Chapter XXX (8)

On the 31st May M. Drouyn de Lhuys wrote to Count Walewski, the French
Ambassador in London, in the following terms:—“Monsieur le Comte, as I
have already several times mentioned, there is by the side of
diplomatic negotiations another action to exercise, and it is the
attitude assumed by the Cabinet of St Petersburg itself which has
shown the necessity of it. When we knew that the army cantoned in the
south of Russia was on a war footing, that it was provisioned as on
the eve of a campaign—when the fleet at Sebastopol was ready to weigh
anchor—when considerable purchases of wood were made for throwing
bridges over the Pruth and the Danube—if all this did not indicate
that hostilities were declared, it at least showed that they were
approaching, and that their commencement only depended on a word. Who
could guarantee us that, under the influence of a first movement, that
word would not be pronounced at St Petersburg, and that, if it had
been, that the city of Constantinople would be protected from a _coup
de main_? It was a danger of this kind that we feared, and as, if it
were to be realised, the game would be lost at the outset, prudence
imposed on us the duty of doing everything to prevent it. In what
could such a measure of foresight more resemble a provocation than did
the armaments of Russia herself? Why should not France and England,
for the object of maintaining the treaty of 1841, have the right of
doing that which one of the Powers which signed that convention was
doing with such very different designs? Such are the considerations
which determined us to send our fleet to Salamis, and which we now
recommend to draw closer to the Dardanelles, not to take the
initiative in an aggression, not to encourage Turkey to refuse every
arrangement, but to secure her against an immediate danger, and to
reserve in case of need to diplomacy the resources which it would no
longer have if it had to struggle against _faits accomplis_.”

Footnote 9:

It is but fair to say that the noble Lord seemed to feel the sarcasm
conveyed in the term “beau,” as the word is translated “important” in
the papers laid before Parliament.

Footnote 10:

_Evenings in my Tent; or, Wanderings in Balad Ejjareed. Illustrating
the Moral, Social, and Political Conditions of various Arab Tribes of
the African Sahara._ By the Rev. W. Davis, F.R.S.S.A. 2 vols. London:
1854.

Footnote 11:

In January 1850 (_vide_ article “The Year of Reaction”), after
commenting on the interposition of Russia to save Austria in the
Hungarian war, we stated our belief that the Czar did not render such
a service to his brother-despot for nothing. “_It is more than
probable_,” we said, “_that a secret treaty, offensive and defensive,
already unites the two powers_; that the crushing of the Magyars was
bought by the condition that the extension of Muscovite influence in
Turkey was to be connived at; _and that the Czar will one day advance
to Constantinople without fear, because he knows that his right flank
is secure on the side of Austria_.”

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TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES

1. Silently corrected obvious typographical errors and variations in spelling. 2. Retained archaic, non-standard, and uncertain spellings as printed. 3. Re-indexed footnotes using numbers and collected together at the end of the last chapter. 4. Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.