Chapter I: The Invasion of the North

An invasion of the North being considered as both practicable and necessary, it only remained to select the most available route.

There was no object in passing east of Hooker's army, and it would have been wholly impracticable to do so, as the wide rivers to be crossed were controlled by our gunboats.

To attempt to cross the Rappahannock to the west, and in the immediate vicinity of Fredericksburg, would have been hazardous, because when an army is crossing, the portion which is over is liable to be crushed before it can be reinforced.

It would seem that Lee's first intention was to move along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge directly toward Washington.* The appearance of his army on Hooker's flank would be a kind of taunt and threat, calculated to draw the latter out of his shell, and induce him to make an attack. In such a case, as the rebels were in the highest spirits, in consequence of their recent victory at Chancellorsville, their commander had little doubt of the result. This plan was feasible enough, provided his cavalry could beat back that of Pleasonton and act as a screen to conceal his movements. This they were not in a condition to do after the battle of Brandy Station, and Lee was thus forced to take the route down the Shenandoah Valley, which had many advantages. The mountain wall that intervened between the two armies, was a sure defence against our forces, for it was covered by dense thickets, and the roads that lead through the gaps, and the gaps themselves, were easy to fortify and hold against a superior force. If Hooker had attempted to assail these positions, one corps could have held him in check, while the other two captured Washington.

[* See map facing page 1.]

The movement also favored the subsistence of the troops, for the valley being a rich agricultural region, Lee was enabled to dispense with much of his transportation and feed his army off the country.

There was one serious obstacle, however, to his further progress in that direction, and that was the presence of a gallant soldier, Milroy, with a very considerable Union garrison intrenched at Winchester.

It was essential to Lee's advance that the valley should be cleared of Union troops, otherwise they would sally forth after he passed and capture his convoys.

With this object in view, on the 10th Ewell's corps passed through Gaines' Cross Roads, and halted near Flint Hill on their way to Chester Gap and Front Royal.

The possibility of an invasion had been discussed for some days in Washington, and Halleck had come to the conclusion that it was better to withdraw the stores and ammunition from Winchester, and retain the post there merely as a lookout, to give warning of the enemy's approach. Accordingly, on the 11th, Milroy received orders from his department commander, General Schenck, to send his armament and supplies back to Harper's Ferry. Milroy remonstrated, saying that he could hold the place against any force that would probably attack him, and that it would be cruel to sacrifice the Union men who looked to him for protection.

In reply to this Schenck telegraphed him that he might remain, but must be in readiness to retreat whenever circumstances made it necessary.

Milroy, in answer to another inquiry, reported that he could move in six hours.

On the 12th he sent out two scouting parties, and learned there was a considerable force at Cedarsville, which he thought might form part of Stuart's raid, information of which had been communicated to him.

He could not believe it possible that an entire rebel corps was near him, for he supposed Lee's army was still at Fredericksburg. His superiors had not informed him, as they should have done by telegraph, that a large part of it had moved to Culpeper. He thought if Lee left Hooker's front at Fredericksburg, the Army of the Potomac would follow and he would receive full information and instructions. He telegraphed General Schenck late that night for specific orders, whether to hold his post or to retreat on Harper's Ferry, stating there appeared to be a considerable force in front of him. As the enemy soon after cut the wires, he never received any answer. He sent a messenger the same night to notify Colonel McReynolds, at Berryville, that there was a large body of the enemy on the Front Royal road, and directed him to send out scouts to Millwood, and keep himself advised of its approach, in order that he might prepare to fall back on Winchester the moment he was attacked by superior numbers.

On the 13th Ewell marched with two divisions directly on Winchester, while he sent the third--that of Rodes--to take Berryville. Thanks to the timely warning McReynolds had received, his brigade got off in time, his rear being covered by Alexander's battery, the 6th Maryland Infantry, and part of the 1st New York (Lincoln) Cavalry. These detained the enemy two hours, and then caught up with the main body. Jenkins' cavalry came upon the retreating force at Opequan Creek, where he made a fierce attack, which was promptly repulsed by the rear guard, aided by the artillery with canister. After this there was no further molestation, and McReynolds' command reached Winchester at 10 P.M.--a march of thirty miles.

Soon after the affair at the Opequan, Major Morris, with 200 men, was attacked at Bunker Hill, an outlying post of Winchester. He occupied a fortified church, but moved out to meet the enemy, under the impression it was only a small raiding party. When he found two thousand men in line of battle he retreated, fighting, to the church again. There, as the doors were barricaded, and the walls loopholed, the rebels could make no impression, and were obliged to fall back to a respectful distance. In the night Morris managed to steal away, and soon rejoined the main body at Winchester.

The arrival of these reinforcements seriously embarrassed Milroy; and it will be seen hereafter that it would have been much better for all concerned if they had retreated to Harper's Ferry at once. They acted, however, strictly in obedience to orders.

Rodes' division, after the taking of Berryville, kept on towards Martinsburg, and bivouacked at a place called Summit Point.

On the morning of the 13th Milroy had sent out a detachment under General Elliot on the Strasburg road, and another under Colonel Ely on the Front Royal road, to reconnoitre. Eliott found no enemy, and returned. An attempt was made to cut him off from the town, but it was repulsed. His troops were then massed on the south side behind Mill Creek and a mill-race which ran parallel to it, and were protected by stone fences. Colonel Ely had a brisk artillery skirmish with Ewell's advance, and then fell back to Winchester, taking post at the junction of the Front Royal and Strasburg roads. The enemy did not attempt to cross the creek that night, but at 5 P.M. they advanced and captured a picket-post which commanded the Strasburg road, but were soon driven out.

From a prisoner captured in this skirmish Milroy learned the highly important intelligence that he was confronted by Ewell's corps and that Longstreet was rapidly approaching.

The most natural course under the circumstances would have been for him to retreat at once, but McReynolds' brigade had just arrived, exhausted by their forced march, and could go no further, without some hours' rest. To move without them would be to sacrifice a large part of his force. He still cherished the hope that Hooker's army would follow Lee up closely and come to his relief.

Ewell at night directed Early's division to attack the works on the north and west of the town at daylight the next morning, while Johnson's division demonstrated against the east and southeast.

Early on Sunday, the 14th, Milroy sent out a detachment to see if the enemy had established themselves on the Pughtown or Romney roads. The party returned about 2 P.M. and reported the roads clear, but soon after the rebels came in great force from that direction, so that Milroy's hopes of escaping by the routes leading to the northwest were dissipated. Immediately west of Winchester, and parallel with Applebie Ridge, on which the main forts were situated, there is another ridge called Flint Ridge, where rifle pits had been commenced to command the Pughtown and Romney roads. These were held by one regiment, and part of another under Colonel Keifer of the 110th Ohio, together with Battery "L" of the 5th United States Artillery. Early's division made a sudden attack there, preliminary to which he opened fire with four batteries. He charged into these rifle-pits and took them, but the garrison retreated successfully, under cover of the fire, from the main works above, which were held by Elliot's and McReynolds' brigades. This was followed by an artillery duel, which was kept up until 8 P.M. without any special results.

Johnson's division at daybreak attacked the eastern side of the town, held by Colonel Ely's brigade, but was gallantly met and repulsed by the 8th Pennsylvania and 87th Pennsylvania. These two regiments, by Milroy's order, made a bold charge against the enemy as they were retiring, but the latter were so suddenly and strongly reinforced that the two regiments were glad to get back to their shelter in the fortified suburbs. They were followed up however, and after severe fighting Johnson gained possession of a part of the town. This apparent success proved of no avail, for the forts above shelled him out. He therefore retired and made no further attempt in that direction.

Darkness ended the struggle for the day. Johnson then left one brigade to prevent Milroy from escaping toward the east and went off with the remainder of his division to form across the Martinsburg pike, about three miles north of Winchester, to intercept Milroy's retreat in that direction.

While these events were going on in the Valley, Imobden's cavalry was engaged in breaking up the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad near Romney, to prevent Milroy from receiving any reinforcements from the west.

The latter now found himself in a perilous situation. His cannon ammunition was nearly exhausted, and he had but one day's rations for his men. He resolved to give up all further attempts to defend the place, to abandon his wagon train and artillery, and to force his way through the hostile lines that night; taking with him only the horses and small arms. This involved his leaving also his sick and wounded, but it was unavoidable. He ordered all the guns spiked, and the ammunition thrown into the cisterns.

At 1 A.M. on the 15th, he moved silently out through a ravine and was not molested until he struck the Martinsburg road, about four miles from the town. There Elliot, who was in the advance with his brigade, met a rebel skirmish line, and soon ascertained that their main body were formed, partly on high ground in a woods east of the road, and partly in an open field east of and adjoining the woods. The enemy were in effect sheltered by a stone fence which bordered a railroad cut, with their reserve and artillery principally posted on elevated ground in the rear.

The only thing to do was to break through their lines as soon as possible. It was now about 3:30 A.M. Elliot, whose record of long, careful, and brilliant service in the regular army is an exemplary one, formed line of battle with his three regiments and fought the six regiments that held the road for about an hour with varied success, encountering a severe artillery fire and driving back their right in disorder by a gallant charge of the 110th Ohio and 122d Ohio; but unfortunately their left held firm, in spite of repeated attacks made by Colonel Shawl with two regiments, reinforced with two more and by part of Colonel Ely's brigade. Their force in front, too, was sustained by heavy reserves both of infantry and artillery.

A signal-gun fired at Winchester showed that the enemy there were aware of the flight and were in full pursuit. The main road being blocked, Milroy determined to try another, and directed the troops to fall back a short distance and turn to the right. Part of them did so, but the greater number, through some misunderstanding, filed to the left, and took the road to Bath. It was no longer possible to reunite the two columns and as Milroy's horse was shot under him about this time, he could use no personal exertions to remedy the disaster. A portion of the command who were not pursued reached Harper's Ferry by way of Smithfield late in the afternoon. Those who moved out on the Bath road also made good their escape, crossed the Potomac at Hancock, and rallied at Bloody Run. The greater part of Colonel Ely's brigade, and Colonel McReynolds' brigade, however, were captured. Milroy claims to have brought off 5,000 men of the garrison, and that the 2,000 paroled by Early, consisted principally of the sick and wounded. Early says he sent 108 officers and 3,250 enlisted men as prisoners to Richmond. Johnson, who intercepted the retreat, says he captured 2,300 prisoners, 175 horses, and 11 battle flags.

While two-thirds of Ewell's corps were attacking Winchester, the other division under Rodes, preceded by Jenkins' brigade of cavalry, pursued McReynolds' wagon train to Martinsburg, arriving there late in the afternoon of the 14th. The town was held as an outlying post of Harper's Ferry by a small detachment of all arms under Colonel Tyler, a subordinate of General Tyler, who formed his men outside of the place and resisted Rodes' attack until night, when his infantry escaped to Shepherdstown, and his artillery and cavalry to Williamsport. In carrying out these movements, however, he lost five guns and five caissons. He passed the river and rejoined the main body at Harper's Ferry. The latter place is wholly indefensible against an enemy holding the hills around it. It is like fighting at the bottom of a well. General Tyler had therefore very wisely moved across the river to Maryland Heights, where he had a strong fortified post. From that commanding eminence he could very soon shell out any force that attempted to occupy the town.

The Shenandoah valley was now clear of Union troops, and soon became the great highway of the invasion. However disastrous Milroy's defeat may be considered on account of the losses incurred, it was not without its compensation. The detention of Ewell's force there gave time to the general Government and the Governors of the loyal States to raise troops and organize resistance, and it awakened the entire North to the necessity of immediate action.

Hooker, having learned that Ewell had passed Sperryville, advanced his right to prevent any crossing in his immediate vicinity, and confine the enemy to the Valley route. He sent the Third Corps to hold the fords opposite Culpeper, and the Fifth Corps to guard those lower down.

On the 13th he gave up his position opposite Fredericksburg, and started north toward Washington, giving orders to Sedgwick to recross and follow on to Dumfries. That night the First Corps reached Bealeton, and the Eleventh Catlett's station. Reynolds was placed in command of the left wing of the army (the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps) and I relieved him in command of the First Corps. The right wing (that is the Second, Fifth, Twelfth, and Sixth Corps) was accompanied by Hooker in person, who reached Dumfries on the 14th.

As soon as Hill saw Sedgwick disappear behind the Stafford hills, he broke up his camp and started for Culpeper.

Some changes in the meantime had occurred in the Army of the Potomac, and General Hancock was assigned to the Second Corps instead of General Couch, who had been sent to organize the department of the Susquehanna at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

The teamsters and fugitives from Winchester, making for Chambersburg in all haste, told the inhabitants of the towns through which they passed that the rebels were close behind them. This created the wildest excitement. As many cases had occurred in which negroes had been seized, and sent South to be sold as slaves, the whole colored population took to the woods and filled up the roads in all directions. The appearance of Jenkins' brigade, who crossed at Williamsport on the morning of the 15th and reached Chambersburg the same day, added to the alarm.

Jenkins was at the head of 2,000 cavalry, and soon became a terror to the farmers in that vicinity by his heavy exactions in the way of horses, cattle, grain, etc. It must be confessed he paid for what he took in Confederate scrip, but as this paper money was not worth ten cents a bushel, there was very little consolation in receiving it. His followers made it a legal tender at the stores for everything they wanted. Having had some horses stolen, he sternly called on the city authorities to pay him their full value. They did so without a murmur--_in Confederate money._ He pocketed it with a grim smile, evidently appreciating the joke. He boasted greatly of his humanity and his respect for private property, but if the local papers are to be believed, it must be chronicled to his everlasting disgrace that he seized a great many negroes, who were tied and sent South as slaves. Black children were torn from their mothers, placed in front of his troops, and borne off to Virginia to be sold for the benefit of his soldiers. There was nothing out of character in that, he thought, for it was one of the sacred rights for which the South was contending.

Prompt measures were taken by the Northern States to meet the emergency. Mr. Lincoln called on the Governors of West Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New York to raise 120,000 men for temporary service. It was easy to get the men, but difficult to arm them, as nearly all serviceable muskets were already in possession of the Army of the Potomac. As early as the 9th two new departments had been created for Pennsylvania: That of the Monongahela, with headquarters at Pittsburg, was assigned to Major-General W. T. H. Brooks; and that of the Susquehanna, with headquarters at Carlisle, to Major-General Darius N. Couch.

On the 15th Ewell reached Williamsport with a force estimated at twelve thousand men and sixteen guns.

Before Couch could reach Carlisle it was already occupied by Jenkins' cavalry, and the terrified farmers of that section of country were fleeing in crowds across the Susquehanna, driving their horses and cattle before them.