Chapter VIII: Act 1890: , the effect of which is explained in the article Insanity. Any (4)

With the stiffly drilled professional soldier of England, Austria and Russia the handiness of the new weapon could hardly have been exploited, for (in Russia at any rate) even skirmishers had to march in step. The Prussians were drilled nominally in accordance with regulations dating from 1812, and therefore suitable, if not to the new weapon, at least to the "swarm" fighting of an enthusiastic national army, but upon these regulations a mass of peace-time amendments had been superposed, and in theory their drill was as stiff as that of the Russians. But, as in France in 1793-1796, the composition of their army--a true "nation in arms"--and the character of the officers evolved by the universal service system saved them from their regulations. The offensive spirit was inculcated as thoroughly as elsewhere, and in a much more practical form. Dietrich von Bülow's predictions of the future battle of "skirmishers" (meaning thereby a dense but irregular firing line) had captivated the younger school of officers, while King William and the veterans of Napoleon's wars were careful to maintain small columns (sometimes company[13] columns of 240 rifles, but quite as often half-battalion and battalion columns) as a solid background to the firing line. Thus in 1866 (see SEVEN WEEKS' WAR), as Moltke had foreseen, the attacking infantry fought its way to close quarters by means of its own fire, and the bayonet charge again became, in his own words, "not the first, but the last, phase of the combat," immediately succeeding a last burst of rapid fire at short range and carried out by the company and battalion reserves in close order. Against the Austrians, whose tactics alternated between unprepared bayonet rushes by whole brigades and a passive slow-firing defensive, victory was easily achieved.

Infantry in the war of 1870.

But immediately after Königgrätz the French army was served out with a breech-loading rifle greatly superior in every respect to the needle-gun, and after four years' tension France pitted breech-loader against breech-loader. In the first battles (see WÖRTH, and METZ: _Battles_) the decision-seeking spirit of the "armed nation," the inferior range of the needle-gun as compared with that of the chassepot, and the recollections of easy triumphs in 1864 and 1866, all combined to drive the German infantry forward to within easy range before they began to make use of their weapons. Their powerful artillery would have sufficed of itself to enable them to do this (see SEDAN), had they but waited for its fire to take effect. But they did not, and they suffered accordingly, for, owing to the ineffectiveness of their rifle between 1000 and 400 yds. range, they had to advance, as the Austrians and Russians had done in previous wars, without firing a shot. In these circumstances their formations, whether line or column, broke up, and the whole attacking force dissolved into long irregular swarms. These swarms were practically composed only of the brave men, while the rest huddled together in woods and valleys. When, therefore, at last the firing line came within 400 or 500 yds. of the French, it was both severely tried and numerically weak, but the fact that it was composed of the best men only enabled it to open and to maintain an effective fire. Even then the French, highly disciplined professional soldiers that they were, repeatedly swept them back by counterstrokes, but these counterstrokes were subjected to the fire of the German guns and were never more than locally and momentarily effective. More and more German infantry was pushed forward to support the firing line, and, like its predecessors, each reinforcement, losing most of its unwilling men as it advanced over the shot-swept ground, consisted on arrival of really determined men, and closing on the firing line pushed it forward, sometimes 20 yds., sometimes 100, until at last rapid fire at the closest ranges dislodged the stubborn defenders. Bayonets (as usual) were never actually used, save in sudden encounters in woods and villages. The decisive factors were, first the superiority of the Prussian guns, secondly, heavy and effective fire delivered at short range, and above all the high moral of a proportion of resolute soldiers who, after being subjected for hours to the most demoralizing influences, had still courage left for the final dash. These three factors, in spite of changes in armament, rule the infantry attack of to-day.

INFANTRY TACTICS SINCE 1870

The net result of the Franco-German War on infantry tactics, as far as it can be summed up in a single phrase, was to transfer the fire-fight to the line of skirmishers. Henceforward the old and correct sense of the word "skirmishers" is lost. They have nothing to do with a "skirmish," but are the actual organ of battle, and their old duties of feeling the way for the battle-formations have been taken over by "scouts." The last-named were not, however, fully recognized in Great Britain[14] till long after the war--not in fact until the war in South Africa had shown that the "skirmisher" or firing line was too powerful an engine to be employed in mere "feeling." In most European armies "combat patrols," which work more freely, are preferred to scouts, but the idea is the same.

Lessons of 1870.

The fire-fight on the line of skirmishers, now styled the _firing line_, is the centre of gravity of the modern battle. In 1870, owing to the peculiar circumstances of unequal armament, the "fire-fight" was insufficiently developed and uneconomically used, and after the war tacticians turned their attention to the evolution of better methods than those of Wörth and Gravelotte, Europe in general following the lead of Prussia. Controversy, in the early stages, took the form of a contest between "drill" and "individualism," irrespective of formations and technical details, for until about 1890 the material efficiency of the gun and the rifle remained very much what it had been in 1870, and the only new factor bearing on infantry tactics was the general adoption of a "national army" system similar to Prussia's and of rifles equal, and in some ways superior, to the chassepot. All European armies, therefore, had to consider equality in artillery power, equality in the ballistics of rifles, and equal intensity of fighting spirit as the normal conditions of the next battle of nations. Here, in fact, was an equilibrium, and in such conditions how was the attacking infantry to force its way forward, whether by fire or movement or by both? France sought the answer in the domain of artillery. Under the guidance of General Langlois, she re-created the Napoleonic hurricane of case-shot (represented in modern conditions by time shrapnel), while from the doctrine formed by Generals Maillard and Bonnal there came a system of infantry tactics derived fundamentally from the tactics of the Napoleonic era. This, however, came later; for the moment (viz. from 1871 to about 1890) the lead in infantry training was admittedly in the hands of the Prussians.

German officers who had fought through the war had seen the operations, generally speaking, either from the staff officer's or from the regimental officer's point of view. To the former and to many of the latter the most indelible impression of the battlefield was what they called _Massen-Drückebergertum_ or "wholesale skulking." The rest, who had perhaps in most cases led the brave remnant of their companies in the final assaults, believed that battles were won by the individual soldier and his rifle. The difference between the two may be said to lie in this, that the first sought a remedy, the second a method. The remedy was _drill_, the method _extended order_.

The extreme statement of the case in favour of drill pure and simple is to be found in the famous anonymous pamphlet _A Summer Night's Dream_, in which a return to the "old Prussian fire-discipline" of Frederick's day was offered as the solution of the problem, how to give "fire" its maximum efficacity. Volleys and absolutely mechanical obedience to word of command represent, of course, the most complete application of fire-power that can be conceived. But the proposals of the extreme close-order school were nevertheless merely pious aspirations, not so much because of the introduction of the breech-loader as because the short-service "national" army can never be "drilled" in the Frederician sense. The proposals of the other school were, however, even more impracticable, in that they rested on the hypothesis that all men were brave, and that, consequently, all that was necessary was to teach the recruit how to shoot and to work with other individuals in the squad or company. Disorder of the firing line was accepted, not as an unavoidable evil, but as a condition in which individuality had full play, and as dense swarm formations were quite as vulnerable as an ordinary line, it was an easy step from a thick line of "individuals" to a thin one. The step was, in fact, made in the middle of the war of 1870, though it was hardly noticed that extension only became practicable in proportion as the quality of the enemy decreased and the Germans became acclimatized to fire.

Between these extremes, a moderate school, with the emperor William (who had more experience of the human being in battle than any of his officers) at its head, spent a few years in groping for close-order formations which admitted of control without vulnerability, then laid down the principle and studied the method of developing the greatest fire-power of which short-service infantry was supposed capable, ultimately combined the "drill" and teaching ideas in the German infantry regulations of 1888, which at last abolished those of 1812 with their multitudinous amendments.

Conditions of the modern battle.

The necessity for "teaching" arose partly out of the new conditions of service and the relative rarity of wars. The soldier could no longer learn the ordinary rules of safety in action and comfort in bivouac by experience, and had to be taught. But it was still more the new conditions of fighting that demanded careful individual training. Of old, the professional soldier (other than the man belonging to light troops or the ground scout) was, roughly speaking, either so far out of immediate danger as to preserve his reasoning faculties, or so deep in battle that he became the unconscious agent of his inborn or acquired instincts. But the increased range of modern arms prolonged the time of danger, and although (judged by casualty returns) the losses to-day are far less than those which any regiment of Frederick's day was expected to face without flinching, and actual fighting is apparently spasmodic, the period in which the individual soldier is subjected to the fear of bullets is greatly increased. Zorndorf, the most severe of Frederick's battles, lasted seven hours, Vionville twelve and Wörth eleven. The battle of the future in Europe, without being as prolonged as Liao-Yang, Shaho and Mukden, will still be undecided twenty-four hours after the advanced guards have taken contact. Now, for a great part of this time, the "old Prussian fire-discipline," which above all aims at a rapid decision, will be not only unnecessary, but actually hurtful to the progress of the battle as a whole. As in Napoleon's day (for reasons presently to be mentioned) the battle must resolve itself into a preparative and a decisive phase.[15] In the last no commander could desire a better instrument (if such were attainable with the armies of to-day) than Frederick's forged steel machine, in which every company was human mitrailleuse. But the preparatory combat not only will be long, but also must be graduated in intensity at different times and places in accordance with the commander's will, and the Frederician battalion only attained its mechanical perfection by the absolute and permanent submergence of the individual qualities of each soldier, with the result that, although it furnished the maximum effort in the minimum time, it was useless once it fell apart into ragged groups. The individual spirit of earnestness and intelligence in the use of ground by small fractions, which in Napoleon's day made the _combat d'usure_ possible, was necessarily unknown in Frederick's. On the other hand, graduation implies control on the part of the leaders, and this the method of irregular swarms of individual fighters imagined by the German progressives merely abdicates. At most such swarms--however close or extended--can only be tolerated as an evil that no human power can avert when the battle has reached a certain stage of intensity. Even the latest _German Infantry Training_ (1906) is explicit on this point. "It must never be forgotten that the obligation of abandoning close order is an evil which can often be avoided when" &c. &c. (par. 342). The consequences of this evil, further, are actually less serious in proportion as the troops are well drilled--not to an unnecessary and unattainable ideal of mechanical perfection, but to a state of instinctive self-control in danger. Drill, therefore, carried to such a point that it has eliminated the bad habits of the recruit without detriment to his good habits, is still the true basis of all military training, whether training be required for the swift controlled movements of bodies of infantry in close order, for the cool and steady fire of scattered groups of skirmishers, or for the final act of the resolute will embodied in the "decisive attack." Unfortunately for the solution of infantry problems "drill" and "close order" are often confused, owing chiefly to the fact that in the 1870 battles the dissolution of close order formations practically meant the end of control as control was then understood. Both the material and objective, and the inward and spiritual significances of "drill" are, however, independent of "close order." In fact, in modern history, when a resolute general has made a true decisive attack with half-drilled troops, he has generally arrayed them in the closest possible formations.

Drill.

Drill is the military form of education by repetition and association
(see G. le Bon, _Psychologie de l'éducation_). Materially it consists
in exercises frequently repeated by bodies of soldiers with a view to
ensuring the harmonious action of each individual in the work to be
performed by the mass--in a word, rehearsals. Physical "drill" is
based on physiology and gymnastics, and aims at the development of the
physique and the individual will power.[16] But the psychological or
moral is incomparably the most important side of drill. It is the
method or art of discipline. Neither self-control nor devotion in the
face of imminent danger can as a rule come from individual reasoning.
A commander-in-chief keeps himself free from the contact with the
turmoil of battle so long as he has to calculate, to study reports or
to manoeuvre, and commanders of lower grades, in proportion as their
duty brings them into the midst of danger, are subjected to greater or
less disturbing influences. The man in the fighting line where the
danger is greatest is altogether the slave of the unconscious.
Overtaxed infantry, whether defeated or successful, have been observed
to present an appearance of absolute insanity. It is true that in the
special case of great war experience reason resumes part of its
dominion in proportion as the fight becomes the soldier's habitual
_milieu_. Thus towards the end of a long war men become skilful and
cunning individual fighters; sometimes, too, feelings of respect for
the enemy arise and lead to interchange of courtesies at the outposts,
and it has also been noticed that in the last stage of a long war men
are less inclined to sacrifice themselves. All this is "reason" as
against inborn or inbred "instinct." But in the modern world, which is
normally at peace, some method must be found of ensuring that the
peace-trained soldier will carry out his duties when his reason is
submerged. Now we know that the constant repetition of a certain act,
whether on a given impulse or of the individual's own volition, will
eventually make the performance of that act a reflex action. For this
reason peace-drilled troops have often defeated a war-trained enemy,
even when the motives for fighting were equally powerful on each side.
The mechanical performance of movements, and loading and firing at the
enemy, under the most disturbing conditions can be ensured by bringing
the required self-control from the domain of reason into that of
instinct. "_L'éducation_," says le Bon, "_est l'art de faire passer le
conscient dans l'inconscient_." Lastly, the instincts of the recruit
being those special to his race or nation, which are the more powerful
because they are operative through many generations, it is the drill
sergeant's business to bring about, by disuse, atrophy of the
instincts which militate against soldierly efficiency, and to develop,
by constant repetition and special preparation, other useful instincts
which the Englishman or Frenchman or German does not as such possess.
In short, as regards infantry training, there is no real distinction
between drill and education, save in so far as the latter term covers
instruction in small details of field service which demand alertness,
shrewdness and technical knowledge (as distinct from technical
training). As understood by the controversialists of the last
generation, drill was the antithesis of education. To-day, however,
the principle of education having prevailed against the old-fashioned
notion of drill, it has been discovered that after all drill is merely
an intensive form of education. This discovery (or rather definition
and justification of an existing empirical rule) is attributable
chiefly to a certain school of French officers, who seized more
rapidly than civilians the significance of modern psycho-physiology.
In their eyes, a military body possesses in a more marked degree than
another, the primary requisite of the "psychological crowd," studied
by Gustave le Bon, viz. the orientation of the wills of each and all
members of the crowd in a determined direction. Such a crowd generates
a collective will that dominates the wills of the individuals
composing it. It coheres and acts on the common property of all the
instincts and habits in which each shares. Further it tends to
extremes of baseness and heroism--this being particularly marked in
the military crowd--and lastly it reacts to a stimulus. The last is
the keynote of the whole subject of infantry training as also, to a
lesser degree, of that of the other arms. The officer can be regarded
practically as a hypnotist playing upon the unconscious activities of
his subject. In the lower grades, it is immaterial whether reason,
caprice or a fresh set of instincts stimulated by an outside
authority, set in motion the "suggestion." The true leader, whatever
the provenance of his "suggestion," makes it effective by dominating
the "psychological crowd" that he leads. On the other hand, if he
fails to do so, he is himself dominated by the uncontrolled will of
the crowd, and although leaderless mobs have at times shown extreme
heroism, it is far more usual to find them reverting to the primitive
instinct of brutality or panic fear. A mob, therefore, or a raw
regiment, requires greater powers of suggestion in its leader, whereas
a thorough course of drill tunes the "crowd" to respond to the
stimulus that average officers can apply.

So far from diminishing, drill has increased in importance under modern conditions of recruiting. It has merely changed in form, and instead of being repressive it has become educative. The force of modern short-service troops, as _troops_, is far sooner spent than that of the old-fashioned automatic regiments, while the reserve force of its component parts, remaining after the dissolution, is far higher than of old. But this uncontrolled, force is liable to panic as well as amenable to an impulse of self-sacrifice. In so far, then, it is necessary to adopt the catchword of the Bülow school and to "organize disorder," and the only known method of doing so is drill. "Individualism" pure and simple had certainly a brief reign during and after the South African War, especially in Great Britain, and both France and Germany coquetted with "Boer tactics," until the Russo-Japanese war brought military Europe back to the old principles.

The South African War.

Formulation of the British "Doctrine."

But the South African War came precisely at the point of time when the controversies of 1870 had crystallized into a form of tactics that was not suitable to the conditions of that war, while about the same time the relations of infantry and artillery underwent a profound change. As regards the South African War, the clear atmosphere, the trained sight of the Boers, and the alternation of level plain and high concave kopjes which constituted the usual battlefield, made the front to front infantry attacks not merely difficult but almost impossible. For years, indeed ever since the Peninsular War, the tendency of the British army to deploy early had afforded a handle to European critics of its tactical methods. It was a tendency that survived with the rest of the "linear" tradition. But in South Africa, owing to the special advantages of the defenders, which denied to the assailant all reliable indications of the enemy's strength and positions, this early deployment had to take a non-committal form--viz. many successive lines of skirmishers. The application of this form was, indeed, made easy by the openness of the ground, but like all "schematic" formations, open or close, it could not be maintained under fire, with the special disadvantage that the extensions were so wide as to make any manoeuvring after the fight had cleared up a situation a practical impossibility. Hence some _preconceived idea_ of an objective was an essential preliminary, and as the Boer mounted infantry hardly ever stood to defend any particular position to the last (as they could always renew the fight at some other point in their vast territory), the preconceived idea was always, after the early battles, an envelopment in which the troops told off to the frontal holding attack were required, not to force their advance to its logical conclusion, but to keep the fight alive until the flank attack made itself felt. The principal tendency of British infantry tactics after the Boer War was therefore quite naturally, under European as well as colonial conditions, to deploy at the outset in great depth, i.e. in many lines of skirmishers, each line, when within about 1400 yds. of the enemy's position, extending to intervals of 10 to 20 paces between individuals. The reserves were strong and their importance was well marked in the 1902 training manual, but their functions were rather to extend or feed the firing line, to serve as a rallying point in case of defeat and to take up the pursuit (par. 220, _Infantry Training_, 1902), than to form the engine of a decisive attack framed by the commander-in-chief after "engaging everywhere and then seeing" as Napoleon did. The 1905 regulations adhered to this theory of the attack in the main, only modifying a number of tactical prescriptions which had not proved satisfactory after their transplantation from South Africa to Europe, but after the Russo-Japanese War a series of important amendments was issued which gave greater force and still greater elasticity to the attack procedure, and in 1909 the tactical "doctrine" of the British army was definitively formulated in _Field Service Regulations_, paragraph 102, of which after enumerating the advantages and disadvantages of the "preconceived idea" system, laid it down, as the normal procedure of the British Army, that the general should "obtain the decision by _manoeuvre on the battlefield_ with a large general reserve maintained in his own hand" and "_strike with his reserve at the right place and time_."

The rehabilitation of the Napoleonic attack idea thus frankly accepted in Great Britain had taken place in France several years before the South African War, and neither this war nor that in Manchuria effectively shook the faith of the French army in the principle, while on the other hand Germany remains faithful to the "preconceived idea," both in strategy and tactics.[17] This essential difference in the two rival "doctrines" is intimately connected with the revival of the Napoleonic artillery attack, in the form of concentrated time shrapnel.

The Napoleonic artillery preparation, it will be remembered, was a
fire of overwhelming intensity delivered against the selected point of
the enemy's position, at the moment of the massed and decisive assault
of the reserves. In Napoleon's time the artillery went in to within
300 or 400 yds. range for this act, i.e. in front of the infantry,
whereas now the guns fire over the heads of the infantry and
concentrate shells instead of guns on the vital point. The principle
is, however, the same. A model infantry attack in the Napoleonic
manner was that of Okasaki's brigade on the Terayama hill at the
battle of Shaho, described by Sir Ian Hamilton in his _Staff Officer's
Scrap-Book_. The Japanese, methodical and cautious as they were, only
sanctioned a pure open force assault as a last resort. Then the
brigadier Okasaki, a peculiarly resolute leader, arrayed his brigade
in a "schematic" attack formation of four lines, the first two in
single rank, the third in line and the fourth in company columns.
Covered by a powerful converging shrapnel fire, the brigade covered
the first 900 yds. of open plain without firing a shot. Then, however,
it disappeared from sight amongst the houses of a village, and the
spectators watched the thousands of flashes fringing the further edge
that indicated a fire-fight at decisive range (the Terayama was about
600 yds. beyond the houses). Forty minutes passed, and the army
commander Kuroki said, "He cannot go forward. We are in check to-day
all along the line." But at that moment Okasaki's men, no longer in a
"schematic" formation but in many irregularly disposed groups--some of
a dozen men and some of seventy, some widely extended and some
practically in close order--rushed forward at full speed over 600 yds.
of open ground, and stormed the Terayama with the bayonet.

The decisive attack.

Such an attack as that at the battle of Shaho is rare, but so it has always been with masterpieces of the art of war. We have only to multiply the front of attack by two and the forces engaged by five--and to find the resolute general to lead them--to obtain the ideal decisive attack of a future European war. Instead of the bare open plain over which the advance to decisive range was made, a European general would in most cases dispose of an area of spinneys, farm-houses and undulating fields. The schematic approach-march would be replaced in France and England by a forward movement of bodies in close order, handy enough to utilize the smallest covered ways. Then the fire of both infantry and artillery would be augmented to its maximum intensity, overpowering that of the defence, and the whole of the troops opposite the point to be stormed would be thrown forward for the bayonet charge. The formation for this scarcely matters. What is important is speed and the will to conquer, and for this purpose small bodies (sections, half-companies or companies), not in the close order of the drill book but grouped closely about the leader who inspires and controls them, are as potent an instrument as a Frederician line or a Napoleonic column.

Controversy, in fact, does not turn altogether on the method of the assault, or even on the method of obtaining the fire-superiority of guns and rifles that justifies it. Although one nation may rely on its guns more than on the rifles, or vice versa, all are agreed that at decisive range the firing line should contain as many men as can use their rifles effectually. Perhaps the most disputed point is the form of the "approach-march," viz. the dispositions and movements of the attacking infantry between about 1400 and about 600 yds. from the position of the enemy.

The approach-march.

The condition of the assailant's infantry when it reaches decisive ranges is largely governed by the efforts it has expended and the losses it has suffered in its progress. Sometimes even after a firing line of some strength has been established at decisive range, it may prove too difficult or too costly for the supports (sent up from the rear to replace casualties and to augment fire-power) to make their way to the front. Often, again, it may be within the commander's intentions that his troops at some particular point in the line should not be committed to decisive action before a given time--perhaps not at all. It is obvious then that no "normal" attack procedure which can be laid down in a drill book (though from time to time the attempt has been made, as in the French regulations of 1875) can meet all cases. But here again, though all armies formally and explicitly condemn the normal attack, each has its own well-marked tendencies.

Current views on the infantry attack.

The German regulations of 1906 define the offensive as "transporting fire towards the enemy, if necessary to his immediate proximity"; the bayonet attack "confirms" the victory. Every attack begins with deployment into extended order, and the leading line advances as close to the enemy as possible before opening fire. In ground offering cover, the firing line has practically its maximum density at the outset. In open ground, however, half-sections, groups and individuals, widely spaced out, advance stealthily one after the other till all are _in position_. It is on this position, called the "first fire position" and usually about 1000 yds. from the enemy, that the full force of the attack is deployed, and from this position, as simultaneously as possible, it opens the fight for fire-superiority. Then, each unit covering the advance of its neighbours, the whole line fights its way by open force to within charging distance. If at any point a decision is not desired, it is deliberately made impossible by employing there such small forces as possess no offensive power. Where the attack is intended to be pushed home, the infantry units employed act as far as possible simultaneously, resolutely and in great force (see the German _Infantry Regulations_, 1906, §§ 324 et seq.).

While in Germany movement "transports the fire," in France fire is regarded as the way to make movement possible. It is considered (see Grandmaison, _Dressage de l'infanterie_) that a premature and excessive deployment enervates the attack, that the ground (i.e. covered ways of approach for small columns, not for troops showing a fire front) should be used as long as possible to march "en troupe" and that a firing line should only be formed when it is impossible to progress without acting upon the enemy's means of resistance. Thereafter each unit, in such order as its chief can keep, should fight its way forward, and help others to do so--like Okasaki's brigade in the last stage of its attack--utilizing bursts of fire or patches of wood or depressions in the ground, as each is profitable or available to assist the advance. "From the moment when a fighting unit is 'uncoupled,' its action must be ruled by two conditions, and by those only: the one material, an object to be reached; the other moral, the will to reach the object."

The British _Field Service Regulations_ of 1909 are in spirit more closely allied to the French than to the German. "The climax of the infantry attack is the assault, which is made possible by superiority of fire" is the principle (emphasized in the book itself by the use of conspicuous type), and a "gradual _building up of the firing line within close range_ of the position," coupled with the closest artillery support, and the final blow of the reserves delivered "unexpectedly and in the greatest possible strength" are indicated as the means.[18]

Defence.

The _defence_, as it used to be understood, needs no description. To-day in all armies the defence is looked upon not as a means of winning a battle, but as a means of temporizing and avoiding the decision until the commander of the defending party is enabled, by the general military situation or by the course and results of the defensive battle itself, to take the offensive. In the British _Field Service Regulations_ it is laid down that when an army acts on the defensive no less than half of it should if possible be earmarked, suitably posted and placed under a single commander, for the purpose of delivering a decisive counter-attack. The object of the purely defensive portion, too, is not merely to hold the enemy's firing line in check, but to drive it back so that the enemy may be forced to use up his local reserve resources to keep the fight alive. A firing line covered and steadied by entrenchments, and restless local reserves ever on the look-out for opportunities of partial counterstrokes, are the instruments of this policy.

Entrenchments.

A word must be added on the use of entrenchments by infantry, a
subject the technical aspect of which is fully dealt with and
illustrated in FORTIFICATION AND SIEGECRAFT: _Field Defences_.
Entrenchments of greater or less strength by themselves have always
been used by infantry on the defensive, especially in the wars of
position of the 17th and 18th centuries. In the Napoleonic and modern
"wars of movement," they are regarded, not as a passive defence--they
have long ceased to present a physical barrier to assault--but as fire
positions so prepared as to be defensible by relatively few men. Their
purpose is, by economizing force elsewhere, to give the maximum
strength to the troops told off for the counter-offensive. In the
later stages of the American Civil War, and also in the Russo-Japanese
War of 1904-1905--each in its way an example of a "war of
positions"--the assailant has also made use of the methods of
fortification to secure every successive step of progress in the
attack. The usefulness and limitations of this procedure are defined
in generally similar terms in the most recent training manuals of
nearly every European army. Section 136, § 7 of the British _Infantry
Training_ (1905, amended 1907) says: "During the process of
establishing a superiority of fire, successive fire positions will be
occupied by the firing line. As a rule those affording natural cover
will be chosen, but if none exist and the intensity of the hostile
fire preclude any immediate further advance, it may be expedient for
the firing line to create some. This hastily constructed protection
will enable the attack to cope with the defender's fire and thus
prepare the way for a farther advance. The construction of cover
during an attack, however, will entail delay and a temporary loss of
fire effect _and should therefore be resorted to only when absolutely
necessary..._. As soon as possible the advance should be resumed, &c."
The German regulations are as follows (_Infantry Training_, 1906, §
313): "In the offensive the entrenching tool may be used where it is
desired, for the moment, to content one's self with maintaining the
ground gained.... The entrenching tool is only to be used with the
greatest circumspection, because of the great difficulty of getting an
extended line to go forward under fire when it has expended much
effort in digging cover for itself. The construction of trenches must
never paralyze the desire for the irresistible advance, _and above all
must not kill the spirit of the offensive_."

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

The organization of infantry varies rather more than that of other
arms in different countries. Taking the British system first, the
battalion (and not as elsewhere the regiment of two, three or more
battalions) is the administrative and manoeuvre unit. It is about 1000
strong, and is commanded by a lieutenant-colonel, who has a major and
an adjutant (captain or lieutenant) to assist him, and an officer of
lieutenant's or captain's rank (almost invariably promoted from the
ranks), styled the quartermaster, to deal with supplies, clothing, &c.
There are eight companies of a nominal strength of about 120 each.
These are commanded by captains (or by junior majors), and each
captain has or should have two lieutenants or second lieutenants to
assist him. Machine guns are in Great Britain distributed to the
battalions and not massed in permanent batteries. In addition there
are various regimental details, such as orderly-room staff, cooks,
cyclists, signallers, band and ambulance men. The company is divided
into four sections of thirty men each and commanded by sergeants. A
half-company of two sections is under the control of a subaltern
officer. A minor subdivision of the section into two "squads" is made
unless the numbers are insufficient to warrant it. In administrative
duties the captain's principal assistant is the colour-sergeant or
pay-sergeant, who is not assigned to a section command. The
lieutenant-colonel, the senior major and the adjutant are mounted. The
commanding officer is assisted by a battalion staff, at the head of
which is the adjutant. The sergeant-major holds a "warrant" from the
secretary of state for war, as does the bandmaster. Other members of
the battalion staff are non-commissioned officers, appointed by the
commanding officer. The most important of these is the
quartermaster-sergeant, who is the assistant of the quartermaster. The
two colours ("king's" and "regimental") are in Great Britain carried
by subalterns and escorted by colour-sergeants (see COLOURS).

The "tactical" unit of infantry is now the _company_, which varies
very greatly in strength in the different armies. Elsewhere the
company of 250 rifles is almost universal, but in Great Britain the
company has about 110 men in the ranks, forming four sections. These
sections, each of about 28 rifles, are the normal "fire-units," that
is to say, the unit which delivers its fire at the orders of and with
the elevation and direction given by its commander. This, it will be
observed, gives little actual executive work for the junior officers.
But a more serious objection than this (which is modified in practice
by arrangement and circumstances) is the fact that a small unit is
more affected by detachments than a large one. In the home battalions
of the Regular Army such detachments are very large, what with finding
drafts for the foreign service battalions and for instructional
courses, while in the Territorial Force, where it is so rarely
possible to assemble all the men at once, the company as organized is
often too small to drill as such. On the other hand, the full
war-strength company is an admirable unit for control and manoeuvre in
the field, owing to its rapidity of movement, handiness in using
accidents of ground and cover, and susceptibility to the word of
command of one man. But as soon as its strength falls below about 80
the advantages cease to counterbalance the defects. The sections
become too small as fire-units to effect really useful results, and
the battalion commander has to coordinate and to direct 8
comparatively ineffective units instead of 4 powerful ones. The
British regular army, therefore, has since the South African War,
adopted the _double company_ as the unit of training. This gives at
all times a substantial unit for fire and manoeuvre training, but the
disadvantage of having a good many officers only half employed is
accentuated. As to the tactical value of the large or double company,
opinions differ. Some hold that as the small company is a survival
from the days when the battalion was the tactical unit and the company
was the unit of volley-fire, it is unsuited to the modern exigencies
that have broken up the old rigid line into several independent and
co-operating fractions. Others reply that the strong continental
company of 250 rifles came into existence in Prussia in the years
after Waterloo, not from tactical reasons, but because the state was
too poor to maintain a large establishment of officers, and that in
1870, at any rate, there were many instances of its tactical
unwieldiness. The point that is common to both organizations is the
fact that there is theoretically one subaltern to every 50 or 60
rifles, and this reveals an essential difference between the British
and the Continental systems, irrespective of the sizes or groupings of
companies. The French or German subaltern effectively commands his 50
men as a unit, whereas the British subaltern supervises two groups of
25 to 30 men under responsible non-commissioned officers. That is to
say, a British sergeant may find himself in such a position that he
has to be as expert in controlling and obtaining good results from
collective fire as a German lieutenant. For reasons mentioned in ARMY,
§ 40, non-commissioned officers, of the type called by Kipling the
"backbone of the army," are almost unobtainable with the universal
service system, and the lowest unit that possesses any independence is
the lowest unit commanded by an officer. But apart from the rank of
the fire-unit commander, it is questionable whether the section, as
understood in England, is not too small a fire-unit, for European
warfare at any rate. The regulations of the various European armies,
framed for these conditions, practically agree that the fire-unit
should be commanded by an officer and should be large enough to ensure
good results from collective fire. The number of rifles meeting this
second condition is 50 to 80 and their organization a "section"
(corresponding to the British half-company) under a subaltern officer.
The British army has, of course, to be organized and trained for an
infinitely wider range of activity, and no one would suggest the
abolition of the small section as a fire-unit. But in a great European
battle it would be almost certainly better to group the two sections
into a real unit for fire effect. (For questions of infantry fire
tactics see RIFLE: § _Musketry_.)

On the continent of Europe the "regiment," which is a unit, acting in
peace and war as such, consists normally of three battalions, and each
battalion of four companies or 1000 rifles. The company of 250 rifles
is commanded by a captain, who is mounted. In France the company has
four sections, commanded in war by the three subalterns and the
"adjudant" (company sergeant-major); the sections are further grouped
in pairs to constitute _pelotons_ (platoons) or half-companies under
the senior of the two section leaders. In peace there are two
subalterns only, and the _peloton_ is the normal junior officer's
command. The battalion is commanded by a major (_commandant_ or
strictly _chef de bataillon_), the regiment (three or four battalions)
by a colonel with a lieutenant-colonel as second. An organization of
3-battalion regiments and 3-company battalions was proposed in 1910.

In Germany, where what we have called the continental company
originated, the regiment is of three battalions under majors, and the
battalion of four companies commanded by captains. The company is
divided into three _Züge_ (sections), each under a subaltern, who has
as his second a sergeant-major, a "vice-sergeant-major" or a
"sword-knot ensign" (aspirant officer). In war there is one additional
officer for company. The _Zug_ at war-strength has therefore about 80
rifles in the ranks, as compared with the French "section" of 50, and
the British section of 30.

The system prevailing in the United States since the reorganization of
1901 is somewhat remarkable. The regiment, which is a tactical as well
as an administrative unit, consists of three battalions. Each
battalion has four companies of (at war-strength) 3 officers and 150
rifles each. The regiment in war therefore consists of about 1800
rifles in three small and handy battalions of 600 each. The
circumstances in which this army serves, and in particular the
maintenance of small frontier posts, have always imposed upon
subalterns the responsibilities of small independent commands, and it
is fair to assume that the 75 rifles at a subaltern's disposal are
regarded as a tactical unit.

In sum, then, the infantry battalion is in almost every country about
1000 rifles strong in four companies. In the United States it is 600
strong in four companies, and in Great Britain it is 1000 strong in
eight. The captain's command is usually 200 to 250 men, in the United
States 150, and in Great Britain 120. The lieutenant or second
lieutenant commands in Germany 80 rifles, in France 50, in the United
States 75, as a unit of fire and manoeuvre. In Great Britain he
commands, with relatively restricted powers, 60.

A short account of the infantry equipments--knapsack or valise, belt,
haversack, &c.--in use in various countries will be found in UNIFORMS,
NAVAL AND MILITARY. The armament of infantry is, in all countries, the
magazine rifle (see RIFLE) and bayonet (q.v.), for officers and for
certain under-officers sword (q.v.) and pistol (q.v.). Ammunition
(q.v.) in the British service is carried (a) by the individual
soldier, (b) by the reserves (mules and carts) in regimental charge,
some of which in action are assembled from the battalions of a brigade
to form a brigade reserve, and (c) by the ammunition columns.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.--The following works are selected to show (1) the
historical development of the arm, and (2) the different "doctrines"
of to-day as to its training and functions:--Ardant du Picq, _Études
sur le combat_; C. W. C. Oman, _The Art of War: Middle Ages_; Biottot,
_Les Grands Inspirés--Jeanne d'Arc_; Hardy de Périni, _Batailles
françaises_; C. H. Firth, _Cromwell's Army_; German official history
of Frederick the Great's wars, especially _Erster Schlesische Krieg_,
vol. i.; Susane, _Histoire de l'infanterie française_; French General
Staff, _La Tactique au XVIII^me--l'infanterie_ and _La Tactique et la
discipline dans les armées de la Révolution--Général Schauenbourg_; J.
W. Fortescue, _History of the British Army_; Moorsom, _History of the
52nd Regiment_; de Grandmaison, _Dressage de l'infanterie_ (Paris,
1908); works of W. v. Scherff; F. N. Maude, _Evolution of Infantry
Tactics and Attack and Defence_; [Meckel] _Ein Sommernachtstraum_
(Eng. trans, in _United Service Magazine_, 1890); J. Meckel, _Taktik_;
Malachowski, _Scharfe- und Revuetaktik_; H. Langlois, _Enseignements
de deux guerres_; F. Hoenig, _Tactics of the Future_ and _Twenty-four
Hours of Moltke's Strategy_ (Eng. trans.); works of A. von
Boguslowski; _British Officers' Reports on the Russo-Japanese War_; H.
W. L. Hime, _Stray Military Papers_; Grange, "Les Réalités du champ de
bataille--Woerth" (_Rev. d'infanterie_, 1908-1909); V. Lindenau, "The
Boer War and Infantry Attack" (_Journal R. United Service
Institution_, 1902-1903); Janin, "Aperçus sur la
tactique--Mandchourie" (_Rev. d'infanterie_, 1909); Soloviev,
"Infantry Combat in the Russo-Jap. War" (Eng. trans. _Journal
R.U.S.I._, 1908); British Official _Field Service Regulations_, part
i. (1909), and _Infantry Training_ (1905); German drill regulations of
1906 (Fr. trans.); French drill regulations of 1904; Japanese
regulations 1907 (Eng. trans.). The most important journals devoted to
the infantry arm are the French official _Revue d'infanterie_ (Paris
and Limoges), and the _Journal of the United Stales Infantry
Association_ (Washington, D. C). (C. F. A.)

FOOTNOTES:

[1] At Bouvines, it is recorded with special emphasis that Guillaume
des Barres, when in the act of felling the emperor, heard the call to
rescue King Philip Augustus and, forfeiting his rich prize, made his
way back to help his own sovereign.

[2] Crossbows indeed were powerful, and also handled by professional
soldiers (e.g. the Genoese at Crécy), but they were slow in action,
six times as slow as the long bow, and the impatient gendarmerie
generally became tired of the delay and crowded out or rode over the
crossbowmen.

[3] As for instance when thirty men-at-arms "cut out" the Captal de
Buch from the midst of his army at Cocherel.

[4] This tendency of the French military temperament reappears at
almost every stage in the history of armies.

[5] The term _landsknecht_, it appears, was not confined to the right
bank of the Rhine. The French "lansquenets" came largely from Alsace,
according to General Hardy de Périni. In the Italian wars Francis I.
had in his service a famous corps called the "black bands" which was
recruited, in the lower Rhine countries.

[6] This practice of "maintenance" on a large scale continued to
exist in France long afterwards. As late as the battle of Lens (1648)
we find figuring in the king of France's army three "regiments of the
House of Condé."

[7] Even as late as 1645 a battalion of infantry in England was
called a "tercio" or "tertia" (see ARMY; _Spanish army_).

[8] In France it is recorded that the _Gardes françaises_, when
warned for duty at the Louvre, used to stroll thither in twos and
threes.

[9] About this time there was introduced, for resisting cavalry, the
well-known hollow battalion square, which, replacing the former
masses of pikes, represented up to the most modern times the
defensive, as the line or column represented the offensive formation
of infantry.

[10] The Prussian Grenadier battalions in the Silesian and Seven
Years' Wars were more and more confined strictly to line-of-battle
duties as the irregular light infantry developed in numbers.

[11] Even when the hostile artillery was still capable of fire these
masses were used, for in no other formation could the heterogeneous
and ill-trained infantry of Napoleon's vassal states (which
constituted half of his army) be brought up at all.

[12] Rifles had, of course, been used by corps of light troops (both
infantry and mounted) for many years. The British Rifle Brigade was
formed in 1800, but even in the Seven Years' War there were
rifle-corps or companies in the armies of Prussia and Austria. These
older rifles could not compare in rapidity or volume of fire with the
ordinary firelock.

[13] The Prussian company was about 250 strong (see below under
"Organization"). This strength was adopted after 1870 by practically
all nations which adopted universal service. The battalion had 4
companies.

[14] The 1902 edition of _Infantry Training_ indeed treated the new
scouts as a thin advanced firing line, but in 1907, at which date
important modifications began to be made in the "doctrine" of the
British Army, the scouts were expressly restricted to the
old-fashioned "skirmishing" duties.

[15] This is no new thing, but belongs, irrespective of armament, to
the "War of masses." The king of Prussia's fighting instructions of
the 10th of August 1813 lay down the principle as clearly as any
modern work.

[16] In the British Service, men whose nerves betray them on the
shooting range are ordered more gymnastics (_Musketry Regulations_,
1910).

[17] In 1870 the "preconceived idea" was practically confined to
strategy, and the tactical improvisations of the Germans themselves
deranged the execution of the plan quite as often as the act of the
enemy. Of late years, therefore, the "preconceived idea" has been
imposed on tactics also in that country. Special care and study is
given to the once despised "early deployments" in cases where a fight
is part of the "idea," and to the difficult problem of breaking off
the action, when it takes a form that is incompatible with the
development of the main scheme.

[18] In February 1910 a new _Infantry Training_ was said to be in
preparation. The _I.T._ of 1905 is in some degree incompatible with
the later and ruling doctrine of the _F.S. Regulations_, and in the
winter of 1909 the Army Council issued a memorandum drawing attention
to the different conceptions of the decisive attack as embodied in
the latter and as revealed in manoeuvre procedure.