Chapter XIX: Part III

129. There is, indeed, a more _mitigated_ scepticism or _academical_ philosophy, which may be both durable and useful, and which may, in part, be the result of this Pyrrhonism, or _excessive_ scepticism, when its undistinguished doubts are, in some measure, corrected by common sense and reflection. The greater part of mankind are naturally apt to be affirmative and dogmatical in their opinions; and while they see objects only on one side, and have no idea of any counterpoising argument, they throw themselves precipitately into the principles, to which they are inclined; nor have they any indulgence for those who entertain opposite sentiments. To hesitate or balance perplexes their understanding, checks their passion, and suspends their action. They are, therefore, impatient till they escape from a state, which to them is so uneasy: and they think, that they could never remove themselves far enough from it, by the violence of their affirmations and obstinacy of their belief. But could such dogmatical reasoners become sensible of the strange infirmities of human understanding, even in its most perfect state, and when most accurate and cautious in its determinations; such a reflection would naturally inspire them with more modesty and reserve, and diminish their fond opinion of themselves, and their prejudice against antagonists. The illiterate may reflect on the disposition of the learned, who, amidst all the advantages of study and reflection, are commonly still diffident in their determinations: and if any of the learned be inclined, from their natural temper, to haughtiness and obstinacy, a small tincture of Pyrrhonism might abate their pride, by showing them, that the few advantages, which they may have attained over their fellows, are but inconsiderable, if compared with the universal perplexity and confusion, which is inherent in human nature. In general, there is a degree of doubt, and caution, and modesty, which, in all kinds of scrutiny and decision, ought for ever to accompany a just reasoner.

130. Another species of _mitigated_ scepticism which may be of advantage to mankind, and which may be the natural result of the Pyrrhonian doubts and scruples, is the limitation of our enquiries to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding. The _imagination_ of man is naturally sublime, delighted with whatever is remote and extraordinary, and running, without control, into the most distant parts of space and time in order to avoid the objects, which custom has rendered too familiar to it. A correct _Judgement_ observes a contrary method, and avoiding all distant and high enquiries, confines itself to common life, and to such subjects as fall under daily practice and experience; leaving the more sublime topics to the embellishment of poets and orators, or to the arts of priests and politicians. To bring us to so salutary a determination, nothing can be more serviceable, than to be once thoroughly convinced of the force of the Pyrrhonian doubt, and of the impossibility, that anything, but the strong power of natural instinct, could free us from it. Those who have a propensity to philosophy, will still continue their researches; because they reflect, that, besides the immediate pleasure, attending such an occupation, philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life, methodized and corrected. But they will never be tempted to go beyond common life, so long as they consider the imperfection of those faculties which they employ, their narrow reach, and their inaccurate operations. While we cannot give a satisfactory reason, why we believe, after a thousand experiments, that a stone will fall, or fire burn; can we ever satisfy ourselves concerning any determination, which we may form, with regard to the origin of worlds, and the situation of nature, from, and to eternity?

This narrow limitation, indeed, of our enquiries, is, in every respect, so reasonable, that it suffices to make the slightest examination into the natural powers of the human mind and to compare them with their objects, in order to recommend it to us. We shall then find what are the proper subjects of science and enquiry.

131. It seems to me, that the only objects of the abstract science or of demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and number are entirely similar, their relations become intricate and involved; and nothing can be more curious, as well as useful, than to trace, by a variety of mediums, their equality or inequality, through their different appearances. But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other, we can never advance farther, by our utmost scrutiny, than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reflection, pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words, which is corrected by juster definitions. That _the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides_, cannot be known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of reasoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, _that where there is no property, there can be no injustice_, it is only necessary to define the terms, and explain injustice to be a violation of property. This proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect definition. It is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical reasonings, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except the sciences of quantity and number; and these may safely, I think, be pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration.

132. All other enquiries of men regard only matter of fact and existence; and these are evidently incapable of demonstration. Whatever _is_ may _not be_. No negation of a fact can involve a contradiction. The non-existence of any being, without exception, is as clear and distinct an idea as its existence. The proposition, which affirms it not to be, however false, is no less conceivable and intelligible, than that which affirms it to be. The case is different with the sciences, properly so called. Every proposition, which is not true, is there confused and unintelligible. That the cube root of 64 is equal to the half of 10, is a false proposition, and can never be distinctly conceived. But that Caesar, or the angel Gabriel, or any being never existed, may be a false proposition, but still is perfectly conceivable, and implies no contradiction.

The existence, therefore, of any being can only be proved by arguments from its cause or its effect; and these arguments are founded entirely on experience. If we reason _a priori_, anything may appear able to produce anything. The falling of a pebble may, for aught we know, extinguish the sun; or the wish of a man control the planets in their orbits. It is only experience, which teaches us the nature and bounds of cause and effect, and enables us to infer the existence of one object from that of another[34]. Such is the foundation of moral reasoning, which forms the greater part of human knowledge, and is the source of all human action and behaviour.

[34] That impious maxim of the ancient philosophy, _Ex nihilo,
nihil fit_, by which the creation of matter was excluded,
ceases to be a maxim, according to this philosophy. Not only the
will of the supreme Being may create matter; but, for aught we
know _a priori_, the will of any other being might create it,
or any other cause, that the most whimsical imagination
can assign.

Moral reasonings are either concerning particular or general facts. All deliberations in life regard the former; as also all disquisitions in history, chronology, geography, and astronomy.

The sciences, which treat of general facts, are politics, natural philosophy, physic, chemistry, &c. where the qualities, causes and effects of a whole species of objects are enquired into.

Divinity or Theology, as it proves the existence of a Deity, and the immortality of souls, is composed partly of reasonings concerning particular, partly concerning general facts. It has a foundation in _reason_, so far as it is supported by experience. But its best and most solid foundation is _faith_ and divine revelation.

Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment. Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more properly than perceived. Or if we reason concerning it, and endeavour to fix its standard, we regard a new fact, to wit, the general tastes of mankind, or some such fact, which may be the object of reasoning and enquiry.

When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, _Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?_ No. _Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?_ No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.

INDEX

Abstraction
not source of ideas of primary qualities, 122.

Academic
philosophy, 34.

Action
and philosophy, 1, 4, 34, 128;

Addition
4.

Analogy
a species of, the foundation of all reasoning about matter of fact,
82;

Animals
the reason of, 83-85;
learn from experience and draw inferences, 83;
which can only be founded on custom, 84;
cause of difference between men and animals, 84 n.

Antiquity
62.

Appearances
to senses must be corrected by reason, 117.

A priori
25, 36 n, 89 n, 132, 132 n.

Aristotle
4.

Association
of ideas, three principles of, 18-19, 41-44 (v. _Cause_ C).

Atheism
116.

Bacon
99.

Belief
(v. _Cause_ C, 39-45);
and chance, 46.

Berkeley
really a sceptic, 122 n.

Bigotry
102.

Body
and soul, mystery of union of, 52;
volition and movements of, 52.

Real existence of (v. _Scepticism_, B, 118-123).

Cause
first (v. _God_, _Necessity_, 78-81; _Providence_,
102-115, 132 n).
a principle of association of ideas, 19, 43;
sole foundation of reasonings about matter of fact or real existence,
22.

A. _Knowledge of Causes arises from experience not from Reason_,
23-33.

Reasonings _a priori_ give no knowledge of cause and effect,
23 f.;
impossible to see the effect in the cause since they are totally
different, 25;
natural philosophy never pretends to assign ultimate causes, but only
to reduce causes to a few general causes, e.g. gravity, 26;
geometry applies laws obtained by experience, 27.

Conclusions from experience not based on any process of the
understanding, 28;
yet we infer in the future a similar connexion between known
qualities of things and their secret powers, to that which
we assumed in the past. On what is this inference based? 29;
demonstrative reasoning has no place here, and all experimental
reasoning assumes the resemblance of the future to the past,
and so cannot prove it without being circular, 30, 32;
if reasoning were the basis of this belief, there would be no need
for the multiplication of instances or of long experience,
31;
yet conclusions about matter of fact are affected by experience even
in beasts and children, so that they cannot be founded on
abstruse reasoning, 33;
to explain our inferences from experience a principle is required of
equal weight and authority with reason, 34.

B. _Custom enables us to infer existence of one object from the
appearance of another_, 35-38.

Experience enables us to ascribe a more than arbitrary connexion to
objects, 35;
we are determined to this by custom or habit which is the great guide
of human life, 36;
but our inference must be based on some fact present to the senses
or memory, 37;
the customary conjunction between such an object and some other
object produces an operation of the soul which is as
unavoidable as love, 38;
animals also infer one event from another by custom, 82-84;
and in man as in animals experimental reasoning depends on a species
of instinct or mechanical power that acts in us unknown to
ourselves, 85.

C. _Belief_, 39-45.
Belief differs from fiction or the loose reveries of the fancy by
some feeling annexed to it, 39;
belief cannot be defined, but may be described as a more lively,
forcible, firm, steady conception of an object than can be
attained by the imagination alone, 40;
it is produced by the principles of association, viz. resemblance,
41;
contiguity, 42;
causation, 43;
by a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature
and our ideas, 44;
this operation of our minds necessary to our subsistence and so
entrusted by nature to instinct rather than to reasoning, 45.

_Probability_, 46-7.

Belief produced by a majority of chances by an inexplicable
contrivance of Nature, 46 (cf. 87-8);
probability of causes: the failure of a cause ascribed to a secret
counteracting cause, 47 (cf. 67);
it is universally allowed that chance when strictly examined is a
mere negative word, 74.

D. _Power_, 49-57.

Power, force, energy, necessary connexion must either be defined by
analysis or explained by production of the impression from
which they are copied, 49;
from the first appearance of an object we cannot foretell its effect:
we cannot see the power of a single body: we only see
sequence, 50.

Is the idea of power derived from an internal impression and is it an
idea of reflection? 51;
it is not derived, as Locke said, from reasoning about power of
production in nature, 50 n;
nor from consciousness of influence of will over bodily organs, 52;
nor from effort to overcome resistance, 52 n (cf. 60 n);
nor from influence of will over mind, 53;
many philosophers appeal to an invisible intelligent principle, to a
volition of the supreme being, and regard causes as only
occasions and our mental conceptions as revelations, 54-5;
thus diminishing the grandeur of God, 56;
this theory too bold and beyond verification by our faculties, and
is no explanation, 57;
vis inertiae, 57 n.

In single instances we only see sequence of loose events which are
conjoined and never connected, 58;
the idea of necessary connexion only arises from a number of similar
instances, and the only difference between such a number and
a single instance is that the former produces a habit of
expecting the usual attendant, 59, 61.
This customary transition is the impression from which we form the
idea of necessary connexion.

E. _Reasoning from effect to cause and conversely_, 105-115 (v.
_Providence_).

In arguing from effect to cause we must not infer more qualities in
the cause than are required to produce the effect, nor reason
backwards from an inferred cause to new effects, 105-8;
we can reason back from cause to new effects in the case of human
acts by analogy which rests on previous knowledge, 111-2;
when the effect is entirely singular and does not belong to any
species we cannot infer its cause at all, 115.

F. _Definitions of Cause_, 60 (cf. 74 n).

Ceremonies
41.

Chance
ignorance of causes, 46;
has no existence, 74 (v. _Cause_ B).

Cicero
4.

Circle
in reasoning, 30.

Clarke
37 n.

Colour
peculiarity of ideas of, 16.

Contiguity
19, 42.

Contradiction
the test of demonstration, 132.

Contrariety
19 n.

Contrary
of matter of fact always possible, 21, 132.

Creation
132 n.

Criticism
132.

Cudworth
57 n, 158 n.

Custom
when strongest conceals itself, 24;
an ultimate principle of all conclusions from experience, 36, 127;
and belief, 39-45;
gives rise to inferences of animals, 84.

Definition
only applicable to complex ideas, 49;
need of, 131;
of cause, 60.

Demonstrative
opp. intuitive, 20;
reasoning, 30;
confined to quantity and number, 131;
impossible to demonstrate a fact since no negation of a fact can
involve a contradiction, 132.

Descartes
57 n.;
his universal doubt antecedent to study if strictly taken is
incurable, since even from an indubitable first principle no
advance can be made except by the faculties which we doubt,
116;
his appeal to the veracity of God is useless, 120 (v. _Scepticism_,
116-132).

Design
argument from, 105 f. (v. _Providence_).

Divisibility
of mathematical and physical points, 124.

Doubt
Cartesian, 116, 120 (v. _Scepticism_ A).

Epictetus
34.

Epicurean
philosophy, defence of, 102-15;
denial of providence and future state is harmless, 104 (v.
_Providence_).

Euclid
truths in, do not depend on existence of circles or triangles, 20.

Evidence
moral and natural, 70;
value of human, 82-9 (v. _Miracles_).

Evil
doctrine of necessity either makes God the cause of evil or denies
existence of evil as regards the whole, 78-81.

Existence
external and perception, 118-9 (v. _Scepticism_, B, 116-32).

Ex nihilo nihil
132 n.

Experience
(v. _Cause_ A, 23-33);
opposition of reason and experience usual, but really erroneous and
superficial, 36 n.

Infallible, may be regarded as proof, 87 (v. _Miracles_);
all the philosophy and religion in the world cannot carry us beyond
the usual course of experience, 113.

Extension
50;
a supposed primary quality, 122.

Faith
101, 132.

Fiction
and fact (v. _Cause_ C), 39 f.

Future
inference to, from past, 29 (v. _Cause_ A).

General
ideas, do not really exist, but only particular ideas attached to a
general term, 125 n.

Geography
mental, 8.

Geometry
propositions of certain, as depending only on relations of ideas not
on existence of objects, 20;
gives no knowledge of ultimate causes: only applies laws discovered
by experience, 27.

God
idea of, 14;
no idea of except what we learn from reflection on our own
faculties, 57;
theory that God is cause of all motion and thought, causes being
only occasions of his volition, 54-57;
by doctrine of necessity either there are no bad actions or God is
the cause of evil, 78-81.

Veracity of, appealed to, 120.

And creation of matter, 132 n.

v. _Providence_, 102-115; _Scepticism_, 116-132.

Golden
age, 107.

Gravity
26.

Habit
(v. _Custom_, _Cause_ B).

History
use of, 65.

Human
nature, inconstancy a constant character of, 68.

Ideas
A. _Origin of_, 11-17.

Perceptions divided into impressions and ideas, 11-12;
the mind can only compound the materials derived from outward or
inward sentiment, 13 (cf. 53);
all ideas resolvable into simple ideas copied from precedent
feelings, 14;
deficiency in an organ of sensation produces deficiency in
corresponding idea, 15-16;
suspected ideas to be tested by asking for the impression from
which it is derived, 17 (cf. 49);
idea of reflection, 51;
general ideas, 135 n;
innate ideas, 19 n;
power of will over ideas, 53.

B. _Association of_, 18-19.

Ideas introduce each other with a certain degree of method and
regularity, 18;
only three principles of association, viz. Resemblance, Contiguity,
and Cause or Effect, 19;
contrariety, 19 n;
production of belief by these principles, 41-43.

C. Correspondence of ideas and course of nature, 44;
relations of ideas one of two possible objects of enquiry, 20;
such relations discoverable by the mere operation of thought, 20,
131;
no demonstration possible except in case of ideas of quantity or
number, 131.

Imagination
11, 39;
and belief, 40.

Impressions
all our more lively perceptions, 12;
the test of ideas, 17, 49.

Incest
peculiar turpitude of explained, 12.

Inconceivability
of the negative, 132 (cf. 20).

Inertia
57 n.

Inference
and similarity, 30, 115 (v. _Cause_).

Infinite
divisibility, 124 f.

Instances
multiplication of not required by reason, 31.

Instinct
more trustworthy than reasoning, 45;
the basis of all experimental reasoning, 85;
the basis of realism, 118, 121.

Intuitive
opp. mediate reasoning, 2.

La Bruyere
4.

Liberty
(v. _Necessity_, 62-97).
Definition of hypothetical liberty, 73.
Necessary to morality, 77.

Locke
4, 40 n, 50 n, 57 n.
His loose use of 'ideas,' 19 n;
betrayed into frivolous disputes about innate ideas by the
School-men, 19 n;
distinction of primary and secondary qualities, 122.

Malebranche
4, 57 n..

Man
a reasonable and active being, 4.

Marriage
rules of, based on and vary with utility, 118.

Mathematics
ideas of, clear and determinate, hence their superiority to moral
and metaphysical sciences, 48;
their difficulty, 48.

Mathematical and physical points, 124 n.

Matter
necessity of, 64;
creation of, 132 n (v. _Scepticism_ A).

Matter-of-fact
contrary of, always possible, 21;
arguments to new, based only on cause and effect, 22.

Metaphysics
not a science, 5-6;
how inferior and superior to mathematics, 48.

Mind
mental geography, 8;
secret springs and principles of, 9;
can only mix and compound materials given by inward and outward
sentiment, 13;
power of will over, 53.

Miracles.
86-101.

Belief in human evidence diminishes according as the event witnessed
is unusual or extraordinary, 89;
difference between extraordinary and miraculous, 89 n;
if the evidence for a miracle amounted to proof we should have one
proof opposed by another proof, for the proof against a
miracle is as complete as possible;
an event is not miraculous unless there is a uniform experience,
that is a proof, against it, 90;
definition of miracle, 90 n;
hence no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle unless its
falsehood would be more miraculous than the event it
establishes, 91;
as a fact the evidence for a miracle has never amounted to proof, 92;
the passion for the wonderful in human nature, 93;
prevalence of miracles in savage and early periods and their
diminution with civilization, 94;
the evidence for miracles in matters of religion opposed by the
almost infinite number of witnesses for rival religions, 95;
value of human testimony diminished by temptation to pose as a
prophet or apostle, 97;
no testimony for a miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much
less to a proof, and if it did amount to a proof it would be
opposed by another perfect proof, 98;
so a miracle can never be proved so as to be the foundation of a
system of religion, 99;
a conclusion which confounds those who base the Christian religion
on reason, not on faith, 100;
the Christian religion cannot be believed without a miracle which
will subvert the principle of a man's understanding and give
him a determination to believe what is most contrary to
custom and experience, 101.

Moral
evil (q.v.) 80.

Moral science
30;
inferior to mathematics, 48;
sceptical objections to, 126-7.

Moral evidence easily combined with natural, 70.

Motion
50.

Nature
design in, 105 f. (v. _Providence_),
and the course of our ideas, 44.

State of, a philosophical fiction, 151, 151 n.

Necessary
connexion (v. _Cause_).

Necessity
two definitions of, 75.

A. _and Liberty_, 62-81;
the controversy is based on ambiguity, and all mankind have always
been of the same opinion on this subject, 63;
our idea of the necessity of matter arises solely from observed
uniformity and consequent inference, circumstances which are
allowed by all men to exist in respect of human action, 64;
history and knowledge of human nature assume such uniformity, 65,
which does not exclude variety due to education and progress, 66;
irregular actions to be explained by secret operation of contrary
causes, 67;
the inconstancy of human action, its constant character, as of winds
and weather, 68;
we all acknowledge and draw inferences from the regular conjunction
of motives and actions, 69;
history, politics, and morals show this, and the possibility of
combining moral and natural evidence shows that they have a
common origin, 70;
the reluctance to acknowledge the necessity of actions due to a
lingering belief that we can see real connexion behind mere
conjunction, 71;
we should begin with the examination not of the soul and will but of
brute matter, 72;
the prevalence of the liberty doctrine due to a false sensation of
liberty and a false experiment, 72 n;
though this question is the most contentious of all, mankind has
always agreed in the doctrine of liberty, if we mean by it
that hypothetical liberty which consists in a power of
acting or not acting according to the determinations of our
will, and which can be ascribed to every one who is not a
prisoner, 73;
liberty when opposed to necessity, and not merely to constraint, is
the same as chance, 74.

B. _Both necessity and liberty are necessary to morality_, this
doctrine of necessity only alters our view of matter and so
is at least innocent, 75;
rewards and punishments imply the uniform influence of motives, and
connexion of character and action: if necessity be denied,
a man may commit any crime and be no worse for it, 76;
liberty also essential to morality, 77.

Objection that doctrine of necessity and of a regular chain of
causes either makes God the cause of evil, or abolishes evil
in actions, 78;
Stoic answer, that the whole system is good, is specious but
ineffectual in practice, 79;
no speculative argument can counteract the impulse of our natural
sentiments to blame certain actions, 80;
how God can be the cause of all actions without being the author of
moral evil is a mystery with which philosophy cannot deal,
81.

Negative
inconceivability of, 132.

Newton
57 n.

Nisus
52 n, 60 n.

Number
the object of demonstration, 131.

Occasional causes
theory of, 55.

Parallelism
between thought and course of nature, 44-5.

Perception
and external objects, 119 f. (v. _Scepticism_, _Impression_,
_Idea_).

Philosophy
moral, two branches of, abstruse and practical, 1-5;
gratifies innocent curiosity, 6;
metaphysics tries to deal with matters inaccessible to human
understanding, 6.

True, must lay down limits of understanding, 7 (cf. 113);
a large part of, consists in mental geography, 8;
may hope to resolve principles of mind into still more general
principles, 9.

Natural, only staves off our ignorance a little longer, as moral or
metaphysical philosophy serves only to discover larger
portions of it, 26;
academical, or sceptical, flatters no bias or passion except love of
truth, and so has few partisans, 34;
though it destroy speculation, cannot destroy action, for nature
steps in and asserts her rights, 34;
moral, inferior to mathematics in clearness of ideas, superior in
shortness of arguments, 48.

Controversies in, due to ambiguity of terms, 62.

Disputes in, not be settled by appeal to dangerous consequences of a
doctrine, 75.

Speculative, entirely indifferent to the peace of society and
security of government, 104 (cf. 114).

All the philosophy in the world, and all the religion in the world,
which is nothing but a species of philosophy, can never
carry us beyond the usual course of experience, 113.

Happiness of, to have originated in an age and country of freedom
and toleration, 102.

Points
physical, indivisible, 124 n.

Power
50 f, 60 n. (v. _Cause_ D).

Probability
46 f. (v. _Cause_, B).

Probable
arguments, 38, 46 n.

Production
50 n.

Promises
not the foundation of justice, 257.

Proof
46 n, 86-101 (v. _Miracles_, _Demonstrative_).

Providence
102-115 (v. _God_).

The sole argument for a divine existence is from the marks of design
in nature; must not infer greater power in the cause than is
necessary to produce the observed effects, nor argue from
such an inferred cause to any new effects which have not
been observed, 105;
so must not infer in God more power, wisdom, and benevolence than
appears in nature, 106;
so it is unnecessary to try and save the honour of the Gods by
assuming the intractability of matter or the observance of
general laws, 107;
to argue from effects to unknown causes, and then from these causes
to unknown effects, is a gross sophism, 108.

From imperfect exercise of justice in this world we cannot infer its
perfect exercise in a future world, 109;
we must regulate our conduct solely by the experienced train of
events, 110;
in case of human works of art we can infer the perfect from the
imperfect, but that is because we know man by experience and
also know other instances of his art, 111-112;
but in the case of God we only know him by his productions, and do
not know any class of beings to which he belongs, 113;
and the universe, his production, is entirely singular and does not
belong to a known species of things, 115.

Punishment
requires doctrines of necessity and liberty, 76 (v. _Necessity_).

Pyrrhonism
126.

Qualities
primary and secondary, 122.

Quantity
and number, the only objects of demonstration, the parts of them
being entirely similar, 131.

Real
presence, 86.

Reality
and thought, 44.

Realism
of the vulgar, 118.

Reason
(a) opp. intuition, 29;
opp. experience, 28, 36 n.

(b) Corrects sympathy and senses, 117.
No match for nature, 34.

Fallacious, compared with instinct, 45.

Of men and animals, 84 n.

(c) attempts to destroy, by reasoning, 124;
objections to abstract reasoning, 124 f. (v. _Scepticism_).

(d) _Reasoning_.

Two kinds of, demonstrative and moral, 30, 46 n, 132;
moral, divided into general and particular, 132;
produces demonstrations, proofs, and probabilities, 46 n.

Probable (v. _Cause_, 28-32).

Relations
of ideas, discoverable by the mere operation of thought,
independently of the existence of any object, 20.

Religion
a kind of philosophy, 113 (v. _Miracles, Providence_).

Resemblance
19, 41 (v. _Similarity_).

Resistance
and idea of power, 53 n.

Scepticism
A. antecedent to study and philosophy, such as Descartes' universal
doubt of our faculties, would be incurable: in a more
moderate sense it is useful, 116 (cf. 129-30);
extravagant attempts of, to destroy reason by reasoning, 124.

No such absurd creature as a man who has no opinion about anything
at all, 116;
admits of no answer and produces no conviction, 122 n. (cf. 34, 126,
128).

B. _As to the Senses_, 117-123.

The ordinary criticisms of our senses only show that they have to be
corrected by Reason, 117;
more profound arguments show that the vulgar belief in external
objects is baseless, and that the objects we see are nothing
but perceptions which are fleeting copies of other
existences, 118;
even this philosophy is hard to justify; it appeals neither to
natural instinct, nor to experience, for experience tells
nothing of objects which perceptions resemble, 119;
the appeal to the _veracity of God_ is useless, 120;
and scepticism is here triumphant, 121.

_The distinction between primary and secondary qualities_ is useless,
for the supposed primary qualities are only perceptions, 122;
and Berkeley's theory that ideas of primary qualities are obtained by
abstraction is impossible, 122, 122 n;
if matter is deprived of both primary and secondary qualities there
is nothing left except a mere something which is not worth
arguing about, 123.

C. _As to Reason_, 124-130.

Attempt to destroy Reason by reasoning extravagant, 124;
objection to _abstract reasoning_ because it asserts infinite
divisibility of extension which is shocking to common sense,
124,
and infinite divisibility of time, 125;
yet the ideas attacked are so clear and distinct that scepticism
becomes sceptical about itself, 125.

Popular objections to _moral reasoning_ about matter of fact, based
on weakness of understanding, variation of judgement, and
disagreement among men, confuted by action, 126;
philosophical objections, that we only experience conjunction and
that inference is based on custom, 127;
excessive scepticism refuted by its uselessness and put to flight by
the most trivial event in life, 128.

Mitigated scepticism or academical philosophy useful as a corrective
and as producing caution and modesty, 129;
and as limiting understanding to proper objects, 130;
all reasoning which is not either abstract, about quantity and
number, or experimental, about matters of fact, is sophistry
and illusion, 132.

D. In _Religion_ (v. _Miracles_, _Providence_).

Sciences
132 (v. _Reason_, (d); _Scepticism_, C).

Secret
powers, 39;
counteracting causes, 47, 67.

Senses
outward and inward sensation supplies all the materials of
thinking--must be corrected by reason, 117.

Scepticism concerning, 117 (v. _Scepticism_, B).

Similarity
basis of all arguments from experience, 31 (cf. 115).

Solidity
50;
a supposed primary quality, 122.

Soul
and body, 52.

Space
and time, 124 f.

Species
an effect which belongs to no species does not admit of inference
to its cause, 115 (cf. 113).

Stoics
34, 79.

Superstition
6 (v. _Providence_).

Theology
science of, 132 (v. _God_, _Providence_).

Tillotson
argument against real presence, 86.

Time
and space, 124 f.

Truth
8, 17 (v. _Scepticism_).

Understanding
limits of human, 7;
operations of, to be classified, 8;
opp. experience, 28;
weakness of, 126 (v. _Reason_, _Scepticism_).

Voluntariness
as ground of distinction between virtues and talents, 130.

Whole
theory that everything is good as regards 'the whole,' 79, 80.

Will
compounds materials given by senses, 13;
influence of over organs of body can never give us the idea of
power; for we are not conscious of any power in our will,
only of sequence of motions on will, 52;
so with power of will over our minds in raising up new ideas, 53.

Of God, cannot be used to explain motion, 57.

Freedom of (v. _Necessity_).