Chapter I: Front Matter (1)

Statesman Edition Vol. XVIII

Charles Sumner

HIS COMPLETE WORKS

With Introduction
BY
HON. GEORGE FRISBIE HOAR

BOSTON
LEE AND SHEPARD
MCM

COPYRIGHT, 1880 AND 1882,
BY
FRANCIS V. BALCH, EXECUTOR.

COPYRIGHT, 1900,
BY
LEE AND SHEPARD.

Statesman Edition.
LIMITED TO ONE THOUSAND COPIES.
OF WHICH THIS IS
No. 320

Norwood Press:
NORWOOD, MASS., U.S.A.

CONTENTS OF VOLUME XVIII.

PAGE

ADMISSION OF MISSISSIPPI TO REPRESENTATION IN CONGRESS. Speech
in the Senate, February 17, 1870 1

THE FIRST COLORED SENATOR. Speech in the Senate, on the
Admission of Hon. Hiram R. Revels, a Colored Person, as Senator
of Mississippi, February 25, 1870 6

CONSIDERATION OF TREATIES IN OPEN SENATE. Remarks in the
Senate, March 17, 1870 9

ELIGIBILITY TO THE SENATE: QUESTION OF INHABITANCY. Remarks
in the Senate, on the Admission of General Adelbert Ames as a
Senator of Mississippi, April 1, 1870 11

RATIFICATION OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT. Speech at a Serenade
before Mr. Sumner’s House in Washington, April 1, 1870 20

ADMISSION OF GEORGIA TO REPRESENTATION IN CONGRESS. Speech in
the Senate, April 5, 1870 23

INCOME TAX. Remarks in the Senate, April 7, 1870 40

MORE WORK TO BE DONE. Letter to the American Antislavery
Society at its Final Meeting, April 8, 1870 45

EDUCATION. Remarks in the Senate, May 9, 1870 47

NO EXCLUSION OF RETIRED ARMY OFFICERS FROM CIVIL OFFICE.
Remarks in the Senate, May 12, 1870 51

ARCTIC EXPEDITIONS. Remarks in the Senate, May 27, 1870 54

ONE CENT POSTAGE WITH ABOLITION OF FRANKING. Speech in the
Senate, June 10, 1870 57

CHINESE INDEMNITY FUND. Report in the Senate, of the Committee
on Foreign Relations, June 24, 1870 115

TAX ON BOOKS. Remarks in the Senate, June 30, 1870 141

NATURALIZATION LAWS: NO DISCRIMINATION ON ACCOUNT OF COLOR.
Remarks in the Senate, July 2 and 4, 1870 144

THE REPUBLICAN PARTY: ITS PAST AND FUTURE WORK. Speech at a
Ratification Meeting in Faneuil Hall, October 15, 1870 169

THE DUEL BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY, WITH ITS LESSON TO
CIVILIZATION. Lecture in the Music Hall, Boston, October
26, 1870 175

THE PATRIOT DEAD AT ARLINGTON. Speech in the Senate, on a
Joint Resolution to remove their Remains, December 13, 1870 254

NABOTH’S VINEYARD. Speech in the Senate on the Proposed
Annexion of San Domingo to the United States, December
21, 1870 257

NEW YEAR’S DAY. Article in the New York Independent, January
5, 1871 300

ITALIAN UNITY. Letter to a Public Meeting at the Academy of
Music in New York, January 10, 1871 307

RESPONSE TO A TOAST. Remarks at a Complimentary Dinner to
Colonel John W. Forney, at Washington, January 28, 1871 310

DUTY OF THE YOUNG COLORED LAWYER. Address at the Commencement
Exercises of the Law Department of Howard University at
Washington, February 3, 1871 314

CHARITY TO FRANCE OR GERMANY? Speech in the Senate, February
4, 1871 319

ADMISSION OF MISSISSIPPI TO REPRESENTATION IN CONGRESS.

SPEECH IN THE SENATE, FEBRUARY 17, 1870.

February 8, 1870, Mr. Trumbull, from the Committee on the
Judiciary, to whom had been referred a bill from the House for
the admission of Mississippi to representation in Congress,
with conditions the same as in the case of Virginia, reported
it back with an amendment striking out all these, and admitting
the State unconditionally.

In a speech, February 17th, in reference to the proposed
amendment, Mr. Sumner said:--

MR. PRESIDENT,--Throughout the long struggle anterior to the Rebellion, and then throughout the Rebellion itself, Slavery had two voices by which it was heard in this Chamber and in the country. The first was that by which its continued existence was vindicated, or, if you please, the right of Slavery; the other was that of State Rights. By these two voices was Slavery heard. Happily, the first is silenced; but the other is still sounding among us, crying out against those generous efforts by which Human Rights are assured.

I am not wrong in this statement. From the beginning it has been the same. How often in times past have we heard the cry of State Rights! At every proposition concerning Slavery, at the presentation of every petition against this tyrannical wrong, at every allusion to it, the cry was heard. And when the Rebellion broke forth, the same cry was raised against those great measures of self-defence by which Slavery, our real enemy, was assailed; and then at each stage of Reconstruction it was the same. Not a measure of Reconstruction which has not encountered this pretension of State Rights. It broke forth in the Virginia debate. It breaks forth on the present occasion. Again we hear the voice of Slavery.

This pretension, which is so constantly manifest, finds partisans naturally on the other side of the Chamber. It is easy for Senators who have upheld Slavery to uphold that interpretation of the Constitution which was the constant ally of Slavery; but it is incomprehensible how Senators fresh from the great battle with Slavery should continue in dalliance with the constant ally.

The argument for State Rights proceeds on a misapprehension. Nobody doubts the right of a State to local self-government, through which are supplied the opportunities of political education, and also of local administration adapted precisely to local wants. This is the peculiarity of our national system, wherein it differs especially from the centralized imperialism of France. But while recognizing the State as the agency for all matters properly local, it must not be allowed to interfere with those other matters, being rights and duties, which are not local, but universal.

Now, Sir, nothing can be clearer than that the Equal Rights of All must be placed under the safeguard of one uniform law which shall be the same in all parts of the nation,--the same in Charleston and New Orleans as in Boston and Chicago. It is absurd to suppose that the rights of the citizen can differ in different States. They must be the same in all the States; but this can be consummated only by the national authority. Therefore, on grounds of reason, I repel that pretension of State Rights which would take this just prerogative from the nation. Understand me, Sir, I do not seek to _centralize_, but to _nationalize_. The partisans of State Rights, in their efforts to decentralize, would _denationalize_. In the name of local self-government they would overthrow the nation.

If I am asked where I find these national powers, I answer, that they are in those two great title-deeds of the Republic, the Declaration of Independence and the National Constitution. Whether viewed apart or together, these two are one and the same; but the two reinforce each other. The Declaration of Independence finds proper machinery for its great purposes in the National Constitution, while the National Constitution is explained, invigorated, and elevated by the Declaration of Independence. By the National Constitution the nation is bound to assure a republican government to all the States, thus giving to Congress the plenary power to fix the definition of such a government; but by the Declaration of Independence the fundamental elements of this very definition are supplied in terms from which there can be no appeal. By this Declaration it is solemnly announced, first, that all men are equal in rights, and, secondly, that just government stands only on the consent of the governed. Other things may fail, but these cannot. Whenever Congress is called to maintain a republican government, it must be according to these universal, irreversible principles. The power to maintain necessarily implies all ancillary powers of prevention and precaution, so that republican government may be assured. All these powers are essentially national, and not local; they belong to the nation, and not to the State.

So long as Slavery existed, this definition was impossible. State Rights were set up against Human Rights; but with the death of Slavery, followed by the extinction of the Rebellion, this definition takes its just place in our national system. Therefore whatever tends to maintain a republican government and to place it beyond assault, whatever tends to maintain the great principles declared at our birth as a nation,--all this is constitutional. As well deny that the sun shines,--as well with puny arm attempt to drag the sun from the sky; still it shines. God be praised! the day has passed when State Rights can be exalted above Human Rights.

It is for Congress to determine, in its discretion, how republican government shall be maintained. Whatever it does in this regard, whether by general law, or by condition or limitation on States, is plainly constitutional beyond all question. All is in the discretion of Congress, which may select the “means” by which this great guaranty shall be performed. It is a guaranty by the express text of the Constitution, and it must be performed. In selecting the means, Congress cannot hesitate at any requirement calculated to secure the beneficent result. By condition-precedent, by condition-subsequent, by prohibitory legislation, by legislation acting directly on the States or the people, by each and all of these Congress may act, bearing in mind always the great definition supplied by our fathers, which must be maintained at all hazards.

It is vain to say that our fathers did not intend this great power and foresee its exercise. There it is in the Constitution, clear and commanding; and there is the great definition in the Declaration of Independence, clear and commanding. If our fathers did not fully appreciate their mighty act, neither did the barons at Runnymede, when they obtained Magna Charta, the perpetual landmark of English rights. The words of the poet are again fulfilled: “They builded better than they knew.” But they did build. They built this vast temple of Republican Liberty, and enjoined upon Congress its perpetual safeguard, “anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding”; and, Sir, by the oath which you have taken to support the Constitution, are you bound to watch and protect this vast temple.

The recent war has had its losses, terrible and afflicting. It has had its gains also. First among these gains is that interpretation of the Constitution which makes us a nation, and places the equal rights of all under the protection of the national power,--being nothing less than the fulfilment of the early promises of the Fathers. Too slowly has this been accomplished; but it is accomplished at last; and it is our duty to see that these promises are in no respect neglected, and that the Republic, One and Indivisible, dedicated to Human Rights, and an example to mankind, is upheld in every part of our wide-spread country.

The amendment striking out the conditions of admission was
rejected, and the bill passed in the form in which it came from
the House,--Yeas 50, Nays 11.

THE FIRST COLORED SENATOR.

SPEECH IN THE SENATE, ON THE ADMISSION OF HON. HIRAM R. REVELS, A COLORED PERSON, AS SENATOR OF MISSISSIPPI, FEBRUARY 25, 1870.

MR. PRESIDENT,--The time has passed for argument. Nothing more need be said. I doubt if anything more can be said in the way of argument.

For a long time it has been clear that colored persons must be Senators, and I have often so declared. This was only according to the irresistible logic of the situation, to say nothing of inherent right.

If I do not discuss the question, it is partly because it is now so plain, and partly because on other occasions I have considered it at length. There is not a point in the case which I have not argued long ago. Nearly a generation has intervened since I insisted at home, in Massachusetts, that all must be equal before the law, without any distinction of color.[1] Several years have intervened since here in this Chamber I insisted on the same truth, and at the same time showed how, at the adoption of the National Constitution, colored persons were citizens according to the terms of all the State Constitutions, except that of South Carolina, and perhaps Virginia and Georgia.[2] These arguments and authorities were not answered then. They cannot be answered. It is useless to interpose ancient pretensions. They are dead beyond resurrection. It is useless to interpose the Dred Scott decision. Born a putrid corpse, this decision became at once a stench in the nostrils and a scandal to the Court itself, which made haste to turn away from its offensive offspring. By the subsequent admission of a colored lawyer to practise at its bar this decision was buried out of sight, to be remembered only as a warning and a shame.[3]

The vote on this question will be an historic event, marking the triumph of a great cause. From this time there can be no backward step. After prolonged and hard-fought battle, beginning with the Republic, convulsing Congress, and breaking out in blood, the primal truths declared by our fathers are practically recognized. “All men are created equal,” says the great Declaration; and now a great act attests this verity. To-day we make the Declaration a reality. For a long time a word only, it now becomes a deed. For a long time a promise only, it now becomes a consummated achievement. The Declaration was only half established by Independence. The greater duty remained behind. In assuring the Equal Rights of All we complete the work.

No man acts for himself alone. What he does, whether for good or evil, is felt in widening circles, according to the measure of his influence. This is true of the Senate, whose influence is coextensive with the Republic, and reaches even beyond its enlarging confines. What the Senate does now will be followed by other bodies and associations. As the greater contains the less, so does the Senate contain all these everywhere throughout the land. In other places there may be a brief struggle, but the end is certain. Doors will open, exclusions will give way, intolerance will cease, and the great truth will be manifest in a thousand examples. Liberty and Equality were the two express promises of our fathers. Both are now assured. And this is the glory of the Republic, before whose mighty presence, radiant with justice, kings and nobles must disappear as the ghosts of night at the morning sun, while the people, with new-found power and majesty, take their place.

What we do to-day is not alone for ourselves, not alone for that African race now lifted up. It is for all everywhere who suffer from tyranny and wrong,--for all everywhere who bend beneath the yoke,--for all everywhere who feel the blight of unjust power; it is for all mankind; it is for God Himself, whose sublime Fatherhood we most truly confess when we recognize the Brotherhood of Man.

A motion by Mr. Stockton, of New Jersey, to refer the
credentials of Mr. Revels to the Committee on the Judiciary
was, after a debate of three days, defeated by a vote of 8 Yeas
to 48 Nays; and on motion of Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, Mr.
Revels was thereupon, by the corresponding vote of Yeas 48,
Nays 8, admitted to a seat.

CONSIDERATION OF TREATIES IN OPEN SENATE.

REMARKS IN THE SENATE, MARCH 17, 1870.

On a resolution submitted by Mr. Ferry, of Connecticut,
providing that “any treaty for the annexation to the United
States of the entire dominion of any foreign power shall be
considered and the question of its ratification decided in open
session of the Senate,” Mr. Sumner said:--

From the beginning I have always held that the Senate erred in the establishment of secrecy, particularly with reference to treaties. I think the first year that I had the honor of a seat in the Senate the question of a change of our rule in that regard was presented, and I voted in its favor. I have seen nothing from that day to this to change my judgment upon that particular point materially. I think that the rule of secrecy was a traditional policy which we derived from the diplomatic usages of the Old World. We came to it naturally, and it has continued with us down to this day. Now, personally, I incline to change it; but I have two suggestions to present, applicable to the pending question. The first is, whether it is advisable to change it while it is known that an important treaty is actually pending; whether the change, if such change should be adopted by the Senate, should not be applicable to the future rather than to any pending question. I merely present that, without undertaking to determine it. The other point is, whether a change so important, not to say so radical, whatever may be the judgment of individual Senators, like the Senator from Connecticut, or like myself, should not be referred to the committee having charge of such questions. I would therefore suggest that the proposition be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. That committee will meet next Tuesday, and I have no doubt will take it at once into consideration.

The resolution was referred accordingly, and, upon the report
of the Committee, was indefinitely postponed.

ELIGIBILITY TO THE SENATE: QUESTION OF INHABITANCY.

REMARKS IN THE SENATE, ON THE ADMISSION OF GENERAL ADELBERT AMES AS A SENATOR OF MISSISSIPPI, APRIL 1, 1870.

MR. PRESIDENT,--I hesitate to say a word in this debate. The question has been exhausted on both sides, and to me, I must be pardoned for saying, it is infinitely plain. It is plain in law; it is plain in fact. When I say it is plain in law, I believe all the Senate on both sides will concur,--for, indeed, the Senator from Ohio [Mr. THURMAN] stated the law precisely as I understand it.

We all know that in topography there are what are called water-sheds, sometimes high, sometimes low, and from these elevations flow in opposite directions the currents which there find their fountains. Sir, the water-shed of this debate is found in the intent; and this water-shed may be high or low. Suffice it that it is a water-shed; this is enough. Suffice it that the intent appears; and this is all that is required, in order to determine the character of the residence. Show me a citizen actually in a State, then the intent to remain fixes his inhabitancy.

The Senator from Illinois [Mr. TRUMBULL] substantially admitted this rule of law. I agree with him that there are but two things to be shown: first, what the old books call the _factum_, and, secondly, what the same old books call the _animus_. What is the _factum_? It is residence. What is the _animus_? It is intent to stay. Now in point of law you can add nothing to these. You may argue till doomsday, you may cite authorities without number, but you can add nothing to these two simple requirements, residence and intent.

MR. THURMAN. Will the Senator allow me to interrupt him?

MR. SUMNER. Certainly.

MR. THURMAN. As he has referred to my statement of the law,
I will say that I did state that those were the two things
necessary, residence and intention,--that you want to find
out what is residence that creates inhabitancy, and what is
intention that creates inhabitancy; and what I said was, and
I maintain yet, that a residence which is enforced is no
residence, and an intention that the party has no power to
execute so long as he remains in the Army is no intention at
all: an intention that the party has no power to execute has no
virtue whatever.

MR. SUMNER. Very well,--I will come to that. The Senator and myself agree that in point of law there are two things to be established, and only two,--residence and intent. The question that remains is one of evidence; it is not a question of law. If the Senator were on the bench, which he once adorned, he would be obliged to charge the jury in this way. The rule of law is positive. All that remains comes under the head of evidence. Now I say by law you must show those two things, residence and intent, and you cannot add to either a tittle.

On this occasion, the most important requirement is that of intent. This is the requirement that has been most argued. And here I go back to that original Latin phrase which dominates this case, and which is in itself an all-sufficient rule: I mean the _animus manendi_. Why is this phrase, so often repeated, handed down for successive centuries? Simply because, like maxims of law, or like proverbs, it contains in one short phrase a rule. You have there a chapter of jurisprudence, if you please, or a volume. It is the mind, or the intent to remain, which governs. This is all that the law says. The law does not go forward and require, as the Senator from Illinois has argued to-day, that there must be an act. You find no such requirement in the rule. The rule is explicit, precise; and here I challenge contradiction. It is simply the intent to remain, the _animus manendi_. Step beyond that and you are lost, if you undertake to state the law. There is no rule of law outside of this simple sum-total.

I come, then, to the point that we have before us, simply a question of intent. I might cite authorities here. I have some of them before me. I will read one. For instance, here is Vattel, quoted by Judge Story in his article on DOMICILE in the “Encyclopædia Americana,” which Senators familiar with this subject know is of authority:--

“Vattel seems to define it to be a fixed residence in any place
with an intention of always staying there.”[4]

On this Judge Story very properly remarks:--

“This is not quite accurate. It would be more correct to say
that that place is the home or domicile of a person in which
his habitation is fixed, without any present intention of
removing therefrom.”

Here are words completely applicable to the case now before us. The learned author then proceeds to say:--

“It is often a mere question of intention.”

And then adds:--

“The mere dwelling or residence in a place is not of itself
sufficient to make it the domicile of the party. He must be
there with the intention of remaining, _animo manendi_.”

Mark the old recurring phrase, with its light and limitation. Here again I say is the rule. You cannot go outside of it. If you go outside of it, you are lost. I am speaking of the rule of law. I know that there can be no addition to that, because, if you do undertake to add to it or to take from it, you must depart from the jurisprudence of every civilized country,--not only of our own country, not only of England, but of every civilized nation on the continent of Europe. In the jurisprudence of every one of those countries you will find this same distinct, precise, simple rule.

Now, Sir, allow me to say,--I say it with entire respect,--the confusion in this debate has arisen from confounding the rule of law with the evidence under that rule. The rule, I say, is precise, that there must be intent. But how shall the intent be proved? Sometimes in one way, sometimes in another; sometimes by long-continued residence,--by purchase of property,--by the establishment of a home,--by the establishment of a place of business,--by all those circumstances and incidents which show fixity of purpose. All this comes under the head of evidence. It does not touch the rule of law behind.

The Senator from Illinois says there must be an act. Allow me to say that words are sometimes acts, and especially if associated with important events. It is a familiar phrase of law that language enters into what we call the _res gestæ_; language is welded into the transaction and becomes a part of it. Words then become things; and when were words more things than when the commanding general in Mississippi distinctly declared his purpose to resign his commission in the Army of the United States and accept a nomination as Senator? Here was a declaration constituting part of the _res gestæ_, and in itself an act.

I am not speaking merely on theory. I have in my hand a case, which I think, when I read it, you will see is applicable: I refer to Metcalf’s Reports, volume three, page 200, the case of _Kilburn_ v. _Bennett_. In the statement of facts is the following passage:--

“For the purpose of showing with what intent the defendant
went to Tyngsborough on the 27th of April, he offered to prove
that about three weeks before that day he told S. Shattuck, in
whose house he then resided, that he should leave Groton before
the 1st of May, and remove with his family to Tyngsborough, to
reside at his brother’s, and make his house a home, until he
should go to Illinois. But the judge ruled that the evidence
was inadmissible, and rejected it.”

The case was carried before the full bench, when the ruling of the judge below was set aside, and the Court observed as follows:--

“The Court held that this, being the mere declaration of the
defendant, was not competent evidence in his favor, and it was
rejected. The general rule undoubtedly is, that a party cannot
give in evidence his own declarations in his favor, unless they
accompany some act, and are a part of the _res gestæ_. But it
appears to us that the declarations offered to be proved are
within the qualification of the rule. They were made in the
ordinary course of business, and in relation to the defendant’s
removal, and they were made to the owner of the house in which
he was at the time residing. This giving notice of his intended
removal is to be considered an act which he might prove in any
case in which it became material; and if so, all that he said
explanatory of his intention in relation to his removal seems
to us to be admissible in evidence.”

Now on the authority of this case it seems to me that the declaration of General Ames, accompanied by the acceptance of candidacy as a Senator, is clearly an act. But I do not argue that the Senate is now bound by any technical rule of this kind. It is enough if the Senate is satisfied with regard to his intent on the evidence adduced. No rule of limitation or exclusion can prevail. If the Senate believes that he had at the time the _animus manendi_, it must act accordingly.

Is the Senate, on the evidence before it,--without the application of any technical rule of evidence, without recognizing his declaration as part of the _res gestæ_,--is the Senate satisfied that at the time named he intended to reside in Mississippi? This is the whole case. On this question of fact each Senator will judge for himself, on the evidence before him. This evidence I will read in the Report of the Committee, being the language of General Ames in a written statement to them, as follows:--

“A number of persons in Mississippi visited this city to find
arguments by which I might be influenced to become a candidate.
I hesitated, because it would necessitate the abandonment
of my whole military life. Finally, for personal and public
reasons, I decided to become a candidate and leave the Army. My
intentions were publicly declared and sincere.”

On which the Committee remark:--

“The intentions thus declared were not only to become a
candidate for the Senate, but to remain and reside in
Mississippi.”[5]

Sir, what more can you ask? On the report of your own Committee you have explicit evidence of the intent of General Ames to reside in Mississippi; and where intent is enough, you need add nothing to it. There is no necessity for any act beyond this declaration, which, as I have already said, is in itself an act, as the Senator from Michigan [Mr. HOWARD] says, taken in connection with his personal presence on the spot,--and I would add, taken in connection with all the necessary implications from his position, and from his acceptance of the candidacy. This is not a case in a justice’s court, or even in a county court. This is the Senate of the United States; and we are considering the evidence with regard to the declarations of a gentleman already chosen by a State of this Union to take his seat among us. We cannot apply to these declarations any technical rule which possibly might be applied in an inferior tribunal. We are to look at the case in its essence, and, if satisfied of the intent, we cannot go further. The Senate does not sit in chains. It may act according to its conscience on the evidence, without any constraint, except from the rule of law requiring intent.

Much stress has been laid upon the fact that General Ames held a commission in the Army of the United States, and was actually the military commander and provisional governor of Mississippi. What then? Does this affect his position now? Is a soldier or officer in the Army, is the commander of an army, shut out from the same privileges that belong to you, Sir, and to me? Each of us may change his domicile as he pleases, and to-morrow or next week transfer his home to another State of the Union, and nobody can say, No. Has the soldier or the officer fewer rights than you and I have? I think not; and I am sure that both reason and authority sustain my conclusion. I have in my hands a volume of the California Reports,--the twenty-eighth volume. I call attention to the case of _The People_ v. _William Holden_, and I will not trouble you with anything more than one clause from the marginal note, as follows:--

“_Residence while in the service of the United States._--The
clause in the Constitution of this State, which declares that
‘no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence
by reason of his presence or absence while employed in the
service of the United States,’ does not prevent a person who
removes to a county while in the service of the United States
from acquiring a residence in that county while in the said
service, if it is his intention so to do.”

“If it is his intention so to do.” These words are strictly applicable to the case of General Ames. There was nothing in his service in Mississippi, nothing in his high military command, to prevent him from establishing an inhabitancy in that State, if it was his intention so to do.

Thus at every point are we brought back to the single rule of law and the evidence under it,--the rule being that there must be an intent to remain, and the evidence being open to the judgment of the tribunal before which the question is raised. Especially must this be the case with the Senate, which will look through all technicalities, all cobwebs, to find the truth. Nor can the Senate be so unjust to any class of citizens as to say that a military commander may not acquire inhabitancy in a State where he is fixed by military duties, provided he so intends. All the adverse presumptions from military residency will be overcome at once by the _animus manendi_, so soon as this is proved.

Do you remember, Sir, a pointed remark made by Lafayette in the French Chamber, shortly after Louis Philippe was crowned King? Astonishment was expressed that the great defender of Liberty should espouse the cause of a Bourbon and help him to the throne. Lafayette, with remarkable condensation of phrase, replied, that he was in favor of Louis Philippe, not _because_, but _notwithstanding_ he was a Bourbon,--“not _because_, but _notwithstanding_.” And in this famous saying of the great French-American you have terms strictly applicable to this case. General Ames, soldier, officer, military commander in Mississippi, became an inhabitant thereof, not _because_, but _notwithstanding_ he was soldier, officer, and military commander.

A resolution of the Committee on the Judiciary, declaring
General Ames “not eligible,” was on motion of Mr. Sumner
amended by striking out the word “not,”--Yeas 40, Nays 12,--and
thus amended was agreed to without a division.

RATIFICATION OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT.

SPEECH AT A SERENADE BEFORE MR. SUMNER’S HOUSE IN WASHINGTON, APRIL 1, 1870.

The occasion was the promulgation by the Secretary of State
of the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment to the
Constitution. A large number of citizens, after calling upon
the President and Vice-President, by whom they were addressed,
proceeded to the house of Mr. Sumner, who appeared with his
friend, Mr. James Wormley, and spoke as follows:--

FELLOW-CITIZENS,--I congratulate you upon the great result that has been accomplished. For years my hope and object have been to see the great promise of the Declaration of Independence changed into performance,--to see that that Declaration became a reality. [_Cheers._] This at last is nearly consummated. I do not say entirely consummated, for it is not.

It is my nature, fellow-citizens, to think more of what remains to be done than of what has been done,--to think more of our duties than of our triumphs; and only to-day I have heard from Philadelphia of a decision in a court of justice that a person of foreign birth could not be naturalized in this country because of color. This is in pursuance of one of those old statutes of the days of Slavery, before the word “white” was stricken from the laws. Repeatedly, from my seat in the Senate, I have made appeals for the expunging of that word from the laws. I have now a bill before the Judiciary Committee to strike this word from our naturalization laws. What the Committee will do remains to be seen. I need not say that I shall try to impress upon the Senate the importance of passing this bill. It remains also, that equal rights should be secured in all the public conveyances and on all the railroads in the United States, so that no one shall be excluded by reason of color.

It further remains that you here in Washington shall complete this equality of rights in your common schools. You all go together to vote, and any person may find a seat in the Senate of the United States; but the child is shut out of the common school on account of color. This discrimination must be abolished. All schools must be open to all, without distinction of color. In laboring for this, you will not only work for yourselves, but will set an example for all the land, and most especially for the South. Only in this way can your school system be extended for the equal good of all. And now, as you have at heart the education of your children, that they may grow up in that knowledge of equal rights so essential to their protection in the world, it is your bounden duty here in Washington to see that this is accomplished.

Your school system must be founded on Equal Rights, so that no one shall be excluded on account of color. In this way Human Rights will be best established. And I would remind you, although this has not been effected, the victories already gained are the assurance that all that should be done will be done.

You have progressed, step by step, until you have reached your present position; and now it only remains that you should continue to the end earnest, faithful, and determined; then will the work be completed.

Returning you my sincere thanks, and offering my felicitations on this occasion, I bid you good night.

ADMISSION OF GEORGIA TO REPRESENTATION IN CONGRESS.

SPEECH IN THE SENATE, APRIL 5, 1870.

Representatives from Georgia had been admitted to seats
in Congress in July, 1868, under the Act of June 25th of
that year; but the subsequent action of her Legislature in
expelling its colored members and filling their places with
whites, and the continued outrages upon loyalists, had the
effect of preventing the admission of her Senators, and
in the next Congress of excluding her from representation
altogether,--involving the necessity of measures for her
reconstruction and admission anew. The first of these was the
Act of December 22, 1869, providing, among other things, for
the reorganization of the State Legislature, by reinstating its
colored members in their seats and purging it of its disloyal
elements. To this succeeded a bill in the same terms with the
Acts for the admission of Virginia and Mississippi, which was
passed in the House with the following amendment, moved by Mr.
Bingham, of Ohio:--

“_Provided_, That nothing in this Act contained shall be
construed to vacate any of the offices now filled in the
State of Georgia, either by the election of the people or
by the appointment of the Governor thereof by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate of said State; neither
shall this Act be construed to extend the official term
of any officer of said State beyond the term limited by
the Constitution thereof, dating from the election or
appointment of such officer, nor to deprive the people of
Georgia of the right under their Constitution to elect
Senators and Representatives of the State of Georgia in
the year 1870; but said election shall be held in the year
1870, either on the day named in the Constitution of said
State or such other day as the present Legislature may
designate by law.”

In the Senate, after several days’ discussion of this proviso,
as in Committee of the Whole, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts,
moved a substitute of opposite character, as follows:--

“_Provided_, That, in consequence of the failure of the
General Assembly of Georgia to perfect a legal organization
for a period of over eighteen months, it be, and hereby
is, declared that the term of service of the said General
Assembly shall date from the 26th of January, 1870,
and shall continue until the persons to be chosen on
the Tuesday after the first Monday of November, 1872,
as members of the General Assembly of said State, are
qualified: _Provided_, That the last clause of the second
subdivision of the first section of the third article of
the Constitution of Georgia, in the following words, ‘The
General Assembly may by law change the time of election,
and the members shall hold until their successors are
elected and qualified,’ shall never be by any Legislature
exercised so as to extend the term of any office beyond the
regular period named in the said Constitution; and the said
General Assembly shall by joint resolution consent to this
fundamental condition before this Act shall take effect.”

April 5th, Mr. Sumner spoke on the pending question as
follows:--

MR. PRESIDENT,--Whatever its result, this debate will be ever memorable. For the first time the African has pleaded in this Chamber.[6] But the curious observer cannot fail to note that he was obliged to plead still for his long-oppressed race. The Senator from Mississippi sits among us, and speaks; but the battle is not yet won. Slavery still asserts her ancient predominance, finding strange voices. No longer is the claim made directly. Nothing is said of Slavery, but the old cause is defended under an _alias_. It is now State Rights which are invoked, or it may be alleged irregularities,--as if State Rights or any irregularities could prevail against the sovereign duty of Congress to see that Georgia is so organized that good people shall be protected in their rights. To this end all else must be tributary, while every pretext of State Rights and every allegation of irregularity are of less consequence than the breath with which they are urged.

It is sad that the Senator from Mississippi should be doomed to encounter this spirit. As he entered the Chamber, the evil genius should have departed; but it is not so. And strange to say, the voices by which it has spoken have been the voices of friends. But so it has been always. How often in other days have the opponents of Slavery been saddened by encountering the voices of friends! The argument of technicality is always at hand, as the well-seasoned weapon of the lawyer,--and this debate is no exception.

I had hoped that this question would be decided without debate, at least on our side,--in short, that all would appreciate the exigency, and unite harmoniously in applying the remedy. I am disappointed. But I shall say very little. Feeling as strongly as I do, and seeing the way as clearly as I do, I cannot be entirely silent.

The case is very simple. From unquestionable evidence it appears that Georgia, while still in transition from the old to the new, while still in process of Reconstruction, and before the work is completed, has lapsed into a condition of insecurity and uncertainty, so that, without the intervention of Congress, the people cannot be assured in the enjoyment of their rights.

This is the broad statement, which is confirmed by the present as well as the past. By an unparalleled audacity colored citizens were expelled from the Legislature simply on account of color, while the orgies of the Ku-Klux-Klan prevailed throughout the State. And now this same Ku-Klux-Klan continues its terrors, while former Rebels threaten to regain their pernicious power. The State is in peril. I do not use too strong language. All evidence is at fault, if it be not as I say. To allow these Rebels to prevail is to sacrifice Reconstruction, and to offer up the Unionists, white and black. It is to do a deed of shame and desertion. Are you ready for this degradation? Shall Congress descend to this vileness?

Again I use strong language; but only in this way can I picture the enormity which is now proposed. Among national obligations which cannot be declined or postponed, and which rest primarily on Congress, is the duty of protecting Reconstruction. _Show that Reconstruction is in peril, and you must act._ Now that it is in peril there can be no question. Concurring testimony from opposite quarters, public acts, and open menace, all attest the condition of Georgia. Others in this debate have entered into details. I give you the irresistible, unanswerable conclusion.

And here occurs the Bingham Amendment, which, however intended, is only an engine of Rebel power. This is its true character, and nothing else. Howsoever it may seem, it must be regarded in its consequences. We must look from the word to the thing. It is not enough to see how it reads; we must see how it works. According to its text, the present Legislature, whose natural existence has been changed by wrongful addition and wrongful subtraction proceeding directly from the old Rebellion, is terminated at a specified day in the coming autumn, and a new election is ordered, without taking into consideration the past or the future,--without considering that thus far it has sat as a provisional Legislature only, although chosen to sit under the State Constitution,--without considering how it has been despoiled of its legislative character and just rights by hostile influence, and how a new election will be a direct appeal to this same hostile influence, giving to it a letter of license and unloosing the Ku-Klux-Klan. The Bingham Amendment is in few words, but they are words of despair to the loyal men of Georgia, and words of cheer to the disloyal.

I have listened to the arguments in its favor. Do I mistake, when I say that they all resolve themselves into technicality? At one moment we have allegations of “irregularity,” and at another of “estoppel”; and such technicalities play their part, while the good people of Georgia are sacrificed. We are estopped, so it is said, by the Act of December 22, 1869, which, failing to provide for the re-performance of certain conditions-precedent, recognized the validity of the legislative acts by which they had been performed. Very well,--suppose the legislative acts are recognized as valid, what then? Because the ratification of the Constitutional Amendments is recognized, does it follow that Congress is thereby “estopped”--such is the word--in completing the work of Reconstruction? I cannot comprehend this reasoning. It would be of value in a county court, but it is out of place in the Senate of the United States, on a question of Reconstruction. To my mind, all this is a matter of supreme indifference. The powers of Congress are above any such incident, and nothing has occurred to impair them in any way. They exist now as at the beginning, awaiting the discretion of Congress.

Do you ask where these powers are found? Of course, in the two Constitutional Amendments already proclaimed,--being ample sources, if none others existed. Out of these Congress is authorized to do all that is needed to enforce Emancipation and to protect the rights of the citizen. This is plain, very plain.

But there are three other sources, each of which is overflowing. The first is from the necessity of the case, _ex necessitate rei_. This is one of the grounds on which Chief-Justice Marshall asserted the power of Congress over the Territories;[7] but it is equally applicable in the work of Reconstruction. From the necessity of the case this power must be in Congress, as without it Reconstruction could not be completed. You must renounce Reconstruction or recognize this power.

Then comes the “guaranty” clause, which is another bountiful, all-sufficient fountain. The United States are to guaranty a republican form of government to the States. But this guaranty can be executed only through Congress. This clause is at once old and new. It is old as the Constitution itself, but it is new in its practical exercise. And the reason is obvious. So long as Slavery prevailed, this mighty power slept; but it was the sleep of a giant. At last it has awaked, never again to sleep or slumber. From this time forward the duty of the nation to guaranty a republican government to all its parts will be constant and ever-present; and this duty is reinforced by all needful powers. The guaranty is continuing and perpetual, and it must be executed at all hazards. In its execution Congress must fix the definition of a republican government. How often have I said this!--but I shall not fail to repeat it so long as the occasion requires. To Congress belongs the duty of determining what is a republican government, and then it must see that such a government prevails in every State.

If in any State the existing government fails according to the just standard, or if it is in any way menaced, then must Congress interfere to execute the sleepless guaranty. And in this interference it may act according to its discretion, determining the occasion and the “means” to be employed. It may act by repression or by precaution, and it may select any “means” proper for the purpose. To say that it may not act by precaution as well as by repression is contrary to reason, and I may say to common sense. Whatever may be done by repression may be done by precaution also. Such is the experience of life in other things, and this obligation of guaranty is subject to the universal law. In the selection of “means” the whole field and the whole arsenal are at its command. Not an instrument, not a weapon, proper for the purpose, which it may not grasp. Here the language of Chief-Justice Marshall, so often quoted, harmonizes with the claim of power which I now make:--

“The Government which has a right to do an act, and has imposed
on it the duty of performing that act, must, according to the
dictates of reason, be allowed to select the means; and those
who contend that it may not select any appropriate means, that
one particular mode of effecting the object is excepted, take
upon themselves the burden of establishing that exception.”[8]

In our recent debates able Senators have denied everything. They will not concede the “means”; and they even ignore this great clause, which, as Cicero said of the ancient _Senatusconsultum_, has rested so long like a sword in its scabbard.[9] But there it is. Senators may ignore it; they may not see it; but there it is in the Constitution. In attempting to belittle this clause Senators only show how little they appreciate the lofty unity of the Republic. Other clauses are important in the machinery of government; but this guaranty makes the Republic one and indivisible, being One out of Many, and places the rights of all under the protecting power of the nation.

Before the extinction of Slavery, State Rights were successful against this guaranty. To invoke this tyrannical pretension was enough. How often was it heard on this floor! How completely did it dominate the Constitution itself! But the habit still continues, and we are still compelled to hear this same pretension, under which States _played the turtle_, drawing head, legs, and tail all within an impenetrable shell. With the overthrow of the Rebellion on the bloody field this pretension should have been abandoned and forgotten. A State is not a turtle, which can shut itself within its shell, and enjoy its own separate animal existence; but it is a component part of this great Republic, with which it is interlaced and interlocked so as to share with every other State a common life, subject to one and the same prevailing law. To insist that a State can play the turtle now, as in the days when Slavery ruled, is to dishonor the Constitution, and to abandon the crowning victory over the Rebellion.

Do you ask for the power in the Constitution to enter into a State and establish republican government? I give it to you in an immortal text. To question it is to show an ignorance of language which in this case is clear beyond criticism, and an ignorance also of the true genius of American institutions, where unity of rights is the Alpha and the Omega. The national motto, _E Pluribus Unum_, is another expression of that great unity by which the States are lost in the Nation. And this guaranty I now invoke for the protection of the good people of Georgia, and for the protection hereafter of Human Rights, when imperilled anywhere within the limits of the Republic.

But there are other and exceptional reasons why Georgia is still within the control of Congress. The process of Reconstruction in this State is not yet completed; so that the government there is simply provisional, and nothing else. This is only according to the Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867, where it is provided,--

“That, until the people of said Rebel States shall be BY LAW
admitted to representation in the Congress of the United
States, _any civil governments which may exist therein shall
be deemed provisional only_, and in all respects subject to
the paramount authority of the United States at any time to
abolish, modify, control, or supersede the same.”[10]

Nothing can be more explicit. Until the people of the Rebel States are “by law” admitted to representation, they are under the power of Congress. Everything done is inchoate, and nothing more. But Georgia is not yet “by law” admitted to representation, and we are now considering when and how such admission shall take place. Meanwhile, according to express language of the Act, the government is “provisional only.” Nor is this all; for the Act proceeds to declare further that this government is “in all respects subject to the paramount authority of the United States at any time to abolish, modify, control, or supersede the same.” Words cannot be stronger. “Abolish,” “modify,” “control,” “supersede.” To argue against their plain meaning is simply ridiculous. To insist that the existing government is beyond the reach of Congress, to be extended or abridged, to be recognized or superseded in its discretion, is preposterous. The power is reserved in terms almost excessive in fulness. Therefore do I say there can be no question of power on the present occasion. As well question that the sun shines or the river flows.

There being no question of power, there arises, then, the obligation of duty. Congress has the power to protect republican institutions in Georgia, and to protect the good people there; and it has the further power to superintend the work of Reconstruction to the end. All this it must do. It cannot abandon the appointed work. Of course it will ascertain the exact condition of things, and will then apply the remedy. No excuse of State Rights, no fine-spun technicality, no plea of irregularity, no argument of “estoppel” can be heard. All these are trivial and unworthy against the commanding duty. Georgia must be saved to herself and to the Union, and Congress must supply the means.

Several courses are open to Congress, and all equally within its powers; for all are derived from the same fountains.

1. Georgia may be remanded for an indefinite period to a condition like that of the Territories, subordinate in all respects to the jurisdiction of Congress, which may meanwhile mould it into loyalty and order.

2. Or the State may be subjected to a military government, until such time as it is fit in every respect for self-government.

3. Or the existing provisional government may be invested with the powers of the State, in such form and way and for such term as Congress in its discretion shall think best.