Chance, Love, and Logic: Philosophical Essays

Chapter XV: Conclusion (3)

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The term pragmatism was introduced into literature in the opening sentences of Professor James’s California Union address in 1898. The sentences run as follows: “The principle of pragmatism, as we may call it, may be expressed in a variety of ways, all of them very simple. In the _Popular Science Monthly_ for January, 1878, Mr. Charles S. Peirce introduces it as follows:” etc. The readers who have turned to the volume referred to have not, however, found the word there. From other sources we know that the name as well as the idea was furnished by Mr. Peirce. The latter has told us that both the word and the idea were suggested to him by a reading of Kant, the idea by the _Critique of Pure Reason_, the term by the “Critique of Practical Reason.”[77] The article in the _Monist_ gives such a good statement of both the idea and the reason for selecting the term that it may be quoted _in extenso_. Peirce sets out by saying that with men who work in laboratories, the habit of mind is molded by experimental work much more than they are themselves aware. “Whatever statement you may make to him, he [the experimentalist] will either understand as meaning that if a given prescription for an experiment ever can be and ever is carried out in act, an experience of a given description will result, or else he will see no sense at all in what you say.” Having himself the experimental mind and being interested in methods of thinking, “he framed the theory that a _conception_, that is, the rational purport of a word or other expression, lies exclusively in its bearing upon the conduct of life; so that, since obviously nothing that might not result from experiment can have any direct bearing upon conduct, if one can define accurately all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply, one will have therein a complete definition of the concept, and _there is absolutely nothing more in it_. For this doctrine, he invented the name _pragmatism_.”

After saying that some of his friends wished him to call the doctrine practicism or practicalism, he says that he had learned philosophy from Kant, and that to one “who still thought in Kantian terms most readily, _praktisch_ and _pragmatisch_ were as far apart as the two poles, the former belonging to a region of thought where no mind of the experimentalist type can ever make sure of solid ground under his feet, the latter expressing relation to some definite human purpose. Now quite the most striking feature of the new theory was its recognition of an inseparable connection between rational cognition and human purpose.”[78]

From this brief statement, it will be noted that Peirce confined the significance of the term to the determination of the meaning of terms, or better, propositions; the theory was not, of itself, a theory of the test, or the truth, of propositions. Hence the title of his original article: _How to Make Ideas Clear_. In his later writing, after the term had been used as a theory of truth,—he proposed the more limited “pragmaticism” to designate his original specific meaning.[79] But even with respect to the meaning of propositions, there is a marked difference between his pragmaticism and the pragmatism of, say, James. Some of the critics (especially continental) of the latter would have saved themselves some futile beating of the air, if they had reacted to James’s statements instead of to their own associations with the word “pragmatic.” Thus James says in his California address: “The effective meaning of any philosophic proposition can always be brought down to some particular consequence, in our future practical experience, whether active or passive; the point lying rather in the fact that the experience must be _particular_, than in the fact that it must be _active_.” (Italics mine.)

Now the curious fact is that Peirce puts more emphasis upon practise (or conduct) and less upon the particular; in fact, he transfers the emphasis to the general. The following passage is worth quotation because of the definiteness with which it identifies meaning with both the future and with the general. “The rational meaning of every proposition lies in the future. How so? The meaning of a proposition is itself a proposition. Indeed, it is no other than the very proposition of which it is the meaning: it is a translation of it. But of the myriads of forms into which a proposition may be translated, which is that one which is to be called its very meaning? It is, according to the pragmaticist, that form in which the proposition becomes applicable to human conduct, not in these or those special circumstances nor when one entertains this or that special design, but that form which is most applicable to self-control under every situation and to every purpose.” Hence, “it must be simply the general description of all the experimental phenomena which the assertion of the proposition virtually predicts.” Or, paraphrasing, pragmatism identifies meaning with formation of a habit, or way of acting having the greatest generality possible, or the widest range of application to particulars. Since habits or ways of acting are just as real as particulars, it is committed to a belief in the reality of “universals.” Hence it is not a doctrine of phenomenalism, for while the richness of phenomena lies in their sensuous quality, pragmatism does not intend to define these (leaving them, as it were, to speak for themselves), but “eliminates their sential element, and endeavors to define the rational purport, and this it finds in the purposive bearing of the word or proposition in question.” Moreover, not only are generals real, but they are physically efficient. The meanings “the air is stuffy” and “stuffy air is unwholesome” may determine, for example, the opening of the window. Accordingly on the ethical side, “the pragmaticist does not make the _summum bonum_ to consist in action, but makes it to consist in that process of evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those generals...; in other words, becomes, through action an embodiment of rational purports or habits generalized as widely as possible.”[80]

The passages quoted should be compared with what Peirce has to say in the Baldwin Dictionary article. There he says that James’s doctrine seems to commit us to the belief “that the end of man is action—a stoical maxim which does not commend itself as forcibly to the present writer at the age of sixty as it did at thirty. If it be admitted, on the contrary, that action wants an end, and that the end must be something of a general description, then the spirit of the maxim itself ... would direct us toward something different from practical facts, namely, to general ideas.... The only ultimate good which the practical facts to which the maxim directs attention can subserve is to further the development of concrete reasonableness.... Almost everybody will now agree that the ultimate good lies in the evolutionary process in some way. If so, it is not in individual reactions in their segregation, but in something general or continuous. Synechism is founded on the notion that the coalescence, the becoming continuous, the becoming governed by laws, the becoming instinct with general ideas, are but phases of one and the same process of the growth of reasonableness. This is first shown to be true with mathematical exactitude in the field of logic, and is thence inferred to hold good metaphysically. It is not opposed to pragmaticism ... but includes that procedure as a step.”

Here again we have the doctrine of pragmaticism as a doctrine that meaning or rational purport resides in the setting up of habits or generalized methods, a doctrine passing over into the metaphysics of synechism. It will be well now to recur explicitly to Peirce’s earlier doctrine which he seems to qualify—although, as he notes, he upheld the doctrine of the reality of generals even at the earlier period. Peirce sets out, in his article on the “Fixation of Belief,” with the empirical difference of doubt and belief expressed in the facts that belief determines a habit while doubt does not, and that belief is calm and satisfactory while doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to emerge; to attain, that is, a state of belief, a struggle which may be called inquiry. The sole object of inquiry is the fixation of belief. The scientific method of fixation has, however, certain rivals: one is that of “tenacity”—constant reiteration, dwelling upon everything conducive to the belief, avoidance of everything which might unsettle it—the will to believe. The method breaks down in practice because of man’s social nature; we have to take account of contrary beliefs in others, so that the real problem is to fix the belief of the community; for otherwise our own belief is precariously exposed to attack and doubt. Hence the resort to the method of authority. This method breaks down in time by the fact that authority can not fix all beliefs in all their details, and because of the conflict which arises between organized traditions. There may then be recourse to what is “agreeable to reason”—a method potent in formation of taste and in esthetic productions and in the history of philosophy,—but a method which again fails to secure permanent agreements in society, and so leaves individual belief at the mercy of attack. Hence, finally, recourse to science, whose fundamental hypothesis is this: “There are real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those realities affect our senses according to regular laws, and ... by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by _reasoning_ how things really are, and any man if he have sufficient experience and reason enough about it, will be led to the one true conclusion.”[81]

It will be noted that the quotation employs the terms “reality” and “truth,” while it makes them a part of the statement of the _hypothesis_ entertained in scientific procedure. Upon such a basis, what meanings attach to the terms “reality” and “truth”? Since they are general terms, their meanings must be determined on the basis of the effects, having practical bearings, which the object of our conception has. Now the effect which real things have is to cause beliefs; beliefs are then the consequences which give the general term reality a “rational purport.” And on the assumption of the scientific method, the _distinguishing_ character of the _real_ object must be that it tends to produce a single universally accepted belief. “All the followers of science are fully persuaded that the processes of investigation, if only pushed far enough, will give one certain solution to every question to which they can be applied.” “This activity of thought by which we are carried, not where we wish, but to a foreordained goal, is like the operation of destiny.... This great law is embodied in the conception of truth and reality. The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all _who investigate_, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real.”[82] In a subsequent essay (on the “Probability of Induction”) Peirce expressly draws the conclusion which follows from this statement; viz., that this conception of truth and reality makes everything depend upon the character of the methods of inquiry and inference by which conclusions are reached. “In the case of synthetic inferences we know only the degree of trustworthiness of our proceeding. As all knowledge comes from synthetic inference, we must also infer that all human certainty consists merely in our knowing that the processes by which our knowledge has been derived are such as must generally have led to true conclusions”[83]—true conclusions, once more, being those which command the agreement of competent inquiries.

Summing up, we may say that Peirce’s pragmaticism is a doctrine concerning the meaning, conception, or rational purport of objects, namely, that these consist in the “effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.”[84] “Our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects,” and if we have any doubt as to whether we really believe the effects to be sensible or no, we have only to ask ourselves whether or no we should act any differently in their presence. In short, our own responses to sensory stimuli are the ultimate, or testing, ingredients in our conception of an object. In the literal sense of the word pragmatist, therefore, Peirce is more of a pragmatist than James.

He is also less of a nominalist. That is to say, he emphasizes much less the _particular_ sensible consequence, and much more the habit, the generic attitude of response, set up in consequence of experiences with a thing. In the passage in the Dictionary already quoted he speaks as if in his later life he attached less importance to action, and more to “concrete reasonableness” than in his earlier writing. It may well be that the relative emphasis had shifted. But there is at most but a difference of emphasis. For in his later doctrine, concrete rationality means a change in existence brought about _through_ action, and through action which embodies conceptions whose own specific existence consists in habitual attitudes of response. In his earlier writing, the emphasis upon habits, as something generic, is explicit. “What a thing means is simply what habits it involves.”[85] More elaborately, “Induction infers a rule. Now the belief of a rule is a habit. That a habit is a rule, active in us, is evident. That every belief is of the nature of a habit, in so far as it is of a general character, has been shown in the earlier papers of this series.”[86]

The difference between Peirce and James which next strikes us is the greater emphasis placed by the former upon the method of procedure. As the quotations already made show, everything ultimately turned, for Peirce, upon the trustworthiness of the procedures of inquiry. Hence his high estimate of logic, as compared with James—at least James in his later days. Hence also his definite rejection of the appeal to the Will to Believe—under the form of what he calls the method of tenacity. Closely associated with this is the fact that Peirce has a more explicit dependence upon the social factor than has James. The appeal in Peirce is essentially to the consensus of those who have investigated, using methods which are capable of employment by all. It is the need for social agreement, and the fact that in its absence “the method of tenacity” will be exposed to disintegration from without, which finally forces upon mankind the wider and wider utilization of the scientific method.

Finally, both Peirce and James are realists. The reasonings of both depend upon the assumption of real things which really have effects or consequences. Of the two, Peirce makes clearer the fact that in philosophy at least we are dealing with the _conception_ of reality, with reality as a term having rational purport, and hence with something whose meaning is itself to be determined in terms of consequences. That “reality” means the object of those beliefs which have, after prolonged and coöperative inquiry, becomes stable, and “truth” the quality of these beliefs is a logical consequence of this position. Thus while “we may define the real as that whose characters are independent of what anybody may think them to be ... it would be a great mistake to suppose that this definition makes the idea of reality perfectly clear.”[87] For it is only the outcome of persistent and conjoint inquiry which enables us to give intelligible meaning in the concrete to the expression “characters independent of what anybody may think them to be.” (This is the pragmatic way out of the egocentric predicament.) And while my purpose is wholly expository I can not close without inquiring whether recourse to Peirce would not have a most beneficial influence in contemporary discussion. Do not a large part of our epistemological difficulties arise from an attempt to define the “real” as something given prior to reflective inquiry instead of as that which reflective inquiry is forced to reach and to which when it is reached belief can stably cling?

Footnote 77:

See article on “Pragmatism,” in _Baldwin’s Dictionary_, Vol. 2., p.
322, and the _Monist_, Vol. 15, p. 162.

Footnote 78:

Kant discriminates the laws of morality, which are _a priori_, from
rules of skill, having to do with technique or art, and counsels of
prudence, having to do with welfare. The latter he calls pragmatic;
the _a priori_ laws practical. See _Metaphysics of Morals_, Abbott’s
trans., pp. 33 and 34.

Footnote 79:

See the article in the _Monist_ already mentioned, and another one in
the same volume, p. 481, “The Issues of Pragmaticism.”

Footnote 80:

It is probably fair to see here an empirical rendering of the Kantian
generality of moral action, while the distinction and connection of
“rational purport” and “sensible particular” have also obvious Kantian
associations.

Footnote 81:

P. 26.

Footnote 82:

P. 56-57.

Footnote 83:

P. 105.

Footnote 84:

P. 45.

Footnote 85:

P. 43.

Footnote 86:

P. 151.

Footnote 87:

P. 53.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PEIRCE’S PUBLISHED WRITINGS

I. Writings of General Interest.[88]

_A._ Three papers in the _Journal of Speculative Philosophy_, Vol. 2
(1868).

1. “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man,” pp.
103-114.

2. “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,” pp. 140-157.

3. “Ground of Validity of the Laws of Logic,” pp. 193-208.

These three papers, somewhat loosely connected, deal mainly with the philosophy of discursive thought. The first deals with our power of intuition, and holds that “every thought is a sign.” The second, one of the most remarkable of Peirce’s writings, contains an acute criticism of the Cartesian tradition and a noteworthy argument against the traditional emphasis on “images” in thinking. The third contains, _inter alia_, a refutation of Mill’s indictment of the syllogism. The same volume of the _Journal_ contains two unsigned communications on Nominalism and on the Meaning of Determined.

_B._ Review of Fraser’s “Berkeley,” in the _North American Review_,
Vol. 113 (1871), pp. 449-472.

This paper contains an important analysis on medieval realism, and of Berkeley’s nominalism. (A Scotist realism continues to distinguish Peirce’s work after this.)

_C._ “Illustrations of the Logic of Science,” in _Popular Science
Monthly_, Vols. 12-13 (1877-1878). Reprinted in Pt. I of this
volume. The first and second papers were also published in the
_Revue Philosophique_, Vols. 6-7 (1879).

_D._ Ten papers in the _Monist_, Vols. 1-3 (1891-1893), and 15-16
(1905-1906). The first five are reprinted in Pt. II of this volume.

The sixth paper, “Reply to the Necessitarians,” Vol. 3, pp. 526-570, is an answer to the criticism of the foregoing by the editor of the _Monist_, Vol. 2, pp. 560ff.; cf. Vol. 3, pp. 68ff. and 571ff., and McCrie, “The Issues of Synechism,” Vol. 3, pp. 380ff.

7. “What Pragmatism Is?” Vol. 15, pp. 161-181.

8. “The Issues of Pragmaticism,” Vol. 15, pp. 481-499.

9. “Mr. Peterson’s Proposed Discussion,” Vol. 16, pp. 147ff.

10. “Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism,” Vol. 16, pp.
492-546.

The last four papers develop Peirce’s thought by showing its agreement and disagreement with the pragmatism of James and Schiller. The last paper contains his Method of Existential Graphs.

_E._ “The Reality of God,” in the _Hibbert Journal_, Vol. 7 (1908),
pp. 96-112. (This article contains brief indications of many of
Peirce’s leading ideas.)

_F._ Six Papers in the _Open Court_, Vols. 6-7 (1893).

1. “Pythagorics” (on the Pythagorean brotherhood), pp. 3375-3377.

2. “Dmesis” (on charity towards criminals), pp. 3399-3402.

3. “The Critic of Arguments (I.), Exact Thinking,” pp. 3391-3394.

4. “The Critic of Arguments (II.), The Reader is Introduced to
Relatives,” pp. 3415-3419. (The last two contain a very clear
succinct account of the general character of Peirce’s logic.)

5. “What is Christian Faith?” pp. 3743-3745.

6. “The Marriage of Religion and Science,” pp. 3559-3560.

_G._ Articles in Baldwin’s “Dictionary of Philosophy”: Individual,
kind, matter and form, possibility, pragmatism, priority, reasoning,
sign, scientific method, sufficient reason, synechism, and
uniformity.

_H._ “Pearson’s Grammar of Science,” in _Popular Science Monthly_,
Vol. 58 (1901), pp. 296-306. (A critique of Pearson’s conceptualism
and of his utilitarian view as to the aim of science.)

II. Writings of Predominantly Logical Interest.

_A._ Five Papers on Logic, read before the American Academy of Arts
and Sciences. Published in the _Proceedings of the Academy_, Vol. 7
(1867).

1. “On an Improvement in Boole’s Calculus of Logic,” pp. 250-261.
(Suggests improvements in Boole’s logic, especially in the
representation of particular propositions. The association of
probability with the notion of relative frequency became a leading
idea of Peirce’s thought.)

2. “On the Natural Classification of Arguments,” pp. 261-287. (A
suggestive distinction between the leading principle and the premise
of an argument. Contains also an interesting note (pp. 283-284)
denying the positivistic maxim that, “no hypothesis is admissible
which is not capable of verification by direct observation.”)

3. “On a New List of Categories,” pp. 287-298. The categories are:
Being, Quality (Reference to a Ground), Relation (Reference to a
Correlate), Representation (Reference to an Interpretant),
Substance. “Logic has for its subject-genus all symbols and not
merely concepts.” Symbols include terms, propositions, and
arguments.

4. “Upon the Logic of Mathematics,” pp. 402-412. “There are certain
general propositions from which the truths of mathematics follow
syllogistically.”

5. “Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension,” pp. 416-432.
(Interesting historical references to the use of these terms and an
attack on the supposed rule as to their inverse proportionality.)

_B._ “Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relations,” in
_Memoires of the American Academy_, Vol. 9 (1870), pp. 317-378.
(Shows the relation of inclusion between classes to be more
fundamental than Boole’s use of equality. Extends the Booleian
calculus to DeMorgan’s logic of relative terms.)

_C._ “On the Algebra of Logic,” _American Journal of Mathematics_,
Vol. 3 (1880), pp. 15-57. (Referred to by Schroeder as Peirce’s
_Hauptwerk_ in “Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik,” Vol. 1., p.
107.)

_D._ “On the Logic of Number,” _American Journal of Mathematics_,
Vol. 4 (1881), pp. 85-95.

_E._ “Brief Description of the Algebra of Relatives,” Reprinted from
??, pp. 1-6.

_F._ “On the Algebra of Logic: A Contribution to the Philosophy of
Notation,” _American Journal of Mathematics_, Vol. 7 (1884), pp.
180-202.

_G._ “A Theory of Probable Inference” and notes “On a Limited
Universe of Marks” and on the “Logic of Relatives” in “Studies in
Logic by members of the Johns Hopkins University,” Boston, 1883, pp.
126-203.

_H._ “The Regenerated Logic,” _Monist_, Vol. 7, pp. 19-40.

“The Logic of Relatives,” _Monist_, Vol. 7, pp. 161-217. (An
elaborate development of his own logic of relatives, by way of
review of Schroeder’s book.)

_I._ Miscellaneous Notes, etc.

1. Review of Venn’s “Logic of Chance,” _North American Review_,
July, 1867.

2. “On the Application of Logical Analysis to Multiple Algebra,”
_Proceedings of the American Academy_, Vol. 10 (1875), pp. 392-394.

3. “Note on Grassman’s ‘Calculus of Extension,’” _Proceedings of the
American Academy_, Vol. 13 (1878), pp. 115-116.

4. “Note on Conversion,” _Mind_, Vol. 1, p. 424.

5. Notes and Additions to Benjamin Peirce’s “Linear Associative
Algebra,” _American Journal of Mathematics_, Vol. 4 (1881), pp.
92ff., especially pp. 221-229.

6. “Logical Machines,” _American Journal of Psychology_, Vol. 1
(1888).

7. “Infinitesimals,” _Science_, Vol. 11 (1900), p. 430.

8. “Some Amazing Mazes,” _Monist_, Vol. 18 (April and July, 1908),
and Vol. 19 (Jan., 1909).

9. “On Non-Aristotelian Logic” (Letter), _Monist_, Vol. 20.

_J._ A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic. 1903. Boston. Alfred
Mudge & Son (a four page brochure).

_K._ Articles in Baldwin’s “Dictionary of Philosophy” on: laws of
thought, leading principle, logic (exact and symbolic), modality,
negation, predicate and predication, probable inference, quality,
quantity, relatives, significant, simple, subject, syllogism,
theory, truth and falsity universal, universe, validity,
verification, whole and parts.

III. Researches in the Theory and Methods of Measurement.

_A._ General and Astronomic.

1. “On the Theory of Errors of Observation,” _Report of the
Superintendent of the U. S. Coast Survey_ for 1870, pp. 220-224.

2. “Note on the Theory of Economy of Research,” _Report of the U. S.
Coast Survey_ for 1876, pp. 197-201. (This paper deals with the
relation between the utility and the cost of diminishing the
probable error.)

3. “Apparatus for Recording a Mean of Observed Times,” _U. S. Coast
Survey_, 1877. Appendix No. 15 to _Report_ of 1875.

4. “Ferrero’s Metodo dei Minimi Quadrati,” _American Journal of
Mathematics_, Vol. 1 (1878), pp. 55-63.

5. “Photometric Researches,” _Annals of the Astronomical Observatory
of Harvard College_, Vol. 9 (1878), pp. 1-181.

6. “Methods and Results. Measurement of Gravity.” Washington. 1879.

7. “Methods and Results. A Catalogue of Stars for Observations of
Latitude.” Washington. 1879.

8. “On the Ghosts in Rutherford’s ‘Diffraction Spectra,’” _American
Journal of Mathematics_, Vol. 2 (1879), pp. 330-347.

9. “Note on a Comparison of a Wave-Length with a Meter,” _American
Journal of Science_, Vol. 18 (1879), p. 51.

10. “A Quincuncial Projection of the Sphere,” _American Journal of
Mathematics_, Vol. 2 (1879), pp. 394, 396.

11. “Numerical Measure of Success of Predictions,” _Science_, Vol. 4
(1884), p. 453.

12. “Proceedings Assay Commission” Washington, 1888. (Joint Reports
on Weighing.)

_B._ Geodetic Researches. The Pendulum.

1. “Measurement of Gravity at Initial Stations in America and
Europe,” _Report of the U. S. Coast Survey_, 1876, pp. 202-237 and
410-416.

2. “De l’influence de la flexibilité du trépied sur l’oscillation du
pendule a réversion,” Conférence Geodesique Internationale (1877)
Comptes Rendus, Berlin, 1878, pp. 171-187. (This paper was
introduced by Plantamour and was followed by the notes of Appolzer.)

3. “On the Influence of Internal Friction upon the Correction of the
Length of the Second’s Pendulum,” _Proceedings of the American
Academy_, Vol. 13 (1878), pp. 396-401.

4. “On a Method of Swinging Pendulums for the Determination of
Gravity proposed by M. Faye,” _American Journal of Science_, Vol. 18
(1879), pp. 112-119.

5. “Results of Pendulum Experiments,” _American Journal of Science_,
Vol. 20 (1880).

6. “Flexure of Pendulum Supports,” _Report of the U. S. Coast
Survey_, 1881, pp. 359-441.

7. “On the Deduction of the Ellipticity of the Earth from the
Pendulum Experiment,” _Report of the U. S. Coast Survey_, 1881, pp.
442-456.

8. “Determinations of Gravity at Stations in Pennsylvania,” _Report
of U. S. Coast Survey_, 1883, Appendix 19 and pp. 473-486.

9. “On the Use of the Noddy,” _Report of the U. S. Coast Survey_,
1884, pp. 475-482.

10. “Effect of the Flexure of a Pendulum upon the Period of
Oscillation,” _Report of the U. S. Coast Survey_, 1884, pp. 483-485.

11. “On the Influence of a Noddy, and of Unequal Temperature upon
the Periods of a Pendulum,” _Report of the U. S. Coast and Geodetic
Survey_ for 1885, pp. 509-512.

_C._ Psychologic. “On Small Differences in Sensation” (in
cooperation with J. Jastrow), _National Academy of Sciences_, Vol. 3
(1884), pp. 1-11.

IV. Philologic.

“Shakespearian Pronunciation” (in coöperation with J. B. Noyes),
_North American Review_, Vol. 98 (April, 1864), pp. 342-369.

V. Contributions to the _Nation_.

Lazelle, Capt. H. M., One Law in Nature. _Nation_, Vol. 17, No. 419.

Newcomb, S., Popular Astronomy. Vol. 27, No. 683.

Read, C., Theory of Logic, 1878. Vol. 28, No. 718.

Rood, O. N., Modern Chromatics, 1879. Vol. 29, No. 746.

Note on the _American Journal of Mathematics_. Vol. 29, No. 756.

Jevons, W. S., Studies in Deductive Logic, 1880. Vol. 32, No. 822.

Ribot, Th., The Psychology of Attention, 1890. Vol. 50, No. 1303.

James, W., The Principles of Psychology, 1890. Vol. 53, Nos. 1357
and 1358.

Comte, A. (F. Harrison, editor), The New Calendar of Great Men,
1892. Vol. 54, No. 1386.

Lobatchewsky, N. (Translator: G. B. Halsted), Geometrical Researches
on the Theory of Parallels, 1891. Vol. 54, No. 1389.

Lombroso, C., The Man of Genius, 1891. Vol. 54, No. 1391.

Note on William James’ abridgment of his Psychology, 1892. Vol. 54,
No. 1394.

McClelland, W. J., A Treatise on the Geometry of the Circle, 1891.
Vol. 54, No. 1395.

Buckley, Arabella B., Moral Teachings of Science, 1892. Vol. 54, No.
1405.

Hale, E. E., A New England Boyhood, 1893. Vol. 57, No. 1468.

Mach, E. (Translator: T. J. McCormack), The Science of Mechanics,
1893. Vol. 57, No. 1475.

Ritchie, D. G., Darwin and Hegel, 1893. Vol. 57, No. 1482.

Huxley, T. H., Method and Results, 1893. Vol. 58, No. 1489.

Scott, Sir Walter, Familiar Letters of Sir Walter Scott. Vol. 58,
No. 1493.

Gilbert, W. (Translator: P. F. Mottelay), Magnetic Bodies. Vol. 58,
No. 1494 and No. 1495.

Forsyth, A. R., Theory of Functions of a Complex Variable, 1893; and
Harkness, J., A Treatise on the Theory of Functions, 1893; and
Picard, E., Traité d’analyse, 1893. Vol. 58, No. 1498.

A Short Sketch of Helmholtz, Sept. 13, 1894. Vol. 59, No. 1524.

Windelband, W. (Translator: J. H. Tufts), A History of Philosophy;
and Falkenberg, R. (Translator: A. C. Armstrong), History of Modern
Philosophy; and Bascom, J., An Historical Interpretation of
Philosophy; and Burt, B. C., A History of Modern Philosophy. Vol.
59, Nos. 1526 and 1527.

Spinoza (Translators: W. H. White and Amelia H. Stirling), Ethics,
1894. Vol. 59, No. 1532.

Watson, J., Comte, Mill, and Spencer, 1895. Vol. 60, No. 1554.

Jones, H., A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Lotze, 1895; and
Eberhard, V., Die Grundbegriffe der ebenen Geometrie, 1895; and
Klein, F. (Translator: A. Ziwet), Riemann and his Significance for
the Development of Modern Mathematics, 1895; and Davis, N. K.,
Elements of Inductive Logic, 1895. Vol. 61, No. 1566.

Benjamin, P., The Intellectual Rise in Electricity, 1895. Vol. 62,
No. 1592.

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Chance, Love, and Logic: Philosophical EssaysChapter XV: Conclusion (3)

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