Chapter II: Part 2

The Declaration, by declaring the Colonies to be free and independent States and following this statement by the statement that the political connection between them and the State of Great Britain was dissolved, leaves it doubtful whether the American claim was that the Colonies had always been free and independent States in treaty connection with Great Britain or merely free states in connection with Great Britain under the law of nature and of nations. The arrangement of the sentences was probably necessary to satisfy the extreme states rights party, but the study of great documents discloses that nearly all contain such compromises, and that the judgment of posterity usually approves the judgment of the less extreme party. When we consider, however, that even Jefferson, the most extreme of the states rights party in the Continental Congress, has recorded his belief that the whole issue of the Revolution could have been settled if Great Britain had adopted the principle of Lord Chatham's bill, and if that bill on the one side and the Fourth Resolution on the other had been taken as the basis of settlement, it is at least not unreasonable to conclude that the extreme states rights theory was put forward more in order that the Americans might have something to concede in a bargain with Great Britain than from any belief in the justness of it, and that the real belief of the Americans was that the Colonies had always been free states, but not independent until they so declared themselves, and that their political connection with the State of Great Britain was under the law of nature and of nations, and not by implied treaty with the State of Great Britain.

Independence was regarded, if this interpretation be correct, as a conditional universal right of free states. Those free states which conform to the conditions necessary to independence--great physical strength, great moral and intellectual ability, and great qualities of leadership--were regarded as entitled to the right of independence. But independence of a free state, as regarded other free states, meant, to the Fathers, only leadership and judgeship. The law of nature and of nations, being universal, they considered as abolishing sovereignty in the European sense, so that the highest function of an independent State was to be the Justiciar of other States. In the literature of the Revolution we find the rights of free and independent states described as rights of "jurisdiction"--not of "sovereignty."

Connection between free States on free principles was regarded by the Fathers as the proper and perhaps the normal condition. They recognized that connection, while based on the assumption of the original independence of the units, necessarily implied a surrender of the right of final decision concerning all or a part of the common purposes to a Justiciar State, or of the right of legislation for the common purposes, expressly defined by written agreement, to a Central Government. Political connection with European States was dissolved in the Revolution, and thereafter refrained from, because the European States stood for a law of nature and of nations which did not permit of free states being connected on free principles.

Taking the whole Declaration together, and reading it in the light of the political literature which was put forth on both sides of the water between the years 1764 and 1776, which is too voluminous to be referred to here specifically, it seems to be necessary to conclude that the views of the American statesmen of the period concerning the nature of the connection between Great Britain and the Colonies, in its details, were these.

They considered, as I interpret their language, that the connection between the American Colonies, as free states, and the free and independent State of Great Britain had existed and of right ought to have existed under the law of nature and of nations, interpreted in so broad a sense that it may perhaps be called the American system of the law of nature and of nations. They accordingly claimed, as I understand them, that Great Britain, as a free and independent state, had power, as Justiciar over the American free states for the common purposes of the whole connection, to finally decide, in a judicial manner, according to the principles of the law of nature and of nations, upon all questions arising out of the connection between them; and that each of the American free states had power, through its legislature, to legislate according to the just public sentiment in each, concerning its purely local matters, and had the right to have its local legislation executed by its executive, and interpreted and applied in private cases by its courts.

Some of the Americans, and those the most patriotic and conservative, thought that Great Britain had jurisdiction to ascertain and execute the law of nations for the common purposes, and in the exercise of that jurisdiction to control, by its decrees and regulations, the action of individuals in the Colonies. This was to regard Great Britain and America as consolidated for the common purposes so as to form what may be called a Justiciary Union. They were content, so long as Great Britain acted on the theory that she was the Justiciar of the British-American Union for the common purposes, and maintained a competent tribunal for determining what were common and what local purposes according to the principles of the law of nature and of nations, that she should finally determine the limits of her own jurisdiction as the Justiciar State of the Union. While I do not mean to say that Great Britain ever recognized that the American Colonies were free states and that she was only a Justiciar State with power of final decision according to the law of nature and of nations over the whole British-American Union for common purposes, yet I think it may not be wholly incorrect to say that from 1700 to 1763, the King and the Parliament of Great Britain, advised by the Committee of the Privy Council for Plantation Affairs assisted by the Board of Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, really acted as the Supreme Administrative Tribunal for applying the principles of the law of nature and of nations in the decision of the questions common to all the free states of a _de facto_ British-American Union and as a necessary incident thereto, decided the limits of the jurisdiction of Great Britain as the Justiciar State of this _de facto_ British-American Union.

In this view, the actions of the Americans show the evolution of a continuous theory and policy, and the application of a single system of principles,--a system which was based upon free statehood, just connection and union. The British-American Union of 1763 was a Union of States under the State of Great Britain as Justiciar, that state having power to dispose of and make all rules and regulations respecting the connected and united free states, needful to protect and preserve the connection and union, according to the principles of the law of nature and of nations. The dissolution of this Union, caused by the violation by the State of Great Britain of its duties as Justiciar State, gave a great impetus to the extreme states' rights party, and the next connection formed,--that of 1778 under the Articles of Confederation,--was not a Union, the Common Government (the Congress) being merely a Chief Executive. Such a connection proving to be so slight as to be little more than a fiction, they formed, under the Constitution of 1787, the only other kind of a union which appears to be practicable, namely, a union under a common government which was a Chief Legislature for all the connected and united states by their voluntary grant, and whose powers were expressly limited, by limitation in the grant, to the common purposes of the whole connection and union of free states.

The power exercised by a Justiciar State in a Justiciary Union, the Fathers recognized as being neither strictly legislative, nor strictly executive, nor strictly judicial, but a power compounded of all these three powers. They considered that it was to be exercised after investigation by judicial methods, both of the facts and principles and of the public sentiment; that the just public sentiment of the free states connected and united with the Justiciar State was to be executed in local matters and was to be considered in the determination of the common affairs; and that the action of the Justiciar State was to result, after proper hearing of the free states concerned, in regulations which were to have the force of supreme law in each of the connected and united free states respectively. This kind of power, which the Fathers called "the superintending power" or "the disposing power" under the law of nature and of nations, and which may be called, using an expression now coming into use, "the power of final decision," being neither legislative nor executive, but more nearly executive than legislative, the more conservative among them considered might be exercised, consistently with the principles of the law of nature and of nations, either by the Legislative Assembly of the Justiciar State or by its Chief Executive. This right of both the Legislative Assembly and of the Chief Executive to exercise the powers of the Justiciar State under the law of nature and of nations is, I believe, also recognized by our Constitution, as I have elsewhere attempted to show.

The Fathers further considered, if my understanding of their belief is correct, that, inasmuch as both the Legislative Assembly and the Chief Executive of the Justiciar State, in exercising its power over the free states connected and united with it, and throughout the Justiciary Union, have as their function the ascertainment of facts and the application of the principles of the law of nature and of nations to those facts, they ought to exercise this function by the advice of a permanent Administrative Tribunal, properly constituted so as to advise them intelligently and wisely. As I have said above, the Revolutionary statesmen considered, as it would seem, that the Committee of the Privy Council for Plantation Affairs, assisted by the Board of Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, had, up to 1763, constituted such an Administrative Tribunal. They considered also, it would seem, that neither the Chief Executive nor the Legislative Assembly was bound by the action of this Administrative Tribunal, its action being wholly advisory, but that the Chief Executive was bound to take its advice before making his dispositions; and that the Chief Executive, when acting as an Administrative Tribunal for disposing and regulating the common affairs of the free states of the Justiciary Union, after taking the advice of this permanent Administrative Tribunal, was a tribunal of first instance. They further considered, as it would seem, that the Legislative Assembly, when acting as an Administrative Tribunal for adjudicating and regulating the common affairs of the Justiciary Union, was a tribunal of final instance, whose dispositions and regulations superseded those of the Chief Executive in so far as they conflicted with them. It was, as I understand it, because the situation of affairs in the British-American Union from 1700 to 1763 conformed to the theoretical ideas of the Americans as to the true nature of the relationship between the American Free States and the State of Great Britain, that they were ready to return to that situation at all times between 1763 and 1778. In the latter year, the spirit of American nationality manifested itself so strongly that all thought of political connection with Great Britain was abandoned.

The practical result of this theory is, that the Chief Executive of a Justiciar State may exercise the power of the Justiciary State, after investigation and adjudication and after taking the advice of a properly constituted permanent Administrative Tribunal given after investigation and upon adjudication, and that such action may take the form of regulations concerning the common affairs of the free states of the Justiciary Union (and even concerning the local affairs of the respective free states, when regulations concerning local affairs are reasonably and justly necessary, as incidental to the regulation of the common affairs, in order to make the regulation of the common affairs effective), and that such regulations may extend to the regulation of the conduct of individuals, and that the Legislative Assembly of the Justiciar State may exercise the same power, to the same extent and that its dispositions and regulations supersede the dispositions and regulations of the Chief Executive in so far as they conflict with them. This conclusion seems correct, if we accept as correct the premise of a universal and common law of nature and of nations, based on human equality arising from creation, of a universal and unalienable human right of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, of a universal right of agency-government of a kind necessary to secure these rights, of a universal right of free statehood of all communities within reasonable territorial limits suitable for the formation and application of just local public sentiment, as the necessary means to secure the right to agency-government, of a universal right of free states to be connected or united with other free states on just principles of the law of nature and of nations, of a universal conditional right of free states to be self governing free states if capable of self government of a universal conditional right of self governing free states to be independent free states, if capable of independence, and of a universal conditional right of independent free states to be justiciar states of justiciary unions of free states if capable of judgeship and able to make their dispositions and regulations effective.

Of course there must be conditions of transition where the relations between free states which would normally be in union, or between detached portions of what would normally be a unitary state, temporarily assume a form which is partly one of union or merger, and partly of dependency. The justification of all such forms of relationship must, it would seem, be found in the fundamental right which every independent state, whether a justiciar state or not, has to the preservation of its existence and its leadership or judgeship--that is, in the right of self-preservation, which, when necessary to be invoked, overrules all other rights. On this theory must, it would seem, be explained the relations between the American Union and its Territories between Germany and Alsace-Lorraine, and between England and Ireland. On this theory of self-preservation, also, must, it would seem, be explained the permanent relationship of dependency which exists between the District of Columbia and the American Union--such dependency being necessary to the preservation of the life of the Union.

Thus, if our interpretation of the Declaration is correct, there was evolved in it, out of the original proposition that "all men are created equal," a complete system of the philosophy of government, directly the opposite of the system of Europe which was based on the proposition that 'all men are created unequal,' or that "some are created equal and some unequal," and the Declaration of Independence was a declaration of an American System, as opposed to the European System. If this interpretation be correct, it was to preserve this American System that President Washington advised against 'political connection' with Europe, and that President Jefferson warned America against "entangling alliances," it was this American System which President Monroe and President Adams declared to have extended itself throughout this hemisphere; it was this American System to preserve which the Civil War was fought and to the maintenance of which President Lincoln rededicated the American people on the field of Gettysburg, it is this American System which President Roosevelt has upheld against the forces in our midst, which on the one side have, by the wrongful use of accumulations of wealth, sought to establish a doctrine of inequality based on the possession of property, and on the other side, by denying the rightfulness of all accumulations of wealth, have sought to establish a doctrine that the inequalities of physical wealth and intellectual ability are to be destroyed, instead of being employed, by those endowed with great wealth or great ability, as the common wealth, in helping each and all to secure their unalienable rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and thus to realize the divine right of equality, it is this American System which the American Congress under the leadership of President McKinley and President Roosevelt, has actually applied in the determination of our relations with the Insular regions, so that they are to-day free states _de facto_ connected and united with the American Union as the Justiciar State, and so that it needs only our recognition to convert them into free states _de jure_ and to bring into legal existence a Greater American Union of Free States of which our present Union will be the Supreme Justiciary Head, determining the questions arising out of the relationship not by edict founded on will and force, but by decision carefully made in each case after ascertaining the facts and the principles of the law of nature and of nations which are properly applicable.

If the principles and the corresponding terms adopted by the Revolutionary Fathers were adopted by them as of universal significance, and if they were right, must we not apply these principles and these terms to-day, when the position of America is reversed and she stands as a great and independent State in relationship with distant communities which are so circumstanced that they can never participate on equal terms in the institution and operation of her government? Must not this law of nature and of nations according to the American System, which for us underlies all other law and which is the Spirit of the Constitution itself, determine for us whether or not we shall continue to use the terms 'colony,' or "dependence," or "empire"?

If we must admit as Americans a universal right of free statehood, is it proper to call Hawaii, Porto Rico, the Philippines or Guam 'colonies'? They are inhabited and we do not propose to colonize them. If they are free states in union with the American Union as the Justiciar State and form with it a Greater American Union, is it proper to call them "dependencies," which may imply a direct legislative power over them? And if the American Union is only the Justiciar State of the whole Greater American Union of Free States, composed of the American Union and its Territories and Insular regions, with power of final decision for the common purposes according to the law of nature and of nations why speak of this as "Empire," which may imply absolute power and a denial that there exists a universal law of nature and of nations protecting alike the rights of persons communities states and nations?

But it will be said the conception I have outlined is impracticable. Judging from the characteristics of human nature, a state which declares itself the Justiciar of a Union of free states in permanent political connection with it, for the purpose of discovering and applying the principles of the law of nations in the just conduct of the common affairs of the Union, is likely, if it acts as a true Justiciar to accomplish much more by the persuasive effect of justice exercised in accordance with an overruling law of nature and of nations, than is an Emperor-State by the issuing of edicts based on a claim of right to be the supreme legislative power over non-represented regions.

Widely scattered free states which are in political connection or union must necessarily have some charge of their own defence both physically and commercially, and the right to protect and support themselves by tariff taxation must necessarily include the right to lay a tariff against the Central State as well as against the other connected states and against foreign states. All these conflicting rights must be harmonized by the Central State, and it must at the same time provide from the common resources for the common defence and welfare. The questions growing out of such relations are the most complicated known to politics. It seems that a Justiciar State acting upon the advice of properly constituted administrative tribunals, which habitually act judicially and whose function is to decide all questions according to law and justice is much more likely to solve such problems by investigation hearing and adjudication than is a Legislator State to settle them by edict, or than is an Executive State to procure a settlement of them by persuading the parties to confer and compromise.

Is not this theory the true _via media_? The theory of the automatic extension of the constitution of a state over its annexed insular, transmarine and transterranean regions which from their local or other circumstances can never equally participate in the institution and operation of its government, in some cases protects individual rights, but it takes no account of the right of free statehood, which is the prime instrumentality for securing these rights. The theory of a power over these regions not regulated by a supreme and universal law, is a theory of absolute power over both individuals and communities in these regions. The theory of a power over these regions based on the principles of the law of nature and of nations, granting that this law is itself based on the divine right of human equality, protects the rights of persons, of communities, of states and of nations.

This theory is not inconsistent with the present doctrine of the Supreme Court of the United States. It is an application and extension of that doctrine. To say, as does the Supreme Court, that the American Union has power over its annexed Insular regions restricted by "the fundamental principles formulated in the Constitution," or by "the applicable provisions of the Constitution," is to say that the power of the Union over these regions is exercised under a supreme law which is not the Constitution of the United States; for "principles formulated in the Constitution" are not the Constitution, and to say that "the applicable provisions" of the Constitution are the Constitution is to say that a part is the whole. Such a supreme law can only be a supreme common law, and a common law can be supreme over a group of scattered states only because it is universal. The only difference between this doctrine and that of the Supreme Court is that the Court's doctrine protects only civil rights, while this protects both civil and political rights.

By adopting this theory of the Reformation and the American Revolution, may not the American System extend indefinitely without danger to America herself? There would be no domination, no subjection. The same law of nature and of nations would extend over and govern throughout the whole Greater American Union. This Greater American Justiciary Union would be but a logical application of the principles underlying the American Legislative, Executive and Judicial Union formed by the Constitution of the United States. It would not be the Constitution which would follow the flag into the regions which America has annexed to herself, but the law of nature and of nations according to the American System. If the Revolutionary theory as I have interpreted it is correct, this law of nature and of nations is everywhere pervasive throughout the American System of Free States. It is greater than the Constitution of the United States. The Constitution lives in so far as it truly declares the law of nature and of nations according to the American System. If the Constitution is interpreted contrary to this law, as authorizing the Union to treat its annexed regions as subjects or as creating a hiatus or a conflict between the powers of the Central and the Local Governments, this overruling law will compel a new interpretation. On this theory the "Territory Clause" of the Constitution recognizes the law of nature and of nations as determining the relationship between the American Union and the Insular regions--"needful" rules and regulations being those which are adapted to accomplish the end desired and which are in accordance with the principles of the law of nature and of nations as declared in the Declaration of Independence.

How can such a theory endanger the Republic? It will require some new institutions, no doubt, but they will be institutions in line with republican ideas and ideals, for they will all be institutions for discovering and applying the principles of the common law. We shall only have to enlarge our conception of the common law, by adding to the definition of Coke, and saying that it is "the perfection of reason and revelation."

Out of this theory of a universal common law of nations have emerged the science of the Law of the State, which deals with the internal relations of states, and the science of International Law, which deals with the temporary relations between independent States. Why out of the same theory should there not emerge a science of the Law of Connections and Unions of States, based on the proposition that free statehood is the normal form of all community life and the right of all communities within proper limits on the surface of the earth, and which will deal with the permanent relations between free states, whether independent or not,--a science which will occupy the wide field of human relationships which lies between that now occupied by the science of the Law of the State and that now occupied by the science of International Law?

To those who regard all law as an aggregate of eternal and universal principles inhering in the nature of things, which are discoverable by man through revelation and reason, and who therefore regard all governmental action as the ascertainment and application of these principles, the conception of a common and universal Law of Connections and Unions of Free States and that of a common and universal International Law, are equally without difficulty. To those who regard all law as an act of human will supported by force, the conception of a common and universal Law of Connections and Unions of Free States and that of a common and universal International Law, are equally impossible; and indeed these persons are logically obliged to deny the existence of any common law of any kind. To those who occupy the middle ground and regard all law as in one aspect the ascertainment and application of eternal principles, and in another aspect an act of human will supported by force, the conception of a common and universal Law of Connections and Unions of Free States is less difficult than that of a common and universal International Law, for the former implies a Justiciar State which is capable of enforcing its decisions and dispositions, while the latter implies the non-existence of any political power capable of enforcing the action agreed or decided upon.

Fortunately, there is every evidence that at the present time this narrow political sect who believe that law is only a human edict supported by physical force,--this sect which had its origin in the dark decades of the nineteenth century when the materialistic philosophy prevailed--is dying out, under the influence of a general renaissance. There are, it is to be believed, many who will be ready and willing to accept as true the statement, which every student of political history must admit to be true, that the philosophy of the American Revolution was a religious philosophy. It is indeed perhaps not too much to say that the period of the American Revolution was the period in which both political and religious thinking reached the highest point, and that there is no question of government which has since arisen which was not either solved by the Revolutionary statesmen or put in the process of solution.

The political philosophy of the American Revolution has long been confused with that of the French Revolution. As matter of fact, they stand at opposite poles. Our philosophy was religious, the French non-religious. America had been peacefully assimilating, for a century and a half, the doctrines of the Reformation. France had been held for two centuries and a half in a condition of mediaevalism, and the principles of the Reformation had little hold among the people. When the Americans spoke, it was with the calm wisdom of free-men; when the French spoke, it was with the folly and excess of intellectual and spiritual slaves who had suddenly emancipated themselves. To the Americans, to whom government was the expression of the just public sentiment, government, equally with religion, was a necessary good; to the French, to whom government was the expression of the will of the majority, whether just or unjust, government was a necessary evil and religion an unnecessary evil. The French Revolution made itself felt, even in America, for a century. Till within recent years, its principles have obscured, though they have never wholly eclipsed, the principles of the American Revolution. But now there seems reason to believe that the French Revolution has spent its force, and that the influence of the American Revolution is growing daily stronger. Signs of this are the councils and conferences which are steadily increasing in number and in power, on the subject of arbitration as the peaceful means of settling questions growing out of the relations of communities, of states and of nations. Arbitration, whether between persons or between communities, states and nations, implies a universal and common law. Peace conferences can, it would seem, have no reasonable purpose and can hope to accomplish no permanent result, except as they attempt to substitute a universal and common law, supported by the public sentiment of the civilized world, for human edicts founded on human will and supported by physical force. The American System is but the establishment of interstate and international arbitration as the common and usual course of governmental action instead of as a voluntary or spasmodic manifestation of governmental will.

Only on the assumption of the existence of this universal common law can the relations between us and our Insular brethren be relations under law, for a written constitution between us and them is impossible. We realize, as Americans, that somehow these relations must be under law if they are to be according to the American System, for we know that there is no liberty except under law, and that the American System has, for its sole object, human liberty.

If we are right, the American people, in rejecting, as they have, the European terms "colony," "dependence" and "empire," and the theory which these terms symbolize, have been true to the American System. In substituting for these terms the American terms, "free state," "just connection" and "union" and the American theory which these terms symbolize, it is not necessary for us to alter in the least our established views concerning the Constitution as the supreme law of the Union. It is only necessary for us to realize that the Constitution is itself but one application of the great principles of the American System which, as the Supreme Court says, are "formulated" in it, and to proceed, by a new formulation or by adjudication, to apply these principles outside the present Union wherever American jurisdiction extends, in the confident belief that they can be applied universally, and that, wherever applied, they will bring the blessings of true liberty.

APPENDIX

THE AMERICAN SYSTEM

THE ANNUNCIATION OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM

"When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for
one people to dissolve the political bands which have
connected them with another, and to assume, among the powers
of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the
laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent
respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should
declare the causes which impel them to the separation--"

"We hold these truths to be self-evident: That all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable rights, that among these are life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these
rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their
just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever
any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it
is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to
institute new government, laying its foundation on such
principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them
shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness."

* * * * *

"We, therefore the representatives of the United States of
America, in General Congress assembled, appealing to the
Supreme Judge of the World for the rectitude of our
intentions do, in the name, and by the authority of the good
people of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That
these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, Free and
Independent States; that they are absolved from all
allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political
connection between them and the State of Great Britain is,
and ought to be, totally dissolved; and that, as Free and
Independent States, they have full power to levy war,
conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and
to do all other acts and things which Independent States may
of right do. And, for the support of this Declaration, with a
firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we
mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes and our
sacred honor."

The Continental Congress. Declaration of Independence of
July 4, 1776.

THE ADOPTION OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM BY THE AMERICAN
UNION IN ITS CONSTITUTION, AS APPLYING TO ITS EXTERNAL
JUSTICIARY RELATIONS

"We, the people of the United States, in order to form a
more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic
tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the
general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America....

"The Executive power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America....

"The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or
other property belonging to the United States....

"The Judicial power of the United States shall be vested in
one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.... The
Judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity,
arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United
States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their authority."

The Constitutional Convention. The Constitution of the
United States, of September 17, 1787.

THE AMERICAN SYSTEM DIFFERENTIATED FROM THE EUROPEAN BY
PRESIDENT WASHINGTON

"Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political
prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable
supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of
patriotism who should labor to subvert these great pillars
of human happiness--these firmest props of the duties of men
and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious
man, ought to respect and cherish them. A volume could not
trace all their connections with private and public
felicity....

"Observe good faith and justice toward all nations.
Cultivate peace and harmony with all. Religion and morality
enjoin this conduct. And can it be that good policy does not
equally enjoin it?...

"The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign
nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have
with them as little political connection as possible....

"Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none
or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in
frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially
foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise
in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the
ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary
combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

"Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us
to pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under
an efficient government, the period is not far off when we
may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we
may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we
may at anytime resolve upon to be scrupulously respected;
when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making
acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us
provocation when we may choose peace or war, as our
interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.

"Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why
quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why by
interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe
entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European
ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?

It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances
with any portion of the foreign world."

President Washington. Farewell Address, September 17, 1796.

THE AMERICAN SYSTEM AS DEFINED BY PRESIDENT
JEFFERSON

"I deem the essential principles of our government [to be]
Equal and exact justice to all men, of whatever state or
persuasion, peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all
nations, entangling alliances with none, the support of the
State Governments in all their rights, as the most competent
administrations for our domestic concerns and the surest
bulwarks against anti-republican tendencies, the
preservation of the General Government in its whole
constitutional vigor, as the sheet-anchor of our peace at
home and safety abroad."

President Jefferson. First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1801.

THE EXTENSION OF THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM TO THE WESTERN
HEMISPHERE DECLARED INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE AMERICAN SYSTEM,
BY PRESIDENT MONROE.

"The political system of the Allied Powers is essentially
different ... from that of America. This difference proceeds
from that which exists in their respective Governments, and
to the defence of our own, which has been achieved by the
loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the
wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which
we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is
devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable
relations existing between the United States and those
Powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on
their part to extend their system to any portion of this
hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety....

"It is impossible that the Allied Powers should extend their
political system to any portion of either continent without
endangering our peace and happiness."

President Monroe Annual Message of December 2, 1823

THE AMERICAN SYSTEM DECLARED TO HAVE EXTENDED ITSELF TO
THE WHOLE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, BY PRESIDENT JOHN QUINCY
ADAMS

"Among the inquiries which were thought entitled to
consideration before the determination was taken to accept
the invitation [to the proposed Congress of the American
Republics at Panama], was that whether the measure might not
have a tendency to change the policy, hitherto invariably
pursued by the United States, of avoiding all entangling
alliances and all unnecessary political connections.

"Mindful of the advice given by the Father of our Country in
his Farewell Address, that the great rule of conduct for us
in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial
relations, to have with them as little political connection
as possible, and faithfully adhering to the spirit of that
admonition, I can not overlook the reflection that the
counsel of Washington in that instance, like all counsels of
wisdom, was founded upon the circumstances in which our
country and the world around us were situated at the time
when it was given that the reasons assigned by him for his
advice were that Europe had a set of primary interests which
to us had none or a very remote relation, that hence she
must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of
which were essentially foreign to our concerns, that our
detached and distant situation invited and enabled us to
pursue a different course, that by our union and rapid
growth, with an efficient Government, the period was not far
distant when we might defy material injury from external
annoyance, when we might take such an attitude as would
cause our neutrality to be respected, and, with reference to
belligerent nations, might choose peace or war, as our
interests, guided by justice, should counsel."

Compare our situation and the circumstances of that time
with those of the present day and what, from the very words
of Washington then, would be his counsels to his countrymen
now? Europe has still her set of primary interests, with
which we have little or a remote relation. Our distant and
detached situation with reference to Europe remains the
same. But we were then the only independent nation of this
hemisphere, and we were surrounded by European colonies,
with the greater part of which we had no more intercourse
than with the inhabitants of another planet. These colonies
have now been transformed into eight independent nations,
extending to our very borders, seven of them Republics like
ourselves, with whom we have an immensely growing commercial
and must have, and have already, important political
connections, with reference to whom our situation is neither
distant nor detached, whose political principles and systems
of government, congenial with our own, must and will have an
action and counteraction upon us and ours to which we cannot
be indifferent if we would.

The rapidity of our growth, and the consequent increase of
our strength, has more than realized the anticipations of
this admirable political legacy. Thirty years have nearly
elapsed since it was written, and in the interval our
population, our wealth, our territorial extension, our
power--physical and moral--have nearly trebled. Reasoning
upon this state of things from the sound and judicious
principles of Washington, must we not say that the period
which he predicted, as then not far off, has arrived, that
America has a set of primary interests which have none or a
remote relation to Europe, that the interference of Europe,
therefore, in those concerns should be spontaneously
withheld by her upon the same principles that we have never
interfered with hers, and that if she should interfere, as
she may, by measures which may have a great and dangerous
recoil upon ourselves, we might be called, in defence of our
altars and firesides, to take an attitude which would cause
our neutrality to be respected, and choose peace or war as
our interest guided by justice, should counsel?

"The acceptance of this invitation, therefore, far from
conflicting with the counsel or the policy of Washington, is
directly deducible from and conformable to it. Nor is it
less conformable to the views of my immediate predecessor,
as declared in his Annual Message to Congress of the 2d
December, 1823."

President John Quincy Adams. Communication to the House of
Representatives, in answer to their Resolution of Inquiry,
regarding the proposed Panama Congress, March 15, 1826.

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE REDEDICATED TO THE PRESERVATION OF
THE AMERICAN SYSTEM, BY PRESIDENT LINCOLN, AT
GETTYSBURG.

"Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on
this continent, a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and
dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.

"Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether
that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated,
can long endure. We are met on a great battlefield of that
war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field, as a
final resting place for those who here gave their lives that
the nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper
that we should do this.

"But, in a larger sense, we can not dedicate--we can not
consecrate--we can not hallow--this ground. The brave men,
living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it,
far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will
little note, nor long remember, what we say here, but it can
never forget what they did here. It is for us the living,
rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which
they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is
rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task
remaining before us--that from these honored dead we take
increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the
last full measure of devotion--that we here highly resolve
that these dead shall not have died in vain, that this
nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom, and
that government of the people, by the people, for the
people, shall not perish from the earth."

President Lincoln. Address at the Dedication of the National
Cemetery at Gettysburg, November 19, 1863.

THE AMERICAN SYSTEM APPLIED IN THE EXTERNAL JUSTICIARY
RELATIONS OF THE AMERICAN UNION, BY PRESIDENT MCKINLEY.

"In order to facilitate the most humane, specific, and
effective extension of authority throughout [the Philippine
Islands], and to secure with the least possible delay the
benefits of a wise and generous protection of life and
property, I have named Jacob G. Schurman, Rear-Admiral
George Dewey, Major-General Elwell S. Otis, Charles Denby,
and Dean C. Worcester to constitute a Commission to aid in
the accomplishment of these results....

"The Commissioners will endeavor,... to ascertain what
amelioration in the condition of the inhabitants and what
improvements in public order may be practicable, and for
this purpose they will study attentively the existing social
and political state of the various populations particularly
as regards the forms of local government, the administration
of justice, the collection of customs and other taxes, the
means of transportation and the need of public improvements.

"They will report to the State Department according to the
forms customary or hereafter prescribed for transmitting and
preserving such communications, the results of their
observations and reflections, and will recommend such
Executive action as may from time to time seem to them wise
and useful....

"It is my desire that in all their relations with the
inhabitants of the Islands the Commissioners exercise due
respect for all the ideals, customs, and institutions of the
tribes and races which compose the population, emphasizing
upon all occasions the just and beneficent intentions of the
Government of the United States.'

"It is also my wish and expectation that the Commissioners
may be received in a manner due to the honored and
authorized representatives of the American Republic, duly
commissioned, on account of their knowledge, skill and
integrity, as bearers of the good will the protection, and
the richest blessings of a liberating rather than a
conquering nation."

President McKinley--Instructions to the Secretary of State
regarding the First Philippine Commission, January 20, 1899.

THE DEFINITION OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM AS APPLIED BOTH TO
THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE AMERICAN
UNION--BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

"When all is said and done, the rule of brotherhood remains
as the indispensable prerequisite to success in the kind of
national life for which we strive. Each man must work for
himself, and unless he so works no outside help can avail
him, but each man must remember also that he is indeed his
brother's keeper, and that while no man who refuses to walk
can be carried with advantage to himself or any one else yet
that each at times stumbles or halts, that each at times
needs to have the helping hand outstretched to him. To be
permanently effective, aid must always take the form of
helping a man to help himself, and we can all best help
ourselves by joining together in the work that is of common
interest to all....

"It is no light task for a nation to achieve the
temperamental qualities without which the institutions of
free government are but an empty mockery. Our people are
now successfully governing themselves, because for more than
a thousand years they have been slowly fitting themselves,
sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously, toward this
end. What has taken us thirty generations to achieve, we
cannot expect to see another race accomplish out of hand,
especially when large portions of that race start very far
behind the point which our ancestors had reached even thirty
generations ago. In dealing with the Philippine people we
must show both patience and strength, forbearance and
steadfast resolution. Our aim is high. We do not desire to
do for the islanders merely what has elsewhere been done for
tropic peoples by even the best foreign governments. We hope
to do for them what has never before been done for any
people of the tropics--to make them fit for self-government
after the fashion of the really free nations."

President Roosevelt. First Message, December 3, 1901.

THE QUESTION OF TERMINOLOGY

_Mr. President, Members of the Association and Section, Ladies and
Gentlemen_:

You have heard ably discussed certain questions which arise out of the relationship between the American Union and the annexed Insular regions, viewed in its sociological and economic aspect. I now ask your attention to a question of immediate interest and importance growing out of this relationship viewed in its political, that is to say, its legal aspect. This question, which the Committee on Arrangements has called "The Question of Terminology," is: What are the correct terms to use in describing the political and legal relationship between the American Union and its distant annexed regions, assuming that this relationship is to be permanent and is to be on terms which are just to all parties?

More specifically, the question which I shall discuss will be, whether we, as Americans, ought, according to American principles, to use, in our political and legal language, the terms "colony," "dependence," and "empire," or whether we ought, according to those principles, to substitute for the term "colony," the term "free state," for "dependence," "just connection," and for "empire," "union."

It is needless to say that I shall accept the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States as final in regard to all the matters adjudicated in them. But the Supreme Court has jurisdiction only for the purpose of determining the rights of individuals. The political relations between the Union and the Insular regions, it determines only so far as may be necessary to ascertain individual rights. Its present doctrine--that the American Union has power over the Insular regions subject to "fundamental principles formulated in the Constitution," or subject to "the applicable provisions of the Constitution," protects the civil rights of individuals, but under it the power of the Union for political purposes remains absolute. The proposition which I shall offer for your judgment, will, I believe, not only not be in conflict with the propositions laid down by the Supreme Court, but will give a reason why they are right. It will, too, I believe, give a reasonable basis for our holding that the power of the American Union over the Insular regions, while ample for the maintenance of a just and proper permanent relationship with them under our control, is not absolute even as respects their political rights.

I have said that I shall discuss this question upon American principles. I shall not base myself on the Constitution of the United States, though I shall try to show the relation of that document to the question, as I understand it. I shall assume it to be settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court,--as it seems clearly to be,--that with the exception of the "Territory" clause of that instrument, it is, and of right ought to be, the Constitution of the thirteen original States of the American Union and of the other States which they have admitted into their Union, and of no other States or communities; and that therefore it does not extend of its own force outside the American Union in any constitutional or legal sense, but only in a metaphorical sense--this being as I understand it, the meaning of the Court when they hold, as they do, that, though the "Territory clause" is of present and universal significance as respects all the regions annexed to the Union, yet, with this exception, only "the applicable provisions of the Constitution" or "the fundamental principles formulated in the Constitution" are in force in the annexed regions. "Extensions," so-called, of the Constitution by Act of Congress, are of course mere Acts of Congress, and whether such metaphorical "extensions" are permanent will depend upon the terms and conditions of the "extension."

But though I shall not base myself on the Constitution of the United States, I shall nevertheless base myself on a great American Document, which preceded the Constitution as a statement of American principles, and which is so far from being inconsistent with it that the Democratic party, in its platform of 1900, called it "the Spirit of the Constitution"--I refer to the Declaration of Independence. It is the American principles set forth in that document which I shall try to discover. If I shall be adjudged to have rightly interpreted that instrument, it will follow that we ought to substitute, in our political and legal language, for the term "colony," the term "free state," for "dependence," "just connection," and for "empire," "union." In making such substitution, however, it will be necessary to give to the terms "free state" and "union," a scientific meaning which will differ from that which they now have in the popular mind, but which will, I believe, be the same as was given to these terms by the Revolutionary statesmen.

I shall not allow myself to be embarrassed by the fact that in my first published writing I used the terms "colony," "dependence" and "empire;" for at the same time that I used these terms, I based myself on principles which were those of free statehood, just connection and union, to which I adhere to this day.