Chapter III: Section 1: That the right to vote, to be voted for, and to (2)

The pirate ship found refuge in an obscure harbor of Wales, known as Moelfra Bay, where she lay in British waters _from half-past seven o’clock, P. M., July 29th, to about three o’clock, A. M., July 31st_, being upward of thirty-one hours, and during this time she was supplied with men from the British steam-tug Hercules, which followed her from Liverpool. These thirty-one hours were allowed to elapse without any attempt to stop her. Here was another stage of “crass negligence.”

Thus was there negligence in allowing the building to proceed, negligence in allowing the escape from Liverpool, and negligence in allowing the final escape from the British coast.

Lord Russell, while trying to vindicate his Government, and repelling the complaints of the United States, more than once admitted that the escape of the Alabama was “a scandal and a reproach,”[60] which to my mind is very like a confession. Language could not be stronger. Surely such an act cannot be blameless. If damages are ever awarded to a friendly power for injuries received, it is difficult to see where they could be more strenuously claimed than in a case which the First Minister of the offending power did not hesitate to characterize so strongly.

The enlistment of the crew was not less obnoxious to censure than the building of the ship and her escape. It was a part of the transaction. The evidence is explicit. Not to occupy too much time, I refer only to the deposition of William Passmore, who swears that he was engaged with the express understanding that “the vessel was going out to the Government of the Confederate States of America,” “to fight for the Southern Government”; that he joined her at Laird’s yard at Birkenhead, near Liverpool, remaining there several weeks; that there were about thirty men on board, most of them old man-of-war’s men, among whom it was “well known that the vessel was going out as a privateer for the Confederate Government, to act against the United States, under a commission from Mr. Jefferson Davis.”[61] In a list of the crew, now before me, there is a large number said to be from the “Royal Naval Reserve.”[62] I might add to this testimony. The more the case is examined, the more clearly do we discern the character of the transaction.

The dedication of the ship to the Rebel service, from the very laying of the keel and the organization of her voyage, with England as her _naval base_, from which she drew munitions of war and men, made her departure as much _a hostile expedition_ as if she had sailed forth from her Majesty’s dock-yard. At a moment of profound peace between the United States and England there was a hostile expedition against the United States. It was in no just sense a commercial transaction, but an act of war.

The case is not yet complete. The Alabama, whose building was in defiance of law, international and municipal, whose escape was “a scandal and a reproach,” and whose enlistment of her crew was a fit sequel to the rest, after being supplied with an armament and with a Rebel commander, entered upon her career of piracy. Mark now a new stage of complicity. Constantly the pirate ship was within reach of British cruisers, and from time to time within the shelter of British ports. For five days, unmolested, she enjoyed the pleasant hospitality of Kingston, in Jamaica, obtaining freely the coal and other supplies so necessary to her vocation. But no British cruiser, no British magistrate ever arrested the offending ship, whose voyage was a continuing “scandal and reproach” to the British Government.

The excuse for this strange license is a curious technicality,--as if a technicality could avail in this case at any stage. Borrowing a phrase from that master of admiralty jurisprudence, Sir William Scott, it is said that the ship “deposited” her original sin at the conclusion of her voyage, so that afterward she was blameless. But the Alabama never concluded her voyage until she sank under the guns of the Kearsarge, because she never had a port of her own. She was no better than the Flying Dutchman, and so long as she sailed was liable for that original sin, which had impregnated every plank with an indelible dye. No British cruiser could allow her to proceed, no British port could give her shelter, without renewing the complicity of England.

The Alabama case begins with a fatal concession, by which the Rebels were enabled to build ships in England, and then to sail them, without being liable as pirates; it next shows itself in the building of the ship, in the armament, and in the escape, with so much of negligence on the part of the British Government as to constitute sufferance, if not connivance; and then, again, the case reappears in the welcome and hospitality accorded by British cruisers and by the magistrates of British ports to the pirate ship, when her evasion from British jurisdiction was well known. Thus at three different stages the British Government is compromised: first, in the concession of ocean belligerency, on which all depended; secondly, in the negligence which allowed the evasion of the ship, in order to enter upon the hostile expedition for which she was built, manned, armed, and equipped; and, thirdly, in the open complicity which, after this evasion, gave her welcome, hospitality, and supplies in British ports. Thus her depredations and burnings, making the ocean blaze, all proceeded from England, which by three different acts lighted the torch. To England must be traced, also, all the wide-spread consequences which ensued.

I take the case of the Alabama because it is the best known, and because the building, equipment, and escape of this ship were under circumstances most obnoxious to judgment; but it will not be forgotten that there were consort ships, built under the shelter of that fatal Proclamation, issued in such an eclipse of just principles, and, like the ships it unloosed, “rigged with curses dark.” One after another, ships were built; one after another, they escaped on their errand; and, one after another, they enjoyed the immunities of British ports. Audacity reached its height when iron-clad rams were built, and the perversity of the British Government became still more conspicuous by its long refusal to arrest these destructive engines of war, destined to be employed against the United States. This protracted hesitation, where the consequences were so menacing, is a part of the case.

It is plain that the ships which were built under the safeguard of this ill-omened Proclamation, which stole forth from the British shores and afterward enjoyed the immunities of British ports, were not only British in origin, but British in equipment, British in armament, and British in crews. They were British in every respect, except in their commanders, who were Rebel; and one of these, as his ship was sinking, owed his safety to a British yacht, symbolizing the omnipresent support of England. British sympathies were active in their behalf. The cheers of a British passenger-ship crossing the path of the Alabama encouraged the work of piracy; and the cheers of the House of Commons encouraged the builder of the Alabama, while he defended what he had done, and exclaimed, in taunt to him who is now an illustrious member of the British Cabinet, John Bright, that he “would rather be handed down to posterity as the builder of a dozen Alabamas” than be the author of the speeches of that gentleman “crying up” the institutions of the United States, which the builder of the Alabama, rising with his theme, denounced as “of no value whatever,” and as “reducing the very name of Liberty to an utter absurdity,”[63] while the cheers of the House of Commons echoed back his words. Thus from beginning to end, from the fatal Proclamation to the rejoicing of the accidental ship and the rejoicing of the House of Commons, was this hostile expedition protected and encouraged by England. The same spirit which dictated the swift concession of belligerency, with all its deadly incidents, ruled the hour, entering into and possessing every pirate ship.

There are two circumstances by which the whole case is aggravated. One is found in the date of the Proclamation which lifted the Rebels to an equality with the National Government, opening to them everything that was open to us, whether ship-yards, foundries, or manufactories, and giving to them a flag on the ocean coëqual with the flag of the Union. This extraordinary manifesto was signed on the very day of the arrival of our Minister in England,--so that, when, after an ocean voyage, he reached the British Government, to which he was accredited, he found this great and terrible indignity to his country already perpetrated, and the floodgates opened to infinite woes. The Minister had been announced; he was daily expected; the British Government knew of his coming;--but in hottest haste they did this thing.

The other aggravation is found in its flagrant, unnatural departure from that Antislavery rule which, by manifold declarations, legislative, political, and diplomatic, was the avowed creed of England. Often was this rule proclaimed, but, if we except the great Act of Emancipation, never more pointedly than in the famous circular of Lord Palmerston, while Minister of Foreign Affairs, announcing to all nations that England was pledged to the Universal Abolition of Slavery.[64] And now, when Slaveholders, in the very madness of barbarism, broke away from the National Government and attempted to found a new empire with Slavery as its declared corner-stone, Antislavery England, without a day’s delay, without even waiting the arrival of our Minister at the seat of Government, although known to be on his way, made haste to decree that this shameful and impossible pretension should enjoy equal rights with the National Government in her ship-yards, foundries, and manufactories, and equal rights on the ocean. Such was the decree. Rebel Slaveholders, occupied in a hideous attempt, were taken by the hand, and thus, with the official protection and the God-speed of Antislavery England, commenced their accursed work.

I close this part of the argument with the testimony of Mr. Bright, who, in a speech at Rochdale, among his neighbors, February 3, 1863, thus exhibits the criminal complicity of England:--

“I regret, more than I have words to express, this painful
fact, that, of all the countries in Europe, this country is the
only one which has men in it who are willing to take active
steps in favor of this intended Slave Government. We supply the
ships; we supply the arms, the munitions of war; _we give aid
and comfort to this foulest of all crimes. Englishmen only do
it._”[65]

In further illustration, and in support of Mr. Bright’s allegation, I refer again to the multitudinous blockade-runners from England. Without the manifesto of belligerency they could not have sailed. All this stealthy fleet, charged with hostility to the United States, was a part of the great offence. The blockade-runners were kindred to the pirate ships. They were of the same bad family, having their origin and home in England. From the beginning they went forth with their cargoes of death;--for the supplies which they furnished contributed to the work of death. When, after a long and painful siege, our conquering troops entered Vicksburg, they found Armstrong guns from England in position;[66] and so on every field where our patriot fellow-citizens breathed a last breath were English arms and munitions of war, all testifying against England. The dead spoke, also,--and the wounded still speak.

REPARATION FROM ENGLAND.

At last the Rebellion succumbed. British ships and British supplies had done their work, but they failed. And now the day of reckoning has come,--but with little apparent sense of what is due on the part of England. Without one soothing word for a friendly power deeply aggrieved, without a single regret for what Mr. Cobden, in the House of Commons, called “the cruel losses”[67] inflicted upon us, or for what Mr. Bright called “aid and comfort to the foulest of all crimes,”[68] or for what a generous voice from Oxford University denounced as a “flagrant and maddening wrong,”[69] England simply proposes to submit the question of liability for individual losses to an anomalous tribunal where chance plays its part. This is all. Nothing is admitted, even on this question; no rule for the future is established; while nothing is said of the indignity to the nation, nor of the damages to the nation. On an earlier occasion it was otherwise.

There is an unhappy incident in our relations with Great Britain, which attests how in other days individual losses were only a minor element in reparation for a wrong received by the nation. You all know from history how in time of profound peace, and only a few miles outside the Virginia Capes, the British frigate Leopard fired into the national frigate Chesapeake, pouring broadside upon broadside, killing three persons and wounding eighteen, some severely, and then, boarding her, carried off four others as British subjects. This was in the summer of 1807. The brilliant Mr. Canning, British Minister of Foreign Affairs, promptly volunteered overtures for an accommodation, by declaring his Majesty’s readiness to take the whole of the circumstances of the case into consideration, and “to make reparation for _any alleged injury to the sovereignty of the United States_, whenever it should be clearly shown that such injury has been actually sustained and that such reparation is really due.”[70] Here was a good beginning. There was to be reparation for an injury to the national sovereignty. After years of painful negotiation, the British Minister at Washington, under date of November 1, 1811, offered to the United States three propositions: first, the disavowal of the unauthorized act; secondly, the immediate restoration, so far as circumstances would permit, of the men forcibly taken from the Chesapeake; and, thirdly, a suitable pecuniary provision for the sufferers in consequence of the attack on the Chesapeake; concluding with these words:--

“These honorable propositions are made with the sincere desire
that they may prove satisfactory to the Government of the
United States, and I trust they will meet with that amicable
reception which their conciliatory nature entitles them to. I
need scarcely add how cordially I join with you in the wish
that they might prove introductory to a removal of all the
differences depending between our two countries.”[71]

I adduce this historic instance to illustrate partly the different forms of reparation. Here, of course, was reparation to individuals; but there was also reparation to the nation, whose sovereignty had been outraged.

There is another instance, which is not without authority. In 1837 an armed force from Upper Canada crossed the river just above the Falls of Niagara, and burned an American vessel, the Caroline, while moored to the shores of the United States. Mr. Webster, in his negotiation with Lord Ashburton, characterized this act as “of itself a wrong, and an offence to the sovereignty and the dignity of the United States, … for which, to this day, no atonement, or even apology, has been made by her Majesty’s Government,”[72]--all these words being strictly applicable to the present case. Lord Ashburton, in reply, after recapitulating some mitigating circumstances, and expressing a regret “that some explanation and apology for this occurrence was not immediately made,” proceeds to say:--

“Her Majesty’s Government earnestly desire that a reciprocal
respect for the independent jurisdiction and authority of
neighboring states may be considered among the first duties of
all Governments; and I have to repeat the assurance of regret
they feel that the event of which I am treating should have
disturbed the harmony they so anxiously wish to maintain with
the American people and Government.”[73]

Here again was reparation for a wrong done to the nation.

Looking at what is due to us on the present occasion, we are brought again to the conclusion that the satisfaction of individuals whose ships have been burnt or sunk is only a small part of what we may justly expect. As in the earlier cases where the national sovereignty was insulted, there should be an acknowledgment of wrong, or at least of liability, leaving to the commissioners the assessment of damages only. The blow inflicted by that fatal Proclamation which insulted our national sovereignty and struck at our unity as a nation, followed by broadside upon broadside, driving our commerce from the ocean, was kindred in character to those earlier blows; and when we consider that it was in aid of Slavery, it was a blow at Civilization itself. Besides degrading us and ruining our commerce, its direct and constant influence was to encourage the Rebellion, and to prolong the war waged by Slaveholders at such cost of treasure and blood. It was a terrible mistake, which I cannot doubt that good Englishmen must regret. And now, in the interest of peace, it is the duty of both sides to find a remedy, complete, just, and conciliatory, so that the deep sense of wrong and the detriment to the Republic may be forgotten in that proper satisfaction which a nation loving justice cannot hesitate to offer.

THE EXTENT OF OUR LOSSES.

_Individual losses_ may be estimated with reasonable accuracy. Ships burnt or sunk with their cargoes may be counted, and their value determined; but this leaves without recognition the vaster damage to commerce driven from the ocean, and that other damage, immense and infinite, caused by the prolongation of the war, all of which may be called _national_ in contradistinction to _individual_.

Our _national losses_ have been frankly conceded by eminent Englishmen. I have already quoted Mr. Cobden, who did not hesitate to call them “cruel losses.” During the same debate in which he let drop this testimony, he used other words, which show how justly he comprehended the case. “_You have been_,” said he, “_carrying on hostilities from these shores against the people of the United States_, and have been inflicting an amount of damage on that country greater than would be produced by many ordinary wars. It is estimated that the loss sustained by the capture and burning of American vessels has been about $15,000,000, or nearly £3,000,000 sterling. _But that is a small part of the injury which has been inflicted on the American marine._ We have rendered the rest of her vast mercantile property for the present valueless.”[74] Thus, by the testimony of Mr. Cobden, were those individual losses which are alone recognized by the pending treaty only “a small part of the injury inflicted.” After confessing his fears with regard to “the heaping up of a _gigantic material grievance_” such as was then accumulating, he adds, in memorable words:--

“You have already done your worst towards the American
mercantile marine. What with the high rate of insurance,
what with these captures, and what with the rapid transfer
of tonnage to British capitalists, you have virtually made
valueless that vast property. Why, if you had gone and helped
the Confederates by bombarding all the accessible seaport towns
of America, a few lives might have been lost, which, as it is,
have not been sacrificed; but you could hardly have done more
injury in the way of destroying property than you have done by
these few cruisers.”[75]

With that clearness of vision which he possessed in such rare degree, this statesman saw that England had “virtually made valueless a vast property,” as much as if this power had “bombarded all the accessible seaport towns of America.”

So strong and complete is this statement, that any further citation seems superfluous; but I cannot forbear adducing a pointed remark in the same debate, by that able gentleman, Mr. William E. Forster:--

“There could not,” said he, “be a stronger illustration of
the damage which had been done to the American trade by these
cruisers than the fact, that, so completely was the American
flag driven from the ocean, the Georgia, on her second cruise,
did not meet a single American vessel in six weeks, though she
saw no less than seventy vessels in a very few days.”[76]

This is most suggestive. So entirely was our commerce driven from the ocean, that for six weeks not an American vessel was seen!

Another Englishman, in an elaborate pamphlet, bears similar testimony. I refer to the pamphlet of Mr. Edge, published in London by Ridgway in 1863, and entitled “The Destruction of the American Carrying-Trade.” After setting forth at length the destruction of our commerce by British pirates, this writer thus foreshadows the damages:--

“Were we,” says he, “the sufferers, we should certainly
demand compensation for the loss of the property captured or
destroyed, for the interest of the capital invested in the
vessels and their cargoes, and, maybe, a fair compensation
in addition for all and any injury accruing to our business
interests from the depredations upon our shipping. _The
remuneration may reach a high figure in the present case; but
it would be a simple act of justice_, and might prevent an
incomparably greater loss in the future.”[77]

Here we have the damages assessed by an Englishman, who, while contemplating remuneration at a high figure, recognizes it as “a simple act of justice.”

Such is the candid and explicit testimony of Englishmen, pointing the way to the proper rule of damages. How to authenticate the extent of national loss with reasonable certainty is not without difficulty; but it cannot be doubted that such a loss occurred. It is folly to question it. The loss may be seen in various circumstances: as, in the rise of insurance on all American vessels; the fate of the carrying-trade, which was one of the great resources of our country; the diminution of our tonnage, with the corresponding increase of British tonnage; the falling off in our exports and imports, with due allowance for our abnormal currency and the diversion of war. These are some of the elements; and here again we have British testimony. Mr. W. E. Forster, in the speech already quoted, announces that “the carrying-trade of the United States was transferred to British merchants”;[78] and Mr. Cobden, with his characteristic mastery of details, shows, that, according to an official document laid on the table of Parliament, American shipping had been transferred to English capitalists as follows: in 1858, 33 vessels, 12,684 tons; 1859, 49 vessels, 21,308 tons; 1860, 41 vessels, 13,638 tons; 1861, 126 vessels, 71,673 tons; 1862, 135 vessels, 64,578 tons; and 1863, 348 vessels, 252,579 tons; and he adds, “I am told that this operation is now going on as fast as ever”; and this circumstance he declares to be “the _most serious aspect_ of the question of our relations with America.”[79] But this “most serious aspect” is left untouched by the pending treaty.

Our own official documents are in harmony with these English authorities. For instance, I have before me now the Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1868, with an appendix by Mr. Nimmo, on shipbuilding in our country. From this Report it appears that in the New England States, during the year 1855, the most prosperous year of American shipbuilding, 305 ships and barks and 173 schooners were built, with an aggregate tonnage of 326,429 tons, while during the last year only 58 ships and barks and 213 schooners were built, with an aggregate tonnage of 98,697 tons.[80] I add a further statement from the same Report:--

“During the ten years from 1852 to 1862 the aggregate tonnage
of American vessels entered at seaports of the United States
from foreign countries was 30,225,475 tons, and the aggregate
tonnage of foreign vessels entered was 14,699,192 tons, while
during the five years from 1863 to 1868 the aggregate tonnage
of American vessels entered was 9,299,877 tons, and the
aggregate tonnage of foreign vessels entered was 14,116,427
tons,--showing that American tonnage in our foreign trade
had fallen from two hundred and five to sixty-six per cent.
of foreign tonnage in the same trade. Stated in other terms,
during the decade from 1852 to 1862 sixty-seven per cent.
of the total tonnage entered from foreign countries was in
American vessels, and during the five years from 1863 to 1868
only thirty-nine per cent. of the aggregate tonnage entered
from foreign countries was in American vessels,--a relative
falling off of nearly one half.”[81]

It is not easy to say how much of this change, which has become chronic, may be referred to British pirates; but it cannot be doubted that they contributed largely to produce it. They began the influences under which this change has continued.

There is another document which bears directly upon the present question. I refer to the interesting Report of Mr. Morse, our consul at London, made during the last year, and published by the Secretary of State. After a minute inquiry, the Report shows that on the breaking out of the Rebellion in 1861 the entire tonnage of the United States, coasting and registered, was 5,539,813 tons, of which 2,642,628 tons were registered and employed in foreign trade, and that at the close of the Rebellion in 1865, notwithstanding an increase in coasting tonnage, our registered tonnage had fallen to 1,602,528 tons, being a loss during the four years of more than a million tons, amounting to about forty per cent. of our foreign commerce. During the same four years the total tonnage of the British empire rose from 5,895,369 tons to 7,322,604 tons, the increase being especially in the foreign trade. The Report proceeds to say that as to the cause of the decrease in America and the corresponding increase in the British empire “there can be no room for question or doubt.” Here is the precise testimony from one who at his official post in London watched this unprecedented drama, with the outstretched ocean as a theatre, and British pirates as the performers:--

“Conceding to the Rebels the belligerent rights of the sea,
when they had not a solitary war-ship afloat, in dock, or in
the process of construction, and when they had no power to
protect or dispose of prizes, made their sea-rovers, when
they appeared, the instruments of terror and destruction to
our commerce. From the appearance of the first corsair in
pursuit of their ships, American merchants had to pay not only
the marine, but the war risk also, on their ships. After the
burning of one or two ships with their neutral cargoes, the
ship-owner had to pay the war risk on the cargo his ship had
on freight, as well as on the ship. Even then, for safety, the
preference was, as a matter of course, always given to neutral
vessels, and American ships could rarely find employment on
these hard terms as long as there were good neutral ships in
the freight markets. Under such circumstances there was no
course left for our merchant ship-owners but to take such
profitless business as was occasionally offered them, let their
ships lie idle at their moorings or in dock with large expense
and deterioration constantly going on, to sell them outright
when they could do so without ruinous sacrifice, or put them
under foreign flags for protection.”[82]

Beyond the actual loss in the national tonnage, there was a further loss in the arrest of our natural increase in this branch of industry, which an intelligent statistician puts at five per cent. annually, making in 1866 a total loss on this account of 1,384,953 tons, which must be added to 1,229,035 tons actually lost.[83] The same statistician, after estimating the value of a ton at forty dollars gold, and making allowance for old and new ships, puts the sum-total of national loss on this account at $110,000,000. Of course this is only an item in our bill.

To these authorities I add that of the National Board of Trade, which, in a recent report on American Shipping, after setting forth the diminution of our sailing tonnage, says that it is nearly all to be traced to the war on the ocean; and the result is summed up in the words, that, “while the tonnage of the nation was rapidly disappearing _by the ravages of the Rebel cruisers_ and by sales abroad, in addition to the usual loss by the perils of the sea, there was no construction of new vessels going forward to counteract the decline even in part.”[84] Such is the various testimony, all tending to one conclusion.

This is what I have to say for the present on _national losses_ through the destruction of commerce. These are large enough; but there is another chapter, where they are larger far: I refer, of course, to the national losses caused by the prolongation of the war, and traceable directly to England. Pardon me, if I confess the regret with which I touch this prodigious item; for I know well the depth of feeling which it is calculated to stir. But I cannot hesitate. It belongs to the case. No candid person, who studies this eventful period, can doubt that the Rebellion was originally encouraged by hope of support from England,--that it was strengthened at once by the concession of belligerent rights on the ocean,--that it was fed to the end by British supplies,--that it was encouraged by every well-stored British ship that was able to defy our blockade,--that it was quickened into frantic life with every report from the British pirates, flaming anew with every burning ship; nor can it be doubted that without British intervention the Rebellion would have soon succumbed under the well-directed efforts of the National Government. Not weeks or months, but years, were added in this way to our war, so full of costly sacrifice. The subsidies which in other times England contributed to Continental wars were less effective than the aid and comfort which she contributed to the Rebellion. It cannot be said too often that the _naval base_ of the Rebellion was not in America, but in England. The blockade-runners and the pirate ships were all English. England was the fruitful parent, and these were the “hell-hounds,” pictured by Milton in his description of Sin, which, “when they list, would creep into her womb and kennel there.” Mr. Cobden boldly said in the House of Commons that England made war from her shores on the United States, with “an amount of damage to that country greater than would be produced by many ordinary wars.”[85] According to this testimony, the conduct of England was war; but it must not be forgotten that this war was carried on at our sole cost. The United States paid for a war waged by England upon the National Unity.

There was one form that this war assumed which was incessant, most vexatious, and costly, besides being in itself a positive alliance with the Rebellion. It was that of blockade-runners, openly equipped and supplied by England under the shelter of that baleful Proclamation. Constantly leaving English ports, they stole across the ocean, and then broke the blockade. These active agents of the Rebellion could be counteracted only by a network of vessels stretching along the coast, at great cost to the country. Here is another distinct item, the amount of which may be determined at the Navy Department.

The sacrifice of precious life is beyond human compensation; but there may be an approximate estimate of the national loss in treasure. Everybody can make the calculation. I content myself with calling attention to the elements which enter into it. Besides the blockade, there was the prolongation of the war. The Rebellion was suppressed at a cost of more than four thousand million dollars, a considerable portion of which has been already paid, leaving twenty-five hundred millions as a national debt to burden the people. If, through British intervention, the war was doubled in duration, or in any way extended, as cannot be doubted, then is England justly responsible for the additional expenditure to which our country was doomed; and whatever may be the final settlement of these great accounts, such must be the judgment in any chancery which consults the simple equity of the case.

This plain statement, without one word of exaggeration or aggravation, is enough to exhibit the magnitude of the national losses, whether from the destruction of our commerce, the prolongation of the war, or the expense of the blockade. They stand before us mountain-high, with a base broad as the Nation, and a mass stupendous as the Rebellion itself. It will be for a wise statesmanship to determine how this fearful accumulation, like Ossa upon Pelion, shall be removed out of sight, so that it shall no longer overshadow the two countries.

THE RULE OF DAMAGES.

Perhaps I ought to anticipate an objection from the other side, to the effect that these national losses, whether from the destruction of our commerce, the prolongation of the war, or the expense of the blockade, are indirect and remote, so as not to be a just ground of claim. This is expressed at the Common Law by the rule that “damages must be for the natural and proximate consequence of an act.”[86] To this excuse the answer is explicit. The damages suffered by the United States are twofold, individual and national, being in each case direct and proximate, although in the one case individuals suffered, and in the other case the nation. It is easy to see that there may be occasions, where, overtopping all individual damages, are damages suffered by the nation, so that reparation to individuals would be insufficient. Nor can the claim of the nation be questioned simply because it is large, or because the evidence with regard to it is different from that in the case of an individual. In each case the damage must be proved by the best possible evidence, and this is all that law or reason can require. In the case of the nation the evidence is historic; and this is enough. Impartial history will record the national losses from British intervention, and it is only reasonable that the evidence of these losses should not be excluded from judgment. Because the case is without precedent, because no nation ever before received such injury from a friendly power, this can be no reason why the question should not be considered on the evidence.

Even the rule of the Common Law furnishes no impediment; for our damages are the natural consequence of what was done. But the rule of the Roman Law, which is the rule of International Law, is broader than that of the Common Law. The measure of damages, according to the Digest, is, “Whatever may have been lost or might have been gained,”--_Quantum mihi abest, quantumque lucrari potui_;[87] and this same rule seems to prevail in the French Law, borrowed from the Roman Law.[88] This rule opens the door to ample reparation for all damages, whether individual or national.

There is another rule of the Common Law, in harmony with strict justice, which is applicable in the case. I find it in the law relating to _Nuisances_, which provides that there may be two distinct proceedings,--first, in behalf of individuals, and, secondly, in behalf of the community. Obviously, reparation to individuals does not supersede reparation to the community. The proceeding in the one case is by action at law, and in the other by indictment. The reason assigned by Blackstone for the latter is, “Because, the damage being common to all the king’s subjects, no one can assign his particular proportion of it.”[89] But this is the very case with regard to damages sustained by the nation.

A familiar authority furnishes an additional illustration, which is precisely in point:--

“No person, natural or corporate, can have an action for a
_public nuisance_, or punish it,--but only the king, in his
public capacity of supreme governor and _paterfamilias_ of the
kingdom. Yet this rule admits of one exception: where a private
person suffers some extraordinary damage beyond the rest of the
king’s subjects.”[90]

Applying this rule to the present case, the way is clear. Every British pirate was _a public nuisance_, involving the British Government, which must respond in damages, not only to the individuals who have suffered, but also to the National Government, acting as _paterfamilias_ for the common good of all the people.

Thus by an analogy of the Common Law in the case of a Public Nuisance, also by the strict rule of the Roman Law, which enters so largely into International Law, and even by the rule of the Common Law relating to Damages, all losses, whether individual or national, are the just subject of claim. It is not I who say this; it is the Law. The colossal sum-total may be seen not only in the losses of individuals, but in those national losses caused by the destruction of our commerce, the prolongation of the war, and the expense of the blockade, all of which may be charged directly to England:--

“illud ab uno
Corpore, et ex una pendebat origine bellum.”[91]

Three times is this liability fixed: first, by the concession of ocean belligerency, opening to the Rebels ship-yards, foundries, and manufactories, and giving to them a flag on the ocean; secondly, by the organization of hostile expeditions, which, by admissions in Parliament, were nothing less than piratical war on the United States with England as the naval base; and, thirdly, by welcome, hospitality, and supplies extended to these pirate ships in ports of the British empire. Show either of these, and the liability of England is complete; show the three, and this power is bound by a triple cord.