Chapter XX: The Sham Blockade (2)

Had we acted throughout on this dictum the war would most probably have been over well inside of eighteen months. Men of the calibre of this grand old Sea Lord, whose farsight, foresight, and second sight have endeared him to the nation and made him unique and incomparable, would soon have made short work of the war. Yet they were not wanted by the then present-day party-system Government. They were much too blunt and honest and energetically active.

The nation will also remember that when Lord Kitchener of Khartoum returned from the East in the early days of the then present Government, it had no use for his invaluable services. He was actually permitted to accept a directorship of one of our poorest railway companies on the south coast for want of a better occupation.[24] But the Press and the public soon brought the Government to book, as it seemingly had to do in every matter of real national importance.

The Government tried to keep Lord Haldane installed at the War Office, but the Press would have none of it. It also insisted on K. of K. being placed in his proper place and kept there. More's the pity that he was not given a free hand to do as he liked.

The Press also clamoured for Lord Fisher as First Lord of the Admiralty. The nation knows how he was treated. A captain in the Navy aptly described the unwanted and slighted Admiral expert in _John Bull_, February, 1916, as follows:

"Lord John Fisher is to-day our second Nelson--a diplomatist among
diplomats and a strategist unequalled in our history. What has Lord
John Fisher done?

"He scrapped 162 obsolete warships which were rotting in harbour at
great expense--for which the Government tried to reprimand him.

"He introduced the water-tube boilers, which, as every engineer and
seaman knows, raise a full head of steam in twenty minutes, instead
of twenty hours, as formerly.

"He introduced the steam turbine, which was adopted by every
nation.

"He introduced oil fuel into the Navy, thus making destroyers
capable of steaming further, a great benefit being the almost total
absence of smoke. He also applied it to battleships and other large
craft.

"He introduced the Dreadnought, the bulwark of Britain, and the
ship that baffled the German nation and made the Kiel Canal useless
for years. The oil-burning, water-tubed destroyer, and the _Queen
Elizabeth_--the Secret Service ship and the monitor--all emanated
from his brain.

"He introduced the battle-cruiser, against the will of a timorous
Government whose cry was ever, 'Cut down armaments,' 'Cut down the
Army and Navy.' Had Fisher listened, the Germans would to-day have
outraged our wives and crucified our children.

"He planned the Falkland Islands battle, and sent the Secret
Service ships to chase the German submarines out of the Channel. He
fought hard against the Dardanelles expedition.

"He was Sea Lord when we sank the _Blucher_, the German destroyers
in the North Sea, the German Fleet at the Falklands.

"He is a great man, who seems never to have made a mistake."

Whilst Sir Edward Grey was giving his explanations in the House of Commons, Lord Devonport was busy in another place. He is one of our shrewdest and most experienced business men. As Chairman of the Port of London Authority and former Parliamentary Secretary of the Board of Trade, he would not be likely to go into figures lightly.

He had given notice to ask the Government for its official figures of Holland's imports of ore (metal) during 1915.

The Duke of Devonshire replied that the figures provided him were only 650,000 tons. It was admitted that Holland had virtually no smelting plant, nor coal to feed it if it had, and the Government was virtually bound to confess that at least this amount of contraband had mostly gone straight through to Germany.

Lord Devonport clearly stated that in reality one and a half million tons of metal ore had been imported; whilst he produced statistics showing the name of every ship, the date of entry, the place from which the cargo came, the quantity and character of the ore carried, and the agents to whom each was consigned.

To summarise shortly the total shipments for the period named by Lord Devonport, August, 1914, to January 15, 1916, it appears that 298 ships carrying 1,414,311 tons of metal ore entered Rotterdam. The countries from which the ore came included Sweden, Norway, Spain, Algeria, Russia, and Great Britain. The totals shown monthly are as follows:

ORE CARGOES.

1914. No. of Ships. Tons.

August 38 174,162
September 11 61,679
October 10 47,900
November 8 37,300
December 14 63,900
------
Total 384,941

1915.
January 17 76,200
February 17 79,700
March 13 85,800
April 22 123,800
May 17 68,100
June 21 95,350
July 21 89,150
August 19 82,300
September 19 92,400
October 22 105,270
November 13 59,700
December 12 48,300
Total 1,006,070

1916.
To January 15 4 23,800
-------
Grand Total 1,414,311

Two hundred and fifty eight ships carried 1,321,456 tons of iron ore; 25 ships carried 41,830 tons of zinc ore, the remainder taking copper ore, pyrites, nickel, manganese, and calamine.

Lord Devonport added:

"What has come of the much-vaunted order in Council declaring that
no goods should either enter or leave Germany? What is the ultimate
destination of these cargoes? There is no concealment about the
matter. Every captain knows exactly. There are no facilities in
Holland for converting ore into pig-iron; not a single
blast-furnace, and no coal to feed it even if there were.

"The cargoes are transhipped into barges and carried up the Rhine
to a place in easy communication with Essen, where Krupp's works
are situated. Sweden is the main source of the supply. _It is
astounding to me that the British Government should sit still while
these ores are sent to the enemy_ from mines which are virtually
the property of the Swedish Government.

"Great though _the imports of ore into Rotterdam have been, they
are insignificant compared with the importations in German ports_
in the Baltic Sea and the North Sea--Lübeck, Stettin, Swinemunde,
Emden and others. _From May 1st to December 31st, 1915, the total
of those imports were 556 cargoes and 2,089,000 tons of ore._ The
question is going to become critical for, _though the country has
been tolerant and long-enduring, things have not gone too well_.
The sheet-anchor of the situation is the British Fleet."

"The figures," says _Fairplay_, the shipping paper, "sufficiently
indicate the absurdity of supposing that the Netherlands Overseas
Trust or any similar artificial would-be barrier as at present
constituted can, in fact, prevent the enemy from receiving vital
supplies of raw or manufactured material."

Nineteen days after the delivery of Sir Edward Grey's "blockade" speech in the House of Commons Mr. T. Gibson Bowles, speaking at a great City demonstration in London on February 14th, 1917, under Lord Devonport as Chairman and convened for the purpose of protesting against hampering our Navy, said: "Since the war began Sir Edward Grey had hampered, shackled, and strangled the Fleet in the performance of its duties." Whilst Lord Charles Beresford wrote to the Chairman: "If the Government had used our sea power as they were legally entitled to do at the commencement of the war, by instituting an effective blockade and making all goods entering Germany absolute contraband, the war would now be over."

Lord Aberconway added: "The matter is far too serious to be trifled with any longer; my personal knowledge intensifies my conviction."

The Government having attempted to evade any direct answer to the startling figures and accusations of the _Daily Mail_ disclosing the get-rich-quick method of the Scandinavian Goulashes, Lord Northcliffe sent a Special Commissioner to Holland, and published the result of his investigations in February, 1916. It showed a repetition of the sordid Scandinavian fiasco, a further proof that the so-called blockade was leaking in every seam.

To enumerate the masses of statistics would be wearisome. It is sufficient for present purposes to quote a few extracts.

_Cocoa Beans._--Of the 528 tons imported into Holland in 1916 Germany received the whole.

_Cocoa Butter._--England could only obtain half what she had in 1913, whereas Germany obtained five times as much.

_Cocoa Powder._--England obtained half 1913 supplies, whereas Germany obtained approximately ten times as much.

_Cocoa in Blocks._--In 1913 Germany imported 4 tons from Holland, Belgium none at all; whereas in 1915 no less than 565 tons were exported from Holland into these two countries, all for German use.

_Copra._--In 1913 Germany obtained 26,728 tons of copra from Holland, whereas in 1915 the amount rose to the amazing total of 106,613 tons.

It would appear from the figures that England was indirectly supplying Germany _inter alia_ with margarine.

In 1913 Great Britain sent to Holland 1,914 tons of the raw material, as against 6,166 tons in 1916. Germany sent no raw material to Holland during either of the years quoted.

In 1913 Holland exported 308 tons of margarine to Belgium and to Germany 401 tons.

In 1915 Holland exported 7,616 tons to Belgium and 21,721 tons to Germany. _Totals of 709 tons suddenly jumped to 29,237._

_Coffee._--Before the war Germany had always exported coffee to Holland in thousands of tons. During 1915 she sent in none at all, but she imported from Holland 129,968 tons; whilst 32,822 tons in addition were sent to Belgium for German use as against a prior yearly average import of about 8,000 tons.

_N.B._--England, which during 1911, 1912 and 1918 exported a yearly average of 6,720 tons of coffee to Holland, suddenly increased her exports to this country to 15,672 tons in 1914 and to 28,425 tons in 1915.

In March, 1916, Brazil was seizing German ships because she could not collect a trifle of about £4,000,000 owing to her for coffee by the Fatherland.

_Cotton._--In the three years before the war England exported an average of 7,808 tons of unspun cotton to Holland, but in 1915 she sent no less than 22,856 tons. Germany, which _exported_ an average of 33,975 tons before the war, actually _imported_ from Holland direct in 1915 no less than 38,750 tons.

The Commercial Treaty of the Rhine, cunningly made by the clever Teutons before war was declared, prevented the Dutch from even examining any cargoes which were thereunder arranged for direct shipment into Germany; whilst from the very first the workings of the much-boasted arrangement made by our Foreign Office with the Netherlands Overseas Trust _piled up evidence, week by week and month by month, that our so-called blockade was an absolute farce_.

In the famous "Kim" case before the Prize Court, the President, Sir Samuel Evans, made the law quite clear. Figures were placed before the Court to show that the average monthly quantities of lard exported from the United States to all Scandinavia in October and November, 1913, was 427,428 lbs. Within three months of the outbreak of war one company was shipping to Copenhagen alone _considerably over twenty times that quantity in three weeks_.

When it might have been thought that the public had forgotten this complete and overwhelming evidence, Lord Emmott, speaking on behalf of the Government, told the House of Lords that "an abnormal supply to a country is not sufficient reason to stop a cargo." Here was a Government spokesman absolutely contradicting the Prize Court Judge--another unwarrantable interference with the rights of Democracy.

On February 22nd and 23rd, 1916, the House of Lords debated an important motion ably advocated by Lord Sydenham.

"That in conformity with the principle of international law and the legitimate rights of neutrals, more effective use could be made of the Allied Fleets in preventing supplies, directly conducing to the prolongation of the war, from reaching the enemy."

Lord Lansdowne, Lord Emmott and the Marquis of Crewe spoke in defence of the Government, but they brought forward no direct proof to upset the alarming statistics which had been quoted against them. Some figures, however, were given to show that during the last past month a greater activity had been caused, in consequence of which there had been some diminution of imports to Germany; whilst it was further promised that as an attempt to concentrate the general supervision of the War Trades Committee the work should be placed in the hands of one Minister, Lord Robert Cecil, who would be given Cabinet rank.

That Lord Robert Cecil is a man of great ability no one doubts. The stock he springs from is pedigree so far as politics are concerned, but he is a lawyer. For many years past this country has suffered greatly from a glut of lawyer politicians, particularly in the unwieldy Cabinet of twenty-three members. The nation remembered only too well how this noble lord had fought so strenuously and so persistently against cotton being made contraband. His appointment therefore to this post of vital importance, which could influence, affect and control the duration of the war to such a great extent, was strongly objected to by the public at large. Neither the act nor the man carried an iota of confidence.

To have seriously attacked the Government and put it out of office would have raised a general outcry. It was considered disloyal even to criticise. "Wait and see" was the only policy Englishmen were permitted to contemplate. Meanwhile this farce, this weakness or this cowardly inaction, whichever epithet is most appropriate to it, was permitted to drift its course. Gleefully the Germans continued to annex the rich cod and herring harvests of Norway, nor did they cavil at the super-price. Gleefully the Norwegian fishermen continued to rake in the deluge of gold, the like of which had never been known within the memory of man. Gleefully the Goulashes of Scandinavia continued to increase and multiply, whilst they prospered and waxed exceedingly rich, in spite of a few widely-proclaimed spectacular fines and confiscations. The advertisements in the papers of neutral countries offering to supply necessities direct into Germany also continued and spread, like the proverbial grain of mustard-seed, until the very mails were glutted with contraband.

One of these multitudinous advertisements is given as an example. It is from the _Fatherland_, March 29th, 1916, the subsidised German-American weekly published in New York:

FOOD TO GERMANY.

DELIVERED THROUGH MY FIRM AT STUTTGART.

Can condensed milk 30 cents
Fruit marmalades, per pound 35 cents
Fifty cigars $2.00
One pound of rice 40 cents
One pound of bacon 75 cents
One pound of lard 70 cents
One pound of cheese 25 cents
100 cigarettes $1.70

Also dried fruits, beans, peas, etc. Invigorating wines for sick and wounded.

Information and price lists on request.

E. R. TRIELER, Dept. F. 35-37, West 23rd St., New York.

No wonder Lord Grimthorpe, after quoting an influential Frenchman's opinion that "England had muscles of iron but brains of wool," argued that, instead of bringing more lawyers into the management, the country would be much more satisfied if the Ministry of Blockade was put into the hands of a fighting man like Lord Beresford or Lord Fisher.

Those in the Secret Service knew that since the outbreak of war Germans had employed only soldiers and sailors to manage it; and that all their lawyers and civilian politicians had been relegated to a back seat until further notice; furthermore, that only proved ability counted. Patronage, length of service, hereditary and social altitude carried no weight whatsoever at Berlin; whilst the capacity for organisation and thoroughness which Germany exhibited had astonished the world.

Yea, verily, it is a true saying that "Britishers are the greatest muddlers on earth." It seems to be their grim bulldog pertinacity only which pulls them through, and their individuality which gives them the stamina to stay.

As the winter turned to spring and the spring to summer other terrible disasters arose which diverted the attention of the nation from the bogus blockade. Mr. Asquith's "one bright spot," the Mesopotamia expedition, turned to gall and wormwood; the terrible Gallipoli fiasco shocked the nation; the pampered Irish rebels appeared in their true colours; the careless sacrifice of a man whom many believed to be one of the noblest and greatest of Army Chiefs (K. of K.) this world had ever seen, paralysed and numbed every English-speaking land; whilst German spies were still permitted to press their deadly finger-prints upon our national throat owing to our unbelievable weakness in neglecting to intern all aliens of belligerent nationality.

Meanwhile the Press continued to growl and to publish statistics from time to time to prove that the so-called blockade was still as great a farce as ever; furthermore, it was absolutely and utterly ineffective to stop supplies going to Germany. Whilst Ministers and Members of the Government still had the audacity to refer to its alleged effectiveness and to call attention to the unenviable plight of starving Germany.

All true Englishmen should gratefully thank God that we had at least one man amongst the few real men who had the courage of his convictions, namely, Mr. W. M. Hughes, the Australian Premier. He, during his all too short sojourn in the Motherland, rendered noble, great and patriotic service. He called with an unmistakable voice at the British Imperial Council of Commerce in London, on June 8th, 1916, for a real blockade. He said: "Do you realise the tremendous pile of treasure we are pouring out in this contest? Do you think that any nation, no matter how wealthy, can stand indefinitely such a strain on its wealth? It cannot. We are living like spendthrifts, upon our capital. There must come a day when we can no longer live upon it. I want to emphasise the point that we cannot continue this struggle indefinitely. The blockade is one great weapon at our disposal--one of the most effective weapons for shortening the duration of the war--by increasing the pressure upon the enemy. _If the blockade had been effective earlier it would have curtailed the war._ We now have the power, as Mr. Balfour said, to make that blockade still more effective, and whatever stands in the way of making that blockade effective against the enemy and against neutrals must be swept aside. _We have to choose between offending neutrals and inviting defeat._ We have to choose between pouring out our treasure and losing the lives of thousands of our best and bravest. Let us hedge around this nation (Germany) a ring of triple steel through which nothing shall pass. I have been told there are still things going out of Britain to Germany. I am told the reason given is that we are getting German money in exchange. That argument does not appeal to me. I would not tolerate the practice for another hour. I would treat those who engage in it as I would treat any other traitor to his country. Therefore insist upon the blockade being such a blockade as will compel our enemies to recognise the power of Britain and the Allies."

Lord Hugh Cecil, the Blockade Minister, does not appear to have been amongst those present at this memorable gathering. More's the pity of it! Had he been perhaps he might have had his eyes opened at last to the folly and inefficiency of his previous policy and foolishly expressed fallacies.

To the probable relief and secret joy of the Cabinet, and to the irreparable loss of the nation, Mr. W. M. Hughes was in the early summer of 1916 compelled to return to his duties in Australia. After his regretted departure the so-called blockade continued to leak, as is proved by the following facts and figures which found their way into the Press in spite of all the hushing-up processes of the weaklings in power. Can it be wondered at that many thousands of astounded Englishmen were actually beginning to believe that some of our prominent Ministers did not want to win the war because they were either indirectly interested financially in Teutonic enterprise, or they were pro-German from other mysteriously concealed causes? What other possible reasons seemed arguable in view of their extraordinary actions, their leaving undone those things which they ought to have done, and their doing those things which they ought not to have done?

How German production steadily revived from the shock of the first year of the war is shown by the following table of pig-iron output in tons published in the _Berliner Tageblatt_:

1914. 1915. 1916.
January 1,566,505 874,133 1,077,046
February 1,445,511 803,623 1,033,683
March 1,602,714 938,438 1,114,194
April 1,534,429 938,679 1,073,706
May 1,607,211 985,968
June 1,531,826 993,496
July 1,561,944 1,047,503
August 587,661 1,050,610
September 580,087 1,033,078
October 734,841 1,076,343
November 788,956 1,019,122
December 858,881 1,029,144

Asking the Prize Court on June 5th, 1916, to condemn the Swedish vessel _Hakan_, of Gothenburg, with her cargo of 3,238 barrels of salted herrings, the Attorney-General, Sir F. E. Smith, alleged that the fish were intended for Germany. Writing from Lübeck to Gottfried Friedrichs, fishmongers, of Altona, said the Attorney-General, a member of the firm of Witte & Co., their forwarding agents, said: "We have prohibited the export of herrings from Norway, but our firm has obtained a licence to export 50,000 tons. We hope to sell 75,000 tons this winter, so there is plenty of work."

Sir Samuel Evans: How many herrings in 50,000 tons?

The Attorney-General: My assistants and confederates inform me that there are about 450,000,000 herrings. It is a conservative estimate.

These are official figures published by the Netherlands Statistical Department on May 20th, 1916; such great assistance rendered to Germany is more serious owing to the fact that Germany's gain has been our loss.

FOODSTUFFS SENT FROM HOLLAND, IN TONS.

(Covering the months January to April.)

EGGS-- 1914. 1916.
To Germany 3,101 11,825
To Britain 2,733 557

FISH--
To Germany 21,337 29,378
To Belgium -- --

MEAT--
To Germany 4,156 30,621
To Britain 25,460 555

POTATO FLOUR and its products--
To Germany 13,991 43,861
To Britain 8,831 5,520

COFFEE--
To Germany 17,429 39,684

COCOA POWDER--
To Germany 598 3,302
To Britain 2,155 1,437

BUTTER--
To Germany 4,010 10,237
To Britain 1,387 33

CHEESE--
To Germany 4,120 25,437
To Britain 5,624 407

One has only to cast the eye down these figures to see what Holland means as a depôt for Germany's food.

During the first four months of 1916 Holland had imported by consent of Great Britain 432,702 tons of cereals. No less than 283,792 tons were re-exported from Holland and consequently did not go into home consumption there; 272,630 tons of this went over into Belgium. It is important, also, to note that of the cereals imported 102,722 tons of maize were included in the total. Most of this maize was used for fattening pigs, which were eventually slaughtered and sent to Germany.

This abundance of pig food allowed by us to be consumed by the Dutch pigs in fact enabled the Dutch to fatten the immense supply which they sent over to Germany. The meat figures given above must be read in the light of this fact.

The more we sent into Holland for her home supply, the more she could release of her home-grown products to the enemy. As between Holland, Germany and ourselves, we lost tremendously. Germany and Holland were of immense assistance to each other, at our expense.

A weekly circular of the London Rice Brokers' Association shows the following striking contrasts in exports from London:

EXPORTS OF RICE FROM LONDON.

January 1st to May 27th, 1915. Same period, 1916.

Cwt. Cwt.
To Holland 247,869 905,078
(say 45,000 tons)
To France 22,607 430

Thus the export to Holland had greatly increased and the supply to France had dwindled almost out of existence. During the single week ended May 27th, 1916, 224,252 cwt. (say 11,212 tons) were shipped to Holland from London.

On June 2nd, 1916, the London Press wailed over the enormous supplies of grain entering Germany through Roumania, which she was enabled to purchase by exchanging goods made from the raw material permitted so kindly by England to leak through the blockade.

In April one consignment of 1,500,000 eggs passed from Holland to Germany in two days only. Indeed, so vast was the drain of Germany upon Holland that the Dutch people complained in June that they were being stinted of their proper food supply. Norway continued to supply nickel, fish, copper, fish oils, and many other things, although England at last awoke in the spring of 1916 to the advisability of purchasing part of the Norwegian fish harvests. In this deal, however, her lawyer Government had not the sense to consult the best export fish merchants, who are essentially business men. She went to work in the usual amateurish way, which spelt reckless waste and extravagance; paying £5 to £7 per package for what could have been previously arranged for at about 10s. or less.

The English Government throughout the war had the Norwegian fish trade absolutely in its own hands. Yet one of its own Consuls supplied Germany wholesale in 1914; it supplied coal and salt to assist the Germans to garner in practically the entire harvest of 1915; and it was not until the middle of 1916 that some English sluggard in power woke up and paid through the nose for what could have been purchased practically on our own terms.

Sweden continued to supply almost everything and anything that Germany required, openly when possible, smuggled in by all manner of tricks and dodges should any difficulty of transport be likely to arise.

At the end of June, 1916, a Liverpool merchant contributed some remarkable facts and figures to the _Liverpool Courier_, proving that England was helping Germany to obtain what she required at the expense of the home consumer in England. The net result of his arguments was that our shipping and home ports were congested for several months by Dutch imports through private arrangements between Holland and England, whereby Holland was supplying Germany to a colossal extent and frustrating the supreme purposes of the so-called blockade. In conclusion, he plaintively besought the nation to adopt the strangle-knot of Mr. Hughes by so tightening the blockade that Holland would no longer be able to provide the Germans with food for her peoples and materials for the manufacture of guns and explosives to slaughter our sons.

The tables of figures quoted showed in glaring contrast the usual enormous increases of imports upon pre-war returns which the British reader had grown quite accustomed to see. To give but one example: the shipments of margarine from Holland to Germany during 1915 showed thirteen times greater, etc.

On July 20th, 1916, during the hearing of a case in the London Prize Court relating to the S.S. _Maracus_, the Solicitor-General (Sir George Cave) read an affidavit by Mr. John Hargreaves, provision merchant, Liverpool, stating that in 1915 the price of lard in Germany was 100s. per cwt., as against 50s. in Liverpool. At that price there was an inducement to American shippers to risk shipment to Germany, and to German buyers to open credits in New York. Should the American shipper succeed in getting two shipments through, he might well make a large profit which would amply compensate him for the loss of one shipment, apart from his chance of recovering compensation from the British Government.

An affidavit by Mr. R. M. Greenwood, Assistant Treasury Solicitor, showed the imports of foodstuffs into Copenhagen during the first six months of 1915 as compared with the similar period of 1913. The figures were:

1913. 1915.
PORK 948,400 lbs. 15,062,060 lbs.
LARD 3,999,700 " 23,458,720 "
OLEO 2,509,900 " 8,775,750 "

The evidence in the case proved that the ship was bound for Germany and her captain had been promised a bonus of £200 if the goods reached their destination.

On June 28th, 1916, Lord Robert Cecil in reply to a question in the House of Commons, said:

"As the result of the Paris Conference His Majesty would be advised to issue an Order in Council withdrawing the successive Orders which had been issued adopting with modifications the Declaration of London, and a general statement should also be issued explaining the reason for this step."

Amidst the loud cheering which followed a voice was heard to exclaim, "After twenty-three months!"

How Potsdam must have hugged itself with delight in 1909, 1910, and 1911 at the absurdly childish simplicity exhibited by the English Liberal Government in nullifying all its geographical advantages by accepting such a one-sided code of sea-law which gave Germany the right to stop food _en route_ to British ports, while forbidding Great Britain to stop food _en route_ to Germany, and whilst in force rendered any effective blockade of Germany impossible.

But what powerful mysterious motives prompted its re-adoption after it had been rejected by the House of Lords? Again on August 20th, 1914, why did the Cabinet illegally put it into force with modifications--though Article 65 thereof states that the code is indivisible?

What was held in the unseen hand and to whom was it extended?

On August 2nd, 1916, M. Clemenceau published an article in _L'Homme Enchainé_, headed, "A Fresh Assassination," in which, after commenting upon the brutal murders of Nurse Cavell and the innocent Captain Fryatt, he wrote:

"It is time that Great Britain made the weight of her will felt, especially as regards the strict application of the blockade, which, has too often been relaxed out of a desire not to arouse an unpleasant quarrel with Washington. It is time to end these half-measures. We must make up our minds as to what to do, and do it."

On July 6th, 1916, Lord Robert Cecil admitted in the House of Commons, in reply, what was tantamount to a confession that the British Fleet employed in the blockade was still muzzled, being bound down by red-tape precedents and strict London directions.

On July 9th he was further compelled to confess that 10,708 tons of lard had been permitted to enter Belgium, as well as about 2,000 tons of tallow and other fats. Nominally this was fathered by the Neutral Relief Committee, but in reality it was just so much more assistance granted to the enemy.

FAT (FOR EXPLOSIVES) IN TONS

In the early part of 1914 Germany exported lard to Holland, but this ceased on the eve of war. Great Britain, on the other hand, for some extraordinary and unintelligible reason, permitted her exports to Holland to increase. These are the figures:

From Germany. From Great Britain.
1914 861 660
1915 Nil 6,591
1916 Nil 12,273

BARLEY FOR MALT

In 1916 Great Britain exported to Holland about fifteen times more barley than normal pre-war exports, so diminishing our home supplies that the British working-man was deprived of his national beverage through shortage and prohibitive prices. Whisky also was similarly affected.

TOBACCO

The Christian spirit of "love your neighbours and your enemies better than yourselves" had apparently no limits with the British Government. Their loyal and hard-suffering subjects were deprived of a full supply of the soothing weed on the excuse of economising freight room, but no effort seems to have been made to curtail _Dutch supplies_, which were _thirty-five times greater than the pre-war exports_.

In 1914 Hamburg and Bremen exported 4,544 tons of tobacco to Holland, but in 1915 and 1916 neither of these towns exported any at all.

The amounts exported by Holland from January to June in tons were as follows:

To Great Britain. To Germany.
1914 1,611 31,891
1915 1,672 54,456
1916 923 96,931

The figures published by the German Steel and Iron Manufacturers Association for the first six months of each respective year show the following outputs, thanks to Sir Francis Oppenheimer's previous Netherlands Overseas Trust, which permits iron ore in millions of tons to proceed direct to Krupps' and other blast furnaces in Germany without let or hindrance to be used against us.

PIG IRON
Tons
1915 5,530,000
1916 6,497,000

STEEL

1915 6,187,000
1916 7,756,000

The _Lokal Anzeiger_, July 28th, 1916, remarked: "These figures constitute a most gratifying state of affairs in respect of the _requirements of the German Armies_." No wonder the captured German officer remarked: "You English will always be fools, whilst we Germans can never be gentlemen"!

In August[25] a Mr. E. Bell, of 12, Yarborough Road, Lincoln, wrote to the Press as follows:

"The talk of tightening the blockade of Germany is rather futile in
face of the following Board of Trade figures referring to cotton
yarn exported from the United Kingdom to the following neutral
countries:

JUNE Sweden Norway Denmark Holland Switzerland
1914 108,900 218,700 106,400 3,220,800 722,600
1915 260,800 348,300 204,700 4,493,300 1,788,800
1916 279,200 508,200 598,400 7,539,800 1,304,100

"Germany is obviously getting the surplus."

The values[26] of New York exports taken for the week July 30th to August 5th are equally startling:

1915. 1916.
New York to £ £
Norway 1,884 137,176
Holland 713 717,601
Holland and Scandinavia 123,327 970,255

On August 26th, 1916, an agreement was signed between the Dutch Fishing Association and the British Government regarding the release of some 120 to 150 Dutch fishing-boats laid up in Scottish ports, whereby not more than 20 per cent. of their catch shall be permitted to go to Germany. Of the remainder twenty per cent. was to be retained for home consumption, and sixty per cent. sold to neutral countries. On each barrel of this sixty per cent. the good, kind, benevolent British Government agreed to pay a subsidy of 30s. to the Dutch boat-owners.

Now the D.F.A. owned about 850 vessels and 1,000 barrels is a good average season's catch!

In addition to this arrangement the British Government agreed to pay full compensation for their loss of part of the season, to be calculated on the basis of the returns on an average season. They also agreed to pay for any damage which might have happened to the interned boats.[27]

One wonders what British fishermen whose vessels have been commandeered had to say when they were informed of these facts.

The _Hamburger Nachrichten_ of August 23rd, 1916, published a telegram from its Hague correspondent declaring that the semi-official German Central Purchase Company was seizing Dutch food in enormous quantities; that local merchants were in a state of alarm and threatening Government interference; and their correspondent defiantly stated: "The Netherlands Government will hardly dream of interfering with the activity of the Dutch Bureau of the German Central Purchase Company, the operations of which are assuming larger and larger dimensions."

To add further proof of the utter futility and hollow sham of the alleged blockade safeguards, namely, the Danish Association Agreement and the Netherlands Overseas Trust, Sir Henry Dalziel informed the House of Commons on August 22nd, 1916, that in June Denmark imported _over ten times as much cotton yarn_ as in June, 1913, and that in the first six months of the present year Holland exported to Germany _over twenty times as much butter_ as in the first six months of 1914, nearly _eight times as much cheese_, and _over seven times as much meat_.

The unfortunate Lord Robert Cecil in mid-August gave quite a eulogistic report upon his stewardship as Blockade Minister, which was immediately followed by the arrival from New York of the Custom House returns showing that during the week ending August 5th the value of the exports to Holland, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark was _eight times_ as _great_ as in the corresponding week of the preceding year. To Holland the exports had increased in value _a thousandfold_ and to Norway _seventy-fivefold_.

On September 1st, 1916, the Government, through the War Trade Statistical Department, issued to the Press an official Memorandum on the question of the efficacy of the British blockade.

It barely amounted to the proverbial half-truth, and was pitiably feeble. It was more than unfortunate that the Government should rush into print just before the United States export figures were due for publication--only a week later.

These latter reliable statistics showed an extraordinary state of affairs:

EXPORTS FROM U.S.A.

1914. 1915. 1916.
£ £ £
To Norway 1,813,400 7,815,000 10,735,600
" Sweden 2,928,800 15,654,800 10,387,800
" Denmark 3,134,000 15,964,800 11,132,400
" Holland 22,443,200 28,653,400 19,852,600
" Switzerland 204,000 547,200 1,631,200

The _Telegraaf_, Amsterdam's leading journal, on September 11th, 1916, quoted Governmental statistics to account for the excessive rise in price of her home products, concluding by the statement that "Holland has sold her livelihood for greater war profits"; whilst all the Dutch Press seemed to deplore mildly the vast and unmanageable manner in which the smuggling of goods over the German frontier was permitted to continue.

The figures for meat, cheese, eggs, vegetables, and butter showed an average _increased export of seventy-five per cent._ on preceding years. Practically every ounce went to Germany or to territory under her rule.

On September 12th, 1916, Reuter's representative at the Hague was able to announce that: "The Dutch Overseas Trust had obtained the release of 420 tons of Kapok, Java cotton, and had also succeeded in removing the difficulties in the way of the importation of cocoa-beans."

Such paragraphs as the above could be found repeatedly by anyone who chose to search the Press. No wonder the smouldering wrath of the long-suffering British public became fanned to a flame and its confidence in its so-called representative Ministers correspondingly decreased.

On September 9th, 1916, the Foreign Office issued a notice that no further export licenses or further facilities would be given by H.M.G. for the importation of certain specified commodities until further notice. The list embraced scores of foods, but, in fact, was merely another patch to the very ragged mantle covering the so-called blockade.

On September 12th, 1916, the War Trade Statistical Department made another feeble attempt in public to refute the statistics quoted by the Press. It set out specious and plausible arguments why general conclusions should be drawn in a light more favourable to our interests. It gave no denials nor suggested that the figures quoted were not correct. It was a fretful official apology, a tacit admission of weakness and inefficiency.

A casual remark was made by a really able German in the Wilhelmstrasse on English policy in regard to Germany, to Mr. D. T. Curtin, as reported by him in the _Times_, October 21st, 1916.

"He said to me:

"'When the war began we thought it would be a fight between the
German Army and the British Navy. That was the cause of the
outbreak of German anger against England on August 4th, 1914. As
time went on we found that the English Government drew the teeth of
its Navy and enabled us to get in through the then so-called
blockade supplies of cotton, copper, lubricating oil, wool' (here
he named some twenty commodities) 'in a sufficiency that will last
us many long months yet. How different would have been our position
to-day if the British Navy had controlled the blockade as we had
every reason to fear it would! We can and will hold out for a long
time, thanks to their blunders.'

"Blockade policy, prisoner policy, enemy trade control, the
Zeppelin reprisal policy--all these are puzzles to the rulers of
Germany. All are taken as part and parcel of their belief of your
desire to curry favour with them and your fear of their
after-the-war trade struggle.

"The average German holds similar views as to America's fear of the
Kaiser's Army and Navy after the war. They frankly tell us that it
will be our turn next."

On October 25th, 1916, Mr. D. T. Curtin explained in the _Times_ how, when he was in Germany, a neutral and pro-Ally resident of a certain port in Germany with whom he discussed things took him for a walk and showed him the quays. There were not hundreds, but thousands of barrels of fats. "It almost makes me weep," he said, "to know that every one of these barrels lengthens the war and destroys the lives of gallant soldiers and their officers." And apart from the public evasions of the blockade is the secret smuggling--difficult to deal with.

A day or so previously Mr. Curtin had written: "Every bar of chocolate entering Germany prolongs the war, which I know from my own personal necessities. The Allies and the Government should realise the great value of the utmost pressure of the blockade."

It was not until December, 1916, that the rising tide of public feeling threatened to burst the banks of reasonable control.

On the first day of that month a crowded meeting of City business men was held in the Cannon Street Hotel under the presidency of Lord Leith of Fyvie to protest against the slackness of the Government and terrible blunders which were far too serious to openly discuss; in particular to insist that "the British Navy be set free to exercise to the full all its lawful sea powers." Startling disclosures were made, and the Government, which had twice restored itself after its legal expiration, was characterised as worn-out and stale, unable to make peace any more than it was able to make war; sentiments which were unanimously acclaimed.

Almost the entire British Press echoed this condemnation, and the Haldane group, recognising that discretion was the better part, awoke at last from its delusions of the value placed by the nation upon their personal services, and after a few feeble remonstrances retired in favour of a new Cabinet. "Wait and see" was compelled to give place to "Do it now."

Mr. Asquith the Unready, Lord Grey of Falloden, the Irresolute, Lord Haldane, the friend of the Kaiser, and the Simonite group of backers, who for fifteen unlucky years had so grievously and disastrously led the country astray; who had cut down armaments, hoodwinked the nation, and when war was declared held back conscription, muzzled the Fleet and were too late for everything, were at last fallen from doing further mischief, and the nation breathed its prayers of thankfulness.

Of the late Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith) one able editor wrote:

"Never before in all our history have such opportunities been
given. He had no opposition; the nation was solid; the Empire was
behind him. No country has ever given any leader such devotion and
none has ever seen its devotion so carelessly wasted. Declaring he
would 'stick at nothing,' he stuck at everything, and moved only
when he was pushed."[28]

What Germany thought of the change is reflected in an extract from its Press when it first heard of the resignation of Mr. David Lloyd George from the War Office, and it was under the belief that the Haldane group had triumphed over him.

The Bavarian _Courier_, December 5th, 1916, said: "This is a terrible disaster for the war party in England," whilst the Leipzig _Tageblatt_ said: "The British people have doubtless had enough of this war agitator. His fall from power brings nearer an honourable peace for Germany."

Within a few days of Mr. Lloyd George being created Prime Minister of England the Kaiser was seeking peace. _Res ipsa loquitur._

* * * * *

What has been given is merely a rough and very deficient resumé of England's sham blockade, which was permitted to muddle along its costly, tragic, and fatal course until the Americans joined the Allies in their fight for freedom and the rights of small nations. Washington at once swept aside maudlin sentiment by its practical common sense, get-right-there-quick decisions.

The nation's relief cannot be expressed in words.

Was it to be wondered at that from the soul of the Motherland prayers had so long and so often ascended?

"Oh, for a man of the old, old Viking blood to lead and direct the battle in place of those poor craven lawyer politicians in the Cabinet of the never-to-be-forgotten twenty-three!"

Indeed, this was the darkest hour before the dawn.

The autumn of 1916 saw the advent of the magic of the Wizard from Wales. To him all honour is due.

For some years prior to the war he had been perhaps the most hated man England had ever known. He had helped to minimise the Army, the Navy, and the House of Lords; he had led people to believe it was almost a crime to own land; he had descended to the lowest levels of vulgar abuse regarding our most sacred traditions; he had helped rob the Church in his native land; he had become despised by the noblest and best of his fellow-countrymen. His sole ambition, apparently, had been to gain the popularity of the masses--a transient glory which might fade in an hour. He had attained the position almost of a deity with the extreme Radical and Socialistic Mob.

But, in this hour of Great Britain's direst peril, he valiantly came forth. He buckled on his armour of undaunted courage and vast ability. He put his whole heart and soul into the fight, absolutely ignoring what effect his actions might have upon his recent followers, forgetting all his schemes of lifelong planning, and concentrating all his vast abilities and ceaseless, untiring energies upon one single concrete thought, one hope, one ideal--Victory.

Like that greatest of all the heroes of ancient Rome--_Venit, vidit, vicit_. Veritably he proved himself a man.

* * * * *

What a pity it is that since those days he has not adjusted himself to this changed world and seized the opportunities for real statesmanship that lie in this era of reconstruction!

FOOTNOTES:

[19] Completed on November 19th, 1915.

[20] The following illuminating advertisement also appeared in the _Neue Freie Presse_ of January 16:

"FOR SALE.

40 tons prime beef, fresh packed in ice from Holland.
Condensed milk from ---- Amsterdam.
Raspberry jam.
China tea, 25 chests.
Soap, 20 to 40 per cent. fatty matter, 8 wagons.
Sausages from ---- Holland.
Cement, linseed oil, a wagon of each every week from ---- Denmark.
Apply, etc."

Not far away from the above advertisement in the same paper is another.

"Soup extract, 2½d. a cube. Soup vegetables, Julienne, 1s. 8d. per lb., China tea (Souchong), 5s. per lb., just come from a Danish export house."

[21] "Apparently the Declaration of London was valid in the House of Commons, but not valid in the House of Lords."--Lord Beresford, House of Lords, February 23rd, 1916.

[22] In referring to the keeping of Government pledges, Sir A. Markham (L.) said: "The only thing the Prime Minister has stuck to has been his salary."--House of Commons, March, 1916.

[23] _Goulashe_ is the name given to illicit traders with Germany.

[24] Books on the life of Lord Kitchener of Khartoum do not dwell upon this unpardonable fact. Some discreetly omit to mention it.

[25] _Daily Mail_, August 16th, 1916.

[26] _Evening News_, August 24th, 1916.

[27] _Daily Mail_, August 28th, 1916.

[28] _Daily Mail_ leading article, December 6th, 1916.

L'ENVOI

Before parting with my reader I feel an apology is due from me, not for anything I have written, but for what I have left unsaid.

I admit this book is an amalgam, and far from being what it might have been, had circumstances not required the exercise of considerable restraint on the part of the writer.

Staunch loyalty to his native land is the least return every true-born British subject can make for his birthright; and just as in carrying out the investigations entrusted to me, I ever kept in mind that the one and only object of my existence for the time being was to help my country, so in compiling the preceding chapters I have been compelled, by what in a higher sphere would be called reasons of State, to suppress many facts and incidents which would, I make no doubt, have constituted interesting reading matter.

I have striven to give nothing away that could be construed directly or indirectly against my country. I have touched, lightly, yet I trust sufficiently, upon the canker spots that I so fervently hope and pray may in time be eradicated from our system of home and foreign affairs.

I may have added to my roll of enemies, yet I rejoice in the consolation that by my actions I know I have brought to me many true and great friends.

My readers may complain that the narrative portion of the book dealing with detailed adventures could well have been extended, and that the discursive semi-political portion could well have been curtailed.

I sympathise exceedingly with them to that extent, but if they knew all they would, I am sure, sympathise even more deeply with me in the difficulties which have arisen regarding the publication of these remnants of my knowledge which are now placed before them. The book, as it is, consists of but the fragments of a tale untold.

Had I been dealing with a foreign country as a foreigner, what a different word-film I could have unrolled!--whilst it must not be forgotten that I hope to re-visit in the future the countries mentioned. Were I permitted to record all the happenings of the past I might find such a return too eagerly awaited and the welcome accorded might be open to various interpretations by the Powers-that-be.

It is extraordinary but nevertheless true that there are people who entertain doubtful feelings regarding anyone who has undertaken Secret Service work. Some even suggest that such a person, male or female, could only be classified as a spy, a person to be shunned and avoided. What ignorance! What little-mindedness!

When the country had declared war and we knew that the long-anticipated war with Germany had become an established fact, what Englishman, worthy of the name, could rest without dreams of active service? Who hesitated to question the service? When I failed again and again for enlistment by reason of age and was told to apply to Lord Grey direct, I had a tinge of suspicion that if I did have the luck to be found acceptable it would probably be for foreign intelligence work.

A bald statement of fact that such work was or is contemptible could only spring from a craven-souled individual who would probably shrink from his country's call in any event; from some narrow-minded, over-indulgent stay-at-home; or from some pompous, self-exalted incompetent, whose ideas of men and things are beneath contempt indeed.

Secret Service is essentially a service of isolated individuality. A member is not supposed to know, nor permitted if possible to know, other members, beyond those whom he must of necessity meet; yet I knew many more active members than my C.O. had any knowledge or any intention that I should know.

All those whom I had the honour of meeting I found to be men of honour, men whom I am proud to have met. I do not care to express any opinion concerning the ladies, because it is very certain that the more a man studies women the less he really knows of their true nature.

The men in responsible positions (I do not attempt to include the underlings employed in casual cases) I found in every instance to be unflinchingly loyal and true to their country over every other consideration. I will give an instance of this extremeness. An officer in the Army, whom I would unhesitatingly have trusted with my honour and my life, was working with me in a dangerous undertaking. To safeguard us both, so far as I could, I suggested that we should form an absolute alliance, for life or death. He solemnly agreed, but he made one stipulation. It was that, if he received a peremptory order from home to put an effective stop to my further services, he should, very reluctantly indeed, but without the smallest hesitation, shoot me without warning. He hastened to add: "You know, old chap, I need not express my known feelings to you, but I am a soldier of the King. I have to obey my orders, and when my country is at war I would shoot my whole family without question, if so ordered from H.Q." I knew he meant it.

I read an account of the capture of this friend by the Germans in Finland--I knew what that meant. I mourned his loss for two whole years. Poor devil! How I pitied him and his fate! But the Secret Service is ever one of surprise and surprises. On April 7th, 1920, I received a letter from the much-lamented departed, "chipping" me in great glee, adding that he had left this branch of service only a few months after I myself had retired hurt, because, to use his own words, "the War Office refused to give me any honours of any kind."

As would be expected, he went straight out to France, where his valour in the field immediately earned some half-dozen mentions in despatches, the D.S.O. and other decorations. Knowing his bravery, skill, and marvellous work whilst abroad in the Secret Service, it seems unbelievable that Home Authorities (who apparently decorated every inmate of the Whitehall Offices, and even telephone girls who retained their stools whilst Zepps were about!) could wilfully ignore such services as his.

That this was not an exceptional case, I may add that I do not know, nor have I ever heard of, even one solitary honour or recognition being bestowed by our own Government upon a soul who _actively served abroad in the Foreign Secret Service_; although I do know of highly-coveted decorations being offered and given from abroad, which would-be recipients declined, or dare not accept, because of those above and around them.

Personally I doubt whether any responsible member of the British Foreign Secret Service ever really troubled himself one iota about such trivial matters as decorations--as such. An ambition to climb to the highest rung of acknowledged service to one's country was another matter.