Animal intelligence: Experimental studies

Chapter XIV: Introduction (3)

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A | G | H | I | J | K
------------------------+------+--------+-----------+--------+------
No. 1, Jan. 7, 1900, | 13 | 10 F | | No. |
PP (string across) | | | | |
| | | | |
No. 1, Jan. 17, 1900, | 21 | 10 F | | (?) |
MM (bolt at top) | | | | |
| | | | |
No. 1, Feb. 24, 1900, | | | Partly | |
OOO (upper string) | | | similar. | No. |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
No. 1, Mar. 24, 1900, | 10 | 30.00 |Dissimilar.| No. |
QQ (chute) | | | | |
| | | | |
No. 1, Apr. 5, 1900, | 7 | 2.20 | Similar. | Yes(?) |
RR (wood plug) | 2 | 2.00 | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
No. 1, Oct. 20, 1900, | | | Similar. | |
VV (loop) | | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
No. 1, Nov. 19, 1900, | 51 A | 132 F | | No. |
Theta (new bolt) | | | | |
| | | | |
No. 1, Jan. 4, 1901, | 80 A |65 F[31]| | No. |
Delta (push back) | | | | |
| | | | |
No. 1, Jan. 6, 1901, | | |Dissimilar.| |
QQ (a) (single | | | | |
wind chute) | | | | |
| | | | |
No. 1, Jan. 7, 1901, | | | | |
Zeta (side plug new) | 20 | im. | ? | |
| | im. | | |
| | | | |
No. 1, Jan. 9, 1901, | | |Dissimilar.| No. |Yes.
QQ (b) (2½ | | | | |
wind chute) | | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
No. 1, Jan. 11, 1901, | | |Dissimilar.| |Yes.[33]
QQ (c) (nail chute) | | | | |
| | | | |
No. 1, Jan. 12, 1901, | 10 | 5 F | | No. |
Epsilon (push down) | 10 | 10 F | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
No. 1, Jan. 16, 1901, | | | | |
QQ (d) (pull chute) | | | | |
| | | | |
No. 1, Jan. 17, 1901, | 10 | 5 F | | |
QQ (f) (string chute) | | | | |
| | | | |
No. 1, Jan. 18, 1901, | | | | |
QQ (e) (hook chute) | | | | |
| | | | |
No. 3, Dec. 17, 1900, |113 | 90 F | | (?) |
QQ (chute) | | | | |
| | | | |
No. 3, Dec. 17, 1900, | 23 | 20 F | | No. |
VV (loop) | | | | |
| | | | |
No. 3, Jan. 4, 1901, | 5 A |2.00[35]|Dissimilar.| No. |
Delta (push back) | 5 | 3.20 | | |
| 15 | 30 F | | |
| 5 | 10 F | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
No. 3, Jan. 4, 1901, | 20 A | 5 F | | No. |
Gamma (wind) | | 8 F | | |
| | | | |
No. 3, Jan. 8, 1901, | | |Dissimilar.| |
Theta (bolt at top) | | | | |
| | | | |
No. 3, Jan. 9, 1901, | 10 | | | No |
QQ (a) (chute bar) | 10 | .40 | ? |complete|
| 10 | 1.00 | | circle.|
| 10 | 1.00 | | |
| | | | |
No. 3, Jan. 9, 1901, | | | | |
QQ (b) (2½ wind chute)| | 5 F |Dissimilar.| |Yes.
| | | | |
| | | | |
No. 3, Jan. 11, 1901, | 45 | 38 F | | No. |Yes.
QQ (c) (nail chute) | | | | |
| 10 | 10 F | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
No. 3, Jan. 15, 1901, | 20 | 11.00 | | No. |Yes.
Epsilon (push down) | | 30 F | ? | |
| 15 | 10 F | | |
| | | | |
No. 3, Jan. 16, 1901, | | | | |
QQ (e) (hook chute) | 10 | .10 |Dissimilar.| No. |
| | .10 | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
No. 3, Jan. 19, 1901, | 7 | 5 F | | |
QQ (ff) (string chute | 8 | 5 F | | |
with wire) | 12 | 3.00 |Dissimilar.| No. |
| | 5 F | | |
| | | | |
No. 3, Jan. 22, 1901, | 10 | 5 F | | |
WW (bar inside) | |6.00[40]| | |
| | | | |
| |7.00[40]|Dissimilar.| No. |
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In only one case (bolt at top) out of eight was there possibly any attempt at the act after he had been put through which had not been made before. The ‘yes or?’ in the table with RR was a case occurring after the imitation of me but before the putting No. 1 through.

Out of 6 cases where he had himself failed, No. 3 succeeded (after being put through 113, 23, 20, 10, 10, 20 and 10 times) in 3 cases (chute bar, push down and bar inside). The act was dissimilar in all three cases, bearing absolutely no resemblance in one case. There was no unsuccessful attempt at the act taught him in any of the cases. With the chute he did finger the bar after tuition where he had not done so before, but it was probably an accidental result of his holding his hand out toward it for me to take as he had formed the habit of doing. In the case of box Epsilon (push down), with which he succeeded by pushing his hand in above the lever (an act which though unlike that taught him might be by some considered to be due to an idea gained from the tuition), he failed entirely after further tuition (15 times).

Like the dogs and cats, then, the monkeys seemed unable to learn to do things from being put through them. We may now examine those which they did do of themselves before tuition and ask whether they learned the more rapidly thereby or modified their behavior in ways which might be due to the tuition. There are too few cases and no chance for comparison on the first point; on the second the records are unanimous in showing no change in the method of operating the mechanisms due to the tuition.

As in Table 9, figures followed by F mean that in that length of time the animal failed. Figures without an F denote the time taken by the animal to operate the mechanism.

As a supplement to Table 12 I have made a summary of the cases where the animals did succeed after tuition, that shows the nature of the act shown them as compared with the act they made use of.

SUPPLEMENT TO TABLE 12

I have kept the results of the tests of the ‘on chair’ type separate from the others because they may be tests of a different thing and surely are subject to different conditions.

They were tests of the animals’ ability to form the habit of going to a certain place by reason of having been _carried_ there and securing food thereby. I would leave the animal loose in the room, and if he failed in 5 or 10 minutes to go to the place of his own accord, would put him back in his cage; if he did go of his own accord, I would note the time. Then I would take him, carry him to the place, and feed him. After doing this 10 times I would turn him loose again and see whether the idea of being fed in such and such a place was present and active in making him go to the place. In such tests we are absolutely sure that the animal can without any difficulty perform the necessary movements and would in case the proper stimulus to set them off appeared, if, for instance, a bit of food on one of the places to which he was to go caught his eye. In so far forth the tests were favorable cases for learning. On the other hand, the situation associated with getting food may have been in these cases not the mere ‘being on box’ but the whole previous experience ‘being carried while clinging and being put or let jump on a box.’ In this respect the tests may have been less favorable than the acts where getting food was always the direct sequent of the act of going into the box.

The experiments were:—

A. Carrying the animal and putting him on a chair.

B. Carrying the animal and putting him on a pile of boxes.

C. Carrying the animal and putting him on the top of a sewing machine.

D. Carrying the animal and putting him on the middle of a board 6 feet long, stretched horizontally across the room, 3 feet from the floor.

E. Carrying the animal and putting him on the side of the cage, head down.

The results are given in Table 13.

The size of the room in which I worked and other practical difficulties prevented me from extending these experiments. As they stand, no stable judgments can be inferred from them. It should be noted that in the successful cases there were no other signs of the presence of the idea ‘food when there’ than the mere going to a certain place. The animal did not wait at the place more than a second or two, did not look at me or show any signs of expecting anything.

TABLE 13

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EXPERIMENT | |RESULTS BEFORE|NUMBER OF TIMES| RESULTS
AND DATE | ANIMAL | TRAINING | PUT THROUGH | AFTER
| | | | TRAINING
----------------+----------+--------------+---------------+-----------
A. Jan. 22, 1901| No. 1. | 5 F | 10 | 1.00
| | | | 3.00
Jan. 22, 1901| No. 1. | 5 F | 10 | im.
| | | | 3.30
Jan. 23, 1901| No. 3. | 5 F | 10 | 3.30
| | 5 F | |
B. Jan. 26, 1901| No. 1. | 10 F | 10 and 5 | 10 F 5 F
| No. 3. | 5 F | 10 | 5 F
| | | 10 | 5 F
C. Jan. 27, 1901| No. 1. | 5 F | 10 | 3.00
D. Jan. 27, 1901| No. 1. | 3.20 | 10 | 5 F
E. Jan. 26, 1901| No. 3. | 5 F | 5 | 5 F
================+==========+==============+===============+===========

Although, as I noted in the early part of this monograph, there were occasionally phenomena in the general behavior of the monkeys which of themselves impressed one as being suggestive of an ideational life, the general run of their learning apart from the specific experiments described was certainly confined to the association of impulses of their own with certain situations. The following examples will suffice:—

In getting them so that they would let themselves be handled it was of almost no service to _take_ them and feed them while holding them or otherwise make that state pleasant for them. By far the best way is to wait patiently till they do come near, then feed them; wait patiently till they do take hold of your arm, then feed them. If you do take them and hold them partly by force, you must feed them only when they are comparatively still. In short, in taming them one comes unconsciously to adopt the method of rewarding certain of their impulses rather than certain _conditions_ which might be associated in their minds with ideas, had they such.

After No. 1 and No. 3 had both reached a point where both could hardly be gotten to leave me and go back into their cages or down to the floor of the room, where they evidently enjoyed being held by me, they still did not climb upon me. The idea of clinging to me was either absent or impotent to cause them to act. What they did do was, in the case of No. 1, to jump about, pawing around in the air, until I caught an arm or leg, to which stimulus he had by dint of the typical sort of animal association learned to react by jumping to my arm and clinging there; in the case of No. 3, to stand still until I held my arm right in front of him (if he were in his cage) or to come and stand on his hind legs in front of me (if he were out on the floor). In both cases No. 3’s act was one which had been learned by my rewarding his impulses. I often tried, at this period of their intimacy with me, this instructive experiment. The monkey would be clinging to me so that I could hardly tear him away. I would do so, and he would, if dropped loose from me, make no efforts to get back.

I have already mentioned my failure to get the animals to put out their right hands through the netting after they had long done so with their left hands. With No. 3 I tried putting my fingers through and poking the arm out and then making the movement with it. He profited little if any by this tuition. Had I somehow induced him to do it himself, a few trials would have been sufficient to get the habit well under way.

Monkey No. 1 apparently enjoyed scratching himself. Among the stimuli which served to set off this act of scratching was the irritation from tobacco smoke. If any one would blow smoke in No. 1’s face, he would blink his eyes and scratch himself, principally in the back. After a time he got in the habit of coming to the front of his cage when any one was smoking and making such movements and sounds as in his experience had attracted attention and caused the smoker to blow in his face. He was often given a lighted cigar or cigarette to test him for imitation. He formed the habit of rubbing it on his back. After doing so he would scratch himself with great vigor and zest. He came to do this always when the proper object was given him. I have recounted all this to show that the monkey enjoyed scratching himself. _Yet he apparently never scratched himself except in response to some sensory stimulus._ He was apparently incapable of thinking ‘scratch’ and so doing. Yet the act was quite capable of association with circumstances with which as a matter of hereditary organization it had no connection. For by taking a certain well-defined position in front of his cage and feeding him whenever he did scratch himself I got him to always scratch within a few seconds after I took that position.

GENERAL MENTAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE MONKEYS

It is to be hoped that the growing recognition of the worth of comparative and genetic studies will lead to investigations of the mental make-up of other species of monkeys, and to the careful overhauling of the work done so far, including these rather fragmentary studies of mine. Work with three monkeys of one species, especially when no general body of phenomena, such as one has at hand in the case of domestic animals, can be used as a means of comparison, must necessarily be of limited application in all its details and of insecure application even in its general features. What I shall say concerning the advance in the mental development of the monkeys over that of other mammals may then be in strictness true of only my three subjects, and it may be left to the judgment of individuals to extend my conclusions as far as seems to them likely. To me it seems fairly likely that the very general mental traits which the research has demonstrated hold true with little variation in the monkeys in general.

The monkeys represent progress in mental development from the generalized mammalian type toward man:—

1. In their sensory equipment, in the presence of focalized vision.

2. In their motor equipment, in the coördinated movements of the hand and the eye.

3. In their instincts or inherited nervous connections, in their general physical and mental activity.

4. In their method of learning or associative processes; in—

_a._ Quicker formation of associations,
_b._ Greater number of associations,
_c._ Greater delicacy of associations,
_d._ Greater complexity of associations,
_e._ Greater permanence of associations.

The fact of (1) is well known to comparative anatomists. Its importance in mental development is perhaps not realized, but appears constantly to a systematic student.

(2) is what accounts for much of the specious appearance of human ways of thinking in the monkeys and becomes in its human extension the handy tool for much of our intellectual life. It is in great measure the prerequisite of 4 _c_.

(3) accounts for the rest of such specious appearances, is at the basis of much of 4 _b_, presages the similar though extended instincts of the human being, which I believe are the leading efficient causes of human mental capacity, and is thus the great mental bond which would justify the inclusion of monkeys and man in a common group if we were to classify animals on the basis of mental characteristics.

Even the casual observer, if he has any psychological insight, will be struck by the general, aimless, intrinsically valuable (to the animal’s feelings) physical activities of a monkey compared with the specialized, definitely aroused, utilitarian activities of a dog or cat. Watch the latter and he does but few things, does them in response to obvious sense presentations, does them with practical consequences of food, sex-indulgence, preparation for adult battles, etc. If nothing that appeals to his special organization comes up, he does nothing. Watch a monkey and you cannot enumerate the things he does, cannot discover the stimuli to which he reacts, cannot conceive the _raison d’être_ of his pursuits. Everything appeals to him. He likes to be active for the sake of activity.

The observer who has proper opportunities and takes proper pains will find this intrinsic interest to hold of mental activity as well. No. 1 happened to hit a projecting wire so as to make it vibrate. He repeated this act hundreds of times in the few days following. He did not, could not, eat, make love to, or get preliminary practice for the serious battles of life out of, that sound. But it did give him mental food, mental exercise. Monkeys seem to enjoy strange places; they revel, if I may be permitted an anthropomorphism, in novel objects. They like to have feelings as they do to make movements. The fact of mental life is to them its own reward.

It is beyond question rash for any one to venture hypotheses concerning the brain parallel of mental conditions, most of all for the ignoramus in the comparative histology of the nervous system, but one cannot help thinking that the behavior of the monkeys points to a cerebrum that is no longer a conservative machine for making a few well-defined sorts of connections between sense-impressions and acts, that is not only fitted to do more delicate work in parts, but is also alive, tender all over, functioning throughout, set off in action by anything and everything. And if one adds coördinations allowing a freedom and a differentiation of action of the muscles used in speech comparable to that already present in connection with the monkey’s hand, he may well ask, “What more of a nervous mechanism do you need to parallel the behavior of the year-old child?” However, this is not the place to speculate upon the importance to human development of our instinctive aimless activity, physical and mental, or to describe further its similarity and evident phylogenetic relationship to the instinctive behavior of the monkeys. Elsewhere I shall undertake that task.

4. In their method of learning, the monkeys do not advance far beyond the generalized mammalian type, but in their proficiency in that method they do. They seem at least to form associations very much faster, and they form very many more. They also seem superior in the delicacy and in the complexity of the associations formed and the connections seem to be more permanent.

This progress may seem, and doubtless will to the thinker who looks upon the human intellect as a collection of functions of which ideation, judgment and reasoning are chief, to be slight. To my mind it is not so in reality. For it seems to me highly probable that the so-called ‘higher’ intellectual processes of human beings are but secondary results of the general function of having free ideas and that this general function is the result of the formation after the fashion of the animals of a very great number of associations. I should therefore say, “Let us not wonder at the comparative absence of free ideas in the monkeys, much less at the absence of inferences or concepts. Let us not wonder that the only demonstrable intellectual advance of the monkeys over the mammals in general is the change from a few, narrowly confined, practical associations to a multitude of all sorts, for that may turn out to be at the bottom the only _demonstrable advance of man_, an advance which in connection with a brain acting with increased delicacy and irritability, brings in its train the functions which mark off human mental faculty from that of all other animals.”

The typical process of association described in Chapter II has since been found to exist among reptiles (by Mr. R. M. Yerkes) and among fishes (by myself). It seems fairly likely that not much more characterizes the primates. If such work as that of Lubbock and the Peckhams holds its own against the critical studies of Bethe, this same process exists in the insects. Yerkes and Bosworth think they have demonstrated its presence in the crayfish. Even if we regard the learning of the invertebrates as problematic, still this process is the most comprehensive and important thing in mental life. I have already hinted that we ought to turn our views of human psychology upside down and study what is now casually referred to in a chapter on habit or on the development of the will, as the general psychological law, of which the commonly named processes are derivatives. When this is done, we shall not only relieve human mentality from its isolation and see its real relationships with other forms; we may also come to know more about it, may even elevate our psychologies to the explanatory level and connect mental processes with nervous activities without arousing a sneer from the logician or a grin from the neurologist.

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Animal intelligence: Experimental studiesChapter XIV: Introduction (3)

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