Chapter II: Part 2

With Kwajalein Atoll now in American hands, a review of the next operation immediately took place. Admiral Nimitz flew there from Pearl Harbor and met with his top commanders. The 2d Marine Division, tempered in the fires of Tarawa, had earlier been alerted to prepare for a May attack on Eniwetok Atoll, 330 miles northwest of Kwajalein. The planners decided to use instead the 22d Marines (under the command of Colonel John T. Walker) and two battalions of the Army’s 106th Infantry Regiment, since they had not been needed in the quick conquest of Roi-Namur and Kwajalein. In addition, the date for the attack was jumped forward to mid-February.

The softening-up process had begun at the end of January, and the carrier air strikes increased the following month. Japanese soldiers caught in this deluge were dismayed. One wrote in his diary, “The American attacks are becoming more furious. Planes come over day after day. Can we stand up under the strain?” Another noted that “some soldiers have gone out of their minds.”

On D-Day, 17 February, the Navy’s heavy guns joined in with a thunderous shelling. Then, using secret Japanese navigation charts captured at Kwajalein, the task force moved into the huge lagoon, 17 by 21 miles in size. Brigadier General Thomas E. Watson, the Marine in overall command of some 10,000 assault troops, had the responsibility for conducting a complex series of successive maneuvers. As at Kwajalein Atoll, the artillery was sent ashore on D-Day on two tiny islets adjacent to the first key target, Engebi Island. The Marines’ 2d Separate [75mm] Pack Howitzer Battalion went to one islet, and the Army’s 104th Field Artillery Battalion went to the other. There they set up to provide supporting fire for the forthcoming infantry assault.

Department of Defense Photo (Army) 187435
]

The landing on Engebi came the next morning, D plus 1, 18 February, as the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 22d Marines headed for the beach in their amtracs. At this time there occurred “one of those pathetic episodes incident to the horrible waste of war.” As one Marine report described it:

One tank was lost in the landings. It was boated in an LCM [Landing
Craft, Medium] on which, unfortunately, only one engine was
functioning. By some mischance the lever depressing the ramp was
operated with the result that the craft began to flood rapidly
while still 500 yards offshore. The tank crew had “buttoned up” and
could gain but [a] small idea of the accident. Despite the frantic
efforts of the LCM’s crew to warn the occupants, the desperate
urgency of the situation was not appreciated. The LCM gradually
filled, listed, and finally spilled her load into the lagoon,
turning completely over. At the last possible moment, one of the
crew of the tank managed to escape as the tank actually hit bottom
forty feet down.

Department of Defense Photo (Army) 324729

_Troops of the Army’s 7th Infantry Division make the tricky transfer from their landing craft to the amphibian tractors which will now carry them in across the reef fringing Kwajalein, for the final leg of their assault of the island._]

KWAJALEIN ISLAND

1-4 FEBRUARY 1944]

Once the two battalions hit the beach, they found the core of the enemy defenses to be a palm grove in the middle of the island. This area was riddled with “spider holes,” and the American shelling had added fallen trees to the cover provided to the Japanese by the dense underbrush. Thus their positions were extremely difficult to locate. It was dangerous work for the individuals and small groups who had to take the initiative, but they did and the assault ground ahead against enemy defenses.

Department of Defense Photo (Army) 212590

_The 37mm gun provided invaluable direct fire support throughout the campaigns of the Pacific War. Here, one of the guns takes on a stubborn Japanese position on Kwajalein, reinforcing the ability of riflemen to deal with the enemy._]

Department of Defense Photo (Army) 212770
]

With these advances and some direct fire from self-propelled 105mm guns against concrete pillboxes, the whole of Engebi had been overrun by the Marines by the afternoon of D plus 1. On the following morning the American flag was raised to the sound of a Marine playing “To the Colors” on a captured Japanese bugle. An engineer company, however, spent a busy day using flamethrowers and demolitions to mop up by-passed enemy soldiers. More than 1,200 Japanese, Koreans, and Okinawans were on Engebi, and only 19 surrendered.

The main action now shifted quickly on D plus 2 to the attack on Eniwetok Island. This mission was assigned to the 1st and 3d Battalions of the Army’s 106th Infantry Regiment. When they landed, their advance was slow. Only 204 tons of naval gunfire rounds (compared to the 1,179 tons which had plastered Engebi) hit Eniwetok. “Spider hole” defenses held up their advance. A steep bluff blocked the planned inland advance of their LVTAs, resulting in a traffic jam on the beaches. Less than an hour after the initial landing, General Watson felt obliged to radio Colonel Russell G. Ayers, commanding the 106th, “Push your attack.”

Things were clearly not going as planned, for General Watson had hoped to secure Eniwetok quickly, and then have the battalions of the 106th immediately ready for an attack on the final objective, Parry Island. To speed the progress on Eniwetok, the reserve troops, the 3d Battalion of the 22d Marines, were ordered to land early in the afternoon. Moving forward, they were soon in heavy combat. Japanese soldiers who had been by-passed kept up their harassing fire; permission to bring the battalions half-track 75mm cannon ashore was flatly denied Colonel Ayers. The Marines had to take responsibility for clearing two-thirds of the southern zone on the island. Tanks were ashore but “not available,” and coconut log emplacements provided the Japanese with strong defensive positions.

Department of Defense Photo (Army) 233727

_Victorious Army soldiers relax by the ruins of a Japanese plane, smashed by the preinvasion bombardment of one of the islets adjacent to Kwajalein. One enterprising man still has the energy and the curiosity to climb on board for a look._]

Nevertheless, the attack inched forward with the repeated use of flamethrowers and satchel charges. Halting for the night several hundred yards from the tip of the island, the Marines were greeted the following morning (D plus 3) by an astonishing sight. The Army battalion supposed to be on their right flank had, without notifying the Marines, pulled back 300 yards to the rear during the night and left a large gap in the American lines. The Marines then had to stem a small but furious Japanese night counterattack. When the soldiers returned in the morning, the American attack began again, and by mid-afternoon the Marines and the Army battalion had secured the southern part of the island.

Department of Defense Photo (Navy) 218615

_A crater from U.S. Navy gunfire marks the left end of a series of Japanese trenches designed to provide mutually supporting enfillade fire against attackers. The shattered trunks of the palm trees show the effects of the Navy’s bomdardment._]

Progress was still very slow in the northern sector, so Marine tanks and engineers moved in to assist the other Army battalion there. Finally, in the afternoon of D plus 4, 21 February, the northern area was also declared secure.

With the elapse of all this time (96 hours instead of the 24 hours expected), General Watson was forced to alter his plans for the final phase of the operation: the assault on Parry. He brought down from Engebi the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 22d Marines, pulled that regiment’s other (3d) battalion off Eniwetok, and designated them for the landing on Parry.

Amidst all of this purposeful activity, the ludicrous side of war emerged in one episode. A U.S. float plane moored in the lagoon, and a boat was sent to take off the crew. Coming alongside, the boat cleverly managed to capsize the plane.

Department of Defense Photo (Navy) 217679

_Waves of amtracs, each one crammed with Marines uncertain of what they will find when they hit the beach, churn in for the assault of Engebi on 18 February 1944. They are hoping to find an enemy dazed by the preparatory artillery fire._]

The exact timing of an amphibious assault is a crucial decision based on a delicate balancing of a host of factors, such as the condition of the troops and their equipment, provision of fire support, etc. General Watson decided to hold off the landing on Parry until D plus 5 (22 February). An official report explained the reasons for the delay:

(a) To rehabilitate and reorganize [the battalion of the 22d
Marines] which had been in action for three successive days.

(b) To reembark, repair, and service medium tanks and rest their
crews.

(c) To make light tanks, which were still engaged on Eniwetok,
available for the assault on Parry Island if required.

(d) To provide one [battalion] of the 106th Infantry as support
reserve in the event it was required.

(e) To allow additional time for the air and surface bombardment of
Parry.

Awaiting the amtracs of the 22d Marines, the Japanese commander on the island issued a very succinct order to his troops:

At the edge of the water scatter and divide the enemy infantry
in their boats--attack and annihilate each one. Launch cleverly
prepared powerful quick thrusts and vivid sudden attacks, and after
having attacked and having destroyed the enemy landing forces,
first of all, then scatter and break up their groups of boats and
ships. In the event that the enemy succeeds in making a landing
annihilate him by means of night attacks.

The enemy plans to “annihilate” failed. For two days before the Marine assault, the Navy had moved its big guns in as close as 850 yards offshore and pounded the defenders with 944 tons of shells. This was supplemented by artillery fire from the neighboring islands and rocket fire from the gunboats as the Marines went in. This rain of shells crept ahead of the tanks and infantrymen as they tenaciously slogged their way across the island.

ENIWETOK
(DOWNSIDE)
ATOLL

_The capture of this atoll followed a carefully planned sequence, using a variety of geographic points: (1) entrance of U.S. ships into the lagoon through Wide Passage in the south and Deep Entrance in the southeast; (2) artillery set up on “Camellia” and “Canna” in the northeast; (3) landing on Engebi in the north; (4) landing on Eniwetok in the south; and, finally (5) landing on Parry in the southeast._]

As always, there was the unexpected. When a shell from a U.S. warship hit directly on top of an underground bunker, all the Japanese inside poured out and ran--of all places--into the sea. Another shell hurled a coconut tree aloft and catapulted the body of an enemy sniper from its branches through the air to his death.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 303037
]

For the assault troops, it was a continuing story of “spider holes,” tunnels, underground strong points, and enemy resistance to the death. Another young Marine, Second Lieutenant Cord Meyer, Jr., in his first combat fought on both Eniwetok and Parry. The grueling experiences he had were typical of everyone who took part in these battles. He was landed with his machine gun platoon in the second wave of assault troops, three minutes after the first men to hit the beach on Eniwetok. Moving quickly inland, the platoon came to the edge of a blasted coconut grove. Then, as the lieutenant later wrote home:

We were hard hit there, and with terrible clarity the reality of
the event came home to me. I had crawled forward to ask a Marine
where the Japs were--pretty excited really and enjoying it almost
like a game. I crawled up beside him but he wouldn’t answer. Then I
saw the ever widening pool of dark blood by his head and knew that
he was dying or dead. So it came over me what this war was, and
after that it wasn’t fun or exciting, but something that had to be
done.

Fortune smiled on me that day, or the hand of a Divine Providence
was over me, or I was just plain lucky. We killed many of them in
fighting that lasted to nightfall. We cornered fifty or so Imperial
[Japanese] Marines on the end of the island, where they attempted
a banzai charge, but we cut them down like overripe wheat, and they
lay like tired children with their faces in the sand.

That night was unbelievably terrible. There were many of them left
and they all had one fanatical notion, and that was to take one of
us with them. We dug in with orders to kill anything that moved. I
kept watch in a foxhole with my sergeant, and we both stayed awake
all night with a knife in one hand and a grenade in the other.
They crept in among us, and every bush or rock took on sinister
proportions. They got some of us, but in the morning they all lay
about, some with their riddled bodies actually inside our foxholes.
With daylight it was easy for us and we finished them off. Never
have I been so glad to see the blessed sun.

With that battle over, the lieutenant and his men were hustled back on ship. For a day and a night they were “desperately trying” to get their gear into proper shape to go right back into combat. The following morning, they went in on the attack on Parry.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 72434

_Poised in a shallow trench, riflemen of the 22d Marines await the order to attack an enemy coconut-log strongpoint on Eniwetok. While the most of the men are carrying M1 rifles, the flamethrower in their midst may well prove crucial._]

They found the beach was swept with machine-gun and mortar fire, but they surged inland over ruined, shell-blasted soil rocked by the continual mortar bursts. Then their captain suddenly pointed, and above the brush line they saw 150 or so men bending forward, moving on a parallel course about 50 yards away. The Marines, however, waved, thinking that they must be fellow Marines. The men paid little attention to the Marines and seemed to be setting up machine guns. The realization struck home: they were Japanese.

Department of Defense Photo (Navy) 80-K-100
]

The lieutenant by now had just half a platoon of men and two machine guns. They set the guns up and started firing at the enemy. One gun jammed, so they buried the parts in the sand, because they thought that the Japanese would charge and they couldn’t possibly stop it or prevent the capture of the gun. When they didn’t attack, the Marines moved in against them. The two sides threw grenades back and forth for what seemed like hours. Many were killed on both sides. Finally the lieutenant and his men threw a whole volley of grenades and charged in and got to the beach. Down it they could see a whole group of Japanese, so all 12 of the Marines, standing, kneeling, or lying prone, fired their rifles and carbines. The enemy fell like ducks in a shooting gallery, but still they closed in on the little group of Marines who then had to back away.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 149144

_In one of the classic photographs of the Pacific War, dog-tired and battle-grime-coated Marines, thankful to be off the island and still alive, relax with a hot cup of coffee on board ship after victoriously ending the bruising fight for Eniwetok._]

Now the lieutenant continued his story:

But we got some tanks and reinforcements some half hour later and
moved through them in skirmish line, which brings this tale to the
most extraordinary incident of all. I was following some ten yards
behind the tanks, when a Jap officer came out of a hole pointing
his pistol at me; so instinctively I shot my carbine from the hip
and hit him full in the face. I walked forward and looked into the
trench and saw another with his arm cocked to throw a grenade. He
didn’t see me. I was only six feet away. I pulled the trigger but
the weapon was jammed with sand. I had to do something, so I took
my carbine by the barrel and hit him with all my might at the base
of the neck. It broke his neck and my carbine.

Finally we killed them all. They never surrender. Again the night
was a bad one, but with the dawn came complete victory, and those
of us who still walked without a wound looked in amazement at our
whole bodies. There was not much jubilation. We just sat and stared
at the sand, and most of us thought of those who were gone--those
whom I shall remember as always young, smiling, and graceful,
and I shall try to forget how they looked at the end, beyond all
recognition....

The lieutenant’s letter went on to praise his men:

They obeyed with an unquestioning courage. One of my section
leaders was hit by a bullet in his arm. It spun him clear around
and set him down on his behind. A little dazed, he sat there for
a second and then jumped up with the remark, “The little bastards
will have to hit me with more than that.” I had to order him back
to the dressing station an hour later. He was weak with loss of
blood but actually pleaded to stay.

My runner was knocked down right beside me with three bullet holes
in him and blood all over his face. Stupidly I said, “Are you hit,
boy?” He was crying a little, being just a kid of eighteen, and
said, “I’m sorry, sir. I guess I’m just a sissy.” I damn near cried
myself at that.

And so it went all through the day, but by evening it was nearly all over. Early the next morning (D plus 6, 23 February) Parry was completely in American hands, and the conquest of Eniwetok Atoll’s vital objectives was complete. Some 3,400 Japanese had been eliminated there at a cost of 348 American dead and 866 wounded.

Mopping up operations on many of the tiny islets in the Marshalls continued until 24 April. The troops encountered a few scattered Japanese soldiers--quickly dispatched--and an oddity. On one atoll they found a German who had married a native woman and had lived there since he had originally been shipwrecked in 1891. One of the obscure atolls was later to become famous as a U.S. nuclear testing ground, and as a name given to a sensational new woman’s bathing suit: Bikini.

The 22d Marines had performed superbly. Recognition of their achievements came in the form of a Navy Unit Commendation, which praised its “sustained endurance, fortitude, and fighting spirit throughout this operation.”

Thus the Marshall Islands operations were successfully concluded. With relatively light American casualties, a big step had been taken in the Central Pacific campaign. U.S. forces were now within 1,100 miles of their next objective, the Mariana Islands. The timetable for that leap was moved up by at least 20 weeks. The 2d Marine Division and the remainder of the Army’s 27th Division were now free for that operation, since they were not needed in the Marshalls. The basic techniques for victorious amphibious assaults were now clearly proven. Another large contingent of American troops had received its baptism of fire, and the Americans had broken the outer ring of Japan’s Central Pacific defenses with impressive skill and courage.

[Sidebar (page 22): Brigadier General Thomas E. Watson

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 11986
]

Commander of Tactical Group-1 built on the 22d Marines, he led the conquest of Eniwetok. For this he was awarded a Distinguished Service Medal. Promoted to major general, he received a second DSM for his service while commanding the 2d Marine Division at Saipan and Tinian. He retired in 1950.

With a birth date of 1892, and an enlistment date of 1912, he fully qualified as a member of “the Old Corps.” After being commissioned in 1916, he served in a variety of Marine assignments in the Caribbean, China, and the United States.

Given the nickname “Terrible Tommy,” Watson’s proverbial impatience was later characterized by General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., as follows: “He would not tolerate for one minute stupidity, laziness, professional incompetence, or failure in leadership.... His temper in correcting these failings could be fiery and monumental.” And so, both Marine and Army officers found out at Eniwetok and later Saipan! ]

[Sidebar (page 26): The Deadly Spider Holes

Later accounts explained what the Marines ran into at Engebi--and what they did to keep their advance moving forward.

Those defenses were of the “spider web” type to which there were many entrances. They were constructed by knocking out the heads of empty gasoline drums and making an impromptu pipeline of them, sunk into the ground and covered with earth and palm fronds. The tunnels thus constructed branched off in several directions from a central pit and the whole emplacement was usually concealed with great skill and ingenuity. If the main position was spotted and attacked the riflemen within could crawl off fifty feet or so down one of the corridors and emerge at an entirely different and unexpected spot from which they could get off a shot and dive down to concealment before it was possible to determine whence the fire proceeded. Every foot of ground had to be gone over with the greatest precaution and alertness before these honeycombs of death could be silenced by the literal process of elimination.

The attacking Marines soon hit upon a method of destroying completely these underground defenses. When the bunker at the center of the web had been located, a member of the assault team would hurl a smoke grenade inside. Although this type of missile did no harm to the Japanese within, it released a cloud of vapor which rolled through the tunnels and escaped around the loosefitting covers of the foxholes.

Once the outline of the web was known, the bunker and all its satellite positions could be shattered with demolitions. ]

[Sidebar (page 28):

The Secretary of the Navy
Washington

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

Twenty-Second Marines, Reinforced, Tactical Group One, Fifth Amphibious Corps

consisting of

Twenty-second Marines; Second Separate Pack Howitzer Company;
Second Separate Tank Company; Second Separate Engineer Company;
Second Separate Medical Company; Second Separate Motor Transport
Company; Fifth Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance Company; Company
D, Fourth Tank Battalion, Fourth Marine Division; 104th Field
Artillery Battalion, U.S. Army; Company C, 766th Tank Battalion,
U.S. Army; Company A, 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion, U.S. Army;
Company D, 708th Provisional Amphibian Tractor Battalion, U.S.
Army; and the Provisional DUKW Battery, Seventh Infantry Division,
U.S. Army.

for service as follows:

“For outstanding heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces
during the assault and capture of Eniwetok Atoll, Marshall
Islands, from February 17 to 22, 1944. As a unit of a Task Force,
assembled only two days prior to departure for Eniwetok Atoll, the
Twenty-second Marines, Reinforced, landed in whole or in part on
Engebi, Eniwetok and Parry Islands in rapid succession and launched
aggressive attacks in the face of heavy machine-gun and mortar fire
from well camouflaged enemy dugouts and foxholes. With simultaneous
landings and reconnaissance missions on numerous other small
islands, they overcame all resistance within six days, destroying
a known 2,665 of the Japanese and capturing 66 prisoners. By their
courage and determination, despite the difficulties and hardships
involved in repeated reembarkations and landing from day to day,
these gallant officers and men made available to our forces in the
Pacific Area an advanced base with large anchorage facilities and
an established airfield, thereby contributing materially to the
successful conduct of the war. Their sustained endurance, fortitude
and fighting spirit throughout this operation reflect the highest
credit on the Twenty-second Marines, Reinforced, and on the United
States Naval Service.”

All personnel attached to and serving with any of the above units during the period February 17 to 22, 1944, are authorized to wear the Navy Unit Commendation Ribbon. ]

_Sources_

All of the basic Marine histories for World War II contain detailed accounts of the Marshalls operation. This monograph represents a summary, supplemented by individual experiences drawn from the Personal Papers and Oral Histories Collections in the Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

Among the most useful were: 1stLt John C. Chapin, USMCR, _The 4th Marine Division in World War II_ (Washington: Historical Division, HQMC, 1945); LtCol Robert D. Heinl, Jr., USMC, and LtCol John A. Crown, USMC, _The Marshalls: Increasing the Tempo_ (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1954); Historical Division, HQMC. “The Marshall Islands Operations.” Unpublished draft, n.d. World War II--Marshall Islands Records File. Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C.; LtCol S. L. A. Marshall, AUS, _Island Victory_ (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1944); Carl W. Proehl, ed., _The Fourth Marine Division in World War II_ (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946); Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Bernard C. Nalty, and Edwin T. Turnbladh, _Central Pacific Drive--History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II_, vol 3 (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1966).

In the Personal Papers Collection Unit, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C., the following files have been useful: First Lieutenant John C. Chapin (PC 671); Master Sergeant Roger M. Emmons (PC 304); Private First Class Robert F. Graf (PC 1946); Princeton University Collection (PC 2216).

Transcripts of interviews in Oral History Collection, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C.: BGen William W. Buchanan; BGen Melvin L. Krulewitch; Col William P. McCahill; MajGen William W. Rogers; LtGen James L. Underhill.

_Other Titles_

The following pamphlets in the Marines in World War II Commemorative Series are now in print: _Opening Moves: Marines Gear Up For War_; _Infamous Day: Marines at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941_; _First Offensive: The Marine Campaign for Guadalcanal_; _Outpost in the North Atlantic: Marines in the Defense of Iceland_; _A Magnificent Fight: Marines in the Battle for Wake Island_; _Across the Reef: The Marine Assault of Tarawa_; _Up the Slot: Marines in the Central Solomons_; _Time of the Aces: Marine Pilots in the Solomons, 1942-1944_.

_About the Author_

Captain John C. Chapin earned a bachelor of arts degree with honors in history from Yale University in 1942 and was commissioned later that year. He served as a rifle-platoon leader in the 24th Marines, 4th Marine Division, and was wounded in action during assault landings on Roi-Namur and Saipan.

Transferred to duty at the Historical Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, he wrote the first official histories of the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions. Moving to Reserve status at the end of World War II, he earned a master’s degree in history at George Washington University with a thesis on “The Marine Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1922.”

Now a captain in retired status, he has been a volunteer at the Marine Corps Historical Center for 10 years. During that time, he wrote _History of Marine Fighter-Attack (VMFA) Squadron 115_. With support from the Historical Center and the Marine Corps Historical Foundation, he then spent some years researching and interviewing for the writing of a new book. _Uncommon Men--The Sergeants Major of the Marine Corps_. This was published in 1992 by the White Mane Publishing Company.

THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in the World War II era, is published for the education and training of Marines by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., as a part of the U.S. Department of Defense observance of the 50th anniversary of victory in that war.

Editorial costs of preparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part by a bequest from the estate of Emilie H. Watts, in memory of her late husband, Thomas M. Watts, who served as a Marine and was the recipient of a Purple Heart.

WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

_DIRECTOR Of MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS_
=Brigadier General Edwin K. Simmons, USMC (Ret)=

_GENERAL EDITOR,
WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES_
=Benis M. Frank=

_CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANT_
=George C. MacGillivray=

_EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION_
=Robert E. Struder=, Senior Editor;
=W. Stephen Hill=, Visual Information Specialist;
=Catherine A. Kerns=, Composition Services Technician

Marine Corps Historical Center
Building 58, Washington Navy Yard
Washington, D.C. 20374-5040

=1994=

PCN 190 003124 00

Transcriber’s Notes

Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.

Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced quotation marks retained.

To make this eBook easier to read, particularly on handheld devices, most images have been made relatively larger than in the original pamphlet, and centered, rather than offset to one side or the other; and some were placed a little earlier or later than in the original. Sidebars in the original have been repositioned between chapters and identified as “[Sidebar (page nn):”, where the page reference is to the original location in the source book. In the Plain Text version, the matching closing right bracket follows the last line of the Sidebar’s text and is on a separate line to make it more noticeable. In the HTML versions, that bracket follows the colon, and each Sidebar is displayed within a box.

Page 11: “infantry went into investigate” was printed that way; probably should be “in to”.

Page 13 (Sidebar “Naval Support”, originally on page 7): “BB 13” is a misprint for “BB 43”.