Chapter IV: Part 4

Thus we have enumerated all the animals of the old continent, to which the common name of ape has been given, though they are not only of very distant species, but even of very different genera. But what has completed the error and confusion in the arrangement of these animals is, that the names of _ape_, _cynocephalus_, _kébos_, _cercopithecos_, which were invented by the Greeks fifteen hundred years ago, have been given to animals of the new continent, which have been discovered within these two or three centuries. They knew not that the animals of Africa and of the East Indies, were not to be found in the southern parts of the new continent. Animals have been found in America with hands and fingers, and this character alone was thought sufficient to give them the appellation of apes, without considering that for transferring a name it was requisite that the animals should be of the same genus, and to apply it justly, of the same identical species. Now the animals of America, of which we shall form two classes, by the names of _sapajous_ and _sagoins_, are very different from all the monkeys of Asia and Africa; and in the same manner as there are neither apes, monkeys, nor baboons, to be found in the new continent, so likewise there are neither the sapajous nor sagoins to be found in the old. Though we have already mentioned these facts in general, in our dissertation concerning the animals of the two continents, we can here prove it in a more particular manner, and demonstrate, that of seventeen species, to which number we may reduce all the ape species in the old continent, and of twelve or thirteen, to which this name of ape has been transferred in the new, there is not any of them alike, or to be found in both continents, for of the seventeen in the old we must first retrench three or four of the apes, who do not exist in America, and to whom the sapajous and the sagoins have no resemblance. Secondly, we must also retrench three or four of the baboons, which are much larger than the sagoins or the sapajous, and also of a very different form; there remains, therefore, only nine monkeys of the old continent with whom any comparison can be made. Now this species of monkeys, as well as the apes and baboons, have particular and general characters, which entirely separate them from the sapajous and sagoins. The first of these characters consists in the rump being bare, on which are natural callosities peculiar to those parts. The second is the having pouches on each side of the jaw, in which the animal can store its food. The third is in the make of the nostrils, which are narrow, and the apertures placed in the under parts, like those of man. The sapajous and sagoins have not one of these characters. The partition between their nostrils is very thick, and the apertures are placed on the sides of the nose, and not below it. They have hair on their posteriors, and no callosities; they have no pouches on each side of their jaws; and hence these animals differ not only in species but even in genus, since they have not any of the general characters common to the whole tribe of monkeys; and this difference in genus supposes still greater in the species, and demonstrates them to be quite distinct from each other.

The names of ape and monkey, therefore, have been very improperly applied to the sapajous and the sagoins. We must preserve their original names, and instead of ranking them with the apes, we should begin by comparing them together. These two families differ from each other by a very remarkable character. All the sapajous make use of their tails like a finger to hang by, and to procure what they cannot reach with their hands. The sagoins, on the contrary, cannot make use of their tail in that manner. Their face, ears, and hair, are also different; we may, therefore, very properly divide them into two distinct races.

Avoiding the use of denominations, which can only be applied to the monkey, baboon, or ape, we have endeavoured to indicate the sapajous and the sagoins by the names they bear in their native country. We are acquainted with six or seven species of sapajous, and six of the sagoins, most of which have varieties. We have carefully searched after their names in all authors, and particularly in the writings of observant travellers who have first mentioned them, because, in general, the names which any one of them have in their native country is derived from some particular character, which alone was sufficient to distinguish it from all the rest. With respect to the varieties, which in this class of animals are, perhaps, more numerous than the species, we have endeavoured to refer each to its respective species. We have had in our possession forty of these animals alive, differing from each other in a greater or less degree, and from a particular and attentive examination of which, we think the whole may be reduced to thirty species, viz. three apes, and one intermediate species between them and the baboons; three baboons, and one intermediate species between them and the monkeys; nine monkeys, seven sapajous, and six sagoins; the rest, or at least the greatest part of them, ought to be considered only as varieties. But as we are not absolutely certain that some of these varieties may not be distinct species, we shall endeavour to give all of them proper denominations.

Here, then, let us consider terrestrial animals, some of which so greatly resemble the human form, in a new point of view. The affixing the name of _quadruped_ to all these animals has been done unjustly. If the exceptions were few we should not have objected to the application of this term. We are convinced that our definitions and names, however general, do not comprehend the whole; that there exists particular beings, which escape the most cautious definitions, and that intermediate species are constantly discovered. We know that many, though to all appearance holding the middle station, have escaped enumeration, and that the general names under which they are included is incomplete; because Nature should never be considered in the aggregate, but by unities only, because man has invented general names only to assist his memory, and because he afterwards weakly regarded those general names as realities; in short, because he has endeavoured to comprehend, under the same denominations, very different animals, and which necessarily required other appellations. I can give both example and proof, without swerving from the class of quadrupeds, which, of all animals, are those best known to man, and to which he was, consequently, the best enabled to give the most precise denominations.

The name of _quadruped_ supposes an animal with _four feet_. If it be deficient in two, like the manati; if it have hands and arms like the ape; or if it have wings like the bat; it is not a quadruped: therefore this general denomination is erroneous when applied to either of those animals. In order to speak with precision, there should be truth in the ideas which the words represent; for instance, let us find a word to convey a perfect idea of an animal with two hands; if we had a term to denote a two-handed animal, as well as one with two feet, we might then say, that man alone is biped and bimanous, because he alone has two hands and two feet; that the manati is only _bimanous_; that the bat is only a _biped_; and the ape a _quadrimanous_, or four-handed animal. Let us now apply these _new_ denominations to every particular being with which they agree, and we shall discover, that from the two hundred species of animals to which we have given the common name of _quadrupeds_, there are thirty-five sorts of apes, baboons, monkeys, sapajous, sagoins, and makis, must be retrenched, as they are _quadrimanous_, or four-handed; and that to those thirty-five species we must add the lori, the murine, Virginian and Mexican opossums, and the jerboas, which are also _quadrimanous_, like those above-mentioned, and that, consequently, the list of four-handed animals being at least composed of forty species, the real number of quadrupeds will be reduced one fifth part. If afterwards we take out twelve or fifteen species of bipeds, namely, the bats, whose fore-feet may rather be called wings than feet, and also three or four jerboas, because they can only walk on their hind feet, those before being too short; if we remove also the manati, which has no hind feet, and the different species of the walrus, and the seal, to which animals they are entirely useless, the number of quadrupeds will be found diminished a third more; and if we still subtract those animals which make use of their fore-feet like hands, as the bears, marmots, coatis, squirrels, rats, and many others, the denomination of quadrupeds will appear to be misapplied to more than one half of these animals. In fact real quadrupeds consist only of whole and cloven-footed animals. When we descend to the digitated class, we find four-handed, or ambiguous quadrupeds, who use their fore-feet in the manner of hands, and which ought to be distinguished or separated from the rest. There are three species of whole hoofed animals, the horse, the zebra, and the ass; and, by adding the elephant, the rhinoceros, the hippopotamus, and the camel, whose feet, though terminated by nails, are solid, and only serve for the purpose of walking, we shall have seven species to which the name of quadruped perfectly applies.

There is a much greater number of cloven-footed than whole-hoofed animals. The oxen, the sheep, the goat, the antelope, the bubalus, the lama, the pacos, the elk, the rein-deer, the stag, the fallow-deer, the roe-buck, &c. are all cloven-footed, and compose all together full forty-species. Thus, we have already fifty animals, ten whole hoofed, and forty cloven-footed, to which the name of quadruped has been rightly applied. In the digitated animals, the lion, tiger, panther, leopard, lynx, cat, wolf, fox, dog, hyæna, civet, badger, weasel, ferret, porcupine, hedge hog, armadillo, ant-eaters, and hog, which last constitutes the shade between digitated and cloven-footed tribes, add more than forty other species, to which the name of quadruped also applies in all the rigour of its acceptation; because, though their fore-feet are divided into four or five toes, they never use them as hands; but all the other digitated species who use their fore-feet to hold and carry food to their mouths, are not, in strict propriety, quadrupeds. Those species, which are also forty in number, form an intermediate class between quadrupeds and four-handed animals, and are in fact neither one nor the other. Therefore, to more than a fourth of our animals, the name of quadruped does not apply; and with more than one half it does not agree in all the extent of its acceptation.

The four-handed animals fill up the great chasm between the quadruped and the human species. The two handed are in the distance between man and the cetaceous tribes. The bipeds with wings are the shade between quadrupeds and birds; and the digitated species who use their fore-feet as hands, fill up all the degrees between the quadrupeds and the four-handed kinds. But this subject is too extensive to be here pursued; however useful it might be to give a distinct knowledge of animals, it is still more so by furnishing us with a new proof, that not any of our definitions are precise, nor our general terms exact, when specifically applied to objects, or to beings which they represent.

But why are these definitions and general terms, which seem to be the master-piece of invention, so exceedingly defective? Is this error the defect of human understanding? or rather, is it not an incapacity, or pure inability, of combining, and perceiving a number of objects at one view? Let us compare the works of nature with those of man: let us examine how both operate, and then enquire whether the human mind, however active and extensive, can follow the same route, without being lost either in the immensity of space, the obscurity of time, or in the infinite combinations of beings? Let a man direct his mind to any object if he would avoid being misled, he must walk in a direct line, pass over the least space, and employ the least possible time to accomplish his end. But in this pursuit, what a number of reflections and combinations must he make to avoid those deceitful and fallacious roads which at first offer themselves in such numbers, that it requires the greatest and nicest discernment to choose the true and direct path? This path, however, is not beyond the depth of the human mind; and by this only sure and solid method he arrives at the destined point of view; but if he seeks another point, it can only be obtained by another line. The train of our ideas is a delicate thread, which only extends in length without any other dimensions; while Nature, on the contrary, does not take a single step, without extending on all sides, and passing at once through the three dimensions of length, breadth and thickness; while man attains but one single point, she embraces all, and penetrates into every part of a solid mass. By the power of art, and length of time, our statuaries form a figure which externally resembles the object proposed; each point of this surface requires a thousand combinations. Their genius travels over as many lines as there are lineaments in the figure, and the least false step would deform it. This piece of marble, so perfectly executed that it seems to breathe, is, therefore, only a multitude of points to which the artist arrives by labour and time; for human genius being unable to seize more than one dimension at a time, and our senses reaching no further than surfaces, we cannot penetrate the substance; while, Nature, on the contrary, designs and enters into the depth of things; she produces forms almost instantaneously; she at once expands them in all their dimensions; as soon as her movements reach the surface, the penetrating powers with which she is animated, operate internally. The smallest atom, when she chooses to make use of it, is obliged to obey her will. Her actions, therefore, extend over all; she travels above, below, to the right and left, and consequently, she not only encompasses the surface, but every particle of the mass. What difference there consequently is in the result? What comparison can be made between a statue and an organised body? But also what inequality in their powers, and how disproportioned the instruments! Man can only make use of the power he possesses. Confined to a small quantity of motion, which he can only communicate by impulsion, he can only exert himself upon surfaces; since the power of impulsion in general is only transmitted by superficial contact. He only sees and touches, therefore, the surfaces of bodies, and when he attempts to proceed further, though he opens, divides, and separates, he still touches nothing more than surfaces. To penetrate the interior parts of bodies, he should be possessed of a portion of that power which acts upon the mass, or of gravity, which is Nature's chief instrument. It is, therefore, the defect of instruments which prevents the art of man from approaching that of Nature. His figures, his pictures, his designs, are only surfaces, or imitations of surfaces, because the images he receives by his senses are all superficial, and he is unable to give them the internal parts.

What is true with regard to the arts is the same as to sciences, only that the latter is less confined, because the mind is the instrument, and which in the former is subordinate to the senses. But in the sciences the mind commands the senses, as its only endeavour is to search into objects, and not to operate on them; to compare, and not imitate them. The mind, though thus cramped by the senses, though often abused by their false reports, is, notwithstanding, neither less pure nor less active. Man, who has a natural desire to knowledge, began by rectifying, and demonstrating the errors of the senses. He has treated them as mechanical organs, as instruments, the effects of which must be left to experience. Pursuing still his desire of knowledge, he has travelled on with the balance in one hand, and the compass in the other, and has measured both time and space. Thus, he has recognized all the exterior parts of Nature's works, but not being able to penetrate her internal parts by his senses, he has drawn his conclusions and formed a judgment of them by analogy and comparison. He discovered that there exists a general force in matter, quite different from that of impulsion; a force which does not come within the compass of our senses, and which, though we are unable to make use of, Nature employs as an universal agent. He has demonstrated, that this force belongs equally to all matter, in proportion to its mass or real quantity; that its action extends to immense distances, decreasing as the space augments. Afterwards, turning his eyes upon living beings, he found, that heat was another force necessary to their production; that light was a matter endowed with an unbounded elasticity and activity; that the formation and expansion of organized beings were the effects of a combination of all these forces; that the extension and growth of animal or vegetable bodies, follow exactly the laws of attraction, and are effected by an increase of all three dimensions at the same time; and that a mould, when once formed, must, according to these laws of affinity, produce a succession of others exactly resembling the original. By combining these attributes, common to animal and vegetable Nature, he discovered, that there existed in both an inexhaustible and reversible fund of organic and living substance; a substance as real as the unformed matter; a substance which continues always in its live as the other does in its inactive state; a substance universally diffused, passing from vegetables to animals by means of nutrition, returning from animals to vegetables by the process of putrefaction, and maintaining an incessant circulation for the animation of beings. He also remarked, that these organic particles existed in every organized body; that they were combined in greater or less quantities with dead matter; that they were more abundant in animals where all is full of life, and more scarce in vegetables where the dead matter predominates, and the living seems to be extinct; where the organic matter, overpowered by the rude, has neither progressive motion, sensation, heat, nor life, and is only manifested by its unfolding and reproduction. Reflecting on the manner each operates, he discovered, that every living being is a mould that possesses the power of assimilating the substances by which it is nourished; that growth is an effect of this assimilation, that the unfolding of a living body is not a simple augmentation of bulk, but an extension in every dimension, and a penetration of new matter into every part of the whole mass; that those parts increasing in proportion to the whole, and the whole in proportion to the parts, the form is preserved, and remains always the same till the growth is completed; that when the body has acquired all its extent, the same matter heretofore employed in the augmentation, is sent back as superfluous from every part to which it had been assimilated; and that, by uniting in one common point, it forms a new being, perfectly like the first, and which to attain the same dimensions, requires only to be expanded by the same mode of nutrition. He also observed that man, quadrupeds, cetaceous animals, birds, reptiles, insects, trees, plants, and herbs, were all nourished, unfolded, and reproduced by the same universal law; and that the manner of their nutrition and generation appearing so different, although dependent on one general and common cause, was because it could not operate but in a mode relative to the form of each particular species of being. To acquire these grand truths, required a succession of ages, and gradual investigation, but having obtained so much, he began to compare different objects together; and to distinguish one from the other, he gave them particular names, and invented general denominations to reunite them under one point of view. He observed, by taking the body of man as the physical model of every living animal, and by comparing and examining every living animal in their several parts, that the form of every thing that breathes is nearly the same; that the anatomy of a man and an ape are similar; that every animal has the same organization, the same senses, the same viscera, the same bones, the same flesh, the same motion of the fluids, and the same action in the solids. In all of them he has found a heart, veins, and arteries; the same organs of circulation, respiration, digestion, nutrition, and secretion; the same solid structure, erected with the same materials, and put together nearly in the same manner. This plan he found to proceed uniformly from mankind to the monkey, from the monkey to quadrupeds, from quadrupeds to the cetaceous animals, and so on to birds, fish, and reptiles. This plan, I say, when well comprehended by the human understanding, exhibits a faithful picture of animated nature, and affords the most simple and general view under which she can possibly be considered; and when we extend it by passing from the animal to the vegetable, we shall find this plan, which we at first found varying only by shades, degenerate by degrees from reptiles to insects, from insects to worms, from worms to zoophytes, and from zoophytes to plants; and though changed in all its exterior parts, nevertheless, still preserving the same character; the principal features of which are nutrition, expansion, and reproduction. These features are general and common to every organized substance, they are eternal and divine; and, far from being effaced or destroyed by time, are only renewed and rendered more plain and evident.

If, from this great picture of resemblances, in which the living universe presents itself as but one family, we pass to that of the differences, wherein each species claims a separate place, and a distinct portrait, we shall perceive, that excepting some of the larger species, such as the elephant, the rhinoceros, the hippopotamus, the tiger, and the lion, every other seems to unite with its neighbouring kind, and to form groups of degraded similitudes, or genera, which our nomenclators have represented in a network of figures, some of which are connected by the feet, and others by the teeth, horns, hair, and others by still smaller affinities. And even the apes, whose form appears to be the most perfect, that is, approaches nearest to that of man, are represented confusedly, and require very accurate observations to distinguish one from the other, because the privilege of separate species is less owing to form than size. Man himself, although a single species, and infinitely removed from that of all other animals, yet being only of a middle size, has more approximations than the larger kinds. We shall find in the history of the orang-outang that if we were only to attend to the figure, we might look on that, animal either as the termination of the human species, or the commencement of the ape; because, except the intellect, he is not deficient in any one thing which we possess, and because, in his body, he differs less from man than from the other animals to which we have given the denomination of apes.

The mind, thought, and speech, therefore do not depend on the form or organization of the body. Nothing more strongly proves that they are peculiar gifts bestowed on man alone, than that the orang-outang which neither speaks nor thinks, has, nevertheless, the body, the limbs, the senses, the skull, and the tongue exactly similar to man. He can counterfeit every motion of the human species, and yet cannot perfectly perform one single act; which may possibly be owing to a defect of education, or perhaps yet more to an error in our judgment. You unjustly compare, it may be said, an ape, who is a native of the forests, with the man who resides in polished society. To form a proper judgment between them, a savage man and an ape should be viewed together; for we have no just idea of man in a pure state of nature. The head covered with bristly hairs, or with curled wool; the face partly hid by a long beard, and still longer hairs in the front, which surround his eyes, destroy his august character, and make them appear sunk in his head, like those of the brutes; the lips thick and projecting, the nose flat, the aspect wild or stupid; the ears, body, and limbs are covered with hair; the nails long, thick, and crooked; a callous substance like a horn under the soles of the feet; the breasts of the female long and flabby, and the skin of her belly hanging down to her knees; the children wallowing in filth, and crawling on their hands and feet; and the father and mother sitting on their hams, forming a hideous appearance, rendered more so by being besmeared all over with stinking grease. This sketch, drawn from a savage Hottentot, is still a flattering portrait, for there is as great a distance between a man in a pure state of nature and a Hottentot, as there is between a Hottentot and us. But if we wish to compare the human species with that of the ape, we must add to it the affinities of organization, the agreements of temperament, the vehement desire of male apes for women, the like conformation of the genitals in both sexes, the periodic emanations of the females, the compulsive or voluntary intermixture of the negresses with the apes, the produce of which has united into both species; and then consider, supposing them not of the same species, how difficult it is to discover the interval by which they are separated.

I acknowledge, if we were forced to judge by external appearance alone, the ape might be taken for a variety in the human species. The Creator has not formed man's body on a model absolutely different from that of the mere animal; he has comprehended his figure, as well as that of every other animal, under one general plan, but at the same time that he has given him a material form, similar to that of the ape, he infused this animal body with a divine spirit. If he had granted the same favour, not to the ape, but to the meanest animal, whose organization seems to us to be the worst of all constructed beings, this animal would soon have become the rival of man. Quickened by his spirit it would have excelled every other animal, by having the power of thought and speech. Therefore, whatever resemblance there may be between the Hottentot and the ape, the interval which separates them is immense, since the former is endowed with the faculties of thinking and speaking.

Who will ever be able to tell in what the organization of an idiot differs from that of another man? yet the defect is certainly in the material organs, since the idiot has a soul like another person. Now, since in mankind, where the whole structure is entirely conformable, and perfectly similar, a difference so trifling as to be entirely imperceptible is sufficient to destroy thought, we must not be astonished that it never appears in the ape, which has not the necessary principle.

The action of the soul in general is distinct and independent of matter. But as it has pleased the Divine Author to unite it with the body, the exercise of its particular actions depends on the state of the material organs; and this dependance is not only apparent from the example of idiots but from persons afflicted with delirium, from infants who cannot think, from healthful men when asleep, and from very old people, after the power of thinking is gone. Even the principle of education seems to consist not so much in instructing the mind, or bringing its operation to perfection, as in modifying the material organs, and putting them into the most favourable condition for exercising the thinking principle. Now there are two kinds of educations which should be carefully distinguished, as their effects are quite different; the education of the individual, which is common both to man and the other animals, and that of the species which belongs to man alone. A young animal, as well from incitement as example, learns in a few weeks to perform all the actions of its parents: a child requires a number of years to attain this degree of perfection, because when born its growth and strength is incomparably less forward than in young animals. In the first years the mind is a void relatively to what it becomes in future. A child, therefore, is much slower in receiving individual education than that of the brute; but for this very reason it becomes susceptible of that of the species. The multiplicity of aids, and the continual cares, which for a long time, the weak state of the infant exact, entertain and increase the attachment of its parents, and while they are attending to the care of the body, they cultivate the mind. The time required to strengthen the first, turns to the profit of the latter. In the generality of animals the corporeal faculties are more advanced in two months than those of an infant in two years; there is, therefore, twelve times as much time employed in its individual education, without reckoning what is still remaining to acquire after this period, without considering that animals quit their young as soon as they are able to provide for themselves, and that soon after this separation they know each other no more, so that all attachment, and all education, ceases in them at the very moment assistance is no longer necessary. Now this time of education being so short, its effects must be very small; and it is even astonishing that animals acquire in two months whatever is necessary for their use during the rest of life: and if we suppose a child, in an equal space of time, should become sufficiently formed and strong to leave its parents, and never to return to them for assistance, would there be any sensible difference between this child and the brute animal? However ingenious and able the parents were, could they be able to prepare and modify its organs in so short a space of time, or to establish the least communication of thought between their minds and his? Could they be able to excite his memory by impressions sufficiently reiterated? Could they even modify or unfold their organs of speech? No, for before the child can pronounce a single word his ear must have received repeated impressions of the sound expressing that word; and, before he can be able to apply or pronounce it properly, the same combination of the word, and the object to which it belongs, must be frequently presented to him. Education, therefore, which alone can expand the powers of the mind, will be unremittingly continued for a length of time; if it should cease, not at the end of two months, as in animals, but even when twelve months old, the mind of the child, which could have received no impression, would remain inactive, like that of an idiot, the defect of whose organs prevents the reception of knowledge. This reasoning would apply with double force if we suppose the child born in a pure state of nature, if it had only a Hottentot mother for its tutoress, and that at the age of two months it was able to separate from her, and live without her care and assistance:--would not this child be worse than an idiot, and entirely on a par with the brutes? But in this state of nature, the first education, that is, the education of necessity, exacts as much time as in the civilized state, because in both the child is equally weak, and equally slow in its growth, and consequently it has need of the care of its parents for an equal portion of time. In short, it would infallibly perish if abandoned before the age of three years. Now this necessary habitude, so long continued between the mother and the child, is sufficient to communicate to it all that she possesses; and though we should falsely suppose, that this mother, in a state of nature, possesses not any one gift, not even that of speech, would not this long habitude with her child produce a language? Thus this state of pure nature, wherein we suppose man to be without thought and speech, is imaginary, and never had existence. This needful and long intercourse of parents with their children produces society in the midst of a desart. The family understand each other by signs and sounds; and this first ray of intelligence, when cherished, cultivated, and communicated, unfolds, in the process of time, all the buds of thought; and as this habitual intercourse could not sustain itself so long without producing mutual signs and sounds, always repeated and gradually engraven on the memory of the child, would consequently become constant and intelligible expressions; though the list of words is short, it still forms a language, which will soon become more extended as the family increases, and will always follow the steps of society in improvement. Society being formed, the education of the child is no longer individual, for then the parents communicate to it not only what they possess from Nature, but also what they have received from their ancestors, and from the society of which they form a part. It is no longer a communication between detached individuals, confined like animals to the transmission of simple faculties, but an institution of which the whole species partakes, and whose produce constitutes the bond and basis of society.

Even among brute animals, though deprived of the thinking principle, those whose education is the longest are also those which seem to have the greatest share of intelligence: the elephant, who takes the longest time in completing its growth, and which requires the assistance of its mother for the whole of the first year, is also the most intelligent animal. The Guinea-pig, which requires only three weeks to accomplish its growth, and be in a generating state, is perhaps, for this reason alone, one of the most stupid animals in Nature. With respect to the ape, with a view to ascertain whose nature we have gone into this investigation, whatever resemblance he may bear to man, yet his affinity to the brutes is evident from the moment of his birth; he is then proportionably stronger, and more completely formed than the infant, and the time of his growth bears no comparison; the assistance of his mother is only necessary during a few months; his education is purely individual, and consequently as sterile as that of other animals.

The ape, therefore, notwithstanding his resemblance to the human form, is a brute, and so far from being second in our species, he is not even the first in the order of animals, because he is not the most intelligent among them; therefore it is only on account of the corporeal resemblance that prejudice has been formed in favour of the great faculties of the ape. He resembles man it is said both externally and internally, and therefore he must not only imitate us, but also of his own accord, act in the same manner as we do. We have seen that every action which we call human is relative to society: that they depend, at first on the mind, and afterwards on education, the physical principle of which is the necessity there is for the long intercourse between parents and children: that this intercourse is very short with the ape; that, like other animals, he only receives an education purely individual, and is not susceptible of any other; consequently he cannot act like man, since no action of the ape has the same principle, nor the same end. With respect to imitation, which appears to be the strongest and most striking character in the ape kind, and which the vulgar refer to him as a peculiar talent, before we decide, we must examine whether this imitation be spontaneous or forced. Does the ape imitate the human species from inclination, or from possessing an innate capacity of performing those actions without choice or exertion? I willingly appeal to all those who have observed this animal without prejudice, and I am convinced they will agree with me, that there is nothing voluntary in their imitation. The monkey having arms and hands, makes use of them as we do, but without any idea of copying our example. The similitude of his limbs and organs necessarily produces motions resembling ours; being formed like man he must be enabled to move like him; but this similarity of motion by no means proves that he acts from imitation. Let us, for instance, construct two pendulums of the same form, and give them an equal motion, would it not be absurd to say that these machines imitate each other? It is the same with respect to the ape, relatively to the body of man; they are two machines, similarly constructed, and by the impulse of Nature move nearly in the same manner: however, parity must not be considered as imitation; the one depends on matter, and the other exists only in reason. Imitation supposes a design of copying; the ape is incapable of forming this design, which requires a train of thought and judgment; for this reason, man, if he choose, can imitate the ape, but the ape cannot have an idea of imitating man.

This parity is no more than the physical part of imitation, and not so complete as the similitude, from which, however, it proceeds as an immediate effect. The ape resembles man more in his body and limbs than in the use he makes of them. By observing the ape attentively we shall perceive that all his motions are sudden, intermittent, and precipitate; and to compare them with those of man we must suppose a different model. Every action of the ape strongly partakes of his education, which is purely animal; and they appear to be extravagant, ridiculous, and inconsequential, because we judge of them by our own, which is a false comparison. As his nature is vivacious, his temperament warm, his disposition petulant, and none of his affections have been polished by education, all his habitudes are excessive, and more resemble the actions of a lunatic than those of a man, or even those of a peaceable animal: from the same reason we find him indocile, and receiving with difficulty the impressions we wish him to imbibe. He is insensible to kindness, and only to be rendered obedient through fear of chastisement. He may be kept in captivity, but not in a domestic state. Always sullen, stubborn, or making grimaces, he may rather be said to be subdued than tamed; therefore none of this species has ever been domesticated in any part of the world, and consequently is more distant from man than most other animals, for docility supposes some analogy betwixt the giver and the receiver of instruction; a relative quality, which cannot be exercised but when there is a certain number of common faculties in both, which only differ from each other because they are active in the master and passive in the scholar. Now the passive qualities of the ape have less relation to the active qualities of man than those of the dog or elephant, who only require good treatment to receive the kind and even delicate sentiments of a faithful attachment, voluntary obedience, grateful service, and an unreserved and ready attention to the commands of their master.

The ape is, therefore, further removed from the human species in relative qualities, than most other animals: He likewise differs greatly by temperament. The human species can dwell in every climate; he lives and multiplies in the northern as well as in the southern regions; but the ape lives with difficulty in temperate countries, and can only multiply in the hottest parts of the earth. This difference of temperament supposes others in organization, which though concealed, are no less real; it must also have a great influence on his natural dispositions. The excess of heat so necessary to this animal renders all his affections, and all his qualities, excessive; and we need not seek for any other cause to account for his petulance, his lubricity, and his other passions, which seem to be as violent as they are extravagant.

Thus the ape, which philosophers, as well as the generality of people, have regarded as a being difficult to define, and the nature of which was at least equivocal, and intermediate between that of man and the brute, is, in fact, no other than a real brute, wearing externally a human mask, but internally destitute of thought, and every other attribute which constitutes the human species: an animal inferior to many others in his relative faculties, and most essentially different from the human race in his nature, temperament, and also in the time necessary to his education, gestation, growth, and duration of life; that is, in every real habitude which constitutes what we call _Nature_ in a particular being.

_Engraved for Barr's Buffon._

THE ORANG-OUTANG[L], OR THE PONGO, AND THE JOCKO.

[Footnote L: Orang-outang is the name this animal bears in the East-Indies; _pongo_, its denomination at Lowando, a province of Congo; and Kukurlacko in some parts of the East-Indies.]

We shall present the Orang-outang and the Jocko together, because they, possibly, belong to the same species. Of all the ape and monkey kinds, these bear the greatest resemblance to the human form, and consequently, those which are most worthy particular notice. We have seen the small orang-outang, or jocko (_fig. 195._) alive, and have preserved its skin; but we can only speak of the pongo, or great orang-outang, from the accounts given us by travellers. If their relations might be depended on, if they were not often obscure, faulty, and exaggerated, we should not doubt of its being a different species from the jocko, a species more perfect, and approaching still nearer to the human race. Bontius, who was head physician at Batavia, and who has left some excellent observations on the Natural History of that part of India, expressly says, that he saw with admiration, some individuals of this species walking erect on two feet, and among others a female (of which he gives a figure) who seemed to have an idea of modesty, covering herself with her hand on the appearance of men with whom she was not acquainted; who sighed, cried, and did a number of other actions, so like the human race, that she wanted nothing of humanity but the gift of speech. Linnæus, upon the authority of Kjoep and other travellers, says, that even this faculty is not wanting in the orang-outang, but that he thinks, speaks, and expresses his meaning in a whistling tone. He calls him the _Nocturnal Man_, and at the same time gives such a description of him, that it is impossible to decide whether he is a brute or human being. We must, however, remark, that, according to Linnæus, this being, whatever he may be, is not above half the height of a man; and as Bontius makes no mention of the size of his orang-outang, we should imagine them to be the same: but, then, this animal of Linnæus and Bontius would not be the true orang-outang, which is of the size of a very tall man: neither can he be what we call the _Jocko_, which I have seen alive; for although he was of the same size as that described by Linnæus, yet he differed in every other character. I can affirm, from having repeatedly seen him, that he neither spake nor expressed himself by a whistling noise, and that he did not perform a single thing which a well instructed dog could not perform: He differed in almost every respect from the description which Linnæus gives of the orang-outang, and agreed much better with that of the _satyrus_ of the same author. I therefore greatly doubt the truth of the description of this _nocturnal man_; I even doubt his existence; and it was probably a white negro, a _Chacrelas_, whom those travellers, which Linnæus has quoted, have but superficially seen, and as blindly described, for the Chacrelas, like the nocturnal man of this author, has white, woolly, frizly hair, red eyes, a weak sight, &c. But then they are men, and do not whistle; nor are they pigmies of only 30 inches in height; they think, speak and act, like other men, and their stature is exactly the same.

Discarding, therefore, this ill-described being, and supposing a little exaggeration in Bontius's relation concerning the modesty of his female orang-outang, there only remains a brute animal, namely, an Ape, of which we have information from authors of more credit; and which is described with the greatest exactness by Edward Tyson, a celebrated English anatomist. This learned gentleman says, that there are two species of this ape, and that the one he gives a description of is not so large as the other called _barris_, or _baris_, by travellers, and _drill_ by the English. This _drill_ is, in fact, the large orang-outang of the East-Indies, or the pongo of Guinea; and the pigmy described by Tyson is the jocko, which we have seen alive. The philosopher Gassendi having advanced, on the authority of a traveller, named St. Amand, that in the island of Java there was a creature which formed the shade between man and the ape, the fact was positively denied. To prove it, Peiresse produced a letter from M. Noël, a physician, who lived in Africa, in which it is asserted, that there is found in Guinea a large ape, called _barris_, which walks erect on its two feet, has an appearance of more gravity and sagacity than any of the other species, and has a very strong inclination for women. Darcos, Nieremberg, and Dapper, speak nearly the same of the barris. Battel calls it pongo, and assures us, "that, excepting his size, he is exactly like a man in all his proportions; but he is as tall as a giant; his face is like that of a man, his eyes deep sunk in the head, and the hair on his brows extremely long; his visage is without hair, as are also his ears and hands; his body is lightly covered with hair. He scarcely differs from man, except not having any calf to his legs; yet he always walks on his hind legs: he sleeps under trees, and builds himself a shelter against the sun and the rains. He lives only upon nuts and fruits, and is no way carnivorous: he cannot speak, and has no more understanding than any other animal of the brute creation. When the people of the country travel in the woods they make fires by which they sleep in the night, and being gone, in the morning this animal comes and sits by it until it goes out, but he has not skill enough to keep the flame alive by feeding it with fuel. They go together in companies, and if they happen to meet with one of the human species, remote from succour, they shew him no mercy. They even attack the elephants, whom they beat with their clubs, and oblige them to leave that part of the forest which they claim as their own. These creatures are never taken alive, for they are so strong that ten men would not be able to hold one of them. They sometimes destroy the young ones; the mother carries them, she herself being in an erect posture, and they cling to her body with their hands and knees. There are two kinds of this animal, both very much resembling the human race, the one the natives call pongo, is taller and thicker than a man; and the other _engeco_, or jocko, whose size is much smaller." It is from this passage that I derived the names _pongo_ and _jocko_. Battel further observes, that when one of these animals dies the rest cover his body with leaves and branches of trees. Purchas adds, in a note, that in the conversations he had with Battel he learned that a negro boy was taken from him by a pongo, and carried into the woods, where he continued a whole year, and that on his return he said, that they never attempted to do him any injury; that they were generally about the height of the human race, but much larger, and nearly double the bulk of a man. Jobson asserts to have seen, in places frequented by these animals, a sort of habitation composed of interwoven branches, which might serve them at least as a shelter from the heat of the sun. "The apes of Guinea, says Bosman, which are called _smitten_ by the Flemings, are of a yellow colour, and grow to a very large size. I have seen some above five feet high. These apes are of a very disagreeable appearance, as well as those of another species, which resemble them in every particular except in size, not being one fourth part so big. They are very easily taught to do almost whatever their masters please." Schouten says, "That the animals which the Indians call orang-outangs are nearly of the same height and figure as man, but that their back and loins are covered with hair, although they have none on the fore part of their bodies; that the females have two large breasts, that their face is coarse, their nose flat, and their ears like those of men; that they are robust, active, bold, and defend themselves against armed men; that they are passionately fond of women, who cannot pass through the woods which they inhabit, without these animals immediately attacking and ravishing them." Dampier, Froger, and other travellers, assert, that young girls, about eight or ten years old, are taken away by these animals, and carried to the tops of high trees, and that it is a very great difficulty to rescue them. To all these testimonies we may add that of M. de la Brosse, mentioned in his voyage to Angola, in 1738, wherein he says that the orang-outangs (which he calls _quimpezés_) often attempt to surprise the Negresses, whom, when they succeed, they detain for the purpose of enjoying, feeding them very plentifully all the time. "I knew (says he) a Negress at Loango who had lived among these animals for three years. They grow from six to seven feet high, and are of great strength. They build sheds, and make use of clubs for their defence. They have flat faces, broad flat noses, ears without a tip, and their skins are fairer than that of a mulatto, but they are covered on many parts of their bodies with long and tawny-coloured hair: their bellies are extremely tense, their heels flat, rising behind about half an inch: they sometimes walk upright, and sometimes upon all fours. We purchased two of these animals, a male of about fourteen months old, and a female about twelve, &c."