Chapter X: Part 10

III. _Brush Fibres, &c._--In addition to the textile industries there are manufactures which utilize fibres of both animal and vegetable character. The most important of these is brush-making. The familiar brushes of everyday use are extremely diversified in form and texture. The supplies of animal fibres are mainly drawn from the badger, hog, bear, sable, squirrel and horse. These fibres and bristles cover a large range of effects. Brushes required for cleansing purposes are composed of fibres of a more or less hard and resilient character, such as horse hairs, and other tail hairs and bristles. For painting work brushes of soft quality are employed, graduating for fine work into the extreme softness of the "camel hair" pencil. Of vegetable fibres the following are used in this industry. The _Caryota urens_ furnishes the Kittul fibre, obtained from the base of the leaf stalks. Piassava is obtained from the _Attalea funifera_, also from the _Leopoldina piassaba_ (Brazil). Palmyra fibre is obtained from the _Borassus flabellifer_. These are all members of the natural order of the Palmaceae. Mexican fibre, or Istle, is obtained from the agave. The fibre known as Whisk, largely used for dusting brushes, is obtained from various species of the Gramineae; the "Mexican Whisk" from _Epicampeas macroura_; and "Italian Whisk" from _Andropogon_. The _coir_ fibre mentioned above in connexion with coarse textiles is also extensively used in brush-making. Aloe and Agave fibres in their softer forms are also used for plasterers' brushes. Many of the whitewashes and cleansing solutions used in house decoration are alkaline in character, and for such uses advantage is taken of the specially resistant character of the cellulose group of materials.

_Stuffing and Upholstery._--Another important use for fibrous materials is for filling or stuffing in connexion with the seats and cushions in upholstery. In the large range of effects required, a corresponding number and variety of products find employment. One of the most important is the floss or seed-hair of the _Eriodendron anfractuosum_, known as Kapok, the use of which in Europe was created by the Dutch merchants who drew their supplies from Java. The fibre is soft, silky and elastic, and maintains its elasticity in use. Many fibres when used in the mass show, on the other hand, a tendency to become matted and compressed in use, and to restore them to their original state the fibre requires to be removed and subjected to a teasing or carding process. This defect limits the use of other "flosses" or seed hairs in competition with Kapok. Horse hair is extensively used in this industry, as are also wool flocks and other short animal hairs and wastes.

_Hats and Matting._--For these manufactures a large range of the fibrous products above described are employed, chiefly in their natural or raw state.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.--The list of works appended comprises only a small
fraction of the standard literature of the subject, but they are
sufficiently representative to enable the specialist, by referring to
them, to cover the subject-matter. F.H. Bowman, _The Structure of the
Wood Fibre_ (1885), _The Structure of Cotton Fibre_ (1882); Cross,
Bevan and King, _Indian Fibres and Fibrous Substances_ (London, 1887);
C.F. Cross, _Report on Miscellaneous Fibres_, Colonial Indian
Exhibition, 1886 (London, 1887); Cross and Bevan, _Cellulose,
Researches on Cellulose_, i. and ii. (London, 1895-1905); C.R. Dodge,
_A Descriptive Catalogue of Useful Fibre Plants of the World_ (Report
No. 9, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Washington, 1897); von Hohmel, _Die
Mikroskopie der technisch verwendeten Faserstoffe_ (Leipzig, 1905);
J.J. Hummel, _The Dyeing of Textile Fabrics_ (London, 1885); J.M.
Matthews, _The Textile Fibres, their Physical, Microscopical and
Chemical Properties_ (New York, 1904); H. Muller, _Die Pflanzenfaser_
(Braunschweig, 1877); H. Schlichter, "The Examination of Textile
Fibres and Fabrics" (_Jour. Soc. Chem. Ind._, 1890, 241); M.
Vetillart, _Etudes sur les fibres vegetales textiles_ (Paris, 1876);
Sir T.H. Wardle, _Silk and Wild Silks_, original memoirs in connexion
with Col. Ind. Ex., 1886, Jubilee Ex. Manchester, 1887; Sir G. Watt,
_Dictionary of Economic Products of India_ (London, 1891); Wiesner,
_Die Rohstoffe des Pflanzenreichs_ (Leipzig, 1873); O.N. Witt,
_Chemische Technologie der Gespinnstfasern_ (Braunschweig, 1888); _Kew
Bulletin_; _The Journal of the Imperial Institute_; _The Journal of
the Society of Arts_; W.I. Hannam, _The Textile Fibres of Commerce_
(London, 1902); J. Jackson, _Commercial Botany_; J. Zipser, _Die
Textilen Rohmaterialien_ (Wien, 1895); F. Zetzsche, _Die wichtigsten
Faserstoffe der europaischen Industrie_ (Leipzig, 1895).
(C. F. C.)

FOOTNOTES:

[1] See also ALPACA, FELT, MOHAIR, SHODDY and WOOL.

[2] Col. Ind. Exhibition, 1886, _Miscellaneous Reports_.

FIBRIN, or FIBRINE, a protein formed by the action of the so-called fibrin-ferment on fibrinogen, a constituent of the blood-plasma of all vertebrates. This change takes place when blood leaves the arteries, and the fibrin thus formed occasions the clotting which ensues (see BLOOD). To obtain pure coagulated fibrin it is best to heat blood-plasma (preferably that of the horse) to 56 deg. C. The usual method of beating a blood-clot with twigs and removing the filamentous fibrin which attaches itself to them yields a very impure product containing haemoglobin and much globulin; moreover, it is very difficult to purify. Fibrin is a very voluminous, tough, strongly elastic, jelly-like substance; when denaturalized by heat, alcohol or salts, it behaves as any other coagulated albumin.

FICHTE, IMMANUEL HERMANN (originally HARTMANN) VON (1797-1879), German philosopher, son of J.G. Fichte, was born at Jena on the 18th of July 1797. Having held educational posts at Saarbrucken and Dusseldorf, in 1836 he became extraordinary professor of philosophy at Bonn, and in 1840 full professor. In 1842 he received a call to Tubingen, retired in 1867, and died at Stuttgart on the 8th of August 1879. The most important of his comprehensive writings are: _System der Ethik_ (1850-1853), _Anthropologie_ (1856, 3rd ed. 1876), _Psychologie_ (1864-1873), _Die theistische Weltansicht_ (1873). In 1837 he had founded the _Zeitschrift fur Philosophie_ as an organ of his views, more especially on the subject of the philosophy of religion, where he was in alliance with C.H. Weisse; but, whereas Weisse thought that the Hegelian structure was sound in the main, and that its imperfections might be mended, Fichte held it to be incurably defective, and spoke of it as a "masterpiece of erroneous consistency or consistent error." Fichte's general views on philosophy seem to have changed considerably as he advanced in years, and his influence has been impaired by certain inconsistencies and an appearance of eclecticism, which is strengthened by his predominantly historical treatment of problems, his desire to include divergent systems within his own, and his conciliatory tone. His philosophy is an attempt to reconcile monism (Hegel) and individualism (Herbart) by means of theism (Leibnitz). He attacks Hegelianism for its pantheism, its lowering of human personality, and imperfect recognition of the demands of the moral consciousness. God, he says, is to be regarded not as an absolute but as an Infinite Person, whose nature it is that he should realize himself in finite persons. These persons are objects of God's love, and he arranges the world for their good. The direct connecting link between God and man is the "genius," a higher spiritual individuality existing in man by the side of his lower, earthly individuality. Fichte, in short, advocates an ethical theism, and his arguments might easily be turned to account by the apologist of Christianity. In his conception of finite personality he recurs to something like the monadism of Leibnitz. His insistence on moral experience is connected with his insistence on personality. One of the tests by which Fichte discriminates the value of previous systems is the adequateness with which they interpret moral experience. The same reason that made him depreciate Hegel made him praise Krause (panentheism) and Schleiermacher, and speak respectfully of English philosophy. It is characteristic of Fichte's almost excessive receptiveness that in his latest published work, _Der neuere Spiritualismus_ (1878), he supports his position by arguments of a somewhat occult or theosophical cast, not unlike those adopted by F.W.H. Myers. He also edited the complete works and literary correspondence of his father, including his life.

See R. Eucken, "Zur Erinnerung I. H. F.," in _Zeitschrift fur
Philosophie_, ex. (1897); C.C. Scherer, _Die Gotteslehre von I. H. F._
(1902); article by Karl Hartmann in _Allegemeine deutsche Biographie_
xlviii. (1904). Some of his works were translated by J.D. Morell under
the title of _Contributions to Mental Philosophy_ (1860).

FICHTE, JOHANN GOTTLIEB (1762-1814), German philosopher, was born at Rammenau in Upper Lusatia on the 19th of May 1762. His father, a ribbon-weaver, was a descendant of a Swedish soldier who (in the service of Gustavus Adolphus) was left wounded at Rammenau and settled there. The family was distinguished for piety, uprightness, and solidity of character. With these qualities Fichte himself combined a certain impetuosity and impatience probably derived from his mother, a woman of a somewhat querulous and jealous disposition.

At a very early age the boy showed remarkable mental vigour and moral independence. A fortunate accident which brought him under the notice of a neighbouring nobleman, Freiherr von Miltitz, was the means of procuring him a more excellent education than his father's circumstances would have allowed. He was placed under the care of Pastor Krebel at Niederau. After a short stay at Meissen he was entered at the celebrated school at Pforta, near Naumburg. In 1780 he entered the university of Jena as a student of theology. He supported himself mainly by private teaching, and during the years 1784-1787 acted as tutor in various families of Saxony. In 1787, after an unsuccessful application to the consistory for pecuniary assistance, he seems to have been driven to miscellaneous literary work. A tutorship at Zurich was, however, obtained in the spring of 1788, and Fichte spent in Switzerland two of the happiest years of his life. He made several valuable acquaintances, among others Lavater and his brother-in-law Hartmann Rahn, to whose daughter, Johanna Maria, he became engaged.

Settling at Leipzig, still without any fixed means of livelihood, he was again reduced to literary drudgery. In the midst of this work occurred the most important event of his life, his introduction to the philosophy of Kant. At Schulpforta he had read with delight Lessing's _Anti-Goeze_, and during his Jena days had studied the relation between philosophy and religion. The outcome of his speculations, _Aphorismen uber Religion und Deismus_ (unpublished, date 1790; _Werke_, i. 1-8), was a species of Spinozistic determinism, regarded, however, as lying altogether outside the boundary of religion. It is remarkable that even for a time fatalism should have been predominant in his reasoning, for in character he was opposed to such a view, and, as he has said, "according to the man, so is the system of philosophy he adopts."

Fichte's _Letters_ of this period attest the influence exercised on him by the study of Kant. It effected a revolution in his mode of thinking; so completely did the Kantian doctrine of the inherent moral worth of man harmonize with his own character, that his life becomes one effort to perfect a true philosophy, and to make its principles practical maxims. At first he seems to have thought that the best method for accomplishing his object would be to expound Kantianism in a popular, intelligible form. He rightly felt that the reception of Kant's doctrines was impeded by their phraseology. An abridgment of the _Kritik der Urtheilskraft_ was begun, but was left unfinished.

Fichte's circumstances had not improved. It had been arranged that he should return to Zurich and be married to Johanna Rahn, but the plan was overthrown by a commercial disaster which affected the fortunes of the Rahn family. Fichte accepted a post as private tutor in Warsaw, and proceeded on foot to that town. The situation proved unsuitable; the lady, as Kuno Fischer says, "required greater submission and better French" than Fichte could yield, and after a fortnight's stay Fichte set out for Konigsberg to see Kant. His first interview was disappointing; the coldness and formality of the aged philosopher checked the enthusiasm of the young disciple, though it did not diminish his reverence. He resolved to bring himself before Kant's notice by submitting to him a work in which the principles of the Kantian philosophy should be applied. Such was the origin of the work, written in four weeks, the _Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung_ (Essay towards a Critique of all Revelation). The problem which Fichte dealt with in this essay was one not yet handled by Kant himself, the relations of which to the critical philosophy furnished matter for surmise. Indirectly, indeed, Kant had indicated a very definite opinion on theology: from the _Critique of Pure Reason_ it was clear that for him speculative theology must be purely negative, while the _Critique of Practical Reason_ as clearly indicated the view that the moral law is the absolute content or substance of any religion. A _critical_ investigation of the conditions under which religious belief was possible was still wanting. Fichte sent his essay to Kant, who approved it highly, extended to the author a warm reception, and exerted his influence to procure a publisher. After some delay, consequent on the scruples of the theological censor of Halle, who did not like to see miracles rejected, the book appeared (Easter, 1792). By an oversight Fichte's name did not appear on the title-page, nor was the preface given, in which the author spoke of himself as a beginner in philosophy. Outsiders, not unnaturally, ascribed the work to Kant. The _Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung_ went so far as to say that no one who had read a line of Kant's writings could fail to recognize the eminent author of this new work. Kant himself corrected the mistake, at the same time highly commending the work. Fichte's reputation was thus secured at a stroke.

The _Critique of Revelation_ marks the culminating point of Fichte's Kantian period. The exposition of the conditions under which revealed religion is possible turns upon the absolute requirements of the moral law in human nature. Religion itself is the belief in this moral law as divine, and such belief is a practical postulate, necessary in order to add force to the law. It follows that no revealed religion, so far as matter or substance is concerned, can contain anything beyond this law; nor can any fact in the world of experience be recognized by us as supernatural. The supernatural element in religion can only be the divine character of the moral law. Now, the revelation of this divine character of morality is possible only to a being in whom the lower impulses have been, or are, successful in overcoming reverence for the law. In such a case it is conceivable that a revelation might be given in order to add strength to the moral law. Religion ultimately then rests upon the practical reason, and expresses some demand or want of the pure ego. In this conclusion we can trace the prominence assigned by Fichte to the practical element, and the tendency to make the requirements of the ego the ground for all judgment on reality. It was not possible that having reached this point he should not press forward and leave the Kantian position.

This success was coincident with an improvement in the fortunes of the Rahn family, and the marriage took place at Zurich in October 1793. The remainder of the year he spent at Zurich, slowly perfecting his thoughts on the fundamental problems left for solution in the Kantian philosophy. During this period he published anonymously two remarkable political works, _Zuruckforderung der Denkfreiheit von den Fursten Europas_ and _Beitrage zur Berichtigung der Urtheile des Publicums uber die franzosische Revolution_. Of these the latter is much the more important. The French Revolution seemed to many earnest thinkers the one great outcry of modern times for the liberty of thought and action which is the eternal heritage of every human being. Unfortunately the political condition of Germany was unfavourable to the formation of an unbiassed opinion on the great movement. The principles involved in it were lost sight of under the mass of spurious maxims on social order which had slowly grown up and stiffened into system. To direct attention to the true nature of revolution, to demonstrate how inextricably the right of liberty is interwoven with the very existence of man as an intelligent agent, to point out the inherent progressiveness of state arrangements, and the consequent necessity of reform or amendment, such are the main objects of the _Beitrage_; and although, as is often the case with Fichte, the arguments are too formal and the distinctions too wire-drawn, yet the general idea is nobly conceived and carried out. As in the _Critique of Revelation_ so here the rational nature of man and the conditions necessary for its manifestation or realization become the standard for critical judgment.

Towards the close of 1793 Fichte received an invitation to succeed K.L. Reinhold as extraordinary professor of philosophy at Jena. This chair, not in the ordinary faculty, had become, through Reinhold, the most important in the university, and great deliberation was exercised in selecting his successor. It was desired to secure an exponent of Kantianism, and none seemed so highly qualified as the author of the _Critique of Revelation_. Fichte, while accepting the call, desired to spend a year in preparation; but as this was deemed inexpedient he rapidly drew out for his students an introductory outline of his system, and began his lectures in May 1794. His success was instantaneous and complete. The fame of his predecessor was altogether eclipsed. Much of this success was due to Fichte's rare power as a lecturer. In oral exposition the vigour of thought and moral intensity of the man were most of all apparent, while his practical earnestness completely captivated his hearers. He lectured not only to his own class, but on general moral subjects to all students of the university. These general addresses, published under the title _Bestimmung des Gelehrten_ (Vocation of the Scholar), were on a subject dear to Fichte's heart, the supreme importance of the highest intellectual culture and the duties incumbent on those who had received it. Their tone is stimulating and lofty.

The years spent at Jena were unusually productive; indeed, the completed Fichtean philosophy is contained in the writings of this period. A general introduction to the system is given in the tractate _Uber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre_ (On the Notion of the Theory of Science), 1794, and the theoretical portion is worked out in the _Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre_ (Foundation of the whole Theory of Science, 1794) and _Grundriss des Eigenthumlichen d. Wissenschaftslehre_ (Outline of what is peculiar in the Theory of Science, 1794). To these were added in 1797 a _First_ and a _Second Introduction to the Theory of Science_, and an _Essay towards a new Exposition of the Theory of Science_. The _Introductions_ are masterly expositions. The practical philosophy was given in the _Grundlage des Naturrechts_ (1796) and _System der Sittenlehre_ (1798). The last is probably the most important of all Fichte's works; apart from it, his theoretical philosophy is unintelligible.

During this period Fichte's academic career had been troubled by various storms, the last so violent as to put a close to his professorate at Jena. The first of them, a complaint against the delivery of his general addresses on Sundays, was easily settled. The second, arising from Fichte's strong desire to suppress the _Landsmannschaften_ (students' orders), which were productive of much harm, was more serious. Some misunderstanding caused an outburst of ignorant ill-feeling on the part of the students, who proceeded to such lengths that Fichte was compelled to reside out of Jena. The third storm, however, was the most violent. In 1798 Fichte, who, with F.I. Niethammer (1766-1848), had edited the _Philosophical Journal_ since 1795, received from his friend F.K. Forberg (1770-1848) an essay on the "Development of the Idea of Religion." With much of the essay he entirely agreed, but he thought the exposition in so many ways defective and calculated to create an erroneous impression, that he prefaced it with a short paper _On the Grounds of our Belief in a Divine Government of the Universe_, in which God is defined as the moral order of the universe, the eternal law of right which is the foundation of all our being. The cry of atheism was raised, and the electoral government of Saxony, followed by all the German states except Prussia, suppressed the _Journal_ and confiscated the copies found in their universities. Pressure was put by the German powers on Charles Augustus, grand-duke of Saxe-Weimar, in whose dominions Jena university was situated, to reprove and dismiss the offenders. Fichte's defences (_Appellation an das Publicum gegen die Anklage des Atheismus_, and _Gerichtliche Verantwortung der Herausgeber der phil. Zeitschrift_, 1799), though masterly, did not make it easier for the liberal-minded grand-duke to pass the matter over, and an unfortunate letter, in which he threatened to resign in case of reprimand, turned the scale against him. The grand-duke accepted his threat as a request to resign, passed censure, and extended to him permission to withdraw from his chair at Jena; nor would he alter his decision, even though Fichte himself endeavoured to explain away the unfortunate letter.

Berlin was the only town in Germany open to him. His residence there from 1799 to 1806 was unbroken save for a course of lectures during the summer of 1805 at Erlangen, where he had been named professor. Surrounded by friends, including Schlegel and Schleiermacher, he continued his literary work, perfecting the _Wissenschaftslehre_. The most remarkable of the works from this period are--(1) the _Bestimmung des Menschen_ (Vocation of Man, 1800), a book which, for beauty of style, richness of content, and elevation of thought, may be ranked with the Meditations of Descartes; (2) _Der geschlossene Handelsstaat_, 1800 (The Exclusive or Isolated Commercial State), a very remarkable treatise, intensely socialist in tone, and inculcating organized protection; (3) _Sonnenklarer Bericht an das grossere Publicum uber die neueste Philosophie_, 1801. In 1801 was also written the _Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre_, which was not published till after his death. In 1804 a set of lectures on the _Wissenschaftslehre_ was given at Berlin, the notes of which were published in the _Nachgelassene Werke_, vol. ii. In 1804 were also delivered the noble lectures entitled _Grundzuge des gegenwartigen Zeitalters_ (Characteristics of the Present Age, 1804), containing a most admirable analysis of the _Aufklarung_, tracing the position of such a movement of thought in the natural evolution of the general human consciousness, pointing out its inherent defects, and indicating as the ultimate goal of progress the life of reason in its highest aspect as a belief in the divine order of the universe. The philosophy of history sketched in this work has something of value with much that is fantastic. In 1805 and 1806 appeared the _Wesen des Gelehrten_ (Nature of the Scholar) and the _Anweisung zum seligen Leben oder Religionslehre_ (Way to a Blessed Life), the latter the most important work of this Berlin period. In it the union between the finite self-consciousness and the infinite ego or God is handled in an almost mystical manner. The knowledge and love of God is the end of life; by this means only can we attain blessedness (_Seligkeit_), for in God alone have we a permanent, enduring object of desire. The infinite God is the all; the world of independent objects is the result of reflection or self-consciousness, by which the infinite unity is broken up. God is thus over and above the distinction of subject and object; our knowledge is but a reflex or picture of the infinite essence. Being is not thought.

The disasters of Prussia in 1806 drove Fichte from Berlin. He retired first to Stargard, then to Konigsberg (where he lectured for a time), then to Copenhagen, whence he returned to the capital in August 1807. From this time his published writings are practical in character; not till after the appearance of the _Nachgelassene Werke_ was it known in what shape his final speculations had been thrown out. We may here note the order of these posthumous writings as being of importance for tracing the development of Fichte's thought. From the year 1806 we have the remarkable _Bericht uber die Wissenschaftslehre_ (_Werke_, vol. viii.), with its sharp critique of Schelling; from 1810 we have the _Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns_, published in 1817, of which another treatment is given in lectures of 1813 (_Nachgel. Werke_, vol. i.). Of the _Wissenschaftslehre_ we have, in 1812-1813, four separate treatments contained in the _Nachgel Werke_. As these consist mainly of notes for lectures, couched in uncouth phraseology, they cannot be held to throw much light on Fichte's views. Perhaps the most interesting are the lectures of 1812 on _Transcendental Logic_ (_Nach. Werke_, i. 106-400).

From 1812 we have notes of two courses on practical philosophy, _Rechtslehre_ (_Nach. Werke_, vol. ii.) and _Sittenlehre_ (_ib._ vol. iii.). A finished work in the same department is the _Staatslehre_, published in 1820. This gives the Fichtean utopia organized on principles of pure reason; in too many cases the proposals are identical with principles of pure despotism.

During these years, however, Fichte was mainly occupied with public affairs. In 1807 he drew up an elaborate and minute plan for the proposed new university of Berlin. In 1507-1808 he delivered at Berlin, amidst danger and discouragement, his noble addresses to the German people (_Reden an die deutsche Nation_). Even if we think that in these pure reason is sometimes overshadowed by patriotism, we cannot but recognize the immense practical value of what he recommended as the only true foundation for national prosperity.

In 1810 he was elected rector of the new university founded in the previous year. This post he resigned in 1812, mainly on account of the difficulties he experienced in his endeavour to reform the student life of the university.

In 1813 began the great effort of Germany for national independence. Debarred from taking an active part, Fichte made his contribution by way of lectures. The addresses on the idea of a true war (_Uber den Begriff eines wahrhaften Kriegs_, forming part of the _Staatslehre_) contain a very subtle contrast between the positions of France and Germany in the war.

In the autumn of 1813 the hospitals of Berlin were filled with sick and wounded from the campaign. Among the most devoted in her exertions was Fichte's wife, who, in January 1814, was attacked with a virulent hospital fever. On the day after she was pronounced out of danger Fichte was struck down. He lingered for some days in an almost unconscious state, and died on the 27th of January 1814.

The philosophy of Fichte, worked out in a series of writings, and
falling chronologically into two distinct periods, that of Jena and
that of Berlin, seemed in the course of its development to undergo a
change so fundamental that many critics have sharply separated and
opposed to one another an earlier and a later phase. The ground of the
modification, further, has been sought and apparently found in quite
external influences, principally that of Schelling's
_Naturphilosophie_, to some extent that of Schleiermacher. But as a
rule most of those who have adopted this view have done so without the
full and patient examination which the matter demands; they have been
misled by the difference in tone and style between the earlier and
later writings, and have concluded that underlying this was a
fundamental difference of philosophic conception. One only, Erdmann,
in his _Entwicklung d. deut. Spek. seit Kant_, S 29, seems to give
full references to justify his opinion, and even he, in his later
work, _Grundriss der Gesch. der Philos._ (ed. 3), S 311, admits that
the difference is much less than he had at the first imagined. He
certainly retains his former opinion, but mainly on the ground, in
itself intelligible and legitimate, that, so far as Fichte's
philosophical reputation and influence are concerned, attention may be
limited to the earlier doctrines of the _Wissenschaftslehre_. This may
be so, but it can be admitted neither that Fichte's views underwent
radical change, nor that the _Wissenschaftslehre_ was ever regarded as
in itself complete, nor that Fichte was unconscious of the apparent
difference between his earlier and later utterances. It is
demonstrable by various passages in the works and letters that he
never looked upon the _Wissenschaftslehre_ as containing the whole
system; it is clear from the chronology of his writings that the
modifications supposed to be due to other thinkers were from the first
implicit in his theory; and if one fairly traces the course of thought
in the early writings, one can see how he was inevitably led on to the
statement of the later and, at first sight, divergent views. On only
one point, the position assigned in the _Wissenschaftslehre_ to the
absolute ego, is there any obscurity; but the relative passages are
far from decisive, and from the early work, _Neue Darstellung der
Wissenchaftslehre_, unquestionably to be included in the Jena period,
one can see that from the outset the doctrine of the absolute ego was
held in a form differing only in statement from the later theory.

Fichte's system cannot be compressed with intelligibility. We shall
here note only three points:--(a) the origin in Kant; (b) the
fundamental principle and method of the _Wissenschaftslehre_; (c) the
connexion with the later writings. The most important works for (a)
are the "Review of Aenesidemus," and the _Second Introduction to the
Wissenschaftslehre_; for (b) the great treatises of the Jena period;
for (c) the _Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns_ of 1810.

(a) The Kantian system had for the first time opened up a truly
fruitful line of philosophic speculation, the transcendental
consideration of knowledge, or the analysis of the conditions under
which cognition is possible. To Kant the fundamental condition was
given in the synthetical unity of consciousness. The primitive fact
under which might be gathered the special conditions of that synthesis
which we call cognition was this unity. But by Kant there was no
attempt made to show that the said special conditions were necessary
from the very nature of consciousness itself. Their necessity was
discovered and proved in a manner which might be called empirical.
Moreover, while Kant in a quite similar manner pointed out that
intuition had special conditions, space and time, he did not show any
link of connexion between these and the primitive conditions of pure
cognition. Closely connected with this remarkable defect in the
Kantian view--lying, indeed, at the foundation of it--was the doctrine
that the matter of cognition is altogether _given_, or thrown into the
_form_ of cognition from without. So strongly was this doctrine
emphasized by Kant, that he seemed to refer the _matter_ of knowledge
to the action upon us of a non-ego or _Ding-an-sich_, absolutely
beyond consciousness. While these hints towards a completely
intelligible account of cognition were given by Kant, they were not
reduced to system, and from the way in which the elements of cognition
were related, could not be so reduced. Only in the sphere of practical
reason, where the intelligible nature prescribed to itself its own
laws, was there the possibility of systematic deduction from a single
principle.

The peculiar position in which Kant had left the theory of cognition
was assailed from many different sides and by many writers, specially
by Schultze (Aenesidemus) and Maimon. To the criticisms of the latter,
in particular, Fichte owed much, but his own activity went far beyond
what they supplied to him. To complete Kant's work, to demonstrate
that all the necessary conditions of knowledge can be deduced from a
single principle, and consequently to expound the complete system of
reason, that is the business of the _Wissenschaftslehre_. By it the
theoretical and practical reason shall be shown to coincide; for while
the categories of cognition and the whole system of pure thought can
be expounded from one principle, the ground of this principle is
scientifically, or to cognition, inexplicable, and is made conceivable
only in the practical philosophy. The ultimate basis for the activity
of cognition is given by the will. Even in the practical sphere,
however, Fichte found that the contradiction, insoluble to cognition,
was not completely suppressed, and he was thus driven to the higher
view, which is explicitly stated in the later writings though not, it
must be confessed, with the precision and scientific clearness of the
_Wissenschaftslehre_.

(b) What, then, is this single principle, and how does it work itself
out into system? To answer this one must bear in mind what Fichte
intended by designating all philosophy _Wissenschaftslehre_, or theory
of science. Philosophy is to him the rethinking of actual cognition,
the _theory_ of knowledge, the complete, systematic exposition of the
principles which lie at the basis of all reasoned cognition. It
traces the necessary acts by which the cognitive consciousness comes
to be what it is, both in form and in content. Not that it is a
natural history, or even a _phenomenology_ of consciousness; only in
the later writings did Fichte adopt even the genetic method of
exposition; it is the complete statement of the pure principles of the
understanding in their rational or necessary order. But if complete,
this _Wissenschaftslehre_ must be able to deduce the whole organism of
cognition from certain fundamental axioms, themselves unproved and
incapable of proof; only thus can we have a _system_ of reason. From
these primary axioms the whole body of necessary thoughts must be
developed, and, as Socrates would say, the argument itself will
indicate the path of the development.

Of such primitive principles, the absolutely necessary conditions of
possible cognition, only three are thinkable--one perfectly
unconditioned both in form and matter; a second, unconditioned in form
but not in matter; a third, unconditioned in matter but not in form.
Of these, evidently the first must be the fundamental; to some extent
it conditions the other two, though these cannot be deduced from it or
proved by it. The statement of these principles forms the introduction
to _Wissenschaftslehre_.

The method which Fichte first adopted for stating these axioms is not
calculated to throw full light upon them, and tends to exaggerate the
apparent airiness and unsubstantiality of his deduction. They may be
explained thus. The primitive condition of all intelligence is that
the ego shall posit, affirm or be aware of itself. The ego is the ego;
such is the first pure act of conscious intelligence, that by which
alone consciousness can come to be what it is. It is what Fichte
called a Deed-act (_Thathandlung_); we cannot be aware of the
process,--the ego _is_ not until it has affirmed itself,--but we are
aware of the result, and can see the necessity of the act by which it
is brought about. The ego then posits itself, as real. What the ego
posits is real. But in consciousness there is equally given a
primitive act of op-positing, or contra-positing, formally distinct
from the act of position, but materially determined, in so far as what
is op-posited must be the negative of that which was posited. The
non-ego--not, be it noticed, the world as we know it--is op-posed in
consciousness to the ego. The ego is not the non-ego. How this act of
op-positing is possible and necessary, only becomes clear in the
practical philosophy, and even there the inherent difficulty leads to
a higher view. But third, we have now an absolute antithesis to our
original thesis. Only the ego is real, but the non-ego is posited in
the ego. The contradiction is solved in a higher synthesis, which
takes up into itself the two opposites. The ego and non-ego _limit_
one another, or determine one another; and, as limitation is negation
of part of a divisible quantum, in this third act, the divisible ego
is op-posed to a divisible non-ego.

From this point onwards the course proceeds by the method already made
clear. We progress by making explicit the oppositions contained in the
fundamental synthesis, by uniting these opposites, analysing the new
synthesis, and so on, until we reach an ultimate pair. Now, in the
synthesis of the third act two principles may be distinguished:--(1)
the non-ego determines the ego; (2) the ego determines the non-ego. As
determined the ego is theoretical, as determining it is practical;
ultimately the opposed principles must be united by showing how the
ego is both determining and determined.

It is impossible to enter here on the steps by which the theoretical
ego is shown to develop into the complete system of cognitive
categories, or to trace the deduction of the processes (productive
imagination, intuition, sensation, understanding, judgment, reason) by
which the quite indefinite non-ego comes to assume the appearance of
definite objects in the forms of time and space. All this evolution is
the necessary consequence of the determination of the ego by the
non-ego. But it is clear that the non-ego cannot really determine the
ego. There is no reality beyond the ego itself. The contradiction can
only be suppressed if the ego itself opposes to itself the non-ego,
places it as an _Anstoss_ or plane on which its own activity breaks
and from which it is reflected. Now, this op-positing of the _Anstoss_
is the necessary condition of the practical ego, of the will. If the
ego be a striving power, then of necessity a limit must be set by
which its striving is manifest. But how can the infinitely active ego
posit a limit to its own activity? Here we come to the _crux_ of
Fichte's system, which is only partly cleared up in the _Rechtslehre_
and _Sittenlehre_. If the ego be pure activity, free activity, it can
only become aware of itself by positing some limit. We cannot possibly
have any cognition of how such an act is possible. But as it is a free
act, the ego cannot be determined to it by anything beyond itself; it
cannot be aware of its own freedom otherwise than as determined by
other free egos. Thus in the _Rechtslehre_ and _Sittenlehre_, the
multiplicity of egos is deduced, and with this deduction the first
form of the _Wissenschaftslehre_ appeared to end.

(c) But in fact deeper questions remained. We have spoken of the ego
as becoming aware of its own freedom, and have shown how the existence
of other egos and of a world in which these egos may act are the
necessary conditions of consciousness of freedom. But all this is the
work of the ego. All that has been expounded follows if the ego comes
to consciousness. We have therefore to consider that the absolute ego,
from which spring all the individual egos, is not subject to these
conditions, but freely determines itself to them. How is this
absolute ego to be conceived? As early as 1797 Fichte had begun to see
that the ultimate basis of his system was the absolute ego, in which
is no difference of subject and object; in 1800 the _Bestimmung des
Menschen_ defined this absolute ego as the infinite moral will of the
universe, God, in whom are all the individual egos, from whom they
have sprung. It lay in the nature of the thing that more precise
utterances should be given on this subject, and these we find in the
_Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns_ and in all the later lectures. God in
them is the absolute Life, the absolute One, who becomes conscious of
himself by self-diremption into the individual egos. The individual
ego is only possible as opposed to a non-ego, to a world of the
senses; thus God, the infinite will, manifests himself in the
individual, and the individual has over against him the non-ego or
thing. "The individuals do not make part of the being of the one life,
but are a pure form of its absolute freedom." "The individual is not
conscious of himself, but the Life is conscious of itself in
individual form and as an individual." In order that the Life may act,
though it is not necessary that it _should act_, individualization is
necessary. "Thus," says Fichte, "we reach a final conclusion.
Knowledge is not mere knowledge of itself, but of being, and of the
one being that truly is, viz. God.... This one possible object of
knowledge is never known in its purity, but ever broken into the
various forms of knowledge which are and can be shown to be necessary.
The demonstration of the necessity of these forms is philosophy or
_Wissenschaftslehre_" (_Thats. des Bewuss. Werke_, ii. 685). This
ultimate view is expressed throughout the lectures (in the _Nachgel.
Werke_) in uncouth and mystical language.

It will escape no one (1) how the idea and method of the
_Wissenschaftslehre_ prepare the way for the later Hegelian dialectic,
and (2) how completely the whole philosophy of Schopenhauer is
contained in the later writings of Fichte. It is not to the credit of
historians that Schopenhauer's debt should have been allowed to pass
with so little notice.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.--Fichte's complete works were published by his son J.H.
Fichte, _Sammtliche Werke_ (8 vols., Berlin, 1845-1846), with
_Nachgelassene Werke_ (3 vols., Bonn, 1834-1835); also _Leben und
Briefwechsel_ (2 vols., 1830, ed. 1862). Among translations are those
of William Smith, _Popular Writings of Fichte, with Memoir_ (2 vols.,
London, 1848-1849, 4th ed. 1889); A.E. Kroeger, portions of the
_Wissenschaftslehre_ (_Science of Knowledge_, Philadelphia, 1868; ed.
London, 1889), the _Naturrecht_ (_Science of Rights_, 1870; ed.
London, 1889); of the _Vorlesungen u. d. Bestimmung d. Gelehrten_
(_The Vocation of the Scholar_, by W. Smith, 1847); _Destination of
Man_, by Mrs P. Sinnett; _Discours a la nation allemande_, French by
Leon Philippe (1895), with preface by F. Picavet, and a biographical
memoir.

The number of critical works is very large. Besides the histories of
post-Kantian philosophy by Erdmann, Fortlage (whose account is
remarkably good), Michelet, Biedermann and others, see Wm. Busse,
_Fichte und seine Beziehung zur Gegenwart des deutschen Volkes_
(Halle, 1848-1849); J.H. Lowe, _Die Philosophic Fichtes_ (Stuttgart,
1862); Kuno Fischer, _Geschichte d. neueren Philosophie_ (1869, 1884,
1890); Ludwig Noack, _Fichte nach seinem Leben, Lehren und Wirken_
(Leipzig, 1862); R. Adamson, Fichte (1881, in Knight's "Philosophical
Classics"); Oscar Benzow, _Zu Fichtes Lekre von Nicht-Ich_ (Bern,
1898); E.O. Burmann, _Die Transcendentalphilosophie Fichtes und
Schellings_ (Upsala, 1890-1892); M. Carriere, _Fichtes
Geistesentwickelung in die Reden uber d. Bestimmung des Gelehrten_
(1894); C.C. Everett, _Fichte's Science of Knowledge_ (Chicago, 1884);
O. Pfleiderer, J.G. _Fichtes Lebensbild eines deutschen Denkers und
Patrioten_ (Stuttgart, 1877); T. Wotschke, _Fichte und Erigena_
(1896); W. Kabitz, _Studien zur Entwickelungsgeschichte der Fichtehen
Wissenschaftslehre aus der Kantischen Philosophie_ (1902); E. Lask,
_Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte_ (1902); X. Leon, _La Philos.
de Fichte_ (1902); M. Wiener, J.G. _Fichtes Lehre vom Wesen und Inhalt
der Geschichte_ (1906).

On Fichte's social philosophy see, e.g., F. Schmidt-Warneck, _Die
Sociologie Fichtes_ (Berlin, 1884); W. Windelband, _Fichtes Idee des
deutschen Staates_ (1890); M. Weber, _Fichtes Sozialismus und sein
Verhaltnis zur Marx'schen Doctrin_ (1900); S.H. Gutman, J.G. _Fichtes
Sozialpadogogik_ (1907); H. Lindau, _Johann G. Fichte und der neuere
Socialismus_ (1900). (R. Ad.; X.)

FICHTELGEBIRGE, a mountain group of Bavaria, forming the centre from which various mountain ranges proceed,--the Elstergebirge, linking it to the Erzgebirge, in a N.E., the Frankenwald in a N.W., and the Bohmerwald in a S.E. direction. The streams to which it gives rise flow towards the four cardinal points,--e.g. the Eger eastward and the Saale northward, both to the Elbe; the Weisser Main westward to the Rhine, and the Naab southward to the Danube. The chief points of the mass are the Schneeberg and the Ochsenkopf, the former having a height of 3448, and the latter of 3356 ft. The whole district is pretty thickly populated, and there is great abundance of wood, as well as of iron, vitriol, sulphur, copper, lead and many kinds of marble. The inhabitants are employed chiefly in the iron mines, at forges and blast furnaces, and in charcoal burning and the manufacture of blacking from firewood. Although surrounded by railways and crossed by the lines Nuremberg-Eger and Regensburg-Oberkotzau, the Fichtelgebirge, owing principally to its raw climate and bleakness, is not much visited by strangers, the only important points of interest being Alexandersbad (a delightfully situated watering-place) and the granite labyrinth of Luisenburg.

See A. Schmidt, _Fuhrer durch das Fichtelgebirge_ (1899); Daniel,
_Deutschland_; and Meyer, _Conversations-Lexikon_ (1904).

FICINO, MARSILIO (1433-1499), Italian philosopher and writer, was born at Figline, in the upper Arno valley, in the year 1433. His father, a physician of some eminence, settled in Florence, and attached himself to the person of Cosimo de' Medici. Here the young Marsilio received his elementary education in grammar and Latin literature at the high school or studio pubblico. While still a boy, he showed promise of rare literary gifts, and distinguished himself by his facility in the acquisition of knowledge. Not only literature, but the physical sciences, as then taught, had a charm for him; and he is said to have made considerable progress in medicine under the tuition of his father. He was of a tranquil temperament, sensitive to music and poetry, and debarred by weak health from joining in the more active pleasures of his fellow-students. When he had attained the age of eighteen or nineteen years, Cosimo received him into his household, and determined to make use of his rare disposition for scholarship in the development of a long-cherished project. During the session of the council for the union of the Greek and Latin churches at Florence in 1439, Cosimo had made acquaintance with Gemistos Plethon, the Neo-Platonic sage of Mistra, whose discourses upon Plato and the Alexandrian mystics so fascinated the learned society of Florence that they named him the second Plato. It had been the dream of this man's whole life to supersede both forms of Christianity by a semi-pagan theosophy deduced from the writings of the later Pythagoreans and Platonists. When, therefore, he perceived the impression he had made upon the first citizen of Florence, Gemistos suggested that the capital of modern culture would be a fit place for the resuscitation of the once so famous Academy of Athens. Cosimo took this hint. The second half of the 15th century was destined to be the age of academies in Italy, and the regnant passion for antiquity satisfied itself with any imitation, however grotesque, of Greek or Roman institutions. In order to found his new academy upon a firm basis Cosimo resolved not only to assemble men of letters for the purpose of Platonic disputation at certain regular intervals, but also to appoint a hierophant and official expositor of Platonic doctrine. He hoped by these means to give a certain stability to his projected institution, and to avoid the superficiality of mere enthusiasm. The plan was good; and with the rare instinct for character which distinguished him, he made choice of the right man for his purpose in the young Marsilio.

Before he had begun to learn Greek, Marsilio entered upon the task of studying and elucidating Plato. It is known that at this early period of his life, while he was yet a novice, he wrote voluminous treatises on the great philosopher, which he afterwards, however, gave to the flames. In the year 1459 John Argyropoulos was lecturing on the Greek language and literature at Florence, and Marsilio became his pupil. He was then about twenty-three years of age. Seven years later he felt himself a sufficiently ripe Greek scholar to begin the translation of Plato, by which his name is famous in the history of scholarship, and which is still the best translation of that author Italy can boast. The MSS. on which he worked were supplied by this patron Cosimo de' Medici and by Amerigo Benci. While the translation was still in progress Ficino from time to time submitted its pages to the scholars, Angelo Poliziano, Cristoforo Landino, Demetrios Chalchondylas and others; and since these men were all members of the Platonic Academy, there can be no doubt that the discussions raised upon the text and Latin version greatly served to promote the purpose of Cosimo's foundation. At last the book appeared in 1482, the expenses of the press being defrayed by the noble Florentine, Filippo Valori. About the same time Marsilio completed and published his treatise on the Platonic doctrine of immortality (_Theologia Platonica de immortalitate animae_), the work by which his claims to take rank as a philosopher must be estimated. This was shortly followed by the translation of Plotinus into Latin, and by a voluminous commentary, the former finished in 1486, the latter in 1491, and both published at the cost of Lorenzo de' Medici just one month after his death. As a supplement to these labours in the field of Platonic and Alexandrian philosophy, Marsilio next devoted his energies to the translation of Dionysius the Areopagite, whose work on the celestial hierarchy, though recognized as spurious by the Neapolitan humanist, Lorenzo Valla, had supreme attraction for the mystic and uncritical intellect of Ficino.

It is not easy to value the services of Marsilio Ficino at their proper worth. As a philosopher, he can advance no claim to originality, his laborious treatise on Platonic theology being little better than a mass of ill-digested erudition. As a scholar, he failed to recognize the distinctions between different periods of antiquity and various schools of thought. As an exponent of Plato he suffered from the fatal error of confounding Plato with the later Platonists. It is true that in this respect he did not differ widely from the mass of his contemporaries. Lorenzo Valla and Angelo Poliziano, almost alone among the scholars of that age, showed a true critical perception. For the rest, it was enough that an author should be ancient to secure their admiration. The whole of antiquity seemed precious in the eyes of its discoverers; and even a thinker so acute as Pico di Mirandola dreamed of the possibility of extracting the essence of philosophical truth by indiscriminate collation of the most divergent doctrines. Ficino was, moreover, a firm believer in planetary influences. He could not separate his philosophical from his astrological studies, and caught eagerly at any fragment of antiquity which seemed to support his cherished delusions. It may here be incidentally mentioned that this superstition brought him into trouble with the Roman Church. In 1489 he was accused of magic before Pope Innocent VIII., and had to secure the good offices of Francesco Soderini, Ermolao Barbaro, and the archbishop Rinaldo Orsini, in order to purge himself of a most perilous imputation. What Ficino achieved of really solid, was his translation. The value of that work cannot be denied; the impulse which it gave to Platonic studies in Italy, and through them to the formation of the new philosophy in Europe, is indisputable. Ficino differed from the majority of his contemporaries in this that, while he felt the influence of antiquity no less strongly than they did, he never lost his faith in Christianity, or contaminated his morals by contact with paganism. For him, as for Petrarch, St Augustine was the model of a Christian student. The cardinal point of his doctrine was the identity of religion and philosophy. He held that philosophy consists in the study of truth and wisdom, and that God alone is truth and wisdom,--so that philosophy is but religion, and true religion is genuine philosophy. Religion, indeed, is common to all men, but its pure form is that revealed through Christ; and the teaching of Christ is sufficient to a man in all circumstances of life. Yet it cannot be expected that every man should accept the faith without reasoning; and here Ficino found a place for Platonism. He maintained that the Platonic doctrine was providentially made to harmonize with Christianity, in order that by its means speculative intellects might be led to Christ. The transition from this point of view to an almost superstitious adoration of Plato was natural; and Ficino, we know, joined in the hymns and celebrations with which the Florentine Academy honoured their great master on the day of his birth and death. Those famous festivals in which Lorenzo de' Medici delighted had indeed a pagan tone appropriate to the sentiment of the Renaissance; nor were all the worshippers of the Athenian sage so true to Christianity as his devoted student.

Of Ficino's personal life there is but little to be said. In order that he might have leisure for uninterrupted study, Cosimo de' Medici gave him a house near S. Maria Nuova in Florence, and a little farm at Montevecchio, not far from the villa of Careggi. Ficino, like nearly all the scholars of that age in Italy, delighted in country life. At Montevecchio he lived contentedly among his books, in the neighbourhood of his two friends, Pico at Querceto, and Poliziano at Fiesole, cheering his solitude by playing on the lute, and corresponding with the most illustrious men of Italy. His letters, extending over the years 1474-1494, have been published, both separately and in his collected works. From these it may be gathered that nearly every living scholar of note was included in the list of his friends, and that the subjects which interested him were by no means confined to his Platonic studies. As instances of his close intimacy with illustrious Florentine families, it may be mentioned that he held the young Francesco Guicciardini at the font, and that he helped to cast the horoscope of the Casa Strozzi in the Via Tornabuoni.