Chapter XXXVII: Section X: The Last Efforts Before Pilate (1)

No person, then, was willing to condemn Jesus; neither Herod, who only made the case a subject of mockery, nor Pilate, who had openly declared that he found nothing criminal in him.

But the hatred of the priests was not disarmed—so far from it, that the chief priests, with a numerous train of their partisans, returned to Pilate with a determination to force him to a decision.

The unfortunate Pilate, reviewing his proceedings in their presence, said to them again: “Ye have brought this man unto me as one that perverteth the people—and, behold, I, having examined him before you, _have found no fault in this man touching those things whereof ye accuse him_: No, nor yet Herod; for I sent you to him, and lo, _nothing worthy of death is done unto him_. I will therefore chastise him and release him.” Luke xxiii. 14, 15.

After “chastising” him! And was not this a piece of cruelty, when he considered him to be innocent?(415) But this was an act of condescension by which Pilate hoped to quiet the rage with which he saw they were agitated.

“Then Pilate therefore took Jesus and scourged him.” John xix. 1. And, supposing that he had done enough to disarm their fury, he exhibited him to them in that pitiable condition; saying to them at the same time, Behold the man! _Ecce homo_. John xix. 5.

Now, in my turn, I say, here is indeed a decree of Pilate, and an unjust decree; but it is not the pretended decree alleged to have been made by the Jews. It is a decision wholly different; an unjust decision, it is true; but sufficient to avail as _a legal bar_ to any new proceedings against Jesus for the same act. _Non bis in idem_, no man shall be put twice in jeopardy, &c. is a maxim, which has come down to us from the Romans.

Accordingly, “from thenceforth Pilate sought to _release_ Jesus.” John xix. 12.

Here, now, observe the deep perfidy of his accusers. “If thou let this man go, thou art not Cæsar’s friend; whosoever maketh himself a _king_ speaketh against Cæsar.” Ib.

It does not appear that Pilate was malignant; we see all the efforts he had made at different times to save Jesus. But he was a _public officer_, and was attached to _his office_; he was intimidated by the outcry which called in question his _fidelity to the emperor_; he was afraid of a _dismissal_: and he yielded. He immediately reascended the judgment-seat; (Matt. xxvii. 19), and, as new light had thus come upon him, he proceeded to make a second decree!

But being for a moment stopped by the voice of his own conscience, and by the advice which his terrified wife sent to him—“_Have thou nothing to do with that just man_”—(Matt. xxvii. 19)—he made his last effort, by attempting to influence the populace to accept of Barabbas instead of Jesus. “But the chief priests moved the people, that he should rather release Barabbas unto them.” Mark xv. 11. Barabbas! a murderer! an assassin!

Pilate spoke to them again: _What will ye then, that I should do with Jesus?_ And they cried out, _Away with him, crucify him_. Pilate still persisted: _Shall I crucify your king?_ thus using terms of raillery, in order to disarm them. But here showing themselves to be more truly Roman than Pilate himself, the chief priests hypocritically answered: _We have no king but Cæsar._ John xix. 15.

The outcry was renewed—Crucify him, crucify him! And the clamour became more and more threatening; “and the voices of them and of the chief priests prevailed.” Luke xxiii. 23.

At length Pilate, _being desirous of pleasing the multitude_, proceeds to speak. But can we call it a legal adjudication, a _judgment_, that he is about to pronounce? Is he, at the moment, in that free state of mind which is necessary for a judge, who is about to pass a _sentence of death_? What new witnesses, what proofs have been brought forward to change his conviction and opinion, which had been so energetically declared, of the innocence of Jesus?

“When Pilate saw that he could prevail nothing, but that rather a tumult was made, he took water and washed his hands before the multitude, saying, _I am innocent of the blood of this just person_; see ye to it. Matt. xxvii. 24. And Pilate gave sentence, that it should be as they required. Luke xxiii. 24. And he delivered him to them to be crucified.” Matt. xxvii. 26.

Well mayest thou wash thy hands, Pilate, stained as they are with innocent blood! Thou hast authorised the act in thy weakness; thou art not less culpable, than if thou hadst sacrificed him through wickedness! All generations, down to our own time, have repeated that the _Just One_ suffered _under Pontius Pilate_. Thy name has remained in history, to serve for the instruction of all public men, all pusillanimous judges, in order to hold up to them the shame of _yielding contrary to one’s own convictions_. The populace, in its fury, made an outcry at the foot of thy judgment-seat, where, perhaps, thou thyself didst not sit securely! But of what importance was that? Thy _duty_ spoke out; and in such a case, better would it be to suffer death, than to inflict it on another.(416)

We will now come to a conclusion.

The _proof_ that Jesus was not, as Mr. Salvador maintains, put to death for the crime of blasphemy or sacrilege, and for having preached a new religious worship in contravention of the Mosaic law, results from _the very sentence_ pronounced by Pilate; a sentence, in pursuance of which he was led to execution by Roman soldiers.

There was among the Romans a custom, which we borrowed from their jurisprudence, and which is still followed, of placing over the head of a condemned criminal a writing containing _an extract from his sentence_, in order that the public might know _for what crime_ he was condemned. This was the reason why Pilate put on the cross a label, on which he had written these words: _Jesus Nazarenus Rex Judæorum_, (Jesus of Nazareth, King of the Jews), which has since been denoted by the initials J. N. R. J. This was the alleged cause of his condemnation. St. Mark says—“And the superscription of his _accusation_ was written over—_The King of the Jews_.” Mark xv. 26.

This inscription was first in _Latin_, which was the legal language of the _Roman_ judge; and it was repeated in _Hebrew_ and _Greek_, in order to be understood by the people of the nation and by foreigners.

The chief priests, whose indefatigable hatred did not overlook the most minute details, being apprehensive that people would take it to be literally a fact affirmed, that Jesus _was the King of the Jews_, said to Pilate: “Write not _King of the Jews_, but that _he said_ I am king of the Jews.” But Pilate answered: “What I have written I have written.” John xix. 21, 22.

This is a conclusive answer to one of the last assertions of Mr. Salvador, (p. 88,) that “the Roman Pilate signed the sentence;” by which he always means that Pilate did nothing but sign a sentence, which he supposes to have been passed by the Sanhedrim; but in this he is mistaken. Pilate did not merely _sign_ the sentence, or decree, but _drew it up_; and, when his draft was objected to by the priests, he still adhered to it, saying, what I have written shall remain as written.

Here then we see the true cause of the condemnation of Jesus! Here we have the “_judicial and legal proof_.” Jesus was the victim of a _political_ accusation! He was put to death for the imaginary crime of having aimed at the power of Cæsar, by calling himself _King of the Jews_! Absurd accusation; which Pilate never believed, and which the chief priests and the Pharisees themselves did not believe. For they were not authorized to arrest Jesus on that account; it was a new, and totally different, accusation from that which they first planned—a sudden accusation of the moment, when they saw that Pilate was but little affected by their _religious_ zeal, and they found it necessary to arouse _his zeal for_ Cæsar.

“_If thou let this man go, thou art not Cæsar’s friend!_” This alarming language has too often, since that time, reverberated in the ears of timid judges, who, like Pilate, have rendered themselves criminal by delivering up victims through want of firmness, whom they would never have condemned, if they had listened to the voice of their own consciences.

Let us now recapitulate the case, as I have considered it from the beginning.

Is it not evident, contrary to the conclusion of Mr. Salvador, that Jesus, considered merely as _a simple citizen_, was not tried and sentenced either _according to law_, or _agreeably to the forms of legal proceedings then existing_?

God, according to his eternal design, might permit the just to suffer by the malice of men; but he also intended, that this should at least happen by a disregard of all laws, and by a violation of all established rules, in order that the entire contempt of forms should stand as the first warning of the violation of law.

Let us not be surprised then, that in another part of his work, Mr. Salvador (who, it is gratifying to observe, discusses his subject dispassionately) expresses some regret in speaking of the “_unfortunate sentence against Jesus_.” Vol. i. p. 59. He has wished to excuse the Hebrews; but, one of that nation, in giving utterance to the feelings of his heart, still says—in language which I took from his own mouth, “We should be very cautious of condemning him at this day.”

I pass over the excesses which followed the order of Pilate; as, the violence shown to Simon, the Cyrenian, who was made in some degree a sharer in the punishment, by being compelled to carry the cross; the injurious treatment which attended the victim to the place of the sacrifice, and even to the cross, where Jesus still prayed for his brethren and his executioners!

To the heathen themselves I would say—You, who have gloried in the death of Socrates, how much must you be struck with wonder at that of Jesus! Ye, censors of the Areopagus, how could you undertake to excuse the Synagogue, and justify the sentence of the Hall of Judgment? Philosophy herself has not hesitated to proclaim, and we may repeat with her—“Yes, if the life and death of _Socrates_ were those of a sage, the life and death of _Jesus_ were those of a divinity.”

FOOTNOTES

1 Cicero, Philip. II. § 43.

2 Nov. Org. 1. 68. “Ut non alius fere sit aditus ad regnum hominus,
quod fundatur in scientiis, quam ad regnum cœlorum, in quod, nisi
sub persona infantis, intrare non datur.”

3 Bishop Wilson’s Evidences, p. 38.

4 See Dr. Hopkins’s Lowell Lectures, particularly Lect. 2. Bp.
Wilson’s Evidences of Christianity, Vol. i. pp. 45-61. Horne’s
Introduction, Vol. i. pp. 1-39. Mr. Horne having cited all the best
English writers on this subject, it is sufficient to refer to his
work alone.

5 Hopkins’s Lowell Lect., p. 48.

6 It has been well remarked, that, if we regard man as in a state of
innocence, we should naturally expect that God would hold
communications with him; that if we regard him as guilty, and as
having lost the knowledge and moral image of God, such a
communication would be absolutely necessary, if man was to be
restored.—Dr. Hopkins’s Lowell Lect., p. 62.

7 The argument here briefly sketched, is stated more at large, and
with great clearness and force, in an essay entitled “The Philosophy
of the Plan of Salvation,” pp. 13-107.

8 See Professor Stuart’s Critical History and Defence of the Old
Testament Canon, where this is abundantly proved.

9 Per Tindal, Ch. Just., in the case of the Bishop of Meath v. the
Marquis of Winchester, 3 Bing. N. C. 183, 200, 201. “It is when
documents are found in other than their proper places of deposit,”
observed the Chief Justice, “that the investigation commences,
whether it was reasonable and natural, under the circumstances of
the particular case, to expect that they should have been in the
place where they are actually found; for it is obvious, that, which
there can be only one place of deposit strictly and absolutely
proper, there may be many and various, that are reasonable and
probable, though differing in degree, some being more so, some less;
and in these cases the proposition to be determined is, whether the
actual custody is so reasonably and probably accounted for, that it
impresses the mind with the conviction that the instrument found in
such custody must be genuine.” See the cases cited in 1 Greenleaf on
Evidence § 142. See also 1 Stark. on Evidence, pp. 332-335, 381-386.
Croughton v. Blake, 12 Mees. & Welsb. 205, 208. Doe v. Phillips, 10
Jurist, p. 34. It is this defect, namely, that they do not come from
the proper or natural repository, which shows the fabulous character
of many pretended revelations, from the Gospel of the Infancy to the
Book of Mormon.

10 1 Greenleaf on Evid. § 34, 142, 570.

11 Morewood v. Wood, 14 East, 329, n. Per Lord Kenyon. Weeks v. Sparke,
1 M. & S. 686; the Berkeley Peerage Case, 4 Campb. 416. Per
Mansfield, Ch. J. See 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 128.

12 1 Starkie on Evidence, pp. 195, 230; 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 483.

13 The arguments for the genuineness and authenticity of the books of
the Holy Scriptures are briefly, yet very fully stated, and almost
all the writers of authority are referred to by Mr. Horne, in his
Introduction to the Study of the Holy Scriptures, vol. i., passim.
The same subject is discussed in a more popular manner in the
Lectures of Bp. Wilson, and of Bp. Sumner of Chester, on the
Evidences of Christianity; and, in America, the same question, as it
relates to the Gospels, has been argued by Bp. M’Ilvaine, in his
Lectures.

14 See the case of the Slane Peerage, 5 Clark & Finelly’s Rep., p. 24.
See also the case of the Fitzwalter Peerage, 10 Clark & Finelly’s
Rep., p. 948.

15 Matt. ix. 10; Mark ii. 14, 15; Luke v. 29.

16 The authorities on this subject are collected in Horne’s
Introduction, vol. iv. pp. 234-238, part 2, chap. ii. sec. 2.

17 See Horne’s Introduction, vol. iv. p. 229-232.

18 See Campbell on the Four Gospels, vol. iii. pp. 35, 36; Preface to
St. Matthew’s Gospel, § 22, 23.

19 See Gibbon’s Rome, vol. i. ch. vi. and vol. iii. ch. xvii. and
authorities there cited. Cod. Theod. Lib. xi. tit. 1-28, with the
notes of Gothofred. Gibbon treats particularly of the revenues of a
later period than our Saviour’s time; but the general course of
proceeding, in the levy and collection of taxes, is not known to
have been changed since the beginning of the empire.

20 Acts xii. 12, 25; xiii. 5, 13; and xv. 36-41; 2 Tim. iv. 11; Phil.
24; Col. iv. 10; 1 Pet. v. 13.

21 Horne’s Introduction, vol. iv. pp. 252, 253.

22 Mark vii. 2, 11; and ix. 43, and elsewhere.

23 Mr. Norton has conclusively disposed of this objection, in his
Evidences of the Genuineness of the Gospels, vol. i. Additional
Notes, see. 2, pp. cxv-cxxxii.

24 Compare Mark x. 46, and xiv. 69, and iv. 35, and i. 35, and ix. 28,
with Matthew’s narrative of the same events.

25 See Horne’s Introd. vol. iv. pp 252-259.

26 Acts xvi. 10, 11.

27 Col. iv. 14. Luke, the beloved physician.

28 Luke v. 12; Matt. viii. 2; Mark i. 40.

29 Luke vi. 6; Matt. xii. 10; Mark iii. 1.

30 Luke viii. 55; Matt. ix. 25; Mark v. 42.

31 Luke vi. 19.

32 Luke xxii. 44, 45, 51.

33 See Horne’s Introd. vol. iv. pp. 260-272, where references may be
found to earlier writers.

34 See Lardner’s Works, 8vo. vol. vi. pp. 138, 139; 4to. vol. iii. pp.
203, 204; and other authors, cited in Horne’s Introd. vol. iv. p.
267.

35 2 Phillips on Evidence, p. 95, (9th edition.)

36 When Abbot, Archbishop of Canterbury, in shooting at deer with a
cross-bow, in Bramsil park, accidentally killed the keeper, King
James I. by a letter dated Oct. 3, 1621, requested the Lord Keeper,
the Lord Chief Justice, and others, to inquire into the
circumstances and consider the case and “the scandal that may have
risen thereupon,” and to certify the King what it may amount to.
Could there be any reasonable doubt of their report of the facts,
thus ascertained? See Spelman’s Posthumous Works, p. 121.

37 The case of the ill-fated steamer President furnishes an example of
this sort of inquiry. This vessel, it is well-known, sailed from New
York for London in the month of March, 1841 having on board many
passengers, some of whom were highly connected. The ship was soon
overtaken by a storm, after which she was never heard of. A few
months afterwards a solemn inquiry was instituted by three gentlemen
of respectability, one of whom was a British admiral, another was
agent for the underwriters at Lloyd’s, and the other a government
packet agent, concerning the time, circumstances and causes of that
disaster; the result of which was communicated to the public, under
their hands. This document received universal confidence, and no
further inquiry was made.

38 Mark i. 20.

39 John xix. 26, 27.

40 John xiii. 23.

41 Matt. xxvii. 55, 56; Mark xv. 40, 41.

42 John xviii. 15, 16.

43 Luke viii. 51; Matt. xvii. 1, and xxvi. 37.

44 This account is abridged from Horne’s Introd. vol. iv. pp. 286-288.

45 Horne’s Introd. vol. iv. p. 289, and authors there cited.

46 See, among others, John i. 38, 41, and ii. 6, 13, and iv. 9, and xi.
55.

47 See Horne’s Introd. vol. iv. pp. 297, 298.

48 See Gambier’s Guide to the Study of Moral Evidence, p. 121.

49 1 Stark. Evid. pp. 514, 577; 1 Greenl. on Evid. §§ 1, 2; Wills on
Circumstantial Evid., p. 2; Whately’s Logic, b. iv. ch. iii. § 1.

50 See 1 Stark. Evid. pp. 16, 480, 521.

51 This subject has been treated by Dr. Chalmers, in his Evidences of
the Christian Revelation, chapter iii. The following extract from
his observations will not be unacceptable to the reader. “In other
cases, when we compare the narratives of contemporary historians, it
is not expected that all the circumstances alluded to by one will be
taken notice of by the rest; and it often happens that an event or a
custom is admitted upon the faith of a single historian; and the
silence of all other writers is not suffered to attach suspicion or
discredit to his testimony. It is an allowed principle, that a
scrupulous resemblance betwixt two histories is very far from
necessary to their being held consistent with one another. And what
is more, it sometimes happens that, with contemporary historians,
there may be an apparent contradiction, and the credit of both
parties remain as entire and unsuspicious as before. Posterity is,
in these cases, disposed to make the most liberal allowances.
Instead of calling it a contradiction, they often call it a
difficulty. They are sensible that, in many instances a seeming
variety of statement has, upon a more extensive knowledge of ancient
history, admitted of a perfect reconciliation. Instead, then, of
referring the difficulty in question to the inaccuracy or bad faith
of any of the parties, they, with more justness and more modesty,
refer it to their own ignorance, and to that obscurity which
necessarily hangs over the history of every remote age. These
principles are suffered to have great influence in every secular
investigation; but so soon as, instead of a secular, it becomes a
sacred investigation, every ordinary principle is abandoned, and the
suspicion annexed to the teachers of religion is carried to the
dereliction of all that candour and liberality with which every
other document of antiquity is judged of and appreciated. How does
it happen that the authority of Josephus should be acquiesced in as
a first principle, while every step, in the narrative of the
evangelists, must have foreign testimony to confirm and support it?
How comes it, that the silence of Josephus should be construed into
an impeachment of the testimony of the evangelists, while it is
never admitted, for a single moment, that the silence of the
evangelists can impart the slightest blemish to the testimony of
Josephus? How comes it, that the supposition of two Philips in one
family should throw a damp of scepticism over the Gospel narrative,
while the only circumstance which renders that supposition necessary
is the single testimony of Josephus; in which very testimony it is
necessarily implied that there are two Herods in that same family?
How comes it, that the evangelists, with as much internal, and a
vast deal more of external evidence in their favour, should be made
to stand before Josephus, like so many prisoners at the bar of
justice? In any other case, we are convinced that this would be
looked upon as _rough handling_. But we are not sorry for it. It has
given more triumph and confidence to the argument. And it is no
small addition to our faith, that its first teachers have survived
an examination, which, in point of rigour and severity, we believe
to be quite unexampled in the annals of criticism.” See Chalmers’s
Evidences, pp. 72-74.

52 See 1 Stark. Evid. pp. 480, 545.

53 If the witnesses could be supposed to have been biassed, this would
destroy their testimony to matters of fact; it would only detract
from the weight of their judgment in matters of opinion. The rule of
law on this subject has been thus stated by Dr. Lushington: “When
you examine the testimony of witnesses nearly connected with the
parties, and there is nothing very peculiar tending to destroy their
credit, when they depose to mere facts, their testimony is to be
believed; when they depose as to matter of opinion, it is to be
received with suspicion.” Dillon _v._ Dillon, 3 Curteis’s Eccl. Rep.
pp. 96, 102.

54 This subject has been so fully treated by Dr. Paley, in his view of
the Evidences of Christianity, Part I., Prop. I., that is it
unnecessary to pursue it farther in this place.

55 1 Stark. Evid., pp. 483, 548.

56 Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric, c. v. b. 1. Part 3, p. 125.
Whately’s Rhetoric, Part 1. ch. 2. § 4. 1 Stark. Evid., p. 487.

57 See the Quarterly Review, vol. xxviii. p. 465. These narrators were,
the Duchess D’Angoulême herself, the two Messrs. De Bouillè, the Duc
De Choiseul, his servant, James Brissac, Messrs. De Damas and
Deslons, two of the officers commanding detachments on the road,
Messrs. De Moustier and Valori, the garde du corps who accompanied
the king, and finally M. de Fontanges, archbishop of Toulouse, who
though not himself a party to the transaction, is supposed to have
written from the information of the queen. An earlier instance of
similar discrepancy is mentioned by Sully. After the battle of
Aumale, in which Henry IV. was wounded, when the officers were
around the king’s bed, conversing upon the events of the day, there
were not two who agreed in the recital of the most particular
circumstances of the action. D’Aubigné, a contemporary writer, does
not even mention the king’s wound, though it was the only one he
ever received in his life. See Memoirs of Sully, vol. i. p. 245. If
we treated these narratives as sceptics would have us treat these of
the sacred writers, what evidence should we have of any battle at
Aumale, or of any flight to Varennes?

58 Far greater discrepancies can be found in the different reports of
the same case, given by the reporters of legal judgments than are
shown among the evangelists; and yet we do not consider them as
detracting from the credit of the reporters, to whom we still resort
with confidence, as to good authority. Some of these discrepancies
seem utterly irreconcilable. Thus, in a case, 45 Edw. III. 19, where
the question was upon a gift of lands to J. de C. with Joan, the
sister of the donor, and to their heirs, Fitzherbert (tit. _Tail_,
14) says it was adjudged fee simple, and not frankmarriage; Statham
(tit. _Tail_) says it was adjudged a gift in frankmarriage; while
Brook (tit. _Frankmarriage_) says it was not decided. (Vid. 10 Co.
118.) Others are irreconcilable, until the aid of a third reporter
is invoked. Thus, in the case of Cooper v. Franklin, Croke says it
was not decided, but adjourned; (Cro. Jac. 100); Godbolt says it was
decided in a certain way, which he mentions; (Godb. 269); Moor also
reports it as decided, but gives a different account of the question
raised; (Moor, 848); while Bulstrode gives a still different report
of the judgment of the court, which he says was delivered by Croke
himself. But by his account it further appears, that the case was
previously twice argued; and thus it at length results that the
other reporters relate only what fell from the court on each of the
previous occasions. Other similar examples may be found in 1 Dougl.
6, n. compared with 5 East, 475, n. in the case of Galbraith _v_.
Neville; and in that of Stoughton _v_. Reynolds, reported by
Fortescue, Strange, and in Cases temp. Hardwicke. (See 3 Barnw. &
Ald. 247, 248.) Indeed, the books abound in such instances. Other
discrepancies are found in the names of the same litigating parties,
as differently given by reporters; such as, Putt _v_. Roster, (2
Mod. 318); Foot _v_. Rastall, (Skin. 49), and Putt _v_. Royston, (2
Show. 211); also, Hosdell _v_. Harris, (2 Keb. 462); Hodson _v_.
Harwich, (Ib. 533), and Hodsden _v_. Harridge, (2 Saund. 64), and a
multitude of others, which are universally admitted to mean the same
cases, even when they are not precisely within the rule of _idem
sonans_. These diversities, it is well known, have never detracted
in the slightest degree from the estimation in which the reporters
are all deservedly held, as authors of merit, enjoying, to this day,
the confidence of the profession. Admitting now, for the sake of
argument, (what is not conceded in fact,) that diversities equally
great exist among the sacred writers; how can we consistently, and
as lawyers, raise any serious objection against them on that
account, or treat them in any manner different from that which we
observe towards our own reporters?

59 Mr. Hume’s argument is thus refuted by Lord Brougham. “Here are two
answers, to which the doctrine proposed by Mr. Hume is exposed, and
either appears sufficient to shake it.

“_First_—Our belief in the uniformity of the laws of nature rests
not altogether upon our own experience. We believe no man ever was
raised from the dead,—not merely because we ourselves never saw it,
for indeed that would be a very limited ground of deduction; and our
belief was fixed on the subject long before we had any considerable
experience,—fixed chiefly by authority,—that is, by deference to
other men’s experience. We found our confident belief in this
negative position partly, perhaps chiefly, upon the testimony of
others; and at all events, our belief that in times before our own
the same position held good, must of necessity be drawn from our
trusting relations of other men—that is, it depends upon the
evidence of testimony. If, then, the existence of the law of nature
is proved, in great part at least, by such evidence, can we wholly
reject the like evidence when it comes to prove an exception to the
rule—a deviation from the law? The more numerous are the cases of
the law being kept—the more rare those of its being broken—the more
scrupulous certainly ought we to be in admitting the proofs of the
breach. But that testimony is capable of making good the proof there
seems no doubt. In truth, the degree of excellence and of strength
to which testimony may arise seems almost indefinite. There is
hardly any cogency which it is not capable by possible supposition
of attaining. The endless multiplication of witnesses,—the unbounded
variety of their habits of thinking, their prejudices, their
interests,—afford the means of conceiving the force of their
testimony, augmented _ad infinitum_, because these circumstances
afford the means of diminishing indefinitely the chances of their
being mistaken, all misled, or all combining to deceive us. Let any
man try to calculate the chances of a thousand persons who come from
different quarters, and never saw each other before, and who all
vary in their habits, stations, opinions, interests,—being mistaken
or combining to deceive us, when they give the same account of an
event as having happened before their eyes,—these chances are many
hundreds of thousands to one. And yet we can conceive them
multiplied indefinitely; for one hundred thousand such witnesses may
in all like manner bear the same testimony; and they may all tell us
their story within twenty-four hours after the transaction, and in
the next parish. And yet, according to Mr. Hume’s argument, we are
bound to disbelieve them all, because they speak to a thing contrary
to our own experience, and to the accounts which other witnesses had
formerly given us of the law of nature, and which our forefathers
had handed down to us as derived from witnesses who lived in the old
time before them. It is unnecessary to add that no testimony of the
witnesses, whom we are supposing to concur in their relation,
contradicts any testimony of our own senses. If it did, the argument
would resemble Archbishop Tillotson’s upon the Real Presence, and
our disbelief would be at once warranted.

“_Secondly_—This leads us to the next objection to which Mr. Hume’s
argument is liable, and which we have in part anticipated while
illustrating the first. He requires us to withhold our belief in
circumstances which would force every man of common understanding to
lend his assent, and to act upon the supposition of the story told
being true. For, suppose either such numbers of various witnesses as
we have spoken of; or, what is perhaps stronger, suppose a miracle
reported to us, first by a number of relators, and then by three or
four of the very soundest judges and most incorruptibly honest men
we know,—men noted for their difficult belief of wonders, and, above
all, steady unbelievers in miracles, without any bias in favour of
religion, but rather accustomed to doubt, if not disbelieve,—most
people would lend an easy belief to any miracles thus vouched. But
let us add this circumstance, that a friend on his death-bed had
been attended by us, and that we had told him a fact known only to
ourselves,—something that we had secretly done the very moment
before we told it to the dying man, and which to no other being we
had ever revealed,—and that the credible witnesses we are supposing,
informed us that the deceased appeared to them, conversed with them,
remained with them a day or two, accompanying them, and to avouch
the fact of his reappearance on this earth, communicated to them the
secret of which we had made him the sole depository the moment
before his death;—according to Mr. Hume, we are bound rather to
believe, not only that those credible witnesses deceive us, or that
those sound and unprejudiced men were themselves deceived, and
fancied things without real existence, but further, that they all
hit by chance upon the discovery of a real secret, known only to
ourselves and the dead man. Mr. Hume’s argument requires us to
believe this as the lesser improbability of the two—as less unlikely
than the rising of one from the dead; and yet every one must feel
convinced, that were he placed in the situation we have been
figuring, he would not only lend his belief to the relation, but if
the relators accompanied it with a special warning from the deceased
person to avoid a certain contemplated act, he would, acting upon
the belief of their story, take the warning, and avoid doing the
forbidden deed. Mr. Hume’s argument makes no exception. This is its
scope; and whether he chooses to push it thus far or no, all
miracles are of necessity denied by it, without the least regard to
the kind or the quantity of the proof on which they are rested; and
the testimony which we have supposed, accompanied by the test or
check we have supposed, would fall within the grasp of the argument
just as much and as clearly as any other miracle avouched by more
ordinary combinations of evidence.

“The use of Mr. Hume’s argument is this, and it is an important and
a valuable one. It teaches us to sift closely and rigorously the
evidence for miraculous events. It bids us remember that the
probabilities are always, and must always be incomparably greater
against, than for, the truth of these relations, because it is
always far more likely that the testimony should be mistaken or
false, than that the general laws of nature should be suspended.
Further than this the doctrine cannot in soundness of reason be
carried. It does not go the length of proving that those general
laws cannot, by the force of human testimony, be shown to have been,
in a particular instance, and with a particular purpose, suspended.”
See his Discourse of Natural Theology, Note 5, p. 210-214. (Ed.
1835.)

Laplace, in his Essai sur les Probabilités, maintains that, the more
extraordinary the fact attested, the greater the probability of
error or falsehood in the attestor. Simple good sense, he says,
suggests this; and the calculation of probabilities confirms its
suggestion. There are some things, he adds, so extraordinary, that
nothing can balance their improbability. The position here laid down
is, that the probability of error, or of the falsehood of testimony,
becomes in _proportion_ greater, as the fact which is attested is
more extraordinary. And hence a fact extraordinary in the highest
possible degree, becomes in the highest possible degree improbable;
or so much so, that nothing can counterbalance its improbability.

This argument has been made much use of, to discredit the evidence
of miracles, and the truth of that divine religion which is attested
by them. But however sound it may be, in one sense, this application
of it is fallacious. The fallacy lies in the meaning affixed to the
term “extraordinary.” If Laplace means a fact extraordinary _under_
its existing circumstances and relations, that is, a fact remaining
extraordinary, notwithstanding all its circumstances, the position
need not here to be controverted. But if the term means
extraordinary _in the abstract_, it is far from being universally
true, or affording a correct test of truth, or rule of evidence.
Thus, it is extraordinary that a man should leap fifteen feet at a
bound; but not extraordinary that a strong and active man should do
it, under a sudden impulse to save his life. The former is
improbable in the abstract; the latter is rendered probable by the
circumstances. So, things extraordinary, and therefore improbable
under one hypothesis, become the reverse under another. Thus, the
occurrence of a violent storm at sea, and the utterance by Jesus of
the the words, “Peace, be still,” succeeded instantly by a perfect
calm, are facts which, taken separately from each other, are not in
themselves extraordinary. The connexion between the command of Jesus
and the ensuing calm, as cause and effect, would be extraordinary
and improbable if he were a mere man; but it becomes perfectly
natural and probable, when his divine power is considered. Each of
those facts is in its nature so simple and obvious, that the most
ignorant person is capable of observing it. There is nothing
extraordinary in the facts themselves; and the extraordinary
coincidence, in which the miracle consists, becomes both
intelligible and probable upon the hypothesis of the Christian. (See
the Christian Observer for Oct. 1838, p. 617.) The theory of Laplace
may, with the same propriety, be applied to the creation of the
world. That matter was created out of nothing is extremely
improbable, in the abstract, that is, if there is no God; and
therefore it is not to be believed. But if the existence of a
Supreme Being is conceded, the fact is perfectly credible.

Laplace was so fascinated with his theory, that he thought the
calculus of probabilities might be usefully employed in discovering
the value of the different methods resorted to, in those sciences
which are in a great measure conjectural, as medicine, agriculture,
and political economy. And he proposed that there should be kept, in
every branch of the administration, an exact register of the trials
made of different measures, and of the results, whether good or bad,
to which they have led. (See the Edinburgh Review, vol. xxiii. pp
335, 336.) Napoleon, who appointed him Minister of the Interior, has
thus described him: “A geometrician of the first class, he did not
reach mediocrity as a statesman. He never viewed any subject in its
true light; he was always occupied with subtleties; his notions were
all problematic; and he carried into the administration the spirit
of the _infinitely_ small.” See the Encyclopedia Britannica, art.
Laplace, vol. xiii. p. 101. Memoires Ecrits à Ste. Helena, i. 3. The
injurious effect of deductive reasoning, upon the minds of those who
addict themselves to this method alone, to the exclusion of all
other modes of arriving at the knowledge of truth in fact, is shown
with great clearness and success, by Mr. Whewel in the ninth of the
Bridgewater Treatises, book 3, ch. 6. The calculus of probabilities
has been applied by some writers, to judicial evidence; but its very
slight value as a test, is clearly shown in an able article on
Presumptive Evidence, in the Law Magazine, vol. i. pp. 28-32 (New
Series.)

60 See Mr. Norton’s “Discourse on the latest form of Infidelity,” p.
18.

61 The arguments on this subject are stated in a condensed form, by Mr.
Horne, in his Introduction to the Study of the Holy Scriptures, vol.
i. ch. 4, sec. 2; in which he refers, among others, to Doctor
Gregory’s Letters on the Evidences of the Christian Revelation; Dr.
Campbell’s Dissertation on Miracles; Vince’s Sermons on the
Credibility of Miracles; Bishop Marsh’s Lectures, part 6, lect. 30;
Dr. Adam’s Treatise in reply to Mr. Hume; Bishop Gleig’s
Dissertation on Miracles, (in the third volume of his edition of
Stackhouse’s History of the Bible, p. 240, &c.); Dr. Key’s Norissian
Lectures, vol. i. See also Dr. Hopkins’s Lowell Lectures, lect. I.
and II. delivered in Boston in 1844, where this topic is treated
with great perspicuity and cogency.

Among the more popular treatises on miracles, are Bogue’s Essay on
the Divine Authority of the New Testament, ch. 5; Bishop Wilson’s
Evidences of Christianity, vol. i. lect. 7; Bishop Sumner’s
Evidences, ch. 10; Gambier’s Guide to the Study of Moral Evidence,
ch. v.; Mr. Norton’s Discourse on the latest form of Infidelity, and
Dr. Dewey’s Dudleian Lecture, delivered before Harvard University,
in May, 1836.

62 See Bishop Wilson’s Evidences, lect. 7, p. 130.

63 1 Stark on Evid. p. 496-499.

64 1 Stark. on Evid. p. 523.

65 1 Stark. Evid. 487. The Gospels abound in instances of this. See,
for example, Mark, xv. 21. John, xviii. 10. Luke, xxiii. 6. Matt.
xxvii. 58-60, John xi. 1.

66 1 Stark. Evid. 522, 585.

67 See 1 Stark. Evid. 498. Wills on Circumstantial Evidence, pp. 128,
129.

68 See Chalmers’s Evidence, chap. iii.

69 See Chalmers’s Evidence, pp. 76-78, Amer. ed. Proofs of this kind
are copiously referred to by Mr. Horne, in his Introduction, &c.
vol. i., ch. 3, sect. II. 2.

70 See Mark viii. 32; ix. 5; and xiv. 29; Matt. xvi. 22; and xvii. 5;
Luke ix. 33; and xviii. 18; John xiii, 8; and xviii. 15.

71 Mark viii. 29; Matt. xvi. 16; Luke ix. 20.

72 Matt. xviii. 21; and xix. 27; John xiii. 36.

73 Gal. ii. 11.

74 John xx. 3-6.

75 Matt. xiv. 30.

76 Acts i. 15.

77 Acts ii. 14.

78 Matt. xvi. 16; Mark viii. 29; Luke ix. 20; John vi. 69.

79 Matt. xxvi. 33, 35; Mark xiv. 29.

80 See Paley’s view of the Evidences of Christianity, part ii. chapters
iii. iv. v. vi. vii; Ibid. part iii. ch. i.; Chalmers on the
Evidence and Authority of the Christian Revelation, ch. iii. iv.
viii.; Wilson’s Evidences of Christianity, lect. vi.; Bogue’s Essay
on the Divine Authority of the New Testament, chap. iii. iv.

81 See Bogue’s Essay, chap. i. sect. 2; Newcome’s Obs. part ii. ch. i.
sec. 14.

82 Mal. iv. 5, 6.

83 Mic. iv. 7.

84 Is. xli. 8, 9; Gen. xxii. 16, seq.

85 Gen. xxii. 16, seq.

86 Matt. i. 19.

_husband_. There was commonly an interval of ten or twelve months,
between the making of the contract of marriage and the time of its
celebration. _Gen_. xxiv. 55; _Judg_. xiv. 8. During this period,
though there was no intercourse between the bride and bridegroom,
not even so much as an interchange of conversation, yet they were
considered and spoken of as husband and wife. If, at the end of this
probationary period, the bridegroom was unwilling to solemnize his
engagements by the marriage of the bride, he was bound to give her a
bill of divorce, as if she had been his wife. And if she, during the
same period, had illicit intercourse with another man, she was
liable to punishment, as an adulteress. JAHN’S Archæol. § 154.

87 Is. vii. 14.

88 Luke ii. 1. _a decree_. This decree was issued eleven years before
it was carried into effect, the delay having been procured by Herod.
This fact reconciles the evangelist with the Roman historians, from
whom it appears that Cyrenius was not governor when the decree was
issued, though he held that office when the census was taken and the
tax assessed. See TOWNSEND, _in loc._

89 Gen. xvii. 12; Lev. xii. 3.

90 Ex. xiii. 2; Numb. viii. 16, 17.

91 Lev. xii. 6, 8.

92 Is. viii. 14.

93 Matth. ii. 3, _he was troubled_. According to Josephus, Herod was
always in fear for the stability of his throne, and anxious to pry
into futurity to discover whether it was likely to endure. Thus,
when advanced to regal power, he sent for Manahem, an Essene, who
had predicted of him when a boy that he would be a king, to inquire
of him how long he should reign. JOSEPH. Ant. xv. § 5. BLUNT,
Veracity, &c. § ii. 2.

94 Mic. v. 2.

95 Hos. xi. 1.

96 Jer. xxxi. 15, and xl. 1.

97 Matth. ii. 22, _he was afraid_. The naked statement of this fact,
without explanation, is a mark of the sincerity of the evangelist,
for the value of which we are indebted to Josephus, who relates,
(Ant. b. 17, ch. 9, § 3,) an instance of savage cruelty in
Archelaus, immediately on his coming to the throne, in causing three
thousand persons to be butchered in cold blood, at the first
passover after Herod’s death. Such an act, committed under such
circumstances, must have been rapidly made known abroad, and
inspired all persons with horror. Well, therefore, might Joseph fear
to return. But Matthew’s incidental allusion to the cause, is
characteristic of a man intent only upon the statement of the main
facts, and regardless of appearances or explanations. BLUNT,
Veracity, &c. § ii. 3.

98 Is. xi. 1, and liii. 2; Zech. vi. 12; Rev. v. 5.

99 Luke ii. 42; _twelve years old_. Jewish children were not obliged to
the observances of the ceremonial law, until they attained to years
of discretion, which, in males, was fixed by common consent at
twelve years. On arriving at this age, they were taken to Jerusalem
at the passover, of which they thenceforth participated, as “sons of
commandment,” being fully initiated into the doctrines and
ceremonies of the Jewish church, probably after examination by the
doctors. This accounts for the circumstance of his being found among
them, both hearing, and asking them questions. STACKHOUSE, Hist. N.
T. ch. i.; BLOOMFIELD, _in loc_.

100 Luke ii. 44; _in the company_. All who came, not only from the same
city, but from the same canton or district, made one company. They
carried necessaries along with them, and tents for their lodging at
night. Such companies they now call _caravans_, and in several
places have houses fitted up for their reception, called
_caravanseries_. This account of their manner of travelling
furnishes a ready answer to the question, How could Joseph and Mary
make a day’s journey, without discovering, before night, that Jesus
was not in the company? In the day-time, we may reasonably presume,
the travellers would mingle with different parties of their friends
and acquaintance; but in the evening, when they were about to
encamp, every one would join the family to which he belonged.
CAMPBELL, _in loc_.

101 The Genealogy of Jesus, as given by Luke, is here inverted for the
sake of more convenient comparison with that given by Matthew.

The apparent discrepancies in these accounts are reconciled by Dr.
Robinson, in the following manner:

“I. In the genealogy given by Matthew, considered by itself, some
difficulties present themselves.

“1. There is some diversity among commentators in making out the
three divisions, each of fourteen generations, v. 17. It is,
however, obvious, that the first division begins with Abraham and
ends with David. But does the second begin with David, or with
Solomon? Assuredly with the former; because, just as the first
begins _apo Abraham_, so the second also is said to begin _apo
David_. The first extends _heos David_, and includes him; the second
extends to an epoch and not to a person; and therefore the persons
who are mentioned as coeval with this epoch are not reckoned before
it. After the epoch the enumeration begins again with Jechoniah, and
ends with Jesus. In this way the three divisions are made out thus:—

1. Abraham.
2. Isaac.
3. Jacob.
4. Judah.
5. Phares.
6. Esrom.
7. Aram.
8. Aminadab.
9. Naasson.
10. Salmon.
11. Boaz.
12. Obed.
13. Jesse.
14. David.

1. David.
2. Solomon.
3. Roboam.
4. Abiah.
5. Asa.
6. Josaphat.
7. Joram.
8. Uzziah (Ozias).
9. Jotham.
10. Ahaz.
11. Hezekiah.
12. Manasseh.
13. Amon.
14. Josiah.

1. Jechoniah.
2. Salathiel.
3. Zorobabel.
4. Abiud.
5. Eliakim.
6. Azor.
7. Sadoc.
8. Achim.
9. Eliud.
10. Eleazar.
11. Matthan.
12. Jacob.
13. Joseph.
14. Jesus.

“2. Another difficulty arises from the fact, that between Joram and
Ozias, in v. 8, three names of Jewish kings are omitted, viz.
Ahaziah, Joash, and Amaziah; see 2 K. 8, 25 and Chr. 22, 1. 2 K. 11,
2. 21 and 2 Chr. 22, 11. 2 K. 12, 21. 14, 1 and 2 Chr. 24, 27.
Further, between Josiah and Jechoniah in v. 11, the name of
Jehoiakim is also omitted; 2 K. 23, 34. 2 Chr. 36, 4. comp. 1 Chr.
3, 15, 16. If these four names are to be reckoned, then the second
division, instead of fourteen generations, will contain eighteen, in
contradiction to v. 17. To avoid this difficulty, Newcome and some
others have regarded v. 17 as a mere gloss, ‘a marginal note taken
into the text.’ This indeed is in itself possible; yet all the
external testimony of manuscripts and versions is in favour of the
genuineness of that verse. It is better therefore to regard these
names as having been customarily omitted in the current genealogical
tables, from which Matthew copied. Such omissions of particular
generations did sometimes actually occur, ‘propteres quod malæ
essent et impiæ,’ according to R. Sal. Jarchi; Lightfoot, Hor. Heb.
in Matth. 1, 8. A striking example of an omission of this kind,
apparently without any such reason, is found in Ezra 7, 1-5,
compared with 1 Chr. 6, 3-15. This latter passage contains the
lineal descent of the high-priests from Aaron to the captivity;
while Ezra, in the place cited, in tracing back his own genealogy
through the very same line of descent, omits at least six
generations. A similar omission is necessarily implied in the
genealogy of David, as given Ruth 4, 20-22. 1 Chr. 2, 10-12. Matth.
1, 5, 6. Salmon was contemporary with the capture of Jericho by
Joshua, and married Rahab. But from that time until David, an
interval of at least four hundred and fifty years (Acts 13, 20,)
there intervened, according to the list, only four generations,
averaging of course more than one hundred years to each. But the
highest average in point of fact is _three_ generations to a
century; and if reckoned by the eldest sons they are usually
shorter, or three generations for every seventy-five or eighty
years. See Sir I. Newton’s Chronol. p. 53. Lond. 1728.

“We may therefore rest in the necessary conclusion, that as our
Lord’s regular descent from David was always asserted, and was never
denied even by the Jews; so Matthew, in tracing this admitted
descent, appealed to genealogical tables, which were public and
acknowledged in the family and tribe from which Christ sprang. He
could not indeed do otherwise. How much stress was laid by the Jews
upon lineage in general, and how much care and attention were
bestowed upon such tables, is well known. See Lightfoot, Hor. Heb.
in Matth. 1, 1. Comp. Phil. 3, 4, 5.

“II. Other questions of some difficulty present themselves, when we
compare together the two genealogies.

“1. Both tables at first view purport to give the lineage of our
Lord through Joseph. But Joseph cannot have been the son by natural
descent of both Joseph and Heli (Eli), Matth. 1, 16. Luke 3, 23.
Only one of the tables therefore can give his true lineage by
generation. This is done apparently in that of Matthew; because,
beginning at Abraham, it proceeds by natural descent, as we know
from history, until after the exile; and then continues on in the
same mode of expression until Joseph. Here the phrase is changed;
and it is no longer Joseph who ’begat’ Jesus, but Joseph ‘the
husband of Mary, of whom was born Jesus who is called the Christ.’
See Augustine, de Consensu Evangel. II. 5.

“2. To whom then does the genealogy in Luke chiefly relate? If in
any way to Joseph, as the language purports, then it must be because
he in some way bore the legal relation of son to Heli, either by
adoption or by marriage. If the former simply, it is difficult to
comprehend why, along with his true personal lineage as traced by
Matthew up through the royal line of Jewish kings to David, there
should be given also another subordinate genealogy, not personally
his own, and running back through a different and inferior line to
the same great ancestor. If, on the other hand, as is most probable,
this relation to Heli came by marriage with his daughter, so that
Joseph was truly his _son-in-law_ (comp. Ruth 1, 8. 11. 12); then it
follows, that the genealogy in Luke is in fact that of Mary the
mother of Jesus. This being so, we can perceive a sufficient reason
why this genealogy should be thus given, viz. in order to show
definitely, that Jesus was in the most full and perfect sense a
descendant of David: not only by law in the royal line of kings,
through his reputed father, but also in fact by direct personal
descent through his mother.

“That Mary, like Joseph, was a descendant of David, is not indeed
elsewhere expressly said in the New Testament. Yet a very strong
presumption to that effect is to be drawn from the address of the
angel in Luke 1, 32; as also from the language of Luke 2, 5, where
Joseph, as one of the posterity of David, is said to have gone up to
Bethlehem, to _enroll himself with Mary his espoused wife_. The
ground and circumstances of Mary’s enrolment must obviously have
been the same as in the case of Joseph himself. Whether all this
arose from her having been an only child and heiress, as some
suppose, so that she was espoused to Joseph in accordance with Num.
36, 8, 9, it is not necessary here to inquire. See Michaelis
‘Commentaries on the Laws of Moses,’ Part II. § 78.