Chapter XV (4)

These happy changes in Austria have produced a corresponding change of public feeling towards her in this country. Four years ago, the epithet “Austrian” was devised by the Liberals as the most telling which could be employed against the Conservative Government. It was purely an “invention of the enemy;” for the Conservative Government showed no special favour to Austria, but only found in her a Power desirous of peace, and willing to make concessions; whereas they rightly discerned in the French Government a fixed resolve to force on a war, and to evade all attempts at a compromise. But who would use the same epithet as opprobrious now? Lord Palmerston himself, who more than any British statesman has acted an unfriendly part towards Austria, now goes out of his way to attend a dinner to Baron Thierry at Southampton, and to express himself in the most friendly terms towards that Government. Austria, in truth, during the last three years, has been doing more for the spread of constitutional government than all the other Governments of the Continent put together. The French Government has felt itself compelled to follow in her wake—first, by allowing freedom of debate to the Chamber of Deputies; and, secondly, by abandoning the right to open “extraordinary credits” on the mere will of the Sovereign; the example in both cases having first been practically given in the new Austrian Constitution. Unhappily the press of France has still to envy the freedom so fully enjoyed by the journals of Austria.

If such has been the influence produced on other countries by the enlightened principles of government now in operation at Vienna, they have not failed to produce an equally powerful effect upon public feeling in Germany. Prussia, once so popular, is falling behind, grumbling; while Austria, without showing any unfriendly rivalry with Prussia, is completely outstripping her in wisdom and liberality of policy. For some years past the Prussian Government has been talking of the necessity of reforming the Germanic Diet, yet without proposing any definite remedy for its defects: last year Austria, without any palaver, quietly tabled a proposal which would most effectually liberalise the Diet, and in the best of all ways. At present the Diet consists entirely of delegates from the respective Governments of the Confederated States,—in fact, it simply represents the Courts; but alongside of the present Diet Austria proposes that another “House” be constituted, the members of which shall be chosen by the Parliaments of the different States; so that, while the existing Diet represents the Courts, the new body would represent the people of Germany. This proposal was adopted by a majority of the Committee of the Diet; but Prussia, instead of being foremost in welcoming such a project, as from her professions might have been expected, sulked—and not only sulked, but raged against the proposal, and hinted that she would even employ force to resist its adoption. As the Diet, however, has declined to accept the resolution of their Committee, the Austrian plan of reform is at present in abeyance; and Prussia, desirous to regain the initiative, now talks of outbidding Austria in the liberality of her proposals. Nevertheless, Prussia has appeared to great disadvantage in this act of rivalry. In truth, it is impossible not to recognise the superiority in statesmanship and breadth of views in the Austrian Government and legislators compared with those of Prussia. And the Prussians must be blind indeed if they do not see that the mingled folly and dogmatism which, scorning compromise, has now brought constitutional government to a dead-lock at Berlin, as well as the opposition which, from motives of jealousy, the Prussian Government is offering to the reform of the Diet, is rapidly destroying their prestige in Germany, and is making many an eye now turn to Vienna, which formerly looked for a leader of the united Fatherland in the House of Hohenzollern.

The great embarrassment which still hangs round the Austrian Government is the refusal of the Hungarians to join with the other sections of the empire in sending representatives to the Reichsrath, or Imperial Parliament. The prospect of the Hungarians foregoing their demand for a wholly separate administration is better than it was, yet still is not so great as the friends alike of Austria and of Hungary could desire. A separate administration for Hungary, while all the other parts of the empire are represented in the Reichsrath, would never work. The Hungarians must either desire it as a step towards entire separation from Austria, or else they are making a mistake. And if they desire to separate from the German, Polish, Sclavonian, and other nationalities which constitute the Austrian empire, the best or only issue to which they can look forward is union with a similar medley of certainly not superior races, in a Confederation of the Danube. We do not see what the Hungarians would gain even if the issue were accomplished in a manner the most favourable for them; but if we take into account the many formidable opposing obstacles, and the probability that the expectations of the Hungarians would be considerably disappointed, the only judgment at which we can arrive is, that the Hungarians are much better as they are, and would act wisely in frankly accepting for themselves the liberal constitution which is already in operation in the other parts of the empire. The Magyars are men of high spirit, great ability, and perhaps the most eloquent speakers in Europe. Moreover, they will count fully fourscore votes in the Reichsrath: surely, then, they need have no fear of not having their fair proportion of influence in the assembly,—the greater likelihood is that they would have too much.

The Hungarian question is a misfortune for all Europe. For, until it is settled, there can be no pacific solution of the Venetian question. As long as Hungary remains in a state of sullen rebellion, the cession of Venetia to Italy would only bring an enemy close to the heart of Austria, and permit a direct co-operation between the Hungarians and their “sympathisers” in Italy. But if Hungary were reconciled, and were again playing her part loyally as an integral portion of the Austrian empire, we believe that the Austrian Government would no longer hesitate to rid themselves of the Venetian difficulty, even though the Quadrilateral is invaluable to them as the most impregnable frontier and position in Europe.

There is still one year more in which a happy solution of both of these serious questions may be attained. Austria has still a year for negotiating with the Hungarians, without the interference of hostile Powers. Italy is in no position to provoke a conflict with Austria for the possession of Venetia. Her old “ally” France has now turned against her, so unceremoniously that even the Italian Government, so ready to hope all things, can no longer mistake the Imperial intentions. The fall of Garibaldi has removed the only fear which Napoleon had before his eyes. Garibaldi was a name of power not only in Italy, but in Europe; and it was at any time within the range of possibility that a great movement would arise under his leadership, which would either compel the French to evacuate Italy, or produce a conflict which would endanger Napoleon’s position in France, and rupture the sagacious policy by which he vibrates to and fro between despotism and revolution, without wholly breaking with either. There is no man in Italy—we might say in Europe—who can do that now. Napoleon is at ease, and snubs the Italian Government with little ceremony. For not only has Garibaldi been removed from the scene, but the prestige of Victor Emmanuel has at the same time received a serious blow. Aspromonte will never be forgotten—in many quarters never forgiven. Rattazzi has, in consequence, been ignominiously overthrown; and in Southern Italy the shooting of the great national hero has given increased force to the discontent with the King’s Government. France now kneels securely on the breast of Italy, and Napoleon does not abandon his hope of being able to break up the new kingdom, and throw Italy back into a state of disunion. There is nothing now for Italy but to improve and consolidate her internal condition, and await the course of events; which, if she play her part wisely, will force the French Emperor to come to her terms, in order that he may profit by her help. One advantage the Italians have certainly derived from recent events: they now know that they must rely only on themselves, and that they have no concessions to expect from the French Emperor but such as they can make it for his interest to yield. The Government, although receding somewhat from the bold and manly position taken up by the late Foreign Minister, General Durando,[10] has at least desisted from those vain repetitions by which it formerly hoped to soften the heart of the Emperor. They are now resolved to take the matter into their own hands, and to make themselves strong enough to enforce their rightful claims. In his address to the King on New Year’s Day, the President of the Deputies said that the Chamber was deeply impressed with the necessity of reorganising and arming the country, and did not hesitate to add—“When we have an army of 400,000 men, and a chief like you, Sire! we shall see if any Power will dare to gainsay our claims to have our own.” The Italians are in the right track now; but they will find that before they are ready to enforce the evacuation of Rome, Napoleon will anticipate a hostile collision by timeously bargaining to cede to them their capital in return for renewed co-operation between the two Governments.

In the neighbouring peninsula a revolution has taken place which startled Europe by its unexpectedness, and which may by-and-by give rise to important consequences. For the present, however, no such consequences attend the movement. The Greeks have been orderly, peaceable, and discreet; and although we entertain no doubt that this movement will ere long extend itself at the expense of Turkey, and will hasten the final disruption of the Ottoman Empire, we trust that the Greeks will continue to act with prudence, and not compromise their fortunes by hasty efforts to revive a Panhellenic kingdom. Their choice of Prince Alfred to be their new King—the founder of a dynasty whose territories would soon comprise all Greece, and the isles alike of the Adriatic and the Ægean—was a great compliment to England, and a proof that the quick sagacity of their race has survived amidst the decay of many nobler powers. It was an instinct, a universal emotion, which declared that they would have no King but Alfred of England; and that instinct was as correct as if the question had been debated in popular assembly for a twelvemonth before. Prince Alfred comes of a good stock, and has had an excellent training; and England is the Power who could, if she would, either assist or oppose the Greek revolution more effectually than any other. England is the stanchest ally of the Porte; but the Greeks knew that they could reckon also upon our still greater attachment to freedom; and, moreover, that if they did secure our alliance, they should not have to pay for it, as their neighbours in Italy had to pay France. Still more, England is commercial, full of capital and enterprise, and the Greeks might reasonably conclude that if our Prince became their King, the bleak hills and deserted harbours of the Morea would soon bloom with verdure, or teem with new life. What they will do now that they are disappointed in their hopes and unanimous desire, we do not know. It is certainly a hard thing for a people that they should be checked in the choice of a King on account of a treaty which they had no hand in making. Were Prince Alfred to become their King, his kingdom probably would ere long rise into an influential place in Europe; but certainly the vacant throne possesses no such attractions as would lead us to desire the annulment of the treaty which forbids it to be filled by an English Prince. The choice of Prince Alfred by the Greeks, however, has had the good effect of checking any dreams of ambition which may have been entertained by Russia, by inducing her to adhere to the treaty, instead of putting forward Prince Leuchtenberg as a candidate for the throne. Important as may be the issues likely to flow from this outburst of new life on the part of Greece, the only matter of any consequence to us at present is the proposed cession to it of the Ionian Islands by Her Majesty’s Government. The cession is to be made only upon certain conditions, and therefore may never take place at all. If the Greeks do not care to comply with these conditions, or if the Ionian people prefer to remain under our rule, that is their concern: and our Government will at least have given proof that its retention of the Ionian Islands does not proceed from a grasping selfishness, but simply (in fulfilment of the trust reposed in us by the other Powers in 1815) to prevent those islands falling into bad hands. In a few years hence, at most, there can hardly fail to be hostilities on the Adriatic, whether between Austria and Italy, or between the Porte and some of its provinces, not unassisted by other Powers; and in such a case our possession of the Ionian Islands would be very embarrassing to us, unless it were known and felt by every one that we remained there only in discharge of a duty to Europe which profited us nothing. Times are greatly altered since 1815: neither France nor Russia has the least chance of ever again being left in possession of Corfu and its sister islands. With a united Italy on one side of the Adriatic, and the growing maritime power of Greece on the other—States which can hardly be enemies, but ought to be firm allies—there is small chance of an extraneous Power being allowed to establish itself in the basin of the Adriatic. Nor, in these times when the principle of nationality is the foremost regulating force in politics, is it likely that Europe would remain indifferent to so flagrant a violation of that principle, as well as of common justice.

As France has her hands full in Mexico, and is waiting till the pear is ripe in Germany, we may count upon another year of peace in Europe. We regard with no jealousy the intervention of France in Mexico. It cannot possibly do us harm; and if the result of the intervention be to raise Mexico to new life and productiveness, the world may congratulate itself on the happy change. Meanwhile, it acts as a diversion, and turns the military ambition of France away from Europe; so that for another year we may take our ease or follow our industry, without fearing to be disturbed by any serious hostilities. Still there is no assured tranquillity; we shall have no Long Peace such as the last generation enjoyed; and for many years to come the country is likely to feel the advantage of keeping its naval and military resources in a state of thorough efficiency.

In a few days Parliament will meet, and already the usual rumours and speculations are current as to the programme of the Ministry. It is very safe to say that there will be nothing in the Speech from the Throne to provoke a conflict. The most prominent feature of the Speech will doubtless be the paragraphs which relate to the great distress in the manufacturing districts, and the admirable spirit with which it is borne by the sufferers and alleviated by the wise munificence of the other classes of the community. There will be an expression of regret for the continuance of the lamentable contest in America, and a hope that it will soon terminate. The country will be congratulated on the extraordinary vitality of its trade and commerce, indicated by the Board of Trade returns, despite the unparalleled disaster which has befallen our greatest branch of industry; and the commercial treaty with France will come in for another laudation. Nothing will be said of the new and indefensible policy of the Government on the Danish question; but the affairs of Greece will be alluded to in a friendly spirit. And finally, Parliament will be congratulated on our friendly relations with all foreign Powers, and the happy prospect of a year of tranquillity. It is rumoured that Mr Gladstone, with his characteristic restlessness, means to propose important changes in regard to the position of the Bank of England; and we have no confidence that the changes proposed by a statesman so crotchetty will be for the better. Although the subject is not likely to be alluded to in the Royal Speech, it appears certain that very considerable reductions are to be proposed in all branches of the national defences. If the work of retrenchment is to be accomplished in a right way, by studying economy without destroying efficiency, the country will be grateful. But if the reduction in the naval and military estimates is to be made, not by improving the organisation and administration of these departments, but by summarily cutting them down—by stopping the work in our dockyards, and dismissing trained soldiers and sailors whose places will by-and-by have to be refilled by raw recruits—it will be a recurrence to the old penny-wise pound-foolish economy which produced the breakdown and disasters of the Crimean war. Time will show. Meanwhile we rejoice to know that the Conservative party, augmented alike in numbers and in prestige, is now so powerful that it ought to be able to resist successfully any measures of wrong policy or mistaken legislation on the part of the Government. The gains and losses at the elections since the last change of Ministry show a net balance of ten seats in favour of the Conservative party—two of which are the new seats, Lancashire and Birkenhead; so that the Conservative Ministry, which was defeated in June 1859 by thirteen votes, would now, in similar circumstances, have a majority of five. But, in truth, the circumstances are _not_ similar. Reform since then has been seen through and discarded; and the feeling of the country is now so universally Conservative, that, if in office, the Conservative party would command a great majority. As it is, they are already so strong, that, when united, they can determine the judgment of the House. Happily the constitution of the State is no longer in danger. Lord Russell’s Reform Bills have had their day, and have been consigned to the limbo of vanities. The constitution of the Church, however, is still an object of virulent and persevering attack; and we trust that the Conservative party will not relax its vigilance and energy from an over-confidence in its successes of last session. Let them remember East Kent, where they threw away an important seat by sheer remissness and mismanagement, and not allow reverses to befall them in Parliament from a like cause. Church questions are now the great battle-field between Conservative and Liberal. Let the Opposition strain every nerve to convert the drawn battle in Church-rates last year into a crowning and decisive victory; so that the work of Radical innovation be finally brought to an end, and that the Conservative party may find its last difficulties vanquished even before it quits its present position on the Opposition benches, and enters upon the pleasurable responsibilities of office, which so soon await it, and of which it promises to have a long term.

_Printed by William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh._

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Footnote 1:

‘Five Months on the Yang-tsze.’ By Thomas Blakiston, Captain, R.A.

Footnote 2:

_Vide_ the confession of one of the Taeping leaders, named Tien-teh,
published in the ‘Pekin Gazette’ of May 1852.

Footnote 3:

‘Le Pere Lacordaire,’ par le Comte de Montalembert. Paris, 1862.

Footnote 4:

‘Lady Morgan’s Memoirs: Autobiography, Diaries, and Correspondence.’
London: W. H. Allen & Co.

Footnote 5:

The accession to the Swedish throne is restricted by law to the male
line, and a recent proposal to abrogate this law in favour of the
King’s only child, a daughter, has not met with success. Nevertheless,
her husband, especially if King of Denmark, would almost to a
certainty be made King also of Norway and Sweden.

Footnote 6:

‘Speculations on the Future,’ June 1856, pp. 736–7.

Footnote 7:

See M. Hall’s reply to the Prussian Government, dated Nov. 6, 1862.

Footnote 8:

The Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs rightly calls this “an
important sacrifice extorted by the force of circumstances.” For it is
to be remembered that the Diet of Frankfort has no right to interfere
with the sovereign powers of any member of the Confederation. The
final Act of Vienna describes the Confederation as composed of
“sovereign and independent” States, the union of which had precisely
for object “to guarantee the sovereign rights of each.” Accordingly,
M. Hall is right when he says (in his despatch of January 5): “The
King of Denmark is bound to fulfil faithfully his federal obligations;
but he has not surrendered to any one his right to regulate the
internal affairs of Holstein, as little as the other members of the
Confederation have done so for their States.”

Footnote 9:

In February 1861 Earl Russell wrote as follows to Lord
Cowley:—“Another plan, which was put forward in Holstein, would give
the Diets of Holstein, Schleswig, and Lauenburg equal power with
Denmark to sanction or refuse the taxes and estimates for the year.
But this plan is so cumbrous and uncertain that, if ever put into
operation, _it would only serve to paralyse the Danish monarchy_. The
Duchy of Schleswig is a Danish duchy, and although both the honour and
interest of Denmark require that Schleswig should be equitably
treated, the King of Denmark could not without danger treat with
Germany respecting the terms to be given to that duchy.”

Footnote 10:

In his circular to foreign courts on the affair of Aspromonte, General
Durando said—“The present position is no longer tenable. The whole
nation claims the capital. If Garibaldi has been resisted, it is
solely because the Government is convinced that it will attain its
end, and that France will recognise the danger of maintaining the
antagonism between the Papacy and Italy.”

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TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES

● Typos fixed; non-standard spelling and dialect retained. ● Used numbers for footnotes, placing them all at the end of the last chapter. ● Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.