Chapter XIII: Part 13

Text size

On the night of the 7th, therefore, the bridge was repaired sufficiently to enable the garrison to evacuate the place; and the troops filed across the river. Two Dutch battalions were the last to leave the place under the Dutch General Haak, who, most improperly, was the first man of his nation to set foot on the bridge. As he did so, a shot struck one of the pontoons with some effect, whereupon he immediately ran across the bridge crying out that all was lost, and reported with shameless mendacity that all his troops had passed over except the rear-guard. Upon this the pontoon-bridge was immediately fired, since a flying bridge had already been prepared for the passage of the rear-guard. As luck would have it, however, a shot from the French batteries cut the hawser; the flying bridge began to swing round; and, to save it from running foul of the kindled boats, the sailors dropped the anchor and so brought it up. When the burning pontoons had floated away, some British seamen, who were employed on the bridge, were for cutting it adrift, but the Dutchmen would not allow them to do so, preferring certain capture to the risk of a few cannon-shot. Thus eleven hundred of them were taken, either through their own cowardice or through that of Haak—a lamentable occurrence in an army which in the past had approved itself to be of incomparable steadfastness and valour.[284]

The Duke, therefore, now held the line of the Waal including the Bommeler Waert, and might well hope to hold it, if the Dutch did their duty, until the army went into winter quarters. He had already put most of his cavalry into cantonments across the Yssel, but the Dutch threw every possible obstacle in the way of providing for the comfort of the troops. The weather too grew wintry, and the men, miserably clothed and housed in open barns, began to fall down very fast from cold and typhus fever. None of them had greatcoats except some of the Guards, Fourteenth, Thirty-seventh, and Fifty-third, who had received those which had been provided by public subscription in 1793, and which were now worn out. Flannel waistcoats had been supplied to the rest by their officers, who had subscribed over a thousand pounds for the purpose; and it appears that, without exaggeration, they had little other clothing. Sheer nakedness, in fact, had been the cause of much, though not of all, of the plundering that had disgraced the army; and this evil had been aggravated by the bitter hostility of the inhabitants towards the British. Not content with resenting real outrages, which were far too abundant, they never ceased flying to the Duke with frivolous and groundless complaints; and so disobliging were the authorities that Lord St. Helens, Ambassador at the Hague, tried for two months in vain to find places where the British might be allowed to establish additional hospitals. ◆Nov. 27.◆ On the 27th of November the infantry in British pay numbered twenty-one thousand and the sick nearly eleven thousand; and when a man was ordered to hospital his comrades would exclaim, “Ah, poor fellow, we shall see thee no more, for thou art under orders for the shambles.” On one occasion five hundred invalids were embarked from Arnheim in barges under charge of a single surgeon’s mate, without sufficient provisions, without even sufficient straw, and brought to Rhenen, where they were left on board for want of sufficient space to admit them to the hospital. A Dutch gentleman counted at one time the bodies of forty-two men who had thus perished of neglect in the barges and had been thrown out dead on to the bank. Meanwhile the rascals who bore the name of surgeon’s mates charged forty thousand pounds for wine for the sick, and, not content with robbing the State by themselves drinking what was supplied, actually plundered the helpless patients committed to their care. Such was the economy of Dundas’s military administration—to obtain recruits by the offer of lavish bounties, to break down their health by giving them insufficient clothing, and to contract with scoundrels so to maltreat them, medically, that they should not recover.[285]

Fortunately for himself the Duke of York was summoned home on the 27th of November to hold personal communication[286] with Ministers; and indeed it seemed as if the campaign were ended. Upon his departure he placed the British troops under Lieutenant-general Harcourt, and the foreign troops in British pay under Lieutenant-general Walmoden, apparently dividing the supreme command between the two. This arrangement was evidently due to the Duke’s unwillingness to subject the British to the Hanoverian Walmoden, who was senior to Harcourt; but, even so, it seems to be absolutely indefensible. The French, being exhausted by the campaign, went into temporary cantonments, Moreau’s division on the west bank of the Rhine over against the line from Wesel to Emmerick, Souham’s in and about Nimeguen, Bonnaud’s between the Meuse and the Waal, and the remainder about Bois-le-Duc and Grave. The Allies were distributed along the north bank of the Waal from Tiel eastward to the Pannarden Canal, which connects the Waal with the Leck (as the Rhine from Arnheim downward is called), the Dutch taking charge of the Bommeler Waert. Eastward from the Pannarden Canal to Wesel the Allied left was to be covered by thirty thousand Austrians under General Alvintzy, which Clerfaye, on the instance of Henry Dundas, agreed to furnish for a payment of one hundred thousand pounds a month.

The Allies’ line of defence seems to have been wrongly chosen, for, owing to the Pannarden Canal, the mass of the waters of the Waal was returned into the Leck, from which cause the Leck was less liable to be frozen. Harcourt had endeavoured to establish a second bridge over the Rhine besides that of the Arnheim, but the Dutch, from malice or negligence, obstructed the forwarding of the materials, as indeed they obstructed everything that might help the British. Altogether the situation was not a happy one, for, though rain had fallen continuously from the beginning of November, there was no saying when a frost might set in and turn the rivers into stable ice. Moreover, Moreau, roused by orders from Paris, became active again. ◆Dec. 11.◆ On the 11th of December the French crossed the Waal in boats at several different points to the attack of the Allied posts, and, though beaten back, left behind them an unpleasant sense of insecurity.[287]

On the 16th Pichegru returned and resumed the command, ◆Dec. 18.◆ and on the 18th the weather changed from rain to a severe frost. In a very few days the Maas and Waal were full of floating ice, which began to pack together, threatening to cover the whole breadth of their streams; while on the Leck the rapidity of the current swept away the bridge of boats at Arnheim. Harcourt, foreseeing that before long the ice on the Waal would become passable by the enemy, prepared to retreat northward. Just at this most critical moment, moreover, there arrived orders from Dundas that seven British battalions of his army were required for service elsewhere; that of these seven the Fortieth, Forty-fourth, and Sixty-third must march to Helvoetsluys at once; and that Alvintzy, who so far had thrown every possible difficulty in the way of co-operation with the Allies, must find troops to take their place. Further, it was now ascertained that the Dutch had gone far in negotiation with the French, and there were strong rumours that an armistice had been concluded between them. Meanwhile the cold increased; sentries were frozen at their posts; and the ice on the Waal, in front of the Allies, became strong enough to give passage to the French, while that on the Leck in their rear, though thick enough to prevent the passage of boats, was too thin to bear cavalry or artillery. Harcourt’s anxiety was extreme; and he begged Dundas urgently for some further instructions as to the duty expected of him, since the order to weaken the force by sending home seven battalions was not in itself of any great assistance.

◆Dec. 27.◆

Affairs were in this condition when, on the 27th, the French crossed the Meuse on the ice to the Bommeler Waert, surprised the Dutch posts there, and pushed on by Bommel over the frozen Waal to Tuil. The Dutch at this place fled instantly without firing a shot, some of the fugitives running on even to Utrecht. At Meteren, a few miles north of Tuil, the French were checked by the Hessians; but, with their right flank exposed by the flight of the Dutch, it was doubtful whether these could maintain their position. ◆Dec. 28.◆ Their commander, however, General Dalwig, decided to stand fast, and ascertained by reconnaissance next day that the French did not exceed two thousand men; whereupon Walmoden ordered ten battalions and six squadrons of British and Emigrants under David Dundas to Geldermalsen, a short distance north of Meteren, in the hope of annihilating this foolhardy French detachment. ◆Dec. 30.◆ Accordingly, at one o’clock on the morning of the 30th, the force moved out from Meteren in three columns, two of them to move direct upon Tuil from the north and north-east, while the third, under Lord Cathcart, fetched a compass to close in upon the enemy from the west. Cathcart’s column unfortunately found the roads impassable and never came into action; but Dundas nevertheless attacked without him, and drove the French, after a sharp fight, from their entrenchments and across the Waal, with the loss of four guns and many killed and wounded, while his own casualties did not exceed fifty. This checked the ardour of the enemy for the moment, and during a few days there was peace upon the Waal.[288]

Walmoden now reinforced his right about Tuil, for the news had reached him that the fortresses of Gertruydenburg ◆1795.◆ and Heusden, on the extreme right of the Allied line, were in serious danger; ◆Jan. 3.◆ and on the 3rd of January 1795 he shifted his quarters to Amerongen, due north of Tiel, and on the north bank of the Leck. Grave at this same time capitulated, and released a large number of French troops for the field. Moreau’s division therefore took up cantonments over against Alvintzy’s corps from Xanten down the Rhine to the Pannarden Canal. Souham’s division, now transferred to Macdonald, occupied the space between the Meuse and Waal as far as the point opposite to Tiel; two more divisions were in the Bommeler Waert, and yet two more about Gertruydenburg and Breda. On the 3rd of January the weather again became intensely cold, Jan. 4.◆ and at noon on the 4th two French detachments from the Bommeler Waert marched over the ice, drove in the posts before Tuil and at Hesselt, a little to the east of it, after hard fighting, and thus gained a passage by which they could move westward on the north bank of the Waal. ◆Jan. 5.◆ On the following day the French attacked Tuil itself, whereupon the Dutch gunners at once fled from their batteries on the river; but, advancing from thence against Geldermalsen, the enemy was repulsed with some loss by the Thirty-third, Forty-second, and Seventy-eighth, under the direction of General David Dundas. It was, however, plain that these posts could not be held against a strong attack so long as frost practically neutralised their natural defences; and Walmoden recalled Dundas and all the troops in that quarter to the north side of the Leck, in order to take up a new line of cantonments extending from Arnheim on the east by Wageningen, Reenen, Amerongen, and Wyk-by-Duurstede to Honswyk.

◆Jan. 6.◆

A sudden thaw on the 6th offered hopes of re-establishing the old position on the Waal, and orders were issued on the 7th for a reconnaissance in force of the whole line of the French posts on the following day; ◆Jan. 8.◆ but on the morning of the 8th the frost abruptly set in again, though not before the troops were already in motion beyond power of recall. On the right, Dundas succeeded in driving the enemy from their posts on the Linge to the Waal, and in recovering Buren and Tiel. The brunt of the work fell upon the Fourteenth, Twenty-seventh, and Twenty-eighth under Lord Cathcart; and these drove the enemy in succession from the villages of Buurmalsen and Geldermalsen and captured a gun, not, however, without a loss of one hundred and thirty men to themselves. On the left the orders seem to have miscarried, probably through the confusion due to divided command. ◆Jan. 10.◆ Before the operation could be carried any further, Pichegru, finding that the ice on the Waal was stronger than ever, on the 10th fell upon the Allied line in great force at three different points between the Pannarden Canal and Tiel. The attack was repulsed upon the right, but the Austrians were forced back on the left flank, and Walmoden ordered the whole force to withdraw once more behind the Leck. This was effected with little loss; Colonel Coote’s brigade of the Fortieth, Fiftieth, and Seventy-ninth being the only British forces severely engaged. Walmoden had fully intended to continue the retreat eastward across the Yssel; but Lord St. Helens, at the Hague, unfortunately protested against this, and another thaw enabled Walmoden to acquiesce. On the night of the 12th frost again set in more severely than ever, and on the 14th the French attacked along the whole line from Arnheim to Reenen. ◆Jan. 15.◆ They were beaten back with heavy loss; but Walmoden, feeling that he was unable to hold his ground, on the following morning gave the order for a further retreat.

The days that followed are amongst the most tragical in the history of the Army. During November and December the discipline of the troops in Holland had greatly improved, but with the coming of the frost and the hardships that attended the constant alarms and marches on the Waal, it had once more broken down completely. Certain regiments of French emigrants, which had joined the army late in the year, were the worst offenders; but it seems certain that some of the British were not far behind them. The country to the north of Arnheim is at the best of times an inhospitable waste, and there were few dwellings and few trees to give shelter or fuel after a dreary march through dense and chilling mist over snow twice thawed and refrozen. Marauders from the regiments of every nationality swarmed round the columns; the drivers of the waggons freed themselves from all control, and the line of march was disorderly beyond description. When the day was ended, the troops of different nations fought for such scanty comforts as were to be found; and once there was a pitched battle between the Guards and the Hessians, who had been on bad terms with each other from the beginning of the campaign. Day after day the cold steadily increased; and those of the army that woke on the morning of the 17th of January saw about them such a sight as they never forgot. Far as the eye could reach over the whitened plain were scattered gun-limbers, waggons full of baggage, of stores, or of sick men, sutlers’ carts and private carriages. Beside them lay the horses, dead; around them scores and hundreds of soldiers, dead; here a straggler who had staggered on to the bivouac and dropped to sleep in the arms of the frost; there a group of British and Germans round an empty rum-cask; here forty English Guardsmen huddled together about a plundered waggon; there a pack-horse with a woman lying alongside it, and a baby, swathed in rags, peeping out of the pack, with its mother’s milk turned to ice upon its lips,—one and all stark, frozen, dead. Had the retreat lasted but three or four days longer, not a man would have escaped; and the catastrophe would have found a place in history side by side with the destruction of the host of Sennacherib and with the still more terrible disaster of the retreat from Moscow.[289]

◆Jan. 19.◆

By the 19th the surviving fragments of the battalions reached their destination on the Yssel, where they were cantoned on the west side of the river from Zutphen to the sea. But there was no hope of long repose for them there. Harcourt perceived clearly that the re-embarkation of his force was now the only resource left to him, and that the place of embarkation must be on the Weser, since the lack of supplies and the incapacity of his commissariat-officers would inevitably forbid him to remain long on the Ems. Within a week, want of victuals and the hostility of the inhabitants compelled him to continue his retreat from the Yssel; ◆Jan. 27–29.◆ and on the 27th the march eastward was resumed, the main body of the British retiring towards Osnabrück, the Germans upon Münster. One detachment of British,[290] however, was sent northward under Lord Cathcart’s command to fetch a compass through West Friesland and along the borders of Groningen, in order to ascertain whether the people of these provinces were as ill-affected as their fellows towards the House of Orange. By whose orders this isolated force was despatched upon such an errand is uncertain; it is only known that the column was followed up and incessantly harassed by the enemy, and that it was not very successful in discovering friendly sentiments among the Dutch. Upon reaching the Ems, the army halted, and on the 5th February took up cantonments on the western bank of the river, Cathcart on the extreme north guarding the passes of the Bourtanger Moor from the Dollart southward, while Abercromby fixed his headquarters further to south and west of the river at Bentheim, and the Hanoverians retired to Münster.

The state of the troops by this time was worse than ever, for thousands of sick had perforce been left behind on the Yssel. “Your army is destroyed,” wrote Walmoden to the Duke of York; “the officers, their carriages, and a large train are safe, but the men are destroyed. The army has now no more than six thousand fighting men, but it has all the drawbacks of thirty-three battalions, and consumes a vast quantity of forage.” A more terrible reproach was never yet levelled against any force; nevertheless it was rather the politicians than the military commanders who had made such a reproach possible, by flinging commissions broadcast to any man or even child who could afford to satisfy the crimps. Upon entering German territory the men met with kindlier treatment from the inhabitants; but the infamous conduct of the French Emigrant Corps threatened to turn the Germans also into enemies. It now became abundantly clear that most of these regiments were simply frauds, imposed upon the English Ministers by a band of unscrupulous adventurers. But the English army, of course, had to bear the burden of their sins; and the Hanoverians and Hessians, naturally espousing the cause of their countrymen, turned upon the British with a bitterness which destroyed all cohesion between the nations of the Allies.[291]

Meanwhile the French, after leaving their opponents to retreat unmolested from the Leck, resumed their advance, and at the end of January occupied Kampen and Zwolle on the Yssel. They made, however, no attempt to hinder the further retirement of the Allies; and their movements for the next fortnight were of the most leisurely description. Then arrived rumours of a French understanding with Prussia, of the neutralisation of North Germany, and of a line of demarcation to be drawn according to the actual territory occupied by the opposing armies. The French at once woke to the importance of gaining immediate possession of Groningen and East Friesland, and General Macdonald’s corps was detached to invade Groningen, while those of Moreau and Vandamme remained in observation on the Yssel. ◆Feb. 27.◆ On the 19th of February Macdonald occupied the town of Groningen, and thence turning eastward he, on the 27th, attacked Cathcart’s fortified posts at Winschoten. He was repulsed; ◆March 1.◆ but two days later the attack was renewed with success by General Reynier, and Cathcart was forced to retreat, which he did with great dexterity, crossing the Ems upon the 3rd. ◆March 3.◆ The entire British force then fell back to the east bank of the Ems to hold the line from Emden to Rheine, headquarters being fixed at Osnabrück.

Five days later the British Cabinet at last decided to withdraw its troops from the Continent, ◆March 11.◆ and on the 11th Harcourt, to his infinite relief, received intimation that transports for twenty-three thousand men were on their way to him. The Hanoverians were in consternation over the danger to which Hanover was exposed by this measure, but there was no help for it. ◆March 16.◆ A few days later Prussian troops arrived to hold the line of the Ems, and on the 22nd the British began their march to Bremen for embarkation. The Prussians did their utmost by obstruction, discourtesy, and insolence to disoblige them on their passage through the country; but this was natural, for they had always professed contempt for the British as a nation of traders, and a tradesman is never so despicable to a dishonest customer as when he refuses to grant him further credit. ◆April 14.◆ Finally, on the 14th of April, the infantry and part of the artillery took ship for England, leaving the remainder of the artillery and the whole of the cavalry behind them under Lord Cathcart and David Dundas. The number embarked was nearly fifteen thousand, some proportion of the sick having been recovered; so that the losses after the retreat from the Leck must have amounted to about six thousand men, of which not a tithe were killed or wounded in action. Thus disgracefully ended the first expedition of Pitt and Dundas to the Low Countries.

AUTHORITIES.—The British despatches relating to the expeditions to Flanders will be found in _W.O. Orig. Corresp._ 46–48, and in Entry Book No. 11. The number of private letters included in this collection makes it of unusual value. For the campaigns at large the best accounts known to me are in Ditfurth’s _Die Hessen in den Feldzügen, 1793, 1794, und 1795_ (Kassel, 1839), and in Witzleben’s _Prinz Friedrich Josias von Coburg-Saalfeld_ (Berlin, 1859), which is not a little built upon Ditfurth, but contains much that is valuable of its own and a superb atlas of maps. On the French side the short memoir of David and the life of Pichegru are of little worth compared with the narrative of Jomini. Marshal Macdonald’s _Mémoires_ are disappointing at this period. Of English printed accounts the most important is Jones’s _Historical Journal of the British Campaign in 1794_. The _Journal_ of Corporal James Brown of the Coldstream Guards supplies a few interesting details. Sir H. Calvert’s _Journal and Correspondence_ is often of value; and there is a great deal of most useful information in the foot-notes to the miserable doggerel called the _Narrative of an Officer of the Guards_. Unfortunately the author, like Brown and Calvert, was a Coldstreamer, for which reason all three confine themselves chiefly to the doings of the brigade of Guards. The regimental histories of the 14th Foot and 15th Hussars have occasionally interesting material, but, taken altogether, the regimental records are disappointing.

THE END

_Printed by_ R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, _Edinburgh_.

THE NETHERLANDS in the 18th Century.

_Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._
]

By the Hon. J. W. FORTESCUE

A
HISTORY OF THE BRITISH ARMY

With numerous Maps and Plans.

8 vo.

Vols I. and II. =To the Close of the Seven Years’ War.= 18s. net each.

Vol. III. =To the Second Peace of Paris.= 18s. net.

Vol. IV. =From the Fall of the Bastille to the Peace of Amiens.=
In Two Parts and a separate volume of Maps. 42s. net.

Vol. V. =From the Renewal of the War to the Evacuation of Rio de la Plata (1803–1807).= 18s. net.

Vol. VI. =From the Expedition to Egypt, 1807, to the Battle of Coruña, Jan. 1809.= 18s. net.

Vol. VII. =1809–1810.= With a separate volume of Maps. 21s. net.

Vol. VIII. =1811–1812.= With a separate volume of Maps. 30s. net.

SOME PRESS OPINIONS

VOLUMES I. and II.

_ENGLISH HISTORICAL REVIEW._—“Mr. Fortescue has been the first to construct a scholarly and connected story of the growth of our military institutions and of the development of tactics as revealed in a continuous series of wars. His style is lucid, and his descriptions of battles are easy to follow. But his chief merit is a well-balanced judgment.”

VOLUME III.

_TIMES._—“Whatever Mr. Fortescue may do in the future, he has already, in his first three volumes, produced one of the most important military works in the English language. It is sincerely to be hoped that they will be read as widely as they deserve to be.”

VOLUME IV.

_TIMES._—“We are witnessing the birth of a military classic which is, and will be for some generations to come, without a peer in the subject to which it relates. The debt which the British Army owes to the writer of this moving chronicle of its great achievements, its grandeurs, and its miseries can only be repaid if every member of the Army endeavours to assimilate for himself, and for the profit of his country, Mr. Fortescue’s admirable and most instructive pages.”

VOLUMES V. and VI.

_SPECTATOR._—“The new volumes of _A History of the British Army_ are of the same high quality as those which have gone before. We can give no higher praise, for Mr. Fortescue can only be compared with himself. He has no rivals as a student of military history, and we question whether he has any living superior as an historian.”

VOLUME VII.

_BROAD ARROW._—“This is a worthy successor to the volumes which have preceded it, and the whole forms a great work by a great, an impartial, and a bold writer.”

MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD., LONDON.

By the Hon. J. W. FORTESCUE

=HISTORY OF THE 17TH LANCERS.= Royal 8vo. 25s. net.

_PALL MALL GAZETTE._—“It is an admirable piece of work. For the most part a regimental record is the driest kind of reading, but the author has succeeded in illuminating the history of the 17th Lancers with humour, with anecdote, and with restrained but appropriate pathos.”

=THE COUNTY LIEUTENANCIES AND THE ARMY, 1803–1814.= 8vo. 10s. net.

_TIMES._—“Mr. Fortescue has produced a volume which is not only a valuable contribution to the military history of the first years of the nineteenth century, but also an indispensable guide to those whose duty it will be hereafter to build upon the foundations which Mr. Haldane has laid.”

=THE BRITISH ARMY, 1783–1802.= Four Lectures. 8vo. 4s. 6d. net.

_UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE._—“The author of the _History of the British Army_ writes always up to a standard so high that few other military writers can compete with him, either in excellence of the literary style, or in the professional value of what is written.... No praise ... could exaggerate its real merits.”

=NARRATIVE OF THE VISIT TO INDIA OF THEIR MAJESTIES KING GEORGE V. AND QUEEN MARY AND OF THE CORONATION DURBAR.= Illustrated. 8vo. 10s. 6d. net.

_EVENING STANDARD._—“A fine literary achievement. It appears to omit nothing of any consequence; the painting is full of colour, without being overburdened by it; the appreciation is enthusiastic, and yet when necessary is tempered with judicious criticism.”

=DUNDONALD.= Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. net.
_English Men of Action Series._

_BOOKS FOR YOUNG PEOPLE_

=THE STORY OF A RED DEER.= Pott 4to. 4s. 6d. _Pocket Classics._ Fcap. 8vo. Cloth, 2s. 6d. net. Leather, 3s. 6d. net.

=THE DRUMMER’S COAT.= Illustrated. Pott 4to. 5s.

=THE THREE PEARLS.= Illustrated. Fcap. 4to. 6s. net.

MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD., LONDON.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Four troops of life guards, ten regiments of horse, five of dragoons, forty-seven battalions of foot.

[2] I had almost written that France was then, as always, the first military nation; and though Prussia wrested the position from her under Frederick the Great and again in 1870, the lesson of history seems to teach that she is as truly the first military, as England is the first naval, nation.

[3] Belhomme, p. 153.

[4] Feuquières.

[5] That is to say, of land-transport. After the sad experience of the Irish war the marine transport was entrusted to an officer specially established for the purpose.—_Commons Journals._

[6] I spell the village according to the popular fashion in England, and according to the Flemish pronunciation. So many names in Flanders seem to halt between the Flemish and the French that it is difficult to know how to set them down.

[7] Fifty-three battalions of infantry and seven regiments of dragoons.—_Beaurain._

[8] No battlefield can be taken in more readily at a glance than that of Landen. On the path alongside the railway from Landen Station is a mound formed of earth thrown out of a cutting, from the top of which the whole position can be seen.

[9] St. Simon. With the exception of one hollow, which might hold three or four squadrons in double rank in line, there is not the slightest shelter in the plain wherein the French horse could find protection.

[10] Life Guards, 1st, 3rd, 4th, 6th Dragoon Guards, Galway’s Horse.

[11] This is, of course, the Talmash of _Tristram Shandy_ and of Macaulay’s History. He signed his name, however, as I spell it here, and I use his own spelling the more readily since it is more easily identified with the Tollemache of to-day.

[13] Namur, Luxemburg, Mons, Charleroi, Ath, Oudenarde, Nieuport, Ostend.

[14] By the defensive alliance concluded between England and Holland early in 1668, it was laid down that either party, on being attacked, had the right to require from the other the aid of a fixed proportion of forces both naval and military. This treaty was arranged by Sir William Temple shortly after the Treaty of Breda had brought to a close the Dutch War of 1665–1667; it was known as the Triple Alliance, Sweden being the third signatory.

[15] 12th, 22nd, 27th.

[16] 1st batt. First Guards, 1st Royals (2 batts.), 8th, 9th, 10th, 13th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 23rd, 24th. The Guards had been substituted (after careful explanation to Parliament) by William’s own direction for the 9th Foot.

[17] Seven regiments of horse and dragoons, fourteen battalions of foot, fifty-six guns.

[18] Coxe, vol. i. p. 182.

[19] So Quincy. Coxe gives August 25–September 5 as the date, but the difference depends merely on the interpretation of the word investment.

[20] See the description in Kane.

[21] St. Simon gives a curious account of Lewis’s difficulty in arriving at the truth, owing to the general unwillingness to tell him bad news.

[22] It is stated in _Records and Badges of the Army_ that Lillingston’s was formed in 1702. But Narcissus Luttrell, Millar, and the Military Entry Books all give the date as 25th March (New Year’s Day) 1705.

[23] Quincy’s account of this portion of the campaign is, so far as concerns Marlborough, full of falsehoods.

[24] Four British regiments were of this detachment. Two battalions of the 1st Royals, the 3rd Buffs, and the 10th Foot.

[25] Narcissus Luttrell.

[26] It is worth noting that this was the first campaign in which Marlborough and the British took the post of honour at the extreme right of the Allied order of battle.

[27] His camp thus lay across the whole of Wellington’s position at Waterloo, from east to west and considerably beyond it to westward, but fronted in the reverse direction.

[28] ORDER OF BATTLE. CAMPAIGN OF 1705.

Right.
RIGHT WING ONLY.
1st Line.
Scots Greys, 3 squadrons.
5th Dragoons, 3 squadrons.

1st Dragoon Guards, 3 squadrons.
5th Dragoon Guards, 2 squadrons.
7th Dragoon Guards, 2 squadrons.
6th Dragoon Guards, 2 squadrons.
3rd Dragoon Guards, 2 squadrons.

1 Batt. 1st Guards.
1 Batt. Royal Scots.
18th Royal Irish.
23rd Royal Welsh.
28th Foot.
Stringer’s Foot.
26th Cameronians.
16th Foot.

3rd Buffs.
21st Royal Scots Fusiliers.
37th Foot.
Macartney’s Foot.
Evans’s Foot.
24th Foot.
15th Foot.

Foreign Troops.

2nd Line.
Foreign Troops.

Extreme Right of Centre.
2nd Batt. Royal Scots.
10th Foot.
Temple’s Foot.
29th Foot.
8th Foot
Left.
_Newspaper._

[29] Peterborough’s Dragoons; Mark Kerr’s, Stanwix’s, Lovelace’s, Townsend’s, Tunbridge’s, Bradshaw’s, Sybourg’s, Price’s Foot. Sybourg’s was made up of Huguenots.

[30] Marlborough’s _Despatches_, vol. ii. p. 262.

[31] This is the story told in Lamberti.

[32] The ground, though now drained, is still very wet.

[33] I have described the field at some length, since the map given by Coxe is most misleading.

[34] Coxe, by a singular error, makes the left consist exclusively of infantry, in face of Quincy, Feuquières, the _London Gazette_ and other authorities, thereby missing almost unaccountably an important feature in the action.

[35] Apparently the whole of Meredith’s brigade, viz.: 1st, 18th, 29th, 37th, 24th, and 10th regiments. The place is still easily identifiable.

[36] Molesworth escaped and was rewarded four years later, at the age of twenty-two, with a regiment of foot.

[37] ORDER OF BATTLE. RAMILLIES, 12TH–23RD MAY 1706.

Right.
RIGHT WING ONLY.
1st Line.
Scots Greys.
5th Royal Irish Dragoons.

1st Dragoon Guards.
5th Dragoon Guards.
7th Dragoon Guards.
6th Dragoon Guards.
3rd Dragoon Guards.
Eighteen Dutch Squadrons.

1 Batt. 1st Guards.
1 Batt. Royal Scots.
16th Foot.
26th Cameronians.
28th Foot.
23rd Royal Welsh.
8th Foot.

3rd Buffs.
21st Royal Scots Fusiliers.
Evans’s Foot.
Macartney’s Foot.
Stringer’s Foot.
15th Foot.

Foreign Infantry.

2nd Line.
Foreign Cavalry.

2nd Batt. Royal Scots.
18th Royal Irish.
29th Foot.
37th Foot.
24th Foot.
10th Foot.

Foreign Infantry.
Left.

From Kane’s _Campaigns_.

[38] _Despatches_, vol. ii. p. 554.

[39] The British regiments regularly employed in the besieging army were the 8th, 10th, and 18th, and Evans’s Foot; the Scots Greys, 3rd and 6th Dragoon Guards. The total loss of the Allies was 32 officers and 551 men killed, 83 officers and 1941 men wounded. The 18th Royal Irish alone lost 15 officers, and in one attack over 100 men in half an hour.

[40] Parker.

[41] ORDER OF BATTLE. CAMPAIGN OF 1707.

Right.
RIGHT WING ONLY
1st Line.
Stair’s Brigade.
Scots Greys.
5th Royal Irish Dragoons.

Palmer’s Brigade
1st Dragoon Guards.
5th Dragoon Guards.
7th Dragoon Guards.
6st Dragoon Guards.
3rd Dragoon Guards.

Orrery’s Foot.
Evans’s Foot.

Foreign horse.

Meredith’s Brigade.
1 Batt. 1st Guards.
1 Batt. Royal Scots.
16th Foot.
23rd Royal Welsh.
8th Foot.

Temple’s Brigade
2nd Batt. Royal Scots.
18th Royal Irish.
Temple’s Foot.
24th Foot.
10th Foot.

Lord North and Grey’s Brigade.
3rd Buffs.
21st Royal Scots Fusiliers.
37th Foot.
26th Cameronians.
15th Foot.
Gore’s Foot.

No British in the Second Line.
Left.

_Postboy_ 26th June 1707.

[42] Slane’s, Brazier’s, Delaune’s, Jones’s, Carles’s, all raised in September.

[43] Mixed battalion of Guards, 19th Foot, Prendergast’s (late Orrery’s).

[44] 16 battalions and 30 squadrons. In these were included the brigades of Sabine, viz., 8th, 18th, 23rd, 37th; of Evans, viz., Orrery’s, Evans’s, and two foreign battalions; and of Plattenberg, which included the Scottish regiments in the Dutch service.

[45] Among them the Royal Scots and Buffs.

[46] That is to say, on the western side of the road from Oudenarde to Deynze.

[47] The ground, though drained and built over about Bevere, seems to have lost little of its original character, and is worth a visit.

[48] British losses: 4 officers and 49 men killed, 17 officers and 160 men wounded.

[49] The force consisted of detachments of the 3rd and 4th Dragoons (now Hussars), 12th, 29th, Hamilton’s, Dormer’s, Johnson’s, Moore’s, Caulfield’s, Townsend’s, Wynne’s Foot.

[50] See, for instance, the commendations of Feuquières.

[51] 135 battalions, 260 squadrons.

[52] 122 battalions, 230 squadrons.

[53] These were, according to a contemporary plan (Fricx), the 16th, 18th, 21st, 23rd, 24th Foot.

[54] He is claimed as a Guardsman by General Hamilton (_Hist. Grenadier Guards_), though Millner assigns him to the 16th Foot. This is the only name of a man below the rank of a commissioned officer that I have encountered in any of the books on the wars of Marlborough, not excluding the works of Sergeants Deane and Millner. Littler was deservedly rewarded with a commission.

[55] The Allied order of battle was peculiar. The artillery was all drawn up in front, in rear of it came a first line of 100 squadrons, then a second line of 80 squadrons, then a third line of 104 battalions, with wings of 14 squadrons more thrown out to the right and left rear. _Daily Courant_, 6th September 1708.

[56] The five English regiments lost about 350 killed and wounded in this assault. This would mean probably from a fifth to a sixth of their numbers. _Daily Courant_, 6th September 1708.

[57] I have failed, in spite of much search, to identify the British regiments present, excepting one battalion of the 1st Royals. Marlborough, as Thackeray has reminded us by a famous scene in _Esmond_, attributed the credit of the action in his first despatch to Cadogan. Another letter, however, which appeared in the _Gazette_ three days later (23rd September), does full justice to Webb, as does also a letter from the Duke to Lord Sunderland of 18th–29th September (_Despatches_, vol. iv. p. 243). Webb’s own version of the affair appeared in the _Gazette_ of 9th October, but does not mention the regiments engaged. Webb became a celebrated bore with his stories of Wynendale, but the story of his grievance against Marlborough would have been forgotten but for Thackeray, who either ignored or was unaware of the second despatch.

[58] Notably Prendergast’s. _Gazette_, 25th November.

[59] The British troops employed were the 6th Foot, 600 marines, and a battalion of seamen.

[60] There are still some remains of the old walls of Tournay on the south side of the town, and the ruins of Vauban’s citadel close by, from which the extent of the works may be judged.

[61] The British regiments employed in the siege were the 1st Royals (2 battalions), 3rd Buffs, 37th, Temple’s, Evans’s and Prendergast’s Foot.

[62] The following description written from the trenches gives some idea of the work: “Now as to our fighting underground, blowing up like kites in the air, not being sure of a foot of ground we stand on while in the trenches. Our miners and the enemy very often meet each other, when they have sharp combats till one side gives way. We have got into three or four of the enemy’s great galleries, which are thirty or forty feet underground and lead to several of their chambers; and in these we fight in armour by lanthorn and candle, they disputing every inch of the gallery with us to hinder our finding out their great mines. Yesternight we found one which was placed just under our bomb batteries, in which were eighteen hundredweight of powder besides many bombs: and if we had not been so lucky as to find it, in a very few hours our batteries and some hundreds of men had taken a flight into the air.”—_Daily Courant_, 20th August.

[63] 8th, 10th, 15th, 16th.

[64] Parker.

[65] A nominal list in the _Postboy_ of 1st October gives 36 officers killed and 46 wounded. An earlier list of 17th September gives 40 officers and 511 men killed, 66 officers and 1020 men wounded; but this is admittedly imperfect.

[66] ORDER OF BATTLE. CAMPAIGN OF 1709.

RIGHT WING ONLY
Right.
1st Line
Sybourg’s Brigade.
Scots Greys, 3 squadrons.
5th Royal Irish Dragoons, 2 squadrons.

Kelburn’s Brigade
1st Dragoon Guards, 2 Squadrons.
5th Dragoon Guards, 2 Squadrons.
7th Dragoon Guards, 2 Squadrons.
6th Dragoon Guards, 1 Squadron.
3rd Dragoon Guards, 2 Squadrons.

Orrery’s Brigade
26th Cameronians.
Two foreign battalions.
Prendergast’s Foot.

Two Foreign Brigadiers.
Twenty-seven squadrons of foreign dragoons.

1 Batt. 1st Guards.
1 Batt. Coldstream Guards.
1 Batt. Royal Scots.
37th Foot.
10th Foot.

2nd Batt. Royal Scots.
23rd Royal Welsh.
Orrery’s Foot.

3rd Buffs.
Temple’s Foot
Evans’s Foot.
16th Foot.

8th Foot.
24th Foot.
21st Royal Scots Fusiliers.
18th Royal Irish.

No British troops in the second line; but the 15th and 19th Foot
were also present at the action of Malplaquet.
Left.

[67] 11th, 37th, Kane’s, Clayton’s, and one foreign battalion of foot. The losses of the expedition were 29 officers and 676 men drowned.

[68] Honey wood to Carteret, Jan. 7/18; Ligonier to Carteret, March 21/April 1, 1744.

[69] Ligonier to Carteret, April 29/May 10.

[70] Wade to Carteret, May 30/June 10, June 25/July 6.

[71] Carteret to Wade, May 25/June 5.

[72] Carteret to Wade, July 13/24, 17/28.

[73] Carteret to Wade, July 31/Aug. 11, Aug. 14/25, 17/28.

[74] Wade to Carteret, Aug. 26/Sept. 6.

[75] _Ibid._, Aug. 19/30, Aug. 25/Sept. 5, Sept. 16/27, Sept. 22/Oct. 3, Oct. 1/12, 10/21

[76] Ligonier to Carteret, July 31/Aug. 11, 1744.

[77] Ligonier to Harrington, Jan. 29/Feb. 9, Feb. 6/17, 1745.

[78] _Gazette_, Feb. 23/March 6, March 1/12, 1745.

[79] Cumberland to Harrington, April 1/12, 12/23.

[80] The ground immediately before Fontenoy presents for fully eight hundred yards a gentle and unbroken slope. An officer, who went over the ground with me, assured me that St. Privat itself does not offer a more perfect natural glacis for modern rifle-fire.

[81] Every one knows the legend of “Messieurs les Gardes Françaises, tirez les premiers.” “Non, messieurs, nous ne tirons jamais les premiers.” But every English account agrees that the French fired first, long before the question had been raised, and I take the authority of Ligonier (who drew up the official account) as final. He says distinctly, “We received their fire.”

[82] _Campagnes des Pays Bas._

[83] Ligonier to Harrington, May 5/16. Cumberland to Harrington, May 11/22.

[84] Fawkener to Harrington, July 19/30.

[85] General Bligh to Cumberland, June 28/July 9.

[86] Cumberland to Harrington, July 2/13.

[87] Cumberland to Harrington, July 14/25.

[88] Ligonier to Harrington, July 14/25.

[89] Harrington to Cumberland, Sept. 4/15; Oct. 1/12, 19/30.

[90] Dunmore to Harrington, Jan. 20/31, Jan. 27/Feb. 7, Feb. 12/23.

[91] Ligonier to Harrington, July 1/12, 1746.

[92] Ligonier to Harrington, July 9/20, 13/24, 16/27.

[93] _Ibid._, July 23/Aug. 3, Aug. 2/13.

[94] Ligonier to Harrington, Aug. 9/20, 19/30, Aug. 26/Sept. 6, Sept. 4/15.

[95] Ligomer to Harrington, Sept. 24/Oct. 5, Sept. 28/Oct. 9.

[96] Ligonier to Harrington, Sept. 28/Oct. 9, Oct. 20/31.

[97] 1st, 15th, 28th, 30th, 39th, and 42nd Foot.

[98] Cumberland to Harrington, Feb. 6/17, March 20/31, March 24/April 4.

[99] Cumberland to Chesterfield, May 1/12, 9/20.

[100] Cumberland blamed the Austrian General, Baroney, and his irregulars for supine negligence on the march. Cumberland to Chesterfield, July 6/17, 1747.

[101] The regiments present at Lauffeld were the Greys, 4th Hussars, Inniskillings, 7th Hussars, and Cumberland’s dragoons, one battalion each of the 1st and 3rd Guards, 3rd, 4th, 13th, 19th, 21st, 23rd, 25th, 32nd, 33rd, 36th, 37th, 48th Foot. The two last had no casualties.

[102] Cumberland to Newcastle, March 18/29, March 22/April 2, March 26/April 6.

[103] _Dropmore Papers_, Auckland to Grenville, 21st and 25th January; 14th and 15th February. _F.O. Holland_, 16th February 1793. And see _Auckland Correspondence_ and _Dropmore Papers_ generally, November 1792 to February 1793.

[104] The head of the column was able to keep sober; the rear, under the endearments of the populace, subsided dead drunk on the road and was brought on in carts. _Narrative of an Officer of the Guards._

[105] Lake to Dundas, 2nd March 1793. Lake’s Instructions, 23rd February. Grenville to Auckland, 20th February 1793. _F.O. Holland_, Auckland to Grenville, 4th March 1793.

[106] _Dropmore Papers_, Auckland to Grenville, 5th and 13th March 1793. _S.C.L.B._ 5th March; Abercromby’s instructions, 9th March; Dundas to York, 15th March 1793; _C.C.L.B._ 2nd March; Adj.-gen. to York, 27th March, 12th April 1793. Calvert, pp. 53, 67.

[107] _S.P. Ireland_, Cooke to Hobart, 23rd April; Westmoreland to Hobart, 27th April; Dundas to Westmoreland, 16th May, 31st July 1793; _S.C.L.B._ 18th May 1793.

[108] _S.C.L.B._ 7th February. _C.C.L.B._ Adj.-gen. to Duke of York, 2nd and 12th April 1793. Dundas to Williamson, 4th April 1793.

[109] Duke of Argyll’s and Earl of Sutherland’s, 1759; Lord Fred. Campbell’s, 1778; Earl of Sutherland’s, Fauconberg’s (Yorkshire), North’s (Cinque Ports), 1779.

[110] Athol’s or the Manx, Sir J. Grant’s, Gower’s (or Wemyss’s), Eglinton’s (or Montgomery’s), Breadalbane’s, Argyll’s, Duke of Gordon’s, Hopetoun’s, Balfour’s (Orkney). Their strength was 650 of all ranks, except the Manx, which were 323 strong.

[111] Murray to Dundas, 26th March 1793.

[112] Sybel, ii. 230; Grenville to Auckland, 3rd April 1793.

[113] _S.C.L.B._ 21st March, 2nd April; _C.C.L.B._ 25th March 1793. _Dropmore Papers_, ii. 360, 387–89. Buckingham to Grenville, 20th January; the King to Grenville, 29th March; Pitt to Grenville, 1st April 1793. Auckland to Grenville, 31st May 1793.

[114] Sybel, ii. 142.

[115] The insisting upon an indemnity must have been the work of Pitt, probably under the influence of Dundas. Grenville trembled at the word indemnity. _Dropmore Papers_, ii. 392.

[116] Protocol of conference of 7th April. Dundas to Auckland and to Murray, 16th April Auckland to Grenville, 19th April 1793.

[117] Murray to Dundas, 22nd April 1793.

[118] Prussians, 8000, of which 1800 cavalry; Austrians, 55,000, of which 10,000 cavalry; Dutch, 15,000, of which 2500 cavalry; Hanoverians, 12,000, of which 3000 cavalry; Hessians, 8000, of which 1500 cavalry; British, 7200, of which 3000 cavalry. Total, 105,200, of which 27,200 in the pay of England. About 5000 of the Austrians and the 8000 Hessians were not expected till June. Witzleben, ii. 117, 181–186. Coburg to York, 1st and 3rd May; Murray to Dundas, 5th May; Dundas to Murray, 10th May 1793.

[119] The authorities for this and the next paragraph are Ditfurth, i. 29, 35, 36; Witzleben, ii. 59; Calvert, p. 83; Sybel, ii. 154.

[120] Ditfurth, i. 48.

[121] 231 horses, draught and pack, and 116 drivers, etc., per battalion of 1100 men, of which 82 horses and 34 men were for the officers. Each company had one four-horse waggon, and each battalion one pair-horse hospital-waggon.

[122] Ditfurth, i. 33; Witzleben, ii. 66. York to Dundas, 25th January 1794. Vol. iii. of this _History_, pp. 524, 525.

[123] _Dropmore Papers_, ii. 349.

[124] Bunbury, _Great War with France_, p. 46.

[125] Poisson, ii. 239, 240.

[126] Rousset, p. 183.

[127] _Vie de Carnot_, i. 138.

[128] “The squadron of men of war and transports was collected, the commodore’s flag hoisted, and the expedition sailed with _most secret_ orders, which as usual were as well known to the enemy and everybody in England as to those by whom they were given” (Marryat, _The King’s Own_, ch. vii. _ad init._). Marryat attributes this failing to the multitude of counsellors that compose a Cabinet. He may be right, but those who are acquainted with the scandalous carelessness with which Ministers treat confidential military documents, find no difficulty in accounting for it otherwise. This evil still continues, and will continue until Cabinet Ministers are subjected to the same penalties for abuse of trust as other servants of the King.

[129] Calvert, p. 72.

[130] _Dropmore MSS._ Lieut.-colonel Freemantle to Buckingham, 13th May 1793. Calvert, p. 79. _Narrative by an Officer of the Guards_, i. 29–31. Murray to Dundas, 10th May (private) 1793. There are some significant omissions from his public letter of the same date as published in the Gazette. _Auckland Correspondence_, iii. 58.

[131] 7th, 11th, 15th, 16th Light Dragoons.

[132] Murray to Dundas, 15th and 17th May 1793.

[133] Witzleben, ii. 194.

[134] That is to say, guns not allotted to the infantry as battalion-guns.

[135] The brigade was reckoned at four battalions, the flank companies being massed into a fourth battalion.

[136] The Fourteenth and Fifty-third, with the flank companies of these two regiments and of the Thirty-seventh, massed into a third battalion. Witzleben (ii. 199) gives a larger number of British troops, calling all squadrons and battalions in British pay by the name English.

[137] Murray to Dundas, 24th May 1793.

[138] Witzleben, ii. 210–211. This author states that the Duke of York asked for the command of the siege, which I believe to be absolutely incorrect, and indeed incredible. See Murray to Dundas, 26th and 29th May; Dundas to Murray, 30th and 31st May 1793.

[139] Blues, Royals, Greys, Inniskillings.

[140] _Vie de Carnot_, i. 321, _sq._

[141] Dundas to Murray, 29th May, 14th June, 12th July; Murray to Dundas, 18th June and 16th July 1793.

[142] Murray to Dundas, 25th July.

[143] Sybel, ii. 370–373.

[144] Ditfurth, i. 69. Witzleben, ii. 263–64. Murray to Dundas (private), 9th August 1793.

[145] Witzleben, ii. 264, 370. Dundas to Murray, 1st August 1793.

[146] Ditfurth, i. 73. 47½ battalions, 58 squadrons. British, 5200 infantry, 1300 cavalry; Austrians, 10,000 infantry, 1000 cavalry; Hanoverians, 9000 infantry, 1600 cavalry; Hessians, 5500 infantry, 1500 cavalry. Total, 29,700 infantry, 5400 cavalry, 1900 artillery.

[147] Hamilton, _History of the Grenadier Guards_, ii. 285.

[148] The British engaged were the flank companies of the Guards and Line, and Royal Artillery. Casualties, seventy-eight killed and wounded.

[149] Murray to Dundas, 16th July; Dundas to Murray, 19th July 1793.

[150] _Dropmore Papers_, ii. 444. Dundas to Grenville, 12th October 1793.

[151] Dundas to Murray, 16th April 1793.

[152] Calvert, vi. 118; Murray to Dundas, 3rd September.

[153] _Vie de Carnot_, i. 394.

[154] Murray to Dundas, 28th and 31st August 1793.

[155] Murray to Dundas, 31st August 1793.

[156] Sybel, ii. 417.

[157] Murray to Dundas (private), 9th September 1793.

[158] _Narrative of an Officer_, pp. 91–92; Ditfurth, i. 127–128.

[159] _Ibid._ pp. 91–93, and see Ditfurth, i. 126.

[160] Flank companies 9th, nine companies 4/60th, 50 artillery.

[161] Cuyler to Dundas, 22nd March 1793.

[162] Battalion companies of the 21st; flank companies (apparently) of the 9th, 15th, 21st, 45th, 48th, 3/60th, 4/60th, 67th. Bruce speaks of eighteen flank companies, perhaps including details of the 25th and 29th, which were serving on the fleet as marines.

[163] Mr. Balfour to Dundas, 20th July 1793.

[164] The official despatch reached the Government on 13th September, but the fact was known to Pitt on the 7th. _Dropmore Papers_, i. 422.

[165] Hood to Dundas, 25th August 1793.

[166] Brenton’s _Naval History_, i. 101.

[167] Mulgrave to Dundas, 1st September 1793.

[168] 3rd, 19th, 27th, 28th, 42nd, 54th, 57th, 59th.

[169] Dundas to Murray, 11th, 14th September; to Hood, 14th September; to Bruce, 18th September 1793; Pitt to Grenville, _Dropmore Papers_, ii. 43 (the conjectural date of September attached to this last is wrong, and should be changed to October).

[170] _Narrative of an Officer_, i. 92.

[171] 19th, 57th, three companies of the 42nd.

[172] Poisson, ii. 525–526.

[173] Dundas to Murray, 13th September 1793.

[174] Dundas to Murray, 13th, 14th, and 28th September; 14th October. Murray to Dundas, 14th and 15th October 1793.

[175] Ditfurth, i. 147.

[176] Murray to Dundas, 6th October. Dundas to Ainslie, 12th October; to Abercromby, 13th October 1793.

[177] 3rd, 28th, 54th, 59th. They had already made one voyage to Ostend and back.

[178] Murray to Dundas, 18th October; Ainslie to Dundas, 23rd October; Dundas to Grey, 26th October; to Murray, 27th October 1793.

[179] Two Austrian battalions, 3rd Guards, flank battalion of Guards, one squadron 7th L.D., and one squadron 15th L.D.

[180] Murray to Dundas, 30th October and 12th November; Dundas to Murray, 8th November 1793.

[181] _Chat huant._

[182] Poisson, iii. 139 _seq._

[183] _Ibid._ 239–248; Rousset, pp. 293, 299.

[184] Rousset, 123–124, 236, 249; also generally, pp. 78–148.

[185] Sybel, iii. 26–27; _Vie de Carnot_, i. 470; _Dropmore Papers_, ii. 501.

[186] _Life of Lord Minto_, ii. 383.

[187] “I think, if you see Dundas, it may not be amiss to urge the danger of running after distant objects while the great object lies still—of hunting the sheep till you have killed the dog. The most fatal error will be, I apprehend, the seeking to preserve the popularity of the war by feeding the avarice of the nation with conquests.”—Windham to Mr. Elliot, December 1793. _Life of Lord Minto_, ii. 196.

[188] Pitt to Grenville, 5th and 7th July 1794. _Dropmore Papers_, ii. 595, 597.

[189] _Parliamentary History_, vol. xxxi.; Debates of 21st January, 3rd February, 10th April 1794.

[190] Adj.-gen. to the Duke of York, _C.C.L.B._ 31st October 1793.

[191] These regiments are arranged according to the dates of their letters of service.

[192] Campbell’s was originally numbered 98th; Huntly’s 100th.

[193] Adj.-gen. to Prince Edward, _C.C.L.B._ 17th March 1794.

[194] _C.C.L.B._, Adj.-gen. to Lieut.-gen. Cunninghame, 8th October 1793.

Here is an example of the scheme as used for raising a regiment of 10 companies each of 60 men.

Proceeds of sale of 1 Lieut.-colonelcy, 1 Majority,
1 Company, 1 Lieutenancy, 1 Ensigncy,
amount to £9250
Cost of 600 men at £15 9000
----
Balance £250
====

Another scheme for augmenting battalions of infantry. As soon as 450 approved recruits have been raised, there shall be added to it a Lieutenant-colonel, and a Major.

The Major will pay for his Lieut.-colonelcy £600
The senior Captain will pay for his senior Majority 700
Another Captain will pay for his junior Majority 550
Two Companies thus vacated will sell for 2800
Levy-money of £5 granted by Government for 450 men 2250
----
Total £6900

Previous Next

Comments

British Campaigns in Flanders 1690-1794Chapter XIII: Part 13

0%36 min left in chapter