Chapter XIX: Conclusion (7)

“It is to be observed also that the majority of the Court uttered no _obiter dicta_ in their judgment. They read out no homily on the evils of drink, as they might well have done in view of the numerous young gentlemen just called to the bar, and who in the dearth of law may easily fall into evil ways; and they carefully avoided asking for such further and better particulars of the stimulants used by counsel and jury as might have given a huge and cheap advertisement to some particular brands. So far so good. Justice now takes breath. The ill-fated _Alert_ is still lapped in the sounding depths. Ponting, the plaintiff, has succeeded on his point; at the bar of Menzies the glasses are still a-clink, and the P. and O. Steam Navigation Company is building a new steamer of 12,000 tons to carry the papers in the appeal case home to the Privy Council.

“On the same subject Mr. J. Arbuckle Reid—who was an eye-witness of the entire transaction—gives his version thus:—

“‘Mister Hoteggs, in addressing the jury,
Lashed himself into a terrible fury;
Talked wildly concerning the funnel and mast,
Till Mac—from the jury-box—spoke out at last.
Cried he, “Your rubbish is getting much stronger,
And I cannot hold my tongue any longer;
I will sum up your speech, sir, just in a word:
It is utter _nonsense_. Your talk is _absurd_.”
Hoteggs looked glum, being quite taken aback.
Thought he, “I must go on a different tack;
This man is against me, that’s plain to be seen,
But I know how to manage _him_—he is green.”
Quick to act on the thought, Hoteggs _called_ out,
“At Menzies’ Hotel I am going to shout;
Mac, come on, bring your mates, and over a gill,
I will make each one convinced against his will.”
To Menzies’ they went, and, quite needless to say,
Hoteggs, after that, had it all his own way.’

“‘MORAL FOR BARRISTERS.

“‘If with a jury you have any bother,
Just shift the case from one bar to the other;
At the court bar your talk may do your side harm,
The pub. bar’s the place, with a dram and a yarn;
But be cautious and mind what you are about,
Otherwise “Be sure your sin will find you out.”’”[4]

Finding that the Full Court decision was against them, Messrs. Huddart, Parker & Co.’s lawyers changed their tactics. With the object of quashing the whole proceedings, they raised the point that the _Alert_ was not a British ship within the meaning of the Merchant Shipping Act. This point was fully recognised on March 24, 1897, before the same Supreme Court Judges who decided the appeal case. Mr. Schutt (barrister) appeared for Huddart, Parker & Co., and Mr. W. H. Williams (barrister) appeared for Ponting. As the matter debated is of great importance to all concerned in shipping interests, it has been deemed advisable to adhere to the authentic verbatim reports of the proceedings as given in the _Herald_ newspaper, March 24, 1897, and the _Argus Law Reports_ of May 11th, 1897, hereto annexed:—

“WHAT IS A BRITISH SHIP?

SCHUTT for the respondents.—The plaintiff brings his action under sect. 103 of the Marine Act 1890. That section comes within Part VI. of the Act, and therefore has to be read with sect. 98, which says that the provision of that Part “shall apply to all British ships registered or being at any place within Victoria and to no others.” Thus, although sect. 103 only uses the word “ship,” it can only apply to a “British ship.” The Imperial Act, 39 and 40 Vict., c. 80, sect. 5, corresponds to our sect. 103; but this question could not arise in England, because there is no equivalent to sect. 98 in the Imperial legislation. We have, however, to refer to the Imperial legislation to find out what is a “British ship”; and we find that, by sects. 18 and 19 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1854, 17 & 18 Vict., c. 104, which two sections it is submitted are to be read together, a British ship must be owned by a British owner, and must be registered. By sect. 17 of the same Act, Part II. of the Act, under which sects. 18 and 19 are, is to apply to the whole of the British dominions. Again, if any alteration of the ship be made, re-registration is required by sect. 84 _et seq._, which, if not done by sect. 87, the ship shall not be deemed duly registered, and shall no longer be recognised as a British ship. In this case the _Alert_, when originally registered, had three masts. The number of her masts was subsequently altered, but she was never re-registered; she is, therefore, not now a British ship, and the plaintiff has no cause of action. [W. H. WILLIAMS referred to _Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, London and China_ v. _Netherlands India Steam Navigation Co._, 10 Q. B. D. 521; 52 L. J. Q. B. 220, per Brett, L. J., as to the meaning of “British ship.”] That case is distinguishable, the question there being whether a certain rule of the Admiralty Court as to the equal liability of the two ships should apply, and, accordingly, whether Dutch or English law was applicable. The ships were there held to be English because owned by English owners, although registered in Holland. The question was not whether they were British ships within the meaning of the Merchant Shipping Acts. He referred also to _Leary_ v. _Lloyd_, 3 E. & E. 178; _R._ v. _Clark_, 5 V. L. R (L.) 440; 17 and 18 Vict., c. 104, sects. 106, 547.

W. H. WILLIAMS for the appellant.—Our local Parliament has put its own meaning on the words “British ship” in sect. 98. The Marine Act 1890 says nothing about recognition or non-recognition, according to whether a ship is registered or not. A British ship means a ship owned by British people. Registration has nothing to do with the British character of the ship. The case in 10 Q. B. D., and Lord Esher’s observations there, are exactly in point here. In addition, it does not lie in the mouth of the defendants to now take advantage of their own wrong. They have continued to sail in and out of port for years, and in their answers to interrogatories they admit that their ship was a British ship, and that they were the registered owners. To allow the defendants to raise this point now would be against public policy. The alteration to the _Alert_ had, according to the Act, to be made under the supervision of the Marine Board. Yearly certificates have been granted by that Board to her for the last sixteen years, and during that time she has been continuously travelling under the British flag. Her owners thus are estopped from saying she is not a British ship. In addition, the alteration effected was not a very material one; it did not alter her identity.

MR. SCHUTT argued in support of the view that the vessel was not registered as a British Ship.

MR. JUSTICE HOLROYD: Suppose, on the consideration of this statute of ours, your view is correct, can you possibly take advantage of it? You, as owners, have for years enjoyed all the privileges possessed by the owners of a duly registered British ship, and you have availed yourselves of them over and over again. You have sailed from port to port, and obtained your clearance papers in that character. Can you now turn round and say that the vessel was not duly registered?

MR. SCHUTT: It seems to me that you are assuming that there was evidence that we did enjoy those privileges, whereas there is not the slightest evidence that we ever did fly the British flag.

MR. JUSTICE HOLROYD: You got your clearance papers from port to port.

MR. SCHUTT: There is no evidence that we did get them.

MR. JUSTICE HOLROYD: How did she get out?

MR. SCHUTT: There is nothing to show that we went out.

MR. JUSTICE WILLIAMS observed that if a new trial were allowed, the evidence would doubtless be forthcoming.

MR. SCHUTT submitted that, as against Ponting, the defendants were perfectly entitled to raise the defence.

MR. JUSTICE HOLROYD: Why? Because he nearly lost his life?

MR. SCHUTT: No; because no representation was made to him that the vessel was a British ship.

MR. JUSTICE HOLROYD: It is contrary to public policy that you should be allowed to say such a thing. I don’t care a straw what Ponting knew. Here you have taken advantage of the privileges afforded by the Imperial Legislature to our colony for years, to obtain certain advantages which would not otherwise have been conceded. You have sailed out and come into port under false pretences, and now you ask to escape from the liability imposed on you by the Act of our Parliament, on the ground that the vessel was never duly registered at all. It seems to me that is directly contrary to public policy, and a fraud on the statutes.

MR. SCHUTT: It is not a fraud; no one knew it.

MR. JUSTICE HOLROYD: It fortunate for you no one did know it, or you would have been fined £100 over and over again.

MR. JUSTICE WILLIAMS said that, although the Court had ordered a new trial on one ground, it had been urged that the new trial would be fruitless, as it could not be shown that the vessel was a British ship. It was said that the vessel was not a British ship unless owned by British subjects, and registered in the manner prescribed by the Merchant Shipping Act. The point had been ably argued by Mr. Schutt, and with great ingenuity; but he (his Honour) could not agree with him.

MR. SCHUTT in reply.—The answer to interrogatories referred to stated as a matter of fact what was really a question of law, which the defendants were not bound to know. There was also no obligation on the defendants to re-register, and therefore they should not be estopped from raising this defence. They might be liable to certain penalties. A leading text-book says that a British ship means a ship which is registered and owned by British owners: Maude and Pollock on _Merchant Shipping_ (3rd ed.), pp. 1, 2.

The following authorities were also referred to during argument:—Bell _v._ Bank of London, 28 L.J. Ex. 116; Union Bank of London _v._ Lenanton, 3 C. P. D. 243.

WILLIAMS, J.—This is an application for a new trial. The Court has already delivered judgment upon a point which we need not further refer to, ordering that a new trial should take place upon the ground there dealt with. But now Mr. Schutt, counsel for the defendants, says that there is an objection which would be a fatal objection to the plaintiff’s case, that it is an objection which could not possibly be got over, and that the Court ought not to send a case for a new trial when the trial would be futile. The Court saw the force of that contention of Mr. Schutt, and so we have heard arguments on that point. Now, that point was this—that this action was an action brought under sect. 109 of our Marine Act, 1890, and that that section only applies to the case of a British ship, and that therefore the plaintiff, before he could bring his action upon the implied contract created by sect. 103, must show that the _Alert_, the ship in question, was a British ship. So far Mr. Schutt’s contention appears to be correct, because sect. 98 of the same Act says, “The provisions contained in this part of this Act”—_i. e._, the part dealing with the safety of ships and prevention of accidents, in which sect. 103 is included—“shall (except where it is otherwise specially provided) apply to all British ships registered or being at any place within Victoria, and to no others.” Therefore it is perfectly clear, so far, that sect. 103 only applies to British ships. Well then, Mr. Schutt further contended that a ship could not be a British ship unless it was owned by British subjects, and unless it was registered in the manner provided by the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, 17 and 18 Vict., c. 104. Now, there is no doubt that those provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, as to registration, and as to what constitutes a British ship, apply to this colony, because sect. 17 says, “The second part of this Act shall apply to the whole of Her Majesty’s dominions.” Now it is upon that point that Mr. Schutt seems to have based his contention—namely, that to constitute the _Alert_ a British ship, it must be proved not only that she belongs to British subjects, but that she was registered as required by the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854. He certainly argued the point very ably, and displayed great ingenuity in his argument, but, unfortunately, I cannot agree with him on that point. Sect. 18 of the same Act provides that “no ship shall be deemed to be a _British_ ship, unless she belongs wholly to owners of the following description, that is to say,” and then the subsections proceed to give the description of the persons to whom she may belong—viz., natural-born British subjects, persons made denizens by letters of denization, or naturalised by or pursuant to any Act of the Imperial Legislature, or by or pursuant to any Act or Ordinance of the proper Legislative authority in any British possession, and bodies corporate established under, subject to the laws of, and having their principal place of business in the United Kingdom or some British possession. Well, that section, if it stood alone, says that a ship shall not be a British ship unless it belongs to owners of a certain description, and if so, it would follow by implication that she was a British ship. Sect. 19 then goes on to say, “Every British ship must be registered in manner hereinafter mentioned,” with certain exceptions. It assumes there that the ship is a British ship. It is not “every ship claiming to be a British ship,” or “seeking to be a British ship,” but it is “every _British_ ship must be registered in the manner hereinafter mentioned, except”—and then it goes on to provide for the exceptions to registration, and then having done that, it goes on to say “and no ship hereby required to be registered shall, unless registered, be recognised as a British ship.” It is upon those words that Mr. Schutt so strongly relies. Now, I desire to draw attention to the marked difference of language. Sect. 18 says, “no ship shall be _deemed_ to be a British ship, unless she belongs wholly to owners” of a certain description, while sect. 19 has “no ship required to be registered shall, unless registered, be _recognised_ as a British ship,” and then it goes on to say in that section, “and no officer of customs shall grant a clearance or transire to any ship hereby required to be registered for the purpose of enabling her to proceed to sea as a British ship, unless the master of such ship, upon being required so to do, produces to him such certificate of registry as is hereinafter mentioned; and if such ship attempts to proceed to sea as a British ship without a clearance or transire, such officer may detain such ship until such certificate is produced to him.” I think, in the first place, that sect. 19 recognises the fact that a ship may be a British ship without registration; but then it says if you are a British ship you must also be registered, and, if not, certain consequences will follow, some of which are enumerated, one being that she shall not be recognised as a British ship. What is the meaning of “shall not be recognised” is given by sect. 106, which says “whenever”—apparently equivalent to “wherever”—“it is declared by this Act that a ship belonging to any person or body corporate qualified according to this Act to be owners of British ships shall not be recognised as a British ship, such ship shall not be entitled to any benefits, privileges, advantages, or protection, usually enjoyed by British ships, and shall not be entitled to use the British flag or assume the British national character; but, so far as regards the payment of dues, the liability to pains and penalties, and the punishment of offences committed on board such ship or by any persons belonging to her, such ship shall be dealt with in the same manner in all respects as if she were a recognised British ship.” Well now, I think—I am taking an extreme case that the ship has never been registered at all, I am not giving my judgment on the view that she was registered and then partially altered, I am taking a bald case of a ship not being registered at all—that the effect of the consequences is pointed out by sect. 106. These are the consequences: namely, that she shall not be entitled to any benefits, privileges, advantages, or protection, usually enjoyed by British ships, and shall not be entitled to use the British flag or assume the British national character, and that because she has not been registered she loses those advantages, and though she loses them there shall be still attached to her all the pains and penalties and punishments for offences as a recognised British ship. I see that is the view taken by a learned writer on shipping—MacLachlan on _Merchant Shipping_ (4th ed.), at p. 96—and it appears to me, though it was not necessary for his judgment, that Brett, L.J., in the Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, London and China _v._ The Netherlands India Steam Navigation Co., Ltd., 10 Q. B. D. 521, takes exactly the same view. It is true that he speaks of a contract outside of the statute, but he is speaking of the statute. He said that it was contended that the ship was not a British ship, and was a Dutch ship because registered in Holland; but he says he does not think the contention has any foundation at all. If the ship is owned by a British subject, that makes it a British ship, and the flying of a flag and the registration, wherever made, are not material. The question is, who is she owned by? The fact that she is not registered deprives her of advantages, and leaves her open to pains and penalties. On that ground alone I am prepared to overrule this point, because this ship, the _Alert_, was owned by British subjects, and that being so, I feel tolerably clear that she was a British ship, and a British ship within the meaning of sect. 103. I think it absolutely immaterial whether she was registered or not. That is the main ground for my judgment.

There are other grounds which it is difficult for the defendants to get over. For the purpose of saving expense, an interrogatory was delivered to the defendants asking, “Were you at the date of the accident the registered owners of the _Alert_?” and the defendants on their oaths said “Yes, we were”; and in addition to that there is no doubt about the fact that for years since the alteration of her three masts to one, the _Alert_ has been going in and out of port and enjoying every advantage as if she were a British ship; and now at a very late stage, and for the purpose of defeating an action, they say we were not. But I do not base my judgment so much on that ground as on the main ground. I think the new trial should take place.

JUSTICE HOLROYD: I concur that there should be a new trial. I do not differ, I think, in any respect from the judgment that has been delivered, although I entertained some doubt as to a portion of it, on which my brother Williams has mainly relied. I have doubted whether sects. 18 and 19 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854 should not be read together as containing a definition of what should be regarded as a British ship, and whether so reading those two sections, the true construction of them was not that a British ship meant a ship belonging to any of the persons described in sect. 18, and registered under the provision of sect. 19. My doubt, however, is not sufficiently strong to induce me to differ from the judgment just delivered. I think that judgment is supported by a reference to the previous Acts relating to registration, particularly the Act 8 and 9 Vict., c. 88, to which I have just directed my attention. It is called, “An Act for the Encouragement of British Shipping and Navigation,” and it speaks of the conditions which are to attach to a British registered ship, and draws clearly a distinction between a “British registered ship” and a “British ship.” I think that throws some light upon, and gives support to, the judgment of my brother Williams. But, in my opinion, it is too late for the defendants now to turn round and set up this ground at all. For years past the defendants have represented themselves as the owners of a duly registered British ship. They have, by so doing, up to this time avoided payment of the penalties prescribed by sect. 53 of the Act for not informing the registrar that the ship had ceased to be effectually registered, and, of course, they avoided it if the argument maintained by Mr. Schutt is correct. I think still it would be contrary to public policy to allow them to come now and declare that during these years they were not the owners of a duly registered British ship. There is a case which I think supports the view I am taking. It is Tabram _v._ Freeman, 2 Cr. & M. 451. In that case an attorney, to whom an insolvent was indebted, and who held a _cognovit_ as a security for the debt, and who was employed by the insolvent to prepare his schedule, and acted as his attorney in procuring his discharge, agreed with the insolvent to omit the debt out of the schedule, and that the _cognovit_ should be suspended until after the discharge, and then revived. The insolvent obtained his discharge, and the attorney two years afterwards entered up judgment on the _cognovit_, and issued execution. The Court, on motion, set aside the judgment and execution, and upon the ground as stated by Gurney, B., at p. 455, that “the plaintiff was the attorney employed by the insolvent, and must be held responsible for the preparation of the schedule. How can he, who prepared the schedule falsely, take advantage of it? It is an act of oppression on the debtor, and a fraud on the law, on the Act, and on the creditors.” The principle of that decision is precisely the same as the principle on which I rely in this case.

JUSTICE A’BECKETT: I wish only to add a few words to say that I think that, without the answer to the interrogatory, and without considering the conduct of the defendants, it cannot be said, on the construction of the statutes, that the _Alert_ does not come within the meaning of sect. 103, and that her owners do not come within the liability imposed by that section; and in approaching the subject, I think we have first to consider that the Marine Act 1890 is a Victorian statute, and we have to ascertain what was the meaning of that Victorian statute in saying in sect. 98 that the provisions contained in Part VI. of the Act “shall ... apply to all British ships registered or being at any place within Victoria and to no others.” We must find a meaning for these words, and of course may refer to the English Act for the purpose of interpreting them. One thing required is that the ship shall be a British ship registered in Victoria. Primarily, those words would mean a ship of British nationality. The _Alert_ was a British ship so far as nationality is concerned, and she was at the time of her wreck registered _de facto_; but Mr. Schutt says that, by reason of a defect in her registration, we are not to regard her as duly registered, and that consequently she has ceased to be a British ship. It seems to me, having regard to what Part VI. deals with—viz., “The Safety and Prevention of Accidents,” that, when a particular obligation is cast upon the owner of a registered ship, it would be an altogether unwarrantable construction of that section to read it as equivalent to “duly registered,” in such a way as to allow an owner to escape its provisions by omitting to do something which the English Act required to make a valid registration. He could not, by his own default, put himself in a position to say that he was not registered, by altering his ship after registration and neglecting to register that alteration. I think, having regard to the object of this legislation, that a registration _de facto_ is sufficient to bring a ship within the provisions of sect. 98. If the _Alert_ was within the section, the only question is whether her owner would be subject to the consequences of not being recognised as the owner of a British ship. What are those consequences? They are defined in sect. 106 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1854, and, as my brother Williams has pointed out, there is nothing in that section to alter the civil liability imposed on the owner by sect. 103 of the Marine Act 1890. I therefore think, on the words of the Act alone, that the defendants have no case on the point raised.

JUSTICE WILLIAMS: This appeal will be allowed, with costs, and there will have to be a new trial before a Judge of this Court.

_Appeal allowed. New trial ordered before a Judge of the Supreme Court._

FOOTNOTES:

[4] Num. xxxii. 23.

The Division of the Spoil.

“I am sure, if you go to law, you do not consider the appeals,
degrees of jurisdiction, the intricate proceedings, the knaveries,
the cravings of so many ravenous animals that will prey upon
you, villainous harpies, promoters, tipstaves, and the like,
none of which but will puff away the clearest right in the world
for a bribe. On the other side, the proctor will side with your
adversary, and sell your cause for ready money; your advocate shall
be gained the same way, and shall not be found when your cause is
to be heard. Law is a torment of all torments.”—_Otway._

It should be mentioned that, although Mrs. Kilpatrick obtained verdicts in both trials (the first jury awarding her £600, and the second one awarding her £791, with costs in each case), still the money was not paid over. The necessary financial security was lodged by Messrs. Huddart, Parker & Co. in the Supreme Court, Melbourne, and steps taken to have the matter sent to England for decision there by the Privy Council. The hotel bar business, however, had meanwhile given a new turn to the legal kaleidoscope, and the defendants’ lawyers were placed in a pretty awkward position; for they had to face the expenses and risk of a new trial, or compromise the matter in some way. They wisely, no doubt, chose the latter course; and through a neutral friend of theirs I was communicated with, and requested to interview Mrs. Kilpatrick and Mr. Ponting for the purpose of ascertaining how much—or rather, how little—money they would take to settle matters, and stop all law proceedings. Why I was sent for I know not, seeing that I was opposed from the outset to law proceedings on the part of Mrs. Kilpatrick and Mr. Ponting too! Suffice it here to say that I did interview them both, and paved the way for the final settlement, which took place on May 20, 1897. Where the money came from is hard to say, but it is generally believed that Messrs. Huddart, Parker & Co. paid in the case of Mrs. Kilpatrick, and their lawyers paid in the case of Mr. Ponting. In dividing the “spoil,” the winning lawyers must have had a merry scramble, for they carried off more than two-thirds of the whole! The poet, Pope, was not very far wrong when he said, or wrote:—

“There, take, says Justice, take ye each a shell;
We thrive at Westminster on fools like you:
’Twas a fat oyster—live in peace—adieu!”

A little light is thrown on the subject by the following extract from the columns of the Melbourne _Herald_ of June 1, 1897:—

THE “_ALERT_” LITIGATION.

ABOUT THE SETTLEMENT. THE COST OF LAW.
THE PLAINTIFF’S EXPLANATIONS.

On last Saturday week we announced that the actions arising out of the loss of the steamer _Alert_, near Cape Schanck, some years ago, had at length been settled. The plaintiffs were Mr. Robert Ponting, sole survivor of the wreck, and Mrs. Kilpatrick, widow of one of the engineers. The terms of the settlement were stated to be the payment of sums of £400 to Mrs. Kilpatrick, and £135 to Mr. Ponting, “clear of all legal expenses.” We now find that, though this statement was technically correct, it did not correctly set out the exact result to the plaintiffs. Mr. Ponting writes to us as follows:—

“Sir,—In your issue of last Saturday (May 22nd) there appears a statement setting forth that, when the settlement of the above cases took place, Mrs. Kilpatrick received £400 and Mr. R. Ponting £135, clear of legal expenses.’ This is not correct, and I hope you will kindly grant me space enough to put the real facts of the case before the public. During the process of my law case I paid over to my solicitor and others the sum of £75. This amount, deducted from £135, leaves me with a balance of £60, out of which I am called upon to pay various sums to witnesses left unpaid by the lawyers. With regard to Mrs. Kilpatrick—who, I believe, paid in to her solicitors upwards of £200—she is left with the balance of less than £200, and, like myself, is called upon to pay various witnesses out of it. When we were asked our terms of settlement, Mrs. Kilpatrick and I agreed—and signed documents to that effect—that we would accept £400 and £135 respectively, clear of all legal expenses. Summed up, the whole affair stands thus:—Defendants’ solicitors paid over to ours £1335. This, added to the sum £275, paid in by us (Mrs. Kilpatrick and myself), makes up a total of £1610. Out of the latter amount £535 were paid back to us, and the balance, £1075, went amongst the lawyers. I am not grumbling at the distribution. On the contrary, I feel grateful for the assistance rendered to me. At the same time I think it only fair that, in the eyes of the public, I should not be credited with more money than I really got.

“I am, etc.,

“ROBERT PONTING.

“BARRY STREET, CARLTON,
“_May 29th, 1897._”

On inquiry at the office of Mr. Ebsworth, solicitor, who acted for Mr. Ponting throughout the protracted litigation, and for Mrs. Kilpatrick during the recent portion of it, we learn that the figures, as stated by Mr. Ponting, are, approximately correct. It is true that during the course of the proceedings Mr. Ponting had to find about £75 to meet current cost, and that Mrs. Kilpatrick was, during the three years’ litigation, called upon to pay about £200. These sums may be taken as representing the difference in costs between solicitors and client and the taxed costs; and considering the protracted nature of the proceedings, the sums mentioned will be considered very reasonable in the present state of the rules of the Supreme Court regarding costs. That the lawyers received £1075 will not be regarded as surprising, when it is remembered that there were several trials and appeals, extending over three years; and that there were numerous witnesses to be paid out of that sum, in addition to the witnesses’ fees remaining to be paid when the settlement took place. Counsel’s fees would also swallow up a considerable amount. Taken altogether, the case is one that well illustrates the present cost of litigation, and might be advantageously taken into consideration as an object-lesson by the Law Commission when it enters upon its investigations.

* * * * *

And now this strange, eventful history must be brought to a close. I have endeavoured, from first to last, to adhere to proved facts, irrespective of the opinions of friends or foes. Life is, after all, a mixture of sweets and sours, and we have to take these as they come in the shape of praise or blame, as the case may be. No matter what line of writing a man may adopt, it is quite impossible for him to please everybody. This being so, the proper plan, in my estimation, is to carry out _Ovid’s_ advice:—

“In a familiar style your thoughts convey,
And write such things as, present, you would say.”

I began this book by relating Ponting’s wonderful escape from the waves, and I finish it with his, quite as wonderful, escape from the lawyers!

My sincerest wish for him is that he may never again be called upon to battle with either of them.

Farewell!

_Printed by Hazell, Watson, & Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury._

GIVEN TO MR. PONTING BY THE PEOPLE OF MELBOURNE AT THE THEATRE ROYAL.]

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relief. This should be done three times a day. Four or five drops
taken on castor sugar two or three times a day will also give much
relief.

=DIPHTHERIA.=—Same directions as for consumption, unless a spray
producer is available, when it is better to spray the Oil on the
affected parts. A little Oil may be painted over the white patches,
and give internally three drops every hour. Sprinkle the Oil about
the bed and room to prevent infection.

=COLIC PAINS IN THE STOMACH OR BOWELS.=—Apply the Oil freely
sprinkled over a cloth previously rinsed in hot water. It is
recommended in adult cases to take six to ten drops internally on
castor sugar.

=CHILBLAINS, SPRAINS, STRAINS, BRUISES.=—Rub the Oil well into
the affected parts two or three times a day. It subdues the pain,
and, if applied in time, prevents discoloration of the skin, and
speedily effects a cure.

=CROUP, INFLAMMATION OF THE LUNGS.=—Same directions as for
Consumption, only more often.

=TYPHOID FEVER.=—Give two to five drops on sugar or in a little
milk every three hours. Hot packs once or twice a day, like those
recommended for Scarlet Fever, will greatly assist, and produce
sleep. Sprinkle about the room as a disinfectant.

=SCARLET FEVER.=—Give five drops on sugar every three hours for the
general symptoms and throat. If the skin is dry and hot, or the
rash does not come out, put a teaspoonful in a quart of hot water,
soak this up in a sheet, and pack the patient closely in it, with
double blankets closely pinned outside to keep in the vapour; after
keeping the patient in an hour, sponge over with Eucalyptus water
made as described. When getting better, rub over the whole body an
embrocation consisting of one part of the Oil and two parts olive
oil. Sprinkle in the bedroom to prevent infection.

=AGUE AND REMITTENT FEVER.=—Give three to five drops four or five
times a day, and sprinkle about the bedroom.

=As a DISINFECTANT, DEODORANT, and ANTISEPTIC.=—The sweet and
refreshing aroma, although peculiar at first to some, supplies
to a sick room an exhilarating and purifying effect. A few drops
sprinkled on a cloth, and suspended in a room, is a sweet and
thorough deodorant and disinfectant.

Transcriber’s Notes

pg 28 Changed: the beauties of that delighful spot
to: the beauties of that delightful spot

pg 29 Changed: Collins party where two men
to: Collins party were two men

pg 54 Changed: Death and trouble rouud me rave.
to: Death and trouble round me rave.

pg 168 Changed: What is your opinion should have been done
to: What in your opinion should have been done

pg 187 Changed: exactly one-twelth of the whole
to: exactly one-twelfth of the whole