Chapter VII: Front Matter (7)

I mean that important treaty by which the Emperor of Russia has ceded to the United States all his possessions on the North American continent. The ratifications were exchanged only about a fortnight ago. Yesterday, the 4th of July, I was honored by a visit from the Minister of Russia, who put into my hand a cable despatch from St. Petersburg, announcing that on the day before the Russian Commissioner left St. Petersburg for Washington to make the formal surrender of that vast region to the United States. To my inquiry when the Commissioner would arrive the Minister replied, “In a fortnight.” In a fortnight, then, final proceedings will be had for the establishment of your jurisdiction over that region, and two questions arise: first, our duty to complete the contract, in consideration of the cession, to pay $7,200,000; and, secondly, our other duty to provide a proper government. But the proposition of my friend from Rhode Island would exclude these important topics from our consideration.

MR. ANTHONY. Would the Senator have the Senate originate an
appropriation bill?

MR. SUMNER. I would have the Senate originate a bill for the
government of this territory, and, if need be, originate a bill
for the payment of the money due. There is no objection in the
Constitution.

MR. ANTHONY. It has never been done.

MR. SUMNER. I beg the Senator’s pardon; it has been done again
and again.

MR. ANTHONY. An appropriation bill originated in the Senate?

MR. SUMNER. Oh, yes.

MR. ANTHONY. I never knew that to be done but once; and then
the House rejected it, refused to consider it.

MR. SUMNER. The Senator refers to what are called the general appropriation bills. The Senate constantly makes appropriations for individual cases and for carrying out treaties. Does it not appropriate for private claims, for salaries, for other obligations? In principle, the present case does not differ from an appropriation for an estate adjoining the Capitol. Alaska is not an estate adjoining the Capitol; but it is to be paid for.

That I may make this clearer, I call attention to the very words of the treaty with Russia:--

“His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias shall appoint
with convenient despatch an agent or agents for the purpose
of formally delivering to a similar agent or agents appointed
on behalf of the United States the territory, dominion,
property, dependencies, and appurtenances which are ceded as
above, and for doing any other act which may be necessary in
regard thereto. But the cession, with the right of immediate
possession, is nevertheless to be deemed complete and absolute
on the exchange of ratifications, without waiting for such
formal delivery.”[230]

So that, by the terms of the treaty, on the exchange of ratifications you became possessors of this jurisdiction; and now, by the approaching surrender, through an official agent, your jurisdiction will be consummated. With this jurisdiction will be corresponding responsibilities. You must govern the territory; you must provide protection for the property and the other interests there. Already, by the telegraph, we learn that a large ship is about to leave San Francisco for Sitka, with merchandise of all kinds. There is also the immense fur-trade, which has been the exclusive Russian interest ever since the discovery of the country, which will be left open, without regulation, unless you interfere by appropriate law. There is that most important fur, the origin of wealth on that whole northwestern coast, the sea-otter, which will be exposed to lawless and destructive depredation, unless the Government supplies some regulations. Will you not do something? Will you leave these interests without care?

Senators exclaim, that they may be considered next winter. Do not forget the distance between Washington and that far-away region; you will then see how long you postpone the establishment of your jurisdiction. Months must elapse after the meeting of Congress next December, leaving this region without government. There should be no delay; you should proceed at once. You certainly will not show yourselves worthy to possess this country, unless you provide at once a proper government. Leaving it a prey to lawless adventure, you will only increase the difficulties of dealing with a region so vast and so remote.

But there is another obligation still. You receive the territory; you ought to pay the money at the same time. A Senator before me cries out, “It will not be appropriated at this session.”

MR. EDMUNDS. It is not due yet.

MR. SUMNER. I ask the Senator’s attention to the point. I understand, as a matter of history, in this negotiation, that, while it was proceeding, it was proposed that the payment should be on the exchange of ratifications, so that, when the cession was completed, the transaction on our part should be completed also; but as the treaty was being drawn, it was understood that there would be no meeting of Congress before next December, while the ratifications might be exchanged before that time. To meet this case, a special provision was introduced, extending the time of payment to a period of ten months from the exchange of ratifications. This explains the article I now read:--

“In consideration of the cession aforesaid, the United States
agree to pay at the Treasury in Washington, within ten months
after the exchange of the ratifications of this convention, to
the diplomatic representative or other agent of His Majesty
the Emperor of all the Russias, duly authorized to receive the
same, seven million two hundred thousand dollars in gold.”[231]

By the letter of the treaty, you may, if you see fit, postpone the payment to ten months from the exchange of ratifications; but I submit to the Senator from Vermont, whether he is willing to do so,--whether, since the transaction is consummated on the part of Russia, he is not willing, nay, desirous also, that it shall be consummated on the part of the United States in the spirit of the original negotiation? I submit this as a question of sound policy,--I will not say of integrity, but simply of sound policy on the part of our Government, a republic representing republican institutions, by whose conduct republican institutions are always judged. Surely you will not fail to protect the national honor; nor will you stick at the letter of the treaty.

* * * * *

I have alluded to two important matters under treaties; but there is still another, more important than any treaty or any appropriation, which dwarfs treaties and dwarfs appropriations, which is not less important, certainly, than the protection of the frontier, now menaced by Indians. I refer to a whole region of our Republic, embracing two extensive States, now menaced by a foe more dangerous to the national peace and welfare than any tribe of Indians. These are returning Rebels in the States of Kentucky and Maryland. Provide against them. They are Indians within your jurisdiction. You have the power; you have the means. Give the ballot to the colored citizens in those States, as you have given it already to colored citizens in the Rebel States, and you will have an all-sufficient protection against these intruders. Here is something to be done. Who doubts the power? Out of three fountains in the Constitution it may be derived. It is your duty, then, to exercise it. See to it that these States have a republican government. Fix in your statute-book an authoritative definition of a republic. Enforce the two Amendments of the Constitution,--one abolishing Slavery, and the other declaring the rights of citizens. Any delay to exercise so clear a power is a failure of duty; and it becomes more reprehensible, when we consider the perils that may ensue. Communicate, if you please, with Union citizens of those two States. Listen to what they say. Be taught by their testimony.

I have, for instance, a letter from an eminent citizen of Maryland, written from Baltimore the 1st of July, which concludes:--

“I will only add, that the interest felt by the loyal people of
this State in the passage of this bill cannot be overstated.”

Communicate with your late colleague upon this floor, that able and patriotic Senator, Mr. Creswell. Listen to his testimony. There can be no doubt that Unionists, whether black or white, in Maryland, require your protection. Give it to them. Do not leave them a prey to Rebels. In the same way they are exposed in Kentucky. Here is a letter from a distinguished citizen of that State, dated July 1st: and I read these, out of many others, simply because they are the latest; they have come within a few hours:--

“I hope you will be able to do good at the extra session, and
extend and protect the rights of the freedmen, as they are
sadly in need of it in Kentucky. Reconstruct us; this is the
only loyal hope.”

Such is the cry. Kentucky needs reconstruction, and it is your duty to provide it. Put her on an equality with the Rebel States. Let her colored citizens enjoy the full-blown rights of citizens, and let the white Unionists there have the protection of their votes. You sent muskets once; send votes now.[232]

On your table is a bill “to enforce the several provisions of the Constitution abolishing Slavery, declaring the immunities of citizens, and guarantying a republican form of government by securing the elective franchise to colored citizens.” Pass this bill, and you furnish the needed protection in these semi-rebel States. Pass this bill, and you supersede strife on this much-vexed and disturbing question in other States of the Union. You at once bring to the elective franchise thousands of good citizens, pledged by their lives and inspired by their recently received rights to sustain the good cause which you have so much at heart. Do this; help in this way the final settlement of the national troubles; pass this bill of peace,--for such it will be, giving repose in all the Northern States,--and in this way help establish repose in all the rest of the country. And yet I am told that even this important measure is to be set aside. We are not to enter upon its consideration; we are not to debate it; we are not to receive petitions in its favor. Is this right? Is it not a neglect of duty? Is it not intolerable?

* * * * *

Mr. President, on these grounds I object to this proposition. I might have objected to it, in the first place, as out of order, and asked the ruling of the Chair, not doubting how the Chair, inspired always by a generous love of human rights, must rule,--not doubting that the Chair would say that a proposition of such a character was too closely associated with one of the most odious measures of our history to deserve welcome at this time. I have raised no such question. I confine myself now to other objections. I object to it as a departure from sound usage, as contrary to the spirit of the Constitution, and as setting up an impediment and obstruction to the transaction of public business of an urgent character, which you cannot neglect without neglect of duty. I ask you to provide for the execution of recent treaties with Venezuela and Russia, to assure protection to Unionists in Maryland and Kentucky, and to give peace to the country. Above all, do not make a bad precedent, to be quoted hereafter to the injury of the Republic.

Mr. Pomeroy, of Kansas, felt “embarrassed in voting against
the resolution offered by the Senator from Rhode Island,”
but he thought it “impracticable and unwise,” that it would
“subject us to censure, and that we ourselves should regret it
hereafter.” Mr. Yates, of Illinois, “was for a special session
for a special purpose.” In reply to a question of Mr. Yates,
Mr. Sumner said:--

I do not believe Congress would have come together, if they had had faith in the President. I believe the session beginning on the 4th of March had its origin in want of confidence in the President. I believe my friend agrees in that.

MR. YATES. Yes.

MR. SUMNER. It was to counteract and watch the President that Congress met on the 4th of March. When this session was about to adjourn, provision was made for its renewal, or a continuation or a prolongation of it, if you may so regard it. I take it in the same spirit with the original enactment.

It was to provide against the President, and to do such other incidental business as the public interests might require. I never doubted that there would be a session on the 3d of July.[233] I so stated at the passage of the resolution. I have so stated constantly since; and I have advised more than one gentleman connected with Congress not to leave the country, because his post of duty was here. I believe that I have answered the question of my friend.

And now one word more. We are assembled under an Act of Congress and the National Constitution. By the Constitution it is provided that “each House may determine the rules of its proceedings.” That is all it can do. It may not annihilate proceedings; it may not forbid proceedings. It may provide rules for them; but it cannot, in a just sense, prevent. Therefore I submit that the resolution, if not positively unconstitutional, is contrary to the spirit of that instrument.

Mr. Ross, of Kansas, hoped “that either the proposition of the
Senator from Massachusetts or something similar to it would
carry.” Mr. Tipton, of Nebraska, was “embarrassed in regard
to voting for the original resolution.” After further debate,
the vote was taken on Mr. Sumner’s substitute, and it was
rejected,--Yeas 6, Nays 26.

Mr. Ross then moved a substitute limiting business “to removing
the obstructions which have been or are likely to be placed in
the way of the fair execution of the Acts of Reconstruction,”
and “such as may be rendered necessary for the preservation of
the peace on the Western frontier.” Debate ensued, in which
Mr. Howe, of Wisconsin, said: “I did not suppose any gentleman
would insist that I was bound by the decision of that body, or
by the conclusion arrived at in that consultation.… I do not
know what penalties I subject myself to by disagreeing here
and now with the conclusions then arrived at.” Mr. Wade, of
Ohio, spoke vigorously against the original resolution. In his
judgment, “there are some questions about which a Senator has
no right to conform his view to that of the majority,” and he
took the original resolution to be of that class. “It sets a
precedent of the greatest danger in high party times.” He hoped
“that no such detriment to a minority will ever be successfully
urged here.” He judged Mr. Sumner’s “measure, which is to give
universal suffrage by Act of Congress, to be upon the subject
of Reconstruction, and one of the most efficient measures
to that end; and yet gentlemen seem to suppose that that is
within the scope of the excluding clause of this resolution.”
Mr. Fessenden was equally positive the other way. He referred
to the caucus of Republican Senators where the original
resolution was prepared, which he deemed “eminently proper.”
“When gentlemen go into consultation with their friends, and
make no protest whatever against having the result of that
consultation acted upon, they agree impliedly and expressly,
in my judgment, that they will be bound on that subject by the
decision which their friends come to, unless they give notice
to the contrary,--that is to say, in case they continue to act
on the subject to the end.” Mr. Sumner followed.

MR. PRESIDENT,--I should not have said another word, but for topics introduced by the Senator from Maine; yet before I allude to those particularly, allow me to answer his argument, so far as I am able to appreciate it. He will pardon me for saying that he confounds right and power. Unquestionably the Senate has the power which he attributes to it; but it has not the right. A jury, as we know, in giving a general verdict, has power to say “Guilty” or “Not guilty,” disregarding the instructions of the court; but I need not say that it is a grave question among lawyers whether it has the right. Now, assuming that the Senate has the power which the Senator from Maine claims, it seems to me it has not the right. It has not the right to disregard the spirit of the National Constitution; and the present proposition is of that character. The Senator does not see it so, I know; for, if he did, he could not give to it the weight of his character. Others do see it so; and if they do, the Senator from Maine must pardon them, if they act accordingly. The Senator would not vote for anything he regarded as hostile to the spirit of the Constitution. I cannot attribute to him any such conduct. Can he expect others to do what he would not do himself? This is my answer to the argument, so far as I understand it. Perhaps I do not do justice to it; yet I try.

There was one other point of argument. The Senate, so the Senator argues, may postpone an individual measure to the next session. Grant it; does it follow that they may postpone, immediately on their arrival, the whole business to another session?

MR. FESSENDEN. They can adjourn on the next day, or on the day
they meet, if they please.

MR. SUMNER. But so long as they continue in session as a Senate, then, under the National Constitution, they must attend to the business of the country. They cannot tie their hands in advance. To do so is to violate the spirit of the Constitution. The Senator cannot have forgotten the Atherton gag, to which I referred before, without naming it, however. Was it not justly an offence and a stench in the nostrils of every patriot citizen? Has it not left a bad name upon the Congresses that recognized it? But this was simply a declaration not to receive petitions on one subject; and now, under the lead of the Senator, we are to continue in session an indefinite time, and to receive no petition, no bill, nothing on anything except on one specified subject. I submit, if the Atherton gag was unconstitutional, if it was odious, if it was a bad precedent, then you are very rash in establishing this much broader precedent. Do not condemn the offensive legislation of the past; do not condemn those slave-masters once so offensive in these Chambers. You go further than they. You impose a gag not upon petitions merely, but upon the general business of the country.

The Senator from Ohio [Mr. WADE] has, with unanswerable force, depicted the offensive character of this precedent, and he has taught us how, now that we are a majority, we should hesitate to set such an example for the future. How should we feel, he has aptly reminded us, if, as a minority, we had such a cup handed to our lips by a patriot Senator? Doubtless, that for the time patriotism had departed.

I should not have been betrayed into these remarks now, but for topics introduced by the Senator from Maine. When I opened this debate, this morning, Senators will bear me witness, I made no allusion to any discussion elsewhere. I did not think a caucus a proper subject for this Chamber; nor did I attribute to it anything of the character which the Senator from Maine does. He makes it not merely sacred, but a _sacro-sanct pact_, by which every one at the meeting is solemnly bound. What authority is there for any such conclusion? Senators went to that caucus, I presume, like myself, without knowing what was to be considered; and let me confess, when the proposition, in its first form, was presented, I was startled by its offensive character. I could not believe that a Senator, knowing the responsibilities and duties of a Senator, and under the oath of a Senator, could start such a thing. Well, Sir, discussion went on. The proposition was amended, modified, mitigated, losing something of its offensiveness in form, but it still remained substantially offensive. I am not aware that any Senator suggested that it should be adopted as a rule of the Senate. If any one did, I did not hear it, though paying close attention to the discussion. I do not think the Senator from Maine made any such suggestion. I certainly never supposed that anybody would propose such a rule. So far as it was to have any value, I supposed it was to be the recorded result of the deliberations of political associates,--so far as practicable, a guide for their action, but not a constraint embodied in a perpetual record. At the last moment, after the vote had been declared to which the Senator from Maine refers, and to which I should make no allusion, if he had not brought it forward, I rose in the caucus, and said, “I will not be bound by any such proposition.” When it had arrived at the stage to which I refer,--the Senator from Maine will not forget it, for he interposed a remark which I will not quote now----

MR. FESSENDEN. You had better quote it. I said, “Then you
should not have voted on the subject, if you did not mean to be
bound by the decision of the majority.”

MR. SUMNER. To which I replied, “I am a Senator of the United States.”

MR. FESSENDEN. I did not hear the reply.

MR. SUMNER. By that reply I meant that my obligations as a Senator were above any vote in caucus; that I had no right to go into caucus and barter away unquestioned rights on this floor. We are under obligations here to discharge our duties as Senators. We cannot in advance tie our hands. I have not said in so many words, “You violate the Constitution in doing it.” Perhaps better reflection would lead me to adopt the stronger language, and say, “You violate the National Constitution.” I feel plainly, clearly, beyond doubt, that such is the character of the National Constitution, and such are our obligations under it, that we cannot, without a dereliction of duty, consent to such a proposition. So I see it; I cannot see it otherwise.

And now I submit to my associates in this body, with whom I am proud to act, whose good opinion I value, whether they would have me, feeling as I do regarding this resolution, act otherwise than as I do. Should I not, as an associate in this Chamber, anxious for the good name of the Senate to which we all belong, proud of this Republic whose honor we hope to bear aloft, and anxious that no precedent should be established which may hereafter be brought to our detriment, should I not enter my frank protest? And, doing so, do I deserve the rude suggestions that have been made to-day? Should I be told that one may not go into a caucus and assist in the debate, and then appear in this Chamber only with the bands of the caucus upon his hands?

Nor is the duty changed by the time of the protest. Vote or no vote makes no difference. No caucus could constrain a Senator on such a question. It was our duty to stay and resist the offensive proposition to the last, and then afterward resist it elsewhere. Senators, if they choose, may take it in their hands and bear it into this Chamber, to enshrine it in the rules of the Senate. If placed there, I know it will do no good; it will stay there to the dishonor of the country, and as a bad precedent for the future.

Mr. Howe spoke again, beginning his remarks as follows: “I am
not so familiar with the history of this country as I wish I
was. I do not know whether it has ever happened hitherto in
the history of the country that a Senator has been arraigned
before the Senate for a violation of a duty to a partisan
caucus. If there ever has been such a trial before, I hope
there never will be such a trial again.” Mr. Yates concluded by
saying: “Now, Sir, there is one of two things, and it commences
this day: that the decisions of such consultations have to be
carried out, or this day begins the death of any consultations
by the majority in the Senate.” Mr. Sumner followed.

MR. PRESIDENT,--It is evident that this debate has opened a broader question than was imagined at first. Doctors disagree. The learned Senator from Illinois differs from the learned Senator from Maine. One expounds the caucus obligations in one way, and the other in another. Now I am clear that this debate ought not to be closed without some defined code of caucus, and it seems to me that the learned Senators, so swift in judgment, ought to supply this code. It should be reduced to a text. We should know to what extent one is bound, and to what extent not bound: whether the Senator from Illinois, who refuses to be bound by the caucus in one point, which was fully discussed, is a man of honor; whether another Senator, who refuses to be bound on other points, is a man of honor. That question could be settled by some explicit code: for we have been admonished that we cannot differ from the caucus without a departure from propriety, if not from duty; and I do not know that stronger language has not been employed. If it has, I will not quote it. It seems to me that this should lead to a practical conclusion, and it is this: to have nothing to do with a proposition which can be discussed only through such avenues, which requires such refinement of detail, with regard to which the Senator from Illinois makes one exception, and other Senators other exceptions, and to which still other Senators entirely object.

Now I am not going to complain of the Senator from Illinois. In following his convictions he is doing right; but then I wish him to understand that others on this floor may have the privilege he claims for himself,--justly claims; it is his title. I recognize the Senator as a man of honor, though he does refuse to carry out the decrees of the caucus. I believe that every Senator here has responsibilities as a Senator which are above any he can have to a caucus, which is only a meeting of friends for consultation and for harmony, where each gives up something with a view to a common result, but no man gives up a principle, no man gives up anything vital. No Senator can expect another Senator to give up anything vital; no Senator can expect another Senator to sacrifice a principle. I will not imagine that any Senator would sacrifice a principle. If a Senator expects another to accord with him in the conclusions of a caucus, I know well it is because he does not see it in the light of principle; but if another Senator does see it in the light of principle, how can he be expected to act otherwise than according to his light? It is not given to all to see with the clearness of the caucus-defenders. Theirs is the pathway of light; they see the obligation as complete. Others cannot see it so. I am in that list. I cannot see it as a final obligation. I have been present in many caucuses, and I believe, looking over the past, I have harmonized reasonably with my associates. Sometimes I have been constrained to differ, and have expressed that difference, and it has generally been received with kindness. The other day I expressed the same difference, little expecting, however, an arraignment on this floor.

Here followed a conversation, in which Mr. Sumner, Mr. Yates,
Mr. Howe, Mr. Grimes, of Iowa, and Mr. Thayer, of Nebraska,
took part. Mr. Yates was willing to except from the resolution
necessary legislation on the Western frontiers. Mr. Sumner
continued:--

Now I submit to my excellent friend, whether his conclusion does not entirely impair the value of the caucus conclusion, except to this extent, in which we all agree, that it is an expression of the opinion of political associates, calculated to exercise a strong influence on the course of public business, and to be received with respect, but not to be imposed upon this Chamber as a rule.

MR. YATES. Allow me to ask the Senator whether he did
not submit himself to the same sort of decision in the
Reconstruction measures. Those matters were before a caucus,
and acted upon.

MR. SUMNER. In the caucus on Reconstruction I moved the amendment that in the future constitutions of the Rebel States the ballot should be required. A division was had. I allude to it now because interrogated openly in the Senate. A division was had, and there were two stand-up votes, when the motion was carried by a vote of 15 to 13. By 15 to 13 in that caucus it was voted to require suffrage for all in the future constitutions of the Rebel States.

MR. EDMUNDS. And what would you have thought, if the thirteen
had repudiated that action?

MR. SUMNER. To repudiate a proposition in favor of human liberty would have been a very different thing from repudiating a proposition against human liberty.

MR. FESSENDEN. When the question is put to the Senator, what he
would have thought, if the thirteen had repudiated it, he says
that is a very different thing, being in favor of liberty.

MR. SUMNER. Very well, does not the Senator say the same?

MR. FESSENDEN. I say there is no difference, where a man
promises to do a thing with a full understanding; he has no
right to violate it, whether it is one way or the other.

MR. SUMNER. The question is, whether the man does promise. There is the point.

MR. FESSENDEN. Very well, then, my reply is, that, if there was
no promise in the case of the thirteen to support the decision,
there is no promise here; if there was a promise in the case
of the thirteen to be bound by it and support it, as they
did, then there was a promise here. The Senator may make the
distinction, if he can.

MR. SUMNER. I will make the distinction clear. I have never said there was a promise in the case of the thirteen, as I insist there was no promise in the recent caucus. Had the Senator felt it his duty to come into the Senate and oppose the report, I should have been pained to find him on the side of wrong; but I am not ready to say that he would have been constrained by the caucus. But, plainly, the repudiation of a caucus vote for Human Rights is to be judged differently from the repudiation of a caucus vote adverse to Human Rights,--assuming, as I do, that there is no promise in either case.

…

Sir, I am tired of this talk of honor, in connection with the public business. This is too solemn; we are under too great responsibilities. Every Senator acts with honor. The Senator from Maine acts with honor, when he seeks to impose a rule which I think offensive to the spirit of the Constitution. The Senator from Illinois acts with honor, when he says that he will not be bound by the vote of this caucus in a particular case. Other Senators act with honor, when they refuse to be bound by the resolution in any of its terms. Every Senator acts with honor. He only acts otherwise who makes injurious imputations upon his associates.

Yes, Sir, let us have this caucus code. If it is to be administered with such severity, let us know it in advance, its terms and its conditions,--what extent of dishonor is to be visited upon those who do not adopt the caucus conclusions, and what extent of honor upon those who so steadfastly and violently carry them forward. Let us have the code. I believe, Sir, that the true code for the Senate is found in the National Constitution, in the rules of this body, and in the sentiments of right and wrong which animate every honest soul; and I believe that no advantage can be taken of any Senator by reminding him that he forbore at a particular moment to register his objection, just as if we were all there on trial, to be saved by speaking promptly. It was no such debate; we were there with friends and brothers, each respecting the sensibilities and convictions of his associates, and, by interchange of opinions, seeking harmony, but not submitting to a yoke.

After further remarks from Mr. Fessenden and Mr. Tipton, the
substitute of Mr. Ross was rejected,--Yeas 15, Nays 19. The
resolution, was then adopted,--Yeas 23, Nays 9.

* * * * *

July 10th, Mr. Sumner called up the following, introduced by
him July 8th:--

“_Resolved_, That the resolution of the Senate, adopted the
5th of July last, limiting the business of the Senate, be,
and hereby is, rescinded.”

In remarks that followed, he showed the character of the
proceedings in the Twenty-Seventh Congress, which had been
adduced as a precedent for the limitation of business. In reply
to Mr. Fessenden, he said:--

I have simply done my duty, in calling attention to the past precedent which had been introduced into the discussion. When it was introduced by the Senator from Maine, I had no means of replying to it. I had not the Journal or the Globe with me, and I supposed, from the statement of the Senator, that it was a resolution practically adopted in this Chamber. I was not aware of what followed. I was not aware of the extent to which the whole spirit of the proposition was denounced. Nor was I aware that its original mover, Mr. Clay, was obliged to abandon his proposition,--that he magnanimously, justly, and considerately abandoned it. That is the true precedent in this body; and that is the precedent which, I submit, it would be better for the Senate to follow. Nothing, surely, could be lost by following it.

The resolution adopted by the Senate on Friday, while it remains, will only be of evil example. If hereafter quoted as a precedent, it may be at last for some purpose of oppression, when Senators will not all be as just as those I now have the honor of addressing. It may be seized then as an engine of tyranny. For one, Sir, I would leave no such weapon in this Chamber to be grasped hereafter by any hand.

The Senate refused to take up the resolution.

* * * * *

July 13th, Mr. Sumner made another attempt by the following
resolution:--

“_Resolved_, That the rule of the Senate limiting business
be suspended, so far as to allow the consideration of
the bill (S. No. 124) to enforce the several provisions
of the Constitution abolishing Slavery, declaring the
immunities of citizens, and guarantying a republican form
of government by securing the elective franchise to colored
citizens.”

But he was not able to obtain a vote upon it, and the important
bill was left on the table.

RECONSTRUCTION ONCE MORE.

PUBLIC SCHOOLS; OFFICERS AND SENATORS WITHOUT DISTINCTION OF COLOR.

SPEECHES IN THE SENATE, ON THE THIRD RECONSTRUCTION BILL, JULY 11 AND 13, 1867.

July 8th, Mr. Trumbull, of Illinois, from the Committee on the
Judiciary, reported a “Bill to give effect to an Act entitled
‘An Act to provide for the more efficient Government of the
Rebel States,’ passed March 2, 1867.” This was the third
Reconstruction measure of the present year. It was debated for
several days. July 11th, Mr. Sumner said:--

MR. PRESIDENT,--Before offering amendments which I have on my table, I desire to call attention briefly to the character of this bill.

The subject of Reconstruction has been before Congress for many years. It first appeared in the Senate as a proposition of my own, as long ago as February, 1862. From that time it has been constantly present. If at any moment Congress has erred, it has been from inaction, and not from action. And now the same danger is imminent.

Mark, if you please, the stages. At every step there has been battle. Nothing could be proposed which was not opposed, often with feeling, sometimes even with animosity. I do not speak now of the other side, but of friends on this side of the Chamber, some of whom have fought every measure.

To my mind nothing has been plainer from the beginning than the jurisdiction of Congress. Obviously it was not for the Executive, but for the Legislative. The President was commander-in-chief of the army; that function was his. But he could not make States or constitutions, or determine how States or constitutions should be made. All that he did to this end was gross usurpation, aggravated by motives and consequences.

Unquestionably the jurisdiction was in Congress; and I shall never cease to lament that it was not asserted promptly and courageously. Our delay has postponed the establishment of peace and reconciliation. Much as the President has erred, Congress has not been without error also. The President erred from assuming powers which did not belong to him; Congress erred from declining to assume powers which belonged to it. The sins of the President were of commission; the sins of Congress were of omission. The President did the things he ought not to have done; Congress left undone the things it ought to have done.

In the exercise of unquestioned jurisdiction, Congress should at once have provided civil governments, through whose influence and agency the Rebel States might have been shaped into republican forms. Such a proceeding would have been more constitutional and more according to the genius of our institutions than that which was adopted. It is hard to reconcile a military government, or any government born of military power, with the true idea of a republic. Tardily, too tardily, Congress entered upon the work; and then began hesitations of another character. Even when assuming jurisdiction, it halted.

For a long time it refused to confer the suffrage upon the colored race. At last this was done.

Then it refused to exclude Rebels from the work of Reconstruction; and when at last it attempted something, its rule of exclusion was so little certain that an ingenious lawyer by a written opinion has set it aside.

There have been bills with riders, and after the passage of these bills there has been a supplementary bill with riders. And still further legislation is needed.

Surely these successive failures have their lesson. They admonish us now to make thorough work.

If you will not establish civil governments, with the military power simply as a support, then at least do not hesitate to vacate the existing governments, which are so many roots and centres of sedition. All the officers of these governments, from highest to lowest, exercise an influence adverse to a just reconstruction. They are in the way of peace and reconciliation. They increase the essential difficulties of forming new governments. Through their influence a hostile spirit is engendered and sustained. Such an obstacle should be removed.

At the same time be careful that Rebel influence is not allowed to prevail in the new governments. Of course this can be only by excluding Rebels during this transition period, until the new governments are formed. The rule of exclusion may be properly changed, when loyal and republican governments are established. Attention has already been called to cases deserving notice: as, for instance, naturalized citizens who have taken an oath to support the National Constitution and afterward became Rebels, but yet are not excluded; cadets at the Military and Naval Academies; persons who have contributed to Rebel loans or invested money in Rebel bonds or securities; contractors who furnished Rebel supplies; also persons who, as authors, publishers, editors, contributors, or as speakers or preachers, encouraged the secession of any State or the waging of war against the United States.

Considering what we hear with regard to the boards of registration,--that in some States they are of doubtful principles, that in others colored fellow-citizens are excluded, so that a large proportion of the electors have no representation in the boards,--it seems to me that we ought by positive words to provide that the boards shall be constituted without distinction of color. Colored persons may be chosen to office, and I cannot doubt that we shall soon welcome colored Senators and Representatives to the National Capitol. Meanwhile the boards of registration must be kept as open as these Chambers; and no commanding general can be allowed to set up a rule adverse to the rights of a race.

A system of public schools without distinction of color should be required. This important duty must not be left to caprice, or to the triumph of truth through local influence. Its performance should be enforced as essential to republican government. We have required suffrage for all; we should require also education for all.

Provision should be made to invalidate the decrees of court in the Rebel States which have not been voluntarily executed. This is necessary for the protection of loyal persons. Look, for instance, at Texas, where, according to recent report, immense sums have been taken by unjust decrees. If the remedy is not applied now, it is doubtful if the opportunity will not be lost forever.

In submitting a constitution to the people, it seems to me advisable that it should not be complicated by any election of officers, State or National, but that all elections should be postponed until after approval of the constitution by Congress.

There should also be penalties for the violation of the Act. The pardon of the President must not be allowed to confer a title to vote; and since officials have shown such a disposition to impair the efficacy of an Act by interpretation, reducing it to a mere shadow, we ought to provide that it shall be interpreted liberally.

In making these propositions, I ask that you should not hesitate simply because they may not be embraced within the terms of the original Acts. I would do now all that we can to make this measure of Reconstruction just and beneficent. I know no other rule worthy of the Senate or adequate to the occasion.

In carrying out these ideas, I propose to offer several amendments, which I will send to the Chair in order. I begin by an amendment as an additional section:--

“_And be it further enacted_, That every constitution in
the Rebel States shall require the Legislature to establish
and sustain a system of public schools open to all, without
distinction of race or color.”

* * * * *

Mr. Trumbull objected to the amendment as not in order under
the rule limiting the business of the session. The question of
order was submitted to the Senate, and the amendment was ruled
out of order,--Yeas 11, Nays 22.

Mr. Sumner then moved the following amendment, which he was
sure must be in order, even under the stringent rule of the
Senate:--

“_Provided_, That no person shall be disqualified as member
of any board of registration by reason of race or color.”

Mr. Conkling, of New York, inquired “whether there is any doubt
upon the law, as it stands now, that men otherwise qualified
are eligible, notwithstanding they are black.” Mr. Sumner
replied:--

I am accustomed to that class of questions on this floor. When, some two or three years ago, I felt it my duty to move, on one bill after another, that there should be no exclusion from the street cars on account of color, I was encountered by learned lawyers, and by none more constantly than my friend opposite, the Senator from Maryland [Mr. JOHNSON], with precisely the suggestion which my friend from New York now makes: that in point of law it was unnecessary; that under the actual law, which was none other than the Common Law, there could be no exclusion on account of color: and yet, in the face of that Common Law, Senators all know that there was an exclusion from the cars on account of color, and the grossest outrages committed. Colored persons were precipitated into the streets, into the mud, under a pelting rain, and they could obtain no redress; and when I asked for redress, grave Senators said, “Let them apply to the courts”; and it was suggested that perhaps I had better volunteer as counsel in court rather than appear in this Chamber. Now the question of my friend from New York is precisely in the same spirit. I cannot doubt, that, under the existing Reconstruction law, there can be no exclusion on account of color,--that nobody is for that reason disqualified from the exercise of any function. What is there to prevent a colored person from being a Senator of the United States? and who can doubt that within a very few months it will be our business to welcome a colored Senator on this floor? I cannot doubt it.

MR. JOHNSON [of Maryland]. How many?

MR. SUMNER. That I do not know. But I ask you who look to the colored vote in these States as the means of security and peace, through which you are to find protection for this Republic, and for white fellow-citizens there as well as for the colored themselves, to see that this stigma is not put upon them by any commanding general pretending to act by virtue of our legislation. It is not enough to tell me, that, under the actual law, colored persons may be designated. To that I reply, in the State of Virginia they have not been designated; and I wish now that Congress should declare that any exclusion on account of color is without the sanction of law.

And that brings me to the inquiry of my friend from Illinois, as to the penalty, I think, or as to the extent of the remedy.

MR. TRUMBULL. The question was, whether your proviso afforded
any remedy.

MR. SUMNER. That I will answer. My proviso affords precisely the same remedy that it afforded on the Railroad Bills. It is in nearly the same terms. I followed those terms, because I know my friend likes good precedents, and we have enough of those on the question of the street cars. The Senate adopted that proviso at least half a dozen times. There it is, without penalty, and yet it has been most efficacious, not only in these streets, but as an example throughout the country. Adopt this proviso now, and I am sure it will be most efficacious with our generals even without any penalty. Should they exclude fellow-citizens on account of color, it will be a violation of law and a failure of duty; there can be no votes of thanks for them,--“no hope of golden spurs to-day.”

Mr. Conkling replied: “I do not wish, for one, to vote for an
amendment which I think carries nothing with it, but which
simply incumbers the bill with unnecessary, and I might say
verbose provisos.”

The amendment was rejected by a tie-vote,--Yeas 18, Nays 18.

At the next stage of the bill, Mr. Sumner renewed his
amendment. In reply to Mr. Edmunds, of Vermont, Mr. Sumner
said:--

I will not spend time. There has been an abuse which has come to our knowledge. We know that in whole States colored persons are excluded from the boards, and this justifies our intervention.

On this second trial the amendment was adopted,--Yeas 21, Nays 8.

Mr. Sumner offered the following:--

“_And be it further enacted_, That there shall be no
elections of State or National officers under any new
constitution until after the same has been approved by
Congress.”

This was objected to by Mr. Trumbull, as out of order under the
rule, and so decided by the Senate.

Mr. Sumner then moved the following amendment:--

“_And be it further enacted_, That in each of these
States all judgments and decrees of court which have not
been voluntarily executed, and which have been rendered
subsequently to the date of the Ordinance of Secession in
each State respectively, shall be subject to appeal to the
highest court in the State, organized after the State shall
be admitted again by Congress into the Union; but no such
appeal shall be allowed, unless the motion for the same
shall have been lodged in the court, or clerk’s office of
the court, in which the decree was rendered, within sixty
days after the governor appointed under this Act shall have
entered upon the discharge of the duties of his office,
and for all judgments rendered subsequently to such date,
within sixty days after the same have been rendered.”

Mr. Trumbull objected to it as out of order under the rule. Mr.
Sumner said:--

My attention has often been called to the necessity of such a provision, by gentlemen from the South, and especially by lawyers there. They tell me that without some such provision the grossest injustice will be done. Throughout the whole Rebellion the local tribunals were sitting to administer justice; yet it was not justice, but injustice, that they administered. Under their decrees private rights were overthrown; and I doubt not that my friend from Illinois has recently read the account of an extensive injustice in Texas, where private property to an almost incalculable amount was taken away by these unjust decrees.

Should there not be a remedy? I think all will say that there should be. This is, if I may so express myself, the last time of asking. If those States are once organized as States and received into the Union, I know not if we have the power of applying a remedy. That we have now I am sure. I cannot doubt our constitutional power at this moment to set aside all those decrees, so far as they have not been voluntarily submitted to, or subject them, according to the provision of my amendment, to appeal in a higher tribunal after the reorganization of justice in these States. Is not the provision reasonable? Is it not to serve the ends of justice? If you do not accept it now, can you accept it at any time hereafter? And if you do not accept it now or hereafter, will not these parties go without remedy? On that question I do not pronounce dogmatically. I do not mean to say that they will be absolutely without remedy; but I do not easily see their remedy. I see difficulties in the way, while at this moment I see no difficulties in the way.

Then I encounter the objection that this is not in order. Why not? Is it not to carry out your Reconstruction Bill, to smooth difficulties, to remove wrong, to establish justice? It may not have been specially foreshadowed in the original bill or the supplemental bill; but I submit that it is entirely germane to both those bills. Besides, it is commended by an intrinsic justice, which should make it acceptable at any time.

The amendment was decided to be out of order.

Mr. Sumner then offered this amendment:--

“_And be it further enacted_, That all the provisions of
this Act, and of the Acts to which this is supplementary,
shall be construed liberally, to the end that all the
intents thereof may be fully and perfectly carried out.”

There was no objection of order to this amendment, and it was
agreed to without a division.

After further amendment the bill was ingrafted upon a House
bill on the same subject and passed,--Yeas 32, Nays 6. Being
referred to a Conference Committee, the report of the Committee
was adopted: in the Senate, Yeas 31, Nays 6,--and in the House,
Yeas 111, Nays 23.

* * * * *

July 13th, on the report of the Conference Committee in the
Senate, Mr. Sumner said:--

And now, as we are about to dismiss this subject for the present session, I cannot forbear again expressing regret that the measure has not been made more complete,--in one word, more radical. This is the third bill of Reconstruction on which we have acted. We ought never to have acted on more than one; and had the Senate been sufficiently radical, had it founded its bill on clear, definite principle, there would have been no occasion for more than one. Just so far as we have failed to found ourselves on clear, definite principle, our bills have failed; and should there be failure under the present bill, it will be precisely on that account.