Chapter II (2)

It was now about half-past eight o’clock, and the firing in the northwest, where Lyon was supposed to be, and where he really was fighting, had almost entirely ceased. At this instant, Dr. S. H. Melcher, the assistant surgeon of Salomon’s regiment, and some of the skirmishers came back from the front, where desultory firing had been going on, and reported that Lyon’s men were coming up the road, for they could be seen plainly, and the gray-coated Iowa regiment plainly distinguished. At once, Lieut. Col. Albert, of the 3d Missouri, and Col. Salomon, of the 5th, notified their regiments _not to fire_ on the troops coming in this direction, for they were friends, and Sigel himself gave the same caution to the artillery.

Everybody was surprised at this unexpected turn of affairs, and the Germans of Sigel’s and Salmon’s regiments began jabbering away delightedly, and the color-bearers were beckoning with their flags to the advancing hosts to “come on”—when, all at once, two batteries of artillery, one on the Fayetteville road and one on the hill where it was supposed Lyon’s men were in pursuit of the flying Confederates, opened with cannister, shell and shrapnel, while the gray-coated troops, supposed to be the Iowans, advanced from the Fayetteville road and attacked the Federal right, and a battalion of cavalry made its appearance, apparently ready and waiting to charge!

The jabbering of the German soldiers was now something wonderful, but it had a different tone from that of a few minutes previously! It is impossible to describe the consternation and frightful confusion that resulted. So surprised and frightened were the soldiers that they could not understand these were _Confederates_ who were firing upon them and coming rapidly forward to sweep them from the face of the earth. They hurried and skurried about crying, some in English: “It is Totten’s battery!” others in German: “_Sie haben gegen uns geschossen! Sie irrten sich!_” (They are firing against us! They make a mistake!) And then making no effort to fight worthy of the name, they began to retreat.

The artillerymen, all of whom were recruits from the infantry, who had seen but little service of any kind, could hardly be brought forward to serve their pieces, although directed by Sigel himself; the infantry would not level their guns until it was too late; indeed, they could not be made to stop running, let alone to turn and fight. Salomon cursed in German, in English, in French. Sigel threatened and bullied and coaxed. No use. As well try to stop a herd of stampeded buffaloes. Lieut. Farrand, with his company of cavalry brought off one piece of artillery which had not been unlimbered and put in position, and away it went the wheels bouncing two feet from the ground and the postilions lashing their horses like race riders.

On came McCulloch’s and Price’s men, the Louisiana regiment of Col. Hebert (pronounced Hebare) which had been mistaken for the 1st Iowa because of its pretty steel gray uniform, was in front, and following them were the Arkansas regiments of Dockery and Gratiot, the 5th and 3d, Greer’s regiment of Texas cavalry, Lieut. Col. Major’s Howard and Chariton county battalion, Johnson’s battalion mounted Missourians, and some other detachments. Up to the very muzzles of the cannons they came, killing the artillery horses and what artillerymen were reckless enough to remain, firing fairly into the faces of the panicky Teutons and forcing them to throw themselves into the bushes, into by-roads, anywhere to escape and scamper away as fast as their legs could carry them. The color-bearer of Sigel’s own regiment was badly wounded; his substitute was killed, and the flag itself was captured by Capt. Tom Staples, a Missourian, of Arrow Rock, Saline county.

When the plateau was reached, the cannon captured and the field gained, the infantry stopped and cheered, Reid’s and Bledsoe’s batteries fired parting salutes into the flying blue-coats, and then, leaving the cavalry to pursue, both infantry and artillery turned about and went up to the other end of the valley to assist their brethren in that quarter, and to participate in the final triumph of the day.

Away went the Germans, down to the south into Christian county, throwing away guns, cartridge boxes, even canteens,—everything that hindered rapid flight,—wandering about and hiding when they could with the Texas, Arkansas, and Missouri cavalry leaping upon them incessantly and slaying them wherever they made the least show of resistance. At Nowlan’s mill, on the James, three miles from the battle-ground, it was told that four fugitives skulked under the mill-dam and, refusing to come out, were riddled with buckshot.

The next day men lay scattered all over the country, wounded or dead; and yet Sigel lost but comparatively few killed. Prisoners were taken in great numbers—run down by the Texas rangers and driven in like flocks of sheep, as timid now and as harmless. Sigel himself got panicky after awhile and fled for Springfield, across the country, accompanied by only two guards, giving rise to the wicked stanza of the song sung in the Confederate camps after the battle, concerning the battle of Wilson’s Creek,—how,

Old Sigel fought some on that day,
But lost his army in the fray;
Then off to Springfield he did run,
With two Dutch guards, and nary gun.

At Mrs. Chambers’ house, four miles south of Springfield, Col. Sigel and his two guards halted and procured a drink of water, and then rode away to Springfield, as rapidly as their jaded horses could carry them. Sigel himself arrived at Springfield with but one orderly.

Only the cavalry under Carr and Farrand, the one piece of artillery, two caissons and about 150 infantry came off in anything like order, and these followed down the wire road some miles to the west and then turned off due north and united with Sturgis’ column, near the Little York road. Only four pieces of artillery were captured at the time of the charge on the hill, for those were all that were in position. The two others were in the rear. In attempting to get one of them away a wheel horse was killed, and the drivers abandoned the gun, after first spiking it as best they could. The gun that was saved was first abandoned out on the Fayetteville road, and hauled off at first by hand a short distance, Capt. Flagg employing the prisoners and soldiers as artillery horses.

Concerning the retreat of that portion of Sigel’s force which went to the westward, Lieut. Chas. E. Farrand (then of the Second Regular Infantry) commanding the company of cavalry before mentioned, writes:—

Upon finding myself with my company alone, I retired in a southerly
direction, and accidentally meeting one of the guides (Mr. Crenshaw),
who had been employed in taking us to the enemy’s camp, I forcibly
detained him until I could collect some of the troops, whom I found
scattered and apparently lost. I halted my company and got quite a
number together, and directed the guide to proceed to Springfield, via
Little York. After proceeding a short distance, we came upon one of
the pieces which had been taken from Col. Sigel. Although the tongue
of the limber was broken, one horse gone, and one of the remaining
three badly wounded, we succeeded in moving it on. Some distance in
advance of this we found a caisson, also belonging to Col. Sigel’s
battery. I then had with me Sergt. Bradburn, of company D, 1st
cavalry, and Corporal Lewis and Private Smith, of my own company (C,
2d dragoons). My company being some distance in advance, I caused the
caisson to be opened, and on discovering that it was full of
ammunition, I determined to take it on. I and the three men with me
tried to prevail upon some of the Germans to assist us in clearing
some of the wounded horses from the harness, but they would not stop.
After considerable trouble, my small party succeeded in clearing the
wounded horses from the harness, hitching in two more and a pair of
small mules I obtained, and moved on, Corporal Lewis and Private Smith
driving, while Sergt. Bradburn and I led the horses. After reaching
the retreating troops again I put two other men on the animals, and
joined my company with my three men. Before reaching Springfield it
became necessary to abandon the caisson,[9] in order to hitch the
animals to the _piece_. This was done after destroying the ammunition
it contained. Lieut. Morris, adjutant to Col. Sigel’s command,
assisted me in procuring wagons, which we sent back on the road after
the wounded.

The route of retreat taken by Lieut. Farrand and Capt. Flagg, and the fragments of Sigel’s command, 400 in all, was down the wire road a short distance, and then north to the Mt. Vernon road. While marching northward this body of disordered men was only within two or three miles of the entire Southern army for three or four hours. Why Generals Price and McCulloch did not send out a small force of mounted men and take prisoner every man, which could very easily have been done, is inexcusable, certainly.

DR. S. H. MELCHER’S ACCOUNT.

Mention has been made of Dr. Samuel H. Melcher, who as assistant surgeon of Col. Salomon’s 5th Missouri (Dr. E. C. Franklin, being surgeon), was present at the battle of Wilson’s Creek with Sigel’s command. To the writer hereof Dr. Melcher, now of Chicago, sends his recollections of the events of the memorable contest. After narrating the preliminary movements of Sigel, substantially as heretofore given, Dr. Melcher says:—

* * * Gen. Sigel soon gave the order to fire, which was responded to
with rapidity, but our guns being on an elevation, and the
Confederates being in a field which sloped toward the creek, the shots
passed over their heads, creating a stampede but doing little, if any,
damage to life or limb. In vain I and others urged the artillerymen to
depress the guns. Either from inability to understand English, or, in
the excitement, thinking it was only necessary to load and fire, they
kept banging away till the whole camp was deserted. * * * The command
then moved on till it reached the Fayetteville road and Sharp’s house.
While the command was taking position, I with my orderly, Frank
Ackoff, 5th Missouri, went into the abandoned Arkansas camp where I
found a good breakfast of coffee, biscuit and fried green corn. * * *
Most of the tents were open—a musket with fixed bayonet being forced
into the ground, but up, and the flap of the tent held open by being
caught in the flint lock. At that time, besides a few Confederate
sick, there were in the camp Lieut. Chas. E. Farrand, in command of
the dragoons, and his orderly. Half an hour later, some straggling
parties from the 3d and 5th Missouri, set fire to some wagons and camp
equipage.

* * * The four guns were in the front, supported by the 3d Missouri,
with the cavalry and dragoons on the left in the timber. The 5th
Missouri was in reserve, except Co. K, Capt. Sam’l A. Flagg, which was
further in the rear, guarding some thirty or forty prisoners. At this
time, scattering shots were heard at some distance in our front, but
no heavy firing. Armed men, mostly mounted, were seen moving on our
right in the edge of the timber. * * *

It was smoky, and objects at a distance could not be seen very
distinctly. Being at some distance in front of the command, I saw a
body of men moving down the valley toward us, from the direction we
last heard Gen. Lyon’s guns. I rode back, and reported to Gen. Sigel
that troops were coming, saying to him, “They look like the 1st
Missouri.” [Iowa?] They seemed moving in a column. * * * By this time,
Sigel could see them. Not seeing their colors, I suggested to Sigel
that he had better show his, so that if it _was_ our men they might
not mistake us—Sigel’s brigade not being in regulation uniform. Gen.
Sigel turned and said: “Color-bearer, advance with your colors, and
wave them—wave them three times.” As this order was being obeyed,
Lieut. Farrand, with his orderly, arrived from the Arkansas camp, each
bearing a rebel guidon, which they had found, and with which they rode
from the right of the line, near Sharp’s house, directly in front of
the color-bearer of Sigel’s regiment. Then there was music in the air.
A battery we could not see opened with grape, making a great deal of
noise as the shot struck the fence and trees, but not doing much
damage, as far as observed, except to scare the men, who hunted for
cover like a flock of young partridges, suddenly disturbed. The
confusion was very great, many of the men saying, “It is _Totten’s_
battery! It is _Totten’s_ battery!” The impression seemed to be
general that Totten was firing into us, after seeing the rebel guidons
of Farrand, as it was the common understanding that the Confederates
had no grape, and these were grape shot, certainly.[10]

Gen. Sigel _now_ evidently thought of retreat, as the only words I
heard from him were, “Where’s my guides?” [Instances of individual
cowardice among Sigel’s officers are here given.] I assisted Lieut.
Emile Thomas (now of St. Louis), the only officer of his company that
had the grit to stay, to reform the men. I do not know if we could
have succeeded, had not a Confederate cavalry battalion suddenly
appeared in our front, on the line of retreat. For a moment the two
commands gazed upon each other, and then came a terrible rattle of
musketry, and a great hubbub and confusion in the direction of Sigel’s
command, which was just around a bend in the road to our rear.

In a twinkling, men, horses, wagons, guns, all enveloped in a cloud of
dust, rushed toward us, and in spite of Lieut. Thomas’s utmost
efforts, Company F started with all speed _down_ the Fayetteville road
toward the Confederate cavalry. The latter, seeming to think that they
were being charged upon, wheeled and got out of the way very quickly!
The bulk of Gen. Sigel’s command _turned to the east_ and were
followed by a Confederate command, that captured one gun at the creek,
many prisoners, and left a considerable number of killed and wounded
along the road.

Perhaps one-third of the command went southwest, and halted at the
next house beyond Sharps’ on the Fayetteville road, and here Dr.
Smith, who was Gen. Rains’ division surgeon, came up, with a long
train of wagons and coaches, and was captured, but at once released on
my intervention. [After this, Dr. Melcher accompanied Dr. Smith to the
battle-field.] * * * The one gun that was abandoned on the
Fayetteville road was really saved by Capt. Flagg, whose men drew the
gun by hand till they found some horses, and the Confederate prisoners
carried the ammunition in their arms. * * * They came into Springfield
the same evening by way of Little York.

Sigel’s reasons for his defeat must here be given. He states that he tried to obey his orders to attack the enemy in the rear and to cut off his retreat. This he did, but he also cut off his own retreat very nearly, a circumstance he had not counted upon.

The time of service of one of his two regiments of infantry, the 5th Missouri, Salomon’s, had expired some days before the battle and they had clamored to go home. On the first of August he had induced them to remain with the army eight days more. This latter term had expired the day before the battle. The men therefore were under no obligations to fight, except that they had marched out to do so, and when the time came, suddenly remembered that “they did not have to fight.” The 3d regiment, Sigel’s own, was not the old 3d, that fought at Carthage; that regiment, its time having expired, had been mustered out, and the new regiment was composed of 400 new recruits and of but a few other men who had seen service. The men serving the artillery were new recruits who knew next to nothing of gunnery, and were commanded by two lieutenants whose only experience as artillerists had been in the Prussian army in a time of peace. Again it is stated that only about half of the companies were officered by men with commissions, which Sigel says, was the fault of the three months’ service.

But over all it is claimed that Sigel’s complete defeat was the result of an attack of vastly superior forces, the flower of McCulloch’s army, that was permitted to approach fatally near under the mistake that they were friends instead of enemies.

As explaining and detailing something of the retreat of that wing of Sigel’s command which turned to the east, the following statement of Captain (now General) E. A. Carr, who, as previously stated, commanded the advance guard of Sigel’s brigade, may be found of interest:—

“At about 9 o’clock Capt. Carr received word that Sigel’s infantry were in full flight and that he was to retreat with all haste. After galloping away as best he could for about a mile and a half to the rear, Carr came upon Sigel at the spring where the army had halted the first night when returning from Dug Spring some days before. After a brief consultation it was decided to move south on the Fayetteville road until there was a chance to go out and circle around the pursuing enemy and then strike for Springfield. There were then present at the spring Sigel, Carr, Lieut.-Col. Albert, Carr’s 56 cavalry, 200 of Sigel’s badly demoralized infantry, one piece of artillery, and two caissons. After “retiring” rather hastily for a mile or so a body of cavalry was observed in front, and Sigel sent Carr up to see the condition of affairs and report at once. Arriving at the front Carr discovered that the Confederate cavalry were coming in from the right and forming across the road, to stop the retreating Federals and send them back to the care of McCulloch’s division again. Reporting at once to Sigel, that officer directed Carr to turn off at the first right-hand road, which happened to be near the point where he (Carr) then stood. Retreating along this road in a brisk walk Sigel asked Carr to march slowly so that the footmen could keep up. Carr replied that unless they hurried forward they would be cut off at the crossing of Wilson’s Creek, and that the infantry ought to march as fast under the circumstances as a horse could walk. Sigel then said, “Go on, and we will keep up.” On arriving at the creek, however, and looking back, Carr saw that the infantry had not kept up, but that a large body of Texas and Arkansas cavalry was moving down and would form an unpleasant junction with him in a few seconds. “To use a Westernism,” says Gen. Carr, “there was no time for fooling then, and as I had waited long enough on the slow-motioned infantry to water my horses, and they were not yet in sight, I lit out for a place of safety which I soon reached, and after waiting another while for Sigel, I went on to Springfield. I was sorry to leave Sigel behind, in the first place, but I supposed all the time he was close to me until I reached the creek, and then it would have done no good for my company to have remained and been cut to pieces also, as were Sigel and his men, who were ambuscaded and all broken up, and Sigel himself narrowly escaped.”