Chapter XXXII: Interpretation of Language (1)

The mind of man is confined in its operations by the material system it inhabits, and has no modes of communicating with other minds except through the medium of the eye and ear. It is by signs addressed to the eye and by sounds affecting the ear that ideas are communicated and received.

It is by the power of _association_, which enables us to recall certain ideas together which have been frequently united, that the use of language is gained. The infant finds certain states of mind produced by material objects invariably connected with certain sounds. This is done so often that whenever a certain perception occurs, the sound recurs which has been so often united with it.

If language is correctly defined as "any sound or sign which conveys the ideas of one mind to another," it is probable that children learn language at a much earlier period than is generally imagined. It is impossible to know how soon the infant notices the soft tones of its own voice when happy, or the moaning or shrill sound that expresses its own pain, and by comparing them with those of its mother, learns, through its little process of reasoning, that another spirit has emotions of pleasure and pain corresponding with its own. Nor can we determine how soon these pleasant sounds of the mother's voice begin to be associated with the benignant smile, or the tones of grief with the sorrowful expression, or the tones of anger with the frowning brow.

It seems very rational to suppose that _sound_, to the infant mind, is what first leads to the belief of the emotions of another mind, by means of a comparison of its own sounds with those originating from another. After this is done, the eye comes in for a share in these offices. The little reasoner, after thousands of experiments, finds the pleasant sound always united with the smiling face, until the object of vision becomes the sign for recalling the idea at first obtained by sound. In gaining the common use of language, we know this is the order of succession. We first learn the _sounds_ that recall ideas, and then, by means of a frequent union of these sounds with some _visible sign_, the power once possessed simply by the sound is conveyed to the sign. Thus we have words that are sounds and words that are visible signs.

The communion of one spirit with that of others in every-day life is maintained ordinarily through the medium of _sounds_; but when distance intervenes, or when some record is to be preserved of the thoughts and feelings of other beings, then signs addressed to the eye are employed. In civilized nations, the signs used are a certain number of arbitrary marks, which are arranged in a great variety of combinations, and each combination is employed to recall some particular idea or combination of ideas. These arbitrary signs are called letters, and in the English language there are only twenty-six; yet, by the almost infinite variety of combination of which these are capable, every idea which one mind wishes to communicate to another can be expressed.

A _written word_ is a single letter or a combination of letters used as a sign to recall one or more ideas. It is considered by the mind as a unit or whole thing, of which the letters are considered as parts, and is shown to be a unit by intervals or blank spaces that separate it from the other words of a sentence. The fact that it is considered by the mind as _a unit_, or a sign separate from all other combinations of letters, is the peculiarity which constitutes it a _word_. A _syllable_ is a combination of letters which is not considered as a unit, but is considered as a _part_ of a word.

Words are used to recall the ideas of _things_, _qualities_, _changes_, and _circumstances_. Some words recall the idea of a thing without any other idea connected with it; such are the words _mind_, _ivory_. Some words recall the idea of quality simply, such as _red_, _hard_, _sweet_. Some words recall the ideas of change merely, such as _motion_, _action_. Some words recall simply the idea of relation or circumstance, such as _on_, _under_, _about_. Sometimes ideas of things, and their actions and relations, are recalled by the same sign; thus _wrestler_ recalls the idea of a thing and its action, and _giant_ of a thing and its _relation_. Some words recall a variety of ideas; thus the term _begone_ recalls the idea of two things, of the desire of a mind and of its mode of expression.

In the process of learning language, mankind first acquire names for the several things, qualities, changes, and circumstances that they notice, and afterward learn the process of _combining_ these names, so as to convey the mental combination of one mind to another. A person might have names for all his ideas, and yet, if he had never learned the art of properly combining these signs, he never could communicate the varied conceptions of his own mind to another person. Suppose, for illustration, that a child had learned the meaning of the terms _cup_, _spoon_, _the_, _put_, _into_, _little_, _my_; it would be impossible for him to express his wish till he had learned the proper _arrangement_ of each term, and then he could convey the conception and wishes of his own mind, viz., "Put the spoon into my little cup."

We see, then, how the new combinations of ideas in one mind can be conveyed to another. The two persons must both have the _same ideas_ attached to the _same sign_ of language, and must each understand the _mode of combination_ to be employed. When this is done, if one person sees a new object, he can send to his friend the signs which represent all its qualities, circumstances, and changes arranged in a proper manner. The absent person will then arrange the _conceptions_ recalled by these words, so as to correspond with those of his correspondent.

In all languages, the same word often is used to recall different ideas, and the meaning of words depends often on their _mode of combination_.

The _art of interpreting_ consists in ascertaining the particular ideas conveyed by words _in a given combination_.

There are two modes of using language which need to be distinctly pointed out, viz., _literal_ and _figurative_.

In order to understand these modes, it is necessary to refer to the principles of _association_. Neither our perceptions or conceptions are ever single, disconnected objects except when the power of abstraction is employed. Ordinarily, various objects are united together in the mind, and those objects which are most frequently united in our perceptions, as a matter of course, are those which are most frequently united in our conceptions.

Now, by the power of _abstraction_, the mind can regard the same object sometimes as a unit or whole, and sometimes can disconnect it, and consider it as several distinct things. Thus it happens that ideas which are connected by the principles of association are sometimes regarded as a whole, and sometimes are disconnected, and considered as separate existences.

Language will be found to be constructed in exact conformity to this phenomenon of mind. We shall find that objects ordinarily united together, as cause and effect, have the _same name_ given, sometimes to the _cause_, sometimes to the _effects_, and sometimes it embraces _the whole_; or the thing, its causes and its effects. As an example of this use of language may be mentioned the term _pride_. We sometimes hear those objects which are the _cause_ of pride receiving that name. Thus a child is called the pride of its parents. The same name is applied simply to the _state of mind_, as when a man is said to be under the influence of pride, while the _effects_ of pride receive the same appellation when we hear a haughty demeanor and consequential deportment called pride. The term is used in its most extended signification as including the thing, its causes, and its effects, when we hear of the "pride of this world," which is soon to pass away, signifying equally the causes of this feeling, the feeling itself, and the effects of it.

_Literal language_ is that in which all words have the ordinary meaning as commonly used.

_Figurative language_ is that in which the ordinary names, qualities, and actions of things are ascribed to _other things_ with which they have been associated.

As an example of the use of language which is _figurative_, we find _tears_, that are the _effects_ of grief, called by the name of the _cause_; thus:

"Streaming _grief_ his faded cheek bedewed."

On the contrary, we find the cause called by the name of the effects in this sentence:

"And _hoary hairs_ received the reverence due."

Here age is called by the name of one of its effects.

The indiscriminate application of names to things which have been connected by _time_, _place_, or _resemblance_, abounds in figurative language. The following is an example where one object is called by the name of another with which it has been connected by _place_:

"The _groves_ give forth their songs."

Here birds are called by the name of the groves with which they have been so often united as it respects _place_. The following is an example where an object is called by the name of another with which it is connected by _time_:

"And _night_ weighed down his heavy eyes."

Here _sleep_ is called by the name of _night_, with which it has been so often united. The following is an example where one object is called by the name of another with which it has been connected by the principle of _resemblance_:

"You took her up, a little, tender bud,
Just sprouted on a bank."

Here a young female is called by the name of an object with which she is connected by the association of resemblance. When one object is thus called by the name of another which it resembles, the figure of speech is called a _metaphor_.

When dominion is called a _sceptre_; the office of a bishop, the _lawn_; the profession of Christianity, the _cross_; a dwelling is called a _roof_; and various expressions of this kind, one thing is called by the name of another of which it is a _part_, or with which it has been connected as a circumstance, cause, or effect.

Not only do objects which have been united in our perceptions receive each other's _names_, but the _qualities_ of one are often ascribed to the other. The following are examples in which the qualities of the cause are ascribed to the effect, and the qualities of the effect are ascribed to the cause:

"An impious mortal gave a _daring_ wound."

Here the quality of the _cause_ is ascribed to the _effect_.

"The _merry_ pipe is heard."

Here the quality of the _effect_ is ascribed to the _cause_. The following is an example where the quality of one thing is ascribed to another connected with it by _time_:

"Now _musing_ midnight hallows all the scene."

The following is an example of the quality of one thing ascribed to another, connected with it by _place_:

"when sapless age
Shall bring thy father to his _drooping_ chair."

We have examples of the qualities of one thing ascribed to another which it _resembles_ in such expressions as these--"imperious ocean," "tottering state," "raging tempest." The following is an example of a thing called by the name of one of its qualities or attending circumstances:

"What art thou, that usurpest this time of night,
Together with the fair and warlike form
In which the _majesty_ of buried _Denmark_
Did sometimes walk?"

Here a king is called by the name of a quality and by the name of his kingdom.

It is owing to the principle of association that another mode of figurative language is employed called _personification_. This consists in speaking of a quality which belongs to living beings as if it were the being in which such a quality was found. This is owing to the fact that the conceptions of qualities of mind are always united with some being, and therefore such ideas are connected ones. Thus it is said in the sacred writings,

"Mercy and truth are met together."

"Righteousness and peace have embraced each other."

"Wisdom crieth aloud, she uttereth her voice."

Another mode of personification is owing to the fact that the actions and relations of inanimate existences very often resemble those of living beings, so that such ideas are associated by the principle of resemblance. In such cases, the actions, properties, and relations of living beings are ascribed to inanimate objects. Thus, when the sea roars and lifts its waves toward the skies, the actions are similar to those of a man when he raises his arm in supplication. An example of this kind of figurative language is found in this sublime personification of Scripture: "The mountains saw thee, and trembled; the overflowing of the waters passed by; the deep uttereth his voice, and lifted up his hands on high; the sun and moon stood still in their habitations." Other examples of this kind are found when we hear it said that "the fields smile," "the woods clap their hands," "the skies frown," and the like.

One cause of figurative language is found in the similarity of effects produced on the body by operations of mind and operations of matter. Whatever causes affect the mind in a similar manner are called by the same name. Thus, when a man endeavors to penetrate a hard substance, the muscles of his head and neck are affected in a particular manner. The same muscles are affected in a similar way when a person makes powerful and reiterated efforts to comprehend a difficult subject. Both these actions, therefore, are called by the same name, and a man is said to _penetrate_ the wood with an instrument, or to _penetrate_ into the subject of his investigations. Thus joy is said to _expand_ the breast, because it does, in fact, produce a sensation which resembles this action. There is a great variety of figurative language founded on this principle. Indeed, there is little said respecting the mind, and its qualities and operations, where we do not apply terms that describe the qualities, actions, and relations of matter.

It is also the case that _actions_ and _relations_ that resemble each other are called by the same name, without regard to the objects in which they exist. Thus the skies are said _to weep_. Here there is, in fact, the same action as is weeping in mankind, and it receives the same name, though it is connected with a different subject. Thus, also, the sword is said to be "_drunk_ with the blood of the slain." Here the same relation exists between the blood and the sword as between a man and an immoderate quantity of liquor, and the relation receives the same name in each case.

_An allegory_ is a succession of incidents and circumstances told of one thing which continually recall another thing, which it resembles in the particulars mentioned. Thus the aged Indian chief describes himself by an allegory: "I am an aged hemlock. The winds of a hundred years have swept over its branches; it is dead at the top; those that grew around have all mouldered away."

_A parable_ is of the same character as an allegory.

_A type_ is an object of conception in which many of its qualities and relations resemble another object that succeeds it in regard to _time_.

_Hyperbole_ is a collection of actions, qualities, or circumstances ascribed to an object which are contrary to the laws of experience, and this language is employed to express excited feeling. Thus, by hyperbole, a person is said to be "_drowned_ in tears."

_Irony_ is language used in such a manner as to contradict the known opinions of the speaker, and is intended to represent the absurdity or irrationality of some thing conceived by him.

_Symbols_ are material things employed to convey the ideas of one mind to another. Thus, as the cultivation of the olive is connected with seasons of peace, an olive branch is used to express the idea of peace.

_Symbolic language_ is the use of words that are names of symbols in place of the names of things represented by symbols. Thus the word olive might be used instead of the word peace.

Figurative language, especially metaphors and symbolic words, abound in the writings of the earliest nations; and as what are claimed to be the earliest revelations of the Creator are recorded in these languages, the rules for interpreting figurative language are of the highest importance.

The preceding illustrates the principles upon which both literal and figurative language are constructed. The question now arises, How are we to determine when expressions are to be interpreted literally and when they are figurative? One single rule will be found sufficient in all cases, viz.:

All language is _literal_ when the common meaning of each word is consistent with our experience as to the nature of things, and consistent with the other sentiments of the writer.

All language is _figurative_ when the names, qualities, and actions ascribed to things are inconsistent with our experience of the nature of things, or contradict the known opinions of the writer.

In the preceding examples of figurative language, it can readily be seen that a literal interpretation would in all cases form combinations of ideas which are opposed to experience as to the nature of things. For example, "_grief_" can not be conceived of as "bedewing a face," because it is an emotion of mind; nor do "hoary hairs" literally ever receive honor; nor do "groves sing," nor "night weigh down the eyes."

In like manner, where the qualities of one thing are ascribed to another with which it has been connected, there is no difficulty in determining that the language is figurative; for a "wound" can not have the quality of "daring," which belongs only to mind, nor can a "pipe" be literally considered as "merry," or "midnight" as "musing;" nor would it be consistent with experience to think of a "chair" as "drooping." Nor in the case of personification is there any more cause of difficulty. Mercy and truth, righteousness, peace, and wisdom, are qualities of mind, and can not be conceived of as "meeting," "embracing," and "crying aloud" in any other than a figurative sense. And when the ocean is said to "lift up his hands," and the sun and moon to "stand still in their habitations," the laws of experience forbid any but a figurative interpretation.

In the case of an _allegory_ and all symbolic language, the same rule applies with equal clearness and certainty. In the example given, it would be a violation of the laws of experience to conceive of a man as a tree with branches and a withered top.

_Hyperbole_ is readily distinguished by the same rule. _Irony_ is known by its being contradictory to the known opinions of the writer. Thus there is never any difficulty in deciding when language is literal and when it is figurative in cases where men have the laws of experience by which to determine.

On the supposition of a revelation from the Creator, there must be subjects upon which mankind have had _no experience_, such as the nature of the Deity, the character and circumstances of the invisible world and of its inhabitants. On these subjects all language must be literal when the literal construction is not in contradiction to the known or implied opinion of the other declarations; for on these subjects, as the laws of experience can not regulate in deciding between figurative and literal language, it is impossible to show any reason why words should not be literal except by comparison with the other statements of the same author. If these show no reasons for supposing it figurative, it must of necessity be considered as literal; for if neither experience nor the writer's opinions oppose a literal meaning, there is _no_ cause why the ordinary and common signification of words should not be retained.

The next inquiry is, How are we to ascertain the ideas which are to be attached to words that are used figuratively? If the common ideas which are recalled by words are not the proper ones, what are the data for knowing _which_ are the ideas to be recalled? The laws of association, upon which language is founded, furnish an adequate foundation for determining this question. If language is such that a literal construction is contrary to the nature of things, the words used figuratively must express something which has been connected with the object recalled by the literal signification, either as _cause_ or _effect_, or as something which it _resembles_, or as something it has been connected with as a _part_, or by circumstances of _time_ or _place_. Of course, a process of reasoning will soon decide which of these must be selected. Take, for example, the expression,

"Streaming grief his faded cheek bedewed."

Here, as "grief" can not bedew the cheek, it must be the name of something which has been connected with grief, either by the principle of resemblance, contiguity in time or place, or by the relation of cause and effect. It is easy to determine that it can not be either of these except the last. Tears are the effect of sorrow, and are therefore called by this name. The nature of the idea conveyed by the figurative term will show whether the cause or effect, or some object related to it as it respects time, place, or resemblance, is intended, and no difficulty can ever occur in deciding. In all cases this general rule avails: when words are used figuratively, such ideas as have been in any way connected with them are to be retained as will be consistent with the known nature of things, and consistent with other assertions of the writer.

In regard to the _literal_ use of language, it has been shown that the same term is sometimes used for the name of the thing ordinarily expressed by it, sometimes for its cause, sometimes for its effect, and sometimes as including all these ideas. The rule for determining in which of these senses the term is used is the same as in regard to figurative language, viz., that signification must be attached to the term which is in agreement with experience as to the nature of things, and with the other sentiments of the writer. Thus, in relation to the example given of the term pride, suppose a child is called the "pride of its parents." We know it can not mean the _emotion of mind_; that it can not mean the _effects_ of this state of mind; and its only other meaning is found consistent with experience, viz., it is the _cause_ or occasion of pride to its parents. The same mode of reasoning can be applied to the other uses of the term. If a man is said to feel pride, there is but one meaning which can be attached to the term. If it is said that "the pride of the world passeth away," it includes the whole, and signifies that the causes of pride pass away, and with them the emotions and the effects.

The following, then, are the clear and simple rules to employ in interpreting all language:

LAWS OF INTERPRETATION.

1. The literal, ordinary meaning is to be given to all words, unless it would express what is inconsistent with experience as to the nature of things, or inconsistent with the opinions of the writer.

2. When the words in a sentence are capable of several literal meanings, that is to be chosen which makes the writer most consistent with himself and with all known circumstances.

3. When the literal meaning expresses what is not consistent with the nature of things or with the writer's other declarations, then the language is _figurative_, and only such a part of the ideas as have been in any way connected with the words used are to be retained as will secure such consistency.

4. In deciding the meaning of words, we are to be guided by the principles of common sense, viz.: No meaning is to be given unless there is _some_ evidence that it is true; and, when there is conflicting evidence, that meaning is the true one which has the _balance_ of evidence in its favor.

ADDENDA TO VOL. I.

The second volume will commence with a description of the _kind_ of evidence which sustains the Bible as a collection of authentic and authoritative records of revelations from the Creator. This kind of evidence, it will be shown, in one grand feature is entirely diverse from any that ever existed, or even that was ever _claimed_ to exist in reference to any pretended revelations.

It will also be shown that this evidence is as strong and reliable as that which regulates men in their daily practical concerns.

This attempt the writer supposes to be, in some respects, peculiar, and one that is particularly calculated to affect popular apprehension, especially that of well-balanced and practical minds. Instead of a great array of detail and argument, the whole will be contained in a very few pages, easily comprehended, and demanding but little time or effort.

In the next place, the laws of interpretation, and the principles of common sense as set forth in this volume, will be _applied_ to discover the answers of the Sacred Oracles to the great questions of life, and their agreement with reason, experience, and the moral sense of mankind.

This will involve a discussion of the _philosophical theories_ which it is believed have obscured and diminished the influence of the great Atoning Sacrifice of "the Great God our Savior Jesus Christ."

The work will conclude with the practical application of the views set forth to the greatest of all human interests, the _right_ training of the human mind in infancy and childhood.

Before offering to the public the topics to be embraced in the last volume, it is deemed expedient to present the _great principles_ on which all the discussions are to rest, and also a fair illustration of the mode in which these principles will be applied.

The following is the illustrative example:

_Theological Dogma of a Depraved Mental Constitution._

In the preceding pages we have seen the evidence that the mind of man is _perfect_ in its _constitutional powers_, and is thus the chief and highest evidence of the wisdom, justice, and benevolence of its Creator.

But the systems of theology in all the Christian sects, excepting a small fraction, teach that the mind of man comes into existence in this world with "_a depraved nature_;" meaning by this a mental constitution more or less depraved.

That this is the ordinary dogma of theological teachings is clear from this statement of the case. A thing can be wrong in only two conceivable ways: one is by its nature or original construction, and the other is by its action. The mind of man, therefore, if it is not perfect every way, is either wrong in _construction_ or wrong in _action_. Now no person ever claimed that the mind of man was not depraved in action, and therefore all who teach that it is depraved any other way must teach that it is depraved in its constitution, or in that nature it received from its Maker, for there are only these two modes of depravity conceivable.

It being granted, then, that the mind of our race is depraved in its nature, of course the Author of this nature is responsible for this inconceivable and wholesale wrong. This forces us to the inevitable conclusion that the Creator of mind is a being guilty of the highest conceivable folly, injustice, and malignity. For reason and common sense teach that "the nature of a contrivance is proof of the character and intention of its author." Therefore, if mind is depraved in construction, the Author of it is a depraved being, and totally unworthy of our trust, respect, or love.

This is the argument which, in all ages, has been pressed on those theologians who maintain the dogma of the depraved nature of man, and there have been these various methods by which this difficulty has been evaded:

One class openly avow that the Creator had power to make the mind of man perfect in all respects, and that he has proved that he has this power by making the minds of angels and of our first parents thus perfect. But, in consequence of our first parents eating the forbidden fruit, every mind created since that time has been ruined in the making, so as to be totally depraved. This, it is maintained, it was right for God to do. _How_ it was right we have no business to inquire. It is an awful mystery; but it was so done that God "is in no way the author of sin."

This amounts simply to a denial of the principle of reason, "that the nature of a contrivance is proof of the intention and character of the contriver." It is saying that the author of sin is not the author of sin.

This will be still farther apparent if we refer to page 158, where is exhibited the only conceivable modes in which one being can be the cause of sin or of wrong action in others. God is undisputably the author of all the _outward_ circumstances that surround us. If, then, he has made our susceptibilities wrong, or combined them wrong, he is the author of sin in every conceivable sense.

Whoever, therefore, affirms that God is the author of a depraved mental organization of the human mind, affirms that he is "the author of sin" in every conceivable sense. To assert such a fact, and then deny that God is the author of sin, is simply a contradiction in terms.

To avoid this dilemma, theologians have instituted the following theories:

The first class teach that the first pair of the human race were made with perfect minds, and then stood as representatives of the race and sinned for the whole. The first part of the penalty came on the actual sinners in the ruin of their own mental constitution, and then, all men being _represented_ in Adam and Eve, the Creator "imputed" this sin to all their posterity, and, as a penalty, all receive a depraved mental constitution.

That is to say, though each of the unborn millions descended from Adam was innocent of the crime, in order to be just, God "imputes" it to each, and, as a penalty, ruins each in its organization, when He has full power to make perfect minds.

Another class assume that the Creator established such a constitution of things that the nature of one mind is transmitted to all its myriad descendants, by the same law as the nature of a plant is included in one seed and is transmitted to all of its future kind. The first parents of our race, receiving perfect minds from their Creator, ruined them by one act of disobedience. Then, by the above law, instituted by their Maker, they transmitted this depraved constitution of mind to all their descendants.

This mode of evading responsibility is about as honorable as if a teacher should so construct springs and traps for his pupils that one little fellow, when forbidden to do it, should touch a spring that should cut off his own hand, and thus move other springs that would maim all the rest of the school, while the master lays all the blame on the child that disobeyed.

Another class teach that the first man and woman of the race were made with perfect minds, and then such a constitution of things was instituted by God that every mind of the human race was so existing with or in them, that when Adam and Eve _voluntarily_ disobeyed the Creator's first law, every one of their descendants _voluntarily_ did the same thing; and then, as a penalty for the deed, the parent and every one of the embryo descendants became "totally depraved."

This theory, which makes every human being guilty of a crime thousands of years before we were born, and for which we are suffering the most awful of all penalties, has nearly passed away to the puerilities of the old schoolmen, and yet there are some of the most popular professors in our largest and most respectable theological seminaries who are publicly advocating it at this very time.

Another method promulgated is the assumption that all the race were originally created perfect, and then, while in the possession of every possible advantage for virtue and happiness, they ruined themselves in a previous state of existence. This is the only theory which really meets the difficulty, and relieves the character of the Creator from being the guilty author of depraved minds.

But this theory, even if it could be established by revelation, does not remedy the strong argument of reason and experience against the wisdom and benevolence of the Creator, on the assumption of a depraved constitution of mind. The man denying a revelation, who is called upon to receive one, can say, Here is a race, every one of whom is ruined, and, so far as I can see, in the making of his mind by the Creator. Therefore this Creator, by his works, is shown to be a being of infinite folly and malignity, from whom no _reliable_ revelation is possible.

Granting the mind to be depraved, the light of reason inevitably guides to a weak or malevolent Creator. To illustrate this, suppose a man is seen manufacturing beautiful porcelain vases, and out of the "clay of the same lump," as he makes them, he spoils every one, cracking, marring, and defacing them in the very process of manufacture. Now suppose this person should turn to a witness, and offer to instruct him in the _best way of doing things_, what would be the common-sense reply? Exactly that which would be due to a Creator who has ruined every mind he sent into this world, and then proposes to reveal the _right way for those ruined creatures to act_!

Another illustration may be permitted. Suppose a colony, by some mischance, settles on an isolated island, which is found covered with the tobacco plant. They clear their plantations, but find that, by a remarkable and unintelligible arrangement, after every shower there is a fall of tobacco seeds, disseminated from an inaccessible height by a machine erected for the purpose and constantly supplied.

After some years, they receive a missive from the king to whom the island belongs, in which he informs them that tobacco is the chief object of his detestation; that it is doing incalculable mischief to his subjects; that it is the chief end of his life, and he wishes it to be of theirs, to exterminate the plant, and thus its use.

He, at the same time, states that he is the author of the contrivance for scattering the seed, and that he keeps it constantly supplied, and claims that he has a right "to do what he will with his own," without being questioned by his subjects.

He then enacts that any person who is found to use tobacco, or even to have a single seed or plant on his premises, shall be burned alive in a caldron of fire and brimstone.

If, in addition to this, that king were to command supreme love to him, and perfect confidence in his wisdom, justice, and goodness, all this would but faintly illustrate that awful system under consideration, whose penalties are _eternal_.

The assumption that the constitution of mind is depraved not only destroys the evidence of the Creator's wisdom and benevolence by the light of reason, but _destroys the possibility of a credible and reliable revelation from him_.

For the belief in the existence of a God is dependent on an intuitive truth, while his character is understood, without a revelation, only by the aid of that intuitive truth which teaches that the nature of his works proves his character and designs. Now if his greatest work, the immortal mind, that which alone gives any value to his other works, is malformed, and thus made the cause of all the misery, crime, and evil of this life, what is there to give any foundation for confidence that his revelations will not be false, pernicious, and malignant?

No man can start with the assumption that there is a revelation from the Creator that needs no proof. The only basis for such a revelation is that intuitive truth by the aid of which miracles and prophecy become evidences of the interposition of the Creator. Thus we perceive that the proof that "the author of a depraved constitution of mind is a depraved being," is as strong as the evidence of a revelation by miracles and prophecy can be.

In regard to these theories, and in regard to the dogma of theology which they are instituted to explain, it is claimed that both reason and the Bible equally forbid each and all of them.

It has already been shown, in Chapters xxii. and xxiii., that all the evidence of reason and experience goes to prove that the mind of man is perfect in its organization. We have only to inquire, then, in regard to the evidence claimed to be found in revelations from the Creator.

Before examining this evidence, it is important to notice the distinction between _revealed facts_ and the _theories_ invented to explain them.

The _fact_, which both experience and revelation agree in teaching, is that man, as a race, is guilty and depraved in _action_, and that from the earliest periods of life this _depraved action_ is manifested.

The _theories_ relate to _the cause_ of this wrong action, and there are only two. The first theory is, that the constitution of mind is perfect, and that the wrong action results from a want of experience, knowledge, right habits, right training, and right social influences.

The second theory is, that the constitution of mind is depraved, and that its wrong action is the inevitable result of this wrong construction.

Then come the theories in reference to _the cause_ of this assumed malformation of mind. There are only two ever assigned, viz., God and man: God by creation, and man by sinning _in_ Adam or _before_ Adam in a pre-existent state.

By those who ascribe the deed to God, it is claimed that he perpetrated this wholesale wrong to our race in one of two ways, viz., either by the direct miscreation of each mind at or near the time of birth, or by creating such a constitution of things that by one wrong act the first pair transmitted, from parent to child, through the whole race, a vitiated and depraved mental constitution.

We now resort to the Bible to ascertain what are its teachings on this subject.

In the first place, then, we find a constant recognition of the fact of a depraved _action_ of mind, and that this commences at the earliest period of life. On this, as a revealed _fact_, there is no debate.

Next, in regard to the _theories_ instituted to account for this fact. Here we shall only discuss the commonly accepted theory of the Christian world, and leave the other for the future volume.

The main reliance for the support of the common theory of a miscreated mind is found in Genesis, chapters i. and v., which, it is claimed, teaches, in the first place, that God could and did create the first human pair with minds perfectly organized, and, next, that after they sinned, their descendants came into life with a depraved mental constitution. The passages read thus:

Gen., i., 26, 27: "_And God said, 'Let us make man in our image, after our likeness.'_"

"_So God created man in his own image; in the image of God created he him, male and female created he them._"

Gen., v., 3: "_And Adam begat a son in his own likeness, after his image, and called his name Seth._"

The whole question in these passages turns on the meaning of the words "image" and "likeness."

Now the only conceptions possible of the "image or likeness" of a human mind to its spiritual Creator are, first, resemblance in its constitutional powers of intellect, susceptibility, and will, and, next, resemblance in the _action_ of these faculties.

That man is the image and likeness of his Maker in constitutional powers is clear, because we can not have any conception of the Creator but as of a mind like our own, infinite in the extent of such capacities. This, then, is _one_ respect in which the first pair could be in the image or likeness to God.

The other only conceivable respect in which they could resemble their Creator is by _their own voluntary action, and this can not be conceived of as created_.

Man is the sole producing cause (see page 158) of his own _voluntary_ acts, which alone decide moral character. Should God create these, man would cease to be their author and cease to be a free agent.

It is thus manifest that a mind can be _created_ in the image of God, so far as we can conceive, only in its constitutional powers of intellect, susceptibility, and will.

This being established as the meaning of the word when it is said that Adam begat Seth "in his own image," if it has reference to the mind alone, or chiefly, then it means that the mental organization of the child was like the parent's, and thus like the Creator's.

In the New Testament, the chief passages which are supposed to bear on this subject are in Romans, chapter v. These are the main texts:

Verse 12: "_Wherefore as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men for that all have sinned._"

Verse 19: "_For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous._"

Here we again are to discriminate between _facts_ and _theories_. The _facts_ here stated are, that by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; that death comes on all men because all sin; and that by one man's disobedience many were made sinners.

Then come the _theories_ as to _the mode_ by which many were made sinners by the sin of one man.

Here the Bible is silent. But theologians have manufactured the _theory_ that when Adam sinned the constitution of his mind was changed, and then that this nature was transmitted to his descendants. All this is without a word of proof.

Others have assumed that all mankind were existing in Adam, and "sinned in him, and fell with him," which is both unintelligible, and equally without support from the Bible.

These, it is believed, are all ever claimed as direct Scripture evidence of a depraved constitution of mind consequent on Adam's sin. Two other passages are quoted as having an _indirect_ bearing on this subject. They are as follows:

2 Peter, ii., 4: "_For if God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to hell, and delivered them into chains of darkness to be reserved unto judgment_"--

Jude, 6 verse: "_And the angels which kept not their first estate, but left their own habitation, he hath reserved in everlasting chains under darkness unto the judgment of the great day._"

In regard to these passages, we are to notice, as before, first, the _facts_ revealed, and, next, the _theories_ instituted in regard to them.

The facts are, that there are two classes of angels, those that have sinned and those that have not; that those that sinned kept not their first estate, but left their habitations; that God cast them down to hell, and that they are reserved in chains of darkness unto the judgment of the great day.

These are all the facts disclosed. Not a word is said as to the _cause_ or _reason_ why some sinned and some did not, nor as to the mode or manner by which these events were brought about. Here the _theories_ come in.

Those who maintain the depravity of the human mental constitution frame their theory on these passages thus:

It is here taught that there are a class of minds that have never sinned. There must be _a cause_ for this diversity from man's experience. _This cause is a perfect mental constitution._ This, it is seen, is _a mere assumption, without a word of proof from the passages quoted_! What is quite as remarkable is, that this theory is maintained in the face of the concession that both Adam and the fallen angels were as well endowed as the unsinning angels in regard to mental constitution, and yet that they all sinned just as the descendants of Adam have done.

This dogma has been sustained by certain misconceptions that should be considered.

The first is in the use of the term "nature." As this word is ordinarily used, it signifies that constitution, received from the Author of all things, which makes certain results or effects _invariable_. Thus, when a fountain invariably sends forth bitter waters, it is called its "nature" to do so; when a tree invariably produces bitter fruit, this is called its "nature." Now if it was a fact that the human mind never acted right, but invariably wrong, it would be proper to apply this term, and to say that in its "nature" it was totally depraved.

But this is not the fact. "Sin is a transgression of law," and every child, from the first, sometimes obeys and sometimes disobeys the physical, social, and moral laws of God. No child ever _invariably_ breaks them, but sometimes obeys and sometimes disobeys.

But theologians have mystified the subject by assuming the very thing to be proved, and then "reasoning in a circle." Thus they assume, not only without, but contrary to evidence, that all human minds _invariably_ act wrong from the first; therefore there must be a cause, and this cause is the "nature" received, directly or indirectly, from the Creator. Then they assume that, as every mind is "totally depraved" in its "nature," it can no more produce holy acts than a corrupt tree can produce good fruit, or a bitter fountain send forth sweet waters.

Another misconception which has embarrassed this subject has arisen from the supposition that it is irreverent, and contrary to the Bible, to allow any limitation to _almighty power_, even in "the nature of things."

But it can be clearly shown that every person who maintains that there is a Creator who is "perfect" in wisdom and benevolence, does, by this assertion, maintain that very limitation to which the objection is made. This is shown by means of accurate definitions.

Thus "_perfect wisdom_ is that which adapts the _best possible_ means to the _best possible_ ends."

"_Perfect benevolence_ is that which produces the _greatest possible good_ with the _least possible_ evil."

That is to say, a Creator who is perfect in wisdom and goodness has done the best that possibly can be done for the great universe of mind in all its infinite and eternal relations. This being so, certainly "_He has no power to do better_."

The only way this is evaded is by using different words that mean the same thing, and then refusing to define these words, or to accept exact definitions of them from others.

The infidel, who allows a God of perfect goodness and wisdom, and the strict Calvinist, who is shocked at hearing that God "_has no power_" to make a better system, or one that has less of evil, say the very same thing themselves, only in more vague and misty modes of expression. They, therefore, are precluded from objecting to positions that involve such a limitation, when it is the very one which they themselves assume.

To affirm that almighty power can make black white and yet black at the same time, or a straight line crooked and still straight, even the strictest upholders of the extent of almighty power would hesitate to affirm, because they are contradictions and absurdities. But they teach equal contradictions who claim that a mind can be _created_ with knowledge, habits, and experience, when it has had neither instruction, training, or experience.

Instead of claiming these absurdities as included in our ideas of this attribute of Deity, we are rather to assume that by almighty power is signified "a power to do all things _except contradictions and absurdities_."

Thus has been presented what is claimed as the evidence in the Bible in favor of a depraved mental constitution in the human race, and it is maintained that it amounts to _nothing at all_.

This being so, then we appeal to the principle of reason and common sense (p. 25), "that _nothing is to be assumed as true unless there is some evidence that it is so_."

Moreover, in Chapters xxii. and xxiii. is exhibited the evidence of reason and experience that the human mind is perfectly organized, and thus the highest evidence of its Maker's wisdom and benevolence.

So we can again appeal to another principle of reason, that "_we are to consider that right which has the balance of evidence in its favor_." If there is no evidence to prove the mind of man depraved in organization, and all the evidence of reason and experience is in favor of its perfect organization, is it not to be assumed that it is thus perfect?

To this might be added the teachings of the Bible in the same direction. But this is deferred to the future volume. In the present illustrative example, the aim is simply to exhibit the fallacy of _one_ of the theological theories that has been incorporated as a part of the teachings of the Bible, thus lessening the respect and confidence accorded to it, and impeding the true religious development of our race.

How it has happened that a dogma, which is so contrary to the moral feelings and the common sense of man, and, at the same time, unsupported by revelation, should have become so incorporated with the teachings of the Christian Church, will be set forth in the next article.

_History of the Dogma._

The history of the dogma of the depraved constitution of the human mind imparted directly or indirectly by the creative agency of its Maker has become a matter of profound interest.

So far as appears, _theories_ on the _philosophy_ of religion did not agitate the apostolic age. Christianity first spread among the humbler classes. They felt that they were sinful and miserable in the present life, and looked with dread and dismay to the dark passage of the grave and the destinies to follow. They were taught to "believe on the Lord Jesus Christ," and that thus they would become good and happy now and forever. This they understood to mean, not a mere intellectual conviction, but a _practical faith_, in which Christ was received as their supreme Lord and teacher _by conforming their feelings and conduct to his teachings_.

But, after a while, the philosophers and rulers became Christians, and then commenced the two grand evils: first, the _theories of philosophy_, and, next, the _enforcing of these theories by pains and penalties_. About A.D. 400 commenced the discussion of the theory under consideration. _Pelagius_, a learned and devout man of Great Britain, aided by his friend Celcius, promulgated the common-sense views on the nature of mind derived from reason and experience, mainly as set forth in this volume, and claimed that these views were sustained by the teachings of the Old and New Testament. He and his friend traveled and disseminated these views in Great Britain, France, Africa, Italy, and Palestine, over which Christianity to a great extent prevailed. The celebrated Augustine, a man of great goodness, talents, and learning, became their leading antagonist. He set forth the philosophical theories afterward adopted and taught by Calvin in the form which is now denominated _the system of High Calvinism_.

This system starts with the assumption (without proof) that the Creator _could_ form mind on a more perfect model than that of our race, and that he _proved_ it by forming the minds of angels and of our first parents on this pattern. But, as a penalty for one act of disobedience by them, first their own mental constitution was vitiated. Next, in the language of standard Calvinists, "Such as man was _after_ the fall, such children did he beget; corruption, by the righteous judgment of God, being derived from Adam to his posterity, not by imitation, but by the propagation of a vicious nature. Wherefore all men are conceived in sin, and are born children of wrath; unfit for every good connected with salvation; prone to evil, dead in sins, and, without the Holy Spirit regenerating them, they neither _will_ nor _can_ return to God, amend their depraved nature, nor _dispose themselves for its amendment_."