Chapter XI: THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS (continued.) (1)

THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL (_continued_).

PLATO.

II. THE PLATONIC DIALECTIC.

The Platonic Dialectic is the Science of Eternal and Immutable Principles, and the _method_ (organon) by which these first principles are brought forward into the clear light of consciousness. The student of Plato will have discovered that he makes no distinction between logic and metaphysics. These are closely united in the one science to which he gives the name of "_Dialectic_" and which was at once the science of the ideas and laws of the Reason, and of the mental process by which the knowledge of Real Being is attained, and a ground of absolute certainty is found. This science has, in modern times, been called _Primordial_ or _Transcendental Logic_.

We have seen that Plato taught that the human reason is originally in possession of fundamental and necessary ideas--the copies of the archetypal ideas which dwell in the eternal Reason; and that these ideas are the primordial laws of thought--that is, they are the laws under which we conceive of all objective things, and reason concerning all existence. These ideas, he held, are not derived from sensation, neither are they generalizations from experience, but they are inborn and connatural. And, further, he entertained the belief, more, however, as a reasonable hypothesis[554] than as a demonstrable truth, that these standard principles were acquired by the soul in a pre-existent state in which it stood face to face with ideas of eternal order, beauty, goodness, and truth.[555] "Journeying with the Deity," the soul contemplated justice, wisdom, science--not that science which is concerned with change, and which appears under a different manifestation in different objects, which we choose to call beings; but such science as is in that which alone is indeed _being_.[556] Ideas, therefore, belong to, and inhere in, that portion of the soul which is properly ousia--_essence_ or _being_; which had an existence anterior to time, and even now has no relation to time, because it is now in eternity--that is, in a sphere of being to which past, present, and future can have no relation.[557]

[Footnote 554: Within "the eikotôn mythôn idea--the category of probability."--"Phædo."]

[Footnote 555: "Phædo," § 50-56.]

[Footnote 556: "Phædrus," § 58.]

[Footnote 557: See note on p. 349.]

All knowledge of truth and reality is, therefore, according to Plato, a REMINISCENCE (anamnêsis)--a recovery of partially forgotten ideas which the soul possessed in another state of existence; and the _dialectic_ of Plato is simply the effort, by apt _interrogation_, to lead the mind to "_recollect_"[558] the truth which has been formerly perceived by it, and is even now in the memory though not in consciousness. An illustration of this method is attempted in the "_Meno_" where Plato introduces Socrates as making an experiment on the mind of an uneducated person. Socrates puts a series of questions to a slave of Meno, and at length elicits from the youth a right enunciation of a geometrical truth. Socrates then points triumphantly to this instance, and bids Meno observe that he had not taught the youth any thing, but simply interrogated him as to his opinions, whilst the youth had recalled the knowledge previously existing in his own mind.[559]

[Footnote 558: "To learn is to recover our own previous knowledge, and this is properly to _recollect._"--"Phædo" § 55.]

[Footnote 559: "Meno," § 16-20. "Now for a person to recover knowledge himself through himself, is not this to _recollect_."]

Now whilst we readily grant that the instance given in the "_Meno_" does not sustain the inference of Plato that "the boy" had learnt these geometrical truths "in eternity," and that they had simply been brought forward into the view of his consciousness by the "questioning" of Socrates, yet it certainly does prove that _there are ideas or principles in the human reason which are not derived from without--which are anterior to all experience, and for the development of which, experience furnishes the occasion, but is not the origin and source_. By a kind of lofty inspiration, he caught sight of that most important doctrine of modern philosophy, so clearly and logically presented by Kant, _that the Reason is the source of a pure_ à priori _knowledge_--a knowledge native to, and potentially in the mind, antecedent to all experience, and which is simply brought out into the field of consciousness by experience conditions. Around this greatest of all metaphysical truths Plato threw a gorgeous mythic dress, and presented it under the most picturesque imagery.[560] But, when divested of the rich coloring which the glowing imagination of Plato threw over it, it is but a vivid presentation of the cardinal truth that _there are ideas in the mind which have not been derived from without_, and which, therefore, the mind brought with it into the present sphere of being. The validity and value of this fundamental doctrine, even as presented by Plato, is unaffected by any speculations in which he may have indulged, as to the pre-existence of the soul. He simply regarded this doctrine of pre-existence as highly probable--a plausible explanation of the facts. That there are ideas, innate and connatural to the human mind, he clung to as the most vital, most precious, most certain of all truths; and to lead man to the recognitions of these ideas, to bring them within the field of consciousness, was, in his judgment, the great business of philosophy.

And this was the grand aim of his _Dialectic_--to elicit, to bring to light the truths which are already in the mind--"a maieusis" a kind of intellectual midwifery[561]--a delivering of the mind of the ideas with which it was pregnant.

[Footnote 560: As in the "Phædo," §§ 48-57; "Phædrus," §§ 52-64; "Republic," bk. x.]

[Footnote 561: "Theætetus," §§ 17-20.]

It is thus, at first sight, obvious that it was a higher and more comprehensive science than the art of deduction. For it was directed to the discovery and establishment of First Principles. Its sole object was the discovery of truth. His dialectic was an _analytical_ and _inductive method_. "In Dialectic Science," says _Alcinous_, "there is a dividing and a defining, and an analyzing, and, moreover, that which is inductive and syllogistic."[562] Even _Bacon_, who is usually styled "the Father of the Inductive method," and who, too often, speaks disparagingly of Plato, is constrained to admit that he followed the inductive method. "An induction such as will be of advantage for the invention and demonstration of Arts and Sciences must distinguish the essential nature of things (naturam) by proper rejections and exclusions, and then after as many of these negatives as are sufficient, by comprising, above all (super), the positives. Up to this time this had not been done, nor even attempted, _except by Plato alone, who, in order to attain his definitions and ideas, has used, to a certain extent, the method of Induction_."[563]

[Footnote 562: "Introduction to the Doctrines of Plato," vol. vi. p. 249. "The Platonic Method was the method of induction."--Cousin's "History of Philosophy," vol. i. p. 307.]

[Footnote 563: "Novum Organum," vol. i. p. 105.]

The process of investigation adopted by Plato thus corresponds with the inductive method of modern times, with this simple difference, that Bacon conducted science into the world of _matter_, whilst Plato directed it to the world of _mind_. The dialectic of Plato aimed at the discovery of the "laws of thought;" the modern inductive philosophy aims at the discovery of the "laws of nature." The latter concerns itself chiefly with the inquiry after the "causes" of material phenomena; the former concerned itself with the inquiry after the "first principles" of all knowledge and of all existence. Both processes are, therefore, carried on by _interrogation_. The analysis which seeks for a law of nature proceeds by the interrogation of nature. The analysis of Plato proceeds by the interrogation of mind, in order to discover the fundamental _ideas_ which lie at the basis of all cognition, which determine all our processes of thought, and which, in their final analysis, reveal the REAL BEING, which is the ground and explanation of all existence.

Now the fact that such an inquiry has originated in the human mind, and that it can not rest satisfied without some solution, is conclusive evidence that the mind has an instinctive belief, a proleptic anticipation, that such knowledge can be attained. There must unquestionably be some mental initiative which is the _motive_ and _guide_ to all philosophical inquiry. We must have some well-grounded conviction, some _à priori_ belief, some pre-cognition "ad intentionem ejus quod quæritur,"[564] which determines the direction of our thinking. The mind does not go to work aimlessly; it asks a specific question; it demands the "_whence_" and the "_why_" of that which is. Neither does it go to work unfurnished with any guiding principles. That which impels the mind to a determinate act of thinking is the possession of a _knowledge_ which is different from, and independent of, the process of thinking itself. "A rational anticipation is, then, the ground of the _prudens quæstio_--"the forethought query, which, in fact, is the prior half of the knowledge sought."[565] If the mind inquire after "laws," and "causes," and "reasons," and "grounds,"--the first principles of all knowledge and of all existence,--"it must have the _à priori_ ideas of "law," and "cause," and "reason," and "being _in se"_ which, though dimly revealed to the mind previous to the discipline of reflection, are yet unconsciously governing its spontaneous modes of thought. The whole process of induction has, then, some rational ground to proceed upon--some principles deeper than science, and more certain than demonstration, which reason contains within itself, and which induction "draws out" into clearer light.

[Footnote 564: Bacon.]

[Footnote 565: Coleridge, vol. ii. p. 413.]

Now this mental initiative of every process of induction is the intuitive and necessary conviction _that there must be a sufficient reason why every thing exists, and why it is as it is, and not otherwise_;[566] or in other words, if any thing begins to be, some thing else must be supposed[567] as the ground, and reason, and cause, and law of its existence. This "_law of sufficient_ (or _determinant) reason_"[568] is the fundamental principle of all metaphysical inquiry. It is contained, at least in a negative form, in that famous maxim of ancient philosophy, "_De nihilo nihil_"--"Adynaton ginestai ti ek mêdenos prouparxontos." "It is impossible for a real entity to be made or generated from nothing pre-existing;" or in other words, "nothing can be made or produced without an efficient cause."[569] This principle is also distinctly announced by Plato: "Whatever is generated, is necessarily generated from a certain aitian"--_ground, reason_, or _cause_; "for it is wholly impossible that any thing should be generated without a cause."[570]

[Footnote 566: "Phædo," § 103.]

[Footnote 567: _Suppono_, to place under as a support, to take as a ground.]

[Footnote 568: This generic principle, viewed under different relations, gives--

1st. _The principle of Substance_--every quality supposes a subject
or real being.

2d. _The principle of Causality_--every thing which begins to be
must have a cause.

3d. _The principle of Law_--every phenomenon must obey some uniform
law.

4th. _The principle of Final Cause_--every means supposes an end,
every existence has a purpose or reason why.

5th. _The principle of Unity_--all plurality supposes a unity as
its basis and ground.]

[Footnote 569: Cudworth's "Intellectual System," vol. ii. p. 161.]

[Footnote 570: "Timæus," ch. ix.]

The first business of Plato's dialectic is to demonstrate that the ground and reason of all existence can not be found in the mere objects of sense, nor in any opinions or judgments founded upon sensation. Principles are only so far "first principles" as they are permanent and unchangeable, depending on neither time, nor place, nor circumstances. But the objects of sense are in ceaseless flux and change; they are "_always becoming_;" they can not be said to have any "_real being_." They are not to-day what they were yesterday, and they will never again be what they are now; consequently all opinions founded on mere phenomena are equally fluctuating and uncertain. Setting out, therefore, from the assumption of the fallaciousness of "_opinion_" it examined the various hypotheses which had been bequeathed by previous schools of philosophy, or were now offered by contemporaneous speculators, and showed they were utterly inadequate to the solution of the problem. This scrutiny consisted in searching for the ground of "contradiction"[571] with regard to each opinion founded on sensation, and showing that opposite views were equally tenable. It inquired on what ground these opinions were maintained, and what consequences flowed therefrom, and it showed that the grounds upon which "opinion" was founded, and the conclusions which were drawn from it, were contradictory, and consequently untrue.[572] "They," the Dialecticians, "examined the opinions of men as if they were error; and bringing them together by a reasoning process to the same point, they placed them by the side of each other: and by so placing, they showed that _the opinions are at one and the same time contrary to themselves, about the same things, with reference to the same circumstances, and according to the same premises_."[573] And inasmuch as the same attribute can not, at the same time, be affirmed and denied of the same subject,[574] therefore a thing can not be at once "changeable" and "unchangeable," "movable" and "immovable," "generated" and "eternal."[575] The objects of sense, however generalized and classified, can only give the contingent, the relative, and the finite; therefore the permanent ground and sufficient reason of all phenomenal existence can not be found in opinions and judgments founded upon sensation.

[Footnote 571: "The Dialectitian is one who syllogistically infers the contradictions implied in popular opinions."--Aristotle, "Sophist," §§ 1, 2.]

[Footnote 572: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xiii.]

[Footnote 573: "Sophist," § 33; "Republic," bk. iv. ch. xii.]

[Footnote 574: See the "Phædo," § 119, and "Republic," bk. iv. ch. xiii., where the Law of Non-contradiction is announced.]

[Footnote 575 "Parmenides," § 3.]

The dialectic process thus consisted almost entirely of _refutation_,[576] or what both he and Aristotle denominated _elenchus_ (elenchos)--a process of reasoning by which the contradictory of a given proposition is inferred. "When refutation had done its utmost, and all the points of difficulty and objection had been fully brought out, the dialectic method had accomplished its purpose; and the affirmation which remained, after this discussion, might be regarded as setting forth the truth of the question under consideration;"[577] or in other words, _when a system of error is destroyed by refutation, the contradictory opposite principle, with its logical developments, must be accepted as an established truth_.

[Footnote 576: Confutation is the greatest and chiefest of purification.--"Sophist," § 34.]

[Footnote 577: Article "Plato," Encyclopædia Britannica.]

By the application of this method, Plato had not only exposed the insufficiency and self-contradiction of all results obtained by a mere _à posteriori_ generalization of the simple facts of experience, but he demonstrated, as a consequence, that we are in possession of some elements of knowledge which have not been derived from sensation; that there are, in all minds, certain notions, principles, or ideas, which have been furnished by a higher faculty than sense; and that these notions, principles, or ideas, transcend the limits of experience, and reveal the knowledge of _real being_--to ontôs on--_Being in se_.

To determine what these principles or ideas are, Plato now addresses himself to the _analysis of thought_. "It is the glory of Plato to have borne the light of analysis into the most obscure and inmost region; he searched out what, in this totality which forms consciousness, is the province of reason; what comes from it, and not from the imagination and the senses--from within, and not from without."[578] Now to analyze is to decompose, that is, to divide, and to define, in order to see better that which really is. The chief logical instruments of the dialectic method are, therefore, _Division_ and _Definition_. "The being able to _divide_ according to genera, and not to consider the same species as different, nor a different as the same,"[579] and "to see under one aspect, and bring together under one general idea, many things scattered in various places, that, by _defining_ each, a person may make it clear what the subject is," is, according to Plato, "dialectical."[580]

[Footnote 578: Cousin's "Lectures on the History of Philosophy," vol. i. p. 328.]

[Footnote 579: "Sophist," § 83.]

[Footnote 580: "Phædrus," §§ 109, 111.]

We have already seen that, in his first efforts at applying reflection to the concrete phenomena of consciousness, Plato had recognized two distinct classes of cognitions, marked by characteristics essentially opposite;--one of "_sensible_" objects having a definite outline, limit, and figure, and capable of being imaged and represented to the mind in a determinate form--the other of "_intelligible_" objects, which can not be outlined or represented in the memory or the imagination by any figures or images, and are, therefore, the objects of purely rational conception. He found, also, that we arrive at one class of cognitions "_mediately_" through images generated in the vital organism, or by some testimony, definition, or explication of others; whilst we arrive at the other class "_immediately_" by simple intuition, or rational apperception. The mind stands face to face with the object, and gazes directly upon it. The reality of that object is revealed in its own light, and we find it impossible to refuse our assent--that is, it is _self-evident_. One class consisted of _contingent_ ideas--that is, their objects are conceived as existing, with the possibility, without any contradiction, of conceiving of their non-existence; the other consisted of _necessary_ ideas--their objects are conceived as existing with the absolute impossibility of conceiving of their non-existence. Thus we can conceive of this book, this table, this earth, as not existing, but we can not conceive the non-existence of space. We can conceive of succession in time as not existing, but we can not, in thought, annihilate duration. We can imagine this or that particular thing not to have been, but we can not conceive of the extinction of Being in itself. He further observed, that one class of our cognitions are _conditional_ ideas; the existence of their objects is conceived only on the supposition of some antecedent existence, as for example, the idea of qualities, phenomena, events; whilst the other class of cognitions are _unconditional_ and _absolute_--we can conceive of their objects as existing independently and unconditionally--existing whether any thing else does or does not exist, as space, duration, the infinite, Being _in se_. And, finally, whilst some ideas appear in us as _particular_ and _individual_, determined and modified by our own personality and liberty, there are others which are, in the fullest sense, _universal_. They are not the creations of our own minds, and they can not be changed by our own volitions. They depend upon neither times, nor places, nor circumstances; they are common to all minds, in all times, and in all places. These ideas are the witnesses in our inmost being that there is something beyond us, and above us; and beyond and above all the contingent and fugitive phenomena around us. Beneath all changes there is a _permanent_ being. Beyond all finite and conditional existance there is something _unconditional_ and _absolute_. Having determined that there are truths which are independent of our own minds--truths which are not individual, but universal--truths which would be truths even if our minds did not perceive them, we are led onward to a _super-sensual_ and super-natural ground, on which they rest.

To reach this objective reality on which the ideas of reason repose, is the grand effort of Plato's dialectic. He seeks, by a rigid analysis, clearly to _separate_, and accurately to _define_ the _à priori_ conceptions of reason. And it was only when he had eliminated every element which is particular, contingent, and relative, and had defined the results in precise and accurate language, that he regarded the process as complete. The ideas which are self-evident, universal, and necessary, were then clearly disengaged, and raised to their pure and absolute form. "You call the man dialectical who requires a reason of the essence or being of each thing. As the dialectical man can define the essence of every thing, so can he of the good. He can _define_ the idea of the good, _separating_ it from all others--follow it through all windings, as in a battle, resolved to mark it, not according to opinion, but according to science."[581]

[Footnote 581: "Republic," bk. vii. ch. xiv.]

_Abstraction_ is thus the process, the instrument of the Platonic dialectic. It is important, however, that we should distinguish between the method of _comparative_ abstraction, as employed in physical inquiry, and that _immediate_ abstraction, which is the special instrument of philosophy. The former proceeds by comparison and generalization, the latter by simple separation. The one yields a contingent general principle as the result of the comparison of a number of individual cases, the other gives an universal and necessary principle by the analysis of a single concrete fact. As an illustration we may instance "the principle of causality." To enable us to affirm "that every event must have a cause," we do not need to compare and generalize a great number of events. "The principle which compels us to pronounce the judgment is already complete in the first as in the last event; it can change in regard to its object, it can not change in itself; it neither increases nor decreases with the greater or less number of applications."[582] In the presence of a single event, the universality and necessity of this principle of causality is recognized with just as much clearness and certainty as in the presence of a million events, however carefully generalized.

[Footnote 582: Cousin's "The True, the Beautiful, and the Good," pp. 57, 58.]

Abstraction, then, it will be seen, creates nothing; neither does it add any new element to the store of actual cognitions already possessed by all human minds. It simply brings forward into a clearer and more definite recognition, that which necessarily belongs to the mind as part of its latent furniture, and which, as a law of thought, has always unconsciously governed all its spontaneous movements. As a process of rational inquiry, it was needful to bring the mind into intelligible and conscious communion with the world of _Ideas_. These ideas are partially revealed in the sensible world, all things being formed, as Plato believed, according to ideas as models and exemplars, of which sensible objects are the copies. They are more fully manifested in the constitution of the human mind which, by virtue of its kindred nature with the original essence or being, must know them intuitively and immediately. And they are brought out fully by the dialectic process, which disengages them from all that is individual and phenomenal, and sets them forth in their pure and absolute form.

But whilst Plato has certainly exhibited the true method of investigation by which the ideas of reason are to be separated from all concrete phenomena and set clearly before the mind, he has not attempted a complete enumeration of the ideas of reason; indeed, such an enumeration is still the grand desideratum of philosophy. We can not fail, however, in the careful study of his writings, to recognize the grand Triad of Absolute Ideas--ideas which Cousin, after Plato, has so fully exhibited, viz., the _True_, the _Beautiful_, and the _Good_.

PLATONIC SCHEME OF IDEAS

I. _The idea of_ ABSOLUTE TRUTH or REALITY (to alêthes--to on)--the ground and efficient cause of all existence, and by participating in which all phenomenal existence has only so far a reality, sensible things being merely shadows and resemblances of ideas. This idea is developed in the human intelligence in its relation with the phenomenal world; as,

1. _The idea of_ SUBSTANCE (ousia)--the ground of all phenomena, "the being or essence of all things," the permanent reality.--"Timæeus," ch. ix. and xii.; "Republic," bk. vii. ch. xiv.; "Phædo,"§§ 63-67, 73.

2. _The idea of_ CAUSE (aitia)--the power or efficiency by which things that "become," or begin to be, are generated or produced.--"Timæus," ch. ix.; "Sophist," § 109; "Philebus," §§ 45, 46.

3. _The idea of_ IDENTITY (auto to ison)--that which "does not change," "is always the same, simple and uniform, incomposite and indissoluble,"--that which constitutes personality or self-hood.--"Phædo," §§ 61-75; "Timæus," ch. ix.; "Republic," bk. ii. ch. xix. and xx.

4. _The idea of_ UNITY (to en)--one _mind_ or intelligence pervading the universe, the comprehensive conscious _thought_ or _plan_ which binds all parts of the universe in one great whole (to pan)--the principle of _order_.--"Timæus," ch. xi. and xv.; "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xiii.; "Philebus," §§ 50-51.

5. _The idea of the_ INFINITE (to apeiron)--that which is unlimited and unconditioned, "has no parts, bounds, no beginning, nor middle, nor end."--"Parmenides," §§ 22, 23.

II. _The idea of_ ABSOLUTE BEAUTY (to kalon)--the formal cause of the universe, and by participation in which all created things have only so far a real beauty.--"Timæus," ch. xi, "Greater Hippias," §§ 17, 18; "Republic," bk. v. ch. 22.

This idea is developed in the human intelligence in its relation to the organic world; as,

1. _The Idea of_ PROPORTION or SYMMETRY (symmetria)--the
proper relation of parts to an organic whole resulting in a
harmony (cosmos), and which relation admits of mathematical
expression.--"Timæus," ch. lxix.; "Philebus," § 155
("Timæus," ch. xi. and xii., where the relation of numerical
proportions to material elements is expounded).

2. _The idea of_ DETERMINATE FORM (paradeigma
archetypos)--the eternal models or archetypes according to
which all things are framed, and which admit of geometrical
representation.--"Timæus," ch. ix.; "Phædo," §112 ("Timæus,"
ch. xxviii.-xxxi., where the relation of geometrical forms
to material elements is exhibited).

3. _The idea of_ RHYTHM (rythmos)--measured movement in time
and space, resulting in melody and grace.--"Republic," bk.
iii. ch. xi. and xii.; "Philebus," § 21.

4. _The idea of_ FITNESS or ADAPTATION
(chrêsimon)--effectiveness to some purpose or end.--"Greater
Hippias," § 35.

5. _The idea of_ PERFECTION (teleiotês)--that which is
complete, "a structure which is whole and finished--of whole
and perfect parts."--"Timæus," ch. xi., xii., and xliii.

III. _The idea of_ ABSOLUTE GOOD (to agathon)--the final _cause_ or _reason_ of all existence, the sun of the invisible world, that pours upon all things the revealing light of truth.

The first Good[583] (_summum bonum_) is God the highest, and Mind or Intelligence (nous), which renders man capable of knowing and resembling God. The second flows from the first, and are virtues of mind. They are good by a participation of the chief good, and constitute in man a likeness or _resemblance_ to God.--"Phædo," §§110-114; "Laws," bk. i. ch. vi., bk. iv. ch. viii.; "Theætetus," §§ 84, 85; "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xix., bk. vii. ch. iii., bk. x. ch. xii.[584]

[Footnote 583: "Let us declare, then, on what account the framing Artificer settled the formation of the universe. He was GOOD;" and being good, "he desired that all things should as much as possible resemble himself."--"Timæus," ch. x.]

[Footnote 584: "At the utmost bounds of the intellectual world is the _idea of the Good_, perceived with difficulty, but which, once seen, makes itself known as the cause of all that is beautiful and good; which in the visible world produces light, and the orb that gives it; and which in the invisible world directly produces Truth and Intelligence."--"Republic," bk. vii. ch. iii.]

This idea is developed in the human intelligence in its relation to the world of moral order; as,

1. _The idea of_ WISDOM or PRUDENCE (phronêsis)--thoughtfulness, rightness of intention, following the guidance of reason, the right direction of the energy or will.--"Republic," bk. iv. ch. vii., bk. vi. ch. ii.

2. _The idea of_ COURAGE or FORTITUDE (andria)--zeal, energy, firmness in the maintenance of honor and right, virtuous indignation against wrong.--"Republic," bk. iv. ch. viii.; "Laches;" "Meno," § 24.

3. _The idea of_ SELF-CONTROL or TEMPERANCE (sophrosynê)--sound-mindedness, moderation, dignity.--"Republic," bk. iv. ch. ix.; "Meno," § 24; "Phædo," § 35.

4. _The idea of_ JUSTICE (dikalosynê)--the harmony or perfect proportional action of all the powers of the soul.--"Republic," bk. i. ch. vi., bk. iv. ch. x.-xii., bk. vi. ch. ii. and xvi.; "Philebus," § 155; "Phædo," § 54; "Theætetus," §§ 84, 85.

Plato's idea of Justice comprehends--

(1) EQUITY (isotês)--the rendering to every man his due.--"Republic," bk. i. ch. vi.

(2.) VERACITY (alêpheia)--the utterance of what is true.--"Republic," bk. i. ch. v., bk. ii. ch. xx., bk. vi. ch. ii.

(3.) FAITHFULNESS (pistotês)--the strict performance of a trust.--"Republic," bk. i. ch. v., bk. vi. ch. ii.

(4.) USEFULNESS (ôpheltmon)--the answering of some valuable end.--"Republic," bk. ii. ch. xviii., bk. iv. ch. xviii.; "Meno," § 22.

(5.) BENEVOLENCE (eunoia)--seeking the well-being of others.--"Republic," bk. i. ch. xvii., bk. ii. ch. xviii.

(6.) HOLINESS (osiotês)--purity of mind, piety.--"Protagoras," §§ 52-54; "Phædo," § 32; "Theætetus," § 84.

The final effort of Plato's Dialectic was to ascend from these ideas of Absolute Truth, and Absolute Beauty, and Absolute Goodness to the _Absolute Being_, in whom they are all united, and from whom they all proceed. "He who possesses the true love of science is naturally carried in his aspirations to the _real Being_; and his love, so far from suffering itself to be retarded by the multitude of things whose reality is only apparent, knows no repose until it have arrived at union with the _essence_ of each object, by the part of the soul which is akin to the permanent and essential; so that this divine conjunction having produced intelligence and truth, the knowledge of _being_ is won."[585]

[Footnote 585: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. v.]

To the mind of Plato, there was in every thing, even the smallest and most insignificant of sensible objects, a _reality_ just in so far as it participates in some archetypal form or idea. These archetypal forms or ideas are the "_thoughts of God_"[586]--they are the plan according to which he framed the universe. "The Creator and Father of the universe looked to an _eternal model_.... Being thus generated, the universe is framed according to principles that can be comprehended by reason and reflection."[587] Plato, also, regarded all individual conceptions of the mind as hypothetical notions which have in them an _à priori_ element--an idea which is unchangeable, universal, and necessary. These unchangeable, universal, and necessary ideas are copies of the Divine Ideas, which are, for man, the primordial laws of all cognition, and all reasoning. They are possessed by the soul "in virtue of its kindred nature to that which is permanent, unchangeable, and eternal." He also believed that every archetypal form, and every _à priori_ idea, has its ground and root in a higher idea, which is _unhypothetical_ and _absolute_--an idea which needs no other supposition for its explanation, and which is, itself, needful to the explanation of all existence--even the idea of an _absolute_ and _perfect Being_, in whose mind the ideas of absolute truth, and beauty, and goodness inhere, and in whose eternity they can only be regarded as eternal.[588] Thus do the "ideas of reason" not only cast a bridge across the abyss that separates the sensible and the ideal world, but they also carry us beyond the limits of our personal consciousness, and discover to us a realm of real Being, which is the foundation, and cause, and explanation of the phenomenal world that appears around us and within us.

[Footnote 586: Alcinous, "Doctrines of Plato," p. 262.]

[Footnote 587: "Timæus," ch. ix.]

[Footnote 588: Maurice's "Ancient Philosophy," p. 149.]

This passage from psychology to ontology is not achieved _per saltum_, or effected by any arbitrary or unwarrantable assumption. There are principles revealed in the centre of our consciousness, whose regular development carry us beyond the limits of consciousness, and attain to the knowledge of actual being. The absolute principles of _causality_ and _substance_, of _intentionality_ and _unity_, unquestionably give us the absolute Being. Indeed the absolute truth _that every idea supposes a being in which it resides_, and which is but another form of the law or principle of substance, viz., _that every quality supposes a substance or being in which it inheres_, is adequate to carry us from Idea to Being. "There is not a single cognition which does not suggest to us the notion of existence, and there is not an unconditional and absolute truth which does not necessarily imply an absolute and unconditional Being."[589]

[Footnote 589: Cousin's "Elements of Psychology," p. 506.]

This, then, is the dialectic of Plato. Instead of losing himself amid the endless variety of particular phenomena, he would search for principles and laws, and from thence ascend to the great Legislator, the _First Principle of all Principles_. Instead of stopping at the relations of sensible objects to the general ideas with which they are commingled, he will pass to their _eternal Paradigms_--from the just thing to the idea of absolute justice, from the particular good to the absolute good, from beautiful things to the absolute beauty, and thence to the ultimate reality--_the absolute Being_. By the realization of the lower idea, embodied in the forms of the visible universe and in the necessary laws of thought, he sought to rise to the higher idea, in its pure and abstract form--the _Supreme Idea_, containing in itself all other ideas--the _One Intelligence_ which unites the universe in a harmonious whole. "The Dialectic faculty proceeds from hypothesis to an unhypothetical principle.... It uses hypotheses as steps, and starting-points, in order to proceed from thence to the _absolute_. The Intuitive Reason takes hold of the First Principle of the Universe, and avails itself of all the connections and relations of that principle. It ascends from idea to idea, until it has reached the Supreme Idea"--the _Absolute Good_--that is, _God_.[590]

[Footnote 590: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xx. and xxi.]

We are thus brought, in the course of our examination of the Platonic method, to the _results_ obtained by this method--or, in other words, to

III. THE PLATONIC ONTOLOGY.

The grand object of all philosophic inquiry in ancient Greece was to attain to the knowledge of real Being--that Being which is permanent, unchangeable, and eternal. It had proceeded on the intuitive conviction, that beneath all the endless diversity of the universe there must be a principle of _unity_--below all fleeting appearances there must be a permanent _substance_--beyond all this everlasting flow and change, this beginning and end of finite existence, there must be an eternal Being, which is the _cause_, and which contains, in itself, the _reason_ of the order, and harmony, and beauty, and excellency which pervades the universe. And it had perpetually asked what is this permanent, unchangeable, and eternal substance or being?

Plato had assiduously labored at the solution of this problem. The object of his dialectic was "to lead upward the soul to the knowledge of real being,"[591] and the conclusions to which he attained may be summed up as follows:

1st. _Beneath all_ SENSIBLE _phenomena there is an unchangeable subject-matter, the mysterious substratum of the world of sense, which he calls the receptacle (ipodochê) the nurse (tithênê) of all that is produced_.[592]

It is this "substratum or physical groundwork" which gives a reality and definiteness to the evanescent phantoms of sense, for, in their ceaseless change, _they_ can not justify any title whatever. It alone can be styled "_this_" or "_that_" (tode or touto); they rise no higher than "_of such kind_" or "_of what kind or quality" (toiouton or opoionoun ti).[593] It is not earth, or air, or fire, or water, but "an invisible _species_ and formless universal receiver, which, in the most obscure way, receives the immanence of the intelligible."[594] And in relation to the other two principles (_i.e._, ideas and objects of sense), "it is _the mother_" to the father and the offspring.[595] But perhaps the most remarkable passage is that in which he seems to identify it with _pure space_, which, "itself imperishable, furnishes a _seat_ (edran) to all that is produced, not apprehensible by direct perception, but caught by a certain spurious reasoning, scarcely admissible, but which we see as in a dream; gaining it by that judgment which pronounces it necessary that all which is, be _somewhere_, and occupy a _certain space_."[596] This, it will be seen, approaches the Cartesian doctrine, which resolves matter into _simple extension.[597]

[Footnote 591: "Republic," bk. vii. ch. xii. and xiii.]

[Footnote 592: "Timæus," ch. xxii.]

[Footnote 593: "Timæus," ch. xxiii.]

[Footnote 594: Ibid., ch. xxiv.]

[Footnote 595: Ibid., ch. xxiv.]

[Footnote 596: Ibid., ch. xxvi.]

[Footnote 597: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. 171.]

It should, however, be distinctly noted that Plato does not use the word ylê--matter. This term is first employed by Aristotle to express "the substance which is the subject of all changes."[598] The subject or substratum of which Plato speaks, would seem to be rather a logical than a material entity. It is the _condition or supposition_ necessary for the production of a world of phenomena. It is thus the _transition-element_ between the real and the apparent, the eternal and the contingent; and, lying thus on the border of both territories, we must not be surprised that it can hardly be characterized by any definite attribute.[599] Still, this unknown recipient of forms or ideas has a _reality_; it has "an abiding nature," "a constancy of existence;" and we are forbidden to call it by any name denoting quality, but permitted to style it "_this_" and "_that_" (tode kai touto).[600] Beneath the perpetual changes of sensible phenomena there is, then, an unchangeable subject, which yet is neither the Deity, nor ideas, nor the soul of man, which exists as the means and occasion of the manifestation of Divine Intelligence in the organization of the world.[601]

[Footnote 598: "Metaphysics," bk. vii. ch. i.]

[Footnote 599: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. 178.]

[Footnote 600: "Timæus," ch. xxiii.]

[Footnote 601: Ibid., ch. xiiii]

There has been much discussion as to whether Plato held that this "_Receptacle_" and "_Nurse_" of forms and ideas was eternal, or generated in time. Perhaps no one has more carefully studied the writings of Plato than William Archer Butler, and his conclusions in regard to this subject are presented in the following words: "As, on the one hand, he maintained a strict system of dualism, and avoided, without a single deviation, that seduction of pantheism to which so many abstract speculators of his own school have fallen victims; so, on the other hand, it appears to me that he did not scruple to place this principle, the opposite of the Divine intelligence, in a sphere independent of temporal origination.... But we can scarcely enter into his views, unless we ascertain his notions of the nature of _Time_ itself. This was considered to have been created with the rest of the sensible world, to finish with it, if it ever finished--to be altogether related to this phenomenal scene.[602] 'The generating Father determined to create a moving image of eternity (aiônos); and in disposing the heavens, he framed of this eternity, reposing in its own unchangeable unity, an eternal _image_, moving according to numerical succession, which he called _Time_. With the world arose days, nights, months, years, which all had no previous existence. The past and future are but forms of time, which we most erroneously transfer to the eternal substance (aidion ousian); we say it was, and is, and will be, whereas we can only fitly say _it is_. Past and future are appropriate to the successive nature of generated beings, for they bespeak motion; but the Being eternally and immovably the same is subject neither to youth nor age, nor to any accident of time; it neither was, nor hath been, nor will be, which are the attributes of fleeting sense--the circumstances of time, imitating eternity in the shape of number and motion. Nor can any thing be more inaccurate than to apply the term _real being_ to past, or present, or future, or even to non-existence. Of this, however, we can not now speak fully. _Time_, then, was formed with the heavens, that, together created, they may together end, _if indeed an end be in the purpose of the Creator_; and it is designed as closely as possible to resemble the eternal nature, its exemplar. The model exists through all eternity; the world has been, is, and will be through all _time_.'[603] In this ineffable eternity Plato places the Supreme Being, and the archetypal ideas of which the sensible world of time partakes. Whether he also includes under the same mode of existence the _subject-matter_ of the sensible world, it is not easy to pronounce; and it appears to me evident that he did not himself undertake to speak with assurance on this obscure problem."[604] The creation of matter "out of nothing" is an idea which, in all probability, did not occur to the mind of Plato. But that he regarded it as, in some sense, a _dependent_ existence--as existing, like time, by "the purpose or will of the Creator"--perhaps as an eternal "generation" from the "eternal substance," is also highly probable; for in the last analysis he evidently desires to embrace all things in some ultimate _unity_--a tendency which it seems impossible for human reason to avoid.

[Footnote 602: See _ante_, note 4, p. 349.]

[Footnote 603: "Timæus," ch. xiv.]

[Footnote 604: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. 171-175.]

2d. _Beneath all mental phenomena there is a permanent subject or substratum which he designates_ THE IDENTICAL (to auto)--_the rational element of the soul--"the principle of self-activity" or self-determination_.[605]

There are three principles into which Plato analyzes the soul--the principle of the _Identical_, the _Diverse_, and the _Intermediate Essence_.[606] The first is indivisible and eternal, always existing in _sameness_, the very substance of _Intelligence_ itself, and of the same nature with the Divine.[607] The second is divisible and corporeal, answering to our notion of the passive _sensibilities_, and placing the soul in relation with the visible world. The third is an intermediate essence, partaking of the natures of both, and constituting a medium between the eternal and the mutable--the conscious _energy_ of the soul developed in the contingent world of time. Thus the soul is, on one side, linked to the unchangeable and the eternal, being formed of that ineffable element which constitutes the _real_ or _immutable Being_, and on the other side, linked to the sensible and the contingent, being formed of that element which is purely _relative_ and _contingent_. This last element of the soul is regarded by Plato as "mortal" and "corruptible," the former element as "immortal" and "indestructible," having its foundations laid in eternity.

[Footnote 605: "Laws," bk. x. ch. vi. and vii.; "Phædrus," § 51; "archê kinêseôs."]

[Footnote 606: "Timæus," ch. xii.; tauton, thateron, and ousia or to symmisgomenon.]

[Footnote 607: "Laws," bk. v. ch. i.]

This doctrine of the eternity of the free and rational element of the soul must, of course, appear strange and even repulsive to those who are unacquainted with the Platonic notion of eternity as a fixed state out of time, which has no past, present, or future, and is simply that which "always _is_"--an everlasting _now_. The soul, in its elements of rationality and freedom, has existed anterior to time, because it now exists in eternity.[608] In its actual manifestations and personal history it is to be contemplated as a "generated being," having a commencement in time.

Now, that the human soul, like the uncreated Deity, has always had a distinct, conscious, personal, independent being, does not appear to be the doctrine of Plato. He teaches, most distinctly, that the "divine," the immortal part, was created, or rather "generated," in eternity. "The Deity himself _formed the divine_, and he delivered over to his celestial offspring [the subordinate and generated gods] the task of _forming the mortal_. These subordinate deities, copying the example of their parent, and receiving from his hands the _immortal principle_ of the human soul, fashioned subsequently to this the mortal body, which they consigned to the soul as a vehicle, and in which they placed another kind of soul, mortal, the seat of violent and fatal affections."[609] He also regarded the soul as having a derived and dependent existence. He draws a marked distinction between the divine and human forms of the "self-moving principle," and makes its continuance dependent upon the will and wisdom of the Almighty Disposer and Parent, of whom it is "the first-born offspring."[610]

[Footnote 608: See _ante_, note 4, p. 349, as to the Platonic notions of "Time" and "Eternity."]

[Footnote 609: "Timaeus," ch. xliv.]

[Footnote 610: See the elaborate exposition in "Laws," bk. x. ch. xii. and xiii.]

That portion of the soul which Plato regarded as "immortal" and "to be entitled divine," is thus the "_offspring of God_"--a ray of the Divinity "generated" by, or emanating from, the Deity. He seems to have conceived it as co-eternal with its ideal objects, in some mysterious ultimate _unity_. "The true foundation of the Platonic theory of the constitution of the soul is this fundamental principle of his philosophy--the _oneness of truth and knowledge_.[611] This led him naturally to derive the _rational_ element of the soul (that element that _knows_), that possesses the power of noêsis from the _real_ element in things (the element that _is_)--the nooumenon; and in the original, the final, and, though imperfectly, the present state of that rational element, he, doubtless, conceived it united with its object in an eternal conjunction, or even identity. But though intelligence and its correlative intelligibles were and are thus combined, the soul is _more_ than pure intelligence; it possesses an element of personality and consciousness distinct to each individual, of which we have no reason to suppose, from any thing his writings contain, Plato ever meant to deprive it."[612] On the contrary, he not only regarded it as having now, under temporal conditions, a distinct personal existence, but he also claimed for it a conscious, personal existence after death. He is most earnest, and unequivocal, and consistent in his assertion of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. The arguments which human reason can supply are exhibited with peculiar force and beauty in the "Phædo," the "Phædrus," and the tenth book of the "Republic." The most important of these arguments may be presented in a few words.

[Footnote 611: See Grant's "Aristotle," vol. i. pp. 150, 151.]

[Footnote 612: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. 209, note.]

1. _The soul is immortal, because it is incorporeal_. There are two kinds of existences, one compounded, the other simple; the former subject to change, the latter unchangeable; one perceptible to sense, the other comprehended by mind alone. The one is visible, the other is invisible. When the soul employs the bodily senses, it wanders and is confused; but when it abstracts itself from the body, it attains to knowledge which is stable, unchangeable, and immortal. The soul, therefore, being uncompounded, incorporeal, invisible, must be indissoluble--that is to say, immortal.[613]

[Footnote 613: "Phædo," §§ 61-75.]

2. _The soul is immortal, because it has an independent power of self-motion_--that is, it has self-activity and self-determination. No arrangement of matter, no configuration of body, can be conceived as the originator of free and voluntary movement.

Now that which can not move itself, but derives its motion from something else, may cease to move, and perish. "But that which is self-moved, never ceases to be active, and is also the cause of motion to all other things that are moved." And "whatever is continually active is immortal." This "self-activity is," says Plato, "the very essence and true notion of the soul."[614] Being thus essentially _causative_, it therefore partakes of the nature of a "principle," and it is the nature of a principle to exclude its _contrary_. That which is essentially self-active can never cease to be active; that which is the cause of motion and of change, can not be extinguished by the change called death.[615]

3. _The soul is immortal, because it possesses universal, necessary, and absolute ideas_, which transcend all material conditions, and bespeak an origin immeasurably above the body. No modifications of matter, however refined, however elaborated, can give the Absolute, the Necessary, the Eternal. But the soul has the ideas of absolute beauty, goodness, perfection, identity, and duration, and it possesses these ideas in virtue of its having a nature which is one, simple, identical, and in some sense, eternal.[616] If the soul can conceive an immortality, it can not be less than immortal. If, by its very nature, "it has hopes that will not be bounded by the grave, and desires and longings that grasp eternity," its nature and its destiny must correspond.

In the concluding sections of the "Phædo" he urges the doctrine with earnestness and feeling as the grand motive to a virtuous life, for "the reward is noble and the hope is great."[617] And in the "Laws" he insists upon the doctrine of a future state, in which men are to be rewarded or punished as the most conclusive evidence that we are under the moral government of God.[618]

[Footnote 614: "Phædrus," §§ 51-53.]

[Footnote 615: "Phædo," §§ 112-128.]

[Footnote 616: Ibid., §§ 48-57, 110-115.]

[Footnote 617: Ibid., §§ 129-145.]

[Footnote 618: The doctrine of Metempsychosis, or transmigration of souls, can scarcely be regarded as part of the philosophic system of Plato. He seems to have accepted it as a venerable tradition, coming within the range of probability, rather than as a philosophic truth, and it is always presented by him in a highly mythical dress. Now of these mythical representations he remarks in the "Phædo" (§ 145) that "no man in his senses would dream of insisting _that they correspond to the reality_, but that, the soul having been shown to be immortal, this, or something like this, is true of individual souls or their habitations." If, as in the opinions of the ablest critics, "the Laws" is to be placed amongst the last and maturest of Plato's writings, the evidence is conclusive that whatever may have been his earlier opinions, he did not entertain the doctrine of "Metempsychosis" in his riper years. But when, on the one hand, the soul shall remain having an intercourse with divine virtue, it becomes divine pre-eminently; and pre-eminently, after having been conveyed to a _place_ entirely holy, it is changed for the better; but when it acts in a contrary manner, it has, under contrary circumstances, placed its existence in some _unholy spot_.

_This is the judgment of the gods, who hold Olympus._

"O thou young man," [know] "that the person who has become more wicked, _departs to the more wicked souls;_ but he who has become better, to the better both in life and in all deaths, to do and suffer what is fitting for the like."--"Laws," bk. x. ch. xii. and xiii.]

4. _Beyond all finite existences and secondary causes, all laws, ideas, and principles, there is an_ INTELLIGENCE _or_ MIND, _the First Principle of all Principles, the Supreme Idea on which all other ideas are grounded; the Monarch and Lawgiver of the universe, the ultimate Substance from which all other things derive their being and essence, the First and efficient Cause of all the order, and harmony, and beauty, and excellency, and goodness, which pervades the universe, who is called by way of pre-eminence and excellence the Supreme Good_, THE GOD (o Theos), "_the God over all_," (o epi pasi Theos).

_This_ SUPREME MIND,[619] Plato taught, is incorporeal,[620] unchangeable,[621] infinite,[622] absolutely perfect,[623] essentially good,[624] unoriginated,[625] and eternal.[626] He is "the Father, and Architect, and Maker of the Universe,"[627] "the efficient Cause of all things."[628] "the Monarch and Ruler of the world,"[629] "the sovereign Mind that orders all things, and pervades all things,"[630] "the sole Principle of all things,"[631] and "the Measure of all things,"[632] He is "the Beginning of all truth,"[633] "the Fountain of all law and justice,"[634] "the Source of all order and beauty,"[635] "the Cause of all good;"[636] in short, "he is the Beginning, the Middle, and End of all things."[637]

[Footnote 619: "Phædo," §§ 105-107.]

[Footnote 620: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives," bk. iii. ch. 77.]

[Footnote 621: "Republic," bk. ii. ch. xix.; "Timæus," ch. ix.]

[Footnote 622: "Apeleius," bk. i. ch. v.]

[Footnote 623: "Republic," bk. ii. ch. xx.]

[Footnote 624: "Timæus," ch. x.; "Republic," bk. ii. ch. xviii.]

[Footnote 625: "Timæus," ch. ix.-x.]

[Footnote 626: Ibid., ch. xii.]

[Footnote 627: Ibid., ch. ix.]

[Footnote 628: "Phædo," § 105.]

[Footnote 629: "Laws," bk. x. ch. xii.; "Republic," bk. vii. ch. iii.; "Philebus," § 50.]

[Footnote 630: "Philebus," §51.]

[Footnote 631: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xix.]

[Footnote 632: "Laws," bk. iv. ch. viii.]

[Footnote 633: "Republic," bk. ii. ch. xxi.]

[Footnote 634: "Laws," bk. iv. ch. vii.]

[Footnote 635: "Philebus," § 51; "Timæus," ch. x.]

[Footnote 636: "Republic," bk. ii. ch. xviii.; "Timæus," ch. x.]

[Footnote 637: "Laws," bk. iv, ch. vii.]