Chapter XXVII: Preface: To Appendix (3)

Who will dare to say that in time of civil war "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, and property without due process of law"? This is a provision of your Constitution than which there is none more just or sacred in it; it is, however, only the law of peace, not of war. In peace, that wise provision of the Constitution must be, and is, enforced by the civil courts; in war it must be, and is, to a great extent, inoperative and disregarded. The thousands slain by your armies in battle were deprived of life "without due process of law." All spies arrested, convicted, and executed by your military tribunals in time of war are deprived of liberty and life "without due process of law "; all enemies captured and held as prisoners of war are deprived of liberty "without due process of law"; all owners whose property is forcibly seized and appropriated in war are deprived of their property "without due process of law." The Constitution recognizes the principle of common law, that every man's house is his castle; that his home, the shelter of his wife and children, is his most sacred possession; and has therefore specially provided, "that no soldier shall _in time of peace_ be quartered in any house without the consent of its owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law [III Amend.]; thereby declaring that, in time of war, Congress may by law authorize, as it has done, that without the consent and against the consent of the owner, the soldier may be quartered in any man's house and upon any man's hearth. What I have said illustrates the proposition, that in time of war the civil tribunals of justice are wholly or partially silent, as the public safety may require; that the limitations and provisions of the Constitution in favor of life, liberty, and property are therefore wholly or partially suspended. In this I am sustained by an authority second to none with intelligent American citizens. Mr. John Quincy Adams, than whom a purer man or a wiser statesman never ascended the chair of the chief magistracy in America, said in his place in the House of Representatives, in 1836, that:--

"In the authority given to Congress by the Constitution of the
United States to declare war, all the powers incident to war
are by necessary implication conferred upon the government
of the United States. Now the powers incidental to war are
derived, not from their internal municipal source, but from the
laws and usages of nations. There are, then, in the authority
of Congress and the Executive, two classes of powers altogether
different in their nature and often incompatible with each
other--the war power and the peace power. The peace power is
limited by regulations and restricted by provisions prescribed
within the Constitution itself. The war power is limited only
by the laws and usage of nations. This power is tremendous; it
is strictly constitutional, but it breaks down every barrier so
anxiously erected for the protection of liberty, of property,
and of life."

If this be so, how can there be trial by jury for military offenses in time of civil war? If you cannot, and do not, try the armed enemy before you shoot him, or the captured enemy before you imprison him, why should you be held to open the civil courts and try the spy, the conspirator, and the assassin, in the secret service of the public enemy, by jury, before you convict and punish him? Why not clamor against holding imprisoned the captured armed rebels, deprived of their liberty without due process of law? Are they not citizens? Why not clamor against slaying for their crime of treason, which is cognizable in the civil courts, by your rifled ordnance and the leaden hail of your musketry in battle, these public enemies, without trial by jury? Are they not citizens? Why is the clamor confined exclusively to the trial by military tribunals of justice of traitorous spies, traitorous conspirators, and assassins hired to do secretly what the armed rebel attempts to do openly--murder your nationality by assassinating its defenders and its executive officers? Nothing can be clearer than that the rebel captured prisoner, being a citizen of the republic, is as much entitled to trial by jury before he is committed to prison, as the spy, or the aider and abetter of the treason by conspiracy and assassination, being a citizen, is entitled to such trial by jury, before he is subjected to the just punishment of the law for his great crime. I think that in time of war the remark of Montesquieu, touching the civil judiciary is true: that "it is next to nothing." Hamilton well said, "The Executive holds the sword of the community; the judiciary has no direction of the strength of society; it has neither force nor will; it has judgment alone, and is dependent for the execution of that upon the arm of the Executive." The people of these States so understood the Constitution and adopted it, and intended thereby, without limitation or restraint, to empower their Congress and Executive to authorize by law, and execute by force, whatever the public safety might require to suppress rebellion or repel invasion.

Notwithstanding all that has been said by the counsel for the accused to the contrary, the Constitution has received this construction from the day of its adoption to this hour. The Supreme Court of the United States has solemnly decided that the Constitution has conferred upon the government authority to employ all the means necessary to the faithful execution of all the powers which that Constitution enjoins upon the government of the United States, and upon every department and every officer thereof. Speaking of that provision of the Constitution which provides that "Congress shall have power to make all laws that may be necessary and proper to carry into effect all powers granted to the government of the United States, or to any department or officer thereof," Chief Justice Marshall, in his great decision in the case of McCulloch _vs._ State of Maryland, says:--

"The powers given to the government imply the ordinary means
of execution, and the government, in all sound reason and fair
interpretation, must have the choice of the means which it
deems the most convenient and appropriate to the execution of
the power.... The powers of the government were given for the
welfare of the nation; they were intended to endure for ages to
come, and to be adapted to the various crises in human affairs.
To prescribe the specific means by which government should, in
all future time, execute its power, and to confine the choice
of means to such narrow limits as should not leave it in the
power of Congress to adopt any which might be appropriate and
conducive to the end, would be most unwise and pernicious."--4
Wheaton, 420.

Words fitly spoken! which illustrated at the time of their utterance the wisdom of the Constitution in providing this general grant of power to meet every possible exigency which the fortunes of war might cast upon the country, and the wisdom of which words, in turn, has been illustrated to-day by the gigantic and triumphant struggle of the people during the last four years for the supremacy of the Constitution, and in exact accordance with its provisions. In the light of these wonderful events, the words of Pinckney, uttered when the illustrious Chief Justice had concluded this opinion, "The Constitution of my country is immortal!" seem to have become words of prophecy. Has not this great tribunal, through the chief of all its judges, by this luminous and profound reasoning, declared that the government may by law authorize the Executive to employ, in the prosecution of war, the ordinary means, and all the means necessary and adapted to the end? And in the other decision before referred to, in the 8th of Cranch, arising during the late war with Great Britain, Mr. Justice Story said:--

"When the legislative authority, to whom the right to declare
war is confided, has declared war in its most unlimited
manner, the executive authority, to whom the execution of the
war is confided, is bound to carry it into effect. He has a
discretion vested in him as to the manner and extent, but he
cannot lawfully transcend the rules of warfare established
among civilized nations. He cannot lawfully exercise powers or
authorize proceedings which the civilized world repudiates and
disclaims. The sovereignty, as to declaring war and limiting
its effects, rests with the legislature. The sovereignty as to
its execution rests with the President."--Brown _vs._ United
States, 8 Cranch, 153.

Has the Congress, to whom is committed the sovereignty of the whole people to declare war, by legislation restricted the President, or attempted to restrict him, in the prosecution of this war for the Union, from exercising all the "powers" and adopting all the "proceedings" usually approved and employed by the civilized world? He would, in my judgment, be a bold man who asserted that Congress has so legislated; and the Congress which should by law fetter the executive arm when raised for the common defense would, in my opinion, be false to their oath. That Congress may prescribe rules for the government of the army and navy and the militia when in actual service, by articles of war, is an express grant of power in the Constitution which Congress has rightfully exercised, and which the Executive must and does obey. That Congress may aid the Executive by legislation in the prosecution of a war, civil or foreign, is admitted. That Congress may restrain the Executive, and arraign, try, and condemn him for wantonly abusing the great trust, is expressly declared in the Constitution. That Congress shall pass all laws NECESSARY to enable the Executive to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection, and repel invasion, is one of the express requirements of the Constitution, for the performance of which the Congress is bound by an oath.

What was the legislation of Congress when treason fired its first gun on Sumter? By the act of 1795 it is provided that whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the execution thereof obstructed, in any State, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceeding or by the powers vested in the marshals, it shall be lawful by this act for the President to call forth the militia of such State, or of any other State or States, as may be necessary to suppress such combinations and to cause the laws to be executed (1st Statutes at Large, 424). By the act of 1807 it is provided that in case of insurrection or obstruction to the laws, either of the United States or of any individual State or territory, where it is lawful for the President of the United States to call forth the militia for the purpose of suppressing such insurrection or of causing the laws to be duly executed, it shall be lawful for him to employ for such purpose such part of the land or naval forces of the United States as shall be judged necessary (2d Statutes at Large, 443).

Can any one doubt that by these acts the President is clothed with full power to determine whether armed insurrection exists in any State or territory of the Union; and if so, to make war upon it with all the force he may deem necessary or be able to command? By the simple exercise of this great power it necessarily results that he may, in the prosecution of the war for the suppression of such insurrection, suspend as far as may be necessary the civil administration of justice by substituting in its stead martial law, which is simply the common law of war. If in such a moment the President may make no arrests without civil warrant, and may inflict no violence or penalties on persons (as is claimed here for the accused), without first obtaining the verdict of juries and the judgment of civil courts, then is this legislation a mockery, and the Constitution, which not only authorized but enjoined its enactment, but a glittering generality and a splendid bauble. Happily, the Supreme Court has settled all controversy on this question. In speaking of the Rhode Island insurrection, the court say:--

"The Constitution of the United States, as far as it has
provided for an emergency of this kind and authorized the
general government to interfere in the domestic concerns of a
State, has treated the subject as political in its nature and
placed the power in the hands of that department." ... "By the
act of 1795 the power of deciding whether the exigency has
arisen upon which the government of the United States is bound
to interfere is given to the President."

The court add:--

"When the President has acted and called out the militia, is
a circuit court of the United States authorized to inquire
whether his decision was right? If it could, then it would
become the duty of the court, provided it came to the
conclusion that the President had decided incorrectly, to
discharge those who were arrested or detained by the troops in
the service of the United States." ... "If the judicial power
extends so far, the guarantee contained in the Constitution
of the United States is a guarantee of anarchy and not of
order." ... "Yet if this right does not reside in the courts
when the conflict is raging, if the judicial power is at that
time bound to follow the decision of the political, it must
be equally bound when the contest is over. It cannot, when
peace is restored, punish as offenses and crimes the acts
which it before recognized and was bound to recognize as
lawful."--Luther _vs._ Borden, 7 Howard, 42, 43.

If this be law, what becomes of the volunteer advice of the volunteer counsel, by him given without money and without price, to this court, of their responsibility--their _personal_ responsibility, for obeying the orders of the President of the United States in trying persons accused of the murder of the Chief Magistrate and Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the United States in time of rebellion, and in pursuance of a conspiracy entered into with the public enemy? I may be pardoned for asking the attention of the court to a further citation from this important decision, in which the court say, the employment of military power to put down an armed insurrection "is essential to the existence of every government, and is as necessary to the States of this Union as to any other government; and if the government of the State deem the armed opposition so formidable as to require the use of military force and the declaration of MARTIAL LAW, we see no ground upon which this court can question its authority" (_Ibid_). This decision in terms declared that under the act of 1795 the President had power to decide and did decide the question so as to exclude further inquiry whether the State government which thus employed force and proclaimed martial law was the government of the State, and therefore was permitted to act. If a State may do this to put down armed insurrection, may not the federal government as well? The reason of the man who doubts it may justly be questioned. I but quote the language of that tribunal, in another case before cited, when I say the Constitution confers upon the President the whole executive power.

We have seen that the proclamation of blockade made by the President was affirmed by the Supreme Court as a lawful and valid act, although its direct effect was to dispose of the property of whoever violated it, whether citizen or stranger. It is difficult to perceive what course of reasoning can be adopted, in the light of that decision, which will justify any man in saying that the President had not the like power to proclaim martial law in time of insurrection against the United States, and to establish, according to the customs of war among civilized nations, military tribunals of justice for its enforcement and for the punishment of all crimes committed in the interests of the public enemy.

These acts of the President have, however, all been legalized by the subsequent legislation of Congress, although the Supreme Court decided, in relation to the proclamation of blockade, that no such legislation was necessary. By the act of August 6, 1861, ch. 63, sec. 3, it is enacted that--

"All the acts, proclamations, and orders of the President of
the United States, after the 4th of March, 1861, respecting
the army and navy of the United States, and calling out, or
relating to, the militia or volunteers from the States, are
hereby approved in all respects, legalized, and made valid
to the same extent and with the same effect as if they had
been issued and done under the previous express authority and
direction of the Congress of the United States."--12 Statutes
at Large, 326.

This act legalized, if any such legalization was necessary, all that the President had done from the day of his inauguration to that hour, in the prosecution of the war for the Union. He had suspended the privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_, and resisted its execution when issued by the Chief Justice of the United States; he had called out and accepted the services of a large body of volunteers for a period not previously authorized by law; he had declared a blockade of the Southern ports; he had declared the Southern States in insurrection; he had ordered the armies to invade them and suppress it; thus exercising, in accordance with the laws of war, power over the life, the liberty, and the property of the citizens. Congress ratified it and affirmed it.

In like manner and by subsequent legislation did the Congress ratify and affirm the proclamation of martial law of September 25, 1862. That proclamation, as the court will have observed, declares that during the existing insurrection all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors within the United States, and all persons guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid and comfort to the rebels against the authority of the United States, shall be subject to martial law and liable to trial and punishment by courts-martial or _military commission_; and second, that the writ of _habeas corpus_ is suspended in respect to all persons arrested, or who are now, or hereafter during the rebellion shall be, imprisoned in any fort, etc., by any military authority, or by the sentence of any court-martial or _military commission_.

One would suppose that it needed no argument to satisfy an intelligent and patriotic citizen of the United States that, by the ruling of the Supreme Court cited, so much of this proclamation as declares that all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors, shall be subject to martial law and be liable to trial and punishment by court-martial or military commission, needed no ratification by Congress. Every step that the President took against rebels and insurgents was taken in pursuance of the rules of war and was an exercise of martial law. Who says that he should not deprive them, by the authority of this law, of life and liberty? Are the aiders and abettors of these insurgents entitled to any higher consideration than the armed insurgents themselves? It is against these that the President proclaimed martial law, and against all others who were guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid and comfort to rebels against the authority of the United States. Against these he suspended the privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_; and these, and only such as these, were by that proclamation subjected to trial and punishment by court-martial or military commission.

That the Proclamation covers the offense charged here, no man will, or dare, for a moment deny. Was it not a disloyal practice? Was it not aiding and abetting the insurgents and rebels to enter into a conspiracy with them to kill and murder, within your capital and your intrenched camp, the Commander-in-Chief of our army, your Lieutenant General, and the Vice-President, and the Secretary of State, with intent thereby to aid the rebellion, and subvert the Constitution and laws of the United States? But it is said that the President could not establish a court for their trial, and therefore Congress must ratify and affirm this Proclamation. I have said before that such an argument comes with ill grace from the lips of him who declared as solemnly that neither by the Congress nor by the President could either the rebel himself or his aider or abettor be lawfully and constitutionally subjected to trial by any military tribunal, whether court-martial or military commission. But the Congress did ratify, in the exercise of the power vested in them, every part of this Proclamation. I have said, upon the authority of the fathers of the Constitution, and of its judicial interpreters, that Congress has power by legislation to aid the Executive in the suppression of rebellion, in executing the laws of the Union when resisted by armed insurrection, and in repelling invasion.

By the act of March 3, 1863, the Congress of the United States, by the first section thereof, declared that during the present rebellion the President of the United States, whenever in his judgment the public safety may require it, is authorized to suspend the writ of _habeas corpus_ in any case throughout the United States or any part thereof. By the fourth section of the same act it is declared that any order of the President, or under his authority, made at any time during the existence of the present rebellion, shall be a defense in all courts to any action or prosecution, civil or criminal, pending or to be commenced, for any search, seizure, arrest, or imprisonment, made, done, or committed, or acts omitted to be done, under and by virtue of such order. By the fifth section it is provided that, if any suit or prosecution, civil or criminal, has been or shall be commenced in any State court against any officer, civil or military, or against any other person, for any arrest or imprisonment made, or other trespasses or wrongs done or committed, or any act omitted to be done at any time during the present rebellion, by virtue of or under color of any authority derived from or exercised by or under the President of the United States, if the defendant shall, upon appearance in such court, file a petition stating the facts upon affidavit, etc., as aforesaid, for the removal of the cause for trial to the circuit court of the United States, it shall be the duty of the State court, upon his giving security, to proceed no further in the cause or prosecution; thus declaring that all orders of the President, made at any time during the existence of the present rebellion, and all acts done in pursuance thereof, shall be held valid in the courts of justice. Without further inquiry, these provisions of this statute embrace Order 141, which is the proclamation of martial law, and necessarily legalize every act done under it, either before the passage of the act of 1863 or since. Inasmuch as that Proclamation ordered that all rebels, insurgents, their aiders and abettors, and persons guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid and comfort to rebels against the authority of the United States, at any time during the existing insurrection, should be subject to martial law, and liable to trial and punishment by a _military commission_, the sections of the law just cited declaring lawful all acts done in pursuance of such order, including, of course, the trial and punishment by military commission of all such offenders, as directly legalized this order of the President as it is possible for Congress to legalize or authorize any executive act whatever.--12 Statutes at Large, 755, 756.

But after assuming and declaring with great earnestness in his argument that no person could be tried and convicted for such crimes by any military tribunal, whether a court-martial or a military commission, save those in the land or naval service in time of war, the gentleman makes the extraordinary statement that the creation of a military commission must be authorized by the legislative department, and demands, if there be any such legislation, "let the statute be produced." The statute has been produced. The power so to try, says the gentleman, must be authorized by Congress, when the demand is made for such authority. Does not the gentleman thereby give up his argument, and admit, that if the Congress has so authorized the trial of all aiders and abettors of rebels or insurgents for whatever they do in aid of such rebels and insurgents during the insurrection, the statute and proceedings under it are lawful and valid? I have already shown that the Congress have so legislated by expressly legalizing Order No. 141, which directed the trial of all rebels, their aiders and abettors, by military commission. Did not Congress expressly legalize this order by declaring that the order shall be a defense in all courts to any action or prosecution, civil or criminal, for acts done in pursuance of it? No amount of argument could make this point clearer than the language of the statute itself. But, says the gentleman, if there be a statute authorizing trials by military commission, "let it be produced."

By the act of March 3, 1863, it is provided in section thirty that in time of war, insurrection, or rebellion, murder and assault with intent to kill, etc., when committed by persons in the military service, shall be punishable by the sentence of a court-martial or _military commission_, and the punishment of such offenses shall never be less than those inflicted by the laws of the State or district in which they may have been committed. By the thirty-eighth section of the same act it is provided that all persons who, in time of war or rebellion against the United States, shall be found lurking or acting as spies in or about the camps, etc., of the United States, or elsewhere, shall be triable by a _military commission_, and shall, upon conviction, suffer death. Here is a statute which expressly declares that all persons, whether citizens or strangers, who in time of rebellion shall be found acting as spies, shall suffer death upon conviction by a military commission. Why did not the gentleman give us some argument upon this law? We have seen that it was the existing law of the United States under the Confederation. Then, and since, men not in the land or naval forces of the United States have suffered death for this offense upon conviction by courts-martial. If it was competent for Congress to authorize their trial by courts-martial, it was equally competent for Congress to authorize their trial by military commission, and accordingly they have done so. By the same authority the Congress may extend the jurisdiction of military commissions over all military offenses or crimes committed in time of rebellion or war in aid of the public enemy; and it certainly stands with right reason, that if it were just to subject to death, by the sentence of a military commission, all persons who should be guilty merely of lurking as spies in the interests of the public enemy in time of rebellion, though they obtained no information, though they inflicted no personal injury, but were simply overtaken and detected in the endeavor to obtain intelligence for the enemy, those who enter into conspiracy with the enemy, not only to lurk as spies in your camp, but to lurk there as murderers and assassins, and who, in pursuance of that conspiracy, commit assassination and murder upon the Commander-in-Chief of your army within your camp and in aid of rebellion, should be subject in like manner to trial by military commission.--Statutes at Large 12, 736, 737, ch. 8.

Accordingly, the President having so declared, the Congress, as we have stated, have affirmed that his order was valid, and that all persons acting by authority, and consequently as a court pronouncing such sentence upon the offender as the usage of war requires, are justified by the law of the land. With all respect, permit me to say that the learned gentleman has manifested more acumen and ability in his elaborate argument by what he has omitted to say than by anything which he has said. By the act of July 2, 1864, cap. 215, it is provided that the commanding general in the field, or the commander of the department, as the case may be, shall have power to carry into execution all sentences against guerilla marauders for robbery, arson, burglary, etc., and for violation of the laws and customs of war, as well as sentences against spies, mutineers, deserters, and murderers.

From the legislation I have cited, it is apparent that military commissions are expressly recognized by the law-making power; that they are authorized to try capital offenses against citizens not in the service of the United States, and to pronounce the sentence of death upon them; and that the commander of a department, or the commanding general in the field, may carry such sentence into execution. But, says the gentleman, grant all this to be so; Congress has not declared in what manner the court shall be constituted. The answer to that objection has already been anticipated in the citation from Benèt, wherein it appeared to be the rule of the law martial that in the punishment of all military offenses not provided for by the written law of the land, military commissions are constituted for that purpose by the authority of the commanding officer or the Commander-in-Chief, as the case may be, who selects the officers of a court-martial; that they are similarly constituted, and their proceedings conducted according to the same general rules. That is a part of the very law martial which the President proclaimed, and which the Congress has legalized. The Proclamation has declared that all such offenders shall be tried by military commissions. The Congress has legalized the same by the act which I have cited; and by every intendment it must be taken that, as martial law is by the Proclamation declared to be the rule by which they shall be tried, the Congress, in affirming the act of the President, simply declared that they should be tried according to the customs of martial law; that the commission should be constituted by the Commander-in-Chief according to the rule of procedure known as martial law; and that the penalties inflicted should be in accordance with the laws of war and the usages of nations. Legislation no more definite than this has been upon your statute-book since the beginning of the century, and has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States valid for the punishment of offenders.

By the thirty-second article of the act of 23d April, 1800, it is provided that "all crimes committed by persons belonging to the navy which are not specified in the foregoing articles shall be punished according to the laws and customs in such cases at sea." Of this article the Supreme Court of the United States say, that when offences and crimes are not given in terms or by definition, the want of it may be supplied by a comprehensive enactment such as the thirty-second article of the rules for the government of the navy; which means that courts-martial have jurisdiction of such crimes as are not specified, but which have been recognized to be crimes and offenses by the usages in the navies of all nations, and that they shall be punished according to the laws and customs of the sea.--Dynes _vs._ Hoover, 20 Howard, 82.

But it is a fact that must not be omitted in the reply which I make to the gentleman's argument, that an effort was made by himself and others in the Senate of the United States, on the 3d of March last, to condemn the arrests, imprisonments, etc., made by order of the President of the United States in pursuance of his Proclamation, and to reverse, by the judgment of that body, the law which had been before passed affirming his action, which effort most signally failed.

Thus we see that the body which by the Constitution, if the President had been guilty of the misdemeanors alleged against him in this argument of the gentleman, would, upon presentation of such charge in legal form against the President, constitute the high court of impeachment for his trial and condemnation, has decided the question in advance, and declared upon the occasion referred to, as they had before declared by solemn enactment, that this order of the President declaring martial law and the punishment of all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors, by military commission, should be enforced during the insurrection, as the law of the land, and that the offenders should be tried, as directed, by military commission. It may be said that this subsequent legislation of Congress, ratifying and affirming what had been done by the President, can have no validity. Of course it cannot if neither the Congress nor the Executive can authorize the proclamation and enforcement of martial law in the suppression of rebellion for the punishment of all persons committing military offenses in aid of that rebellion. Assuming, however, as the gentleman seemed to assume, by asking for the legislation of Congress, that there is such power in Congress, the Supreme Court of the United States has solemnly affirmed that such ratification is valid.--2 Black, 671.

The gentleman's argument is full of citations of English precedent. There is a late English precedent bearing upon this point--the power of the legislature, by subsequent enactment, to legalize executive orders, arrests, and imprisonment of citizens--that I beg leave to commend to his consideration. I refer to the statute of 11 and 12 Victoria, ch. 35, entitled "An act to empower the lord lieutenant, or other chief governor or governors of Ireland, to apprehend and detain until the first day of March, 1849, such persons as he or they shall _suspect_ of conspiring against her Majesty's person and government," passed July 25, 1848, which statute in terms declares that all and every person and persons who is, are, or shall be, within that period, within that part of the United Kingdom of England and Ireland called Ireland at or on the day the act shall receive her Majesty's royal assent, or after, by warrant for high treason or treasonable practices, or _suspicion_ of high treason or treasonable practices, signed by the lord lieutenant, or other chief governor or governors of Ireland for the time being, or his or their chief secretary, for such causes as aforesaid, may be detained in safe custody without bail or main prize, until the first day of March, 1849; and that no judge or justice shall bail or try any such person or persons so committed, without order from her Majesty's privy council, until the said first day of March, 1849, any law or statute to the contrary notwithstanding. The second section of this act provides that, in cases where any persons have been, _before_ the passing of the act, arrested, committed, or detained for such cause by warrant or warrants signed by the officers aforesaid, or either of them, it may be lawful for the person or persons to whom such warrants have been or shall be directed, to detain such person or persons in his or their custody in any place whatever in Ireland; and that such person or persons to whom such warrants have been or shall be directed shall be deemed and taken, to all intents and purposes, lawfully authorized to take into safe custody and be the lawful jailers and keepers of such persons so arrested, committed, or detained.

Here the power of arrest is given by the act of Parliament to the governor or his secretary; the process of the civil courts was wholly suspended; bail was denied and the parties imprisoned, and this not by process of the courts, but by warrant of a chief governor or his secretary; not for crimes charged to have been committed, but for being _suspected_ of treasonable practices. Magna Charta, it seems, opposes no restraint, notwithstanding the parade that is made about it in this argument, upon the power of the Parliament of England to legalize arrests and imprisonments made before the passage of the act upon an executive order, and without colorable authority of statute law, and to authorize like arrests and imprisonments of so many of six million of people as such executive officers might _suspect_ of treasonable practices.

But, says the gentleman, whatever may be the precedents, English or American, whatever may be the provisions of the Constitution, whatever may be the legislation of Congress, whatever may be the proclamations and orders of the President as Commander-in-Chief, it is a usurpation and a tyranny in time of rebellion and civil war to subject any citizen to trial for any crime before military tribunals, save such citizens as are in the land or naval forces, and against this usurpation, which he asks this court to rebuke by solemn decision, he appeals to public opinion. I trust that I set as high value upon enlightened public opinion as any man. I recognize it as the reserved power of the people which creates and dissolves armies, which creates and dissolves legislative assemblies, which enacts and repeals fundamental laws, the better to provide for personal security by the due administration of justice. To that public opinion upon this very question of the usurpation of authority, of unlawful arrests, and unlawful imprisonments, and unlawful trials, condemnations, and executions by the late President of the United States, an appeal has already been taken. On this very issue the President was tried before the tribunal of the people, that great nation of freemen who cover this continent, looking out upon Europe from their eastern and upon Asia from their western homes. That people came to the consideration of this issue not unmindful of the fact that the first struggle for the establishment of our nationality could not have been, and was not, successfully prosecuted without the proclamation and enforcement of martial law, declaring, as we have seen, that any inhabitant who, during that war, should kill any loyal citizen, or enter into any combination for that purpose, should, upon trial and conviction before a military tribunal, be sentenced as an assassin, traitor, or spy, and should suffer death, and that in this last struggle for the maintenance of American nationality the President but followed the example of the illustrious Father of his Country. Upon that issue the people passed judgment on the 8th day of last November, and declared that the charge of usurpation was false.

From this decision of the people there lies no appeal on this earth. Who can rightfully challenge the authority of the American people to decide such questions for themselves? The voice of the people, thus solemnly proclaimed, by the omnipotence of the ballot in favor of the righteous order of their murdered President, issued by him for the common defense, for the preservation of the Constitution, and for the enforcement of the laws of the Union, ought to be accepted, and will be accepted, I trust, by all just men, as the voice of God.

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: I have said thus much touching the right of the people, under their Constitution, in time of civil war and rebellion, to proclaim through their Executive, with the sanction and approval of their Congress, martial law, and enforce the same according to the usage of nations.

I submit that it has been shown that, by the letter and spirit of the Constitution, as well as by its contemporaneous construction, followed and approved by every department of the government, this right is in the people; that it is inseparable from the condition of war, whether civil or foreign, and absolutely essential to its vigorous and successful prosecution; that according to the highest authority upon constitutional law, the proclamation and enforcement of martial law are "usual under all governments in time of rebellion"; that our own highest judicial tribunal has declared this, and solemnly ruled that the question of the necessity for its exercise rests exclusively with Congress and the President; and that the decision of the political departments of the government, that there is an armed rebellion and a necessity for the employment of military force and martial law in its suppression concludes the judiciary.

In submitting what I have said in support of the jurisdiction of this honorable court, and of its constitutional power to hear and determine this issue, I have uttered my own convictions; and for their utterance in defense of my country, and its right to employ all the means necessary for the common defense against armed rebellion and secret treasonable conspiracy in aid of such rebellion, I shall neither ask pardon nor offer apology. I find no words with which more fitly to conclude all I have to say upon the question of the jurisdiction and constitutional authority of this court than those employed by the illustrious Lord Brougham to the House of Peers in the support of the bill before referred to, which empowered the lord lieutenant of Ireland, and his deputies, to apprehend and detain, for the period of seven months or more, all such persons within that island as they should _suspect_ of conspiracy against her Majesty's person and government. Said that illustrious man: "A friend of liberty I have lived, and such will I die; nor care I how soon the latter event may happen, if I cannot be a friend of liberty without being a friend of traitors at the same time--a protector of criminals of the deepest dye--an accomplice of foul rebellion and of its concomitant, civil war, with all its atrocities and all its fearful consequences."--Hansard's Debates, 3d series, vol. 100, p. 635.

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: It only remains for me to sum up the evidence and present my views of the law arising upon the facts in the case on trial. The questions of fact involved in the issue are:--

First, did the accused, or any two of them, confederate and conspire together as charged? and--

Second, did the accused, or any of them, in pursuance of such conspiracy, and with the intent alleged, commit either or all of the several acts specified?

If the conspiracy be established, as laid, it results that whatever was said or done by either of the parties thereto, in the furtherance or execution of the common design, is the declaration or act of all the other parties to the conspiracy; and this, whether the other parties, at the time such words were uttered or such acts done by their confederates, were present or absent--here, within the intrenched lines of your capital, or crouching behind the intrenched lines of Richmond, or awaiting the results of their murderous plot against their country, its Constitution and laws, across the border, under the shelter of the British flag.

The declared and accepted rule of law in cases of conspiracy is that--

"In prosecutions for conspiracy it is an established rule that where several persons are proved to have combined together for the same illegal purpose, any act done by one of the party, in pursuance of the original concerted plan, and in reference to the common object, is, in the contemplation of law as well as in sound reason, the act of the whole party; and, therefore, the proof of the act will be evidence against any of the others who were engaged in the same general conspiracy, without regard to the question whether the prisoner is proved to have been concerned in the particular transaction."--Phillips on Evidence, p. 210.

The same rule obtains in cases of treason: "If several persons agree to levy war, some in one place and some in another, and one party do actually appear in arms, this is a levying of war by all, as well those who were not in arms as those who were, if it were done in pursuance of the original concert, for those who made the attempt were emboldened by the confidence inspired by the general concert, and therefore these particular acts are in justice imputable to all the rest."--1 East., Pleas of the Crown, p. 97; Roscoe, 84.

In _Ex parte Bollman and Swartwout_, 4 Cranch, 126, Marshall, Chief Justice, rules: "If war be actually levied,--that is, if a body of men be actually assembled, for the purpose of effecting, by force, a treasonable purpose,--all those who perform any part, _however minute, or however remote from the scene of action_, and who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors."

In United States _vs._ Cole _et al_, 5 McLean, 601, Mr. Justice McLean says: "A conspiracy is rarely, if ever, proved by positive testimony. When a crime of high magnitude is about to be perpetrated by a combination of individuals, they do not act openly but covertly and secretly. The purpose formed is known only to those who enter into it. Unless one of the original conspirators betray his companions and give evidence against them, their guilt can be proved only by circumstantial evidence.... It is said by some writers on evidence that such circumstances are stronger than positive proof. A witness swearing positively, it is said, may misapprehend the facts or swear falsely, but that circumstances cannot lie.

"The common design is the essence of the charge; and this may be made to appear when the defendants steadily pursue the same object, whether acting separately or together, by common or different means, all leading to the same unlawful result. And where _prima facie_ evidence has been given of a combination, the acts or confessions of one are evidence against all.... It is reasonable that where a body of men assume the attribute of individuality, whether for commercial business or for the commission of a crime, that the association should be bound by the acts of one of its members in carrying out the design."

It is a rule of the law, not to be overlooked in this connection, that the conspiracy or agreement of the parties, or some of them, to act in concert to accomplish the unlawful act charged, may be established either by direct evidence of a meeting or consultation for the illegal purpose charged, or more usually, from the very nature of the case, by circumstantial evidence.--2 Starkie, 232.

Lord Mansfield ruled that it was not necessary to prove the actual fact of a conspiracy, but that it might be collected from collateral circumstances.--Parson's Case, 1 W. Blackstone, 392.

"If," says a great authority on the law of evidence, "on a charge of conspiracy, it appear that two persons by their acts are pursuing the same object, and often by the same means, or one performing part of the act and the other completing it, for the attainment of the same object, the jury may draw the conclusion there is a conspiracy. If a conspiracy be formed, and a person join in it afterwards, he is equally guilty with the original conspirators."--Roscoe, 415.

"The rule of the admissibility of the acts and declarations of any one of the conspirators, said or done in furtherance of the common design, applies in cases as well where only part of the conspirators are indicted or upon trial as where all are indicted and upon trial. Thus, upon an indictment for murder, if it appear that others, together with the prisoner, conspired to commit the crime, the act of one, done in pursuance of that intention, will be evidence against the rest."--2d Starkie, 237.

They are all alike guilty as principals.--Commonwealth _vs._ Knapp, 9 Pickering, 496; 10 Pickering, 477; 6 Term Reports, 528; 11 East., 584.

What is the evidence, direct and circumstantial, that the accused, or either of them, together with John H. Surratt, John Wilkes Booth, Jefferson Davis, George N. Sanders, Beverly Tucker, Jacob Thompson, William C. Cleary, Clement C. Clay, George Harper, and George Young, did combine, confederate, and conspire, in aid of the existing rebellion, as charged, to kill and murder, within the military department of Washington, and within the fortified and intrenched lines thereof, Abraham Lincoln, late, and at the time of the said combining, confederating, and conspiring, President of the United States of America and Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy thereof; Andrew Johnson, Vice-President of the United States; William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States; and Ulysses S. Grant, Lieutenant General of the armies thereof, and then in command, under the direction of the President?