Chapter X: Part 10

ART. VII. (1.)--_The Greek New Testament, edited from Ancient Authorities, with the Latin Version of Jerome from the Codex Amiatinus._ By S. P. TREGELLES, LL.D. Matthew to Acts--Catholic Epistles--Romans to Philemon. S. Bagster and Sons.

(2.) _Fragmenta Evangelica quæ ex antiqua recensione versionis Syriacæ Novi Testamenti a Gulielmo Curetono vulgata sunt Græce reddita textuique Syriaco editionis Schaafianæ et Græco Scholzianæ fideliter collata._ Pars Prima. J. R. CROWFOOT, S.T.B. Williams and Norgate.

It is difficult to estimate our unpaid obligations to the students and scholars who have sacrificed their life to furnish us with the common-places of our knowledge. The elaborate and prolonged effort, the perseverance, ingenuity, and scientific skill often concealed in the foundations of a great building or in the underways of a great city, are no inapt illustration of the lifelong labours of those students and votaries of literature who have placed in our hands authentic and accurate copies of the _chefs-d'oeuvre_ of ancient thinkers. The learned, patient, and devout men to whom we are indebted for our present careful approximations to the text of the New Testament, have undergone a species of toil which it is very difficult for those scholars even to appreciate, who have never made the attempt to decipher a single MS. or to gather around them the abundant and often conflicting evidence on which the judgment of the critic really turns. Whatever be the ultimate currency or acceptance of the text which Dr. Tregelles has offered to the world as the result of his life-long effort, and granting that some of the disadvantages under which he has suffered have left ineffaceable marks on the greater part of the work, and that his main principles may still be under judicature, yet we readily endorse the strong language of Bishop Ellicott: 'The edition of Tregelles will last to the very end of time as a noble monument of faithful, enduring, and accurate labour in the cause of truth; it will always be referred to as an uniquely trustworthy collection of assorted critical materials of the greatest value, and as such it will probably never be superseded.'[170] The Bishop does not regard Dr. Tregelles' text as the final one, but does not hesitate to speak of it as far better than Tischendorf's, and as furnishing material which no subsequent editor can afford to ignore. With the exception of the text of the Apocalypse and of the appendices rendered necessary by the progress of textual criticism since the earlier portions of the work were published, this long-expected work is now placed in our hands. The exception to which we have referred is, we profoundly regret to say, occasioned by the serious indisposition of the learned, laborious, and devout editor. The regret is to some extent alleviated from a literary point of view by the circumstance that one of the first contributions to Biblical science made by this conscientious and accurate scholar was published in 1844, and entitled 'The Book of Revelation in Greek, edited from Ancient Authorities, with a new English Version and various Readings, by Samuel P. Tregelles.' There is this difference, however, between the evidence alleged by Dr. Tregelles for the text of the Revelation and that which he has pursued throughout the elaborate work now before us, that in the former he was either content or only able at that time to give the evidence of the few Uncial MSS. and early versions, then known to contain the Apocalypse, with such confirmation as they received from a large number of the Cursive MSS. Although his object was to approximate as nearly as possible to the most ancient text, his _apparatus criticus_ had not then reached the proportions it has subsequently assumed, and he did not even attempt to marshal the evidence of patristic quotations, or to give the arguments _pro_ and _contra_ any reading that he deliberately adopted. The _Codex Sinaiticus_ had not then been rescued from the Convent of St. Catherine by the enterprising Dr. Tischendorf, and the system of careful notation which is adopted in the _magnum opus_ now before us, had not been elaborated. Since 1844, moreover, the Rev. Bradley Alford has published a collation of the celebrated Cursive MS. 38, Dr. Delitzch has discovered the MS. used by Erasmus, and a careful collation is promised of the Codex Basiliensis, which Dr. Tregelles proposes to call Q, instead of adopting the old and confusing symbol B, which has led some to identify it with _the_ Codex Vaticanus. The introduction to the interesting volume on the text of the Book of Revelation was expanded in 1854 into a goodly octavo entitled 'An Account of the printed text of the Greek New Testament, with remarks on its revision upon critical principles, together with a collation of the critical texts of Griesbach, Scholz, Lachmann, and Tischendorf with that in common use.' We know no work on biblical criticism more charged with well-digested information, and none which reveals a more extensive literary enterprise, than that which is here recorded. Dr. Tregelles tells us in the preface to his Greek Testament, that this work contains a detailed exposition of the principles he holds and the studies in which he has been engaged, and as his editors earnestly request that it be referred to in explanation of the principle adopted by Dr. Tregelles, it is almost incumbent upon us to remind our readers of its contents and spirit. In the appendix to section 13, occurs a brief and modest sketch of the extensive and continuous labours of this great student of the New Testament text. It appears that he commenced his research simply for his own satisfaction. The text of Dr. Scholz, based so largely on the consensus of later MSS. but revealing the small group of Alexandrian authorities and most ancient witnesses in opposition to the text adopted by him, first called Dr. Tregelles to a consideration of the fact that these most ancient but rejected testimonies were curiously confirmed by the older versions. He was thus led to conceive of the creation of a text entirely based on the authority of the most ancient copies. He did not even know that Lachmann in 1838 had already made his celebrated though imperfect attempt to produce the text of the first four centuries in entire or professed independence of the later authorities and of the received text. When the Codex Amiatinus of Jerome's Latin Version was collated and published by Fleck in 1840, Tregelles found it confirm, in opposition to the Clementine Vulgate, the oldest Greek readings. In preparing his work on the text of the Revelation, he found it necessary to collate the Uncial MSS. with his own hand. In 1845 he collated the Codex Augiensis (in Trinity Coll. Camb.). Though he visited Rome for the purpose of collating the celebrated _Codex Vaticanus_ he was prevented from copying unless it were surreptitiously on his thumb-nails, a single reading. We formerly gave to our readers[171] a full account of the various imperfect collations made by Birch, Bartolocci, and Cardinal Mai, and also of the edition which has recently been published under the auspices of Dr. Tischendorf. In the greater part of Dr. Tregelles' critical labours he has been compelled to trust to the faulty and otherwise divergent collations which preceded Dr. Tischendorf's edition; but while he was deprived of the personal advantage of investigating Codex B for himself, he did collate at Rome, with his own hand, the Codex Passonei, and at Florence the Codex Amiatinus of Jerome's Latin; and at Modena, Venice, Munich, and Basle, other Uncial MSS. of considerable portions of the New Testament. Many of these were used by Tischendorf in his second Leipsic edition of the Greek Testament.

Dr. Tregelles became acquainted in 1849 with the remarkable Syriac fragment which Dr. Cureton found among the MSS. brought from the Nitrian monasteries and deposited in the British Museum. This mutilated fragment contains portions of the four Gospels--Matt. i.-viii. 22; x. 31-xxiii. 25; Mark xvi. 17-20; John i. 1-42; iii. 6-vii. 37; xiv. 11-29; Luke ii. 48-iii. 16; vii. 33-xv. 21; xvii. 24-xxiv. 44; but in the opinion of the best Syriac scholars, it is older than the Peshito, and would seem to have been collated with the Greek by the translator of the Greek Testament into Syriac (Peshito). Dr. Cureton supposed that it represents a first translation from the original Hebrew Gospel of Matthew, but Dr. Davidson has we think conclusively proved that it is a translation from the Greek. Dr. Cureton conjectured that sundry curious blunders or deviations from the canonical Matthew are due to the mistakes made by the translator of the Hebrew into Syriac. These conjectures are ingenious but perfectly gratuitous. Dr. Davidson has shown that in a variety of places the Curetonian Syriac (as it is called) differs from the early Greek text by the obvious blunder between two _Greek_ words of similar appearance. We have been rather explicit on the matter of this valuable witness to a very early text, not only because Dr. Tregelles and others have made constant reference to it, but because the second work which we have placed at the head of this article is a translation into Greek of the first part of these precious fragments, and is, moreover, a collation of every reading with Scholz's text, and with Schaaf's edition of the Peshito. This critical effort of Mr. Crowfoot will be of real service to the student who is not familiar with Syriac, and who wishes to see for himself the singular deviations of this text from the Textus Receptus. Take _e.g._ the additions made to the text of Matthew in chap. xx. 28, where a passage resembling one in Luke vii. is introduced. The Cur. Syriac here is sustained by the Codex D. Very frequently, however, it corresponds in its omissions with the most ancient MSS. and with the old Latin, as in Matt. xx. 22, 23. It is profoundly interesting, moreover, in that it retains of Mark's Gospel only a portion of the very closing passage, which is not to be found in Codex B. or in [Hebrew: Aleph]. Partly in consequence of this testimony Dr. Tregelles leaves the passage as an authentic appendix to the text of the Gospel of St. Mark. We see that Mr. Crowfoot and Dr. Tregelles sometimes differ, as we might expect them to do, as to the Greek equivalent which they suppose most likely to have been the exemplar of the Syriac, but they do not seriously differ as to the testimony it bears to a particular reading. In Matthew xi. 23, the Textus Rec. reads [Greek: kai sy Kapernaoum hê heôs tou ouranou hypsôtheisa, k.t.l.] Mr. Crowfoot gives in place of [Greek: hê], [Greek: ouch]. Dr. Tregelles on the authority of B, C, D, the Vulgate _a, b, c_, and Syr. Cur., gives [Greek: mê], and makes the clause interrogative.

But to proceed with Dr. Tregelles' labours. The various collations made by him need not be exhaustively enumerated, though special attention should be called to the extraordinary effort and patience which was required by him to form an accurate estimate of the readings of the Codex Colbertinus, called 33 in the Gospels, and 13 in the Acts and Catholic Epistles. The leaves of the vellum have been in places sodden with damp and stuck together. The consequence was that when separated, 'the ink adhered to the _opposite_ page rather than to its own, so that in many leaves the MS. could only be read by observing how the ink had _set-off_, and thus reading the Greek words _backwards_.' At Paris, Leipsic, Berlin, Dresden and Wolfenbüttel, Dr. Tregelles continued his patient research, and came to such discoveries as that the Codex Sangallensis ([Delta] of the Gospels), and Codex Boernerianus (G of St. Paul's Epistles) were the severed portions of the same book. At Dublin, the difficult palimpsest fragment (Z) was deciphered after submitting the vellum to a chemical process, and Tregelles was able to restore the portions which had been left blank in the edition of this fragment published by Dr. Barrett.

Special reference may be made to the Codex, called Zacynthius and designated [Xi], the property of the British and Foreign Bible Society. This is almost an illegible parchment palimpsest, containing considerable portions of Luke's Gospel. The readings of this old lectionary have been carefully noted by Tregelles and are cited throughout his text of the Gospel of Luke. The Codex Leicestrensis, the property of the Town Council of Leicester, has been also carefully collated by our author, as well as by Mr. Scrivener. It is cited as 69 in the Gospels, 31 Acts, and by other numbers in remaining portions of the New Testament.

Dr. Tregelles has not paid _much_ attention to the mass of cursive MSS. It is not fair to accuse him of utterly neglecting them, when he has gone through the laborious work of collating specimens of cursive MSS. in each of the divisions of his subject. He has, however, placed far more confidence in another class of authority and of evidence. The most ancient versions have been thoroughly noted by him in their several codices. The old Latin is carefully studied throughout; the Codex Amiatinus of Jerome's Latin is published in the volume before us, with all the deviations from it in the Clementine Vulgate. The Peshito and Harcleian Syriac versions, the Cureton fragments, the Jerusalem Lectionary, the Memphitic and Thebaic (sometimes called the Coptic and Sahidic) versions, the Ethiopic and the Gothic, are used throughout this edition of the Greek Testament. A considerable number of uncial MSS., which have been published in facsimile or in a printed text, Dr. Tregelles has copied with his own hand, and all the rest of the uncial MSS. he appears to have also collated with his own hand. Having gone through this extraordinary labour, he has proceeded to give the text of the New Testament on the authority of the oldest MSS. and versions, and with the aid of the earliest citations, so as to present the text of the fourth century. He does not hesitate to deviate from these ancient testimonies, when they agree in transcriptural error; and he confers this great advantage on the student, that he states in every case the authorities on both sides with reference to any disputed reading.

Now there has often been expressed on the part of the advocates of the cursive MSS. and the Constantinopolitan group of MSS. and of the later uncial MSS., the conviction that their consensus ought to outweigh the strong and clearly expressed testimony of the ancient MSS. on the plausible supposition that the existing later MS. _may_ be the copies of an older text than that of any existing MS. whatever. Now if Dr. Tregelles or Dean Alford or Dr. Tischendorf had been mere slaves of the few uncial MSS. of great antiquity which are extant, and had no further or corroborative testimony to add in favour of the readings, or the additions and omissions they have affirmed, there would be much justice in the protest sometimes raised; but neither of them can justly be charged with this, and Dr. Tregelles must certainly be acquitted of such prejudice. He and Dean Alford do indisputably and notoriously differ in certain cases where subjective reasons and considerations of the exercise of personal discretion must assume great importance; and in some of these doubtful and difficult cases Tregelles has been more influenced by diplomatic considerations, and has more readily yielded to authority, than Dean Alford; but Dr. Tregelles has stated very acutely and powerfully his reasons for trusting the ancient MSS., even in these difficult readings. Let the following phenomena to which he is able, in most cases, to add the unexceptionable evidence of his own personal observation and collation, be considered. (_a_) The uncial MSS. are now known and have been at length collated with such care that we may be certain of their testimony. (_b_) The palimpsests which have been recently found and deciphered confirm the readings of the oldest codices. (_c_) The great discovery of the Sinaitic Codex throws in its testimony against the bulk of the cursive MSS. (_d_) The Curetonian Syriac of the Gospels agrees with the oldest MSS. (_e_) Certain cursive MSS. (such as Codex Colbertinus of the 12th century) agree with the ancient text rather than with the bulk of the cursives, thus providing a class of exception which proves the rule. (_f_) There is agreement of the ancient versions with this older text; and (_g_) not infrequently there is the express testimony of early patristic writers to the existence of such a text in their day. Now the principle that Dr. Tregelles takes great pains to establish is as follows,--While there are certain readings sustained by the great majority of recent MSS., divergent readings of the same passages can be proved to have been in existence long before the existence of these MSS., by the evidence of the earliest MSS. of the old Latin version, by the Syriac and other translations, and by the deliberate discussion of the very peculiarities in question by some earlier writer like Origen. Now, even if there were no uncial MSS. which confirmed such divergence, this would constitute a presumption in favour of such a divergence, if some adequate explanation could be found of the commonly received text. But, if in addition to these testimonies, a considerable number of the most ancient uncial MSS. confirm such readings, then Tregelles urges the adoption of them as an approximation to the true text. Thus, take his elaborate argument in favour of the reading of Matt. xix. 17, [Greek: ti me erôtas peri tou agathou? heis estin ho agathos]. This alteration was first made by Griesbach and sustained by Lachmann, and adopted subsequently by Tischendorf and Alford, though condemned by Mr. Scrivener on the ground of the numerical poverty of the evidence, and because it evinced theological zeal for the honour of the Incarnate Son. It is interesting to find, since the judgment of these recensionists was deliberately given, that the final recension of the Vatican MS. and the testimony of the Sinaitic MS. have arisen to defend it. The evidence for the existence of this text in the fourth century, or indeed before the time of Origen, and before the existence of _Cureton Syriac_, just proves, according to Tregelles, that it is safe 'to take the _few_ documents whose evidence is _proved_ to be trustworthy, and to discard the eighty-nine ninetieths of the evidence shown thus to be less valuable.' One result of his comparative criticism is, 'that as certain MSS. are found by a process of inductive proof to contain an ancient text, their character as witnesses must be considered to be so established, that in other places their testimony deserves peculiar weight;' and still further--'that the ancient MSS. were not exceptional documents, because they contain readings which we learn elsewhere to have been both ancient and widespread.'

One great advantage in Dr. Tregelles' New Testament is, that he not merely states but cites the authority of the patristic writers to whom he appeals, and by a somewhat elaborate notation enables the reader at a glance to see how his uncial MSS. and principal versions are serving him, and where all the _lacunæ_ begin and end.

We proceed to give some further account of the contents and peculiarities of this great work. Dr. Tregelles and Dr. Alford agree in the great majority of cases where they differ from the received text, although in some instances they have not with the same facts before them, come to the same conclusion. _E.g._, both call attention to the fact that in John vi. 51, the clause [Greek: hên egô dôsô] is omitted by B, C, D, L, T, 33, the Latin versions, the Cur. Syriac, Thebaic, and Æthiopic versions, and by many Fathers, and Alford even mentions a longer list of such omissions than Tregelles, but Alford allows the _homoioteleuton_ just above, to be a sufficient explanation of the original omission in the text, and retains the clause: Tregelles strikes it out, making the verse read thus, 'and the bread which I will give for the life of the world is my flesh.' Since their discussion, the Sinaitic MS. confirms Tregelles, by not only omitting the clause, but altering the order of the words. This alteration of order may confirm Dean Alford in his continued insertion of the clause, though we think Tregelles is in the right. Through whole chapters of the Gospels, Acts, and Epistles, these two recensionists may be said to agree _verbatim et literatim_, and to have come precisely to the same conclusions: still a few specimens of their divergence may explain more fully than a more elaborate analysis, the character of their work. In John viii. 41, Alford prefers the less comprehensible form [Greek: gegennêmetha], to the form [Greek: egennêthêmen], on the ground of the possible alteration of the tense to the more usual form. We do not think that Tregelles has acted here on his own principles, for he shows that versions and citations defend the former rather than the latter reading. In John viii. 54, they differ again as to the preferable character of the readings [Greek: hêmôn] or [Greek: humôn], 'our God' or 'your God,' and here Tregelles defends the reading [Greek: hêmôn] with a great array of evidence; see also ch. ix. 4, where [Greek: hêmas dei ergazesthai k.t.l.] is given as preferable to the [Greek: eme dei k.t.l.], and largely on the ground that Origen must have been acquainted with this obscure text, and tried to interpret it. In each instance a theological zeal might have provoked a copyist to the ordinary readings. Throughout the ninth chapter of the Acts, where the received text has passed through so fiery an alembic, Alford and Tregelles agree, we believe, in every word, with one exception, and that is the word [Greek: epeirazen] is preferred by one to the [Greek: epeirato] of the other in v. 26. Here strong uncial authority governs Tregelles, and the disposition to prefer the less usual or less common form has influenced Dr. Alford. In Romans v. 1, the celebrated reading [Greek: echômen] in place of [Greek: echomen] is preferred by Tregelles. Alford still has doubts about it, from the indecision of MSS. in their modes of spelling certain vowel sounds. The quotations from Origen and Tertullian are decisive of the existence of such a text in their day, and the array of versions is strongly confirmatory of the seven uncials and two cursives that are quoted for it. We need scarcely say, that Tregelles gives his powerful authority in favour of [Greek: hos], rather than [Greek: theos], in 1 Tim. iii. 16, and rejects the reference to the three heavenly witnesses in 1 John v. 7; but in spite of the authority of Tischendorf's collation of B and of [Hebrew: Aleph], and other authorities in favour of the received text, he gives [Greek: kyriou] instead of [Greek: theou] as the preferable reading of Acts xx. 28.

Our author is strongly moved by the citations of Origen, and consequently places in his margin as the alternative reading in Heb. ii. 9, [Greek: chôris theou] by the side of [Greek: chariti theou]. It is clear, from no fewer than seven citations of Origen, he must have had a MS. before him with this startling statement, 'that Jesus on the behalf of all without (or in the absence, or hiding of) God might taste death.' The only MS. authority for such a reading is the uncial fragment called M of the tenth century, so that we are surprised to see the high place given to it in Tregelles' margin. Dr. Tregelles, in the wealth of material at his disposal, sometimes almost travels into the region of the exegete, as in the long note upon Rom. ix. 5, where he gives eight or nine quotations from Greek and Latin Fathers, to show the sense in which they took the phrase, [Greek: ho ôn epi pantôn theos eulogêtos eis tous aiônas] as not divided from the [Greek: ho christos] which precedes. It may be added, that he retains [Greek: en Ephesô] in the text of Eph. i. 1, thus preserving the traditional character of this Epistle as one addressed not to Laodiceans or any group of Asiatic churches, but to the church at Ephesus.

Dr. Tregelles and Dean Alford differ slightly in 1 Cor. iii. In the fifth verse, [Greek: ti oun estin Apollôs] is preferred to the [Greek: tis] of the Receptus, by Tregelles, while Alford sustains the latter. Tregelles has given the adjectives [Greek: chrysion] and [Greek: argyrion] in v. 12, in place of the [Greek: chryson], [Greek: argyron]; and [Greek: ethêka] to the commoner [Greek: tetheika] and of v. 10. Here Alford seems to have the weight of evidence in favour of his view, though doubtless the _aorist_ gives the finer sense, and makes the truer affirmation 'I laid,' rather than 'I have been laying the foundation.'

He leaves [Greek: Agar] in brackets in his text of Gal. iv. 25. So also he deals with the [Greek: eikê] of Matt. v. 22. The [Greek: baptisantes] of Matt. xxviii. 19, given on the authority of the doubtful recensions of the Vatican MS. is most unsatisfactory. Tischendorf, who gave it in some of his earlier editions, has returned to [Greek: baptizontes]; and probably Dr. Tregelles will show us in his appendix that he has done the same, as [Hebrew: Aleph] agrees with all the uncial MS. here in the more grammatical reading. We will not further trouble our readers with details. These will suffice for a specimen. Every page presents at a glance the presence of the entire group of MS. versions and fragments collated by the author, and the whole is printed with extreme beauty of type and arrangement.

In conclusion, we express our profound sense of the obligation under which the accomplished and persevering editor has laid every student of the New Testament. There is a fulness and richness of material placed here by him, at the disposal of those who are utterly precluded from this kind of investigation. The work is done so conscientiously and laboriously, that great confidence is inspired in the accuracy and reliableness of the information thus harvested for general use. The principles on which Dr. Tregelles has toiled, are so clearly put, and for the most part so patiently applied, that they command hearty respect, if not general assent. Such work as this is necessarily provisional, and cannot be regarded as final. The discovery of the Sinaitic codex and the recent collated edition of the Vatican MS. since the commencement of Tregelles' enterprise, is sufficient proof of this; and until the promised appendices appear we cannot tell to what extent this circumstance may have modified the text of our author. It is inexpressibly affecting that the labour of nearly forty years should be arrested when the patient, true-hearted scholar had just reached, as we understand, the last chapter of the Revelation, and that he should be suffering not only from prostration of strength, but be smitten in that very organ of vision which he had consecrated so lovingly to his Master's service. We can only deplore and sympathize with such disappointments as these. We are satisfied that we speak the universal desire of his collaborateurs, and of his rivals, in this lofty field of work, when we express the earnest hope that he may yet be spared to complete his labours, and to see the effect of them in the deeper reverence paid by his contemporaries to the Word of the living God.

ART. IX.--_The War of 1870._

It is impossible as yet even to guess the consequences of the memorable war of 1870. It may verify the German exclamation that the hour of the Latin race has come, and that France has ceased to be a great power, or it may lead to the moral resurrection of that essentially noble people, and even to the recovery of its military supremacy. It may develope a French Republic which from its failure to turn the tide of fortune shall be followed by a Jacobin successor, and issue in a despotism of the sword not less fearful than that of Napoleon I. or it may be the forerunner of a better period when France, purified by adversity, shall win the esteem and admiration of Europe, by her constancy in affliction, her lofty patriotism, her renewed energy, her surviving genius. Looking at it, too, from the other side, it may accelerate the unity of Germany, cemented by blood poured out in the field, by a brotherhood in arms, and by common triumphs; or it may tend only to German divisions, and to the collapse of the policy of 1866, by aggrandising Prussia out of all proportions, and making her influence intolerable to the minor States. Who, indeed, shall speculate on the results of this mighty and awful conflict, when, though it seems for the time to be drawing to a close, France refuses to acknowledge defeat, and defies the invader behind the walls of the capital, and when, though apparently struck to the ground, she still raises the flag of resistance, appeals to the memories of 1793, and endeavours to rally for a final effort those national forces which, in her case, have so often proved impossible to subdue? Yet, if we shall not attempt to forecast the remote issues of this tremendous struggle, or to predict what it shall ultimately bring forth, the time has come when we can briefly describe its marvellous events and fortunes, and can truly indicate its immediate lessons of deep significance to these kingdoms. The momentous war of 1870 is not only one of the grandest illustrations of the art which founds and destroys Empires; it not only is an astonishing drama, every scene which the military student should examine carefully and lay to heart; it not only fascinates the ordinary observer by its gigantic action and immense events; it points conclusively to a solemn moral, not to be forgotten by any country which seeks to maintain its position in the world, and cherishes a sense of its independence. It shows how weak, in the hour of trial, may be even a great military power which neglects the real sources of its strength, and relies mainly on its martial traditions, on its past honour, on the memory of a name; it proves fearfully how imperial despotism may rear an edifice of imposing grandeur, which for a generation shall deceive mankind, and yet fall suddenly at the first breath of misfortune; it testifies to the old truth that material prosperity with moral corruption are the fruitful sources of national decline; and it teaches us what we should never forget, how terrible and decisive, in modern warfare, are the results of rapid and great success, and how absolutely necessary it is for England, in the present menacing condition of Europe, to surround herself with an invulnerable shield, to look after her national defences, and to take care that by sea and on land she shall possess the means of repelling aggression.

It would be an unnecessary and unprofitable task to examine at length the causes of the war. Impartial history, we believe, will pronounce that though Napoleon gave the challenge, it had been to some degree provoked by the policy of Bismark, by the attitude recently taken by Prussia, by the series of events which since 1866 have changed the centre of power in Germany. It was impossible but that the Emperor should feel bitterly how he had been outwitted by the unscrupulous statesman who had purchased his complicity in the spoliation of Denmark by promises of annexation on the Rhine, and had afterwards coolly violated his pledges; nor yet that he should not be really alarmed at the immense development of the military power of Prussia during the preceding five years. It would have been disregarding the traditions which, rightly or wrongly, for two centuries have guided the foreign policy of France, to have witnessed the absorption of the German States into one dominant and threatening power, without an effort to break the union; and if an attempt to obtain this, was contrary to modern ideas and aspirations, it was only carrying out what had always been the views of Henry IV. and Richelieu. Besides, ever since the battle of Sadowa, France and Prussia had been watching each other, and tending inevitably to collision; both Powers had been increasing their armaments, and events have proved which was the more ready; and we know from the Imperial correspondence that Napoleon had been repeatedly warned that Prussia was meditating an invasion of France, and would avail herself of the first opportunity. It is not, therefore, too much to say that it was not merely French folly and arrogance which precipitated this tremendous conflict; the conduct of Prussia and her aggressive acts contributed to it in no slight degree; and if France, as it has turned out, was unwise in not accepting accomplished facts, and in chafing at the military strength of her rival, we can perfectly comprehend this sentiment, without charging her, as a nation, with any peculiar turn for aggrandisement, or even any extraordinary ambition. It must be admitted that the Emperor was utterly in the wrong in the pretext on which he declared war, and that his whole policy in this respect showed ignorance of the real state of opinion. After the Hohenzollern candidature of Spain had been withdrawn at the instance of England, it was an act of extreme unwisdom to have proceeded to further demands; and the result was that, to outward seeming, France, at the beginning of hostilities, was alone to blame for the frightful contest, and that Prussia appeared the injured defender of the national independence of Germany. In truth, however, in this as in other matters, Bismark probably outgeneralled Napoleon; he seems to have been eager for war, and to have been too glad to find an opportunity to attack France with the support of public opinion; and now at least when he puts forward claims to wrest from her some of her present provinces, he can scarcely be considered by impartial men as the mere opponent of French aggression.

Hostilities were proclaimed on the 15th of July, after efforts at negotiation on the part of England. There can be little doubt that the war was welcomed by the classes who form public opinion in Germany, quite as much as in France. The passionate and foolish cry, 'to Berlin,' was answered by shouts of defiance, 'to Paris;' and if French chauvins and journalists talked of the annexation of the left bank of the Rhine, and of the breaking up of the German Confederation, claims for 'the lost patrimony of Elsass and Lothringen' were put forward prominently by the press of Germany. In fact, amiable German professors who back the arrogant demands of Bismark, and pleasantly insist on 'the line of the Vosges,' as a necessary bulwark for 'peace-loving Germany,' against the 'intolerable ambition of Frenchmen,' must have a strange notion of the facts of the case; the war fever was at least as strong in the capital of Prussia, as in that of France; and it is about as correct to represent the two nations as differing in this, as it is to repeat the veracious legend--of which of course the League of Pilnitz and the barbarous invasion of 1792 are confirmations that cannot be gainsaid--that France has always been the assailant of her meek and long-suffering Teutonic rival. Within a few days after the declaration of war, the army of the Rhine was set in motion, and the heads of the columns of eight French corps were approaching the verge of the German frontier; the main bodies, however, being still distant. The first corps, under the renowned MacMahon, had advanced from Algeria and the south, and occupied Upper and Lower Alsace, its headquarters being at Strasburg. The second and fifth corps of Frossard and De Failly were sent forward, and at St. Avold and Bitsche held the approaches to the Rhenish Palatinate, from MacMahon's left to near the line of the Saar. To the left of these again, was the fourth corps, marched from the north under L'Admirault, and stationed at and around Thionville; while, in the rear, Bazaine with the third corps, was moving to the great fortress of Metz; the sixth, under the orders of Canrobert, was on its way from Chalons to Lorraine; and far behind, the Imperial Guard--the flower of the French army--was pushing forward from the French capital. In the meantime, the seventh corps of Douay formed the extreme right of the great French line; far to the north it guarded Belfort, the 'gate of France,' between the Vosges and the Jura; and it connected itself with MacMahon's rear-guard along the Rhine and Lower Alsace. The whole French army, in its first line, extended in a huge semicircle from Northern Lorraine to the Southern Vosges; but its second line, massed between Metz and Chalons, was at a considerable distance from the first; and though it was well connected by railways, and placed as it was, it threatened equally the Rhenish provinces and Southern Germany, it was not yet even nearly concentrated.

Such was the disposition of the army of the Rhine about the 21st or 22nd of July. It will be seen at once that it was well adapted for an offensive movement against Germany, if made rapidly and in full force, for Baden and the Palatinate were threatened, and the exact point of attack was concealed. Placed as they were, the forces of France could either pour into the Rhineland, drawing after them their reserves on all sides, or they could cross the Rhine, and, advancing from Strasburg, interpose between Northern and Southern Germany and endeavour to break up their uniting armies. On the other hand, the position of the French was badly chosen as a line of defence; for their foremost corps were widely disseminated, and in case of a sudden attack, were thrown too far beyond their supports; and if they were assailed by a resolute foe, converging against them in full strength, they would be exposed to serious disaster. For these reasons we may certainly infer that the strategic plan of the French Emperor was to march upon the Germans with much rapidity, and whether the recently published pamphlet does or does not disclose his purpose, it is evident that he intended to advance either by the Rhineland on Landau and Mayence, or by Strasburg into the territory of Baden. Besides, he must have known perfectly well that a brilliant initiative was his best chance; for not only was it in accordance with the traditions and genius of the French soldier; not only was it calculated to sow dissensions and alarm among his foes and perhaps prevent them from combining; it was the sole means to give full effect to the one great advantage which France would possess over Prussia at the beginning of a campaign, the imposing strength of a standing army, supposed to be ready at all points and formidable in its numerical proportions, compared with levies, immense indeed when brought together and set in motion, but believed to be inferior in military power, and requiring time to be fully arrayed. It may therefore be said with confidence, that a sudden and vigorous spring on Germany was the real scheme of Napoleon III.; and, notwithstanding all that has occurred, it is impossible to say what the result would have been had this design been carried out boldly, with the promptness and skill of a great commander who would have led his troops to immediate victory. Unhappily, however, for the interests of France, vacillation at the decisive moment took the place of resolution and genius; and her armed arrays, however imposing to outward seeming, were not in a state to undertake great and rapid operations. The Emperor lingered a fortnight at Paris before he went to his headquarters at Metz; even when he had arrived he passed nearly a week, uncertain, it would appear, how to strike; and thus the favourable opportunity was lost which might have changed the whole course of the war. In addition to this, it is now well known that the army was not ready to march; its commissariat was not complete; it was deficient in ammunition and supplies; and its real strength was considerably less than Napoleon III. had been led to expect. Between the irresolution of its chief, and its own ill-prepared condition, it had already forfeited its most hopeful chances before even a blow had been struck.

During these delays of the army of the Rhine Germany had been making astonishing efforts. If Bismark's reports are to be believed, the German nation was not prepared for immediate war on a gigantic scale. But considering that since the battle of Sadowa Prussia had been steadily increasing her armaments, and that it is tolerably clear from her government press that she was eager to measure her strength with France, we shall scarcely credit the Northern Confederation with any want of military readiness; still immense as their exertions were, it is not impossible that the Southern States were taken to some extent by surprise. However this may have been, the summons to arms against the ancient and dreaded foe met with but one answer from the Teutonic race; and whatever may be thought of the policy of its rulers, its patriotism and heroic attitude are entitled to the highest admiration. From the sandy wastes that border the Niemen to the valleys watered by the Moselle, and from the shores of the Northern Sea to the Danube and the Bohemian hills, the martial cry 'to the war' was heard; the integrity of the Fatherland was the one thought of the whole people; and whatever may have been the divisions caused by the events of 1866, and whatever the hopes of dispossessed sovereigns, of blind diplomatists, or of discontented nobles, it was soon evident that Napoleon III. would have to contend against an united Germany. This single circumstance shows how impolitic had been the course of the French Emperor, and how badly he had been advised; and, in fact, unless, as is not improbable, the conduct of Prussia shall tend to disunion, the war will have done more to make Germany a concordant people than any event since 1813. Within a few days the military system of the nation was in full operation; the army was 'mobilized' and increased to its war strength within the local limits assigned to its different divisions, and in an exceedingly short time a gigantic array composed of regular troops in the first line, with reserves of landwehr in the second, was in a state to commence operations under the guidance of leaders of proved ability. Those who witnessed that mighty torrent of war pouring through Germany towards the Rhenish frontier have described its tremendous power and impulse; and none who have observed how it was directed can doubt that it had been long held in hand to commence as well as to repel aggression. Towards the last days of July and the first of August, while the French were still disseminated in Lorraine, three vast German armies had taken possession of the territory of the Rhenish Palatinate, and, already in communication with each other, were being marshalled to pour into France an overwhelming tide of invasion. The first army, numbering about 80,000 men, was under the command of the aged Steinmetz, and was approaching the Saar from Treves, its outposts reaching to near Saar-Louis. The second army, nearly 200,000 strong, had crossed the Rhine at and above Mayence, and, led by King William and Prince Frederick Charles, held the centre of the Rhenish Palatinate, its outposts almost advanced to the Saar, and its rearward divisions stretching far backwards. To the left was the third army, commanded by the Crown Prince of Prussia, about 150,000 strong; it touched the right of the second army, and extended thence to the course of the Rhine, and its vanguard, along the stream of the Lauter, approached the northern frontier of Alsace, the main body being not distant, and concealed behind the adjoining fortresses. From Treves on the west to Landau on the east, and pressing forward to the very edge of France, the huge German masses were already in a state to fall on their enemy with tremendous force.

The manner in which these immense armies were formed, organised, and moved in concert within a short distance of the French frontier, was one of the most notable of strategic exploits. In the space of nineteen or twenty days 430,000 men in the highest state of efficiency for war, with guns, horses, and other material, had been arrayed and prepared for the field, and now stood on the verge of the Rhineland ready to overrun Alsace and Lorraine. We know of no finer military movement, except perhaps the splendid concentration of Napoleon's forces on the Belgian frontier on the 14th of June, 1815; and it attests clearly the calculating forethought and ability of the Prussian Government, the high training and skill of its generals, and the discipline and power of the German troops. The French army, scattered and divided on the semicircle from Thionville to Belfort, and with its first line widely separated from the second, was already in no condition to offer a successful resistance to its mighty foe; it was not only much weaker in strength, being outnumbered fully two to one at the decisive points where it was threatened, it was also so disunited in its parts, that it could hardly collect 60,000 men in any position to withstand an attack. In fact, a glance at the map will show that along the whole line of the Saar and the Lauter it was exposed to be defeated in detail by a force infinitely superior in power; and this peril was aggravated by the circumstance, placed beyond dispute by the clearest evidence, that it believed itself completely secure, and that its leaders were planning a forward movement while their enemy was close at hand to destroy them.

It is now well known that a German advance was not suspected in the French camp even during the first three days of August: the woods along the edge of the frontier were not searched by the French outposts, and the German columns were allowed to collect in force behind this deceptive screen while the Emperor and his Marshals were dreaming of a march without an obstacle into the Rhenish provinces. The consequences of this ruinous neglect and self-deception became soon evident. On the 4th of August the Crown Prince of Prussia detached a part of his vast army to attack the extreme right of the whole French line, this movement being only the first step of a general advance across the French frontier. The Prince, with about 40,000 men, fell upon a single division of about 10,000 which lay encamped near the town of Weissenburg, surprised it, it is said, when at breakfast, and drove it back in a state of confusion. The French, rallying on the Geisberg, made a gallant resistance for a short time; but the hill having been stormed by the enemy, they were ultimately driven in utter rout from beyond Weissenburg on the road to Strasburg. The first success, so important in war, had thus been decisively won; the trophies of the day were 500 prisoners, a gun, and a great deal of material; and the advanced guard of the German army stood in triumph upon the soil of France, the right wing of the French forces having been already threatened and struck, and the secret of their want of preparation having been disclosed to their able antagonists.

The affair at Weissenburg was only the prelude of operations of a more serious kind. The 5th of August was spent by the Crown Prince in bringing the mass of his troops forward, and in arraying them for a formidable attack on the French forces in his immediate front. There can be no doubt that in making these dispositions he exposed his flank to the corps of De Failly, which, stationed at Bitsche, beyond the Vosges, ought to have combined with that of McMahon, and fallen on the right of the Prussian commander, while, as yet, his columns were not closed up, and his whole line was somewhat out of order. This movement, however, was not executed; the want of intelligence and the vacillation which characterised the operations of the French, were again too painfully conspicuous; and though De Failly sent one division through the hill passes to the aid of his colleague, he remained at Bitsche with the bulk of his troops, and left MacMahon completely isolated. Meanwhile that brave, but unfortunate chief, made preparations to resist the attack of the Germans, now evidently impending. It is a misconception to suppose, as some have done, that he advanced recklessly against his foe; what he did was to take and occupy a defensive position on the flank of the Germans, where he could hope to give them battle, under circumstances of the least disadvantage, and De Failly, if he wished, could come to his aid; and we assert, with confidence, that this strategy was the best open to the Duke of Magenta. The marshal by the evening of the 5th had drawn up his forces along the crest of a range which extends from Reichsofen on the left by Woerth to Elsasshausen, and Marbronn on the right, and which, with the stream of the Sauer in front, and with broken ground along the rising slopes, formed a strong position against his enemy. MacMahon's object evidently was to compel the Germans to turn against him, and assail him as they changed their front; he would thus divert them from the road to Strasburg, and engage them as favourably for himself as possible; and at the same time, he as it were summoned the corps of De Failly to join his rear, while he kept open several lines of retreat. These were the arrangements of an able commander; and considering that MacMahon had not more than 50,000 men in his band, his dispositions certainly give proof of the tactical skill for which he is renowned. On the morning of the 6th, the Crown Prince advanced to the attack, with 130,000 men, and not less than 440 guns. As MacMahon had calculated, the change of front, which the Germans were compelled to make, threw their line for some time into confusion; and the French repelled for several hours a somewhat feeble and disunited effort against their left, at and near Reichsofen. Meantime the French centre at Woerth had been engaged; there too, for a considerable time, MacMahon's divisions resisted stoutly, and even for a moment assumed the offensive. But about two o'clock the huge German line had come up on all sides in strength; and the Crown Prince prepared to turn the French wings at both sides, combining with this an attack in front--a movement justified by his superiority in force, but certainly not without hazard. MacMahon, who, at this conjuncture, De Failly not having come up, ought, in our judgment, to have retreated, struck desperately at the German centre at Woerth, thinned by the extension of its flanks; but the French onset was bravely resisted, and indeed it could not have been successful. Ere long the formidable outflanking movement developed itself, and became decisive; and from Reichsofen to beyond Marbronn the dense German columns extended threateningly, and overlapped the whole French position. A sudden panic fell on MacMahon's army; its right and centre gave way; and it was soon a mass of disheartened fugitives, broken on all sides into disunited fragments. Six thousand prisoners and thirty guns were the spoils of the victorious Germans; and for some time the defeated force was annihilated, in a military point of view.