Chapter III: Front Matter (3)

He seems also to have anticipated that flagrant sophism, which,
under the guise of Popular Sovereignty, insists that men shall
be at liberty--“perfectly free” is the phrase of the Nebraska
Bill--to buy and sell fellow-men.

“If you will adopt the principles of Liberty, adopt them
altogether. Every argument which you can urge in support
of your own claims might be employed, with far greater
justice, in favor of the emancipation of your bondsmen.
When that event shall have taken place, your demand will
deserve consideration. At present, what you require under
the name of Freedom is nothing but unlimited power to
oppress. It is the freedom of Nero.”[10]

The threats of disunion, coming from slave-drivers, are also
foreshown, and treated with the scorn they merit.

“Who can refrain from thinking of Captain Lemuel Gulliver,
who, while raised sixty feet from the ground on the hand
of the King of Brobdignag, claps his hand on his sword and
tells his Majesty that he knows how to defend himself?
You will rebel!… But this is mere trifling. Are you, in
point of fact, at this moment able to protect yourselves
against your slaves without our assistance? If you can
still rise up and lie down in security,--if you can still
eat the bread of the fatherless and grind the faces of the
poor,--if you can still hold your petty Parliaments, and
say your little speeches, and move your little motions,--if
you can still outrage and insult the Parliament and people
of England,--to what do you owe it?”[11]

The sensitiveness of slave property--the same in our Slave
States as in the British West Indies--is aptly described in
the remark, that a pamphlet of Mr. Stephen or a speech of Mr.
Brougham is sufficient to excite all the slaves in the colonies
to rebel. And it is shown that in a servile war the master
_must_ be loser; for his enemies are his chattels. Whether
the slave conquer or fall, he is alike lost to the owner. In
the mean time, the soil lies uncultivated, the machinery is
destroyed. And when the possessions of the planter are restored
to him, they have been changed into a desert.[12]

Here also is an exhibition of the incompatibility between
Slavery and Christianity, which ought to be read in every
Southern pulpit:--

“The immorality and irreligion of the slaves are the
necessary consequences of their political and personal
degradation. They are not considered by the law as human
beings.… _They must become men before they can become
Christians_.… Can a preacher prevail on his hearers
strictly to fulfil their conjugal duties in a country where
no protection is given to their conjugal rights,--in a
country where the husband and wife may, at the pleasure of
the master or by process of law, be in an instant separated
forever?… The great body of the colonists have resolutely
opposed religious instruction; and they are in the right.
They know, though their misinformed friends in England do
not know, that Christianity and Slavery cannot long exist
together.”[13]

Such is the philippic against Slavery by the first writer of
the English language in our day, and one of the first in all
times. As testimony to a sacred cause, it is priceless; as a
contribution to literature, it cannot be forgotten. Why it was
suppressed by American publishers, who gave us the earliest
collection of Macaulay’s Essays ever printed in England or
America, I know not. Unhappily, this suppression was too
much in harmony with the received American system from that
day to this, whether in publishing Humboldt’s work on Cuba,
the Bishop of Oxford’s work on the American Church, or the
engraving of Ary Scheffer’s “Christus Consolator,” from all of
which the slave is shut out. That this blame may not fall upon
the author himself, it is important to know that the American
collection was made without any list supplied by him. In the
modesty of his nature, he regarded his contributions to Reviews
as fugitive pieces, which he abandoned to the world, without
caring to gather them together. It will be for posterity to
rejudge this judgment.

In this statement, I rely upon personal recollection of
conversations with him. More than twenty years ago--as also
more recently--I was in the habit of meeting the great writer
in the society of London; and I remember well how, on one of
these occasions, when told that an American bookseller proposed
to publish a collection of his articles, he very positively
protested against it, and refused to furnish a list. Nor
is it out of place to add here, that, while his wonderful
conversation left on the mind an ineffaceable impression of
eloquence and fulness, perhaps without parallel, it also showed
a character of singular integrity.

This article is not alone in attesting his sympathy with the
Antislavery cause. The first public appearance of Macaulay,
while yet a very young man, was at an Antislavery meeting;
and one of his most stinging speeches, at the maturity of his
powers, in the House of Commons, bore testimony to the depth
and constancy of this sentiment.[14] This was natural; for he
was son of Zachary Macaulay, one of the devoted Abolitionists
who helped to carry, first, the abolition of the slave-trade,
and then, at a later day, the abolition of Slavery itself, in
the British dominions.

The services of the father, as friend of the slave, have been
aptly commemorated by a cenotaph in Westminster Abbey, situated
in the nave, on the left side of the great door as you enter,
and close to the imposing monument of Fox. The son now lies
in the same historic burial-place and beneath the same mighty
roof,[15] but in Poets’ Corner, distant by more than the whole
length of the nave from the tablet erected in honor of his
father. In all that multitude of monuments to the illustrious
dead, if we except the line of kings, there is but one other
instance of father and son enshrined in the Abbey, and that is
Lord Chatham and William Pitt, whose monuments are also distant
from each other by more than the whole length of the nave.

Such is the conspicuous fellowship of the two Pitts and
the Macaulays, father and son, although most unlike in
circumstances of life and the services which have secured this
common foothold of immortality. In each case, the father, even
with the fame of Lord Chatham, has new glory from the son. The
resting-places of the two Pitts are known at once on entering
the Abbey. Hereafter, the stranger, who has stood with grateful
admiration before the grave of the younger Macaulay, will
seek with reverent step the simple tribute to his father, the
Abolitionist,--mindful that the love of Human Freedom in which
the son was cradled and schooled gave to his character some of
its best features, and to his career of authorship its earliest
triumph.

My purpose is simply to introduce this new-found testimony
against Slavery, and not to dwell on the life or character of
the author. If I followed a hint from him, the way would be
open. Nobody can forget that in one of his most magnificent
essays he has availed himself of the interest, transient it may
have been, created by a newly discovered prose work of Milton,
and has reminded his readers that the dexterous Capuchins never
choose to preach on the life and miracles of a Saint till they
have awakened the devotional feelings of their auditors by
exhibiting some relic of him,--a thread of his garment, a lock
of his hair, or a drop of his blood. Here, indeed, is a relic
of Macaulay; but I venture no further.

CHARLES SUMNER.

STATUE OF HORACE MANN.

LETTER TO DR. SAMUEL G. HOWE, MARCH 5, 1860.

From the public papers of the time.

SENATE CHAMBER, March 5, 1860.

MY DEAR HOWE,--I am glad to know that you are moving in earnest
for a public statue to Horace Mann.

Absence, and not indifference, is my excuse for not associating
myself at first with this purpose. Though tardily, I do it
now most sincerely, and with my whole heart. I send you for
it one hundred dollars; but you will please not to measure my
interest in this tribute to a public benefactor by the sum which
I contribute. Were I able, it would be ten times as large. If
each person in Massachusetts who has been benefited by the vast
and generous labors of Horace Mann,--each person who hates
Intemperance, and who hates Slavery,--each person who loves
Education, and who loves humane efforts for the prisoner, the
poor, and the insane,--should contribute a mite only, then his
statue would be of gold. Why not at once appeal to good men, and
insist upon organization throughout the Commonwealth, reaching
into every School District, so that all may have an opportunity
to contribute? Pray do this, and if I can serve you any way
about it, command me, and believe me,

Always yours,

CHARLES SUMNER.

P. S.--Mr. Seward, who is not a Massachusetts man, asks me to put
his name down for fifty dollars. I enclose his subscription.

USURPATION OF THE SENATE IN IMPRISONING A CITIZEN.

TWO SPEECHES, ON THE IMPRISONMENT OF THADDEUS HYATT FOR REFUSING TO TESTIFY IN THE HARPER’S FERRY INVESTIGATION, IN THE SENATE, MARCH 12 AND JUNE 15, 1860.

On his return to the Senate, at the opening of Congress,
December 5, 1859, Mr. Sumner encountered the agitation arising
from the famous attempt of John Brown at Harper’s Ferry. Though
warned to enter slowly into the full responsibilities of his
position, he was constantly moved by incidents arising from
this agitation.

* * * * *

On the first day of the session, Mr. Mason, of Virginia, moved
the appointment of a committee “to inquire into the facts
attending the late invasion and seizure of the armory and
arsenal of the United States at Harper’s Ferry, in Virginia,
by a band of armed men,” and the long resolution concluded
with “power to send for persons and papers.” The Committee
was appointed, with Mr. Mason as chairman, and, in the course
of its duties, summoned John Brown, Jr., of Kansas, and F. B.
Sanborn and James Redpath, of Massachusetts, who severally
failed to appear. Thaddeus Hyatt, of New York, appeared, but
refused to testify. Thereupon Mr. Mason reported from his
committee the following resolution.

“Whereas Thaddeus Hyatt, appearing at the bar of the
Senate, in custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms, pursuant to
the resolution of the Senate of the 6th of March, instant,
was required, by order of the Senate then made, to answer
the following questions, under oath and in writing: ‘1st,
What excuse have you for not appearing before the select
committee of the Senate, in pursuance of the summons
served on you on the 24th day of January, 1860? 2d, Are
you now ready to appear before said committee, and answer
such proper questions as shall be put to you by said
committee?’--time to answer the same being given until
the 9th day of March following: And whereas, on the said
last-named day, the said Thaddeus Hyatt, again appearing,
in like custody, at the bar of the Senate, presented a
paper, accompanied by an affidavit, which he stated was
his answer to said questions; and it appearing, upon
examination thereof, that said Thaddeus Hyatt has assigned
no sufficient excuse in answer to the question first
aforesaid, and in answer to said second question has not
declared himself ready to appear and answer before said
committee of the Senate, as set forth in said question, and
has not purged himself of the contempt with which he stands
charged: Therefore,

“_Be it resolved_, That the said Thaddeus Hyatt be
committed by the Sergeant-at-Arms to the common jail of the
District of Columbia, to be kept in close custody until
he shall signify his willingness to answer the questions
propounded to him by the Senate; and for the commitment and
detention of the said Thaddeus Hyatt this resolution shall
be a sufficient warrant.

“_Resolved_, That, whenever the officer having the said
Thaddeus Hyatt in custody shall be informed by said Hyatt
that he is ready and willing to answer the questions
aforesaid, it shall be the duty of such officer to deliver
the said Thaddeus Hyatt over to the Sergeant-at-Arms of the
Senate, whose duty it shall be again to bring him before
the bar of the Senate, when so directed by the Senate.”

On the question upon its passage, March 12, 1860, Mr. Sumner
spoke as follows.

MR. PRESIDENT,--It is related in English parliamentary history, that, on a certain occasion, when the House of Commons was about ordering the commitment of a somewhat too famous witness to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms, the Speaker interfered by volunteering to say, that “the House ought to pause before they came to a decision upon a point in which the liberty of the subject was so materially concerned.”[16] That same question is now before us. We are to pass on the liberty of a citizen.

Pardon me, if I say that such a question cannot at any time be trivial. But it has an unaccustomed magnitude on this occasion, because the case is novel in this body; so that what you now do, besides involving the liberty of the gentleman at the bar, will establish a precedent, which, in itself, will be a law for other cases hereafter.

Now, if it be conceded that the Senate is invested with all the large powers claimed by the Houses of Parliament, then I cannot doubt its power in the present case, although I might well question the expediency of exercising it. But this is notoriously untrue. It is well known that Parliament is above the constraint of a written Constitution; and it has been more than once declared--much to the indignation of our Revolutionary fathers--that it is “omnipotent” to such extent that it can do anything it pleases, except make a man of a woman, or a woman of a man. The Senate has no such large powers; it is not “omnipotent,” but under the constraint of a written Constitution. Instead of authority in all possible cases, it has authority only in certain specific cases.

If the Senate can summon witnesses to its bar, and compel them to testify, under pains and penalties, it must be by virtue of powers delegated in the Constitution,--I do not say by express grant, but at least by positive intendment. I say positive intendment; for nothing is to be presumed against liberty.

There are certain cases in which the power is clear: first, and most conspicuously, in the trial of impeachments; secondly, in determining the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members; and, thirdly, in punishing its members for disorderly behavior. All these proceedings are judicial, as well as political, in character, and carry with them, as a natural incident, the power to compel witnesses to testify.

Beyond these three cases, which stand on the express words of the Constitution, there are two other cases, quasi-judicial in character, which, though not supported by express words of the Constitution, have grown out of necessity and reason, amounting to positive intendment, and are sanctioned by precedents. I refer, first, to the inquiry into an alleged violation of the privileges of this body, as where a copy of a treaty was furtively obtained and published; and, secondly, to the inquiry into conduct of servants of the Senate, like that now proceeding with regard to the Printer, on the motion of the Senator from New York [Mr. KING]. If I were asked to indicate the principle on which these two cases stood, I should say it was that just and universal right of _self-defence_ inherent in every parliamentary body, as in every court, and also in every individual, but which is limited closely by the simple necessities of the case.

Such are the five cases in which this extraordinary power has been heretofore exercised: the first three standing on the text of the Constitution, and the other two on the right of self-defence necessarily inherent in the Senate; all five sanctioned by precedents of this body; all five judicial in character; all five judicial also in purpose and intent; and all five agreeing in this final particular, that they have no legislative purpose or intent. Beyond these cases there is no precedent for the exercise by the Senate of the power in question.

It is now proposed to add a new case, most clearly without any support in the Constitution, without any support in the right of _self-defence_ inherent in the Senate, and without any support in the precedents of the Senate.

A committee has been appointed to inquire into the facts attending the late invasion and seizure of the armory and arsenal at Harper’s Ferry by a band of armed men, and report whether the same was attended by armed resistance to the authorities and public force of the United States, and by the murder of any citizens of Virginia, or of any troops sent there to protect public property; whether such invasion was made under color of any organization intended to subvert the government of any of the States of the Union; the character and extent of such organization; _whether any citizens of the United States, not present, were implicated therein or accessory thereto, by contributions of money, arms, munitions, or otherwise_; the character and extent of the military equipment in the hands or under the control of such armed band; where, how, and when the same was obtained and transported to the place invaded; also, to report what legislation, if any, is necessary by the Government for the future preservation of the peace of the country and the safety of public property; with power to send for persons and papers.

And this committee, after several weeks of session, now invokes the power of the Senate to compel the witness to testify. The chairman of the committee, the Senator from Virginia [Mr. MASON], who calls for the imprisonment of an American citizen, has shown no authority for such an exercise of power in the Constitution, or in the admitted right of self-defence, or in the precedents of the Senate. He cannot show any such authority. It does not exist.

Surely, where the Constitution, and reason, and precedent, all three, are silent, we might well hesitate to exercise a power so transcendent. But I shall not stop here. I go further, and point out two specific defects in the resolution of the Senate.

_First._ The inquiry which it institutes is clearly judicial in character,--without, however, any judicial purpose, or looking to any judicial end. The committee is essentially a Tribunal, with power of denunciation, but without power of punishment,--sitting with closed doors, having the secrecy of the Inquisition or the Star Chamber, or, if you please, the Grand Jury,--with power to investigate facts involving the guilt of absent persons, and to denounce fellow-citizens as felons and traitors. If such a power is lodged anywhere outside of judicial tribunals, it must be in the House of Representatives, as the Grand Inquest of the Nation, with its power to impeach all civil officers, from the President down; but it cannot be in the Senate. Let me cite an illustration. The Constitution of Maryland provides expressly that “the House of Delegates may inquire, on the oath of witnesses, into all complaints, grievances, and offences, as the Grand Inquest of the State, and may commit any person for any crime to the public jail, there to remain until discharged by due course of law.” But I deny that the Senate of that neighbor State can erect itself into a Grand Inquest.

If the Senate of the United States have power to make the present inquiry, then, on any occasion of alleged crime, of whatever nature, whether of treason or murder or riot, it may rush to the assistance of the grand juries of the District, or, still further, it may rush to the assistance of the grand juries of Virginia; in short, it will be an inquest of commanding character, and with far-reaching, all-pervading process, supplementary and ancillary to the local inquest,--or, rather, so transcendent in powers, that by its side the local inquest will be dwarfed into insignificance. This cannot be proper or constitutional. But perhaps I am especially sensitive on this point; for, as a citizen of Massachusetts, I cannot forget that her Bill of Rights, originally the work of John Adams, provides expressly that the legislative department shall never exercise judicial powers, and the judicial department shall never exercise legislative powers,--“to the end,” as is solemnly declared, “it may be a government of laws, and not of men.”

But, assuming that the resolution is defective so far as it constitutes an inquest into crime, it may be said that the witness should be compelled to answer the other parts. Surely, the Senate will not resort to any such refinement in order to imprison a citizen.

_Secondly._ But there is a broader objection still: that, whatever may be the power of the Senate in judicial cases, it cannot compel the testimony of a witness in a proceeding of which the declared purpose is merely legislative. Officers of the Government communicate with Congress and its committees simply by letter. They are not summoned from distant posts, or even from their offices here. And I know not why a distant citizen, charged with no offence, and in every right the peer of any office-holder, should be treated with less consideration. If information be desired from him for any legislative purpose, let him communicate it in the way most convenient to himself, and most consistent with those rights of the citizen which all are bound to respect.

At all events, if this power is to be exercised, let it not be under a simple resolution of the Senate, but by virtue of a general law, passed by both Houses, and approved by the President, so that the citizen shall be surrounded with certain safeguards.

Mr. President, I confidently submit that a power so entirely without support, and also so obnoxious to criticism, at the same time that it is so vast, is not to be carelessly exercised. You cannot send the witness to prison without establishing a new precedent and commencing a new class of cases. You will declare that the Senate, at any time,--not merely in the performance of admitted judicial duties, but also in the performance of mere legislative duties,--may drag a citizen from the most distant village of the most distant State, and compel his testimony, involving the guilt or innocence of absent persons, or, it may be, of the witness himself. This is a fearful prerogative, and permit me to say, that, in assuming it, you liken yourselves to the Jesuits, at the period of their most hateful supremacy, when it was said that their power was a sword whose handle was at Rome and whose point was in the most distant places. You take into your hands a sword whose handle will be in this Chamber, to be clutched by a mere partisan majority, and whose point will be in every corner of the Republic.

If the present case were doubtful, which I do not admit, I feel that I cannot go wrong, when I lean to the side of Liberty. But, even admitting that you have the power, is this the occasion to use it? Is it, upon the whole, expedient? Is the object to be accomplished worth the sacrifice? It is well to have a giant’s strength, but it is tyrannous to use it like a giant.

For myself, Sir, I confess a feeling of gratitude to the witness, who, knowing nothing which he desires to conceal, and chiefly anxious that the liberties of all may not suffer through him, feeble in body and broken in health, hardly able to endure the fatigue of appearing at your bar, now braves the prison which you menace, and thrusts his arm as a bolt to arrest an unauthorized and arbitrary proceeding.

The resolutions were adopted March 12, 1860, and on the same
day Mr. Hyatt was committed to the common jail of Washington.

* * * * *

On the 15th of June, 1860, Mr. Mason, of Virginia, Chairman of
the Harper’s Ferry Investigating Committee, in submitting his
final report, further submitted the following order.

“_Ordered_, That Thaddeus Hyatt, a witness confined in
the jail of this city for refusal to appear and testify
before said committee, be discharged from custody, and
that a copy of this order be delivered to the jailer by
the Sergeant-at-Arms, as his warrant for discharging said
prisoner.”

On the question upon its passage, Mr. Sumner spoke as follows.

MR. PRESIDENT,--I welcome with pleasure the proposition for the discharge of Mr. Hyatt from his long incarceration in the filthy jail where he has been detained by the order of the Senate. But I am unwilling that this act of justice should be done to a much injured citizen, without for one moment exposing the injustice which he has received at your hands.

The case, it seems to me, can be made as plain as a diagram.

We must not forget a fundamental difference between the powers of the House of Representatives and the powers of the Senate. It is from the former that the Senator from Virginia has drawn his precedents, and here is his mistake.

To the House of Representatives expressly are given by the Constitution _inquisitorial_ powers, while no such powers are given to the Senate. This is contained in the words, “The House of Representatives shall have the _sole_ power of impeachment.” Here, then, obviously, is something delegated to the House, and not delegated to the Senate,--namely, those inquiries in their nature preliminary to impeachment, which may or may not end in impeachment; and since, by the Constitution, every “civil officer” of the national government may be impeached, the _inquisitorial_ powers of the House may be directed against every “civil officer,” from the President down to the lowest on the list.

This is an extensive power, but it is confined solely to the House. Strictly speaking, the Senate has no general _inquisitorial_ powers. It has, we know, _judicial powers_ in three cases under the Constitution:--

1. To try impeachments;

2. To judge the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members;

3. To punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two thirds, to expel a member.

In the execution of these powers, the Senate has the attributes of a court, and, according to established precedents, it may summon witnesses and compel their testimony, although it may well be doubted if a law be not necessary even to the execution of this power.

Besides these three cases, expressly named in the Constitution, there are two others, where it has already undertaken to exercise _judicial powers_, not by virtue of express words, but in _self-defence_:--

1. With regard to the conduct of its servants, as of its Printer;

2. When its privileges have been violated, as in the case of William Duane,[17] by a libel, or in the case of Nugent,[18] by obtaining and divulging a treaty while still under seal of secrecy.

It will be observed that these two classes of cases are not sustained by any text of the Constitution. If sustained at all, it must be by that principle of universal jurisprudence, and also of natural law, which gives to every body, whether natural or artificial, the right to protect its own existence,--in other words, the great right of self-defence. And I submit that no principle less solid can sustain this exercise of power. It is not enough to say that such a power would be _convenient_, highly convenient, or important. _It must be absolutely essential to the self-preservation of the body_; and even then, in the absence of any law, it must be open in our country to the gravest doubts.

“Doubtless,” says Blackstone, “all arbitrary powers, well executed, are _the most convenient_.”[19] But _mere convenience_ is not a proper reason, under a free government, for the assumption of powers not granted; and this is especially the case where the powers are arbitrary and despotic, and touch the liberty of the citizen.

Now, if the present inquiry were in the House of Representatives, and were directed against the President or the Secretary of War, on the ground of negligence or malfeasance at an important moment, it would be clearly within the jurisdiction of that body, which has the _sole_ power of impeachment; but it would not come within the jurisdiction of the Senate, until it became the duty of the latter body to try the impeachment instituted by the House.

But the present inquiry is neither preliminary to impeachment nor on the trial of an impeachment. It has no such element. It is precisely the same as if an inquiry should be instituted into the murder of Dr. Burdell in New York, or into the burning of slaves in Alabama, or into the banks of New York, or into the conduct of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in alleged obstructions of the Fugitive Slave Bill,--with regard to all which the Senate has no judicial powers. And yet it has judicial powers in all these cases, precisely to the same extent that it has in the case of John Brown at Harper’s Ferry.

I know it is said that this power is necessary _in aid of legislation_. I deny the necessity. _Convenient_, at times, it may be; but _necessary_, never. We do not drag members of the Cabinet or the President to testify before a committee, _in aid of legislation_; but I say, without hesitation, they can claim no immunity which does not belong equally to the humblest citizen. Mr. Hyatt and Mr. Sanborn have rights as ample as if they were office-holders. Such a power as this--which, without the sanction of law, and merely at the will of a partisan majority, may be employed to ransack the most distant States, and to drag citizens before the Senate all the way from Wisconsin or from South Carolina--may be convenient, and to certain persons may seem to be necessary. Throughout all time alleged necessity has been the apology for wrong.

“So spake the Fiend, and with _necessity_,
The tyrant’s plea, excused his devilish deeds.”

Such, according to Milton, was the practice among the fallen angels.

Let me be understood as admitting the power of the Senate, where it is essential to its own protection or the protection of its privileges, but not where it is required merely in aid of legislation. The difference is world-wide between what is required for _protection_ and what is required merely for _aid_; and here I part from Senators with whom I am proud on other matters to act. They hold that this great power may be exercised, not merely for the _protection_ of the Senate, but also for its _aid_ in framing a bill or in maturing any piece of legislation. To aid a committee of this body merely in a legislative purpose, a citizen, guilty of no crime, charged with no offence, presumed to be innocent, honored and beloved in his neighborhood, may be seized, handcuffed, kidnapped, and dragged away from home, hurried across State lines, brought here as criminal, and then thrust into jail. The mere statement of the case shows the dangerous absurdity of such a claim. “Nephew,” said Algernon Sidney in prison, on the night before his execution, “I value not my own life a chip; but what concerns me is, that the _law_ which takes away my life may hang every one of you, whenever it is thought convenient.” It was a dangerous _law_ that aroused the indignation of the English patriot. But in the present case there is not even a law,--nothing but an order made by a fractional part of Congress.

There are Senators here who pretend to find in the Constitution the right to carry slaves into the National Territories. That such Senators should also find in the same Constitution the right to make a slave of Mr. Hyatt or Mr. Sanborn, or of anybody else, merely to aid legislation, is not astonishing; but I am at a loss how Senators who love Freedom can find any such right in the Constitution.

I say nothing now of precedents from the British Parliament, for they are all more or less inapplicable. We live under a written Constitution, with certain specified powers; and all these are restricted by the Tenth Amendment, declaring that “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” But even British precedents have found a critic at home, in the late Chief Justice of England, Lord Denman, pronouncing judgment in the great case of _Stockdale_ v. _Hansard_,[20]--and also in the words of an elegant and authoritative historian, whose life has been passed in one or the other of the two Houses of Parliament: I refer to Lord Mahon, now Earl Stanhope, who, in his History of England, thus remarks:--

“I may observe, in passing, that throughout the reign of George
the Second the privileges of the House of Commons flourished
in the rankest luxuriance.… So long as men in authority are
enabled to go beyond the law, on the plea of their own dignity
and power, _the_ ONLY _limit to their encroachments will be
that of the public endurance_.”[21]

Nothing can be more true than this warning. But Lord Brougham has expressed himself in words yet stronger, and, if possible, still more applicable to the present case.

“All rights,” says this consummate orator, “are now utterly
disregarded by the advocates of Privilege, excepting that of
exposing their own short-sighted impolicy and thoughtless
inconsistency. Nor would there be any safety for the people
under their guidance, if unhappily their powers of doing
mischief bore any proportion to their disregard of what is
politic and just.”[22]

With these observations I quit this question, anxious only that the recent Usurpation of the Senate may not be drawn into a precedent hereafter.

During Mr. Hyatt’s protracted imprisonment, Mr. Sumner visited
him constantly, and thus became familiar with the condition
of the jail. This led to the introduction of the following
resolution, March 13, 1860.

“_Resolved_, That the Committee on the District of Columbia
be directed to consider the expediency of doing something
to improve the condition of the common jail of the city of
Washington.”

Before the vote on the resolution was taken, Mr. Sumner remarked that he had visited the jail, and found it neither more nor less than a mere human sty; and since the Senate had undertaken to send a fellow-creature there, he thought that the least it could do was to see that something was done to improve its condition.

ABOLITION OF CUSTOM-HOUSE OATHS.

RESOLUTION IN THE SENATE, MARCH 15, 1860.

Mr. Sumner submitted the following resolution, which was
considered by unanimous consent, and agreed to.

RESOLVED, That the Committee on Finance be instructed to consider whether the numerous custom-house oaths, now administered under Acts of Congress, may not with propriety be abolished, and a simple declaration be substituted therefor.

BOSTON COMMON, AND ITS EXTENSION.

LETTER TO GEORGE H. SNELLING, ESQ., OF BOSTON, MARCH 26, 1860.

Mr. Snelling interested himself much with regard to the
disposition of the lands west of Boston Common, known as
the “Back Bay Lands,” and owned by the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. Beyond a general desire to keep them open, his
special aim was to have a tidal lake, bordered by avenues
with trees. In this effort he was aided particularly by John
A. Andrew, afterwards Governor. Other citizens, including the
venerable Josiah Quincy, Professor Agassiz, and Dr. Edward
Jarvis, wrote letters, published at the time, and used before
the Committee of the Legislature to whom the matter was
referred. Among these was the following.

SENATE CHAMBER, March 26, 1860.

MY DEAR SIR,--I am grateful for your timely intervention to save
our Boston Common, by keeping it open to the western breezes
and the setting sun. It is not pleasant, I know, to separate in
opinion from those about us; but your object is so disinterested,
so pure, so benevolent, so truly in the nature of a charity, that
all, even though differing in details, must be glad that you have
come forward.

I know well the value of water in scenery. Perhaps nothing
else adds so much to the effect of a landscape, which, indeed,
without water often seems lifeless, or, as was once said by
a valued friend of mine, “like a face without eyes.” Boston,
from its peninsular situation, cannot be entirely deprived of
this picturesque feature. It seems to me, however, that, in
a region like that now in question, we should hesitate long
before renouncing the opportunity of adding to its attractions
by a piece of water, which, from perennial supply, would always
prove an ornament of unsurpassed beauty, as well as a place of
recreation, and a source of health.

On this it is useless to enlarge. All who have ever stood on
Boston Common will easily see how much this pleasant retreat
must lose in charm, when its great western vista is closed;
and all who have ever speculated on the probable growth of our
metropolis, and the longing of a crowded population for fresh
air, will recognize the necessity for open spaces, which will be
_outdoor ventilators_.

Boston is already growing in every direction. A wise forecast,
if not able at once to provide all the means needful for its
salubrity and adornment, will at least avoid embarrassing the
future, when half a million of souls have built their homes about
the ancient Trimountain.

Our Common has been ample enough for the past; but the metropolis
has already outgrown it in every respect. Besides being too
narrow in proportions, it is wanting in those accessories of
beauty and of knowledge especially illustrative of Natural
History, which, according to the experience of other countries,
are proper for public grounds. I wish much to see there, among
other things, an arboretum, where every tree that can bear our
climate shall find its classified place,--pleasing the eye by its
beauty, protecting the body by its shade, and speaking to all by
the voice of Science.

Accept the thanks of an absent citizen, who never thinks of his
native Boston without a yearning to see it foremost in all that
contributes to a true civilization; and believe me to be, my dear
Sir,

Very faithfully yours,

CHARLES SUMNER.

To GEORGE H. SNELLING, Esq.

ATTEMPT TO KIDNAP A CITIZEN UNDER ORDER OF THE SENATE.

THE CASE OF FRANK B. SANBORN, OF CONCORD, MASSACHUSETTS, WITH SPEECHES IN THE SENATE, APRIL 10, 13, AND 16, 1860.

The case of Mr. Sanborn illustrates the reach of the Slave
Power, and the extent to which the Senate did its bidding, at
the instance of the author of the Fugitive Slave Bill. It is
one of the skirmishes in the warfare with Slavery.

April 10, 1860, Mr. Sumner presented the memorial of Mr.
Sanborn, which he explained as follows.

I have a memorial, Mr. President, from Frank B. Sanborn, of Concord, Massachusetts, setting forth a gross attempt to kidnap, by men pretending to act in the name of the Senate of the United States. The memorial is authenticated by his affidavit before a notary public. It sets forth, that, on the evening of the 3d of April, certain persons, who had been prowling about his neighborhood, under shelter of night, with fraudulent pretence drew him to his door, seized him, handcuffed him, and then by force undertook to convey him to a carriage. By the courageous interposition of a refined lady, his sister, neighbors were aroused; the village was next summoned by the ringing of bells, and at length that great friend of the oppressed in our country, the writ of _Habeas Corpus_, arrived on the ground. By intervention of that writ he was taken from the custody of the kidnappers. The next day a hearing was had before the Supreme Court of Massachusetts; and Chief Justice Shaw, for thirty years the honored Chief Justice of Massachusetts, whose opinions are respected in every part of the country, representing the full bench, without undertaking to pass upon the question of jurisdiction in the Senate, went on to declare that the power delegated to its Sergeant-at-Arms could not be delegated to another, and that therefore all these proceedings were void, and the prisoner was discharged.

Now, Mr. President, this act, it seems to me, is conspicuous, both from the person against whom it was directed and the place where it was attempted. It was directed against Mr. Sanborn, a quiet citizen engaged in the instruction of youth, a scholar of excellent attainments, of perfect purity, and much beloved by friends and neighbors. It was attempted at Concord, where another seizure was once attempted, which began that revolutionary contest that ended in Independence. I affirm, Mr. President, that a person like Mr. Sanborn, having suffered this outrage at the hands of persons claiming to act in the name of the Senate, has a right to redress in this body: and I assert, still further, that this body owes something to its own character; it ought to wash its hands of such an outrage. I offer his memorial, and ask its reference to the Committee on the Judiciary, and, that the Senate may better understand it, I think it ought to be printed. I move also its printing.

Mr. Mason, of Virginia, Chairman of the Harper’s Ferry
Committee, made an explanation of the attempt to arrest Mr.
Sanborn, in the course of which he said: “This man Sanborn was
in correspondence either with the man who was not long since
hung in Virginia for his conduct as a traitor and murderer
at Harper’s Ferry, or with some of his associates, I do not
recollect which.” At the call of Mr. Fessenden the memorial was
read, when Mr. Sumner said, in reply to Mr. Mason:--

I merely wish to correct one error into which the Senator has fallen. He states that Mr. Sanborn was taken from the custody of those pretended officers by a mob. Now nothing is within my knowledge except what is authenticated by that memorial under oath, and there the statement is express that he was not taken from the custody of these pretended officers except by the intervention of the writ of _Habeas Corpus_, sustained by the _posse comitatus_ of the neighborhood.

Mr. Mason having stated that he expected a return of the
officer, at his suggestion the memorial was laid on the table
to await that return. To this Mr. Sumner consented, as he
declared, with great reluctance, and with the understanding
that then it should be referred.

April 13, 1860, Mr. Sumner presented additional papers in the
case. After reading these, he said:--

There, Sir, is the official response to the assertion of the Senator from Virginia. The Senator says that Mr. Sanborn was rescued by a mob. It is true there was a mob in Concord. It was a mob of kidnappers, who went there in the name of the Senate of the United States to seize a citizen of Massachusetts. I have here a letter which I have received from a prominent citizen of Concord, present at the time. This is his statement:--

“No rescue by the crowd was made or attempted, till the writ
of _Habeas Corpus_ was served; and this, even, Carleton and his
fellows resisted, till the deputy sheriff was obliged to use
force to take Mr. Sanborn from him.… The arrest was as brutal,
cowardly, and outrageous a proceeding as I ever knew in seven
years’ experience as sheriff of that county.”

Sir, it is not unnatural that an arrest made under such circumstances should have attracted attention in that town and throughout Massachusetts. It did so. It has excited a feeling of indignation against this attempt, increased, perhaps, when people put the question, “Why all this effort to seize Mr. Sanborn? Why this overthrow of law to accomplish such a purpose?”

It is notorious that there is a citizen of Virginia, formerly chief magistrate of that State, who has openly avowed that he knew much in regard to the very matters in inquiry before that committee, and that rubies could not bribe him to disclose it. He has thrown the challenge down to that committee and this Senate, before the whole country, refusing openly to testify; and yet that committee make no motion to bring Ex-Governor Wise before the Senate, and compel him to testify. Instead, the committee seeks a Northern man, Mr. Hyatt, now in jail, and another Northern man, Mr. Sanborn, who it is well understood know nothing of the matter; and it follows up Mr. Sanborn by an attempt which I characterize here as simply an act of kidnapping.

Mr. Mason, in reply, insisted, at some length, that Mr. Sumner
could have no information on the action of the committee, which
had not yet reported. To this Mr. Sumner rejoined:--

Mr. President, I profess to have no information except what is open to all the world; and there are two things open to all the world, through the public press: first, that the Ex-Governor of Virginia has more than once declared that he had important information in reference to the matter before the committee, and that rubies would not tempt him to disclose it; and, secondly, it is known that the Ex-Governor of Virginia has not been brought to Washington, as Mr. Hyatt has been, and as an attempt has been made to bring Mr. Sanborn. No kidnappers have been sent into Virginia, nor handcuffs put upon Ex-Governor Wise.

April 16, 1860, Mr. Mason presented to the Senate the warrant
for the arrest of Mr. Sanborn, with the return of the Deputy
Marshal of Massachusetts to whom it was addressed, and
moved its reference to the Committee on the Judiciary, with
instructions to inquire and report whether any, and what,
further proceedings were necessary to vindicate the authority
of the Senate and to effect the arrest of the witnesses. This
motion was agreed to. Mr. Sumner then moved that the memorial
of Mr. Sanborn, with the additional papers, be taken from
the table and referred to the same committee. Here Mr. Mason
promptly interposed the very unusual motion _that the memorial
be rejected_. The Chair decided that the motion “to reject”
could not take precedence, and therefore the motion to refer
was first in order. Then it was that Mr. Sumner spoke as
follows.

Mr. President, I think that I ought not to listen to such a proposition as has been made by the Senator from Virginia with reference to this memorial, without one word in reply. Here is a memorial from a gentleman of perfect respectability, charged with no crime, presumed to be innocent, complaining of gross outrage at the hands of certain persons pretending to act in the name of the Senate. The facts are duly set forth. They are authenticated also by documents now of record. The Senator moves--without any reference to a committee, without giving the petition the decency of a hearing, according to the ordinary forms of this body--that the memorial be “rejected”; and he makes this unaccustomed motion with a view to establish a precedent in such a case. I feel it my duty to establish a precedent also in this case, by entering an open, unequivocal protest against such attempt. Sir, an ancient poet said of a judge in hell, that he punished first and heard afterwards,--“_castigatque auditque_”; and, permit me to say, the Senator from Virginia, on this occasion, takes a precedent from that court.

To this protest Mr. Mason replied: “The Senator from
Massachusetts, it seems to me, makes an opportunity to use
language in the Senate Chamber which, so far as my intercourse
with the world goes, is not usual out of the Senate Chamber.
There is nothing in it that I have a right to take as
personally offensive to myself. The Senate is the proper judge
and arbiter of the decorum of its own proceedings.”

Then ensued a debate on the return, in which Mr. Bayard, of
Delaware, and Mr. Trumbull, of Illinois, took part, when Mr.
Sumner, at last obtaining the floor, remarked as follows.

Only one word. I presented a memorial to this body, setting forth an outrage. The Senator from Virginia moved its rejection, while he proposed that the case should be proceeded with. I characterized that motion as I thought I was authorized to do, referring to a precedent of antiquity, and that was all; and this is the occasion for a lecture from the Senator on the manner in which one should conduct on this floor. From the heights of his self-confidence he addresses me. Sir, I wish to say simply, in reply, that, when an outrage comes before this body, I shall denounce it in plain terms; and if a precedent from a very bad place seems to be in point, I shall not hesitate to quote it.

Mr. Mason rejoined: “I did not undertake to lecture the
Senator, of all others, upon the subject of manners or
propriety. I do not mean it offensively, but, for my own
convenience, I should consider it time thrown away. All that I
said was, that I was not accustomed, in my intercourse with the
world outside of this Chamber, to hear language of that sort in
the circles in which I move.”

April 17, 1860, the memorial of Mr. Sanborn was referred to the
Judiciary Committee, according to the motion of Mr. Sumner.

June 7, Mr. Bayard, of Delaware, from the Committee on
the Judiciary, to whom was referred the return of the
Deputy-Marshal and the other papers, reported a “Bill
concerning the Sergeant-at-Arms of the Senate and the
Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives,” authorizing
the appointment of deputies. This was intended to meet the
decision of Chief Justice Shaw, of Massachusetts.[23]

June 15, Mr. Bayard moved to proceed with the consideration
of his bill. The motion was not agreed to,--there being, on a
division, ayes 22, noes 25. This was the end of that bill.

* * * * *

This incident was much noticed by the Northern press,
especially in Massachusetts. The Boston _Atlas and Bee_
expressed itself thus:--

“In our opinion the people of the Free States are never
better satisfied with their representatives than when they
see them repelling indignantly and manfully the arrogant
insults of the slave-driving aristocracy. It will not
diminish their attachment to Mr. Sumner, when they take
notice that his rebuke of Mr. Mason was not in reply to
any insult upon himself, but upon one of his outraged and
abused constituents.”

PETITIONS AGAINST SLAVERY.

SPEECH IN THE SENATE, APRIL 18, 1860.

The treatment of these petitions illustrates the tyranny of the
Slave Power to the very eve of its fall. Such an incident is
not without historic significance.

MR. PRESIDENT,--I present the petition of Henry Elwell, Jr., and four hundred and fifty-five others, of Manchester, in Massachusetts, earnestly petitioning Congress to repeal the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850,--to abolish Slavery in the District of Columbia, and in the United States Territories,--to prohibit the inter-State slave-trade,--and to pass a resolution pledging Congress against the admission of any Slave State into the Union, the acquisition of any Slave Territory, and the employment of any slaves by any agent, contractor, officer, or department of the National Government; also, a like petition of Alvan Howes and fifty-five others, of Barnstable, Massachusetts; also, a like petition of John Clement and one hundred and nineteen others, of Townsend, Massachusetts; also, a like petition of Samuel L. Rockwood and seventy-three others, of Weymouth, Massachusetts; also, a like petition of J. H. Browne and sixty-four others, of Sudbury, Massachusetts; also, a like petition of Daniel Hosmer and ninety-eight others, of Sterling, Massachusetts; also, a like petition of Albert Gould and one hundred and thirty-one others of Leicester, Massachusetts; also, a like petition of James M. Evelett and two hundred others, of Princeton, Massachusetts; also, a like petition of Daniel Otis and seventy-nine others, of South Scituate, Massachusetts; also, a like petition of Calvin Cutter and eighty-four others, of Warren, Massachusetts; also, a like petition of R. W. French and thirty others, of Lawrence, Massachusetts; also, a like petition of Edmund H. Sears and two hundred and forty-five others, of Wayland, Massachusetts.

These several petitions I now present. On a former occasion, during this session, a similar petition presented by me was laid upon the table. A similar petition presented by another Senator was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. An authoritative precedent, established after debate, since I have been in the Senate, seems to be the best guide on this occasion. That was on a memorial from four thousand citizens of Boston, praying the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Act. After ample consideration, during which much was said against the memorialists, no proposition was made to lay their prayer on the table. Following that precedent, and another established during the present session, I move that all these petitions be referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. Mason, of Virginia, at once moved that the petitions lie on
the table, thus precluding debate and stifling action. The yeas
and nays were ordered on motion of Mr. Sumner, and resulted as
follows, 25 yeas and 19 nays:--