Chapter XX: Appendix (2)

"This same power of steam would enable European nations to disembark
upon our shores even a larger force than that which finally encamped
around Sebastopol. To resist such an attack, should it ever be
made, our cities and harbors must be fortified, and those fortifications
must be provided with guns, ammunition, and instructed artillerists.
To repel the advance of such an army into the interior, it is not enough
to trust to the number of brave but undisciplined men that we can
bring to bear against it. An invading army of 15,000 or 20,000 men
could easily be crushed by the unremitting attacks of superior numbers;
but when it comes to the case of more than 100,000 disciplined
veterans, the very multitude brought to bear against them works its
own destruction; because, if without discipline and instruction, they
cannot be handled, and are in their own way. We cannot afford a Moscow
campaign."

"Our regular army never can, and, perhaps, never ought to be, large
enough to provide for all the contingencies that may arise, but it
should be as large as its ordinary avocations in the defence of the
frontier will justify; the number of officers and non-commissioned
officers should be unusually large, to provide for a sudden increase;
and the greatest possible care should be bestowed upon the instruction
of the special arms of the artillery and engineer troops. The militia
and volunteer system should be placed upon some tangible and effective
basis; instructors furnished them from the regular army, and all
possible means taken to spread sound military information among them.
In the vicinity of our sea-coast fortifications, it would be well to
provide a sufficient number of volunteer companies with the means of
instruction in heavy artillery, detailing officers of the regular
artillery for instructors."

On this subject of instructing our volunteers and militia in the use of sea-coast batteries, we add the following quotation from Major Barnard's pamphlet:--

"One of the main causes of inefficiency in coast batteries, which
has given color to the idea that they may be passed, or even _attacked_
with impunity, I conceive to be the want of _skill_ and _care_ in the
use of the guns. The result is a prodigious smoke, and a prodigious
throwing away of balls, and very little damage done. This has been,
however, by no means a _peculiarity_ of coast defences. The same system
of random firing has hitherto prevailed, both in the use of small arms
in land and of heavy ordnance in sea battles; nor has it occurred
apparently to even the greatest masters of the art of war, to ask why,
for one man wounded, or for one effective shot in a vessel's hull, so
many thousands of shot should be thrown uselessly into the air."

"But this question is _now_ asked, both in the use of the soldier's
rifled musket, and in the management of ships' guns, as well as of
artillery of all kinds."

"It is at last discovered that it is of more importance to teach the
soldier to direct his piece with accuracy of aim, than to perform
certain motions on parade with the precision of an automaton. The same
idea is now infused into all the departments of military and naval
science, and is a _necessary_ result of the recent great
improvements in the construction of arms. In short, the truth has at
last become apparent that the old-fashioned system of random firing,
though perhaps like the 'charge of the six hundred' at Balaklava, 'bien
magnifique, _n'est pas la guerre_.'"

"It is of the utmost importance that we should apply this principle
to the management of our sea-coast batteries, and give it a practical
effect. The _volunteers_ of our cities will constitute _mainly_, in
time of war, the gunners of our forts and manipulators of our sea-coast
guns. In time of war, they will probably be exercised in these duties.
But it is most desirable that we should have at _all times_ a body of
gunners, practised in these exercises. The result would be, not only to
give to our _citizens_, as well as citizen-soldiers, confidence in the
defences provided for their security, but it would disseminate military
knowledge, and an intelligent idea of the bearing and objects of the
different defensive works. To carry out this idea, it would be
desirable that there should be at each considerable seaport town, a
sufficient garrison of _artillery_ troops to aid in the instruction
of the volunteers. In the present condition of the army _this_ cannot
be hoped; but perhaps it might, at least, be found practicable to detail
an artillery officer or two for the purpose."

NOTE TO CHAPTER VIII.--OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES.

The author has seen nothing since this chapter was written to induce him to change the views therein expressed with respect to the superior strategic importance of the line of Lake Champlain, both as a line of military operations, and as a line of defence. The mutual commercial interests of the United States and the Canadas render a war between the two countries less probable than formerly; nevertheless, such an event is by no means impossible, and common prudence should induce us to prepare in the best possible manner for such a contingency.

NOTE TO CHAPTERS IX., X., XI. AND XII.--ARMY ORGANIZATION.

Since these chapters were written, several important changes have been made in our army organization. The rank of Lieutenant-General (at least, by brevet) has been revived, the staff, administrative corps, infantry and cavalry have been increased, and a company of engineer troops organized. But this company is mainly employed at West Point for instruction of the cadets in the several branches of military engineering, and thus serves to supply a deficiency long felt in the system of education at the Military Academy. The want, however, of troops of this arm for the construction, care, and preservation of our permanent fortifications, and for the general duties of field engineering, still remains to be supplied. Of all the arms of military organization, this one most requires instruction in time of peace; it cannot be supplied at the moment a war is declared.

In speaking of our present army organization, as compared with those of the different European powers which he was sent to examine and report upon, Captain McClelland says:--

"Our force of artillery is large in proportion to the other arms of
service, while the number of our engineer troops is ridiculously and
shamefully small; it is, therefore, more than probable that in any
future siege it will be easy for the artillery to construct their own
batteries, while the engineers will be sufficiently burdened by the
construction of the other works of attack; we have now, at last, the
germ of an artillery school of practice; I would then suggest, for the
consideration of the Secretary, the propriety of causing the artillery
to construct their own batteries. The position and armament of siege
batteries should be determined by consultation between the engineers and
the artillery, the former having the preponderating voice, in order to
secure the necessary harmony and connection between all parts of the
works of attack. This change," he says, "will require to be introduced
into the artillery manual and course of instruction everything in
relation to the preparation of the fascines, gabions, platforms, and
magazines, the dimensions of batteries, manner of arranging, working
parties, etc."

With regard to the suggestion of Captain McClellan, it is sufficient to remark, that it seeks to remedy one evil by introducing another equally as great and equally as objectionable. The defect in our present army organization is that one of its arms is too small for the duties which, from the very nature of military service, naturally and properly belong to it; and it surely is no remedy for this defect to permanently transfer a part of these duties to another arm. As well might it be said, if our artillery force were "ridiculously and shamefully small" in proportion to the infantry and cavalry, that the field batteries should be permanently transferred to those arms, and that light artillery tactics should be comprised in our infantry and cavalry manuals.

There are certain duties which the military experience of ages has shown to properly and almost necessarily belong to each particular arm of an army organization, and every attempt to make one branch perform the appropriate duties of another has invariably destroyed its efficiency for either service. Suppose our medical corps were "ridiculously and shamefully small" in proportion to our pay department, shall our paymasters perform the duties of surgery, and be instructed in the use of the scalpel and amputating instruments! This is, perhaps, an extreme case, but it serves to illustrate the principle.

The defect referred to by Captain McClelland, and which has so often been pointed out by our best military men, cannot be obviated by any transfer or assignment, whether temporary or permanent, of the appropriate duties of one corps to another. Indeed, such a measure would only tend to make this defect permanent, and to convert a temporary into a lasting evil. It can readily be remedied by legislative action, but in no other way. The executive action suggested would be deprecated by all. Moreover, the evil is now so obvious and so generally admitted, that there can be little doubt that Congress will soon perceive the importance of applying the only proper and effective remedy.

NOTE TO CHAPTER XIII.--PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS.

Although the general principles of the plan and arrangement of a permanent fortification, as established by the great masters of this branch of military science, remain the same; nevertheless, the vast improvements which have, within the last few years, been made in projectiles, require some changes in the details of defensive works of this character. These changes consist mainly in an increased thickness of stone and earthen parapets and of the covering of magazines, in the arrangement of embrasures, and in protecting the garrison from an enemy's sharpshooters. The introduction of heavier siege guns, and of heavier ordnance on ships of war, and especially on those propelled by steam, require much larger ordnance in forts designed for the defence of harbors. In the Russian war, Sweaborg was made to suffer from a distant bombardment which left her fortifications intact. These modifications in the arrangements and armaments of forts are absolutely necessary in order to restore the relative power of defence against the improvements made in the means of attack. They can very easily be introduced without changing the form or general character of the works, and they are really so very essential that, without them, a fort constructed 25 or 30 years ago, and well suited to the then existing state of the military art, will be likely to offer no very considerable resistance to modern siege batteries or well organized maritime attacks.

Some have gone much further in their estimate of the effect produced by the increased size and force of military projectiles, and boldly assert that masonry works of strong relief can no longer be used, and that the increased range of small arms requires an entire change of the bastioned front, with lines more extended.

With respect to the effect of the increased range of small arms, it is very natural that a superficial observer should adopt the opinion that this improvement must be followed by an extension of the lines of a defensive military work; but a close study of the subject will probably lead to a different conclusion. Such at least is the opinion of the ablest military engineers of Europe. The lines of the bastioned front now generally in use, were really too long for a good defence with the arms in use at the time it was adopted; and, in theory, the "rampart gun" was to be relied upon for the defence of certain exposed points. But this weapon is no longer in use; its place, however, is better supplied by the increased range of the musket and rifle. The latter weapon is almost invaluable for defending the approaches to a permanent work.

With respect to the breaching of stone masonry by siege batteries, it has long been an established principle that all masonry exposed to the fire of land batteries should be masked by earthen works. The neglect of this rule caused the fall of Bomarsund. Those who so readily draw, from the results of that siege, the inference that the present mode of fortifying land fronts must be abandoned, exhibit their ignorance of military engineering. The facts do not justify their conclusions.

With respect to sea fronts, which can be reached only by guns afloat, the case is very different. They are usually casemates of masonry, not masked by earthen works. Whether the increased efficiency of projectiles thrown by ships and floating batteries now require a resort to this mode of protecting masonry on the water fronts of fortifications, is a question well worthy of discussion. This subject has already been alluded to in the Note on Sea-coast Defences, and it is there shown that no facts have yet been developed which require or authorize any change in our present system.

NOTE TO CHAPTER XIV.--FIELD ENGINEERING.

As Mexico had no permanent fortifications to be besieged, the war in that country afforded very little practice in that branch of engineering which is connected with the attack and defence of permanent works, particularly sapping and mining. The only operation resembling a siege was the investment and bombardment of Vera Cruz, and it is worthy of remark that if General Scott had stormed that place, weak as it was, he must have lost a large number of his men, while from his trenches and batteries he reduced it with scarcely the sacrifice of a single life.

Nor did either party in this war make much use of field works in the attack and defence of positions. Nevertheless, no one can read the history of the war without appreciating the important influence which Fort Brown had upon General Taylor's defence of the left bank of the Rio Grande. Again if we compare our loss in other Mexican battles with that which the Americans sustained in their attacks upon Monterey, Churubusco, Molino del Key, and Chapultepec,--places partially secured by field works--we shall be still more convinced of the value of temporary fortifications for the defence of military positions, although it was manifest that the Mexicans neither knew how to construct nor how to defend them.

Nor was there much practice in this war in the use of military bridges, for, with the exception of the Rio Grande, our armies had no important rivers to cross. We must not, however, omit to note the important fact that General Taylor was unable to take advantage of the victories of Palo Alto and Resacade La Palma to pursue and destroy the army of Arista, _because_ he had no pontoon equipage to enable him to follow them across the Rio Grande. It should also be remarked that even a very small bridge equipage would have been of very great use in crossing other streams and ravines during the operations of this war. One of our cavalry officers writes:--

"On our march from Matamaras to Victoria and Tampico, in 1846
and 1847, we had infinite difficulty in bridging boggy streams (there
being no suitable timber), and in crossing ravines with vertical banks;
a few ways of the Birago trestles would have saved us many days and
a vast amount of labor. In the operations in the valley of Mexico, our
movements, checked as they so often were by impassable wet ditches
and sometimes by dry ravines, would have been rendered so much more
free and rapid by the use of the Birago trestles, that our successes
could have been gained at far less cost, and probably with more rapidity
than they were."

With regard to military reconnaissance, the splendid achievements of Lee and others connected with the operations of General Scott, proved the value and importance of this particular branch of field engineering.

But field engineering, as a branch or arm of the military service, received its greatest development and most brilliant application in the Crimean war, particularly in the siege of Sebastopol, and the measures resorted to by General Todtleben to defend that place against the attack of superior forces.

A brief sketch of these defensive works may be of interest to the reader:--

When the allies reached Balaklava, Sebastopol was defended on the south side only by a loop-holed wall about four feet and a half thick, and from eighteen to twenty feet high, and a semicircular redoubt with two stories of loop-holes, and five guns in barbette. These works would have afforded some protection against a _coup-de-main_ by infantry and cavalry, but could have offered no very considerable obstacle to a combined attack of these arms with artillery.

The Russian engineer commenced his operations for strengthening this position by occupying the most important points in his line of defence with detached field works of sufficient relief to resist an assault, and generally closed at the gorge. These works were afterwards connected by re-entering lines of a weaker profile, which served to enfilade the ravines and to flank the advanced works. The old wall was strengthened with earth, and rifle-pits for sharpshooters were constructed at a considerable distance in front.

The most important points of the main line of defence were: 1st. The Flag-staff Bastion. 2d. The Central Bastion. 3d. The Malakoff. 4th. The Redan. 5th. The little Redan. The command of the first was about fifteen feet, its ditch thirty feet wide and from twelve to fifteen feet deep. A portion of the scarp was provided with palisades some ten feet high. The construction of the Central Bastion was similar to that of the Flag-staff, but weaker in profile. The relief of the other works was still less. The command of the Malakoff was about fourteen feet, its ditch eighteen feet wide and twelve feet deep. The thickness of parapet in these works was generally about eighteen feet, and the bombproofs were covered with timber eighteen inches thick and six feet of earth. The loop-holed walls connecting these works were covered by a rampart and parapet, or entirely replaced by a simple parapet. Many of the embrasures were revetted with the common boiler iron ships' water-tanks filled with earth. The same material was sometimes used for traverses. Rope mantelets were used to protect the artillerists at the pieces from rifle balls and small grape. Great attention was given to the construction of bombproofs to cover the men from vertical firing. These were sometimes under the rampart and the second line of defence (where there was one), often under special traverses, or entirely under ground, and occasionally excavated in the solid rock. Some had fireplaces and chimneys, and were well ventilated. Interior slopes were revetted with gabions, crowned by fascines and sand bags. Gabions were also employed to repair the damage caused by the enemy's artillery. Abattis, military pits, caltrops and spikes, stuck through planks, and explosive machines were employed in front of different parts of the defences. Mines were resorted to in front of the Flag-staff Bastion to retard the French approaches. They were made in rocky soil with craters from twelve to fifteen feet deep. The Russian counter-approaches generally consisted of fleches, united by a simple trench.

Captain McClelland, one of our officers sent to the Crimea, from whose valuable Report most of the foregoing details are gathered, adds the following remarks upon these works of defence:--

"From the preceding hasty and imperfect account of the defences
of Sebastopol, it will appear how little foundation there was for
the generally-received accounts of the stupendous dimensions of the
works, and of new systems of fortifications brought into play. The
plain truth is, that these defences were simple temporary fortifications
of rather greater dimensions than usual, and that not a single new
principle of engineering was developed. It is true, that there were
several novel minor details, such as the rope mantelets, the use of
iron tanks, etc., but the whole merit consisted in the admirable
adaptation of well-known principles to the peculiar locality and
circumstances of the case. Neither can it be asserted that the plans
of the various works were perfect. On the contrary, there is no
impropriety in believing that if Todtleben were called upon to do
the same work over again, he would probably introduce better close
flanking arrangements."

"These remarks are not intended to, nor can they, detract from the
reputation of the Russian engineer. His labors and their results will
be handed down in history as the most triumphant and enduring monument
of the value of fortifications, and his name must ever be placed in the
first rank of military engineers. But, in our admiration of the
talent and energy of the engineer, it must not be forgotten that the
inert masses which he raised would have been useless without the skilful
artillery and heroic infantry who defended them. Much stronger places
than Sebastopol have often fallen under far less obstinate and
well-combined attacks than that to which it was subjected. There can be
no danger in expressing the conviction that the siege of Sebastopol
called forth the most magnificent defence of fortifications that has
ever yet occurred."

We will now pass to the works of attack. When the allies decided that the works of Sebastopol could not be carried by a simple cannonade and assault, but must be reduced by a regular siege, the first thing to be considered was to secure the forces covering the siege works from lateral sorties and the efforts of a relieving army. The field works planned for this purpose were not of any great strength, and many of them "were only undertaken when a narrow escape from some imminent danger had demonstrated their necessity." The French line of defence consisted of eight pentagonal redoubts, connected by an infantry parapet. The English seemed to attach but little importance to field works for the defence of their position; the terrible slaughter at Inkerman was the natural consequence of this neglect.

In describing the engineering operations of the allies at this siege. Captain McClelland says:--

"In regard to the detailed execution of the French attacks, little or
nothing novel is to be observed. Even when coolly examining the
direction of their trenches, after the close of the siege, it was very
rare that a faulty direction could be detected; they always afforded
excellent cover, and were well defiladed; in some cases the excavation
of the double direct sap was carried to the depth of six and a half feet
in the solid rock! The execution of many of the saps and batteries was
worthy of a school of practice. In the parallels, bombproofs were
provided as temporary hospitals, offices for the generals on duty, etc.
They did not use the sapper armor. The use of the sap-roller was
often attempted, but it could be employed only during the latter part of
the attack upon the Malakoff, when the fire of the Russian artillery was
nearly extinguished by the mortars; before that, as soon as a sap-roller
was placed in position--some thirty guns would be brought to bear
upon it, the result being its immediate destruction. It may justly be
said of the French approaches, that they admirably carried into practice
their system of sapping. The technical skill and patient courage
evinced by their officers and men in pushing forward such excellent
approaches, under a most deadly fire, is worthy of all commendation, and
is such as might have been expected from the antecedents of their
corps of engineers."

"With regard to the English, the case was different; it seemed as
if they systematically abandoned the excellent system taught and
perfected with so much care at Chatham. Whenever the ground was
difficult, their trenches generally ceased to afford shelter; a
shallow excavation in the rock, and a few stones thrown up in front,
appeared to be all that was considered necessary in such cases. They
were often faulty in direction as well as in profile, being not
unfrequently badly defiladed, or not gaining ground enough and
entirely too cramped; nor were they pushed as close to the Redan as
they ought to have been before giving the assault. In too many
cases the expression '_tâtonnement_ of the French would seem
to convey the best idea of their operations. Their batteries, however,
were very well constructed. The magazines, platforms, etc., were
usually similar to those adopted at Chatham, although
unnecessary deviations were sometimes complained of. They
employed neither armor nor the full sap, sometimes the half-full, but
generally the flying-sap were employed."

It may also be added, that, at the time of the assault, the French approaches had been pushed to the distance of thirty-two paces of the counterscarp of the Malakoff, while the English had scarcely reached within two hundred and twenty-five yards of the ditch of the Redan.

This description of the operations of the English at the siege of Sebastopol carries the professional reader directly back to their sieges in the Spanish Peninsula. It certainly is very strange that a great nation leading the van of civilization should, after such experience, have neglected to provide its army with a proper number of engineer officers and engineer troops, well instructed in the peculiar and difficult duties of that arm. What excuse can ever be offered for substituting human life for professional skill in the operations of a siege, when that skill may so readily be acquired in time of peace, and is always so necessary an element of a good military organization!

While every one admits that the siege of Sebastopol proved the immense importance of fieldworks against land attacks, some would conclude from the operations of that siege that good earthen works of a large development are better suited for the defence of a large city than permanent fortifications with masonry revetments, and which will necessarily have a less extended line of fire and less capacity for men and military stores. We quote the remarks of Captain McClelland on this point, and also make a short extract from the recently published Journal of the siege of Sebastopol by General Niel.

Captain McClelland says:--

"This would seem to be the proper place to notice a popular fallacy,
which, for a time at least, gained extensive credence. It was, that the
siege of Sebastopol proved the superiority of temporary (earthen)
fortifications over those of a permanent nature. It is easy to show that
it proved nothing of the kind; but that it only proved that temporary
works in the hands of a brave and skillful garrison are susceptible of a
longer defence than was generally supposed. They were attacked as
field works never were before, and were defended as field works never
had been defended. The main difference between properly constructed
permanent fortifications (intended to resist a siege) and temporary
works, is that the latter seldom present an insuperable obstacle against
assault, while the former always do. In addition, permanent works
have a better command over the adjacent country, and are more carefully
and perfectly planned. The masonry walls, which render an assault
impossible, cannot be seen from the distance, and can be destroyed
only by establishing batteries on the crest of the glacis, or the
edge of the ditch; the earthen parapet alone being visible beyond that
point, they may, until the besiegers arrive there, be regarded in the
same light as field works, with the difference that the garrison are not
harassed by the necessity of being constantly prepared to repel an
assault."

"Now, in the siege of Sebastopol, the trenches of the besiegers
never reached the edge of the ditch; so that, had the fortification been
a permanent one, the most difficult, slow, and dangerous part of the
siege remained to be undertaken, viz., the crowning of the covered
way, the establishment of the breach batteries, the descent and passage
of the ditch, and the assault of the breach; in other words, at the
moment when the weakness of the temporary works became apparent and
fatal, the true strength of the permanent defences would have commenced
coming into play."

"Assuming the progress of the attack to have been as rapid as it was
under existing circumstances, the besiegers, on the 8th of September,
would not yet have been in a condition to crown the covered way, the
siege would certainly have extended into the winter; and it may even
be doubted whether the place would eventually have fallen, until the
allies were in sufficient force to invest the north as well as the
southside."

General Neil remarks:--

"Struck by the length of the siege of Sebastopol, certain foreign
officers have expressed the opinion that masonry-revetted scarps are not
of incontestable utility in fortified places."

"Sebastopol, a vast retrenched camp, defended by field fortifications
of strong profile, derived its principal strength from an armament
such as could only exist in an extensive maritime arsenal, and from a
large army which always preserved its free communications with the
interior of Russia."

"If the enceinte had been provided with good revetted scarps;
if it had been necessary to breach these, and subsequently have been
compelled to penetrate through difficult passages, in rear of which the
heads of our columns would have met an army, Sebastopol would have
been an impregnable fortress."

"When we compare, in effect, the works of attack at Sebastopol
with those of an ordinary siege, we will see that on the 8th of
September, 1855, the day of the last assault, we had only executed,
after the greatest effort, the besieging works which precede the
crowning of the covered way; we had not then, as yet, entered upon that
period of the works of a siege which is the most difficult and the most
murderous; and there was no occasion to engage ourselves in them, since
the ditches and parapets of the enceinte were not insurmountable, as the
sequel has proved."

"The difficulty consisted in conquering the Russian army upon a
position prepared long beforehand for its defence, quite as much as in
surmounting the material obstacle of the fortification."

"Our places of arms being established at thirty metres from the
besieged works, we were able to choose our own time for action, and to
throw ourselves unexpectedly upon the enemy when the fire of our
artillery had forced him to shelter himself, up to the last minute,
behind his numerous blindages; to have gone further would have been
inviting the initiative in the attack on the part of the Russian army."

"The absence of scarp walls, which would have secured the place
from escalade, did not exercise a less influence upon the defence;
for the besieged were compelled to keep permanently at the gorges
of the works, strong reserves, in readiness to repulse the assault,
which they saw themselves menaced with from the commencement of
the siege."

"Finally, it can be remarked, that these reserves, which were decimated
night and day by the concentric fire of our batteries, were able
to issue out from the enceinte through wide debouches, without having
to pass through the narrow defiles which are formed by the drawbridges
of revetted places; they were, then, a permanent threat for the
besiegers, who were exposed to seeing their trenches unexpectedly
invaded by the greater part of the Russian army."

"Neither side, consequently, was in a position analogous to that
which is presented in the siege of a fortified place, protected from
insult by good masonry scarps.'" (Note to page 443.)

And again, page 423, the same authority remarks:

"Now, it (the Russian army) is no longer able to escape from the
concentric fires of our batteries; for, _not being protected by masonry
scarps_, it is obliged constantly to keep united strong reserves, in
order to repulse the assault with which it is at every instant menaced'"

NOTE TO CHAPTER XV.--MILITARY EDUCATION, &C.

With regard to the subjects discussed in this chapter it will, perhaps, be sufficient to remark that the Mexican war incontestably proved the value of the West Point Military Academy; for the superior efficiency of properly-educated officers over those who had been appointed from civil life without any knowledge of the profession they were called upon to practice, fully satisfied the country of the importance of that institution, and even silenced the clamors of the few who refused to be convinced.

The recent abortive attempt to give efficiency to our navy by means of a retired list, has, it is feared, destroyed for a time all hopes of introducing this very necessary measure into our military service; although it is very certain that without this we can never have our system of promotion placed upon an effective and satisfactory basis, which shall give efficiency to the army by rewarding merit, while it prevents injustice by closing the avenues of political favoritism.

The Mexican war also most abundantly proved that our objections to the system of military appointment were well founded, and it is hoped that the more recent abuses of that system will call public attention to the necessity of a change; for if military office continue to be conferred for partisan services, it will soon destroy the integrity as well as the efficiency of our army.

EXPLANATION OF PLATES

Figs. 1, 2, 3.--Used to illustrate the strategic relations of the armies A and B.

Fig. 4.--Line of operations directed against the extremity of the enemy's line of defence, as was done by Napoleon in the Marengo campaign.

Fig. 5.--Napoleon's plan of campaign in 1800, for the army of the Rhine, and the army of reserve.

Fig. 6 shows the plan adopted by Napoleon in the campaign of 1800, to preserve his communications.

Fig. 7 illustrates the same thing in the campaign of 1806.

Fig. 8.--Interior and central line of operations.

Fig. 9 represents a camp of a grand division of an army. The distance from the front row of tents to the line of camp-guards should be from 350 to 400 feet; thence to the line of posts, from 150 to 200 feet; thence to the line of sentinels, from 100 to 200 feet. In many cases, the line of posts between the camp-guards and sentinels may be dispensed with. The distance between battalions will be from 50 to 100 feet; and the same between squadrons and batteries.

Fig. 10.--Details of encampment for a battalion of infantry. The width of company streets will depend upon the strength of a company, and will be so arranged that the front of the camp shall not exceed the length of the battalion, when drawn up in line of battle. This width will be from 50 to 100 feet. The distance between the tents of each row will be 2 or 3 feet; the distance between the tents of one company and those of another, from 4 to 6 feet.

Fig. 11 is the camp of a squadron of cavalry. A single company encamping alone, would be arranged in the same way as an entire squadron. The horses are picketed in two lines parallel to the tents, and at a distance from them of about 12 feet. The forage is placed between the tents. A squadron of two companies will occupy a front of about 180 feet. The fires, or company kitchens, should be 50 or 60 feet in rear of the non-commissioned officers' tents.

Fig 12 is the camp of two batteries of foot artillery, or two companies of foot engineers.

[The plan of encampment for artillery, as given in the "Instruction of U.S. Field Artillery, horse and foot," may be employed where a single battery encamps by itself, or where only the skeleton of companies is maintained; but it will be found exceedingly inconvenient, where a full battery, with a large train, encamps on the same line with other troops. The plan we have given is that which is employed in most European services.]

Fig. 13.--In this plan for mounted artillery and engineers, the fires are so arranged as to expose the ammunition as little as possible to the sparks from the kitchens.

Fig. 14.--Simple parallel order of battle.

15.--Parallel order, with a crochet on the flank.

16.--Parallel order, reinforced on a wing.

17.--Parallel order, reinforced on the centre.

18.--Simple oblique order.

19.--Oblique order, reinforced on the assailing wing.

20.--Perpendicular order.

21.--Concave order.

22.--Convex order.

23.--Order by echelon on a wing.

24.--Order by echelon on the centre.

25.--Combined order of attack.

26.--Formation of infantry by two deployed lines.

27, 28.--- Arrangements corresponding to depth of column.

29.--Formation by squares.

30.--Mixed formation of three battalions.

31.--Deep formation of heavy columns.

32.--Formation in columns by brigade.

33.--Formation of two brigades of cavalry, by the mixed system.

34.--Passage of the Sound by the British fleet, in 1807.

35.--Attack on Copenhagen.

36.--Attack on Algiers.

37.--Attack on San Juan d'Ulloa.

38.--Attack on St. Jean d'Acre.

39.--Plan of a regular bastioned front of a fortification.

40.--Section of do. do.

41.--Tenaillons.

Fig. 42.--Demi-tenaillons, with a bonnet.

43.--A horn-work.

44.--A crown-work.

45.--A redan.

46.--A lunette.

47.--A mitre or priest-cap.

48.--A bastioned fort.

49.--Vertical section of a field intrenchment.

50.--Simple sap.

51.--Flying sap.

52.--Full sap.

53.--Crater of a military mine.

54.--Plan of the attack of a regular bastioned work.