Chapter I: Part 1

[Frontispiece: Baron von Freytag-Loringhoven]

DEDUCTIONS FROM
THE WORLD WAR

BY

BARON VON FREYTAG-LORINGHOVEN

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL
AND
DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE GERMAN IMPERIAL STAFF

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS
NEW YORK AND LONDON
The Knickerbocker Press
1918

COPYRIGHT, 1918
BY
G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, NEW YORK

COPYRIGHT
BY
CONSTABLE & CO., LTD., LONDON

The Knickerbocker Press, New York

_INTRODUCTORY NOTE_

_Baron von Freytag-Loringhoven, the author of this book, is the most distinguished soldier-writer of Prussia. In other words, since none will dispute Prussia her militarism, he is the most distinguished living writer on militarism in theory and practice._

_Freytag comes of a Baltic family. He was born in Russia, the son of a Russian diplomatist, and he served in the Russian Army before, at the age of twenty-one, he joined a Prussian Guard Regiment. Before the war he was an influential member of the General Staff in Berlin, and had made a reputation by his writings on the history and science of war. On the outbreak of war he became the German representative on the Austro-Hungarian General Staff. The military weakness of Austria has in recent years been a commonplace in Berlin, and Freytag duly tells us how the "brave troops" of the Dual Monarchy "had to suffer for the sins and omissions of which the Parliaments had been guilty." When Count Moltke, the Chief of the German General Staff, was superseded by Falkenhayn, after the failure of the original German offensive in the West, Freytag became Quartermaster-General in the field, and Moltke became Deputy Chief of the General Staff--that is to say, head of such parts of the General Staff Organization as remain in Berlin, while the main business of the General Staff is conducted from "Great Headquarters" in the field._

_At the beginning of August, 1916, Falkenhayn was superseded in his turn by Hindenburg, after the German failure at Verdun. Freytag's post of Quartermaster-General was merged in the larger post which was now created for Ludendorff, and, Moltke having died in June, Freytag was appointed in September, 1916, to the post, which he still holds, of Deputy Chief of the General Staff._

_Shortly before his appointment, Freytag's position as chief writer to the Prussian Army was put beyond dispute by his decoration with the Order Pour le Mérite (Peace Class). The Order Pour le Mérite (Military Class) was founded by Frederick the Great, and has now been conferred upon innumerable Prussian officers. Freytag is apparently the only officer who has received during the present war the Order Pour le Mérite (Peace Class), which was founded by Frederick William IV in 1842, and is conferred for distinction in "Science and Arts."_

_"DEDUCTIONS FROM THE WORLD WAR" was written for German consumption. As soon as a few German newspaper reviews called attention to its contents, and especially to the chapters "The Army in the Future" and "Still Ready for War" with their candid explanation of the way in which Germany proposes, this war finished, to prepare for the next, all comment was restricted or suppressed. Circulation of the book in Germany was promoted, but its export was prohibited, and very few copies have found their way across the frontier._

_This book is interesting as an attempt to lay the foundations of "history"; it is comparable with the "popular edition" of Moltke's "History of the Franco-German War of 1870," upon which a whole generation of Germany was brought up, while the real history of the war was being written in France--for posterity. The book is very instructive as a denunciation of international ideals and as a warning of the plans which are being made in Berlin for the cold and reasoned application of the lessons of the war and the development of a still more scientific military system, a still more perfect war-machine, than existed in 1914. Again, we have here, on the best possible authority, the warning that Germany--with all her avowed indignation at the idea of an economic "war after the war"--is determined not only to rebuild her military system, but to build it this time upon an indestructible economic foundation. But above all Freytag's book is a revelation because he says what Germany thinks. "War has its basis in human nature," he writes, "and as long as human nature remains unaltered, war will continue to exist, as it has existed already for thousands of years." That view is universal in Germany, and to the German people Freytag's deductions will seem to be only logic and common sense. In reality, Freytag the soldier says nothing a whit stronger in praise of militarism than is said in his apt quotations from Prince Bülow the civilian. Militarism is not a Prussian invention; militarism is Prussia herself. And so long as Prussia rules Germany, all talk that seeks to distinguish "war parties" from "peace parties," "militarists" from "statesmen" is misleading._

_J.E.M._

_December, 1917._

AUTHOR'S FOREWORD

It may seem presumptuous to draw conclusions from the World War while it is still in progress. And yet it is imperative that we should be clear in regard to a number of questions which have presented themselves as a result of the War. We must look for their solution in the State and the Army. The War must admonish us to submit our whole national life and our military organisation to an examination in the light of the experiences which we have gained. Such an examination cannot and should not be much longer postponed.

Without clear views and an adequate understanding of the major sequences of the War, not only as regards operations and tactics, but also as regards world-politics and world-economics, without carefully balancing the new experience that it has brought us against all that it has confirmed and that has to be maintained, we shall not be in a position to draw accurate deductions for the future. Towards this the writer hopes to contribute by means of the following arguments. They are addressed equally to the Army and the nation.

CONTENTS

CHAP.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

AUTHOR'S FOREWORD

I. THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE CENTRAL POWERS

II. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONAL AND MASSED WARFARE

III. THE INFLUENCE OF TECHNICAL SCIENCE

IV. LEADERSHIP

V. THE ARMY IN THE FUTURE

VI. STILL READY FOR WAR

DEDUCTIONS FROM THE
WORLD WAR

I

THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION
OF THE CENTRAL POWERS

The grouping of the Powers at the beginning and still more during the course of the World War has been extremely unfavourable to the Central Powers. We must go back to the desperate struggle of Frederick the Great in the Seven Years' War to find anything comparable to it. Napoleon, too, found himself at length pitted against all Europe, but the comparative strength of the opposed forces at the beginning of the autumn campaign of 1813 was by no means unfavourable to him. The Allies at that time possessed only an insignificant superiority of numbers. Moreover, our enemies have not had to endure what Field-Marshal Count Schlieffen in 1909 justly deduced from the history of previous coalition wars:

"Even when all objections have been disposed of, every difficulty overcome, even when resolution is ripened, and a powerful advance from all sides is about to be set on foot, yet in the breast of every individual the anxious question will still arise: Will the others come? Will our distant Allies take their stand at the right time?"[1]

Not only did all the Allies take their stand, but, in addition, they were reinforced by our former allies, Italy and Roumania, while America showed herself more and more clearly a secret ally of the Entente Powers, rendering the most valuable services by furnishing them with all manner of requisites of war and pecuniary loans, long before she openly took up her stand against us in February, 1917, by severing diplomatic relations and in April by declaring a state of war. However valuable to Germany and Austria-Hungary has been the alliance of Turkey and later of Bulgaria, an equilibrium of forces could not, of course, be effected by means of these States. England has been successful in keeping the Entente together, and has utilised the fact that the destruction of the Central Powers proved to be far more difficult than had been anticipated in order to strengthen the bond between herself and her Allies. They had involved themselves in a common undertaking, which had not prospered according to expectations. Now there was no alternative but to carry it through, for to give it up would be equivalent to a confession of utter failure and defeat. The ties which bound the Continental Allies to England were constantly reinforced by the promise held out of territorial acquisitions, as well as by monetary aids. In this connection England's favourable position in world-politics and world-economics stood her in noticeably good stead. The more the prospect vanished of inflicting on us a military defeat with the aid of the blockade, the more England strengthened her endeavour to secure that we should at any rate find ourselves after the War in an unfavourable economic position, both geographically and in respect of commercial treaties. England gave expression to her desire for war and victory by creating a strong land-army, finally adopting the system of universal service. In so doing she broke with her traditional custom of waging Continental wars to all intents and purposes by means of the armies of her Allies.

In the wars against Louis XIV England had already raised herself to the position of a great Colonial Power and had won for herself supremacy on the sea. As a result of the Seven Years' War, she became a World-Power. It was not, however, until the American War of Independence that she entered upon a period of world-policy and world-economics. It has justly been said:[2]

"World-trade there had long been, but not world-policy. Not even England possessed the latter, in spite of her world-embracing settlements and dominions. In fact there existed only European policy. World-policy could only come into being when in the other continents, as well as in our own, independent and permanent centres, capable of asserting themselves against the European Great Powers, had shaped for themselves a State existence. This happened in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the case of America, and in the twentieth century in the case of Japan."

In the European Continental wars up to 1870-71, when we were still predominantly an agrarian State, questions of world-policy and world-economics had played a comparatively subordinate role. It has been the development of our trade, combined with the increase of our population, which, in the course of this World War, has thrown into special prominence the significance of these questions in relation to our Fatherland. The import of raw materials, foodstuffs, and manufactured articles, the export of the products of our industries, had become essential conditions of our economic life. In regard to these questions the outbreak of the World War found us insufficiently prepared. Such measures as we had taken were shown to be inadequate. Hence in our conduct of the War we were faced with a difficult problem, which had not arisen in the case of previous wars on the European mainland. We found ourselves not only at such a disadvantage in regard to the general political situation as we had not hitherto experienced, and, as a consequence of this, faced with an overwhelming superiority of numbers, but also we had to grapple with an economic situation as difficult as could possibly be imagined. This is not the place to examine how far, in view of the all too rapid growth of her trade, world-policy and world-economics may have been premature in the case of Germany, inasmuch as our continental position was still by no means sufficiently assured. Here Ranke's words are applicable: "Who can control circumstances, calculate future events, govern the surging of the elements?"[3] Even the power of prevision attributed to great men is after all very limited. Friedjung[4] remarks justly that the real necessity of events and of all which we assert to have taken place in accordance with the laws of history only becomes apparent when the history of the world is considered in large epochs; that, for the rest, history is an ingenious tissue of necessity and chance, and that to estimate future events is consequently hardly possible even for the most clear-sighted contemporary observers. Hence diplomats have often been unjustly accused of furnishing an incorrect report in regard to a foreign country, concerning which they were supposed to possess an exact knowledge. Even the most perfect knowledge of a country does not endow its possessor with the capacity to foresee coming events, although, of course, the gift of exact observation exists in different degrees in different individuals. It might well be imagined that, in this age of extreme publicity, it should be easy enough to form a trustworthy estimate of a foreign country and its armed power. The Press and the proceedings of Parliament furnish a host of details from which to build up a complete picture, but whether this picture will prove accurate in case of war is a matter of doubt, for many unforeseen accidents, notably those resulting from the power of personality, are in such matters peculiarly likely to affect the issue. Thus the abundance of news which we have at our disposal at the present day may easily serve only to obscure and distract.

The consequences of the blockade to which the Central Powers were subjected made themselves felt at once. Although we have succeeded by our own might in developing and carrying on our economic life during the War, none the less the advantages of our economic position in the world have made themselves felt all the time. They alone explain the fact that new opportunities of resistance constantly revealed themselves to our opponents, because the sea was open to them, and that victories which formerly would have been absolutely decisive, and the conquest of whole kingdoms, still brought us no nearer to peace. Thus was Russia able to recover from the severe defeats of the summer of 1915 and to attack once more in the following year with newly-equipped armies.

Though the American Admiral Mahan, in his famous book, _The Influence of Sea-Power on History_, summed up the result of the Seven Years' War as follows: On the sea, immense success and material gain for England, on land, enormous sacrifice of men, with the sole result that the _status quo_ was maintained; though he asserts, moreover, that the British fleet contributed most towards the overthrow of Napoleon by cutting him off from the most important of all sources for replenishing supplies, namely, the sea, the question of sea-power was not really of decisive importance in those times. Pitt, in his speech in Parliament against the Peace of Paris of 1763, already emphasised the fact that North America had been conquered for England in Germany. Napoleon was defeated on land. The Continental States of that time, pre-eminently France, were still agrarian States, and far better able than now to suffice for their own needs for a long time. In our days of world-policy and world-economics, the views of the famous naval writer are far more in accordance with actuality. The fact that we have resorted to submarine warfare as a means of self-defence is in itself a proof of it. The unsparing application of this new weapon will hasten materially the end of this mighty economic conflict, by means of the economic difficulties which it will create for our opponents and for neutrals. The World War affords incontrovertible proof that Germany must for all time to come maintain her claim to sea-power. We need not at present discuss by what means this aim is to be achieved.

As the result of our geographical situation, it will always remain our task to form a just estimate of the opposing demands of world-economics and national economics in the narrower sense, and of oversea and continental politics. Even in land-warfare, economic considerations have played a very considerable part. The occupation by our troops of Belgium and of the coal and industrial district of Northern France, as well as of Poland, Lithuania, and Kurland, procured us important economic advantages and involved a corresponding loss to our enemies. The main object of the Serbian campaign was to establish a land communication with Turkey, whose obstinate defence of the Dardanelles had rendered us signal service, since it barred the exit from and entry to the harbours of the Black Sea against Russia. At the same time, the operations against Serbia procured us the valuable alliance of Bulgaria. Not only did we acquire by this means an accession of strength against the numerical superiority of our enemies, but also the possibility of trade intercourse with the Balkan States. A year later, the unwelcome hostility of Roumania and her overthrow procured us further economic advantages and secured our position in regard to the whole of the Balkans. Now, as always, it is the sword which decides in war; it is victory on the battle-field that gives the decision, but its effect is far more dependent than it used to be on world-economic factors. These factors are to be traced through the whole of this War.

To be sure, modern times had already witnessed one great economic war. The American Civil War of the sixties of last century arose out of the economic antagonism between the trading and industrial States of the North and the cotton-growing States of the South of the Union. In the latter, cultivation by the aid of slaves formed the basis of the industry, and to this extent the slave question was a factor in the dispute. It was not, however, until later that the demand for the abolition of slavery found wide expression in the North and was utilised as a welcome means of stirring up feeling against the South. The real points at issue were that the Northern States wanted high protective duties, while the Southern States wanted to facilitate export, and that the Northern States had a special interest in utilising the customs revenues for investments which should above all be of advantage to their trade, but which were a matter of indifference to the South. The American War of Secession, like everything else American at that time, attracted little attention with us. Germany was still only a geographical conception; there could be no question of a world-policy for its component States. Moreover, our own wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870-71, claimed all our attention. Yet, different as were the cause, the development, and the other conditions of the American Civil War compared with the present World War, the economic factors which in each case found expression have engendered more than one similar phenomenon. The Northern States endeavoured at the outset, by the aid of their imposing fleet, to cut off the Southern States, which had no battle-fleet worth mentioning, from their sea-borne supplies, and, also, on land, from the Mississippi and the corn-growing States of the South-West, and thus paralyse them economically. The valour of the Southern troops, who were far inferior numerically, as well as of their generals, and, above all, the distinguished leadership of Lee, for four years rendered impossible the accomplishment of this so-called "Anaconda plan," until the Southern States finally succumbed to the blockade.

Things never quite repeat themselves in history. But we may learn from history. Not in order to be more prudent another time, but in order to be wise for all time, as Jacob Burckhardt says. In this sense, the American Civil War might have furnished us many a hint which was left disregarded. But we must confess, as Professor Bernhard Harms said in a lecture, that in August, 1914, we found ourselves confronted with the problem of conducting a war governed by world-economic considerations without immediately comprehending it. To be sure, our opponents too only gradually perceived the true situation. The operations which they had begun extracted only little by little the full advantage of the world-economic situation, which was favourable to them and unfavourable to us; they did so only when they met with an unexpected force of resistance in the Central Powers. But in any case, in our military conduct of the War, we drew the necessary conclusions from the world-situation, and were at pains to turn it to account by means of a far-reaching organisation.

In every domain only the War itself could be the great teacher in regard to these hitherto unknown effects of world-economics upon its range. It was generally taken for granted that a long war was in these days hardly practicable. For England it was "a commercial war with a view to her own enrichment and the annihilation of her chief rival."[5] Nevertheless, even England did not at the outset reckon for a war of such long duration. Only when it became apparent that the forcible annihilation of her "chief rival" by the aid of her Allies was not to be accomplished did England find herself compelled to make considerable additions to her fighting forces, and finally to adopt the system of universal service. Lord Kitchener was prompt in grasping the situation, and, by erecting a strong army, put the country in a position to sustain a long war.

Even Field-Marshal Count Schlieffen, for all his farsightedness, though he insisted that the frontal attack would produce no decisive result, but that the campaign would drag itself out, declared in the article already referred to:

"Such wars are, however, impossible at a time when the existence of the nation is based upon the unbroken continuance of trade and industry, and the machinery which has been brought to a standstill must be set in motion again by a speedy decision. A strategy of exhaustion becomes impossible, when the maintenance of it demands milliards from millions."

This frontal wearing down of forces in entrenched warfare has none the less taken place on most sections of the fronts; but we have reaped positive results only from the war of movement. The present-day world has, contrary to expectation, proved itself capable of enduring a long war, though at the cost of such destruction as humanity has never before experienced. The expenditure of milliards would to be sure have been avoided, if we had succeeded, as Count Schlieffen in the same argument goes on to suggest, in conducting the attack on a large scale against the front and both flanks of the enemy, and in developing it to a sweeping victory. We did, in fact, achieve several local victories of this nature, but we did not achieve such a victory at the Marne with our whole western army at the beginning of the War. It is fruitless to picture to oneself how, if the case had been otherwise, events might have developed in detail, but we may confidently assert that a complete German victory at the Marne in September, 1914, would have given quite another character to the whole War, and would certainly have shortened it very considerably. From this may be seen the full significance of a decisive military success, even in a war so influenced by world-economics as the present.

[1] _Deutsche Revue_, January, 1909.

[2] Alexander v. Peetz. Introduction to _Weltpolitische Neubildungen_, by Paul Dehn.

[3] _Ursprung des Siebenjährigen Krieges_.

[4] _Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland_, Introduction to Vol. II.

[5] Dr. Georg Solmssen. _England und Wir!_ Lecture delivered at Cologne, November 13, 1916.

II

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONAL AND
MASSED WARFARE

In the course of the present World War the soul of a war waged by means of great national armies has revealed itself as something special, something hitherto inexperienced. Its origin may be traced back to the time of the French Revolution. The _levée en masse_ of the French Republic is, to be sure, to a great extent legendary. It furnished hardly a quarter of the anticipated man-power. Clausewitz[1] remarks justly:

"If the whole War of the Revolution passed over without all this making itself felt in its full force and becoming quite evident; if the generals of the Revolution did not persistently press on to the final extreme, and did not overthrow the monarchies in Europe; if the German armies now and again had the opportunity of resisting with success and checking for a time the torrent of victory--the cause lay in reality in that technical incompleteness with which the French had to contend, which showed itself first among the common soldiers, then in the generals, lastly, at the time of the Directory, in the Government itself. After all this was perfected by the hand of Buonaparte, this military power, based on the strength of the whole nation, marched over Europe, smashing everything in pieces so surely and certainly that wherever it encountered only the old-fashioned armies, the result was not doubtful for a moment."

Yet Napoleon waged his victorious wars with a prætorian army. Only at the period of his decline did he utilise the national strength to a fuller extent. After the overthrow of his army in Russia, he made what were for those days enormous levies in France, amounting in all to 1,237,000 men. Even at the time when his power was increasing, it was not so much the strength of the armies which he placed in the field that decided the issue as the fact that the other States were not at that time in a position to make good their losses by a continual requisitioning of the national strength.

The French people did not by any means flock enthusiastically to the Imperial flag. After the repulse of the invasion of 1792, their warlike ardour had been more and more extinguished. In the case of the increased levies of the last year of the First Empire, it was necessary to resort to violent measures in order to carry out the conscription. Hence, though the Napoleonic army was supported upon the national strength, it was never a national army in the true sense of the term.

On the other hand, the designation "national army" exactly applies to the Prussian army of the War of Liberation. The population of the diminished and impoverished Prussian State at that time numbered less than five millions, and of this number the Prussian army included in August, 1813, not less than 271,000 men. Moreover, the recourse to the provinces for the organisation of the _Landwehr_ gave the army a special character. By the retention of universal military service even after the war, the Prussian army was differentiated from the armies of other States. In Prussia alone, after the great campaigns of the beginning of the nineteenth century, did a genuine fusion take place between nation and army. But even in 1870-71 the strain upon our national strength for the purposes of war was nothing like as great as in the present World War. We entered upon the Franco-Prussian War with the advantage on our side, and therefore it appeared to many unnecessary to requisition the national strength more extensively than had been done hitherto.

Only reluctantly did Roon accede to Moltke's demand on December 8, 1870, for further supplies of troops, which were rendered necessary by the growing extension of the theatre of war and by the mass-levies of the Republic in the second period of the war; and yet how modest appears this demand compared with the conditions of the present day. It amounted only to the calling up of fifty-seven Landwehr battalions which were employed at home for guarding prisoners or for coast defence, and the transfer to Alsace-Lorraine of a number of reserve battalions. This proposal, emanating from the Chief of the General Staff, was to be sure the result of the increasing difficulties which the national war in France was causing, but although even at that time nation was contending against nation on French soil, yet the armies of the Republic consisted only of masses of men hurriedly scrambled together, who were again and again routed by the onset of the German troops, which, though far inferior in numbers, were vastly superior in fighting efficiency. Thus even the 950,000 men whom France still had under arms at the conclusion of the war could not alter the fate of the country.

"Gambetta believed," writes Arthur Chuquet,[2] "that the legendary marvels of 1792 and 1793 could be repeated. He overlooked the fact that it was the cowardice and lack of discipline of the volunteer forces of the First Republic which were mainly responsible for the defeat of the revolutionary armies, and that the Republic at that time was saved, not by the heroism of its troops, but by dissension within the coalition."

The campaign against the army of the Second Empire had demonstrated the superiority of our own army based upon the principle of universal military service. The campaign against the Republic revealed the hopelessness of the resistance of a completely improvised militia to disciplined troops. Nevertheless, no really new points of view in the realm of war psychology were revealed in this instance. Quite otherwise was it in the case of the American Civil War. Here the Southern States were very soon compelled to resort to universal military service, and the Northern States to raise larger and larger volunteer levies, with a longer term of service. Like every other civil war, this was steeped in the hatred of both parties. In the Southern States the reaction of the national character upon military efficiency was revealed very clearly. They continued their resistance to the utmost limit. But Europe, up to the outbreak of the World War, had not witnessed any such phenomena in war. It was the adoption of universal military service by all the Great Powers, as a result of the German victories of 1870-71, which first introduced a new element into the conduct of war. This inevitably made itself all the more perceptible when the increased facilities of communication of modern times rendered the nations more closely coherent within their own borders and more accessible to the suggestive influence of the Press for good as well as for ill. That men have always been susceptible to suggestion is demonstrated by the spread of religious fanaticism, but the present age has increased this susceptibility still further. Even distinguished minds are subject to mass-suggestion, as is shown in the case of numerous distinguished scholars and artists among our enemies. Neither judgment nor good taste availed to prevent them from joining in the general orgies of hatred directed against everything German.

Among the factors which have contributed in recent times to increase this susceptibility of the masses must be counted the political elections, which have everywhere stirred up passions and prejudiced sound judgment. They alone explain many events which have taken place in America. In the several States there are over twenty offices which have to be filled annually by means of public elections. And in these it is not the personal opinion of the voter that counts, but the party politicians and their whips. It is the ingenuity and unscrupulousness of the latter, as well as their expenditure of large sums of money, that decide the issue. It is, in fact, in the great democratic republics that we find the worst form of moral servitude. The widely-diffused but superficial education of the masses renders them peculiarly open to suggestion. The sense of unity of whole nations has been considerably enhanced by the fact that in present-day warfare the entire population is involved either directly or indirectly. The countries as a whole are implicated economically.

In 1914 for the first time France opposed to our national army an army organised upon the basis of universal military service; an army, moreover, in which hatred against everything German had been kindled by the assiduous fostering through decades of the agitation for a war of _revanche_. The overwhelming impression of our initial successes, which had by no means been anticipated when Germany was attacked on all sides, inflamed these passions still further. The Swiss writer Stegemann, in his history of this War,[3] suggests that it may have been suspected in foreign countries that the preparedness of Germany's army and navy, which had been achieved during long years by infinite labour and feverish activity, was merely apparent and was associated with a degeneration of nervous force.

"To this suspicion the campaigns of this War have furnished a heroic answer. When the order of mobilisation was published, all trace of nervousness vanished. Even from a distance one could perceive the power and energy of a military organisation which was suddenly called from its tranquil development to perform the most exalted achievements. This gave nourishment to the theory that Germany had intentionally provoked the War. The thoroughness in execution which was really due to the character and constitution of the nation was misconstrued as the deliberate provocation of war."

As a result of the thoughtless adoption of _franc-tireur_ methods of warfare in Belgium, with the support and approval of the authorities, the War acquired from the outset still more of the character of a struggle of nation against nation. The principle that war is directed only against the armed strength of the enemy-State and not against its population could not under these circumstances be upheld by our troops. They found themselves compelled to resort to severe measures of retaliation. Thus the War acquired a character of brutality which is otherwise very alien to the nature of our well-conducted German soldiers.

The self-assurance of the French army, which had already begun to waver, was restored after the Battle of the Marne. Subsequently the French authorities left no stone unturned in order, with the aid of a corrupt and lying Press, to sustain the confidence of the nation in an ultimate victory. The continued augmentation of the allied English army, the alleged inexhaustible reserves of Russia (in spite of all the defeats which she had suffered), the entry into the War of Italy, and, later, of Roumania as Allies, the munitions furnished by America, and finally her open partnership against us--all this had to be utilised again and again to strengthen the tissue of lies which France wove round herself more and more closely, so closely that the French finally lost all sense of truth. Thus the French army is inspired, even if not consciously so in all its members, with the feeling that it is not only a question of freeing the native soil from a hated invader, but also of a struggle for the future world-position of France. The characteristics of the French soldier have always been a product rather of his race than of any military training. They explain the devotion and the contempt of death with which whole divisions have hurled themselves forward again and again in dense masses in hopeless attempts to break through.

The French national character exhibits striking contradictions. High and noble qualities exist side by side with base impulses. The French soldier exhibits heroic courage side by side with the instincts of a "_Nettoyeur_," and, in the treatment of our prisoners, his conduct has been worthy of an apache. The French officers have completely lost that chivalrous sentiment which as late as 1870 found expression in the words of an old Frenchman: "The person of a prisoner is sacred." The French, both white and black, and their women no less, have not scrupled to jeer at and ill-treat our prisoners in the most flagrant manner, and the Government of the Republic has in general furnished an example of unworthy treatment of prisoners. The naturally amiable and, under ordinary circumstances, good-natured Frenchman easily degenerates, as a result of his excitable temperament, into the very opposite. The history of the wars of religion and of the Revolution affords evidence of the fact. The human beast is always roused in him with surprising suddenness. His characteristic light-heartedness engenders in him a disinclination to think things out to a conclusion. This renders him very susceptible to influence, and prevents him from seeing through the tissue of lies presented to him in the newspapers. While the Frenchman had always displayed military aptitude, his training in time of peace upon the basis of universal military service had only still further developed his good military qualities, and he has never exhibited those failings which formerly and often erroneously have been attributed to French armies, such as lack of endurance in difficult situations, the inability to endure defeats, susceptibility to panic. The effect of universal military service has manifestly been to discipline the whole nation, and to furnish an appropriate vessel for its always very strongly developed sense of unity. Those who judged the French nation by the customary standard of former days have been astonished at their conduct in this War.

As England has developed into a Land Power only in the course of this War, it has been only by degrees that warlike enthusiasm has infected the masses of her people. England, great as have been her feats of organisation, has never been able to make up for the advantage with which France entered the War owing to her possession of universal military service. Since she took her time, and the nature of entrenched warfare made it possible, England was able, however, to furnish her numerous new formations with a training which was lacking in the armies of Gambetta. Nevertheless, the new English divisions could not attain either the coherence of the old troops of the expeditionary army first dispatched to France or the fighting value of the French troops. The English reached a high degree of technical efficiency, but their fighting tactics remained defective. Also, for all that tough courage peculiar to the Englishman, they lacked that spirit which can be engendered only by the consciousness of a lofty national purpose such as that for which the French were fighting. In place of her voluntary army England gradually built up for herself on French soil a national army; but, voluntary army or national army, it served only the ends of English politics and the economic war against Germany. If the purpose of the War played only a minor part in the case of the voluntary army, it played a very considerable part in the case of the national army. If this purpose was not presented clearly and comprehensively to the understanding of every individual, the maximum amount of effort could not be expected from this army. In stirring up and working upon the feelings of the masses, England in fact showed no more scruples than France. Though the Englishman is less excitable by temperament, he is all the more obstinate in clinging to a notion which has once taken root in his mind. This stirring up of hatred has in his case, too, engendered distressing excesses as regards the treatment of German prisoners. In certain cases, even if not as a general rule, the English have shown themselves not behind the French in brutality.

Thus we had to wage war against enemies who were under the influence of a mass-psychosis. This has engendered phenomena such as Europe had not witnessed since the time of the wars of religion. Deeds of horror and senseless rage of destruction, such as are described for us in _Simplicissimus_ have again made themselves manifest. The notion that humanity as a whole had advanced spiritually was proved to be an error. The vast distance between civilisation and _Kultur_ was clearly revealed.

After the Thirty Years' War an effort was made to alleviate, by careful training of the men, the horrors of war due to the outrages of the military rabble. Thus it was asserted in praise of Prince Eugène of Savoy that in the neighbourhood of his camp the peasant could till his field unmolested. Instead of war being made to feed itself, a complicated system of supplies was adopted. The result was that the war strategy of the weak voluntary armies of that time became fixed more and more into a conventional mould, from which Frederick the Great was the first to emancipate it, so far as the limited means available at that time rendered this possible. Subsequently, under Napoleon, war developed more and more into "true war," to use Fichte's expression. This transformation, however, could be fully effected only by means of universal military service. Universal military service holds sway over our age and for generations will not vanish. To it Prussia-Germany owes her advancement, and it was inevitable that, when all the Great Powers adopted it, the violence of war should again be augmented. We must not let the bright side of universal service blind us to its dark side. Henceforth the passion of war infected whole nations, and this passion was constantly inflamed anew by contact with that of the enemy. Therewith many of those barriers were overthrown by means of which the professional soldiery, preserving the chivalrous customs of the Middle Ages, had sought to check the excesses of war. Also the barriers which International Law had sought to oppose to the encroachments of war collapsed in the face of this new violence.

At the same time factors were introduced into the World War which could not fail to react upon the strategical and tactical conditions and which it will be impossible to disregard in the future. They call for a new standard in measuring the efficiency of armies. Thus the efficiency of the German troops far surpasses that which might have been expected according to the standard of earlier times. Even in regard to the operations at the Loire at the turn of the year 1870-71, the late Field-Marshal Freiherr von der Goltz wrote in his Reminiscences[4]:

"With the exception of a few stout hearts, everyone was sick of even the most successful battles. The fire of war still burnt, but with a dim and flickering light. The craving to enjoy at length the longed-for term of tranquillity was very widespread."

In these words is reflected the effect of an exhausting triumphal progress which the second army had pushed into the heart of the enemy country. Here, in fact, the thought might well intrude: Have we not now had victory enough? And yet at that time less than five months of war had elapsed, and the course of the war had been extraordinarily successful. The troops had not undergone anything like such tremendous experiences as they have had in the present World War. In this War the consciousness that our national existence is at stake has raised us above ourselves.

All of us, leaders as well as men, have human weaknesses, and assuredly not all German soldiers are heroes by nature. But it is precisely in this--in the fact that the weak are carried along with the strong--that the educative force of this struggle for the existence of Germany is revealed. The weak could not do otherwise than strive to be heroes. Reverses, such as were occasionally inevitable in this long and tremendous War, have doubtless had a temporarily depressing effect upon the troops, and after efforts and a consumption of nervous force such as have never been experienced in any previous wars, the craving for rest has sometimes made itself felt. But even in the third year of the War, the fire of war did not merely flicker with a dim light, but was constantly rekindled to fresh flame. In Transylvania and Roumania and in Eastern Galicia in 1917 the troops displayed an ardour equal to that of the first days of the War. The magic of victory enabled them to defy all the difficulties of the ground and all the inclemencies of the weather. They would not, of course, have been a national army, linked to the homeland by a thousand ties, if they had felt no desire for the conclusion of a long war, a war demanding ever fresh sacrifices, and if a calmer feeling had not taken the place of the enthusiasm of the first months. But it was just such a feeling that was necessary for the accomplishment of such gigantic achievements in the West and in the East. What was wanted was not enthusiasm, but the living heroic sense of duty on the German soldier. Moreover, there exists in our army a cool contempt for danger, such as elsewhere has only been exhibited in picked professional armies, and yet ours has remained a national army in the best sense of the word.

Clausewitz declares[5]:

"If we look at a wild warlike race, then we find a warlike spirit in individuals much more common than in a civilised people; for in the former almost every warrior possesses it, whilst in the civilised, whole masses are only carried away by it from necessity, never by inclination."

None the less, the inculcated sense of duty, the conscious will of the whole people, when, as in the case of this War, it is a question of safeguarding our most treasured possessions, and when the purpose of the War is clearly manifest, has brought forth even loftier achievements than mere warlike impulse, or, as in the case of the Japanese, the sense of the blessedness of extinction.

In fact, we cannot sufficiently express our joyful recognition of the high sense of duty and the power of resistance which our troops have everywhere displayed in the face of overwhelmingly superior forces, while at the same time we ought not to refuse our respect even for our enemies, above all the French. For they too were prepared and resolved every one to die for his country. On both sides was revealed a nervous force, a capacity of resistance to inclement conditions, with which no one had credited the civilised humanity of the present day, more especially in the face of the increased effectiveness of present-day weapons. Before the War it was looked upon as an understood thing that the efficiency of the older classes of recruits was only limited. Field-Marshal Count Schlieffen, who taught us how to manipulate a massed army, and who, because he was convinced of the great importance of numbers in war, was unwilling to abandon the employment of the older drafts in the front line: none the less declared, "Landwehr and Landsturm, territorial army and territorial army reserves, can only to a very limited extent be reckoned as part of the nation in arms."

If the World War has not confirmed this prediction, it is due to the fact that such imponderable things defy any attempt to assess them. Hence it is not to be wondered at that we encountered surprises in these matters. The improved hygiene and treatment of wounds of the present day have contributed greatly to maintaining the efficiency of the national armies. In the case of Germany, above all, medical art and science have achieved wonders. They have succeeded in preserving our army from those epidemics which have been the scourge of previous armies and in restoring to it almost 90 per cent. of its wounded. Only by their aid has it been possible to maintain continuously the full strength of our troops and to carry on the war for so long.

The Russians have afforded us less cause for surprise than the rest of our enemies. True they brought up their masses earlier than had been anticipated, but these, as was to be expected, proved themselves very unwieldy, so that the superior mobility of our troops helped to restore the balance. Their unshaken resistance to the Russian mass attacks did the rest.

With the introduction of universal military service in the year 1874, the Russian army had acquired quite a new character. In place of the old soldiers with their long term of service, whose regiment had been their home, there were now levies of troops subject first to a six-year and later to a four-year and three-year term of service. Many conditions which had formerly contributed to the efficiency of the Russian troops were now abolished. The subordination of the peasants disappeared more and more, but it could not be replaced by that conscious and enlightened sense of duty which is possible only in an old civilised nation. If the Russian army was found wanting in Eastern Asia, this was due above all to the fact that it proved incapable of adapting itself to the conditions of modern warfare. It afforded no opportunity for the training of the individual soldier to self-reliance in war. In his report to the Tsar upon the Manchurian campaign Kuropatkin said:

"Undoubtedly, universal military service has, from a moral standpoint, improved the mass of our troops, but in view of the low standard of civilisation of the individual men, it is difficult to infuse them with the notion of discipline. Belief in God, devotion to the Tsar, love for the Fatherland, still contribute to keep the soldiers firm in the ranks, and to make them brave and obedient fighters, but these feelings have in recent times been severely shaken and forcibly wrested from the heart of the Russian."

The unpopularity of the war against Japan was, in the opinion of the General, chiefly to blame for the often very defective resistance of the troops in battle. He writes:

"To-day more than ever, the moral strength of an army is governed by public feeling. Therefore, in order to be successful, a war must be popular, the whole people must strive for success in harmony with the Government. But the aims which we pursued in the Far East were understood neither by the Russian soldiers nor their officers."

In 1914, on the other hand, this condition was completely satisfied: at the beginning, the war was extremely popular in Russia. Moreover, the Russian army had learnt much from the Manchurian campaign, both as regards organisation and also as regards strategy and tactics. It had been systematically organised and prepared for the war against Germany and Austria-Hungary. Nevertheless, the defects in the political organism of the Empire and in the national character could not be remedied in a decade. Kuropatkin expressed his conviction that, in a war against Germany and Austria-Hungary, Russia would certainly in the first instance be defeated. Only with time did he hope for a turn of the tide, thanks to the inexhaustibleness of Russia's reserves of men. His respect for the superiority of German training led Kuropatkin, when he was Minister of War, to declare that a war of conquest against Germany would be a calamity for the Russian Empire. The World War, no less than the March revolution of the present year, though in a different sense, has revealed that Russia was not really ripe for universal military service. Had it been otherwise, we and our allies might have been unable to defend ourselves against envelopment by overwhelmingly superior numbers.

More than once did the Austro-Hungarian army threaten to succumb before the far superior numbers of the Russian forces. At the beginning, the Austro-Hungarian army proved not strong enough to defeat the main body of the Russian forces in Galicia. Certainly the troops showed no lack of heroic self-sacrifice, and the engagements of August and September, 1914, furnished signal instances of the splendid courage of the army of the Dual Monarchy, which was in fact filled with glowing enthusiasm for this contest of giants. Naturally, in view of the mixture of races comprised in the Dual Monarchy, it could not be kindled through and through with a common ardour to the same degree as the German army. Such a unity of sentiment as existed with us was impossible in its case. The Austro-Hungarian military leaders had to cope with difficulties arising from the mixture of races comprised in their forces, difficulties which did not exist in the case of ourselves or our opponents. Moreover, these brave troops had to suffer for the sins and omissions of which the Parliaments of the Monarchy had been guilty during past decades. The army was too weak in numbers, and equipped with far too insufficient an artillery, to enable it to resist successfully the Russian hordes and at the same time to cope with the Serbians. The weakness of their regimental cadres in time of peace had rendered impossible the training for actual battle-tactics. This fact was bound to result in a certain lack of unity and cohesion in the larger units.

If the Russians, in spite of their great numerical superiority, did not succeed in smashing the brave Austro-Hungarian army in the autumn of 1914 at Lemberg and on the San, that speaks for the small ability and defective mobility of the Russian army, which, it is true, made progress in these respects in the course of the War. As a result of the reckless expenditure of the Russian troops, whose leaders were always spendthrift of the lives of their men, their army remained, notwithstanding their heavy losses and the defective training of the reserves, a redoubtable adversary.

In spite of all the technical improvements of the present day, the moral element proved to be, now as ever, the decisive factor in war. In the case of the Central Powers, that lofty moral strength, arising from the sense of righteous self-defence in a war which had been thrust upon them, showed its superiority to the zeal which a commercial and predatory war could kindle in our enemies. The following words of Droysen[6] completely apply to the German nation: