Chapter XXVI: Appendix: No. I (1)

_The case of Passmore Williamson, as stated by himself in his petition for a habeas corpus, to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania._

_To the Honorable the Judges of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania:_

The petition of Passmore Williamson respectfully sheweth: That your petitioner is a citizen of Pennsylvania, and a resident of Philadelphia; that he is a member of "The Pennsylvania Society for promoting the abolition of Slavery, and for the relief of free negroes unlawfully held in bondage, and for improving the condition of the African race," incorporated by act of Assembly passed the 8th day of December, A. D. 1789, of which Dr. Benjamin Franklin was the first president, and that he is secretary of the acting committee of said society.

That on Wednesday, the 18th day of July last past, your petitioner was informed that certain negroes, held as slaves, were then at Bloodgood's hotel, in the city of Philadelphia, having been brought by their master into the state of Pennsylvania, with the intention of passing through to other parts. Believing that the persons thus held as slaves were entitled to their freedom by reason of their having been so brought by their master voluntarily into the state of Pennsylvania, the petitioner, in the fulfilment of the official duty imposed upon him by the practice and regulations of the said society, went to Bloodgood's hotel for the purpose of apprizing the alleged slaves that they were free, and finding that they with their master had left said hotel, and gone on board the steamboat of the New York line, then lying near Walnut Street wharf, your petitioner went on board the same, found the party, consisting of a woman named Jane, about thirty-five years of age, and her two sons, Daniel, aged about twelve, and Isaiah, aged about seven, and, in presence of the master, informed the said Jane that she was free by the laws of Pennsylvania; upon which she expressed her desire to have her freedom, and finally, with her children, left the boat of her own free will and accord, and without any coercion or compulsion of any kind; and having seen her in possession of her liberty, with her children, your petitioner returned to his place of business, and has never since seen the said Jane, Daniel and Isaiah, or either of them; nor does he know where they are, nor has he had any connection of any kind with the subject.

Your petitioner used no violence whatever, except simply holding back Colonel Wheeler, their former master, when he attempted by force to prevent the said Jane from leaving the boat. Some half dozen negroes, employed, as your petitioner is informed, as porters and otherwise, at the wharf and in the immediate neighborhood, of their own accord and without any invitation of the petitioner, but probably observing or understanding the state of affairs, followed the petitioner when he went on board the boat. An allegation has been made that they were guilty of violence and disorder in the transaction. Your petitioner observed no acts of violence committed by them, nor any other disorder than the natural expression of some feeling at the attempt of Colonel Wheeler to detain the woman by force; that there was not any violence or disorder amounting to a breach of the peace is also fairly to be inferred from the fact that two police officers were present, who were subsequently examined as witnesses, and stated that they did not see anything requiring or justifying their interference to preserve the peace. And your petitioner desires to state explicitly that he had no preconcert or connection of any kind with them or with their conduct, and considers that he is in no way responsible therefor. Your petitioner gave to Colonel Wheeler, at the time, his name and address, with the assurance that he would be responsible if he had injured any right which he had; fully believing at the time, as he does still believe, that he had committed no injury whatever to any right of Colonel Wheeler.

On the night of the same day your petitioner was obliged to leave the city to attend an election of the Atlantic and Ohio Telegraph Company, at Harrisburg, and returned to Philadelphia on Friday, the 20th of July, between one and two o'clock, A. M. Upon his return, an _alias_ writ of _habeas corpus_ was handed to him, issued from the district court of the United States for the eastern district of Pennsylvania, upon the petition of the said John H. Wheeler, commanding him that the bodies of the said Jane, Daniel and Isaiah he should have before the Hon. John K. Kane, judge of the said district court, forthwith. To the said writ your petitioner the same day, viz., the 20th day of July last past, made return, that the said Jane, Daniel and Isaiah, or by whatever name they may be called, nor either of them, were not then, nor at the time of issuing said writ, or the original writ, or at any other time, in the custody, power, or possession of, nor confined nor restrained of their liberty, by your petitioner; therefore he could not have the bodies of the said Jane, Daniel and Isaiah before the said judge, as by the said writ he was commanded.

Whereupon and afterwards, to wit: on the 27th day of July aforesaid, it was ordered and adjudged by the court that your petitioner be committed to the custody of the marshal, without bail or mainprize, as for a contempt in refusing to make return to a writ of _habeas corpus_ theretofore issued against him at the instance of Mr. John H. Wheeler; all which appears by the record and proceedings in the said case, which your petitioner begs leave to produce, and a copy of an exemplification of which is annexed to this petition. Thereupon, on the same day, a warrant was issued, commanding that the marshal of the United States, in and for the eastern district of Pennsylvania, forthwith take into custody the body of your petitioner, for a contempt of the honorable the judge of the said district court, in refusing to answer to the said writ of _habeas corpus_, theretofore awarded against him, the said petitioner, at the relation of Mr. John H. Wheeler, a copy of which is hereto annexed, and also a warrant, by and from the marshal of the United States, to the keeper of the Moyamensing prison, a copy of which is also hereto annexed; under which warrants your petitioner was committed to the said prison, and is now there detained, without bail or mainprize.

Notwithstanding the record is silent on the subject, your petitioner thinks it proper to state that, on the return of the writ of _habeas corpus_, the judge allowed the relator to traverse the said return by parol, under which permission the relator gave his own testimony, in which he stated that he held the said Jane, Daniel and Isaiah as slaves, under the law of Virginia, and had voluntarily brought them with him by railroad from the city of Baltimore to the city of Philadelphia, where he had been accidentally detained at Bloodgood's hotel about three hours; and certain other witnesses were examined. From the testimony thus given, though not at all warranted by it or by the facts, the said judge decided that your petitioner had been concerned in a forcible abduction of the said Jane, Daniel and Isaiah, against their will and consent, upon the deck of the said steamboat, but admitted that your petitioner took no personally active part in such supposed abduction after he had left the deck.

The hearing took place on the morning of Friday, the 20th of July, at ten o'clock, your petitioner having had the first knowledge of the existence of any writ of _habeas corpus_ between one and two o'clock on the same morning. Under these circumstances, before the said testimony was gone into and afterwards, the counsel of your petitioner asked for time, until the next morning, for consultation and preparation for the argument of the questions which might arise in the case, which applications were refused by the court, and the hearing went on, and closed on the same morning between twelve and one o'clock.

On Tuesday, the 31st of July, 1855, your petitioner presented to the Hon. Chief Justice of this court a petition for a _habeas corpus_, which was refused.

Inasmuch as your petitioner is thus deprived of his liberty for an indefinite time, and possibly for his life, as he believes, illegally; inasmuch as he is a native citizen of Pennsylvania, and claims that he has a right to the protection of the commonwealth, and to have recourse to her courts for enlargement and redress; he begs leave respectfully to state some of the grounds on which he conceives that he is entitled to the relief which he now prays.

Whatever may be the view of the court as to the probability of his discharge on a hearing, your petitioner respectfully represents that he is clearly entitled to have a writ of _habeas corpus_ granted, and to be thereupon brought before the court. Upon this subject the Pennsylvania _habeas corpus_ act is imperative. Indeed, as the question of the sufficiency of the cause of his detention directly concerns his personal liberty, any law which should fail to secure to him the right of being personally present at its argument and decision, would be frightfully inconsistent with the principles of the common law, the provisions of our Bill of Rights, and the very basis of our government.

It is believed that no case, prior to that of your petitioner, is reported in Pennsylvania, of a refusal of this writ to a party restrained of his liberty, except the case of _Ex parte Lawrence_, 5 Binn. 304, in which it was decided that it was not obligatory on the court to issue a second writ of _habeas corpus_ where the case had been already heard on the same evidence upon a first writ of _habeas corpus_ granted by another court of the petitioner's own selection: in other words, that the statutory right to the writ was exhausted by the impetration and hearing of the first writ, and that the granting of a second writ was at the discretion of the court. This case, therefore, appears to confirm strongly the position of your petitioner, that he is absolutely entitled at law to the writ for which he now prays.

On the hearing there will be endeavored to be established on behalf of your petitioner, on abundant grounds of reason and authority, the following propositions, viz.:--

1. That it is the right and duty of the courts, and especially of the supreme court of this commonwealth, to relieve any citizen of the same from illegal imprisonment.

2. That imprisonment under an order of a court or judge not having jurisdiction over the subject matter, and whose order is therefore void, is an illegal imprisonment.

3. That the party subjected to such imprisonment has a right to be relieved from it on _habeas corpus_, whether he did or did not make the objection of the want of jurisdiction before the court or judge inflicting such imprisonment; and that if he did not make such objection, it is immaterial whether he were prevented from making it by ignorance of the law, or by the want of extraordinary presence of mind, or by whatever other cause.

4. That the courts and judges of the United States are courts and judges of limited jurisdiction, created by a government of enumerated powers, and in proceedings before them the records must show the case to be within their jurisdiction, otherwise they can have none.

5. That if the record of any proceeding before them show affirmatively that the case was clearly without their jurisdiction, there can no presumption of fact be raised against such record for the purpose of validating their jurisdiction.

6. That no writ of _habeas corpus_ can be issued to produce the body of a person not in custody under legal process, unless it be issued in behalf and with the consent of said person.

7. That at common law, the return to a writ of _habeas corpus_, if it be an unevasive, full and complete, is conclusive, and cannot be traversed.

8. That a person held as a slave under the law of one state, and voluntarily carried by his owner for any purpose into another state, is not a fugitive from labor or service within the true intent and meaning of the constitution of the United States, but is subject to the laws of the state into which he has been thus carried; and that by the law of Pennsylvania a slave so brought into this state, whether for the purpose of passing through the same or otherwise, is free.

9. That the district court of the United States has no jurisdiction whatever over the question of freedom or slavery of such person, or of an alleged abduction of him, nor any jurisdiction to award a writ of _habeas corpus_ commanding an alleged abductor, or any citizen by whom he may be assumed to be detained, to produce him.

10. That in case of a fugitive from service or labor from another state, the district court of the United States has jurisdiction to issue a warrant for the apprehension of such fugitive, and in case he be rescued and abducted from his claimant, so proceed by indictment and trial by jury against such abductor, and on conviction to punish him by limited fine and imprisonment; but even in the case of a fugitive slave, said court nor the judge thereof has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of _habeas corpus_, commanding the alleged abductor to produce such fugitive, or to enforce a return of such writ, or allow a traverse of the return thereof if made, or upon such traverse in effect convict the respondent, without indictment or trial by jury of such abduction, and thereupon punish him therefor by unlimited imprisonment in the name of a commitment, as for a contempt in refusing to return such writ of _habeas corpus_.

11. That generally it is true that one court will not go behind a commitment by another court for contempt; but that this is only where the committing court has jurisdiction of the subject matter; and your petitioner submits that when the circumstances of the supposed contempt are set forth upon the record of commitment, and it further appears thereupon that the whole proceedings were _coram non judice_, and that for that and other reasons the commitment was arbitrary, illegal and void, it is the right and duty of a court of competent jurisdiction, by writ of _habeas corpus_, to relieve a citizen from imprisonment under such void commitment.

12. That neither the district court of the United States nor the judge thereof had any shadow or color of jurisdiction to award the writ of _habeas corpus_ directed to your petitioner, commanding him to produce the bodies of Jane, Daniel, and Isaiah, and that such writ was void; that your petitioner was in no wise bound to make return thereto; that the return which he did make thereto was unevasive, full, and complete, and was conclusive, and not traversable; that the commitment of your petitioner as for a contempt in refusing to return said writ is arbitrary, illegal, and utterly null and void; that the whole proceedings, including the commitment for contempt, were absolutely _coram non judice_.

13. That in such oppression of one of her citizens, a subordinate judge of the United States has usurped upon the authority, violated the peace and derogated from the sovereign dignity of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania; that all are hurt in the person of your petitioner, and that he is justified in looking with confidence to the authorities of his native state to vindicate her rights by restoring his liberty.

To be relieved, therefore, from the imprisonment aforesaid, your petitioner now applies, praying that a writ of _habeas corpus_ may be issued, according to the act of Assembly in such case made and provided, directed to Charles Hortz, the said keeper of said prison, commanding him to bring before your honorable court the body of your petitioner, to do and abide such order as your honorable court may direct.

And your petitioner will ever pray, &c.

PASSMORE WILLIAMSON.

_Moyamensing Prison, August 9, 1855._

No. II.

_The Opinion and Decision of Judge Kane, referred to in the foregoing petition._

_The U. S. A. ex. rel. Wheeler_ agt. _Passmore Williamson_--Sur. _Habeas Corpus_, 27th July, 1855.--Colonel John H. Wheeler, of North Carolina, the United States Minister to Nicaragua, was on board a steamboat at one of the Delaware wharves, on his way from Washington to embark at New York for his post of duty. Three slaves belonging to him were sitting at his side on the upper deck.

Just as the last signal bell was ringing, Passmore Williamson came up to the party--declared to the slaves that they were free--and forcibly pressing Mr. Wheeler aside, urged them to go ashore. He was followed by some dozen or twenty negroes, who, by muscular strength, carried the slaves to the adjoining pier; two of the slaves at least, if not all three, struggling to release themselves, and protesting their wish to remain with their master; two of the negro mob in the meantime grasping Colonel Wheeler by the collar, and threatening to cut his throat if he made any resistance.

The slaves were borne along to a hackney coach that was in waiting, and were conveyed to some place of concealment; Mr. Williamson following and urging forward the mob; and giving his name and address to Colonel Wheeler, with the declaration that he held himself responsible towards him for whatever might be his legal rights; but taking no personally active part in the abduction after he had left the deck.

I allowed a writ of _habeas corpus_ at the instance of Colonel Wheeler, and subsequently an _alias_; and to this last Mr. Williamson made return, that the persons named in the writ, "nor either of them, are not now nor was at the time of issuing of the writ, or the original writ, or at any other time, in the custody, power, or possession of the respondent, nor by him confined or restrained: wherefore he cannot have the bodies," etc.

At the hearing I allowed the relator to traverse this return; and several witnesses, who were asked by him, testified to the facts as I have recited them. The District Attorney, upon this state of facts, moved for Williamson's commitment: 1. For contempt in making a false return; 2. To take his trial for perjury.

Mr. Williamson then took the stand to purge himself of contempt. He admitted the facts substantially as in proof before; made it plain that he had been an adviser of the project, and had given it his confederate sanction throughout. He renewed his denial that he had control at any time over the movements of the slaves, or knew their present whereabouts. Such is the case, as it was before me on the hearing.

I cannot look upon this return otherwise than as illusory--in legal phrase--as evasive, if not false. It sets out that the alleged prisoners are not now, and have not been since the issue of the _habeas corpus_, in the custody, power or possession of the respondent; and in so far, it uses legally appropriate language for such a return. But it goes further, and by added words, gives an interpretation to that language, essentially variant from its legal import.

It denies that the prisoners were within his power, custody or possession, at any time whatever. Now, the evidence of respectable, uncontradicted witnesses, and the admission of the respondent himself, establish the fact beyond controversy, that the prisoners were at one time within his power and control. He was the person by whose counsel the so called rescue was devised. He gave the directions, and hastened to the pier to stimulate and supervise their execution. He was the spokesman and first actor after arriving there. Of all the parties to the act of violence, he was the only white man, the only citizen, the only individual having recognized political rights, the only person whose social training could certainly interpret either his own duties or the rights of others, under the constitution of the land.

It would be futile, and worse, to argue that he who has organized and guided, and headed a mob, to effect the abduction and imprisonment of others--he in whose presence and by whose active influence the abduction and imprisonment have been brought about--might excuse himself from responsibility by the assertion that it was not his hand that made the unlawful assault, or that he never acted as the jailer. He who unites with others to commit a crime, shares with them all the legal liabilities that attend on its commission. He chooses his company and adopts their acts.

This is the retributive law of all concerted crimes; and its argument applies with peculiar force to those cases, in which redress and prevention of wrong are sought through the writ of _habeas corpus_. This, the great remedial process by which liberty is vindicated and restored, tolerates no language, in the response which it calls for, that can mask a subterfuge. The dearest interests of life, personal safety, domestic peace, social repose, all that man can value, or that is worth living for, are involved in this principle. The institutions of society would lose more than half their value, and courts of justice become impotent for protection, if the writ of _habeas corpus_ could not compel the truth--full, direct, and unequivocal--in answer to its mandate.

It will not do to say to the man, whose wife or whose daughter has been abducted, "I did not abduct her; she is not in my possession; I do not detain her; inasmuch as the assault was made by the hand of my subordinates, and I have forborne to ask where they propose consummating the wrong."

It is clear, then, as it seems to me, that in legal acceptance the parties whom this writ called on Mr. Williamson to produce, were at one time within his power and control; and his answer, so far as it relates to his power over them, makes no distinction between that time and the present. I cannot give a different interpretation to his language from that which he has practically given himself, and cannot regard him as denying his power over the prisoners now, when he does not aver that he has lost the power which he formerly had.

He has thus refused, or at least he has failed, to answer to the command of the law. He has chosen to decide for himself upon the lawfulness as well as the moral propriety of his act, and to withhold the ascertainment and vindication of the rights of others from that same forum of arbitrament on which all his own rights repose. In a word, he has put himself in contempt of the process of this court and challenges its action.

That action can have no alternative form. It is one too clearly defined by ancient and honored precedent, too indispensable to the administration of social justice and the protection of human right, and too potentially invoked by the special exigency of the case now before the court, to excuse even a doubt of my duty or an apology for its immediate performance.

The cause was submitted to me by the learned counsel for the respondent, without argument, and I have therefore found myself at some loss to understand the grounds on which, if there be any such, they would claim the discharge of their client. One only has occurred to me as, perhaps, within his view; and on this I think it right to express my opinion. I will frankly reconsider it, however, if any future aspect of the case shall invite the review.

It is this: that the persons named in this writ as detained by the respondent, were not legally slaves, inasmuch as they were within the territory of Pennsylvania when they were abducted.

Waiving the inquiry whether, for the purpose of this question, they were within the territorial jurisdiction of Pennsylvania while passing from one state to another upon the navigable waters of the United States--a point on which my first impressions are adverse to the argument--I have to say:

I. That I know of no statute, either of the United States, or of Pennsylvania, or of New Jersey, the only other state that has a qualified jurisdiction over this part of the Delaware, that authorises the forcible abduction of any person or any thing whatsoever, without claim of property, unless in aid of legal process.

2. That I know of no statute of Pennsylvania, which affects to divest the rights of property of a citizen of North Carolina, acquired and asserted under the laws of that state, because he has found it needful or convenient to pass through the territory of Pennsylvania.

3. That I am not aware that any such statute, if such a one were shown, could be recognized as valid in a court of the United States.

4. That it seems to me altogether unimportant whether they were slaves or not. It would be the mockery of philanthropy to assert, that, because men had become free, they might therefore be forcibly abducted.

I have said nothing of the motives by which the respondent has been governed; I have nothing to do with them; they may give him support and comfort before an infinitely higher tribunal; I do not impugn them here. Nor do I allude, on the other hand, to those special claims upon our hospitable courtesy which the diplomatic character of Mr. Wheeler might seem to assert for him. I am doubtful whether the acts of Congress give to him and his retinue, and his property, that protection as a representative of the sovereignty of the United States, which they concede to all sovereignties besides. Whether, under the general law of nations, he could not ask a broader privilege than some judicial precedents might seem to admit, is not necessarily involved in the cause before me. It is enough that I find, as the case stands now, the plain and simple grounds of adjudication, that Mr. Williamson has not returned truthfully and fully to the writ of _habeas corpus_. He must, therefore, stand committed for a contempt of the legal process of the court.

As to the second motion of the District Attorney--that which looks to a committal for perjury--I withhold an expression of opinion in regard to it. It is unnecessary, because Mr. Williamson being under arrest, he may be charged at any time by the Grand Jury; and I apprehend that there may be doubts whether the affidavit should not be regarded as extrajudicial.

Let Mr. Williamson, the respondent, be committed to the custody of the marshal without bail or mainprize, as for a contempt of the court in refusing to answer to the writ of _habeas corpus_, heretofore awarded against him at the relation of Mr. Wheeler.

N. B. A motion of the prisoner's counsel for leave to amend the return was refused, and to a question for what time the imprisonment was to be, the judge replied--"While he remains in contempt."

No. III.

_The opinion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, delivered by Judge Black, declining to grant the petition of Passmore Williamson._

This is an application by Passmore Williamson for _habeas corpus_. He complains that he is held in custody under a commitment of the district court of the United States, for a contempt of that court in refusing to obey its process. The process which he is confined for disobeying was a _habeas corpus_ commanding him to produce the bodies of certain colored persons claimed as slaves under the law of Virginia.

Is he entitled to the writ he has asked for? In considering what answer we shall give to this question, we are, of course, expected to be influenced, as in other cases, by the law and the constitution alone. The gentlemen who appeared as counsel for the petitioner, and who argued the motion in a way which did them great honor, pressed upon us no considerations except those which were founded upon their _legal_ views of the subject.

It is argued with much earnestness, and no doubt with perfect sincerity, that we are bound to allow the writ, without stopping to consider whether the petitioner has or has not laid before us any probable cause for supposing that he is illegally detained--that every man confined in prison, except for treason or felony, is entitled to it _ex debito justitiæ_--and that we cannot refuse it without a frightful violation of the petitioner's rights, no matter how plainly it may appear on his own showing that he is held in custody for a just cause. If this be true, the case of _Ex parte Lawrence_, 5 Binn. 304, is not law. There the writ was refused because the applicant had been previously heard before another court. But if every man who applies for a _habeas corpus_ must have it as a matter of right, and without regard to anything but the mere fact that he demands it, then a court or a judge has no more power to refuse a second than a first application.

Is it really true that the special application, which must be made for every writ of _habeas corpus_, and the examination of the commitment, which we are bound to make before it can issue, are mere hollow and unsubstantial forms? Can it be possible that the law and the courts are so completely under the control of their natural enemies, that every class of offenders against the Union and the state, except traitors and felons, may be brought before us as often as they please, though we know beforehand, by their own admissions, that we cannot help but remand them immediately? If these questions must be answered in the affirmative, then we are compelled, against our will and contrary to our convictions of duty, to wage a constant warfare against the federal tribunals by firing off writs of _habeas corpus_ upon them all the time. The punitive justice of the state would suffer still more seriously. The half of the Western Penitentiary would be before us at Philadelphia, and a similar proportion from Cherry Hill and Moyamensing would attend our sittings at Pittsburgh. To remand them would do very little good; for a new set of writs would bring them all back again. A sentence to solitary confinement would be a sentence that the convict should travel for a limited term up and down the state, in company with the officers who might have him in charge. By the same means the inmates of the lunatic asylums might be temporarily enlarged, much to their own detriment; and every soldier or seaman in the service of the country could compel his commander to bring him before the court six times a week.

But the _habeas corpus_ act has never received such a construction. It is a writ of right, and may not be refused to one who shows a _prima facie_ case entitling him to be discharged or bailed. But he has no right to demand it who admits that he is in legal custody for an offence not bailable and he does make what is equivalent to such an admission when his own application and the commitment referred to in it show that he is lawfully detained. A complaint must be made and the cause of detainer submitted to a judge before the writ can go. The very object and purpose of this is to prevent it from being trifled with by those who manifestly have no right to be set at liberty. It is like a writ of error in a criminal case, which the court or judge is bound to allow if there be reason to suppose that an error has been committed, and equally bound to refuse if it be clear that the judgment must be affirmed.

We are not aware that any application to this court for a writ of _habeas corpus_ has ever been successful where the judges, at the time of the allowance, were satisfied that the prisoner must be remanded. The petitioner's counsel say there is but one reported case in which it was refused, (5 Binn. 304;) and this is urged in the argument as a reason for supposing that in all other cases the writ was issued without examination. But no such inference can fairly be drawn from the scarcity of judicial decisions upon a point like this. We do not expect to find in reports so recent as ours those long-established rules of law which the student learns from his elementary books, and which are constantly acted upon without being disputed.

The _habeas corpus_ is a common law writ, and has been used in England from time immemorial, just as it is now. The statute of 31 Char. II. c. 2, made no alteration in the practice of the courts in granting these writs. (3 Barn. and Ald. 420 to Chitty's Reps. 207.) It merely provided that the judges in vacation should have the power which the courts had previously exercised in term time, (1 Chitty's Gen. Prac. 686,) and inflicted penalties upon those who should defeat its operation. The common law upon this subject was brought to America by the colonists; and most, if not all of the states, have since enacted laws resembling the English statute of Charles II. in every principal feature. The constitution of the United States declares that "the privilege of a writ of _habeas corpus_ shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it." Congress has conferred upon the federal judges the power to issue such writs according to the principles and rules regulating it in other courts. Seeing that the same general principles of common law on this subject prevail in England and America, and seeing also the similarity of their statutory regulations in both countries, the decisions of the English judges, as well as of the American courts, both state and federal, are entitled to our fullest respect, as settling and defining our powers and duties.

Blackstone (3 Com. 132) says the writ of _habeas corpus_ should be allowed only when the court or judge is satisfied that the party hath probable cause to be delivered. He gives cogent reasons why it should not be allowed in any other case, and cites with unqualified approbation the precedents set by Sir Edward Coke and Chief Justice Vaughan in cases where they had refused it. Chitty lays down the rule (1 Cr. Law, 101; General Prac. 686-7.) It seems to have been acted upon by all the judges. The writ was refused in _Rex_ v. _Scheiner_, (1 Burr. 765,) and in the case of the three Spanish sailors, (3 Black. Rep. 1324.) In Hobhouse's case, (2 Barn. and Ald. 420,) it was fully settled by a unanimous court, as the true construction of the statute, that the writ is never to be allowed, if upon view of the commitment it be manifest that the prisoner must be remanded. In New York, when the statute in force there was precisely like ours, (so far I mean as this question is concerned,) it was decided by the supreme court (5 Johns. 282) that the allowance of the writ was a matter within the discretion of the court, depending on the grounds laid in the application. It was refused in Huster's case, (1, 2 C. 136) and in _Ex parte Ferguson_, (9 Johns. Rep. 139.) In addition to this we have the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, in Watkins's case, (3 Peters, 202) that the writ ought not to be awarded if the court is satisfied that the prisoner must be remanded. It was accordingly refused by the supreme court of the United States in that case, as it had been before in Kearney's case.

On the whole, we are thoroughly satisfied that our duty requires us to view and examine the cause of detainer now, and to make an end of the business at once, if it appear that we have no power to discharge him on the return of the writ.

This prisoner, as already said, is confined on a sentence of the district court of the United States for a contempt. A _habeas corpus_ is not a writ of error. It cannot bring a case before us in such a manner that we can exercise any kind of appellate jurisdiction in it. On a _habeas corpus_, the judgment, even of a subordinate state court, cannot be disregarded, reversed or set aside, however clearly we may perceive it to be erroneous, and however plain it may be that we ought to reverse it if it were before us on appeal or writ of error. We can only look at the record to see whether a judgment exists, and have no power to say whether it is right or wrong. It is conclusively presumed to be right until it is regularly brought up for revision. We decided this three years ago at Sunbury, in a case which we all thought one of much hardship. But the rule is so familiar, so universally acknowledged, and so reasonable in itself, that it requires only to be stated. It applies with still greater force, or at least for stronger reasons, to the decisions of the federal courts. Over them we have no control at all, under any circumstances, or by any process that could be devised. Those tribunals belong to a different judicial system from ours. They administer a different code of laws, and are responsible to a different sovereignty. The district court of the United States is as independent of us as we are of it--as independent as the supreme court of the United States is of either. What the law and the constitution have forbidden us to do directly on writ of error, we, of course, cannot do indirectly by _habeas corpus_.

But the petitioner's counsel have put his case on the ground that the whole proceeding against him in the district court was _coram non judice_, null and void. It is certainly true that a void judgment may be regarded as no judgment at all; and every judgment is void which clearly appears on its own face to have been pronounced by a court having no jurisdiction or authority in the subject matter. For instance, if a federal court should convict and sentence a citizen for libel, or if a state court, having no jurisdiction except in civil pleas, should try an indictment for a crime and convict the party--in these cases the judgments would be wholly void. If the petitioner can bring himself within this principle, then there is no judgment against him; he is wrongfully imprisoned, and we must order him to be brought out and discharged.

What is he detained for? The answer is easy and simple. The commitment shows that he was tried, found guilty, and sentenced for _contempt of court_, and nothing else. He is now confined in execution of that sentence, and for no other cause. This was a distinct and substantive offence against the authority and government of the United States. Does any body doubt the jurisdiction of the district court to punish contempt? Certainly not. All courts have this power, and must necessarily have it; otherwise they could not protect themselves from insult, or enforce obedience to their process. Without it they would be utterly powerless. The authority to deal with an offender of this class belongs exclusively to the court in which the offence is committed, and no other court, not even the highest, can interfere with its exercise, either by writ of error, mandamus, or _habeas corpus_. If the power be abused, there is no remedy but impeachment.

The law was so held by this court in M'Laughlin's case, (5 W. & S. 275,) and by the supreme court of the United States in Kearney's case, (7 Wharton, 38.) It was solemnly settled as part of the common law, in Brass Crossley's case, (3 Wilson, 183,) by a court in which sat two of the foremost jurists that England ever produced. We have not the smallest doubt that it is the law; and we must administer it as we find it. The only attempt ever made to disregard it was by a New York judge, (4 Johns. Rep. 345,) who was not supported by his brethren. This attempt was followed by all the evil and confusion which Blackstone and Kent and Story declared to be its necessary consequences. Whoever will trace that singular controversy to its termination will see that the chancellor and the majority of the supreme court, though once outvoted in the Senate, were never answered.

The Senate itself yielded to the force of the truths which the supreme court had laid down so clearly, and the judgment of the court of errors in Yates's case (8 Johns. 593) was overruled by the same court the year afterward in _Yates_ v. _Lansing_, (9 Johns. Rep. 403,) which grew out of the very same transaction, and depended on the same principles. Still further reflection at a later period induced the Senate to join the popular branch of the legislature in passing a statute which effectually prevents one judge from interfering by _habeas corpus_ with the judgment of another on a question of contempt.

These principles being settled, it follows irresistibly that the district court of the United States had power and jurisdiction to decide what acts constitute a contempt against it; to determine whether the petitioner had been guilty of contempt; and to inflict upon him the punishment which in his opinion he ought to suffer. If we fully believed the petitioner to be innocent--if we were sure that the court which convicted him misunderstood the facts, or misapplied the law--still we could not reëxamine the evidence or rejudge the justice of the case, without grossly disregarding what we know to be the law of the land. The judge of the district court decided the question on his own constitutional responsibility. Even if he could be shown to have acted tyrannically or corruptly, he could be called to answer for it only in the Senate of the United States.

But the counsel for the petitioner go behind the proceeding in which he was convicted, and argue that the sentence for contempt is void, because the court had no jurisdiction of a certain other matter which it was investigating, or attempting to investigate, when the contempt was committed. We find a judgment against him in one case, and he complains about another, in which there is no judgment. He is suffering for an offence against the United States; and he says he is innocent of any wrong to a particular individual. He is conclusively adjudged guilty of contempt; and he tells us that the court had no jurisdiction to restore Mr. Wheeler's slaves.

It must be remembered that contempt of court is a specific criminal offence. It is punished sometimes by indictment, and sometimes in a summary proceeding, as it was in this case. In either mode of trial the adjudication against the offender is a conviction, and the commitment in consequence is execution. (7 Wheat. 38.) This is well settled, and I believe has never been doubted. Certainly the learned counsel for the petitioner have not denied it. The contempt may be connected with some particular cause, or it may consist in misbehavior which has a tendency to obstruct the administration of justice generally. When it is committed in a pending cause, the proceeding to punish it is a proceeding by itself. It is not entitled in the cause pending, but on the criminal side. (Wall. 134.)

The record of a conviction for contempt is as distinct from the matter under investigation, when it was committed, as an indictment for perjury is, from the cause in which the false oath was taken. Can a person convicted of perjury ask us to deliver him from the penitentiary, on showing that the oath on which the perjury is assigned, was taken in a cause of which the court had no jurisdiction? Would any judge in the commonwealth listen to such a reason for treating the sentence as void? If, instead of swearing falsely, he refuses to be sworn at all, and he is convicted, not of perjury, but of contempt, the same rule applies, and with a force precisely equal. If it be really true that no contempt can be committed against a court while it is enquiring into matter beyond its jurisdiction, and if the fact was so in this case, then the petitioner had a good defence, and he ought to have made it on his trial. To make it after conviction is too late. To make it here is to produce it before the wrong tribunal.

Every judgment MUST be conclusive until reversed. Such is the character, nature, and essence of all judgments. If it be not conclusive, it is not a judgment. A court must either have power to settle a given question finally and forever, so as to preclude all further inquiry upon it, or else it has no power to make any decision at all. To say that a court may determine a matter, and that another court may regard the matter afterward as open and undetermined, is an absurdity in terms.

It is most especially necessary that convictions for contempt in our courts should be final, conclusive, and free from reëxamination by other courts on _habeas corpus_. If the law were not so, our judicial system would break to pieces in a month. Courts totally unconnected with each other would be coming in constant collision. The inferior courts would revise all the decisions of the judges placed over and above them. A party unwilling to be tried in this court, need only defy our authority, and if we commit him, take out his _habeas corpus_ before an associate judge of his own choosing, and if that judge is of opinion that we ought not to try him, there is an end of the case.

The doctrine is so plainly against the reason of the thing, that it would be wonderful, indeed, if any authority for it could be found in the books, except the overruled decision of Mr. Justice Spencer of New York, already referred to, and some efforts of the same kind to control the other courts made by Sir Edward Coke, in the King's Bench, which are now universally admitted to have been illegal, as well as rude and intemperate. On the other hand, we have all the English judges, and all our own, disclaiming their power to interfere with or control one another in this way. I will content myself by simply referring to some of the books in which it is established, that the conviction of contempt is a separate proceeding, and is conclusive of every fact which might have been urged on the trial for contempt, and among others want of jurisdiction to try the cause in which the contempt was committed. (4 Johns. Rep. 325, _et sequ._ The opinion of Chief Justice Kent, on pages 370 to 375. 6 Johns. 503. 9 Johns. 423. 1 Hill. 170. 5 Iredell, 190. Ib. 153. 9 Sandf. 724. 1 Carter, 160. 1 Blackf. 166. 25 Miss. 836. 2 Wheeler's Criminal Cases, p. 1. 14 Ad. and Ellis, 556.) These cases will speak for themselves; but I may remark as to the last one, that the very same objection was made there and here. The party was convicted of contempt in not obeying a decree. He claimed his discharge on _habeas corpus_ because the chancellor had no jurisdiction to make the decree, being interested in the cause himself. But the Court of Queen's Bench held that if that was a defence it should have been made on the trial for contempt, and the conviction was conclusive. We cannot choose but hold the same rule here. Any other would be a violation of the law which is established and sustained by all authority and all reason.

But certainly the want of jurisdiction alleged in this case would not even have been a defence on the trial. The proposition that a court is powerless to punish for disorderly conduct, or disobedience of its process in a case which it ought ultimately to dismiss, for want of jurisdiction, is not only unsupported by judicial authority, but we think it is new even as an argument at the bar. We, ourselves, have heard many cases through and through before we became convinced that it was our duty to remit the parties to another tribunal. But we never thought that our process could be defied in such cases more than in others.

There are some proceedings in which the want of jurisdiction would be seen at the first blush; but there are others in which the court must inquire into all the facts before it can possibly know whether it has jurisdiction or not. Any one who obstructs or baffles a judicial investigation for that purpose, is unquestionably guilty of a crime, for which he may, and ought to be tried, convicted, and punished. Suppose a local action to be brought in the wrong county; this is a defence to the action, but a defence which must be made out like any other. While it is pending, neither a party, nor an officer, nor any other person, can safely insult the court, or resist its order. The court may not have power to decide upon the merits of the case; but it has undoubted power to try whether the wrong was done within its jurisdiction or not. Suppose Mr. Williamson to be called before the circuit court of the United States as a witness in a trial for murder, alleged to be committed on the high seas. Can he refuse to be sworn, and at his trial for contempt, justify himself on the ground that the murder was committed within the limits of a State, and thereby triable only in a State court? If he can, he can justify perjury for the same reason. But such a defence for either crime, has never been heard of since the beginning of the world. Much less can it be shown, after conviction, as a ground for declaring the sentence void.

The wish which the petitioner is convicted of disobeying was legal on its face. It enjoined upon him a simple duty, which he ought to have understood and performed without hesitation. That he did not do so is a fact conclusively established by the adjudication which the court made upon it. I say the wish was legal, because the act of Congress gives to all the courts of the United States the power "to issue writs of _habeas corpus_, when necessary for the exercise of their jurisdiction, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law." Chief Justice Marshall decided in Burr's trial, that the principles and usages referred to in this act were those of the common law. A part of the jurisdiction of the district court consists in restoring fugitive slaves; and the _habeas corpus_ may be used in aid of it when necessary. It was awarded here upon the application of a person who complained that his slaves were detained from him. Unless they were fugitive slaves they could not be slaves at all, according to the petitioner's own doctrine, and if the judge took that view of the subject, he was bound to award the writ. If the persons mentioned on it had turned out on the hearing to be fugitives from labor, the duty of the district judge to restore them, or his power to bring them before him on a _habeas corpus_, would have been disputed by none except the very few who think that the constitution and law on that subject ought not to be obeyed. The duty of the court to enquire into the facts on which its jurisdiction depends is as plain as its duty not to exceed it when it is ascertained. But Mr. Williamson stopped the investigation _in limine_; and the consequence is, that every thing in the case remains unsettled, whether the persons named in the writ were slaves or free.