Chapter IX: Part I: No. 3 (9)

There was a considerable ferment in France on the subject of the
length of the line held by the French Army as compared with our
army. The French losses had been enormous. They had practically
borne the brunt of the fighting for three years. There was a larger
proportion of their young manhood put into the line than in any
belligerent country in the world. They held 336 miles. We held a
front of 100 miles.

That is not the whole statement, because the Germans were much more
densely massed in front of ourselves. Not only that, but the line we
held was much more vulnerable. Practically the defense of Paris was
left to us, and the defense of some of the most important centres,
but there was the fact that you had this enormous front held by the
French Army, as compared with what looked like the comparatively
small front of ours.

Shortage of Farm Labor

In addition to that, the French Army at that time was holding, I
think, a two-division front on our line in order to enable us to
accumulate the necessary reserves for the purposes of the attack in
Flanders. That was part of the line which, I believe, was held
before by the British and French.

The French were pressing in order to withdraw men from the army for
purposes of agriculture. I ought to explain that their agricultural
output had fallen enormously, owing to the fact that they had
withdrawn a very large proportion of their men from the cultivation
of the fields, and they felt it essential that they should withdraw
part of their army for the purpose of cultivating the soil, and they
were pressing us upon these topics.

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir William Robertson, and
the Cabinet felt that it was inevitable that during the Winter
months there should be some extension, and we acknowledged that
something had to be done to meet the French demands, and to that
extent we accepted the principle that there must be some extension
of the line.

At that time the Field Marshal was under the impression that the
Cabinet had taken a decision without his consent. The Chief of the
Imperial Staff upon that sent the following memorandum to the War
Cabinet. I will read it, but first, with reference to the Boulogne
Conference, I may, perhaps, say that that was the first time we had
a discussion with the French Ministers. The subject of discussion
was a rather important foreign office. It was not summoned in the
least to discuss an extension of the lines. We never knew that was
to be raised. Sir William Robertson and I represented the British
Government, and M. Painlevé, the Prime Minister, and General Foch
represented the French Government.

When Sir William Robertson discovered that the Field Marshal was
under the impression that we had come to a decision without his
consent he sent the War Cabinet a memorandum, in which he says:

"At the recent Boulogne Conference the question of extending our
front was raised by the French representatives. The reply given was
that, while in principle we were, of course, ready to do whatever
could be done, the matter was one which could not be discussed in
the absence of Sir Douglas Haig, or during the continuance of the
present operations, and that due regard must also be had to the plan
of operations for next year.

"It was suggested that it would be best for the Field Marshal to
come to an arrangement with General Pétain, when this could be done.
So far as I am aware no formal discussion has taken place, and the
matter cannot be regarded as decided. Further, I feel sure that the
War Cabinet would not think of deciding such a question without
first obtaining Sir Douglas Haig's views. I am replying to him in
the above sense."

That, I think, was on the 19th of October. The War Cabinet fully
approved of the communication. Sir Douglas Haig communicated, and
said that it threw a new light on the Boulogne position. I think
that we have a right to complain of the way in which it has been
rumored about that Sir Douglas Haig protested.

The War Cabinet's Decision

The fact that Sir William Robertson had explained and Sir Douglas
Haig had stated that the explanation threw new light has never been
repeated. That is how mischief is done.

On Oct. 24 this question was first formally discussed by the War
Cabinet. There was further pressure from the French Government, and
Sir William Robertson gave his views as to the time which the
British Government ought to take, and this conclusion is recorded in
the minutes of the War Cabinet as follows:

"The War Cabinet approve of the suggestion of the Chief of the
Imperial Staff that he should reply to Field Marshal Sir Douglas
Haig in the following sense: The War Cabinet are of the opinion that
in deciding to what extent the British troops can take over the line
from the French regard must be had to the necessity of giving them a
reasonable opportunity for leave, rest, and training during the
Winter months and to the plan of operations for the next year, and,
further, while the present offensive continues it will not be
possible to commence taking over more line.

"Under these circumstances the War Cabinet fear that until this
policy is settled it will be premature to decide finally whether the
British front is to be extended by four divisions or to greater or
lesser extent."

The resolution was communicated to Sir Douglas Haig by Sir William
Robertson, and we never departed from it. After that came the
Cambrai incident and the Italian disaster, which necessitated our
sending troops to Italy. That made it difficult for the Field
Marshal to carry out the promise he made to General Pétain for a
certain extension of the front. Then the present French Prime
Minister came in, and he is not a very easy gentleman to refuse. He
was very insistent that the British Army should take over the line.

Clemenceau Suggested Versailles

We stood by the position that that was a matter to be discussed by
the two Commanders in Chief. We never swerved from that position. At
last M. Clemenceau suggested that the question should be discussed
by the military representatives at Versailles, and that the
Versailles Council should decide if there was any difference of
opinion. The military representatives discussed the question, and
the only interference of the War Cabinet was to this extent. We
communicated with the Chief of Staff, who was then in France, and
with Sir Douglas Haig to urge on them the importance of preparing
their case for the other side so as to make the strongest possible
case for the British view.

The military representatives at Versailles suggested a compromise,
but coupled with it recommendations as to steps which ought to be
taken by the French Army to assist the British if they were
attacked, and by the British to assist the French if they were
attacked, which was even a more important question than the
extension of the front.

That recommendation came up for discussion at the Versailles Council
of Feb. 1. Before that meeting Sir Douglas Haig and General Pétain
met and entered into an agreement as to the extension of the front
to Brissy, and Sir Douglas Haig reported that to the Versailles
Council. When the discussion took place there no further extension
of the line was taken at all as a result of the discussion.

That is the whole story. I was to make it perfectly clear that in
the action Sir Douglas Haig took for the extension of the line he
had the full approval of the British Cabinet, having regard to the
pressure of the French Government and military authorities. Sir
Douglas Haig had no option except to make the extension. He was in
our judgment absolutely right in the course he took. Naturally, he
would have preferred not to have done it, but the British Government
fully approved of the action he took.

The real lesson of the discussion is the importance of unity of
command. It would never have arisen if you had had that. Instead of
one army and one commander responsible for one part of the line, and
another army and another commander responsible for another part of
the line, we have one united command responsible for the whole and
every part. It was the only method of safety, and I am glad we have
it at last.

It was not so much a question of the length of the line held by one
force or the length held by another. It was a question of reserves
massed behind.

The Premier ended with a plea for a truce to political "sniping." On May 13 it was announced that as a disciplinary measure General Maurice had been placed on "the retired list."

The New British Service Act

Provisions of Law Which Raises Military Age

The new British Military Service act became effective in April, 1918, having passed both houses of Parliament by large majorities; it immediately received the royal assent. The provision applying conscription to Ireland was suspended temporarily, on the assumption that it would not be enforced until a measure of home rule for Ireland was agreed upon. The main provisions of the new service measure are as follows, as analyzed by The London Times:

RAISING OF MILITARY AGE

Men Up to 50.--Obligation to military service imposed upon every
male British subject:

1. Who has at any time since Aug. 14, 1915, or who for the time
being is in Great Britain, and

2. Who on April 18, 1918, had attained the age of 18 years and had
not attained the age of 51 years or who at any subsequent date
attains the age of 18 years.

Men Up to 55.--If it appears necessary at any time for the defense
of the realm, his Majesty may, by Order in Council, declare the
extension of the obligation to military service to men generally or
to any class of men up to any age not exceeding 56 years. The draft
of any such order is to be presented to each house of Parliament,
and will not be submitted to his Majesty in Council unless each
house presents an address, praying that the order may be made.

Doctors.--Duly qualified medical practitioners, who have not
attained the age of 56 years, are made immediately liable to
military service.

FORMER PRISONERS OF WAR

The clause in the act of May, 1916, excepting from military service
any person who has been "a prisoner of war, captured or interned by
the enemy, and has been released or exchanged," is to cease to have
effect. It is, however, provided that the change shall be without
prejudice to any undertaking, recognized by the Government, and for
the time being in force, that any released or exchanged prisoner of
war shall not serve in his Majesty's forces during the present war.

TIME-EXPIRED MEN

The act of May, 1916, provided that the service should not be
prolonged of men who, when their times for discharge occurred, had
served a period of twelve years or more and had attained the age of
41 years. This section is to cease to have effect.

EXTENSION TO IRELAND

Method of Procedure.--His Majesty may, by Order in Council, extend
the act to Ireland, with the necessary modifications and
adaptations.

Legal Proceedings.--An Order in Council may be issued to make
special provision for the constitution of the civil court before
which proceedings for any offenses punishable on summary conviction
under the Reserve Forces act, the Army act, and the Military Service
acts are to be brought in Ireland. The order may also assign any
such proceedings to a specified civil court or courts.

WITHDRAWAL OF EXEMPTIONS

His Majesty may, by proclamation declaring that a national emergency
has arisen, direct that any certificates of exemption other than
those granted on the grounds of ill-health or of conscientious
objection shall cease to have effect.

THE TRIBUNALS

The Local Government Board or the Secretary for Scotland may make
regulations for the following purposes:

1. For providing for applications for certificates of exemption,
including appeals, being made to such tribunals, constituted in such
manner and for such areas as may be authorized.

2. For establishing special tribunals, committees, or panels for
dealing with particular classes of cases.

3. For regulating and limiting the making of applications.

4. For making other provision to secure the expeditious making and
disposal of applications.

It is provided that such regulations shall not alter the four
grounds for applications for certificates of exemption--the
expediency, in the national interests, that a man should be engaged
in other work, business or domestic reasons, ill-health, and
conscientious objection.

PENALTIES

Any person making a false statement with a view to preventing or
postponing the calling up of himself or any other person, or for any
medical examination, is to be liable to six months' imprisonment.

It is to be the duty of any man whose certificate has been
withdrawn, or who no longer satisfies the conditions on which it was
granted, to transmit it forthwith to the local office of the
Ministry of National Service. If he fails without reasonable cause
to do so, he will be liable to a fine of £50.

MEDICAL EXAMINATION

Any man holding a certificate of exemption (other than one from
combatant service only) or applying for its renewal may at any time
be required to present himself for medical examination or
re-examination.

VOLUNTEER OBLIGATION

Every man granted a certificate of exemption is to join the
Volunteer Force for the perid of the war, unless the tribunal
dealing with the case orders to the contrary.

CONVENTIONS WITH ALLIED STATES

The act is to be read with previous acts in relation to the act of
1917, which confirmed conventions with allied States making subjects
of those States in this country liable for military service. That
act is also to apply to Ireland, if the act is extended to Ireland.

EXCEPTIONS

The exceptions from the act are the following:

1. Men ordinarily resident in the Dominions.

2. Members of the regular or reserve forces or of the Dominion
forces, and territorials liable to foreign service.

3. Men serving in the navy, the Royal Marines, or the air force.

4. Certain categories of officers and men who have left or been
discharged from the forces in consequence of disablement or
ill-health; and men medically rejected, if, on further medical
examination after April 5, 1917, they have been certified to be
totally and permanently unfit for any form of military service.

5. Men in holy orders or regular ministers of any religious
denomination.

British Aid to Italy

General Plumer's Dispatch

The report was published May 10, 1918, that 250,000 Italian troops had been concentrated in France to swell the reserves of the allied armies against the German offensive, and that this had been accomplished without weakening the Italian front, which was preparing for a threatened Austrian attack. No statement was made regarding the British troops that had gone to Italy's aid during the disaster to the Italian armies in 1917.

General Sir Herbert Plumer, who took over the command of the British troops in Italy after their arrival there, Nov. 10, 1917, submitted his official report March 9, 1918. He stated that he found on his arrival that the situation in Italy was disquieting, the Italian Army having received a severe blow, and the aid that the British and French might give could not be immediate owing to difficulties of transport. As it was then uncertain whether the Italians could hold the Piave line, it was arranged that two British divisions in conjunction with the French should move to the hills north and south of Vicenza. By the time the troops had reached this position the situation had improved and an offer was made by the British in conjunction with the French to take over a sector of the foothills of the Asiago Plateau. But as snow was imminent and special mountain equipment was difficult to provide, the suggestion was made by the Italians that the British should take over the Montsello sector, with the French on their left. This was agreed to.

Sir Herbert considers that the entrance of the French and British had an excellent moral effect and enabled the Italians to withdraw and reorganize. The Montsello sector, which was taken over on Dec. 4 and work immediately begun on its defense, is described by Sir Herbert as a hinge to the whole Italian line, joining the mountain portion facing north, from Mount Tomba to Lake Garda, to the Piave line held by the 3d Italian Army.

December was an anxious month. Several German divisions were east of the Piave, and an attempt to force the river and capture Venice was considered likely. Local attacks grew more and more severe, and, though the progress of the enemy was not great and Italian counterattacks were constantly made, the danger of a break-through increased. The Austrians were being encouraged to persevere in the hope of getting down to the plains for the Winter.

Rear lines of defense were constructed, and as time passed and the preparations were well forward the feeling of security grew, and was further increased by the recapture by the Italians of the slopes of Monte Asolone on Dec. 22. The following day Mount Melago and Col del Rosso, on the Asiago Plateau, were lost, but the Italians regained the former by a counterattack. Though Christmas Day found the situation still serious, especially on the Asiago, where the Italians, while fighting stubbornly, suffered from strain and cold, the situation showed signs of improvement. This outlook was brightened still further by the capture of Mount Tomba, with 1,500 prisoners, by the French. In this action British artillery assisted.

"During all this period," the dispatch continues, "we had carried out continuous patrol work across the River Piave and much successful counterbattery work. The Piave is a very serious obstacle, especially at this season of the year, the breadth opposite the British front being considerably over 1,000 yards, and the current 14 knots. Every form of raft and boat has been used, but wading has proved the most successful, though the icy cold water made the difficulties even greater. In spite of this there has never been any lack of volunteers for these enterprises.

"On Jan. 1 our biggest raid was carried out by the Middlesex Regiment. This was a most difficult and well-planned operation, which had for its objective the capture and surrounding of several buildings held by the enemy to a depth of 2,000 yards inland, provided a surprise could be effected. Two hundred and fifty men were passed across by wading and some prisoners were captured, but, unfortunately, the alarm was given by a party of fifty of the enemy that was encountered in an advanced post, and the progress inland had therefore, in accordance with orders, to be curtailed. The recrossing of the river was successfully effected, and our casualties were very few. An operation of this nature requires much forethought and arrangement, even to wrapping every man in hot blankets immediately on emerging from the icy water.

"The 3d Italian Army also opened the year well by clearing the Austrians from the west bank of the Piave about Zenson. This was followed on Jan. 14 by the attack of the 4th Italian Army on Mount Asolone, which, although not entirely successful, resulted in capturing over 400 Austrian prisoners. The situation had by this time so far improved that I offered to take over another sector of defense on my right in order to assist the Italians. This was agreed to, and was completed by Jan. 28. On this day and the following the 1st Italian Army carried out successful operations on the Col del Rosso--Mont Val Bella front, on the Asiago Plateau. The infantry attacked with great spirit, and captured 2,500 Austrians. British artillery took part in the above operation."

General Plumer states that in February the weather was bad, much snow having fallen, and operations were hampered. Although the British had not taken part in serious fighting, yet they had some share in the improvement which, he says, had taken place.

The work of the R. F. C., under Brig. Gen. Webb-Bowen, during the period under review (says Sir Herbert) has been quite brilliant. From the moment of arrival they made their presence felt, and very soon overcame the difficulties of the mountains. They have taken part in all operations, and rendered much assistance to the Italians in the air. They have carried out a large number of successful raids on enemy aerodromes, railway junctions, &c., and have during the period destroyed sixty-four hostile machines, a large proportion of which were German, and nine balloons, our losses to the enemy during the period being twelve machines and three balloons.

A comparison of the photographs of hostile battery positions when our artillery entered the line with the positions now occupied shows that the enemy batteries have been successfully forced back almost throughout the whole front. Some British artillery assisted both in French and Italian operations, and a frequent interchange of British and Italian batteries was made, together with counterbattery staff officers, in order that experience of each other's methods might be gained. Every effort was made to illustrate the value of counterbattery work, the value of which we had learned by experience in France, but which the Italians had not hitherto fully appreciated.

"The Italians were only too anxious to profit by any experience we could give them, and this was done not only by frequent interchange of visits of commanders and staffs to the various sectors of defense, but by the establishment of schools of instruction, at which a large number of Italian officers actually underwent the courses. About 100 Italian officers attended the courses at the various schools, together with some French officers. Similarly, British officers underwent courses at French and Italian schools."

Sir Herbert thanks the Italian authorities for their assistance, especially General Diaz, Chief of the Staff, and expresses indebtedness to Generals Fayolle and Maistre, in command of the French troops.

Emperor Charles's "Dear Sixtus" Letter

French Supplemental Statement Corroborates Its Authenticity

The publication of the letter of Emperor Charles of Austria to his brother-in-law, Prince Sixtus, in which he sought a separate peace with France, referring to the "just claims" of France to Alsace-Lorraine, and which caused the downfall of Count Czernin, the Austrian Foreign Secretary, was followed by this official denial by the Austrian Government:

The letter by his Apostolic Majesty, published by the French Premier
in his communiqué of April 12, 1918, is falsified, (verfaelscht.)
First of all, it may be declared that the personality of far higher
rank than the Foreign Minister, who, as admitted in the official
statement of April 7, undertook peace efforts in the Spring of 1917,
must be understood to be not his Apostolic Majesty but Prince Sixte
of Bourbon, who in the Spring of 1917 was occupied with bringing
about a rapprochement between the belligerent States. As regards the
text of the letter published by M. Clemenceau, the Foreign Minister
declares by All Highest command that his Apostolic Majesty wrote a
purely personal private letter in the Spring of 1917 to his
brother-in-law, Prince Sixte of Bourbon, which contained no
instructions to the Prince to initiate mediation with the President
of the French Republic or any one else, to hand on communications
which might be made to him, or to evoke and receive replies. This
letter, moreover, made no mention of the Belgian question, and
contained, relative to Alsace-Lorraine, the following-passage: "I
would have used all my personal influence in favor of the French
claims for the return of Alsace-Lorraine, if these claims were just.
They are not, however." The second letter of the Emperor mentioned
in the French Premier's communique of April 9, in which his
Apostolic Majesty is said to have declared that he was "in accord
with his Minister," is significantly not mentioned by the French
communiqué.

This statement drew forth from the French Government the following reply:

There are rotten consciences. The Emperor Charles, finding it
impossible to save his face, falls into the stammerings of a man
confounded. He is now reduced to accusing his brother-in-law of
forgery, by fabricating with his own hand a lying text. The original
document, the text of which has been published by the French
Government, was communicated in the presence of M. Jules Cambon,
Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and delegated
for this purpose by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the
President of the Republic, who, with the authorization of the
Prince, handed a copy of it to the President of the Council.

The Prince spoke of the matter to M. Ribot himself in terms which
would have been devoid of sense if the text had not been that
published by the French Government, is it not evidence that no
conversation could have been opened, and that the President of the
Republic would not even have received the Prince a second time, if
the latter, at Austria's instance, had been the bearer of a document
which contested our rights instead of affirming them?

The Emperor Charles's letter, as we have quoted it, was shown by
Prince Sixte himself to the Chief of State. Moreover, two friends of
the Prince can attest the authenticity of the letter, especially the
one who received it from the Prince to copy it.

The Serbian Government, moreover, gave the lie direct to Count Czernin's statement in reference to offering peace to Serbia. Premier Pashitch was asked in the Skupshtina at Corfu by Deputy Marco Trifcovitch whether Count Czernin's statement was true. He replied that he had denied Count Czernin's statements as soon as he had received the text of the speech from Amsterdam, and that he welcomed this fresh opportunity of declaring before Parliament that, so far as Serbia was concerned, the statements were totally inaccurate. (Exclamations from the right, "Czernin lied!") The Premier then proceeded to say that Count Czernin had never made peace overtures to Serbia, and that, if he had, such proposals would not have been accepted. "All the statements of Count Czernin," continued M. Pashitch, "are only the result of Austro-Hungarian intrigues."

Premier Clemenceau explained in detail before three committees of the French Chamber, the Committees on Foreign Affairs, the Army, and the Navy, which represented practically one-fourth of the total membership, the circumstances connected with the letters; it was unanimously agreed that there was nothing in the situation to justify any further consideration than had been given them. The Paris Temps gave the following details concerning their receipt:

The Emperor's two letters, and the conversations arising out of
them, will form an essential part of the proceedings before the
committees today. The letter from the Emperor to Prince Sixte of
Bourbon-Parma was communicated to M. Poincaré on March 31 last year,
but it remained in the possession of the Prince, who gave a copy of
it to M. Ribot, by whom it was placed in the archives of the French
Foreign Office. "Let us add," says the Temps, "that in the course
of the interview which he had with Lloyd George at Folkestone a few
days after the copy of the letter came into his possession that M.
Ribot handed a copy of this copy to the British Premier. A little
later in the interview which took place at St. Jean de Maurienne, in
Savoy, between the chiefs of the British, French, and Italian
Cabinets the question was raised as to what should be done in case
the Austro-Hungarian Cabinet took steps toward peace negotiations.
An agreement was come to without difficulty between the Allies as to
the line of conduct to be adopted in such an eventuality. Let us add
that this first letter sent to Prince Sixte had determined the
Allies to ask for further explanations, as the result of which
Prince Sixte received from his imperial brother-in-law a second
letter, which was also communicated to M. Poincaré and M. Ribot. We
have no right to give any indication on this subject, but we believe
we can state that this second letter was regarded unanimously by the
Allies as of such a nature that it would not permit them to pursue
the conversations further."

Kaiser Wilhelm in the following telegram accepted without reserve Emperor Charles's statement that the Sixtus letter had been distorted:

Accept my heartiest thanks for your telegram, in which you repudiate
as entirely baseless the assertion of the French Premier regarding
your attitude toward French claims to Alsace-Lorraine, and in which
you once again accentuate the solidarity of interest existing
between us and our respective empires. I hasten to inform you that
in my eyes there was no need whatever for any such assurance on your
part, for I was not for a moment in doubt that you have made our
cause your own, in the same measure as we stand for the rights of
your monarchy. The heavy but successful battles of these years have
clearly demonstrated this fact to every one who wants to see. They
have only drawn the bonds close together. Our enemies, who are
unable to do anything against us in honorable warfare, do not recoil
from the most sordid and the lowest methods. We must, therefore, put
up with it, but all the more is it our duty ruthlessly to grapple
with and beat the enemy in all the theatres of war. In true
friendship, WILHELM.

As a sequel to the matter it was reported from Vienna that the mother of Empress Zita and Prince Sixtus had been compelled to leave Vienna and live in retirement at her estates, remote from the Austrian capital.

THE ISSUES IN IRELAND

Official Report of the Irish Convention--Full Text of the Chairman's Summary of the Proceedings

The Irish home-rule question, in consequence of the failure of the Irish Convention to agree, became an important war issue in the Spring of 1918 on account of its effect upon Great Britain's man-power measures.

Premier Lloyd George, on May 21, 1917, announced the Government's decision to summon a convention of Irishmen representing all parties and interests to endeavor to reach an agreement on the home-rule question. The Sinn Feiners refused to send representatives, but all other factions were represented in the convention, which met July 25, 1917, at Dublin and elected Sir Horace Plunkett Chairman. The report of its recommendations was made public April 13, 1918, in three separate documents--the proposals for a scheme of Irish self-government, adopted by vote of 44 to 29 in a total membership of 90; a protest by the Ulster Unionist delegates, who dissented from any agreement, and the report of 22 Nationalist delegates, who were unable to agree to the fiscal proposals. The majority proposals were accepted by practically all the Nationalists, all the Southern Unionists, and 5 out of 7 of the Labor representatives.

The summary of the proceedings, presented by Sir Horace Plunkett, and the scheme of government as agreed upon by the majority, are of importance historically for a comparison with subsequent measures of home rule, which the British Government announces it intends to introduce before putting into force conscription in Ireland.

THE CHAIRMAN'S SUMMARY

Sir Horace Plunkett's letter reads:

Sir: I have the honor to transmit herewith the report of the
proceedings of the Irish Convention. For the immediate object of the
Government the report tells all that needs to be told:

It shows that in the convention, while it was not found possible to
overcome the objections of the Ulster Unionists, a majority of
Nationalists, all the Southern Unionists, and five out of the seven
Labor representatives were agreed that the scheme of Irish
self-government set out in Paragraph 42 of the report should be
immediately passed into law. A minority of Nationalists propose a
scheme which differs in only one important particular from that of
the majority. The convention has, therefore, laid a foundation of
Irish agreement unprecedented in history.

I recognize that action in Parliament upon the result of our
deliberations must largely depend upon public opinion. Without a
knowledge of the circumstances which, at the termination of our
proceedings, compelled us to adopt an unusual method of presenting
the results of our deliberations, the public might be misled as to
what has actually been achieved. It is, therefore, necessary to
explain our procedure.

Adopting the Report

We had every reason to believe that the Government contemplated
immediate legislation upon the results of our labors. The work of an
Irish settlement, suspended at the outbreak of the war, is now felt
to admit of no further postponement. In the dominions and in the
United States, as well as in other allied countries, the unsettled
Irish question is a disturbing factor both in regard to war effort
and peace aims. Nevertheless, urgent as our task was, we could not
complete it until every possibility of agreement had been explored.
The moment this point was reached--and you will not be surprised
that it took us eight months to reach it--we decided to issue our
report with the least possible delay. To do this we had to avoid
further controversy and protracted debate. I was, therefore, on
March 22, instructed to draft a report which should be a mere
narrative of the convention's proceedings, with a statement, for the
information of the Government, of the conclusions adopted, whether
unanimously or by majorities.

It was hoped that this report might be unanimously signed; and it
was understood that any groups or individuals would be free to
append to it such statements as they deemed necessary to give
expression to their views. The draft report was circulated on March
30, and discussed and amended on April 4 and 5. The accuracy of the
narrative was not challenged, though there was considerable
difference of opinion as to the relative prominence which should be
given to some parts of the proceedings. As time pressed, it was
decided not to have any discussion upon a majority report, nor upon
any minority reports or other statements which might be submitted.
The draft report was adopted by a majority, and the Chairman and
Secretary were ordered to sign it and forward it to the Government.
A limit of twenty-four hours was, by agreement, put upon the
reception of any other reports or statements, and in the afternoon
of April 5 the convention adjourned sine die.

The public is thus provided with no majority report, in the sense of
a reasoned statement in favor of the conclusions upon which the
majority are agreed, but is left to gather from the narrative of
proceedings what the contents of such a report would have been. On
the other hand, both the Ulster Unionists and a minority of the
Nationalists have presented minority reports covering the whole
field of the convention's inquiry. The result of this procedure is
to minimize the agreement reached, and to emphasize the
disagreement. In these circumstances I conceive it to be my duty as
Chairman to submit such explanatory observations as are required to
enable the reader of the report and the accompanying documents to
gain a clear idea of the real effect and significance of the
convention's achievement.

I may assume a knowledge of the broad facts of the Irish question.
It will be agreed that of recent years the greatest obstacle to its
settlement has been the Ulster difficulty. There seemed to be two
possible issues to our deliberations. If a scheme of Irish
self-government could be framed to which the Ulster Unionists would
give their adherence, then the convention might produce a unanimous
report. Failing such a consummation, we might secure agreement,
either complete or substantial, between the Nationalist, the
Southern Unionist, and the Labor representatives. Many entertained
the hope that the effect of such a striking and wholly new
development would be to induce Ulster to reconsider its position.

Ulster Issue Unsolved

Perhaps unanimity was too much to expect. Be this as it may, neither
time nor effort was spared in striving for that goal, and there were
moments when its attainment seemed possible. There was, however, a
portion of Ulster where a majority claimed that, if Ireland had the
right to separate herself from the rest of the United Kingdom, they
had the same right to separation from the rest of Ireland. But the
time had gone by when any other section of the Irish people would
accept the partition of their country, even as a temporary
expedient. Hence, the Ulster Unionist members in the convention
remained there only in the hope that some form of home rule would be
proposed which might modify the determination of those they
represented to have neither part nor lot in an Irish Parliament. The
Nationalists strove to win them by concessions, but they found
themselves unable to accept any of the schemes discussed, and the
only scheme of Irish government they presented to the convention was
confined to the exclusion of their entire province.

Long before the hope of complete unanimity had passed, the majority
of the convention were considering the possibilities of agreement
between the Nationalists and the Southern Unionists. Lord Midleton
was the first to make a concrete proposal to this end. The report
shows that in November he outlined to the Grand Committee and in
December brought before the convention what looked like a workable
compromise. It accepted self-government for Ireland. In return for
special minority representation in the Irish Parliament, already
conceded by the Nationalists, it offered to that Parliament complete
power over internal legislation and administration, and, in matters
of finance, over direct taxation and excise. But, although they
agreed that the customs revenue should be paid in to the Irish
Exchequer, the Southern Unionists insisted upon the permanent
reservation to the Imperial Parliament of the power to fix the rates
of customs duties. By far the greater part of our time and attention
was occupied by this one question, whether the imposition of customs
duties should or should not be under the control of the Irish
Parliament. The difficulties of the Irish Convention may be summed
up in two words--Ulster and Customs.

Customs and Excise Problem

The Ulster difficulty the whole world knows; but how the customs
question came to be one of vital principle, upon the decision of
which depended the amount of agreement that could be reached in the
convention, needs to be told. The tendency of recent political
thought among constitutional Nationalists has been toward a form of
government resembling as closely as possible that of the dominions,
and, since the geographical position of Ireland imposes obvious
restrictions in respect of naval and military affairs, the claim for
dominion home rule was concentrated upon a demand for unrestricted
fiscal powers. Without separate customs and excise Ireland would,
according to this view, fail to attain a national status like that
enjoyed by the dominions.

Upon this issue the Nationalists made a strong case, and were able
to prove that a considerable number of leading commercial men had
come to favor fiscal autonomy as part of an Irish settlement. In the
present state of public opinion in Ireland it was feared that
without customs no scheme the convention recommended would receive a
sufficient measure of popular support to secure legislation. To
obviate any serious disturbance of the trade of the United Kingdom
the Nationalists were prepared to agree to a free-trade arrangement
between the two countries. But this did not overcome the
difficulties of the Southern Unionists, who on this point agreed
with the Ulster Unionists. They were apprehensive that a separate
system of customs control, however guarded, might impair the
authority of the United Kingdom over its external trade policy.
Neither could they consent to any settlement which was, in their
judgment, incompatible with Ireland's full participation in a scheme
of United Kingdom federation, should that come to pass.

It was clear that by means of mutual concessions agreement between
the Nationalists and the Southern Unionists could be reached on all
other points. On this important point, however, a section of the
Nationalists, who have embodied their views in a separate report,
held that no compromise was possible. On the other hand, a majority
of the Nationalists and the whole body of Southern Unionists felt
that nothing effective could result from their work in the
convention unless some understanding was reached upon customs which
would render an agreement on a complete scheme attainable. Neither
side was willing to surrender the principle; but both sides were
willing, in order that a Parliament should be at once established,
to postpone a legislative decision upon the ultimate control of
customs and excise. At the same time each party has put on record,
in separate notes subjoined to the report, its claim respecting the
final settlement of this question. A decision having been reached
upon the cardinal issue, the majority of the convention carried a
series of resolutions which together form a complete scheme of
self-government.

Parliament for All Ireland

This scheme provides for the establishment of a Parliament for the
whole of Ireland, with an Executive responsible to it, and with full
powers over all internal legislation, administration, and direct
taxation. Pending a decision of the fiscal question, it is provided
that the imposition of duties of customs and excise shall remain
with the Imperial Parliament, but that the whole of the proceeds of
these taxes shall be paid into the Irish Exchequer. A joint
Exchequer Board is to be set up to determine the Irish true revenue,
and Ireland is to be represented upon the Board of Customs and
Excise of the United Kingdom.

The principle of representation in the Imperial Parliament was
insisted upon from the first by the Southern Unionists, and the
Nationalists conceded it. It was felt, however, that there were
strong reasons for providing that the Irish representatives at
Westminster should be elected by the Irish Parliament rather than
directly by the constituencies, and this was the arrangement
adopted.

It was accepted in principle that there should be an Irish
contribution to the cost of imperial services, but owing to lack of
data it was not found possible in the convention to fix any definite
sum.

It was agreed that the Irish Parliament should consist of two
houses--a Senate of sixty-four members and a House of Commons of
200. The principle underlying the composition of the Senate is the
representation of interests. This is effected by giving
representation to commerce, industry, and labor, the County
Councils, the Churches, learned institutions, and the peerage. In
constituting the House of Commons the Nationalists offered to
guarantee 40 per cent. of its membership to the Unionists. It was
agreed that, in the south, adequate representation for Unionists
could only be secured by nomination; but, as the Ulster
representatives had informed the convention that those for whom they
spoke could not accept the principle of nomination, provision was
made in the scheme for an extra representation of Ulster by direct
election.

The majority of the Labor representatives associated themselves with
the Nationalists and Southern Unionists in building up the
Constitution, with the provisions of which they found themselves in
general agreement. They frankly objected, however, to the principle
of nomination and to what they regarded as the inadequate
representation of Labor in the upper house. Throughout our
proceedings they helped in every way toward the attainment of
agreement. Nor did they press their own special claims in such a
manner as to make more difficult the work, already difficult enough,
of agreeing upon a Constitution.

Knottiest Question in History

I trust I have said enough to enable the reader of this report and
the accompanying documents to form an accurate judgment upon the
nature and difficulties of the task before the convention and upon
its actual achievement. While, technically, it was our function to
draft a Constitution for our country, it would be more correct to
say that we had to find a way out of the most complex and anomalous
political situation to be found in history--I might almost say in
fiction. We are living under a system of government which survives
only because the act abolishing it cannot, consistently with
Ministerial pledges, be put into operation without further
legislation no less difficult and controversial than that which it
has to amend. While the responsibility for a solution to our problem
rests primarily with the Government, the convention found itself in
full accord with your insistence that the most hopeful path to a
settlement was to be found in Irish agreement. In seeking this--in
attempting to find a compromise which Ireland might accept and
Parliament pass into law--it has been recognized that the full
program of no party could be adopted. The convention was also bound
to give due weight to your opinion that to press for a settlement
at Westminster, during the war, of the question which, as I have
shown, had been a formidable obstacle to agreement would be to
imperil the prospect of the early establishment of self-government
in Ireland.

Notwithstanding the difficulties with which we were surrounded, a
larger measure of agreement has been reached upon the principle and
details of Irish self-government than has yet been attained. Is it
too much to hope that the scheme embodying this agreement will
forthwith be brought to fruition by those to whose call the Irish
Convention has now responded? I have the honor to be, Sir, your
obedient servant,

HORACE PLUNKETT.
April 8, 1918.

THE MAJORITY REPORT

The proposed scheme of Irish self-government referred to in Sir Horace Plunkett's letter is set out below, the majorities by which each section or subsection was carried being indicated in parentheses:

THE IRISH PARLIAMENT. (51 votes to 18.)

(1) The Irish Parliament to consist of the King, an Irish Senate,
and an Irish House of Commons.

(2) Notwithstanding the establishment of the Irish Parliament or
anything contained in the Government of Ireland act, the supreme
power and authority of the Parliament of the United Kingdom shall
remain unaffected and undiminished over all persons, matters, and
things in Ireland and every part thereof.

POWERS OF THE IRISH PARLIAMENT. The Irish Parliament to have the
general power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government
of Ireland, subject to the exclusions and restrictions specified in
3 and 4 below. (51 to 19.)

EXCLUSIONS FROM POWER OF IRISH PARLIAMENT. (49 to 16.) The Irish
Parliament to have no power to make laws on the following matters:

(1) Crown and succession.

(2) Making of peace and war, (including conduct as neutrals.)

(3) The army and navy.

(4) Treaties and foreign relations, (including extradition.)

(5) Dignities and titles of honor.

(6) Any necessary control of harbors for naval and military
purposes, and certain powers as regards lighthouses, buoys, beacons,
cables, wireless terminals, to be settled with reference to the
requirements of the military and naval forces of his Majesty in
various contingencies. (41 to 13.)

(7) Coinage; legal tender; or any change in the standard of weights
and measures.

(8) Copyright or patent rights.

TEMPORARY AND PARTIAL RESERVATION. The Imperial and Irish
Governments shall jointly arrange, subject to imperial exigencies,
for the unified control of the Irish police and postal services
during the war, provided that as soon as possible after the
cessation of hostilities the administration of these two services
shall become automatically subject to the Irish Parliament. (37 to
21.)

RESTRICTION ON POWER OF IRISH PARLIAMENT ON MATTERS WITHIN ITS
COMPETENCE. (46 to 15.)

(1) Prohibition of laws interfering with religious equality. N.
B.--A subsection should be framed to annul any existing legal
penalty, disadvantage, or disability on account of religious belief.
Certain restrictions still remain under the act of 1829.

(2) Special provision protecting the position of Freemasons.

(3) Safeguard for Trinity College and Queen's University similar to