Chapter VIII (1)

Battles of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania--the Campaign in the Shenandoah Valley.

Leaving Providence at quarter past seven o'clock, on April 20th, 1864, we took the steamboat train en route for Washington, where we arrived at dark on the 23d, and went to the "Soldiers' Rest" barracks.

On the 24th we took in the Capitol and other sights about Washington, and the next day went into camp about a mile east of the Capitol.

The 26th we drew two government wagons, ambulance, and horse equipments for the officers. The men who did not re-enlist, and were left in Knoxville, joined the battery at this camp.

On the 27th we drew horses, a battery of six Napoleon guns, ammunition, etc., and were now ready for the field; and on the morning of the 30th we were ordered to Alexandria, and arrived there in the afternoon, and went into camp near the city.

May 2d, loaded the battery on cars and started for Warrenton Junction, arriving there at three o'clock in the afternoon, and were assigned to the artillery brigade of the Ninth Army Corps.

The whole Army of the Potomac was in our immediate vicinity, under command of Gen. Meade; the Ninth Corps, under Gen. Burnside, reporting direct to Gen. Grant, who was in command of the entire Army of the United States, and was personally directing the movements of the campaign against Richmond, and at this time, May 2d, had about completed his plans to cross the Rapidan and attack Lee's army.

On May 4th, the Fifth and Sixth Corps crossed at Germania Ford, and the Second Corps and Sheridan's cavalry crossed at Ely's Ford; Burnside's Corps was at the crossing of the Rappahannock River and Alexandria Railroad, to hold that position until our troops had crossed the Rapidan.

On May 3d we got everything in shape for a forward movement, and on the 4th moved toward Brandy Station, and encamped near the railroad bridge for the night.

May 5th, broke camp early in the morning, and moved with the corps across the Rapidan, at Germania Ford, and continued our march until late in the evening. Since early in the forenoon we had heard the incessant roar of artillery and musketry in our front, and during the last part of the march had passed large numbers of wounded men going to the rear.

On the morning of the 6th we hitched up at three o'clock, and awaited orders. At five o'clock we started with Benjamin's battery, and marched about four miles and went into position near some woods. There had been a constant roar of musketry since five o'clock. Our position was such that we could see but a very small part of the field, and we wondered why we were put in such a position, as the underbrush in the woods just in our front was so thick that we could not see an enemy until they were right on our guns.

We remained in this position until nine o'clock in the evening without firing a shot. All day long the roar of battle had continued; large numbers of wounded had been passing our position all day; occasionally a stray shot would come our way, but nothing of any account.

At nine o'clock in the evening we had orders to limber up, and moved about five miles out on the Chancellorsville road, and went into camp at three o'clock in the morning.

On the 7th we hitched up at eight o'clock in the morning, but did not move until dark; then we marched by the Chancellorsville House, and at daylight went into camp. From this until the 15th, we remained near this camp, going into position once or twice, but not firing a shot; in the meantime the infantry and cavalry with some artillery, had been having some very hard fighting, but the large amount of woods and the contour of the ground was such that a small amount of artillery was used in the battles of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania, so that on the 15th a large number of batteries were sent back to the rear.

We hitched up at four o'clock on the morning of the 15th, and started for Fredericksburg, where we arrived in the evening, and encamped; remained in camp the 17th, crossed the Rappahannock on the 18th, and next day marched to Belle's Landing, and remained there until the 24th, when we started for Port Royal, where we arrived on the 26th.

On the morning of the 27th we received orders to send forty horses and twenty men to the front.

On the 28th we turned over the balance of our horses, and loaded guns and caissons on steamer and started for Washington, landing at the Navy Yard on the night of the 31st, and turned in our battery, then marched to Fort Lincoln, about four miles north of the city, and went into barracks. We remained there doing garrison duty and having drills on both light and heavy artillery until July 5th.

On the morning of the 5th we started for Fort Sumner, on the northwest of the city near the Potomac, arriving there in the afternoon, and went into barracks. In the fort was a battery of six thirty-two pound rifled guns, and we were given charge of these. The infantry in the fort were all one hundred day men.

On the 7th Gen. Augur visited the fort and ordered Capt. Buckley to draw muskets for the men. We did not like this move, but had to "take our medicine." We had to smile when we saw some of the hundred-day men out on drill; but when we went out on our first drill with muskets I guess it must have been rather amusing to the spectators.

We appeared on dress parade with the infantry the same night we received our muskets, and it wasn't a success as far as we were concerned. Quite a large number of our men had been in the service long enough to get quite a good idea of infantry tactics, but on this occasion they failed to remember "just a little bit" of them.

The next morning we sent a detail of thirteen men and a sergeant up the Potomac on picket. That night at about one o'clock we heard firing on our picket-line, and in a short time some of the infantry pickets reached the fort and reported that the rebel cavalry were driving in our whole line.

Everybody was turned out, and there was considerable excitement. We waited for some of our men to show up, but they did not come, and we came to the conclusion that it was a scare.

In the morning our relief went out, and when our men came in we found that two farmers had come down the road with a wagon and some led horses. Our men halted them, but some of the led horses got away and started on. The infantry pickets opened on them, and our men tried to stop their firing, but the more they halloed the faster came the bullets. For self-protection, our men opened on the pickets, firing high, and in a few minutes everything was quiet on the picket-line.

Perhaps a slight history of the situation of affairs at this time will be of interest. The Army of the Potomac was before Richmond; Gen. Hunter, commanding forces in the Shenandoah Valley, had moved up the valley and had met with good success, destroying the Central Virginia Railroad at Goshen Springs and at Staunton, also destroying at Staunton the enemy's depot, woolen factory, government stables, and large quantities of army material, and captured fifteen hundred prisoners and three pieces of artillery.

Here Hunter was joined on June 8th by the troops of Crook and Averell, who had marched from West Virginia by way of Warm Springs and Goshen, making his available force about eighteen thousand men. On the 10th Hunter started with his whole army for Lynchburg. Two days marching brought him to Lexington, Va., where he remained until the 14th, waiting for his expected wagon train, and then continued his march. Averell reached Lynchburg on the afternoon of the 17th, and Hunter's main force the same evening.

On the 18th Hunter attacked with all his available force, but was repulsed. From some prisoners taken Hunter found that Breckenridge had been re-enforced during the night by the corps of Gen. Early (Stonewall Jackson's old corps).

Hunter was now in a tight place, and could not retreat up the Shenandoah Valley, as the enemy had repaired the railroad and could now send troops by rail and hold Rockfish Gap, so Hunter resolved to retreat by way of Bulford's Gap to Charlestown, in the Kanawha Valley. Early hurried him along for a time, but soon turned back. By this move the Shenandoah Valley was left open, and Gen. Lee immediately started Early and Breckenridge down the valley and into Maryland, and on the 11th of July Early was in front of Washington.

Things remained quiet in our front until the afternoon of the 11th, when our pickets reported that our cavalry was falling back under quite a brisk fire from the enemy's cavalry. We had our muskets piled up and at once took our positions on the thirty-two pound rifle battery, thinking we could do more execution with them than we would be apt to with the muskets. At about five o'clock in the afternoon our men out on picket were relieved by some cavalry.

We did not fire a shot from our battery, and only one shot was fired from the fort, and that was at a squad of our own cavalry. The shot did no harm, as it went wide of its mark. The major commanding our fort wanted us to open on this same party, but Capt. Buckley refused to do so until he was satisfied who we were going to fire on.

We felt rather blue over our situation, as all in our immediate vicinity were new troops or clerks from the city, and we did not have much confidence in them, but we soon heard that the Sixth Corps and a part of the Nineteenth had arrived, and we felt that Washington was safe.

The night of the 11th was quiet in our front, and on the 12th only a little picket firing. Before dark Early had been driven back by Wright's Sixth Corps, and things had quieted down.

About noon time we received orders to turn in our muskets and report at Camp Barry. Nobody objected to this order, and soon we were on the march. Capt. Buckley and Lieuts. Bonn and Gray started ahead, and when the men under command of Lieut. Chase arrived at Camp Barry, they had requisitions for a four-gun battery of three-inch rifles. We did not get our complement of horses, baggage wagons, ambulance, etc., until the next morning, but at five o'clock on the afternoon of the 13th we marched in pursuit of Early.

We reached Tenallytown and went into camp, but the next morning we found that many of our horses were lame, and we had to stay there two days, working night and day to get them shod.

On the 16th we started for Snicker's Gap. Marched twenty miles, and went into camp at Edwards' Ferry. Hitched up early in the morning, crossed the Potomac, and marched to Leesburg, and joined the Nineteenth Corps.

Early in the morning on the 18th, we were on the road; passed through Snicker's Gap and went into camp near the Shenandoah River, but later crossed the river and marched about four miles and went into position, where we remained until about nine o'clock in the evening, when we received orders to recross the river and report at Washington with the Nineteenth and Sixth Corps.

This movement was by order of Gen. Grant, he supposing that Early had started for Richmond, and wanting the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps forwarded via Washington to join the Army of the Potomac, then in front of Petersburg.

We marched nearly all night, stopping at Leesburg to feed, and then continued on to Goose Creek, where we went into camp, having marched about twenty-four miles. Our march was continued for three days, starting early in the morning and making camp at dark.

The 23d we started at daylight and arrived at Chain Bridge in the afternoon and went into camp, remaining there two days, which gave the men and horses a rest. The weather had been very warm, and the dust on the march was almost suffocating.

On the 26th we had orders to start back to Harper's Ferry, and we broke camp early in the morning and hurried along, arriving at our destination on the evening of the 29th and went into camp, the men and horses being pretty well tired out. We omitted the evening roll-call so as to allow the men to go to sleep early; but we were just a little vexed to get orders in the evening to be ready to move at three o'clock in the morning--where? Right back over the road we had just come!

"Boots and saddles" were blown at half-past two the next morning, and we moved out of camp promptly at three o'clock. It was reported that some one in the battery, on being woke up and told that we were to retrace our steps over the same ground that we had covered twice since the 16th, made a very profane remark, but on investigation the culprit could not be found.

We marched that day until late in the evening, when we encamped in a lot alongside of the pike. Starting early next morning we passed through Frederick City and went into camp on the Gettysburg pike, where we remained one day, and then started back, making twenty-four miles, and again went into camp. We remained there until Aug. 6th, when we stared at daylight and reached Knoxville, having marched twenty-three miles.

On the 7th we crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, and encamped at Halltown.

There were various reasons for the marches and countermarches we had been making for the past fifteen days. Early had not started up the valley as was supposed, but was holding on to some of the fords, and his whole force was in the lower part of the Shenandoah Valley. There were a number of generals commanding certain sections of the country in the vicinity of Washington, and each thought that Early was sure to attack him, and if a small cavalry force showed up in his vicinity, he immediately wired to Washington that Early's whole force was after him, and then everything had to "hustle;" but at last Gen. Grant insisted that one man should take command of the whole, and Gen. Philip H. Sheridan was sent from his command of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac to take command of all troops on the Upper Potomac. Gen. Grant, on the 6th of August, ran down to Monocacy Bridge, in Maryland, and met Gen. Sheridan at that point, and gave him his final instructions.

Gen. Hunter had just arrived from his long trip down the Kanawha Valley, and his troops were at or near Harper's Ferry, having been delayed by low water in the Ohio River, and also by various breaks on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, from reporting as soon as expected.

Gen. Halleck had sent one or two sharp telegraph orders to Hunter, hurrying him up, so Hunter, as soon as he had his troops at the Ferry, sent his resignation to Washington, and it was accepted, and the army lost a good general.

Sheridan's army consisted of the Sixth Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Wright, its three divisions by Gens. Russell, Getty and Rickets; one division of the Nineteenth Corps, Maj. Gen. Emory commanding corps, Gen. Dwight commanding division (the second division of the Nineteenth Corps, Gen. Grover, arrived on the 18th of August); Army of West Virginia (Eighth Corps), Gen. Crook commanding, Gens. Thoburn and Duval as division commanders. The cavalry consisted of Gen. Torbert's division and Averell's; Torbert was appointed as Chief of Cavalry, with Merritt and Averell commanding divisions.

The rebel force in the valley consisted of "Stonewall" Jackson's old corps, now commanded by Early, with Gens. Rodes, Ransom and Gordon commanding divisions. Breckenridge's division, three battalions of artillery and one corps of cavalry commanded by Gen. Lomax, with Vaughn, Johnson, McCausland and Imboden as brigade commanders.

I quote from Sheridan's Memoirs the following description of the Shenandoah Valley, that the reader may have a better idea of the different movements of the army:

"The valley has its northern limit along the Potomac between McCoy's ferry at the eastern base of the North Mountain, and Harper's Ferry at the western base of the Blue Ridge. The southern limit is south of Staunton, on the divide which separates the waters flowing into the Potomac from those that run to the James. The western boundary is the eastern slope of the Alleghany Mountains, the eastern, the Blue Ridge; these two distinct mountain ranges trending about southwest inclose a stretch of quite open, undulating country varying in width from the northern to the southern extremity, and dotted at frequent intervals with patches of heavy woods.

"At Martinsburg the valley is about sixty miles broad, and on an east and west line drawn through Winchester about forty-five, while at Strasburg it narrows down to about twenty-five. Just southeast of Strasburg, which is nearly midway between the eastern and western walls of the valley, rises an abrupt range of mountains called Massanutten, consisting of several ridges which extend southward between the North and South Forks of the Shenandoah River until, losing their identity, they merge into lower but broken ground between New Market and Harrisonburg. The Massanutten ranges, with their spurs and hills, divide the Shenandoah Valley into two valleys, the one next the Blue Ridge being called the Luray, while that next the North Mountain retains the name of Shenandoah.

"A broad macadamized road, leading south from Williamsport, Maryland, to Lexington, Virginia, was built at an early day to connect the interior of the latter State with the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, and along this road are situated the principal towns and villages of the Shenandoah Valley, with lateral lines of communication extending to the mountain ranges on the east and west. The roads running toward the Blue Ridge are nearly all macadamized, and the principal ones lead to the railroad system of eastern Virginia through Snicker's, Ashby's, Manassas, Chester, Thornton's, Swift Run, Brown's and Rockfish Gaps, tending to an ultimate centre at Richmond. These gaps are low and easy, offering little obstruction to the march of an army coming from eastern Virginia, and thus the Union troops operating west of the Blue Ridge were always subjected to the perils of a flank attack; for the Confederates could readily be brought by rail to Gordonsville and Charlottesville, from which point they could move with such celerity through the Blue Ridge that, on more than one occasion, the Shenandoah Valley has been the theatre of Confederate success, due greatly to the advantage of possessing these interior lines."

As before stated, our battery arrived at Halltown on the 7th of August. We put our guns in position and remained there three days.

On the 9th, Lieut. Gray was detailed as Ordnance Officer, Artillery Brigade, Nineteenth Army Corps.

The 10th we moved with our corps to Berryville, and on the morning of the 11th we made a forward movement, Sheridan intending to force Early into a fight. Early was not willing to accept a battle, and moved his army up the valley.

We followed as far as Cedar Creek, and on the afternoon of the 13th had quite a lively brush with Early's rear guard, we only firing a few shots. We remained there until the evening of the 15th, when we moved out of camp at ten o'clock, and reached Winchester at daylight, and went into position, where we remained until the morning of the 17th, when we moved back to Berryville.

Next morning we retired about four miles and formed line-of-battle, Crook on the left, Emory in the centre, and Wright on the right. This retrograde movement was caused by Sheridan receiving notice that Kershaw's division of infantry and two brigades of Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry were on the way to re-enforce Early, and at that time, the 16th, had reached Front Royal, where Merritt, with his cavalry, was disputing their advance.

Early, as soon as he found that Sheridan had fallen back, put his force in motion, and lost no time in following us down the valley, and from this until the 19th, our army was on the defensive. We were at or near Halltown, where several skirmishes occurred, we firing only a few shots, however.

On the 3d of September all the three-years men who had not re-enlisted were mustered out at Charlestown, and went home under the charge of Capt. Buckley.

Sheridan learned on the 16th that Kershaw's division of infantry and Cutshaw's artillery had been returned to Richmond, and he immediately made preparations for a forward movement; and on the morning of the 19th his cavalry forced the Berryville crossing of the Opequon, followed by the Sixth, Eighth and Nineteenth Corps. The enemy was posted in line-of-battle, and in a short time the engagement became general. It was nearly dark before Early was fairly beaten and sent "whirling through Winchester."

Our part in this important victory may be seen in part from the report of Capt. E.D. Taft, Chief of Artillery, Nineteenth Army Corps:

"Battery D, First Rhode Island Artillery, by my direction, took position in a skirt of woods on the right of the Nineteenth Army Corps, and immediately opened fire on one of the enemy's batteries, then enfilading our lines on the right, when the enemy opened fire from two guns in the wood with canister, about two hundred yards distant and in rear of our line of infantry. The battery soon silenced these two guns, and then renewed the fire on the battery enfilading our line, silencing it for a short period, but the infantry falling back for want of ammunition rendered the position unsafe for artillery. The battery had whilst in this position, although under a severe fire front and left oblique, been gallantly fought. The support having retired, and the battery having lost four men and six horses and one wheel broken, I ordered it to withdraw, which was done in good order. This closed the operations of these batteries for the day."

Capt. Taft's report is wrong in one particular. When our infantry fell back, Capt. Taft did ride up to our battery and tell the commanding officer to hold his position as long as possible, but look out and not lose his pieces, and then rode away. We soon had orders to limber up.

At this time some infantry in our front was showing up rather near our position. As we were afraid they would get at us before we could get through the woods, we thought that a few rounds of canister, rightly distributed, would give them a check and allow us to retire.

Lieut. Bonn was in command of the right section, and Lieut. Gray of the left. Lieut. Gray was still on detached duty, but came up while we were halted in the woods and took his section into the fight. We promptly commenced to distribute canister among the infantry in our front, and they soon took shelter under the bank of Red Bud Run. Just at this time Lieut. Gray's left piece was disabled by a shot, and he sent it to the rear, but retained the cannoneers to help on the other pieces. It was now decided that we could pull out.

The right section pulled out, and the right piece of the left section was about to limber up, when a shot from a twenty-pound Parrott that was across the Red Bud Run passed entirely through the swing horses. We had to stay, then, and Sergt. Tucker and his men needed no orders to commence firing again.

We soon expended all our canister, and had to use solid shot as our shell had given out some time before. The infantry that was under the bank to our right and front now commenced to give us some trouble, and we began to think that we had staid too long; but we would shy a shot along the bank and they would lay low; meantime we were hurrying to get our dead horses on the limber clear, but it was a slow job.

About this time an officer rode out of the woods in our rear and gave us the welcome news that a brigade of the Eighth Corps was close at hand; and in a minute or two we saw them coming on the double-quick. When they arrived we ceased firing and limbered up, and taking the harnesses from our dead horses, we soon joined the rest of the battery. When our lines advanced, we were ordered to move with them, and we had quite a good view of the final rout of Early's army. We went into camp for the night just outside of Winchester.

On the morning of the 20th we started early in pursuit of the enemy, and on arrival at Strasburg went into camp. Gen. Early was found in position just in our front at Fisher's Hill, strongly fortified. His position was almost impregnable from an attack in front, so Sheridan sent the Eighth Corps around his left to take the position by flanking it. It took until the afternoon of the 23d to get the Eighth Corps into position, as they had to make most of the movements through thick woods, and keep out of sight of the rebels' signal stations. On the afternoon of the 23d the Eighth Corps charged down on to Early's left flank and routed it. The movements in our front were to help carry out this project.

On the morning of the 23d our corps was advanced, and at three o'clock in the afternoon Grover's division drove in the skirmish line in our front and formed in line-of-battle. Some two hundred yards in our front was a ridge, and the rebel sharpshooters took up their position on this ridge, and made it very uncomfortable for us. The third brigade, second division, Nineteenth Corps, soon made a charge and captured this position, which was within three hundred yards of the enemy's fortifications.

Gens. Sheridan and Grover were at the right of our battery when the infantry carried the hill. Sheridan wanted a piece of artillery sent out there, and Gen. Grover came and asked Lieut. Chase if he could put a piece on that ridge. Lieut. Gray was sent to see if it was possible to do so. Dismounting just before the top of the ridge was reached, he left his horse in charge of an orderly and took to all fours to do the rest of the distance.

There was quite a depression on the top of the ridge, and just on the other edge was a slight rifle-pit that had been hastily thrown up by the enemy. Our skirmishers were occupying this, and it was quite necessary to keep well down, as the enemy's infantry and artillery were within short range, and were giving this particular spot very close attention.

Becoming convinced that if a piece could be put into this depression it would do good execution, Lieut. Gray gave the signal, and Sergt. Tucker with his piece started on the gallop and was soon there, the piece being halted before the top of the ridge was reached. The pickets kept up a sharp fire so as to have the smoke hide our movements, and we ran the piece by hand into the depression and filled both haversacks with ammunition and loaded. We had a sure mark, and when we sent that shell into the earthwork in our front, it made things jingle. The enemy was not slow in returning the compliment, and as they had eight or ten guns in our immediate front, we laid low, but just as soon as we thought they had fired everything, we repeated the experiment before they had loaded.

We had been in this position about fifteen or twenty minutes when Gens. Sheridan and Grover ran over the ridge and took shelter in the depression just to our right. Sheridan was anxious to see the whole situation, and crawled up to the skirmish line, some ten feet in advance of us. Gen. Grover soon joined him, and just about this time a shot from a twenty-pound Parrott ploughed through the slight ridge within a foot of Sheridan's head, covering him with dirt. He rolled over on his side, and we thought he was wounded, but he was only getting the dirt out of his ear and neck; he came back, though, and took his position by the side of our piece.

In a few minutes we heard cheers on our right and soon saw the enemy breaking all along the line. We sent shot after shot in quick succession, but were told to stop firing. Soon our corps came sweeping over the ridge and down the other side.

Sheridan now wanted his horse, but could not see it, so Lieut. Gray let him take his, but regretted it in a moment, as Sheridan went dashing down the hill over stumps and fallen trees, and we expected to see horse and rider take a tumble, but they were soon out of sight.

We limbered up and went back to where the remainder of the battery was, and then started over to the pike and joined our division. We marched nearly all night and then went into camp at Woodstock, to get a little sleep and some rations.

At two o'clock in the afternoon we started again and reached Edenburg, where toward night we fired a few shots and then encamped. In the morning we were away early, and marched all day, going into position two or three times and firing a few shots, but apparently doing the enemy no great harm. The next day we marched to Mount Jackson, having quite a skirmish in the afternoon.

On the morning of the 29th we started at nine o'clock, and on reaching Harrisonburg, went into camp, remaining there until the 6th of October, occupying the time in foraging for our horses.

On the morning of the 30th Lieut. Gray took nine mounted men from the battery, armed with revolvers, and started out into the country to secure some horses that he had seen the day before, but on arriving where he had seen the horses he found the natives had run them off to the mountains. Following the trail for about seven miles we ran across a few straggling rebel cavalrymen, several of whom were captured, and also a number of horses.

We continued on until we were about fifteen or sixteen miles from camp, when we stopped at a farmhouse and had dinner and fed our horses. We then started toward camp again, but by a different road than that on which we came. We had two or three quite sharp skirmishes with squads of rebel cavalry, and about dusk Billy Mills, who was in the advance, rode back bringing the information that there was a company of rebel cavalry drawn up on the side of the road with the intention of obstructing our passage. We had at this time nine rebel cavalrymen as prisoners and twenty-three horses.

The line was immediately halted, and Lieut. Gray rode ahead to reconnoiter. When he arrived at the edge of the woods he found a company of rebels drawn up in line in a large field adjoining the road. On looking over the situation he found that the fence in the rear and on the left had been taken down, to allow egress from the lot, which gave him the impression that the force there had some doubt as to the number of our men.

Riding back, the column was started forward, following the road until close to the edge of the woods where we could be seen from the lots. We filed by twos from the road into the woods and made a short countermarch on to the road and into the woods again, which manoeuvre made it look as if we had two companies. On moving into the woods the second time, all the rebel cavalrymen were dismounted, their arms strapped to each other and ordered to sit down, and one man left as guard.

The darkies that had been confiscated to take care of the spare horses, twelve in number, were mounted on them, and a line was formed at the edge of the woods, consisting of twenty men, nine of us and eleven darkies sandwiched in, the other darkey being left to look after the horses. These arrangements were not quite satisfactory to some of the darkies; but they were told that when we started out of the woods they must keep well up in the line or get shot.

An order was given to charge, every man was told to halloo as loud as he could yell, and ride straight for the line of the rebel cavalry. The scheme worked like a charm. The rebel line soon broke and fled to the woods, we in hot pursuit, capturing three, two seriously wounded, while our loss was one darkey shot, and slight wounds on two horses. We soon collected our men together and sent them back to the woods under command of Sergt. Tucker.

Lieut. Gray and Mills rode down to the town to see if there were any rebels there, we having seen a squad of men leaving there a few minutes before we had our brush with the company of cavalry. Both Lieut. Gray and Mills had on rebel uniforms, and they soon had information that the body of men which had left the town a few minutes before were Yankees, which information was pleasing to them.

Mills was immediately sent back to have the line moved forward, and we soon entered the town. Lieut. Gray sat on his horse with a dozen people around him, who were giving what information they could, and urging him to hurry so as to capture some of the Yankees that had left a few minutes before. The squad of men we saw leaving the town was Lieut. Corthell and some men from Battery G. of our regiment. When our line came up there was a look of astonishment on the faces of some of the people when they found we were Yankees.

We arrived in camp about eight o'clock with twenty-eight horses and thirteen rebel cavalrymen, which we considered a good day's work for ten light artillerymen.

On the morning of the 6th Sheridan started his army down the valley, having done all the damage with his cavalry that he could in this neighborhood. We bivouacked at Mount Jackson, and started the next morning and reached Woodstock late in the evening.

On the morning of the 8th we hitched up early, but did not move. We soon learned that Sheridan had made up his mind to give the rebel cavalry another lesson.

Gen. Rosser had just arrived in the valley with his brigade, and he was put in command of all the cavalry. Since leaving Harrisonburg they had been annoying our rear guard, so Sheridan sent word to Torbert on the evening of the 7th to "give Rosser a drubbing in the morning, or get whipped yourself, and the infantry will be halted until the affair is over."

Torbert had the divisions of Merritt and Custer, and in the morning he attacked Rosser. After a hard fight of about two hours Rosser had received his "drubbing," losing eleven pieces of artillery, several wagons, and three hundred prisoners.

We started on our march at ten o'clock, and encamped near Strasburg, remaining there one day, and then moved to the north bank of Cedar Creek, and went into position just off the pike on the extreme left of the Nineteenth Corps. Crook (Eighth Corps) went into position on the left of the pike joining the left of the Nineteenth Corps, his right advanced some hundred and fifty yards beyond our position. The Sixth Corps had started for Port Royal, to rejoin the Army of the Potomac, while Merritt's cavalry was on the extreme right of our line.

Our cavalry destroyed all the mills and crops in the valley as we fell back, and gathered in all the live stock, so that Early could not subsist his army in the valley. Early was at Fisher's Hill on the morning of the 13th, just the same, but probably brought his rations with him. We occupied this position until the morning of the 19th. In the meantime the Sixth Corps had come back and taken position in rear of the Nineteenth Corps. Sheridan had been called to Washington, which left Wright in command.

At break of day on the 19th, three of Early's divisions surprised Crook's camp and stampeded his whole command. Our battery, being on the extreme left of the Nineteenth Corps, were the first troops to receive their attention after the Eighth Corps had been swept away.

We had orders to have our battery hitched up at daylight, and we had just completed the task when we heard a volley of musketry on our left. We fired four rounds, just to make a noise and wake up the camp, not yet realizing just what had happened on our left.

Lieut. Gray hurriedly gave orders to have the tents struck and everything in readiness to move. In a few minutes we saw a line coming over the hill on our left, and making sure they were not our troops, we opened on them, but after firing for a few minutes, Gen. Emory dashed up and ordered us to stop firing, as they were some of our men, and Lieut. Gray was told to always look out before he commenced firing. At this moment Lieuts. Chase and Bonn came up, and Chase took command.

In the two or three minutes that had elapsed since we had stopped firing, the line of infantry that we had driven behind the brow of the hill, now opened on us, and in a few seconds we had orders to "give it to them." We had just opened on them as Gen. Wright rode up. He asked Emory "What is the matter?" and Emory replied, "Early has surprised us--Crook's corps has gone." Wright quickly took in the situation, and started off.

We had warm work before us, the enemy's line of infantry on our left having a notion of charging us, but as they came over the ridge we had very nearly a complete flank fire on them, and our left section commenced using canister. The right of their line was driven back over the ridge, but the left was swinging up parallel with the pike, which gave them a flank fire on our battery. We were lucky in having three or four loads of hay piled up just in rear of the limbers and on a line with the caissons on the extreme left of the battery, this pile of hay stopping many of the bullets from our left.

At this time the fourth brigade, second division, Nineteenth Corps, swung into position on our left. The smoke and fog was quite thick, and they did not open fire for some minutes thinking that the line in their front was some of the Eighth Corps falling back. Their mistake was discovered, and none too soon, for the enemy made a dash for our guns, but the line on our left had their guns loaded, and poured a volley at them which checked their onward rush.

We were firing very rapidly and doing good execution, as we kept the line on our left (or in front of our left section, which had swung to the left) back to the brow of the ridge; but it now became apparent that we must fall back, as the right of our support had given way and the troops on the left of the battery were only hanging on so as to give us a chance to get out; and to add to our troubles, the line of infantry on our left, which we had until now been able to keep back to the ridge, was joined by Wharton's rebel division which had moved up the pike, and they were pouring in a nasty fire.

When we received the order, "Limber to the rear," we were not long in executing it, as the rebels were now very close to us. All the pieces were taken off but the left piece of Lieut. Gray's section--three of the limber horses being down, and in a minute every horse on the limber was shot. It was impossible to take the piece by hand to the rear, and the caisson had started some minutes before. The pike had been in the hands of the rebels for the last fifteen minutes, so Lieut. Gray told the three or four cannoneers who had been trying to get the limber clear, to join the battery.

Maj. Hart, of Gen. Emory's staff, wanted to save this piece, and told Lieut. Gray to fix the prolong and he would have the infantry haul it off. It was simply sacrificing men to make the attempt under the circumstances. Maj. Hart lost his life, also Capt. Watson and Lieut. Quay, both of the Eighth Indiana, and Lieut. Col. Kenny, commanding the Eighth Indiana, was severely wounded, and four others. Lieut. Gray was the only one who escaped from the attempt to get the piece away.

The following is from Vol. XLIII. of the Official Records of the War:

Hdqrs. Fourth Brig., Second Div., 19th Army Corps, Cedar Creek, Va., October 24, 1864.

Captain: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of my command in the engagement on the 19th of October, instant:

* * * * the right regiment (Eighth Indiana) supporting Battery D, First Rhode Island Artillery. In consequence of the dense fog, which existed at the time, the enemy advanced on the battery and were within a short distance of it before we could distinguish whether they were friends or foes, the more so, as we supposed them to be a portion of the Eighth Corps, and notwithstanding we received a very heavy fire from that direction, we did not reply to it until they charged directly on the battery. Five pieces were withdrawn successfully, and while attempting to save the last one Major Hart (of General Grover's staff), Capt. William D. Watson, and Lieut. George W. Quay (both of Eighth Indiana) were killed, and Lieut. Col. A.J. Kenny (commanding Eighth Indiana) severely wounded. * * * * *

I cannot close this report without referring to the bravery of the lamented Major Hart (of General Grover's staff), who was killed while cheering on the men in their attempt to save the last gun of Battery D, First Rhode Island Artillery. In him we have lost a noble, brave, efficient officer.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID SHUNK, _Colonel Eighth Indiana, Commanding_.

Capt. E.A. Fiske,
_Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen._,
_Second Div., Nineteenth Army Corps_.

Hdqrs. Third Brig., Second Div., 19th Army Corps, Near Cedar Creek, Va., October 24, 1864.

Sir: In obedience to orders, I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of this brigade in the action of the 19th instant:

* * * * the left of the One Hundred and Seventy-sixth New York reached nearly to and supported Battery D, First Rhode Island Artillery.

These dispositions had scarcely been made, and orders given to the men to reserve their fire until the enemy was near enough to make the fire effective, when we began to receive a heavy fire of musketry from the advancing, but still hidden, enemy. The fire came from our front, our right, and our left, with a heavy, but random fire of artillery from the heights formerly occupied by General Crook's command. The enemy's lines were not developed until they were within one hundred and fifty yards of our lines, and then were but dimly visible through the fog. At this time they opened a furious and destructive fire upon us, still advancing, which was vigorously and effectively returned, checking to some extent their advance. The enemy's lines, as now developed, were nearly at right angles with the main brigade line, and facing the One Hundred and Seventy-sixth New York and the three companies of the One Hundred and Fifty-sixth New York, which had changed front. The left of their lines extended very nearly to Cedar Creek, while their right extended as far as the eye could reach through the fog and smoke. In a very few moments they were on us in force, their left swinging to the right, while their right poured heavy volleys in our rear. A desperate hand-to-hand fight ensued on the left of the brigade line. The enemy had planted their colors on our works and were fighting desperately across them, meeting with a stubborn resistance, while they swarmed like bees round the battery on our left and rear. * * * *

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ALFRED NEAFIE, _Lieutenant Colonel, Commanding Brigade_.

Capt. E.A. Fiske, _Acting Assistant Adjutant General_.

When the battery retired, we moved to the right and rear of our position, crossed Meadow Brook, passing to the west of the Bell Grove house (Sheridan's head-quarters) and joined some infantry about one thousand yards to the rear, and went into position, firing at a line of infantry on the pike, and then fell back just beyond Middletown, and again went into position behind some light breastworks that had been thrown up. We remained there until three or four in the afternoon, firing occasionally when we could see anything to fire at.

Gen. Sheridan joined his command at about half-past ten in the morning, from Winchester. At this time Getty's division, of the Sixth Corps, was holding a position about one mile north of Middletown, his left near the pike. Col. Lowell's cavalry extended from Getty's left to near Middletown. The other two divisions of the Sixth Corps, the Nineteenth, and part of the Eighth Corps, were just south of Newtown.

Our army had lost twenty-four pieces of artillery, a large amount of camp equipage, ambulances, wagons, and thirteen hundred prisoners.

Sheridan's arrival gave our men confidence. He had the two divisions of the Sixth Corps, also the Nineteenth, and part of the Eighth Corps put in line on the right of Getty's division. The enemy tried to break this line, but Emory handsomely repulsed the charge.

At about a quarter of four o'clock Sheridan advanced his whole line, which was met by a stubborn resistance; but soon the enemy was obliged to give way, and in a short time it was a complete rout.

Our infantry followed the enemy until their old camps were reached at Cedar Creek, and then the cavalry took up the chase. All of our guns were recaptured, and twenty-four of Early's (just the number we lost in the morning), besides about all of the ambulances and wagons that were lost in the morning were in our hands that night, with a large majority of Early's.

Our battery followed the infantry when the advance was made, and on arrival at Cedar Creek, went into our position of the morning. We had lost one gun and one limber and all of our camp equipage (our teams, having taken the pike when they fell back, were captured); notwithstanding, we felt happy at the way things had turned out. We also experienced just a little regret that we had no blankets, tents, or anything else in fact, but what we had on.

Not a man of the battery had had a morsel to eat since the night before, and no show for rations getting to the front that night. We could get along without tents or blankets, but the day's excitement had given us a good appetite. We built up two large camp fires and sat around discussing the events of the day.

About nine o'clock Lieut. Gray (who had left the battery shortly after we arrived in our old position) rode into camp escorting a four-mule team which he had captured. The contents of the wagon were soon spread out, disclosing three boxes of "hard-tack" as a part of the capture. This was issued at once, and we had a good supper.

The following is Lieut. Gray's report of his two hours' absence: "When we arrived in our old position just at dusk, there was a rebel battery on the hill beyond the bridge, and quite a piece to the right. A few shells came over our camp, and I knew they were from a three-inch rifle; having lost one of that kind in the morning, I thought I would ride over and see if I could find it.

I rode down toward our right, crossed a small stream in the woods, and came out near a small plateau where some two or three hundred rebel infantrymen were trying to hold our cavalry from coming up the hill. I swung back and joined the head of our cavalry line, which proved to be the First Vermont, Col. Bennett. He was waiting for his men to close up.

I crossed the stone wall and rode a few yards to the left, when Gen. Custer, with the Fifth New York came up, and both regiments charged. I was carried along with the crowd, but before we had gone fifty yards the rebel infantry broke. I made friends with a sergeant, and suggested that we shove ahead and get the guns of the battery that had been firing but a minute or two before.

He fell into the scheme, and we gathered about a dozen of his command and struck out for the battery, but they had limbered up, and were quite a piece from where we expected to find them. We were riding at a sharp trot, passing through quite a number of rebel infantry, who paid not the least attention to us. I soon made out the battery, which was bearing off to the right.

I rode to the head of the battery and ordered them to halt. The officer in command told me that he had orders to go to the rear as quick as possible. I explained to him who I was, and ordered him to countermarch. As soon as the battery was halted three or four of the mounted men rode up to see what the matter was, and heard the conversation. I heard the click of two or three revolvers, and wished I was at home, as my friend the sergeant and his men had stopped to take some of the rebel infantry into camp, leaving me entirely alone.

I rode directly in front of the commanding officer of the battery, holding my Colt's navy revolver very close to him, and told him it was no use making a fuss, as our cavalry was some distance in our front, and it was impossible for him to get away.

He finally gave the order to countermarch, and we were nearing the pike when some of our cavalry came up, and they demanded our surrender. I explained to them how things stood, and that they could have all the pieces but one, but I wanted one at least. The officer in command allowed I had no business out there anyway, and he would take charge of the guns. We had quite an argument, but I had to let him have his own way.

I now came to the conclusion that I didn't want any guns, so I rode up the pike, where I soon got into their infantry, which was scattered over the lots on each side of the pike. On the pike were three lines of vehicles going at a slow trot, the lines being composed of pieces of artillery, wagons, ambulances, and caissons, all mixed in together.

I rode alongside the pike until I came to a place where there was a down grade, and I then took a whip from one of the drivers and his "jerk-line" and swinging his lead mules over against the next team to him, I put the whip to them, and it was fun to see those mules try to climb over that team. In a few seconds there was a mix-up, mules, horses, wagons and drivers, being piled up, completely blocking the road.

I went back down the pike asking different drivers what they had in their wagons. I soon struck one that said he had three boxes of Yankee hard-tack, a wall tent, blankets, and the mess-kit of the surgeon of the Fourth Georgia. I asked him to pull out out into the lot, but he allowed that he would lose his place in line if he did; but as the line was halted, I persuaded him to do as I suggested, telling him I would answer all questions if anyone asked them.