the Quetta-Chaman railway to be discussed, as well as the projection of railways from Chaman to Kandahar and from Peshawar to Kabul. Besides these important subjects there were the prolongation of the Indian system of telegraphs to Kabul and Kandahar; the provision of telegraphic communication between Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat; Kabul and Kandahar; Kandahar and Herat. The re-organisation of the Afghan army had also to be considered, while the demarcation of the Mohmand boundary and the Seistan border, the definition of the Amir’s control over border tribes, the question of the subsidy and Habib Ullah’s powers in respect of the importation of munitions of war were topics, the examination of which would be, it was expected, to the mutual benefit of the contracting parties in an Anglo-Afghan alliance. In India it was understood that there might be a difficulty in the arrangement of the terms which were to be secured from the Amir; but that ultimately, and after protracted negotiations, our demands would be conceded. To this end the chief of the Mission was provided with a treaty, drawn up under the personal supervision of Lord Curzon during his brief residence in London in 1904, which was designed to bring about a discussion of every aspect of the old agreements with a view to removing previous difficulties and arriving at a clear understanding for the future.

This treaty comprised three clauses, but Habib Ullah, simulating annoyance at the terms of the clause which attempted to restrict the importation of arms, would not enter into any discussion over it. After the Mission had passed four months in the Afghan capital, the limit, to which the Amir of Afghanistan would permit himself to go, reproduced simply the formal renewal on both sides of the engagements entered into between Abdur Rahman, the late Amir of Afghanistan, and the Government of India.

The Dane Treaty therefore was as follows:

He is God, Extolled be His perfection,

His Majesty Siraj-ul-millat-wa-ud-din, Amir Habib Ullah
Khan, Independent King of the State of Afghanistan and
its Dependencies, on the one part, and the Honourable Mr.
Louis William Dane, C.S.I., Foreign Secretary of the Mighty
Government of India and the Representative of the Exalted
British Government on the other part.

His said Majesty doth hereby agree to this, that in the
principles and in the matters of subsidiary importance of
the Treaty regarding internal and external affairs, and
of the engagements which his Highness my late father,
that is, Zia-ul-millatwaud-Din, who has found mercy, may
God enlighten his tomb! Concluded and acted upon with the
Exalted British Government, I also have acted, am acting,
and will act upon the same agreement and compact, and I
will not contravene them in any dealings or in any promise.

The said Honourable Mr. Louis William Dane does
hereby agree to this, that as to the very agreement
and engagement which the Exalted British Government
concluded and acted upon with the noble father of his
Majesty Siraj-ul-millatwaud-Din, that is, his Highness
Zia-ul-millatwaud-Din, who has found mercy, regarding
internal and external affairs of principle or subsidiary
importance, I confirm them and write that they (the British
Government) will not act contrary to those agreements and
engagements in any way or at any time.

Made on Tuesday, the 14th day of Muharram-ul-haram of the
year 1323 Hijri, corresponding to the 21st day of March of
the year 1905 A.D. (Persian Seal of Amir Habib Ullah Khan.)

This is correct. I have sealed and signed.

AMIR HABIB ULLAH,
LOUIS W. DANE, Foreign Secretary,
Representing the Government of India.

Thus the situation upon the arrival of Mr. Dane from Kabul differed in no way from that which had preceded his departure for the Afghan capital, save that substantial concessions had been awarded to the Amir of Afghanistan who, in return, had conceded nothing. In addition to an astonishing and entirely unnecessary elevation in the style and title of the ruler of Afghanistan--conveyed in the charge “Independent King of the State of Afghanistan and its Dependencies,” and the reference to “His Majesty,” which the precious instrument reveals--inevitable corollaries of the transaction were the continuation of the annual subsidy of eighteen lakhs to Abdur Rahman’s successor, the release of the arrears--approximately amounting to £400,000--which had been accumulating since a little previous to the demise of the late Amir, and the right to an unrestricted importation of arms.

It must not be supposed that the mere ratification of the engagements was sufficient for the purposes of British policy in Central Asia. Much more was needed; and, since facilities were deliberately withheld and the Amir rejected consideration of our pledged responsibility, it is evident that the subjugation of Afghanistan to the interests of India is incomplete. It is of value perhaps to have ascertained that the Amir is disaffected and untrustworthy. There was always a doubt but it was hoped that the affront, which he offered so sedulously to the British Government, was due to his own conspicuous vanity rather than the manifestation of actual ill-will. The Kabul conference made that point clear; but, as the Imperial Government have elected to observe an impressive reticence upon the circumstances of this unfortunate episode, it is no less incumbent upon others to do likewise. Nothing can be gained by revealing to the world the details of a rebuff without parallel in the history of Indian politics, unless such acknowledgment were made to assist public opinion in appreciating the issues involved in the absence of any satisfactory understanding between Kabul and Calcutta. That this course formed no part of the late Government’s policy was disclosed on June 21, 1905, by the debate in Parliament upon the Indian budget and, at a later date, upon Mr. Balfour’s speech on Imperial Defence. The Ministers, who spoke on these occasions, concealed the truth rather than stated it, and their utterances cannot be accepted as either correct or adequate. Mr. Balfour’s statement that the construction “of strategic railways by Russia in Afghanistan” would provoke Great Britain to war does not render the character of Anglo-Afghan policy more intelligible, nor remove the disadvantages from our position. On the contrary, the utterance was most misleading since no such contingency, as the construction of Russian railways in Afghanistan itself, is likely to occur until Russia is prepared to strike with all her strength in Persia and Afghanistan. The question of Anglo-Afghan relations, therefore, remains for solution, having given rise to a situation which was regarded by the late Viceroy and every member of his Council with the gravest apprehension.

[44] Funeral service.

APPENDICES