Chapter XII: Appendix (6)

6. That, in the process of “Reconstruction,” it is not enough to secure the death of Slavery throughout the Rebel and belligerent region only; that experience testifies against Slavery wherever it exists, not only as crime against humanity, but as disturber of the public peace and spoiler of the public liberties, including liberty of the press, liberty of speech, and liberty of travel and transit; that, in the progress of civilization, it has become incompatible with good government, and especially with that “republican form of government” which the United States are bound to guaranty to every State; that from the outbreak of this Rebel war, even in States professing loyalty, it has been an open check upon patriotic duty and an open accessory to the Rebellion, so as to be a source of unquestionable weakness to the national cause; that the defiant pretensions of the master claiming control of his slave are in direct conflict with paramount rights of the nation; and that, therefore, it is the further duty of Congress, in the exercise of its double powers under the Constitution, as guardian of the national safety, to take all needful steps for the extinction of Slavery, even in States professing loyalty, so that this crime against humanity, this disturber of the public peace, and this spoiler of the public liberties shall no longer exist anywhere to menace the general harmony, that civilization may be no longer shocked, that the constitutional guaranty of a republican form of government to every State may be fulfilled, that the Rebellion may be deprived of the traitorous aid and comfort Slavery has instinctively volunteered, and that the master claiming an unnatural property in human flesh may no longer defy the nation.

7. That, in addition to the guaranties stipulated by Congress, and as the cap-stone to its work of restoration and reconciliation, the Constitution itself must be so amended as to prohibit Slavery everywhere within the limits of the Republic; that such prohibition, leaving all personal claims, whether of slave or master, to the legislation of Congress and of the States, will be a sacred and inviolable guaranty, representing the collective will of the people of the United States, and placing Universal Emancipation under sanction of the Constitution, so that Freedom shall be engraved on every foot of the national soil and be woven into every star of the national flag, while it elevates and inspires our whole national existence, and the Constitution, so often invoked for Slavery, but at last in harmony with the Declaration of Independence, will become, according to the aspirations of its founders, sublime guardian of the inalienable right of every human being to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness: all of which must be done in the name of the Union, in duty to humanity, and for the sake of permanent peace.

PRAYER OF ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND.

SPEECH IN THE SENATE, ON PRESENTING A PETITION OF THE WOMEN’S NATIONAL LEAGUE, PRAYING UNIVERSAL EMANCIPATION BY ACT OF CONGRESS, FEBRUARY 9, 1864.

MR. PRESIDENT,--I offer the petition now on the desk before me. It is too bulky for me to take up. I need not add that it is too bulky for any of our pages to carry.

This petition marks a stage of public opinion in the history of Slavery, and also in the suppression of the Rebellion. As it is short, I will read it.

“_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States_:--

“The undersigned, women of the United States above the age of
eighteen years, earnestly pray that your honorable body will
pass, at the earliest practicable day, an act emancipating all
persons of African descent held to involuntary service or labor
in the United States.”

There is also a duplicate of the petition, signed by “men above the age of eighteen years.”

It will be perceived that the petition is in rolls. Each roll represents a State. For instance, here is New York with a list of seventeen thousand seven hundred and six names, Illinois with fifteen thousand three hundred and eighty, and Massachusetts with eleven thousand six hundred and forty-one. But I will read the abstract with which I have been furnished.

State. Men. Women. Total.
New York 6,519 11,187 17,706
Illinois 6,382 8,998 15,380
Massachusetts 4,249 7,392 11,641
Pennsylvania 2,259 6,366 8,625
Ohio 3,676 4,654 8,330
Michigan 1,741 4,441 6,182
Iowa 2,025 4,014 6,039
Maine 1,225 4,362 5,587
Wisconsin 1,639 2,391 4,030
Indiana 1,075 2,591 3,666
New Hampshire 393 2,261 2,654
New Jersey 824 1,709 2,533
Rhode Island 827 1,451 2,278
Vermont 375 1,183 1,558
Connecticut 393 1,162 1,555
Minnesota 396 1,094 1,490
West Virginia 82 100 182
Maryland 115 50 165
Kansas 84 74 158
Delaware 67 70 137
Nebraska 13 20 33
Kentucky 21 .. 21
Louisiana .. 14 14
Citizens of the United States living in
New Brunswick 19 17 36
------ ------ ------
34,399 65,601 100,000

These several petitions are consolidated into one, being another illustration of the motto on our coin,--_E pluribus unum_.

This unprecedented petition is signed by one hundred thousand men and women, who unite in this unparalleled number to support its prayer. They are from all parts of the country, and from every condition of life: from the seaboard, fanned by the free airs of the ocean, and from the Mississippi and the prairies of the West, fanned by the free airs which vitalize that extensive region; from the families of the educated and uneducated, rich and poor, of every profession, business, and calling in life, representing every sentiment, thought, hope, passion, activity, intelligence, that inspires, strengthens, and adorns our social system. Here they are, a mighty army, one hundred thousand strong, without arms or banners, the advance-guard of a yet larger army.

Though memorable for numbers, these petitioners are more memorable for the prayer in which they unite. They ask nothing less than Universal Emancipation; and this they ask directly at the hands of Congress. No reason is assigned. The prayer speaks. It is simple, positive. So far as it proceeds from the women of the country, it is naturally a petition and not an argument. But I need not remind the Senate that there is no reason so strong as the reason of the heart. Do not all great thoughts come from the heart?

It is not for me at this moment to offer reasons which the one hundred thousand petitioners have forborne. But I may properly add, that, naturally and obviously, they all feel in their hearts, what reason and knowledge confirm, not only that Slavery _as a Unit_, one and indivisible, is the guilty origin of the Rebellion, but that its influence everywhere, even outside the Rebel States, is hostile to the Union, always impairing loyalty, and sometimes openly menacing the national cause. It requires no difficult logic to conclude that such a monster, wherever it shows its head, is a _National Enemy_, to be pursued and destroyed as such, or at least a nuisance to the national cause, to be abated as such.

The petitioners know well that Congress is the depository of those supreme powers by which rebellion, alike in its root and distant offshoots, may be surely crushed, while unity and peace are permanently assured. They know well that the action of Congress may be with the coöperation of the Slave-Masters, or even without their coöperation, under the overruling law of military necessity, or the commanding precept of the Constitution to guaranty a republican form of government. Above all, they know well that to save the country from peril, especially to save the national life, there is no power in the ample arsenal of self-defence which Congress may not grasp; for to Congress, under the Constitution, belongs the prerogative of the Roman Dictator, to see that the Republic receives no detriment. Therefore to Congress these petitioners appeal.

I ask the reference of the petition to the Select Committee on Slavery and Freedmen.

An earnest debate ensued, which ended in the reference of the
petition.

EQUAL PAY OF COLORED SOLDIERS.

REMARKS IN THE SENATE, ON DIFFERENT PROPOSITIONS, FEBRUARY 10, 29, AND JUNE 11, 1864.

February 3d, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, reported a joint
resolution to equalize the pay of soldiers in the United
States army, which provided that all persons of color, who
have been or may be mustered into the military service of
the United States, shall receive the same uniform, clothing,
arms, equipments, camp equipage, rations, medical and hospital
attendance, pay and emoluments, other than bounty, as other
soldiers of the regular or volunteer forces of the United
States of like arm of service, during the whole term in which
they shall be or shall have been in such service, and every
person of color who shall hereafter be mustered into the
service shall receive such sums in bounty as the President
shall order in the different States and parts of the United
States, not exceeding one hundred dollars.

February 4th, the Senate considered the joint resolution. Mr.
Fessenden, of Maine, “wished to inquire what propriety there is
in our going back and paying them this increase for services
already rendered.” Mr. Wilson thought, “as an act of justice,
the bill should be retrospective,”--that “the gross injustice
done by the country toward these men ought to be corrected.”
Mr. Fessenden was in favor, and had ever been in favor, of
putting colored soldiers on a level with white, but he was
opposed to paying men for services already rendered, unless
the men were promised full pay by orders emanating from the
War Department. Mr. Sumner, after stating that there were two
classes of enlistments, first, under the statute of 1861, and,
secondly, under the statute of 1862, insisted that under the
former statute any person of African descent might be enlisted
and entitled to the same pay as a white soldier. “There was
no limitation in the statute. There was no color there. There
was nothing against the enlistment of colored men under that
statute, except a blind prejudice which we ought to forget.”
He concluded: “I wish to see our colored troops treated like
white troops in every respect. But I would not press this first
principle by any retroactive proposition, unless where the
faith of the Government is committed, and there I would not
hesitate. The Treasury can bear any additional burden better
than the country can bear to do an injustice.”

February 10th, the subject being still under consideration, Mr.
Sumner said:--

MR. PRESIDENT,--I am grateful to the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. FOSTER] for his admirable argument on this question; and yet it seems to me, if he will pardon me, that even in point of law he has not stated the case as strongly in favor of this obligation as it might be stated. It may be remembered, that, when this discussion was closing, the other day, I ventured to throw out the remark, that there were evidently two classes of cases: the first, where enlistments in good faith were made under the statute of 1861; and the second, where they were made under the statute of 1862.

In point of law, it seems obvious, if enlistments were made in good faith under the statute of 1861, and there was no legal objection to those enlistments, then the United States are bound. If, on the contrary, they were made under the subsequent statute, then it is simply a question of policy and expediency whether we shall make this payment. The whole subject is open to discussion,--first, in the light of sentiment, which may involve expediency and policy, and, secondly, in the light of law. I shall not say anything upon it in the first aspect, except to make one remark,--that our country at this moment can ill afford to take the responsibility of refusing justice to colored soldiers whom it has allowed to shed their blood in its cause. The soul repudiates any such sacrifice,--for sacrifice it will be, at once of honor and of interest. I do not follow out this idea, but pass at once to the second aspect, which I called the question of law; and there I differ from my learned friend from Connecticut, when I say that there are certain colored regiments in the field who in point of law are entitled to the full wages of thirteen dollars a month.

MR. FOSTER. If the Senator will pardon me, I insisted on that
fact, and said they were enlisted, not under the law, but under
instructions from the Department, authorizing the officers to
enlist them on the same terms that white troops were enlisted,
which would be thirteen dollars per month.

MR. SUMNER. Very well. I still understood the Senator to imply that perhaps in point of law there might be some doubt whether the Government was liable for the thirteen dollars a month. I propose to carry the argument a little further, and show, by calling attention for one moment to the statutes,--not at any great length,--that, under the statutes themselves, the Government is obliged to pay certain regiments thirteen dollars a month.

I begin with the Massachusetts fifty-fourth and fifty-fifth regiments; and these may be taken as examples. I have before me the actual order under which those two regiments were raised.

“WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, January 26, 1863.

“_Ordered_, That Governor Andrew, of Massachusetts, is
authorized, until further orders, to raise such number of
volunteer companies of artillery for duty in the forts of
Massachusetts and elsewhere, and such corps of infantry for the
volunteer military service, as he may find convenient; _such
volunteers to be enlisted for three years_,”--

Mark, Sir, if you please, the period of service,--“for three years,”--

“or until sooner discharged, _and may include persons of
African descent_, organized into separate corps. He will make
the usual needful requisitions on the appropriate staff bureaus
and officers for the proper transportation, organization,
supplies, subsistence, arms, and equipments, of such volunteers.

“EDWIN M. STANTON, _Secretary of War_.”

Now, on the face of this order, the Governor of Massachusetts is empowered to raise certain regiments in the volunteer service of the United States for three years. Under what statute? Under no other, surely, than the statute of 1861, for it was under that statute that the organization for three years was authorized. If you come to the later statute--and to that I ask particular attention--of July 17, 1862, which contains a special provision with reference to African troops, you will find that it is to raise troops for nine months.

“SEC. 3. _And be it further enacted_, That the President be,
and he is hereby, authorized, in addition to the volunteer
forces which he is now authorized by law to raise, to accept
the services of any number of volunteers, not exceeding one
hundred thousand, as infantry, for a period of nine months,
unless sooner discharged.”

And then, Sir, in section twelve of this same statute, the President is further empowered to employ persons of African descent. In section fifteen we come to the question of pay.

“_And be it further enacted_, That all persons who have been or
shall be hereafter enrolled in the service of the United States
under this Act”--

“Under this Act,”--an Act authorizing enrolments for nine months, not for three years--

“shall receive the pay and rations now allowed by law to
soldiers, according to their respective grades: _Provided_,
That persons of African descent, _who under this law shall be
employed_, shall receive ten dollars per month and one ration,
three dollars of which monthly pay may be in clothing.”

Now, Sir, you have the question precisely: Under what statute were these enlistments made? Were they under the nine months’ statute, or under the three years’ statute? To answer that question, look at the order of the War Department:--

“_Ordered_, That Governor Andrew, of Massachusetts, is
authorized, until further orders, to raise such number of
volunteer companies of artillery for duty in the forts of
Massachusetts and elsewhere, and such corps of infantry for the
volunteer military service, as he may find convenient; _such
volunteers to be enlisted for three years, or until sooner
discharged_.”

Here are no nine months’ men. There is nobody under the second statute, but all are clearly under the first by the plain language of the order. And this is none the less so, even if the second statute, so far as Africans are concerned, may be interpreted to sanction a longer term of enlistment.

Mark well, that “all persons who have been or _shall be hereafter enrolled in the service of the United States_ under this Act shall receive the pay and rations now allowed by law to soldiers.” (§ 15.) But were not the soldiers of the fifty-fourth and fifty-fifth Massachusetts regiments “enrolled in the service of the United States”? Unquestionably, if troops ever were enrolled.

But it is the _proviso_ that follows which causes the mischief. “Persons of African descent, _who under this law shall be employed_, shall receive ten dollars,” &c.

It is said that these colored soldiers were “employed,”--that is all,--not “enrolled,” but “employed”; and on this distinction the promise of Governor Andrew in the name of the National Government, and the honest expectations of the soldiers, are set aside.

The order of the Secretary of War is for “volunteer companies of artillery,” also for “corps of infantry,” “_to be enlisted for three years_,” “and may include persons of African descent.” The persons of African descent are to be included in the artillery or infantry “enlisted.” Such persons are in advance declared men to be _enlisted_. And yet the argument which denies them their well-earned wages asserts that they are only “employed,” and not enlisted. But if they are “employed,” then are the “corps of infantry” in which they are included “employed” also.

To me the conclusion seems irresistible, on the face of these facts, that these troops were enrolled or enlisted under the earlier statute. It is clear that Governor Andrew thought so at the time, and it is equally clear that the troops themselves thought so at the time.

But there remains behind another question. Is there anything in existing legislation to prevent the enlistment of a colored person under the statute of 1861? To this I answer positively in the negative, and I challenge contradiction. There is no color in that statute. There is no color in any statute raising troops for the army of the United States, nor any color in any statute raising sailors for the navy of the United States. Only in our militia statutes do you find the word “white.” In all our army and navy statutes there is no such limitation. The statute of 1861, therefore, in point of law embraced all persons, whether black or white, and it was entirely at the option of the President, before the passage of the statute of 1862, to organize or receive colored troops under that statute. He hesitated. I regretted at the time his hesitation. I thought it an error by which the country suffered. We endeavored to repair that error by the amendment introduced by the brave Senator from New York, who is no longer here [Mr. KING], which you will find in the statutes of 1862. But I doubt if any person at the time, who had given attention to the subject, supposed this amendment necessary, except as an encouragement to a policy which the Government was too slow to adopt. For myself, I remember well my own feelings in voting for it. I accepted it as notice to the Administration that in the opinion of Congress the time had come when colored troops must be used. In point of law it was plain that it could not stand in the way of an enrolment under the earlier statute.

And the Secretary of War seems to have acted on this interpretation; for, in undertaking to raise colored troops, no allusion was made to the statute of 1862, but the language of his order in every particular pointed to the statute of 1861. Am I wrong, then, if I say that in point of law these colored troops have just the same right to the full pay of a soldier that any Senator on this floor has to his compensation? It is by just as good title, and as firm in the statute-book, as your own pay, Sir.

I suggested, the other day, that there were two classes of cases,--one where the enlistments had been made in good faith under the earlier statute, and a second class where they had been made under the later statute; and I suggested, that, if we were disposed to recognize the difference between these two classes, it might afford a solution to our present difficulties. I am not disposed, on any ground of sentiment, to impose an unnecessary tax upon the burdened treasury of my country, although there is no tax required by justice that I would hesitate to impose. If there are colored troops in our service, who, at the time they were mustered, had no reason to suppose that they were enlisted under the statute of 1861, who were led to believe that they came under the statute of 1862, that is, for the pay of ten dollars, I am not disposed to press for them any claim on ground of sentiment,--that is, for the past. I take the past as it is; but for the future I insist that they shall be put upon an equality. True equality in the past is for the National Government to redeem its pledges, whether direct or only implied,--whether there is an absolute promise, of which you have a record, or only an inference or understanding, founded, it may be, in misconception, but still embraced in good faith by innocent parties. On this ground, at a proper moment, I shall be ready to propose an amendment something like the following, to come in immediately after the word “service”:--

“_Provided_, That, with regard to all past service, it shall
appear to the satisfaction of the Secretary of War that such
persons, at the time of being mustered into service, were led
to suppose that they were enlisted under the Act of Congress
approved July 22, 1861, as volunteers in the army of the United
States.”

* * * * *

Mr. Fessenden could not concur in Mr. Sumner’s construction of
the Act of 1862. Mr. Lane, of Indiana, thought, “if we place
colored troops hereafter on an equality with the white troops,
it is surely as much as they can ask, either from the justice
or the generosity of this Senate; for no man, in his sober
senses, will say that their services are worth as much, or that
they are as good soldiers.” Mr. Sumner replied:--

MR. PRESIDENT,--I hope the Senator from Indiana will pardon me, if I refer to him for one minute. He is so uniformly generous and just that I was the more surprised, when I listened to his remarks just now. I was surprised at his lack of generosity and his lack of justice--he will pardon me--toward these colored soldiers. I was surprised--he will pardon me--at his injustice to the State of Massachusetts. He spoke disparagingly of the colored soldiers. He thought they had been paid enough. He thought that the gallant blood shed on the parapets of Fort Wagner had been paid enough; and he failed to see that the men who died for us on that bloody night, and were buried in the same grave with the devoted colonel who led them, now stood alive in this presence to plead for the equality of their race. How can I help regret that the Senator was led into such remark?

Also, in the ardor of his utterance,--he will pardon me still further,--the Senator undertook to say, that, if we entered on this payment, we should charge the Treasury with some one or two hundred millions in addition to its present burden. Why, Sir, that is an entire mistake. Even if we pay everything contemplated by the resolution, I am told that the whole will be little more than a million: much, I admit, to charge unnecessarily upon the Treasury, but not the very large sum which seemed to fill the patriotic vision of the Senator.

MR. LANE, of Indiana. The Senator misunderstood my statement
altogether. My statement was, that, if we were called upon now
to go back and increase the pay of the colored troops three
dollars a month more than the law provided, with the same
propriety we might be called upon to go back and increase the
pay of our white soldiers because they thought that their pay
had not been enough; and that would add to the burdens of the
Treasury to a very large amount.

MR. SUMNER. I accept the correction gladly. Certainly I have no disposition to press anything beyond the meaning of the Senator. But he will allow me to say that I was hardly mistaken in his argument. It was, that we should charge the Treasury with a burden it could ill bear. Now, if this money is due, let us charge the Treasury with the burden; and that brings me again to the direct question, Is not the money due? The Senator denies it; but he will pardon me again, if I say he hardly went into an argument on that head. I repeat, then, is the money due? I dislike to trouble the Senate by going over topics already too much discussed; but I trust they will excuse me, if I state the case yet once more. On many accounts I confess a special interest in it; not the least is that I would have my country above doing injustice, least of all injustice to people of a race too long crushed by injustice.

The argument need not be long. In the first place, the statute of 1861 contains no words which can be interpreted in any way to exclude the enrolment of persons of color under it. I challenge any Senator to mention a single word in that statute authorizing any such exclusion. You have, then, the statute in the case. That is the first point. Then you have the order from the Secretary of War to Governor Andrew, authorizing an enrolment for three years, making no discrimination between persons of African descent and white soldiers. That is the second point. You have, in the third place, the open promises and pledges of Governor Andrew, under that order, and for the time being the agent of the United States, solemnly promising the full pay of thirteen dollars a month to these colored persons as soldiers of the United States. And, in the last place, you have the very terms of enlistment subscribed by these soldiers at the time of enlistment, which I read the other day, where it is expressly stated that they entered into service under the statute of 1861.

These four points,--the statute of 1861, the order of the Secretary, the promise of Governor Andrew in behalf of the United States, and the terms of enlistment,--all these make a case by which, as it seems to me, the Government is bound. In face of these, how can it be said that these colored troops were “employed” under the statute of 1862? There is no ingenuity of interpretation which can place them there.

That I am not mistaken in the facts on which I found this argument is apparent from a letter which I hold in my hand, written by one of these soldiers, now on Morris Island. I content myself with a brief extract.

“In the month of February, 1863, Governor John A. Andrew
announced that he had permission from the War Department to
raise a regiment of infantry to be composed of men of color.
Enlisting began immediately, and the fifty-fourth regiment was
filled to overflowing in three months. The only inducement he
offered to these men was an acknowledgment of their manhood;
for he promised that the United States Government would treat
them, in _every_ particular, the same as other volunteer
regiments from the State of Massachusetts.”

MR. LANE. Will the Senator pardon me a moment just there?

MR. SUMNER. Certainly.

MR. LANE. They were to be treated in every respect as the
volunteer troops from Massachusetts. Will the Senator contend
that the commissioned officers of colored regiments might be
drawn from the colored troops themselves, after the passage of
the law of 1862? Was not that a disparity? Was that treating
them like other troops?

MR. SUMNER. Of course the order is applicable simply to the enlisted men. It is not applicable to the officers.

The letter goes on to say,--

“The enlistment rolls signed by these men bound them to obey
the President,” &c.

How?

“In pursuance of the law passed in July, 1861, calling for
volunteers.”

Such was the understanding. By this lure you won these men to the field of sacrifice.

I have already said too much, but before I sit down I cannot forget that the Senator from Indiana, in his impetuous movement, brushed against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. I do not remember his precise words, nor do I care to remember them. But he more than intimated that there was on the part of this State something else than a patriotic motive in pressing this obligation. I think he said this whole effort is to save the payment of this extra money. Does not the Senator know that Massachusetts has already provided for the payment of this sum, so far as its own two regiments are concerned, and that those regiments have refused to receive it? These colored troops declare that they were enlisted as soldiers of the United States, and as such are entitled to the pay of soldiers of the United States from the Government of the United States. If it be wrong to maintain their claim, then is Massachusetts wrong, then am I wrong. If the claim is maintained earnestly, it is because, both in law and in sentiment, and on every ground of policy or expediency, it commends itself to those who represent Massachusetts. And now, since this State has been called in question, I shall not content myself with merely giving my own opinions and arguments, but I ask you to listen to her honored Governor.

In an official communication to the Legislature of Massachusetts, Governor Andrew has discussed this whole question with his accustomed lucidity and thoroughness. Here is something of what he says.

“To my own mind, the right of these men, under the existing
statutes, to the lawful pay and allowances of volunteers is
demonstrably clear. But if it is doubtful, it is agreed, I
believe, in all quarters, that it will be the duty and the
pleasure of Congress to embrace an early opportunity to
prevent by positive legislation the continuance of that doubt.
Meantime I must embrace the earliest occasion to invoke the
Legislature of Massachusetts to render justice to the men of
these regiments beyond the possibility of a doubt, by the
appropriation of the needful means out of our own treasury
until the National Congress or the Executive Department shall
correct the error.”[305]

The Governor, after considering some details of the argument, proceeds as follows.

“I think there can be no proposition of law more clear than
this, namely, that colored men are competent to be enlisted
into the regular army of the United States, into the volunteer
army of the United States, into the navy of the United States,
and to be employed in any arm of either service.

“The Military Enlistment Law of 1814 required only that the
recruit shall be a ‘free, effective, able-bodied man, between
the ages of eighteen and fifty years.’ (_See Act of December
10, 1814._) It did not require a man to be under forty-five,
nor a citizen, nor white, in which three respects it differs
from the old Militia Act. The Naval Act of 1813 is not less
clear.”[306]

Such is the statement of the Governor on this question in point of law. At the time these regiments were mustered into the service he believed that he was acting legally under the statutes of the United States. He so instructed these men; and these men naturally believed him, and gave themselves, generously, nobly, beautifully, to the public service. Will the country now disown them? Will the country now fasten a ban upon them, and lead them to say in their hearts that they have been duped?

February 13th, the subject being still before the Senate,
Mr. Sumner offered the proviso of which he had already given
notice at the close of his first remarks; but, after debate,
he withdrew it at the request of Mr. Wilson, who, seeing
the opposition to the joint resolution, proposed to abandon
all that part making it retroactive. In withdrawing it, Mr.
Sumner again vindicated it, saying, in conclusion: “I am
unwilling to withdraw the proposition. I shall do it, if my
colleague desires it. At any rate, I should rather, for my own
satisfaction, have a vote upon it.”

In the debate that ensued, Mr. Reverdy Johnson said: “If the
Governor of Massachusetts has made a promise which the law did
not authorize, if he has created, as between the Massachusetts
soldiers and the Governor of Massachusetts, an obligation which
ought to be redeemed, let Massachusetts redeem it.” “They have
passed a law to redeem it,” said Mr. Fessenden, “but these
regiments refuse to receive it from Massachusetts.”

Mr. Wilson moved to insert words making the resolution
applicable only “from and after the first day of January,
1864,” which was agreed to. After debate, Mr. Sumner again
moved his proviso, which was lost,--Yeas 16, Nays 21. Other
amendments were moved, and the debate continued for days.

February 23d, Mr. Davis moved as a substitute three
resolutions,--that all negroes and mulattoes, by whatever term
designated, in the military service of the United States, be
discharged and disarmed, and also providing for payment to
loyal owners on account of slaves taken into the service.
Lost,--Yeas 7, Nays 30.

Mr. Collamer, of Vermont, having moved an amendment providing
for a certain class of cases, Mr. Sumner, February 25th,
brought forward his amendment in the following terms:--

“_Provided, also_, That all persons whose papers of
enlistment shall show that they were enlisted under the Act
of Congress of July, 1861, shall receive from the time of
their enlistment the pay promised by that statute.”

In proposing this again, he said: “I believe, if any persons
have enlisted in the national service, and, through any
ambiguity or misinterpretation of legislation, their rights
have been drawn in question, it belongs to Congress, as
guardian and conservator of the rights of every citizen, to
see that they have the proper remedy.” The amendment was
adopted,--Yeas 19, Nays 18.

February 29th, Mr. Fessenden addressed the Senate in
explanation of his position. He had been from the beginning in
favor of placing colored soldiers on the same footing as white;
but he objected to the attempt to provide for exceptional cases
on this general bill, and he asked, “whether we should have had
such an uproar throughout the country, if this amendment had
been in regard to three or four or more white regiments, to
go back and pay them an additional sum from the time of their
enlistment, and the principle had been objected to.”

Mr. Sumner, in reply, reviewed the case, and in conclusion
said:--

From the question of law I pass to that other question which occupied the attention of the Senator from Maine, as to when and where we should meet this obligation. He says, Bring in a separate bill. That was said the other day. I say, Meet it whenever it appears. It is in itself a case of such absolute and overwhelming justice that the Senate ought not to postpone it for a single day,--especially ought not to postpone it, when it has under consideration a bill so entirely germane as the present. If it were a bill concerning the Pacific Railroad or the sale of gold, it might be questionable whether the proposition should be ingrafted upon it; but, as it is a bill to put colored troops on an equality with other troops in the national service, I say that the pending proposition is perfectly germane, and, being in itself of commanding justice, ought not to be postponed. It is a common device of enemies to object to a measure on a particular bill. For myself, I wish it understood that I am for the proposition on any bill and at any time.

Then, on motion of Mr. Grimes, of Iowa, the joint resolution
was recommitted to the Committee on Military Affairs.

March 2d, Mr. Wilson reported a new bill, in lieu of the
original joint resolution so much discussed, which, besides
the provision in the joint resolution, contained an additional
section in substantial conformity with Mr. Sumner’s proviso,
giving to all persons of color enlisted and mustered into the
service of the United States the pay allowed by law to other
volunteers in the service, from the date of their muster, if it
had been pledged or promised to them by any officer or person,
who, in making such pledge or promise, acted by authority of
the War Department; and the Secretary of War was to determine
any question of fact arising under this provision.

March 8th, the bill being under consideration, Mr. Davis moved
an additional section, giving to loyal owners of slaves taken
into service compensation to be determined by commissioners
appointed by the Circuit Court of the United States.

March 9th, Mr. Davis made an elaborate speech vindicating
property in slaves.

March 10th, after further debate, the additional section of
Mr. Davis was rejected,--Yeas 6, Nays 31,--and also another
amendment moved by him. The bill then passed the Senate,--Yeas
31, Nays 6. In the House of Representatives other matters were
substituted for the provisions which had occupied the attention
of the Senate, as the object was already accomplished in
another way.

April 22d, the Army Appropriation Bill being under
consideration, Mr. Wilson moved, as an amendment, the bill to
equalize the pay of soldiers which had passed the Senate. Mr.
Fessenden thought that “the measure ought to be passed, and
passed at once.” If the Senate would waive the objection to
putting it on the Appropriation Bill, he would not object. The
amendment was agreed to,--Yeas 31, Nays 5.

Then followed another series of struggles. The House of
Representatives made amendments which were disagreed to by the
Senate. Then came no less than three different Committees of
Conference. The report of the last Committee, which was made
June 10th, contained the following substitute for the Senate
amendment:--

“That all persons of color who were free on the nineteenth
day of April, 1861, and who have been enlisted and mustered
into the military service of the United States, shall,
from the time of their enlistment, be entitled to receive
the pay, bounty, and clothing allowed to such persons
by the laws existing at the time of their enlistment.
And the Attorney-General of the United States is hereby
authorized to determine any question of law arising under
this provision. And if the Attorney-General aforesaid shall
determine that any of such enlisted persons are entitled to
receive any pay, bounty, or clothing in addition to what
they have already received, the Secretary of War shall make
all necessary regulations to enable the pay department to
make payment in accordance with such determination.”

Mr. Sumner observed that the report did not seem to settle the
question in issue; that, if he were merely looking after the
interests of his own constituents and the regiments organized
in Massachusetts, he might rest satisfied; but that he was
unwilling to sanction a settlement which did not embrace all
the colored troops. The debate extended into the next day, when
Mr. Sumner remarked:--

I stated last night that in my opinion this report undertook to conclude something, but did not conclude it. On further consideration, I am satisfied that I was not much mistaken. It is a conclusion in which nothing is concluded. I may say, too, that it is not entirely creditable to Congress, and, so far as I now accept the result, it will be with much reluctance. It would have better become Congress to recognize a solemn obligation toward those now baring their breasts for us in battle, and falling on the ramparts of the enemy, rather than question their title to pay as soldiers, which I believe as strong for them as for any white soldiers. I regret sincerely that their title has not been positively recognized in the text of a statute; but, after effort in both branches, and the appointment of several committees of conference, such recognition has failed. I despair of obtaining it, at least on the present bill. On that account I am induced to look critically at the proposition before us, to see whether this affords any measure of justice. In one sense it affords nothing; and I believe the Senator from Maine [Mr. MORRILL], who was on the last committee, will not differ from me on that point; but it does distinctly and unequivocally refer the question to the judgment of the Attorney-General of the United States. Substantially Congress agrees to take his opinion. He has already given it. I have it in my hand, in a communication dated April 23, 1864, on a case submitted by the President.

“I do not know that any rule of law, constitutional or
statutory, ever prohibited the acceptance, organization, and
muster of ‘persons of African descent’ into the military
service of the United States as enlisted men or volunteers. But
whatever doubt might have existed on the subject had been fully
resolved before this order was issued, by the 11th section
of the Act of July 17, 1862, chap. 195, which authorized the
President to employ as many persons of African descent as he
might deem necessary and proper for the suppression of the
Rebellion, and for that purpose to organize and use them in
such manner as he might judge best for the public welfare.”

And then again he says:--

“I have already said that I knew of no provision of law,
constitutional or statutory, which prohibited the acceptance
of persons of African descent into the military service of
the United States; and if they could be lawfully accepted as
private soldiers, so also might they be lawfully accepted as
commissioned officers, if otherwise qualified therefor. But the
express power conferred on the President by the 11th section of
the Act of July 17, 1862, chap. 195, before cited, to employ
this class of persons for the suppression of the Rebellion as
he may judge best for the public welfare, furnishes all needed
sanction of law to the employment of a colored chaplain for a
volunteer regiment of his own race.”[307]

By the report before the Senate, it is declared as follows: “And the Attorney-General is hereby authorized to determine any question of law arising under this provision.” In the full confidence that we shall at last, through the Attorney-General, obtain that justice which Congress has denied, I consent to give my vote for the report.

The report was concurred in.[308] The Attorney-General, Mr.
Bates, as Mr. Sumner anticipated, affirmed the equal rights of
the colored soldiers.[309]

OPENING OF THE STREET-CARS TO COLORED PERSONS.

SPEECHES IN THE SENATE, ON VARIOUS PROPOSITIONS, FEBRUARY 10, MARCH 17, JUNE 21, 1864.

The opening of the street-cars in Washington constitutes a
special chapter of effort, which, beyond its local influence,
was important as an example to the country.

February 27, 1863, the Senate having under consideration the
bill to authorize the Alexandria and Washington Railroad
Company to extend their road across the Potomac River and
through the city of Washington to the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad station, Mr. Sumner moved an amendment in the
following words:--

“_And provided, also_, That no person shall be excluded
from the cars on account of color.”

In making this motion, he called attention to what seemed to
him a new illustration of the barbarism of Slavery. An aged
colored person had been excluded from the cars and dropped in
the mud. He thought the incident discreditable, and that it was
the duty of Congress to interfere. The following dialogue then
ensued.

MR. HOWE (of Wisconsin). I should like to ask the Senator
from Massachusetts, as a question of law, whether, if
this railroad company, being common carriers, should drop
any person or refuse to carry any person who offered them
their fare, they would not be liable as the law now stands,
without any express enactment?

MR. SUMNER. If you ask me the question as a lawyer, I
should say they would be liable; but the experience here,
as I believe, is, that this liability is not recognized.
The Senator knows well, that, under the influence of
Slavery, human rights are disregarded, and those principles
of law which he recognizes are set aside. Therefore it
becomes the duty of Congress to interfere and specially
declare them.

MR. HOWE. Would the effect of the amendment be any more
than a reënactment of the existing law?

MR. SUMNER. That was said of the Wilmot Proviso, as the
Senator will remember.

The question being taken by yeas and nays, resulted, Yeas 19,
Nays 18; so the amendment was agreed to. It was concurred in by
the House, and approved by the President, March 3, 1863.

This provision, though applicable to a single road, seemed to
decide the principle. But it was not so regarded by the other
railroads in Washington, which continued to exclude colored
persons, often under painful circumstances.

* * * * *

February 10, 1864, Mr. Sumner called attention to this subject
by the following resolution:--

“_Resolved_, That the Committee on the District of Columbia
be directed to consider the expediency of further providing
by law against the exclusion of colored persons from the
equal enjoyment of all railroad privileges in the District
of Columbia.”

Mr. Sumner explained the resolution.

MR. PRESIDENT,--It is necessary that I should call attention to a recent outrage which has occurred in this District. I do it with great hesitation. At one moment I was inclined to keep silence, believing that the good name of our country required silence; but since it has already found its way into the journals, I cannot doubt that it ought to find its way into this Chamber.

An officer of the United States, with the commission of Major, with the national uniform, has been pushed from a car on Pennsylvania Avenue for no other offence than that he was black. Now, Sir, I desire to say openly that we had better give up railroads in the national capital, if we cannot have them without such an outrage upon humanity, and upon the national character. An incident like that, Sir, is worse at this moment than defeat in battle. It makes enemies for our cause abroad, and sows distrust. I hope, therefore, that the Committee on the District of Columbia,--I know the disposition of my honorable friend, the Chairman of that Committee,--in the bills we are to consider relative to the railroads in this District, will take care that such safeguards are established as will prevent the repetition of any such wrong.

In reply to Mr. Hendricks, of Indiana, Mr. Sumner spoke again.

MR. PRESIDENT,--I am sure that the Senator from Indiana [Mr. HENDRICKS] is mistaken in regard to the provision for colored people. There may be here and there, now and then, once in a long interval of time, a car which colored people may enter; but any person traversing the avenue will see that those cars appear very rarely; and if any person takes the trouble to acquaint himself with the actual condition of things, he will learn that there are great abuses and hardships, particularly among women, growing out of this outrage. I use plain language, Sir, for it is an outrage. It is a disgrace to this city, and a disgrace also to the National Government, which permits it under its eyes. It is a mere offshoot of the Slavery which, happily, we have banished from Washington.

Now go back to the facts on which I predicated my motion. The Senator from Iowa [Mr. GRIMES] has referred to the colored officer. I have in my hand his letter, addressed to his military superior, making a report of the case, and, as it is very brief, I will read it.

“WASHINGTON, D. C., February 1, 1864.

“SIR,--I have the honor to report that I have been obstructed
in getting to the Court this morning by the conductor of car
No. 32 of the Fourteenth Street line of the city railway.

“I started from my lodgings to go to the hospital I formerly
had charge of, to get some notes of the case I was to give
evidence in, and hailed the car at the corner of Fourteenth
and I Streets. It was stopped for me, and, when I attempted to
enter, the conductor pulled me back, and informed me that I
must ride on the front with the driver, as it was against the
rules for colored persons to ride inside. I told him I would
not ride on the front, and he said I should not ride at all.
He then ejected me from the platform, and at the same time
gave orders to the driver to go on. I have, therefore, been
compelled to walk the distance in the mud and rain, and have
also been delayed in my attendance upon the Court.

“I therefore most respectfully request that the offender may be
arrested and brought to punishment.

“I remain, Sir, your obedient servant,

“A. T. AUGUSTA, M. B.,
“_Surgeon Seventh U. S. Colored Troops_.

“CAPTAIN C. W. CLIPPINGTON, _Judge Advocate_.”

In my opinion, the writer of this letter had just as much right in that car as the Senator from Indiana, and it was as great an outrage to eject him as it would be to eject that Senator. I go further, and I say--pardon the illustration--that the ejection of that Senator would not bring upon this capital half the shame that the ejection of this colored officer necessarily brings upon the capital. I do not mean, of course, to make the remark personal; but, as the Senator from Indiana has entered into this discussion, and chooses to vindicate this inhumanity, I allude to him personally.

The resolution was adopted,--Yeas 30, Nays 10.

February 24th, Mr. Willey, of West Virginia, from the Committee
on the District of Columbia, made a report in the following
terms.

“That the Act entitled ‘An Act to incorporate the
Washington and Georgetown Railroad Company,’ approved May
17, 1862, makes no distinction as to passengers over said
road, or as to any of the privileges of said road, on
account of the color of the passenger, and that, in the
opinion of the Committee, colored persons are entitled to
all the privileges of said road which any other persons
have, and to all the remedies for any denial or breach of
such privileges which belong to any other persons. The
Committee, therefore, ask to be discharged from the further
consideration of the premises.”

February 25th, Mr. Sumner called attention to this report, and
moved to reconsider the vote accepting it. Mr. Grimes stated
that “the Committee hold that every person has a right to ride
in the cars, and that a colored person has the same remedies
open to him for any infringement of his rights by the Company
as anybody else.” Mr. Sumner then inquired, “whether it was
the understanding of the Committee that the ejection of a
colored person from a car was illegal.” Mr. Grimes replied,
“As I understood it.” Mr. Sumner. “That the ejection was
illegal?” Mr. Grimes. “Yes, Sir.” Mr. Reverdy Johnson united
in this conclusion. Mr. Willey said: “The law is now full and
perfect in all its provisions and adaptations to secure the
colored persons in the enjoyment of the privileges of this
railroad.” Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, said: “I think in law
he is right, but in practice it is an undeniable fact that the
spirit of the old law and the old practices still lingers to
some extent here in the District.” Mr. Saulsbury, of Delaware,
followed: “I most heartily approve of the action of the officer
on board that railroad-car. I think he deserved the thanks
of the community. When these negroes go about sticking their
heads into railroad-cars, and among white people, and into the
Supreme Court Room, I think an officer is perfectly right in
telling them they have no business there.” Mr. Sumner remarked
as follows.